The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word diplōma, meaning “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is defined as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is defined as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.

In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.

China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China’s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.

The United States’ current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.

Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, argue that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”

Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. sanctions intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.

For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is deterrence by denial, as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in Thucydides’ Trap, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.

Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia’s posture. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as described by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”

It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.

While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.

Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Western Hemisphere is the de facto core position for undisputed U.S. power, integrity, and uncompromising sovereignty. While the U.S. commitment to Europe remains, European nation-states must step up to the plate and take charge of funding and leadership of their own defense. The segment on “civilisational erasure” is directly aligned with the position already made explicit by Vice President JD Vance in early 2025 at the Paris artificial intelligence conference in France and the Munich Security Conference in Germany.

One of the most meaningful merits of the NSS is its call to reposition economic security, industrial renaissance, and technological leadership at the heart of the U.S. strategy to deter and prevail in the event of military conflict. The NSS refrains from mentioning “major power competition,” opting instead for an acknowledgement of spheres of influence.  The NSS does not antagonizes China, instead framing it as an economic and technological competitor, rather than an ideological one. Sustaining American reshoring, reindustrialization, industrial base funding, technological edge, manufacturing supply chains, and access to critical materials, is what underwrites how the U.S. deals with China, deterrence postures notwithstanding. A clear focus on economic competition allows the NSS to remain as vague as possible on the potential for military confrontations in the Indo-Pacific.

Economy, Industry, Technology

In the 2025 NSS, the terms “economy/economic” are used 66 times and “industry/industrial” 19 times, including under “industrial base,” “industrial production,” and “industrial supply chains.” As for “technology/technological,” they appear 17 times. The core meaning of a dozen such mentions is captured as follows:

U.S. military power and diplomatic influence rest on a strong, resilient domestic economy. National security depends on rebuilding America’s industrial base, restoring economic self-reliance, and securing critical supply chains. Economic and technological competitiveness over the long term is essential to preventing conflict and sustaining global leadership. Further, the United States will actively protect its workers and firms from unfair economic practices.

American power requires an industrial sector able to meet both civilian and wartime production needs. Reindustrialization is a top national economic priority, aimed at strengthening the middle class and regaining control over production and supply chains. The U.S. will reshore manufacturing, attract investment, and expand domestic capacity, particularly in critical and emerging technologies. Hence a credible military depends on a robust and resilient defense industrial base.

Preserving merit, innovation, and technological leadership is essential to maintaining America’s historic advantages. Strengthening the resilience of the U.S. technology ecosystem, especially in areas such as AI, is a national priority and a foundation of global leadership. Thus, long-term success in technological competition is central to deterrence and conflict prevention.

Economic Security First

The 2025 NSS references industries primarily through a national-security lens, rather than civilian market categorization, including defense (industrial base, munitions production, weapons systems manufacturing, military supply chains), manufacturing (re-shored industrial production, domestic manufacturing capacity, wartime and peacetime production), energy (oil, gas, coal, nuclear) and its infrastructure and exports, strategic supply chains (critical materials, components and parts manufacturing, logistics and production networks), infrastructure, both physical and digital to be built at industrial-scale, and strategic technologies.

The 2025 NSS strategic technologies are artificial intelligence, explicitly cited as a comparative U.S. advantage; other critical and emerging technologies such as dual-use and strategic technologies tied to national power; defense and military technologie integrated with industrial and innovation advantages; intelligence and surveillance technologies such as monitoring supply chains, vulnerabilities, and threats; cyber technology including espionage, theft, and protection of intellectual property; industrial and manufacturing technologies aiming at re-shoring, reindustrialization, and advanced manufacturing; energy technologies directly linked to economic and national security; and sensitive technologies protected via aligned export controls.

The 2025 NSS treats economic power, industrial superiority, and technological edge as inseparable pillars of national security. Technology is framed less as a civilian growth driver and more as a strategic asset, a competitive weapon, and a deterrence multiplier. Civilian industry is subordinated to national resilience, mobilization capacity, and deterrence, reinforcing the 2025 NSS’s broader fusion of economic security, industrial policy, and military strategy. This constitutes an optimal response to the Chinese “civilian-military fusion” and “unrestricted warfare” model.

Space

While a mention of “space” appears only once on page 21 of the NSS, the second Trump administration published on December 18th an Executive Order “Ensuring American Space Superiority“ prioritizing lunar basing and economic development by 2030 with a clear focus on Artemis, cislunar security as a theatre, and space nuclear power on a schedule. To secure U.S. assets and interests from Earth orbit through cislunar space to the Moon, integrating commercial capabilities into the defense complex, reforming acquisition, and modernizing the nation’s military space architecture become paramount. Space traffic management and space situational awareness services are no longer solely provided by the U.S. government for free.

