While the uprisings of the 2011 Arab Spring brought about renewed optimism in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region, it ended in catastrophic failure. Over 180,000 individuals were killed, and over six million were displaced—a solemn reminder to demonstrators and activists today. While the defiance of demonstrators is laudable, lives were lost as the death toll increased to seemingly little avail as negotiations between the military government and opposition in Sudan seemed destined for failure, until talks brokered by the African Union yielded a breakthrough agreement.

The United States dispatched an envoy to facilitate ongoing talks in Sudan, and the African Union suspended the country’s membership. While the situation in Sudan appears to have stabilized to a degree, the unrest in Sudan and Algeria has spread to other North African states, in a reverberating echo of the 2011 Tahrir Square demonstrations in Cairo, Egypt. As economic discontent spreads throughout the Middle East, political unrest is growing. 

In Morocco, a BBC survey has revealed that more than half of respondents in the country seek immediate political change. Whether mass protests will erupt in Morocco is unknown; however, grievances are palpable, signaling a possible rerun of the unrest experienced in the Arab Spring protests. Eight years after the failure of the mass protests of 2011 to affect meaningful reform, lessons must be learned to avoid similar outcomes—or worse.

With the removal of the Mubarak dictatorship, came the election of Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, Mohamed Morsi. Just as Morsi’s election symbolized the dawn of a new era for many, his demise by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup and recent unexpected death was emblematic of democracy’s often brutal fate in the Middle East and North Africa—a statement which does not imply support for the Muslim Brotherhood or deflect from the short-lived hopes for a chaotic presidency, but rather highlights its reverse effect: the emboldening of military dictatorships. Except for Tunisia, many states in the region have seen the implementation of greater autocratic control or have spiraled into anarchy since the Arab Spring. 

The convoluted role of the United States in the Arab Spring, whereby President Obama sanctioned regime change in Libya while supporting the military-backed coup in Egypt, arises from the contention between abiding by America’s foreign policy and national security interests and aligning with local democratic movements. 

One conspicuous feature of the United States’ approach to recent unrest is resounding silence. This could reflect the Trump’s antipathy to foreign intervention or precautionary measures after the inefficacy of U.S. involvement in 2011. Nonetheless, the protests in Sudan and Algeria are organic movements of ordinary citizens, many of whom are young people—the nemesis of autocratic dictatorships. The large-scale involvement of youths was illustrated in the successful attempt to block 82-year-old Algerian President Bouteflika from running for a fifth term. 

Almost seventy percent of Algeria’s population is under the age of 30, resembling the demographic profile of the Arab Spring protests, aided by social media and propelled by economic hardships seeking to topple military-backed regimes. These similarities present similar obstacles with a decentralized opposition being unsustainable in the long-term. Meanwhile, the presence of social media as a weapon for democracy remains a concern for Arab governments, evidenced by the internet blackout in Sudan, which only served to further fuel public grievances. 

A case study of Egypt reveals that deposing the front-facing leadership is merely a smokescreen to the power structure that remains—mainly bureaucrats, members of the security and military establishments, and oligarchs loyal to the old regime. While delaying elections in Algeria favors protestors in buying time to prevent Army Chief Gaid Salah’s preferred candidate taking office—a remnant of Bouteflika’s regime—the action highlights how a lack of organization amongst the opposition impedes progress. The militaries in both Sudan and Algeria are the repositories of power. Salah’s description of protestors who opposed the army as being “enemies of Algeria,” reinforces the brevity of hope instilled by the protests, before being silenced by the military. 

Revolutions enthuse the masses with optimism, however, the experiences of the 2011 protests reveal an illusory and temporal effect in the face of a powerful military and security establishment. The Sudanese and Algerian cases highlight growing dissent in the Middle East and North Africa. Without an organized opposition with overwhelming international support, political unrest in the MENA region is likely to bear an uncanny resemblance to the events of the first Arab Spring, potentially resulting in anarchy, civil war, or the imposition of stronger autocratic rule.

The Return of the Arab Spring was originally published on Global Security Review.

The seemingly omnipotent regimes in each of these countries are on increasingly shaky ground after years of corruption, public deception, and coercion. Protests in Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan have laid the groundwork for potentially positive changes in those countries. In Iran, many wish for a similar movement towards reform. However, they face critical challenges ahead if any changes are to be realized. Going forward, it would behoove policymakers, particularly those in Western countries, to closely monitor events in Iran.

