China’s interests lie in maintaining the status quo. Russia’s interests lie in disrupting it.

For China, Pyongyang’s behavior recalled memories of 1994, when Beijing sent a delegation to Pyongyang to notify the then-Kim Il Sung (the grandfather of current leader Kim Jong-Un), that China would be initiating official diplomatic relations with South Korea.

A furious Kim Il Sung threatened Chinese officials that North Korea would develop diplomatic ties of their own with the Republic of China—Taiwan—in retaliation. Nevertheless, Pyongyang neglected to carry out that threat, and China continued in its plans to normalize relations with South Korea.

Where China Withdraws—Russia Steps In.

Many in China are wondering why North Korea thinks it can get away with criticizing China in such a public manner. The answer, it seems, lies with China’s “strategic partner,” Russia.

In January 2017, the Chinese authorities found that Pyongyang had shipped out its first wishes for a happy New Year in Moscow, not Beijing. As China has stepped up economic pressure on North Korea by cutting off coal exports and implementing restrictions on doing business with North Korea, Russia has stepped in to exploit the situation and to fill the gap. Russia is now Pyongyang’s top coal provider.

Furthermore, North Korea has been importing crude oil from Russia to reduce its energy dependence on China. Early this year, Russian authorities representatives visited Pyongyang to talk about railroad transportation cooperation.

Is North Korea Getting Help on its Missile Program?

In the summer of 2017, in the wake of one of North Korea’s ballistic missile test launches, Ukraine was cited as a source of North Korean missile technology.

However, the Ukrainian government vehemently denied the allegations. Objectively, Ukraine would have little to gain from providing North Korea with weapons technology, as it would significantly hinder their efforts to increase U.S. support for their fight against Russian-backed separatists.

Analysis: Chinese-Russian Divide Over North Korea Reveals Greater Tensions to Come

China’s interests lie in maintaining the status quo while Russia’s interests lie in disrupting it. China desperately wishes to avoid a military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. It fears a U.S.-allied and unified Korea, on its border, and would inevitably have to manage a massive humanitarian crisis on its doorstep.

Russia, however, sees opportunities in stoking tensions on the Korean peninsula. Increased international and U.S. attention on North Korea means less focus on Russia’s military engagements in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

Moscow could very well be encouraging further North Korean belligerence to divert attention away from a large-scale military operation in Ukraine or Belarus in the wake of its Zapad-2017 war games, which reportedly saw the deployment of over 100,000 Russian, Belarussian, and CIS troops across Russia’s and Belarus’ eastern borders.

The divide over North Korea reveals that the China-Russia “strategic partnership” is flawed. In the coming decade, it is likely that the two countries will find themselves at odds over their respective national interests.

North Korea Crisis Reveals Fractures in the China-Russia Strategic Partnership was originally published on Global Security Review.

While eastern European leaders are certainly justified in their concern, it is the job of military leaders all over the world to ensure that their forces are prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios. Zapad and other large-scale war games are intended to test the readiness of military forces to deal with such situations.

History, and Russia’s military doctrine, tells us that for the Kremlin to legitimately consider the use of force against a sovereign state—under the guise of aiding Russian-speaking separatists, military drills, or otherwise, the Russian military and political leadership must perceive a legitimate threat to Russia’s national interest—largely the interests of its ruling oligarchic elite.

Additionally, the Kremlin must be sure of its ability to prevail in any forceful confrontation or to, a minimum, ensure a stalemate. Neither condition seems present.

Since last year’s strategic Caucasus-2016 exercise, no Russian allies or client states are under greater threat than they were last year. A few, like Bashar al Assad of Syria, have seen threats to their rule decrease in the past year.

How Likely is it that Russia Will Attempt a Crimea-Style Operation Against the Baltics?

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Western countries were caught unaware as Russia employed hybrid tactics to hide its deployment of forces to Crimea.

NATO has beefed up its presence in its Baltic and Eastern-European Union member countries, further reducing the already slim chances that Russia will want to attempt an incursion in Baltic or E.U. states.

NATO is now keeping a much closer eye on the Russian military techniques, particularly since the  Zapad-2013 exercises featured simulations of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against Sweden.

Preparing for a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

The Russian military has been holding large scale strategic exercises each year of the twenty-first century, as the Russian economics has rebounded from the lows of the early 1990s. Preparing for such a conflict doesn’t mean the Kremlin is planning to commence one.

It is also worth noting a correlation between Russia’s economic state and its military spending and training. This would imply that the Russian Armed Forces have a tendency to train as far because they can afford to.

Until 2015, Russia’s military expenditures and the number of war games it conducted, both large- and small-scale, had been increasing at a faster rate than the rate of economic growth.

Russian Troop Deployments in Military Training Exercises

Russian GDP figures, Military Exercise Data, and Troop Numbers

Given the degree of attention focused on Russia’s military deployments, it’s highly unlikely that that Zapad-2017 will escalate into a full-scale or partial military conflict with NATO.

Even though Russia’s Gross domestic product grew to 2014, its costs grew by 300 percent at the exact same period and the number of war games increased by 157 percent from 2008 to 2014.

It should be noted that this precludes any so-called “black money” that would not appear on a publicly available balance sheet.

Security Analysis: Although Possible; War with NATO is Unlikely.

The biggest risks stemming from the Zapad drills are possible errors, including stray shots, local attempts to test responses through other measures, moderate or temporary escalation in existing conflict zones (such as in Ukraine, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia).

Additionally, due to regional geopolitical developments in the Russia-Belarus relationship, Russia may attempt to use “nonlinear” warfare tactics (asymmetric tactics) in order to further consolidate the Russia-Belarus “Union State.”

Zapad-2017: Analyzing Troop Numbers & Economic Factors was originally published on Global Security Review.