Repositioning the U.S. as an unrivalled economic-industrial-technological leader provides valuable opportunities to the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific and Europe-Middle-East-Africa regions: “The goal is for our partner nations to build up their domestic economies, while an economically stronger and more sophisticated Western Hemisphere becomes an increasingly attractive market for American commerce and investment.” After 35 years of the West divorcing itself from Reality, we now face a technology-savvy tripolar world. The NSS, complemented by the Executive Order on Ensuring American Space Superiority, merely reflects a long overdue readjustment to 21st-century geopolitics. These are fundamentally the space, nuclear, and disruptive industries, focused in ways that achieve techno-strategic power.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Techno-Economic power at the heart of the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

These unmanned and precision attacks targeted strategic locations, ranging from early warning radar sites to critical military installations. They did not provoke the feared nuclear response. Instead, these operations exposed a new threat calculus where persistence, precision, and the power of perception are paramount.

Recent analyses suggest that such drone operations contributed to shifting risk assessments within adversary states, where even a 10 percent to 15 percent error in perception could lead to miscalculation. American nuclear strategists now contend with an urgent need to rethink deterrence as the boundary between conventional and nuclear erodes.

Spectral Shifts: Rethinking Strategic Assumptions

For decades, American nuclear strategy hinged on the assumption that any conventional attack on nuclear command and control assets would inevitably trigger a nuclear counter-response. Data from Cold War–era exercises and subsequent real-world incidents reinforced this mindset among defense planners. Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes on sensitive Russian assets, including radar installations integral to Russia’s early warning systems, force a reconsideration of long-held assumptions.

The Kremlin’s response is notably restrained, treating these incursions as manageable costs rather than triggers for nuclear escalation. This strategic restraint, observed in multiple public and classified communications from Moscow, signals that deterrence may now rely less on the brute force of nuclear capability and more on the sophistication of targeting and intent. The takeaway for modern policymakers is that deterrence must now incorporate a broader array of factors, including technology-driven precision and the adversary’s threshold for escalation.

Phantom Impact: Redefining Strategy Beyond Nuclear Might

The era when the primary measure of strategic impact was synonymous with nuclear firepower is ending. Ukraine’s innovative use of low-cost, high-precision drones demonstrates that small platforms can disrupt traditional security calculations. Recent reports from defense think tanks estimate that the unit cost of drone operations is less than 1 percent of what a conventional fighter aircraft mission might cost, yet their operational impact in terms of intelligence and tactical disruption is comparable in key areas.

These drones infiltrate deep into adversary territory and strike high-value military and economic assets once presumed invulnerable. Such operational dynamics challenge the long-standing monopoly of nuclear-armed states over credible homeland threats. American planners must now recalibrate their threat models to integrate non-nuclear options, recognizing that the future of strategic impact is both more economical and more technologically complex than ever before.

Haunted Homelands: The Crumbling Illusion of Sanctuary

During the Cold War, vast distances, natural barriers, and the geographic isolation provided by oceans created the comforting illusion that major powers could enjoy an impenetrable sanctuary. Today, that illusion is crumbling. Ukraine’s drone operations are a vivid demonstration that even regions thought to be well-protected can be penetrated. Attacks targeting Russia’s early warning networks, critical oil infrastructure, and military bases reveal that no area can rest on its laurels.

American infrastructure, ranging from energy grids to communication systems and early warning radars, face elevated risks in an age of highly agile autonomous systems. Consider that the global market for unmanned aerial vehicles is projected to reach nearly $50 billion by 2030. Considering this, there is an immediate imperative to overhaul homeland defense strategies. Rapid response protocols, increased situational awareness, and investment in counter-drone technologies are no longer optional. They are emerging as essential components of modern deterrence.

Phantom Signals: How Optics and Intent Drive Escalation

One of the most remarkable aspects of Ukraine’s campaign is its ability to secure tactical advantages without spiraling into uncontrolled escalation. The success of these drone strikes lies in their careful timing, precision, and measured execution. Ukrainian forces consistently space out operations and meticulously choose targets that convey national resolve without risking mass casualties. This dual messaging, delivering a tangible operational effect while sending a clear political signal, underscores a critical evolution in deterrence thinking.

Today, the optics and perceived intent behind an action can be as decisive as the physical impact. One analysis points out that misinterpretations of strategic intent now pose as much risk of inadvertent escalation as traditional force-on-force scenarios. For the United States, this means that developing clear, well-articulated signaling frameworks is crucial. Such frameworks must enable policymakers and military leaders to assert credible force while avoiding actions that might be misread as provocative by adversaries. In a world where every action is scrutinized and the margins for error are thinning, clarity in communication becomes a cornerstone of modern deterrence.

