The democratic transition in Sudan was halted in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane conducted a military coup. Ongoing confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces keep the country in perpetual instability. They have also drawn civilians into the bloodshed.

Guinean president Alpha Condé was ousted in a September 2021 coup, and his successors pledged to bring in a civilian government by 2024. This has yet to happen.

Two coups occurred in Mali within a short period of time. The first coup occurred in August 2020, and the second one took place in May 2021. The military government promises to restore civilian control. It has not.

Shortly after Gabon’s President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was re-elected in August 2023, a military coup d’état removed him from power, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election. Ondimba is but one more example of this trend.

Leaders of these coups frequently use security and governance failures as justification for the actions taken. In reality, they tend to worsen stability and undermine democratic processes. The frequent occurrence of military takeovers in such politically unstable countries adds complexity to diplomatic endeavours and presents substantial obstacles to regional development, stability, and security, including the proliferation of insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

However, a notable trend among these nations in recent years is the steady rise of Russian presence and influence. Over the past few months, there were significant events involving Russian armed groups in Africa, which highlighted Moscow’s growing influence and strategic interests in the region. Russian actions have far-reaching consequences for countering Western influence, especially from the European Union and the United States.

Russia is already strengthening its military ties with several African nations, including those that saw political upheaval in recent years. In May, Russia began implementing a military cooperation agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe, which involves joint exercises, education, training, and logistics.

Guinea-Bissau further strengthened connections with Russia, as President Umaro Sissoco Embalo engaged in discussions with Russian officials regarding diverse areas of collaboration. These include military training and oil exploration.

Russia is also working towards establishing a logistics center on the Red Sea in Sudan. This will strengthen its naval capabilities and strategic presence in the region. Sudan has restated its dedication to Russia in building a naval base on the Red Sea. This development is because of the growing military cooperation between Sudan and Russia, showcasing Moscow’s wider aspirations to enhance its military influence in strategic African nations.

According to experts, there is concern that Russian armed groups are taking advantage of migration routes, specifically those that pass through the Sahara. This exploitation could potentially result in a rise in irregular migration towards Europe. Russia may be seeking to create instability in European nations by intensifying the refugee crises, with the intention of impacting elections and weakening support for Ukraine.

Russia is also actively pursuing economic engagements and resource extraction deals in Africa. Russian officials explored cooperation on infrastructure and natural resource projects, particularly in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia also sought to dominate the uranium market by acquiring assets in Burkina Faso and Chad. President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to support local regimes, coups, and insurgencies facilitates these economic engagements, as evidenced by recent developments in West Africa.

Furthermore, Russian paramilitary groups, particularly the Wagner Group, or as it is now known, Africa Corps, remained active in supporting local regimes and insurgencies with activities in different African nations, including Sudan, Burkina Faso, the Sahel, the Central African Republic, and Libya. In Libya, for example, Russian forces protect oil and gas interests, which constrains Western access and increases European dependence on Russian energy.

Regardless of the obvious fact that Russia, along with China, has a strategic interest in controlling Africa’s natural resources, Russia has a clear objective of countering the West’s influence in Africa. The impacts manifest on several fronts.

First, when it comes to strategic military positioning, cementing the presence of its paramilitary forces while also establishing military bases and logistical centers in key African locations enhances Russia’s ability to project power and influence regional dynamics—potentially disrupting Western naval operations and trade routes.

Second, by exploiting African migration routes to Europe, Russia can create social and political instability within the EU countries, thus influencing elections and weakening public support for EU policies, including sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.

Russia’s investments in African natural resources also provide alternative revenue streams and reduce the impact of Western economic sanctions. Control over critical minerals and energy resources increases Russia’s leverage in global markets, including control of gold mines in Sudan and oil exploration endeavours in various African nations. Russia’s expansion of influence through military cooperation has benefited the latter. Strengthening military cooperation with African nations did indeed help Russia build a network of supportive regimes, limiting Western influence in these countries. Furthermore, by forging closer ties with African countries, Russia is proving successful in undermining Western diplomatic efforts in the region, complicating Western economic strategies, and creating votes and positions in international forums that align with Russian interests.

