The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

The election took on a new importance following the breakdown of the once powerful alliance between the Marcos and Duterte political dynasties—after the rapid political decline of the previously popular Duterte family. The Dutertes accused President Marcos of leading a deliberate effort to eliminate his most significant political rivals.

What began as a unified political force that dominated the 2022 elections disintegrated into a bitter rivalry, characterized by personal attacks and an impeachment move against Vice President Sara Duterte. She faces allegations of fund misuse, unexplained wealth accumulation, and even issuing threats against President Marcos, the First Lady, and the House Speaker.

The outcome of the Senate race was crucial, as senators will serve as jurors in the impeachment trial of the vice president. To convict Duterte and permanently bar her from public office, at least 16 of the 24 senators must vote in favor of removal.

The elections, which determined half of the Senate, the entire House of Representatives, and thousands of local officials, revealed a surprisingly even split between Marcos- and Duterte-aligned candidates, defying pre-election polling that predicted a weaker performance from the Duterte faction. The final tally of votes shows that neither Marcos nor Duterte were the big winner in the Senate. Instead, a solid block of both Marcos and Duterte supporters was joined by various reformist candidates who are likely to serve as wild cards in both an impeachment trial and future legislative debates.

Meanwhile, former President Rodrigo Duterte was elected by a massive margin in his bid to reclaim the mayorship of Davao City, despite being detained by the International Criminal Court (ICC). He remained eligible to run because he has not been convicted of any crime. Unexpectedly, the strong showing from the Duterte bloc, combined with the deepening political divide, raises concerns about potential unrest, power consolidation efforts, or gridlock within key institutions even in the intelligence community. As rival factions jostle for influence, the risk of politically motivated violence, destabilizing protests, or coercive maneuvers at both the national and local levels may increase, threatening the country’s governance stability and democratic integrity.

President Marcos publicly distanced himself from the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Duterte. The President denies accusations that he is pursuing a personal vendetta against the Duterte family. Instead, Marcos focused his campaign narrative on the country’s economic progress and his firm stance on defending national sovereignty, highlighting his administration’s opposition to China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. With tensions over Beijing’s regional behavior rising, China is a major political flashpoint in this election cycle.

By downplaying his involvement in the impeachment process, Marcos aims to protect his image as a unifying leader above partisan revenge, possibly to appeal to moderates. This move also helps shift public discourse away from the political feud and refocus it on policy, allowing him to sidestep accusations of using state power to silence rivals.

Marcos’s hardline rhetoric on China serves as a strategic appeal to nationalist sentiment, which grew amid repeated maritime confrontations in the South China Sea. By taking a strong position against Beijing, he seeks to rally public support, differentiate himself from Duterte’s historically China-friendly stance, and secure backing from defense-focused and pro-sovereignty voters.

The spotlight on China in the campaign reflects a broader trend of foreign policy becoming a domestic political issue. This signals a growing alignment between national security concerns and electoral strategy.

Marcos’s tougher China policy also aligns with American interests in the region, potentially strengthening his international legitimacy while further polarizing his rivalry with the Dutertes, who are seen as closer to China.

Conclusion

The convergence of internal political rivalries, external geopolitical interests, and a shifting demographic base marks a potentially volatile era for Philippine democracy where political missteps could quickly escalate into security threats or international incidents. While the Philippines has a civic society and the institutional framework necessary for democratic resilience, political reform, especially an enforceable anti-dynasty law, is essential to revitalize governance.

The results from the Philippine midterm elections illustrate not only the enduring power of political dynasties, but also the rising intensity of intra-elite competition, as both the Marcos and Duterte factions entrench their influence in the Senate. The election’s implications extend beyond politics into questions of institutional credibility, legal accountability, and long-term political stability. How this battle unfolds will shape the Philippines’ democracy in the face of deepening polarization.

The Philippine midterm elections are no longer routine legislative exercises. They are a crucible for deeper structural tensions in the country’s democracy. With institutional legitimacy, political accountability, and regional stability at stake, the results of elections could redefine the Philippines’ democratic trajectory and security outlook in the years to come.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense.

Power Play in the Philippine Midterm Election was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nonproliferation has been the goal of America’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War more than three decades ago. At that time, the biggest concern was the possibility of the crumbling Soviet military apparatus being captured by rogue states, terrorist organizations, and other non-friendly entities that could use Soviet expertise and technological prowess to develop means to attack the United States. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), for instance, was started in 1991 to assist the Soviet Union and its “successor entities” to “destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”

Since then, many more programs have been created to control exports of sensitive and dual-use materials. Regardless of the effectiveness of these programs, it might seem that the world has entered a new era of proliferation as allies and partners, among others, start to question the security commitments of the United States and the possible prospect of developing their own nuclear programs.