Ghosts in the Arsenal: Integrating Drones into Deterrence

Drones are transcending their traditional role on the battlefield and are emerging as indispensable strategic assets. Modern unmanned systems serve multiple roles, from surveillance and intelligence gathering to direct precision strikes against key targets. Their integration is revolutionizing how military operations are conducted without risking human life. Moreover, these systems have the added benefit of being less politically charged than manned strike platforms. However, their growing prominence also introduces the potential for miscalculation.

With investments in drone technology doubling over the past decade in many leading militaries, the United States must swiftly incorporate these assets into its overarching deterrence framework. This requires the formulation of robust policies that define the operational limits and acceptable contexts for drone employment, comprehensive training programs for commanders in escalation management, and public messaging that reinforces strategic resolve without escalating tensions. The rapid pace of technological adoption means that the window for effective integration is short, and strategic agility is paramount.

Phantoms of the Future: Recasting Deterrence in the Drone Age

Retaining U.S. strategic credibility in the coming decades will demand an evolution beyond a deterrence model solely anchored in nuclear might. Although nuclear forces remain critical, they are no longer the exclusive instruments that shape adversary behavior in today’s multidomain conflicts. The future of deterrence depends on a seamless strategy where nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities are coherently integrated. This entails developing a comprehensive national doctrine for drone utilization that explicitly defines clear thresholds for action, acceptable target sets, and robust escalation-management protocols. In parallel, efforts must focus on modernizing homeland defenses to counter the threat of long-range, autonomous drone attacks, especially in sectors such as space-based assets, energy, and telecommunications. Data from defense budget analyses show that if every NATO member met the 2 percent gross domestic product defense spending target, the alliance’s budget would increase by over $100 billion annually. Such investments, along with analogous U.S. initiatives to enhance technological resilience, are crucial if deterrence is to remain credible and effective in this new operational environment.

Final Haunting: Embracing the Ghostly Evolution of Deterrence

“Ghosts in the Skies” is not just a metaphor; it encapsulates the profound transformation underway in modern deterrence. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone technology is forcefully redefining the conventional wisdom that has long informed global security policy. This paradigm shift challenges entrenched assumptions and demands a rapid evolution of U.S. military strategy. In an era of hybrid threats and rapid technological change, our global security environment is more complex and interdependent than ever before. The future of deterrence will rely on the capacity to adapt swiftly, integrate non-linear threat responses, and build flexible defense systems that are as agile as the adversaries they are designed to deter. The message for policymakers is clear: embrace this ghostly evolution now, for in the emerging multidomain battlefield every misstep carries the risk of destabilizing not only regional security but also global order.

The transformation in deterrence prompted by Ukraine’s drone operations is a stark reminder that innovation in warfare can render old paradigms obsolete. As nations invest in cost-effective, high-precision autonomous systems, the calculus of deterrence will continue to shift, compelling the United States and its allies to rethink both doctrine and defense spending. In this new era, where even the faintest ghost can upend strategic balance, the ability to adapt and respond with agility will be the true measure of national security.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is no diplomatic disagreement, it’s a brewing storm cloaked in trade deals and technology theft. Viewed through the unforgiving lens of a new Cold War, their discussion exposes the economic fault lines, ballooning trade deficits, strategic supply chain vulnerabilities, and the silent hemorrhaging of American innovation through intellectual property theft. As they unearth Cold War-era playbooks and contrast them with China’s modern hybrid strategies, a chilling pattern emerges: the past isn’t repeating, it’s evolving.

They delve to the heart of deterrence, revealing a precarious global balance that demands more than policy; it demands resolve. If America misreads the moment, it may sleepwalk into strategic irrelevance.

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Navigating the US-China Relationship: Myths and Realities was originally published on Global Security Review.

“Not Today Satan” is a song (questionable by my earlier generation) by KB and Andy Mineo, drawing on the roots of one’s faith and the daily battle of one’s temptations (my words, not theirs). But breaking down the lyrics can teach us a ton about the world of deterrence.

Deterrence, in general, draws back to the earliest battles recorded in history. Being able to create an opposing force without ever lifting a sword is often how I think of deterrence. Having a force that is willing, alongside a proven capability, is a powerful pair, and one that makes up today’s most reliable deterrent—the American nuclear triad. But the triad’s effectiveness goes beyond what I know it can do. Others must know and understand its value as well. This is where KB steps in with some relevant lyrics:

Yeah, I live my life on the regular
But his attacks are perpetual
Forbidden fruit seem so edible
You try to resist like ellipticals.