Russia’s specific involvement in Libya is also important to consider. Controlling significant oil and gas resources is the central focus of Russia’s presence there. By maintaining influence over Libyan oil fields, Russia will constrain Western access to these resources and increase European dependency on Russian energy supplies. The increasing presence of its paramilitary Wagner Group, which is influencing and supporting strongly armed factions within Libya and safeguarding Russian interests, cements this control.

This involvement includes securing key infrastructure and providing military support to local allies. Russian involvement in Libya includes smuggling oil and gas, generating revenue, and undermining EU efforts to cut off Russian energy imports.

Another critical aspect is Libya’s role as a transit point for migrants heading to Europe, which allows Russia to influence migration flows and destabilize European nations—exacerbating the refugee crisis. Overall, Libya’s strategic location on the Mediterranean Sea provides Russia with significant geopolitical leverage, allowing it to project a threat into the Mediterranean and challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence.

The actions of Russian paramilitary groups in different African countries, along with their emphasis on safeguarding Russia’s economic interests, are fuelling the rise of terrorism in the region. The growing presence of Russian forces is already exacerbating regional conflicts and heightening local tensions, potentially fuelling the rise of terror groups. This is particularly concerning as organizations with ties to ISIS are gaining momentum in West Africa and the Sahel. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Niger, along with the departure of American forces from Niger, resulted in a significant rise in extremist groups in the region. This is having a detrimental impact on the West’s counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Overall, the situation in some African states is proving increasingly worse. The growing influence of Russia comes at the expense of Western powers, resulting in proxy conflicts and potentially destabilizing the continent even more. This can create environments that are conducive to the growth of terror groups. Russia’s manipulation of migration flows can result in worsening the refugee crisis. Terror groups can take advantage of this to bolster influence, bases, and activities in Africa and beyond. The dangers of worsening local conflicts are becoming more pronounced and the escalating violations of human rights in numerous African countries pose a range of intricate consequences that could potentially affect the stability of African.

In short, Russian action in Africa is bad for its inhabitants and bad for the West. At some point the West must counter Russia’s malicious efforts.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Russia’s Influence in Africa: Understanding the Big Picture was originally published on Global Security Review.

In response, the Trump administration’s 2018 “Africa Strategy” specifically targets Russia as a key geopolitical rival, presenting the United States’ potential African partner countries with an apparent choice between Cold War-style enemies. Again in March, the U.S. pointed to Russia as a threat in Africa, when Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan warned Angola of Russia’s interests in Africa. The U.S. media environment has also fostered an ascendant vision of Russia in Africa, quoting “alarmed” U.S. officials who speak of Russia being “highly active” in the region.

This growing narrative pushes an inflated interpretation of Russia’s real capabilities while ignoring or footnoting the broader context. The relative size, scope, and trajectory of Russia’s gradual increasing economic involvement in Africa indicate an approach fitting with the behavior of other similarly sized economies. Russia’s military footprint and economic connections remain comparably marginal in Africa, while the French, Chinese, and U.S. hold entrenched positions. Meanwhile, Russian military adventurism on the scale of with its involvement in the Syrian Civil War is unlikely in Africa, owing to a Russian population increasingly vocal over domestic issues and opposed to foreign entanglements. 

Russian global military posture skips Africa

The Kremlin’s military priorities are planted firmly in Russia’s elongated peripheral regions of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. Insofar as Russia leaves these spaces, it is usually to counter the United States and allies (who are actively involved in Russia’s neighborhood themselves) with low-level incursions designed for disruption. 

In terms of intentions, the Russians, unlike the Americans, do not fight a Global War on Terror across the Sahara/Sahel, requiring a lily pad strategy of U.S. drone bases for thousands of miles. There is not an internal security dimension to Russian involvement in Africa, precluding similarly scaled military deployment. 

In terms of capabilities, Russia lacks a significant military or political command in Africa. Many African countries do not have a Russian embassy or even a small diplomatic mission, and Russia’s military footprint—outside of small contingencies of mercenaries—remains marginal, with no bases to bivouac within, and no host governments agreeing to allow them space.  Meanwhile, the United States has 5-6,000 soldiers across Africa and around 34 bases. 