From the outset, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran undermined the functioning of an effective government in the country. Revolutionaries established parallel institutions alongside each government apparatus which imposed obstacles on nearly every decision-making process in Iran. The Islamic Revolution enmeshed itself in domestic, economic, and foreign policymaking to ensure its interests were upheld. For example, the religious Guardian Council of the Revolution can impede the Parliament, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) meddles with the country’s economy and interferes with the Iranian armed forces whenever it deems necessary to do so.

Today, parallel institutions in Iran have amassed substantial power, and it’s unlikely they will relinquish it voluntarily. The Guardian Council is a hindrance to parliamentary decision-making on critical matters like international anti-money laundering bills, while the IRGC provides support, funding, and resources to foreign militia groups, and brings them into Iran.

During the 2009 Iranian Green Movement, the IRGC deployed armored vehicles into volatile cities alongside anti-riot security forces and attacked protestors, arresting and subsequently torturing them. When it came to fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iranians were never fully supportive of the IRGC’s actions. Many disregarded Tehran’s strong support for the Assad regime in Syria and disapproved of money that was badly needed at home being spent on expansionist programs.

Presently, Iranians are even more furious with the IRGC following widespread flooding in several Iranian provinces, further underscoring the regime’s inability to manage a crisis effectively. The matter is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of infrastructure and economic development projects in Iran are awarded to firms connected to the IRGC. Many projects have been entirely unnecessary or were improperly planned.

During a visit to areas affected by the flooding, IRGC commanders were confronted by angry and disappointed residents, in some cases being on the receiving end of “long live the Shah” chants. Their solution is to bring in al-Hashd ash-Sha’abi—or the Iraqi Shia Militia of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—to the province of Khuzestan under the guise of providing aid. In reality, the group is there to suppress protesters and dissenters. Khuzestan is home to a significant population of Iranians of Arab descent, so it’s ironic that foreign Arabs are charged with suppressing dissent.

During the 2009 Green Movement, protests across Iran in 2017, and in the aftermath of the 2019 flood, the IRGC has repeatedly shown that it holds no reservations about using brutal tactics to oppress the Iranian people. Thus, once the IRGC begins to feel that it is losing its grip on power, it’s likely Iran will descend to the verge of civil war. Practically speaking, any foreign actors intent on constraining the IRGC should establish an agile taskforce to monitor, identify, and block every IRGC financial transaction and trade deal from North Africa to East Asia.

The Islamic Republic’s long and tragic record on human rights has been overlooked by the West—primarily Europe—for the sake of business and commercial opportunities in Iran. Iran’s rank of civil and political rights was stagnant during the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, Iran’s human rights ranking out of a score of one hundred) improved by just eleven points over two decades—from six to seventeen. It is a false hope to believe that the current system in Iran will bring about any positive or substantive changes to both Iran and the broader region.

With or without sanctions, with or without the nuclear deal, with or without the IRGC being officially designated as a terrorist organization, the theocratic regime in Tehran will continue as it has for forty years. The Iranian presidency was held first by a moderate, then by a reformist, then by a fundamentalist, and now by a moderate—yet any case for true peace within the country or with the rest of the world is nonexistent. Real reform in Iran would mean the release of imprisoned members of the Baha’i faith, journalists, women’s rights activists, and citizens of the U.S. and U.K. accused of espionage. This is, however, unlikely as the regime’s survival is increasingly dependent upon the repression of dissent.

In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iranian opposition groups increasingly felt that the international community was turning a blind eye to the regime’s repressive policies. For some time, the Iranian opposition movement appeared to stagnate. In recent years, however, the Iranian diaspora has led to a resurgence of opposition. As older generations hold meetings and conferences around the globe, younger groups such as Iran Revival are breathing new life into the fight against the regime of the Islamic Republic.

Iran Revival’s members are primarily younger Iranians who have left the country. The group has established a ten-point transition path for Iran. Since the group’s establishment in September, it’s social media following has grown substantially and the group’s Instagram features numerous videos filmed by Iranians residing in Iran. The U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, met with representatives of the group during Nowrooz, the Iranian New Year. Officials in other Western governments would do well to engage with groups that have a vision for Iran such as Iran Revival. Engagement with opposition groups is essential if the country is to have a peaceful path to political transition.