An understanding of our world is an interest of mine. As I walk through KB’s lyrics, I cannot help but see the parallel he paints for his listener. We are all regular people under consistent attack. Though carefully crafted, this “attack” does not appear as an attack. The subtle convincing, or slight shifts in one’s core belief about a topic is altered with ease, slowly manipulating a person’s core understanding, while creating a heavy load of resistance against what and how one might think, slowly shifting what we believe.

As a nation, better yet, a human race, we must understand the truth behind nuclear deterrence. What lives on our social feeds and livestream networks will not highlight these truths. Much of what is pushed today is developed using your search data, often repurposed with a subtle undertone and agenda, luring you in to want more; making the information you absorb feel like, in the words of KB, “forbidden fruit” appearing “so edible.” Unfortunately, this information can be misleading, luring the reader to believe a message that is untrue.

The genesis of deterrence is found in some of the greatest writings of military strategists such as Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. How nations prepare and think about war began on the rumination of the words muttered by these men and their predecessors. Beyond the expert understanding required by men and women who wear the uniform, the people that deterrence serves must also understand how it works and why it exists.

Today’s nuclear deterrence is not mere jargon. In fact, it is the opposite. Just as KB and other lyricists carefully craft the words in a song, senior leaders, strategists, and policy developers carefully craft deterrence strategy and deliver capability that, like a good song, speaks to the emotions of the intended audience.

For American deterrence, it is not merely the ability to tug at the heart strings of the listener that is its power, unlike a song. Instead, it is the new B-21 raider, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, and the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that make it effective.

These three legs of the nuclear triad work together to make deterrence effective, just as the combination of KB’s lyrics, instrumentation, and beat work together to make a song great.  With impeccable timing, these assets deliver the desired effects. Just as a musician must deliver a performance for an audience to experience the desired emotions, sailors and airmen must perform as expected to make these systems effective in conveying their message to the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians.

Keeping with the music analogy, effective deterrence requires the American military to offer a daily performance similar to Queen’s performance at Live Aid in 1985—often considered the greatest performance of all time. As a country, the United States seeks to protect an international order where democracy and personal freedoms thrive and allow artists like KB to create the kind of music that moves listeners.

In doing so, the United States must understand how to deter those who seek to challenge that order. If Americans do not want to see “Satan today,” as KB’s lyrics say, we better understand what it means to keep the adversary away. It is not moving lyrics or a great performance that will accomplish this goal, but a ready nuclear arsenal and the willingness to employ its weapons that keeps the peace.

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Ben Burdette was a missileer in the United States Air Force. He is the founder of Networth and an executive coach. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.  

Not Today: A Nuclear Deterrence Analogy was originally published on Global Security Review.

I was taken aback by his comment. It also convinced me of the role Air & Space Power Journal played, albeit small, in deterring the Chinese from choosing conflict with the United States. In the decade since that encounter, Air & Space Power Journal—Mandarin, which published Mandarin language (often translated from English) articles written specifically for a Chinese audience, ceased publication. Arabic and French editions are also no longer published. Air University Press, which publishes books by military and civilian authors and the Air Force’s professional journals, also lost several of its staff positions.

If Air Education and Training Command’s proposed 2025 budget remains unchanged, Air University Press’s operating budget will shrink to a point that operations will become virtually untenable. The circumstances are similar for National Defense University Press, which publishes Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), and a number of books and research monographs on topics related to joint operations. Naval War College Press, Army War College Press, Marine Corps University Press and Joint Special Operations University Press also saw their budgets decline over the past decade. It is only Army University Press at Fort Leavenworth that still seems to maintain significant support—despite being smaller than at past points in time.

The decision to further reduce military press budgets in fiscal year 2025 to the point that even operating is a challenge, is short sighted in the extreme. For example, the 2025 NDU Press budget, proposed as an unfunded requirement (UFR), is 54 percent less than the 2012 budget. NDU eliminated funding for NDU Press, including Prism and JFQ, as of FY21. Temporary funds were identified, but those will likely expire in 2025. Without the UFR, NDU Press, now down to a staff of 5, will cease production of JFQ for the first time in 32 years.

Military presses play a vital role in the life of the services and the joint community. They are unique tools that allow each service to discuss and debate tactical, operational, and strategic issues internally and share and debate the perspectives of service members with the academic community, other services, allies, and partners, and, as our experiences illustrates, America’s adversaries.