While the United States and ally France fulfill air-land-sea campaigns across multi-country theaters, Russia fills niche support roles with countries the United States does not have significant military relationships with—such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and South Sudan. 

It is worth noting that the two most high-profile instances of Russian influence in Africa in recent years were borne out of economic enterprises for Russian businessmen. In 2017, mercenaries—not Russian soldiers—from the Wagner Group outfit began advising Central African Republic (CAR) on how to defend against militias in the country’s seven-year-long civil war.  In 2018, it was reported that Russian individuals arrived as consultants in several African countries to influence their elections, such as South Africa and Madagascar. As with the Wagner Group, it was possibly money that drew in the operatives, rather than clear strategic objectives from Moscow. 

Russo-African Economic Normalization is…Normal

In addition to a smaller military presence, Russia is also a minor economic player in the region. Russia retreated from Africa after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union but reinvested in a sharp increase over the past 20 years. The increases are notable not for their scope but rather their steep return from much lower levels. 

Russian trade with Africa makes up less than 1% of global trade with Africa, which is comparable to economies of its own size, though far behind the United States, China, and especially Europe. 

Foreign wars are increasingly unpopular in Russia, reducing the risk of major interventions beyond Russia’s periphery

Russia will continue attempts to drum up economic integration with Africa to bring life to its weak economy, but military interventions involving long-term ground deployments to active conflicts, especially at the levels seen by the United States and France, are unlikely—owing to the growing unpopularity of foreign wars among Russians. Refocusing inward, Russia is less likely to afford attention to far-reaching foreign entanglement in the future, moving Africa further to the bottom of the Kremlin’s limited agenda. 

Moving forward, and with this context in mind, the Cold War-esque U.S. government and media perspective may incur negative policy implications and misconstruing the United States’ geopolitical rivals’ roles risks miscommunication with current or potential African allies. The United States has the benefit of strong favorability in many Africa states. The U.S. should market itself as a productive partner irrespective of other outsiders, and remind African countries of their agency, rather than force a choice between supposed zero-sum competitors.

Don’t Buy the Hype on Russia in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

The CAR’s population is primarily split between into two regions: most of the country’s minority Muslim population inhabits the Sahel, while the majority Christian community is located mainly in the savanna. The present conflict between both groups erupted in 2012 and continues today. The conflict was ignited when Muslim rebels of the Seleka group seized power from the Christians. In response, Christians formed the anti-Balaka faction. Since 2012, government forces have become involved, leading to a number of severe humanitarian crises that threaten to destabilize the country further.

Nearing the Tipping Point

In 2013, then-Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon stated that the Central African Republic had experienced a “total breakdown of law and order” that threatened both its security and stability and that of its neighbors. While government forces remain in control of the capital of Bangui, armed groups have taken over 70 percent of the country, subjecting civilians to regular attacks. The nature of the conflict has heightened ethnic tensions, as hundreds of localized groups beyond the Seleka and anti-Balaka factions taking control of territory throughout the CAR.

Fighting between the two rival groups and government forces has made life difficult for civilians, who are increasingly fearful of leaving their homes or allowing their children to attend school. The conflict in the CAR is at a tipping point and threatens to push the country into a state of famine. Peacekeeping and mediation efforts have stagnated, making it essential to promote an alternative approach to providing conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance in the CAR. Intervening organizations must engage at the community level to stem the flow of fighters entering the conflict.

Conflict at the Community Level

The violence in the Central African Republic has affected communities large and small. Towns and villages have been destroyed as young men are increasingly attracted by the possibility of income from joining a militia. Political disruption, violence, and a weak economy have perpetuated a lack of adequate medical services, hindered internal migration, and prevented communities from modernizing necessary infrastructure. Disease is nothing new to the CAR, but the conflict has exacerbated the inaccessibility of healthcare leading to increased mortality rates.

As violence spreads, higher numbers of CAR citizens have been forced to flee to refugee camps. As of 2018, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated that almost 550,000 individuals had been internally displaced. The conditions in these refugee camps are less than adequate. In regular communities, access to medical facilities is limited, and transit to and from first aid areas is minimal. However, individuals in refugee camps are faced with “little or no humanitarian assistance,” and are often left to fend for themselves.