Iran—similar to Venezuela, Algeria, and Sudan—displays the right criteria for a possible regime change. The country is facing severe economic woes, Iranian opposition groups are organizing themselves more effectively over issues like corruption and women’s rights, and possible alternatives to the current regime are emerging. No authoritarian regime in history has survived indefinitely, and the one currently ruling Iran will be no exception.

Iran, Algeria, Sudan, and Venezuela Have One Major Similarity was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extremist propaganda has spread beyond Libya to reach Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. While this isn’t a new phenomenon, North African states continue to suffer from substantial terrorist attacks. Recently, the Tripoli-based Libyan National Oil Company and the High National Electoral Commission were attacked by militants seemingly linked to ISIS (Daesh). Extremist movements are increasing their propaganda output and continue to pose a severe threat to internal and regional security.

Tunisia is engulfed in a deep economic crisis. As such, international financial institutions are demanding significant economic structural reforms, which have triggered protests and prompted an increase in propaganda originating from networks in Libya to exploit socio-economic issues to attract disaffected young people to their ranks.

On October 28^th, 2018 a woman with no previously-known militant background (according to Tunisian authorities) blew herself up. The attack occurred just as the country’s vital tourism industry started to recover more than three years after two deadly terror attacks. More recently, on March 7^th, 2019, a post office in Tunis intercepted 19 letters containing potentially deadly toxins addressed to notable journalists, politicians, and trade unionists. Local authorities revealed that the substances were produced in a Tunisian laboratory. This is a critical security issue that needs to be addressed—both domestically and regionally, and possibly in cooperation with the European Union. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt are strategic partners for Europe—ensuring their stability is essential to avoid further crises in the region.

On March 10^th, 2019, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb’s (AQIM) al-Andalus media foundation released an audio clip of a speech given by AQIM official Abu Obeida Yusuf al-Annabi. The address championed the Algerian protests against current Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and encouraged protesters to demand Sharia-based governance. Despite Algeria having recently initiated a massive counter-terrorism operation to prevent the infiltration of terrorists through the country’s borders with Tunisia, Libya, and Mali, extremist propaganda still represents a serious issue.

Algier’s counter-terrorism efforts are increasingly complicated by illegal migration and human trafficking along Algeria’s southern border. Terrorism and criminality are increasingly interconnected, and the need to break the nexus between the two has increased following the social unrest that led to the ouster of the 82-year old Bouteflika. Stability in Algeria is critical—for the security of Algerians, and the broader region. The country’s next leader will face a challenging economic situation, persistent threats from terrorist networks in Mali and Libya, and increasing extremist propaganda targeted to influence the country’s younger generations.

According to the British government’s Foreign Travel Advice, “terrorists are likely to try to carry out attacks in Morocco. You should be vigilant at all times.”  Two Scandinavian tourists were brutally killed in Morocco in December of 2018. While local authorities reported the attackers were not affiliated with ISIS, the attack—coupled with ISIS’ territorial defeat in Syria and Iraq—has lead to growing scrutiny over the group’s increasingly asymmetric dimension.

One component of the Moroccan counter-terrorism strategy is moussalaha—a reconciliation program. Launched in 2018, it is a de-radicalization program to combat violent extremism. According to the General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration, human rights and anti-radicalization experts provide psychological support and rehabilitation of charged and jailed people for terror crimes. On March 10^th of 2019, Moroccan authorities announced a repatriation program to allow militants of Moroccan origin to return in safety. The returnees were subject to judicial investigations for their alleged involvement in terror-related activities. The Head of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation estimated 1.668 Moroccans joined ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

In Egypt, several cells affiliated with Wilaya Sinai (Islamic State in the Sinai) remain operational and continue to threaten security and stability in the Sinai. Egypt continues to suffer from ongoing attacks against Christians and other religious minorities. The elimination of the territorial holdings of ISIS in Syria and Iraq could force militants to flow into Egypt.

Furthermore, despite the group’s territorial defeat, ISIS-affiliated propaganda and the group’s shift to an asymmetric entity from a territorially-based entity will continue to threaten North African security. ISIS, in addition to smaller, localized groups, are capable of radicalizing young people in a complex regional context, one deeply affected by economic crises. Extremist propaganda represents an illusory—but convincing—opportunity for young people to turn from losers to winners. Breaking the nexus between terrorism and criminality (especially smuggling) is essential to promote regional stability and security.

The Resilience of Jihadi Extremist Groups in North Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.