For less than 0.000025 percent of the defense budget (roughly $20-25 million), the services can fully fund all seven presses. Such a sum does not even constitute noticeable waste in the federal government. Service presses play an important role that goes well beyond the few points offered above. Let us explain.

The Service Press

Just over 40 years ago, noted civil-military scholar Sam Sarkesian observed, “All militaries must be socialized into reinforcing their commitment to the political system and in their understanding of the political-social dimensions of their role as soldiers. How well this is accomplished is primarily a function of military professionalism.” The US military, as a group of individuals with specialized knowledge, “are granted autonomy contingent on maintaining the trust of the society they serve,” and in which members become experts on this knowledge and “share a commitment to common values and ethical principles.”

Debate and discussion about these issues often take place in the pages of service journals. For example, in the Spring 2024 issue of the US Air Force’s, Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower, three Air Force officers discuss the challenge of “moral injury” as a result of waging war. Service presses also frequently publish articles or books on professional ethics, leadership, and related topics. They serve as a vital outlet for members of the military and civil service to identify and discuss the very challenges that undermine the character of a free nation’s military.

The importance of thinking about larger ideas and crafting thoughtful arguments is nothing new. In an October 1946 speech to the US Air Force’s Air University, Army Air Forces Major General F. L. Anderson noted, “It is not enough for airmen to be technicians. They must be versed in human affairs; they must understand the political, social, and economic aspects of international relations. They must be educated to the standard required by the history-changing role of Air Power.” Service presses serve as leading indicators of the intellectual health of the military as they affirm, explore, and expand the “specialized knowledge” of the profession as well as the all-volunteer force’s shared “commitment” to broader societal values and principles.

By providing a platform for Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians to discuss and debate the profession of arms in a rigorous manner—a platform that includes inputs from the public at large including taxpayers, Allies, partners, diplomats, and civilian researchers—largely unavailable anywhere else, servicemembers are compelled to think deeply about war and its consequences. Consider the persistent debate over the role of retired senior military officers in US foreign policy in the pages of Parameters first in 2006 and revived again in 2020, or the Gian Gentile-John Nagl debate over Afghanistan in pages of JFQ. These professional academic fora provide an opportunity for military professionals and civilian contributors to challenge the existing orthodoxy and offer new and better approaches for achieving American interests through military means. Publications of publicly funded professional military presses are often a place for self-examination and criticism of the system. As discussed below, they are the one place where authors are free to challenge the institution they serve.

These long-standing institutions are places where the military’s best and brightest can engage with and participate in the intellectual development of the military profession and its members. In fact, key service doctrinal innovations were developed and honed in military publications—consider Air Force Colonel John A. Warden’s Five Rings, Army General Don Starry’s AirLand Battle, and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop. Finally, professional military presses serve as a critical repository and history of the military’s intellectual development, providing Americans a window into the proclivities, trends, and concerns of a subordinate military, which, while representing a fraction of the population that the Constitution makes subordinate to civilian authority. Sadly, in an era focused on technological solutions to all military challenges, service presses and their role in encouraging innovative thought within the military is seen as expendable.

Scholarly For a Reason

Except for National Defense University Press and Joint Special Operations University Press, which work for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Special Operations Command, respectively, military presses are subordinate to each services’ education and training command and aligned under their professional military education institutions. These schools are civilian-accredited masters- and, in some cases, doctoral-degree granting institutions. These presses adhere strictly to civilian academic publishing standards but vary in one important way. They provide an unmatched level of support to the many military officers who seek to publish an article, book, or monograph related to their profession. Military press editors spend far more time helping their writers craft quality articles than traditional academic presses. After all, military presses serve the profession of arms, along with university academics who write for a living.

The founding of military presses and their publications date back seven decades or more. Importantly, they offer military members a place to publish that maintains a strong tradition of discourse and academic freedom. In the inaugural issue of Air University Quarterly Review in March 1947, the editorial board noted the now-familiar disclaimer that accompanies all publications of military presses, that the content therein represents authors’ opinions and may not “coincide with” that of the military service or department.

The 1947 opening statement said, “The Editor and Editorial Board wish to encourage new thinking. Consequently, if the appearance here of articles which may not agree with accepted policy, or even with majority opinion, will stimulate discussion and provoke controversy, an important part of this journal’s mission will have been accomplished: to induce airmen to have original thoughts on these matters and to give these thoughts expression.” In the immediate post-World War II era, leaders of the Army Air Forces knew how important it was to encourage airmen to think, write, and develop ideas that challenge the status quo.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, established Joint Forces Quarterly in 1993, soon after the Gulf War, admonishing readers not to “read the pages that follow if you are looking for the establishment point of view or the conventional wisdom. Pick up JFQ for controversy, debate, new ideas, and fresh insights—for the cool yet lively interplay among some of the finest minds committed to the professional of arms.”