The Evolution of Humanitarian Issues in CAR

As of 2018, half of the CAR’s population requires humanitarian aid, more than two million people. The CAR is mostly comprised of rural communities that lack access to medical facilities or basic first aid, the capital of Bangui, for example, has just one major hospital. According to the CIA, many suffer from treatable diseases, such as malaria or malnutrition, due to a weak healthcare system exacerbated by violent conflict. With a poor transit system destroyed by a conflict that makes it difficult for rural residents to travel for medical care, mortality rates remain high. Even if they can make it to a medical facility, those who suffer life-altering injuries resulting from the conflict are often unable to afford medical services and pharmaceuticals.

The ongoing conflict has weakened the country’s economy, leaving 75 percent of the population impoverished. Attacks at a local level have increased, which have primarily come in the form of violent attacks on refugee sites and on educational and healthcare facilities. Growing numbers of internally displaced peoples has made it challenging to provide clean water at refugee camps, and obstacles to trade and farming have inflated the prices of food and other essentials.

Humanitarian aid groups face difficulties in their attempts to assist the affected population. Threatened with violence and robberies, the movement of humanitarian groups within the CAR has been limited. As of September 2018, seven of these groups have withdrawn their services from the nation.

A Solution Starts at the Local Level

To decrease the attractiveness of joining armed groups, there is a need for solutions at the community level to improve economic and living conditions. As shown by the largely ineffective peacekeeping missions in the region, external mediation with the government and militias has been difficult.

A focused and localized approach within the CAR’s communities could have a more lasting effect, providing other outlets for civilians while stemming the flow of new militia recruits. As such, there are five recommendations to engender an improved situation in the country:

1. Expand local peace agreements and non-aggression pacts

Recently, a number of peace agreements and non-aggression pacts at a local level have had a stronger effect on reducing violent conflict within rural communities. These peace deals bring prominent community actors and organizations together, including women’s organizations, religious leaders, and local government authorities, to mediate peace offers between rival groups.

2. Address the conflict’s religious and ethnic characteristics at the source

To prevent the conflict from strengthening at the national level, it is critical to address the issues at the core of the conflict at the local level. That means promoting tolerance in communities and helping local religious leaders and other respected leaders to influence their communities to pursue reconciliation. Since the conflict in CAR is of a religious nature, it is imperative to intervene with education for youth so as not to perpetuate divisions between ethnic and religious groups.

3. Provide alternative employment to young men

Young men in the CAR are the most likely to impede future peace agreements between rival groups. Thus, it necessary to provide alternative outlets for these individuals to prevent them from perpetuating the conflict at the national level. To keep them from joining armed groups, local groups and international mediators will need to create and provide new forms of employment in numerous communities. This is already happening in a number of CAR’s communities, but it is essential to expand these practices across the nation.

Currently, many work projects “involve restoring public goods, including schools, clinics, bridges, roads, as well as churches as mosques,” according to a piece published by Foreign Policy. The benefit of this is not only to make potential militia fighters unavailable while rebuilding the country’s infrastructure but to provide tangible skills and training in community roles that can develop into careers and boost both local and national economies. With the potential for a job, young men are provided with other income options that make joining militias less attractive.

4. Invest in technology and medical facilities in rural areas

Technology will bridge the equality gap between the people of cities and rural communities and will distribute vital information to rural dwellers who have little access to resources on politics and economics.

Rural communities desperately need access to medical facilities, especially with the spread of disease in areas hospitable to insects like tsetse flies and mosquitoes. This requires the creation of new medical facilities and improved transportation and communications infrastructure.

5. Crackdown on the sale of weapons

National and local governments must impose stricter regulations on the transfer of military-grade weaponry throughout the CAR. These weapons often end up in the hands of local rebels, who incite violence in communities, further exacerbating the conflict. To limit these sales, it is essential to shut down the black markets that distribute weapons to rebels.

Looking to the Future

The situation in CAR will take time to resolve. Promoting tolerance at the local level while helping respected leaders to arrange reconciliation, promoting understanding, and helping respected leaders facilitate dialogue between rival groups. While international assistance is necessary, successful mediation will require a broader effort from community actors and CAR citizens to resolve this conflict at the grassroots level.