Military presses are not part of a service’s public affairs office, nor should they be. Understandably, contributions to military presses must be cleared to ensure no classified information is released and that a service’s doctrine is not misrepresented. However, well-reasoned dissent and criticism are not only acceptable but highly desired. In fact, in many cases, that is the purview of a military press—loyal opposition. Starving military presses of funding or killing them outright shuts down the very discussion they were designed to facilitate.

Contributions to military presses are necessarily wide-ranging and include everything from the fine details of drone technology to satellite operations, international political economy, deterrence, and discussions of social issues affecting the military. Again, the military not only must execute America’s political will with lethal force but must continually replenish its all-volunteer ranks through enticing individuals and families to serve.

Society-Wide Intellectual Engagement

Military presses engage in a dialogue that is both internal to each service, where iron sharpens iron, and external, where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians attempt to shape perspectives nationally and abroad. The relatively few academic journals that cover “security studies” broadly speaking, rarely publish the type of scholarly yet professionally focused articles and books that are the purview of service presses. This means that without them, the debate ceases to occur.

Western militaries are bureaucratic and technocratic in nature and rigorously examine failures. Coming from open societies, they often freely discuss their challenges to find the best solutions. Cutting off that discussion by killing the venues where those discussions take place will inevitably lead to suboptimal outcomes. The civilian and military contributors to service press publications, together with readers, create a larger intellectual common where dialogue that is critical to stewarding the effective execution of politics by other means takes place.

The common created by this dialogue has significant worldwide reach and impact. For example, Air University Press’s four journals have an annual audience of well over one million readers globally. National Defense University’s Joint Force Quarterly had close to one million readers worldwide in 2023. The other military presses have similar annual readerships. Ally and partner militaries read American military publications and often adopt similar thinking and approaches. Adversary militaries read American military publications and are impressed by the level of creativity, intelligence, and thoughtfulness of the United States’ military establishment.

Historical Record

Finally, military presses are an unrivaled record of military thought and the change in thinking that follows the nation’s many conflicts. Military Review is a case in point. It was first published in 1922 as a response to American involvement in World War I. In the century since the journal began, Military Review has played a vital role in the various reform movements that changed the Army after major conflicts like Vietnam, for example.

The flagship journal of the Air Force, currently represented by the journals Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower and Air & Space Operations Review, turned 77 in March 2024 and predate the establishment of the US Air Force. Airpower’s evolution and debates surrounding topics like the Air Force role in countering a rising China and nuclear modernization are found in their pages.

Naval War College Review was founded in 1948 and serves as the central venue for the discussion of seapower. The journal’s archives are the central repository for discussion and debate concerning seapower’s role during the Cold War, for example.

Parameters: A Journal of Strategic Landpower published its first issue in 1971 and was largely a response to the US Army’s performance in Vietnam. Many of the post-Vietnam reforms undertaken by the Army were first discussed in its pages.

Further, these publications are peppered with the articles of field grade officers who later became general and flag officers—a sign of the importance the military places on the intellectual development of its future leaders. Just to name a few, then-Major David H. Petraeus, then-Major Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., then-Captain James Stavridis, and then-Lieutenant Colonel B. Chance Saltzman all wrote in their respective professional journals. Leading civilian scholars of the military also contribute to service professional journals. Barbara Tuchman, Richard Betts, John Mearshimer, Robert Pape, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, Tammi Biddle, Williamson Murray, Matthew Kroenig, and Hal Brands all contributed to the various professional publications of the military presses.

Whether Civilian or Military Outlet

Some ask why civilian-operated military-focused outlets cannot do the job of a military press. Indeed, fine civilian and association journals, such as Air & Space Forces Magazine, Texas National Security Review, Global Security Review, Marine Corps Gazette, Proceedings, Armed Forces & Society, RUSI Journal, and War on the Rocks are actively engaged in the various and important debates that arise from the military profession. However, service presses do not report to a board of directors, individual donors, or other private entities. They are publicly funded, open access, and are often staffed and led by active-duty, retired, or former servicemember with deep service-specific knowledge. This approach to publishing allows service presses to publish on topics that are important to their service, but not necessarily commercially viable.

The End of Service Presses?

For senior service leaders looking to pinch every last penny to fund new weapons or additional operations, this makes a support entity like a press an attractive target. This is a short-sighted effort to save very little money. In the case of the Air Force, eliminating Air University Press will save about $1 million in operations costs and $2 million in staff salaries and benefits. This, in an Air Force Budget of about $217 billion.

The services and the Department of Defense should reconsider the regular cuts to military press budgets. Rather than severely underfunding or effectively defunding their presses, the services and the Department of Defense should fund them to a level that allows each to perform the functions discussed above.

Service leaders must be fully cognizant of the role their presses play and the audience they serve. While most fall under the organization of each service’s military university or war college, service presses draw contributors and readers from across the service and beyond. Over 99 percent of the more than 1 million readers that learn from the Air Force’s professional journals are not students at Air University, for example.

It is also time to put to rest the incorrect belief that military presses exist solely to serve students at the various command and staff and war colleges. They do not. Instead, they belong to their respective services and provide information and research for audiences—military and civilian—at home and abroad. As such, it is perhaps time for service secretaries and chiefs of staff to take a role in ensuring that their presses continue to serve as the place where the service expresses its intellectual history, innovation, and thought.

Regardless of whether the United States wins or loses its wars, military presses and the professional books, monographs, and journals they publish will serve as the place where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and members of the broader society think, discuss, and debate the profession of arms. The demise of service presses is not in the interest of any service, but it seems it will take a senior leader or Congress to step in and stop this from happening.

Dr. Laura Thurston-Goodroe is the editor of Æther and Air & Space Operations Review. Dr. Adam Lowther is the Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are their own.

Why Military Presses Matter was originally published on Global Security Review.

U.S. nuclear forces, operated by the Air Force and Navy, have entered a years-long period that will see the modernization of warheads, bombs, and delivery systems. Many of these land-, air-, and sea-based systems, which constitute the so-called nuclear triad, entered service during the Cold War and will reach the end of their life cycles in the coming decades.

The ballistic missiles, submarines, bombers, fighters, and air-launched cruise missiles in operation today will be gradually phased out for newer systems. The United States will also develop new nuclear warheads and upgrade facilities that produce and maintain nuclear weapons. However, while some modernization efforts are already underway, debate persists in Washington over their direction and extent, especially given the massive investments they will require. The Congressional Budget Office estimates [PDF] that maintaining and modernizing U.S. nuclear forces will cost $400 billion between 2017 and 2026.

How did the nuclear triad emerge?

The triad emerged and evolved, more by accident than design, over the four decades of the Cold War as the United States and the Soviet Union responded to each other’s advances. “No one set out to create the triad,” says Stephen Schwartz, editor and co-author of Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. “It arose out of interservice rivalry, pork barrel congressional politics, competition between defense contractors, fear of the Soviet Union, and highly redundant nuclear targeting.”

What are the legs of the U.S. nuclear triad?

Ground. The ground-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, managed by the U.S. Air Force, is the largest of the three regarding the number of delivery platforms. It comprises four hundred Minuteman III intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which were first deployed in 1970. ICBMs are missiles capable of striking targets more than 5,500 kilometers away. Each Minuteman III can deliver one warhead, though the missile originally designed to carry three to multiple targets. The United States keeps ICBMs on nearly constant alert. They are in underground silos spread out across thousands of acres of farmland in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming.

Sea. The sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, by far the largest in terms of total deployed warheads, comprises more than two hundred Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which can be launched from fourteen Ohio-class nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) based in Washington State, on the west coast, and Georgia, on the east coast. Twelve of the fourteen SSBNs are at sea at all times, with five each in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans always on “hard alert” in designated patrol areas, ready to launch their missiles within minutes of receiving an order from the president. Each Trident II SLBM can deliver four to five independently targetable nuclear warheads, although the missile is capable of carrying up to eight warheads.

Air. The air-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad comprises two types of heavy bombers, which are based in Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota: forty-four B-52H Stratofortresses and sixteen stealth B-2A Spirits. The B-52H, which has been modified extensively over its fifty years of service, carries nuclear-tipped, air-launched cruise missiles. The B-2A, which became operational in 1997, can be armed with three different nuclear bombs. The Air Force used another aircraft, the B-1B Lancer, for nuclear missions until 1997, but has since modified it to carry only conventional weapons.

What other nuclear weapons does the U.S. have?

The United States also has approximately five hundred nuclear bombs adapted for tactical use with various fighter aircraft. About 150 of these are located at bases in five NATO ally states, but modernization plans may include reducing the total number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons. Though they have no fixed definition [PDF], tactical nuclear weapons are generally distinguished from strategic ones by their shorter delivery ranges, and they are designed for battlefield scenarios in which conventional weapons might otherwise be used. (Tactical nuclear weapons have never been used in battle.)

What modernization is planned for each leg of the triad?