Local Approach Needed in Central African Republic as Humanitarian Crisis Looms was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether through denying journalists the right to cover a story without security implications, or restricting reporting using scare tactics, there is a deeper meaning behind each time a government cracks down on journalists.

In attacking media outlets, the officials in question confirm that the story in question is worth covering. That is not to say it won’t be dangerous. Russia, in particular, has a long history of politically-motivated murders of journalists.

Perhaps the best-known is Anna Politkovskaya. As a reporter, she covered corruption within Russia and revealed much of the torture and the brutal warfare tactics employed by the Russian government and military in Chechnya. After multiple threats, being jailed, and forced into exile on various occasions, she was assassinated in 2006, in the elevator of her apartment building in central Moscow.

In doing so and without words, the Kremlin revealed its willingness to use forceful tactics in response to its decreasing patience for journalists covering controversial topics such as the Beslan crisis, the Moscow theater hostage situation, the Chechen wars, and the Ryazan apartment bombings.

Journalists will continue to be targeted and assassinated throughout the former Soviet Union.

In July 2018, three Russian journalists were murdered in the Central African Republic while investigating the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary group linked to the Kremlin. The Wagner Group is known to operate throughout the world in countries like Ukraine, Syria, and the Central African Republic.

There is not yet confirmation that their deaths were linked to covering this organization. However, all of the journalists worked for the Investigation Control Center, a Russian news organization financed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Khodorkovsky is a former Russian oil oligarch who was run out of his country by Russian President Putin after being accused of fraud, embezzlement and money laundering. The Wagner Group is known to be associated with Yevgeniy Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, both of whom are Russian oligarchs with close ties to Putin.

Russia isn’t the only post-Soviet state where journalists are under threat.

Thus far in 2018, the deaths of two journalists, Maksim Borodin and Sergei Grachyov, have been confirmed. Although police claim that Borodin died after falling out of a window, his colleagues assert his death was due to his reporting on corruption.

In 2017, there were four journalists reportedly killed after writing critical articles about corruption. Six deaths may not seem extreme. However, all six deaths show that corruption is a dangerous topic to cover.

Although Russia tends to be the immediate enemy in the eyes of the free press, it is by no means the only country with this systemic restriction. Belarus, a former part of the Soviet Union, recently detained at least 18 journalists.

Authorities accused them of unlawfully obtaining information, searching the offices of independent news agencies in Minsk. This kind of action not only shuts down some of the independent reporting available in Belarus but also creates a hostile environment for journalists entering or leaving the country.

What is Motivating the Crackdowns in Russia and Belarus?

As with every action taken by an administration publicly sanctioned or not, there is always a reason behind it. In other words, there is more at play than a simple crackdown on journalists in Russia and Belarus.

These attacks and threats are happening for a reason. In Belarus, a new election looms on the horizon for Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and anti-regime reporting cannot be tolerated.

When examining some of the recent events in Russia, observers note an uptick in unofficial military actions abroad in countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Syria. In order that the Kremlin prevent the discovery of unpleasant truths and avoid embarrassment, these areas cannot be independently covered.

In fact, Putin recently created a patriotic directorate in the military to increase “moral and political unity.” This is reminiscent of political actions taken in the Soviet Union, highlighting the need for Russia’s government to maintain an official line that cannot be challenged.

The security implications can be complex and multifaceted when journalists are targeted.

On one hand, the daily security for journalists and foreigners suspected on hostile action is immediately under threat. For the state itself, the crackdown represents that the state feels its own position is under threat. However, an objective reading of the situation might show that in states like Russia and Belarus, the maintenance of the current power dynamic is imperative.

The cycle of corruption in Russia is controlled by oligarchs, who in turn are given opportunities by President Putin that increase their own wealth. In doing so, Putin reinforces the belief that only with himself as president will this system continue to sustain itself.

Journalists who threaten exposing and destroying this system are seen as a threat. Observers should be mindful to look at more than the detentions and deaths of reporters, but rather look into what it was they could have exposed.

The Escalating Crackdown on Journalists in Russia and Belarus was originally published on Global Security Review.