Ground. The planned replacement for the Minuteman III ICBM, known for now as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), is still in the design phase. In the meantime, the Air Force is continuing to upgrade the Minuteman III.

Sea. First deployed in 1981, Ohio-class submarines will be replaced beginning in the early 2030s with Columbia-class submarines, which are expected to operate through the 2080s. Assuming current requirements and cost projections hold, the Navy will likely operate between ten and twelve Columbia-class SSBNs, which will feature sixteen missile launch tubes, four fewer than the Ohio-class SSBNs have. The submarine-launched Trident II is undergoing improvements to extend its service life through the early 2040s. The Navy will likely reduce the number of deployed SLBM warheads as well.

Air. The U.S. Air Force is developing a new stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider, which will be capable of delivering both nuclear and conventional payloads. Meanwhile, the Air Force is expected to upgrade and keep the B-2A Spirit in service through 2058[PDF] and the nuclear-capable B-52H through 2040.

The Air Force has put out contracts to develop a new weapons system, known as the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, which may be capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads and be interoperable across the U.S. nuclear bomber force. It is not expected to be operational until 2030.

What arms control agreements cap the U.S. nuclear arsenal?

Russia is the only other nuclear weapon state with an arsenal comparable to that of the United States. The New START Treaty [PDF] entered into force in February 2011 and limits U.S.- and Russian-deployed warheads to 1,550 and deployed delivery vehicles—individual ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers—to 700. The United States and Russia report their strategic warhead and delivery vehicle counts to each other on a biannual basis.

Why is nuclear modernization debated?

Shortly into his tenure, President Obama declared “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Despite this, most of the ongoing triad modernization began under his administration, and fewer U.S. nuclear weapons were eliminated under him than under any other post–Cold War president. President Donald J. Trump declared shortly after his election in 2017 that he would seek to “greatly strengthen and expand [U.S.] nuclear capability,” and he ordered the Department of Defense to conduct a review of the U.S. nuclear posture, which is expected to be completed by early 2018.

Some aspects of nuclear modernization face political opposition, with critics noting that the triad itself is an artifact of Cold War-era strategic thinking. In 2017, a group of Democratic senators sought to slow development of the LRSO, citing strategic concerns and high costs. Others, including former Defense Secretary William J. Perry, have recommended abolishing the ICBM force, arguing that the other two legs of the triad would be sufficient for deterrence.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russian-propagated disinformation campaigns, psychological manipulation efforts, cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, financial and military aid to paramilitary groups, and the deployment of unmarked special forces by Russia in Crimea and later in Eastern Ukraine exemplifies the concept of contemporary non-linear conflict. Rather than proceeding in strategic, iterative steps, the various elements of the Russian strategy worked in tandem to complement one another.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent incursion into eastern Ukraine was launched on the pretext of protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the region. Russian media outlets and pro-Russian media in Ukraine began broadcasting continuous reports of anti-Russian violent demonstrations in Ukraine and that the security of the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine was in jeopardy.

The manner with which the Kremlin created the “conditions” for intervention is not dissimilar to those utilized by the Bush Administration prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As the public would eventually learn, the administration had misled the congress and military about the possession of WMDs by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. This mistruth was the impetus for over a decade of bloody conflict that the administration was ill-prepared for.

The invasion was accomplished with great efficiency, but the Bush administration had failed to conceive a viable exit strategy. The occupation forces purged the entire bureaucratic state of the previously ruling Ba’ath party.

This purge created post-occupation conditions rife for corruption, disorder, and insurgency as a result of the critical shortage of experienced politicians and bureaucrats. The dismantling of the administrative and political structures that existed prior to the invasion left the country almost entirely bereft of adequate internal security measures.

By contrast, the Crimean annexation was masterfully executed by Russia; in no small part due to the Kremlin’s plan for integrating Crimea with greater-Russia. As the first wave of the “assault” was underway, the Russian legislature (the Duma) passed legislation that would make federal districts out of the territory of Crimea and city of Sevastopol (the location of Russia’s long-held Black Sea naval base).

In addition to their non-traditional “invasion,” the Russian forces made considerable and effective use of information warfare, cyber warfare, local militia, and protestors, combined with unmarked elite special forces units to foment a political coup within the autonomous territory. The new government then passed a seemingly “democratic” referendum in the Crimean parliament to formally request to join the Russian Federation. Coincidentally, the Parliament was surrounded by Russian “little green men;” special forces in unmarked uniforms.

Photo credit: quapan via VisualHunt / CC BY

Russia’s Justification for the Annexation of Crimea was originally published on Global Security Review.