Whether the US would actively defend its allies and partners if attacked, thousands of miles away from American territory, has long stimulated debate. Now, more than ever, Ukraine and the Middle East are important centers of attention following their years-long conflicts and the involvement of the United States. In Ukraine, for instance, President Trump called for peace negotiations, allegedly, without the consent of Ukraine.

Amid these decisions, conflicting messages were shared by American officials on the issue. On the one hand, President Trump stated that “Ukraine may be Russian one day, or not,” and that there were discussions on the possibility of a deal to provide the United States with part of Ukraine’s mineral deposits in exchange for American weapons. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine is unrealistic and that the country should abandon its hopes of a return to its pre-2014 borders.

The fears running among Ukrainians and other European partners are shared. What if the US withdraws its assistance from Ukraine? What about the rest of the continent? On Monday, February 17, 2025, European leaders met to form a united front during an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss Trump’s plans for Ukraine and the continent. In this meeting, the reliability of Europe’s key transatlantic partner might be questioned. As this situation and the negotiations continue, many possible outcomes are certain to receive attention.

One of them includes the possibility of developing or expanding European nuclear programs, which is an idea floated for some time. For instance, Elena Davlikanova, from the Center for European Policy Analysis, reported that “[d]uring his speech in Brussels on October 17, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy voiced what many Ukrainians are thinking, that in the war for its existence, Ukraine now has a choice between NATO membership or manufacturing nuclear weapons.” If, according to the US Secretary of Defense, Ukraine’s membership in NATO is dismissed, then the other viable option for Kyiv is clear. And so might be for other US partners and allies.

In the Middle East, furthermore, a similar situation could be addressed. Since the last violent exchanges between Israel and Iran, concerns were raised about the possibility that Iran may now finally develop its own nuclear program with the assistance of Russia. Moreover, President Trump’s plans to expel ethnic Palestinians from Gaza and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East” could fuel concerns among Arab partners.

Along these lines, Arab states, friend or foe of the US, may acquire nuclear capabilities if they perceive their interests (regime survival, national integrity, sovereignty, etc.) are at stake and if they consider the growing US-Israel alliance a security risk. Iran could definitely see it this way, but what about the newly established Syrian government? The historical competition between Israel and Syria could now further expand as Islamist organizations now control the country.

Overall, two roads seem to be ahead of us. If the Trump administration’s goal is to partially denuclearize China and Russia, then concessions (“sacrifices”) will need to be made, which might include surrendering Ukraine to Moscow and, perhaps, Taiwan to Beijing—or at least the sovereignty claims of the South China Sea. If this is the case, the US alliance may tremble, encouraging US partners and allies to pursue their own independent nuclear programs. The other road leads to the support of US partners and allies but without facing real possibilities of engaging in arms control negotiations with either China or Russia.

In other words, the status quo would be maintained. The Trump administration would need to start evaluating these two paths ahead, but partners and allies should also play their part to convince the administration that they are not a burden to carry, and that keeping the alliance alive will also benefit the United States in the short and long term.

Santiago Spadiliero is a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies whose research is focused on great power competition, deterrence, and America’s missile defense architecture.

President Trump’s Foreign Policy Could Encourage Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

These states are modernizing their naval deterrence capabilities, thus weaponizing the waters of the IOR. The growing competition between US-led alliances, China and India, as well as India and Pakistan intensified, particularly with US support for India to counter China’s influence in the IOR.

Pakistan views these developments as a security threat, as they challenge its maritime mobility and increase the risk of entanglement between Indian and Pakistani forces at sea. The escalating tensions between India and Pakistan underscore the need for maritime confidence-building measures (CBM) and risk-reduction strategies to avoid conflict. What are the evolving dynamics between India and Pakistan in the IOR and how can maritime CBMs be realized and institutionalized to prevent prospects for any dangers?

Maritime Entanglement in the IOR

Maritime entanglement refers to the complex and potentially dangerous situations where naval forces from different states, often adversaries, come into proximity or engage in activities that can lead to unintended confrontations, miscalculations, or escalations. The IOR is a center point for states’ contestation where forces of India and Pakistan can interface anytime.

India is modernizing its naval capabilities to assert its regional dominance through advanced technologies such as Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers, uncrewed systems, and sensors, thereby expanding its naval presence.

India has also approved the purchase of MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance drones, which will enhance the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of its armed forces in the IOR.

India is also inclined to procure high endurance unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) to further enhance its ISR, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and mine-counter measures (MCM). India is using China’s looming threat as leverage to procure 26 Rafale-M fighters to serve as the new carrier, Vikrant’s, air wing, and three additional Kalvari-class submarines.

Pakistan, in turn, is also improving its deterrence survivability. Pakistan’s capability is mainly based on conventional platforms with heavy reliance on cruise missiles. Its sea-based force consists of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, deployed on Agosta-class submarines or on-surface ships.

India’s acquisition of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) adds new complexities to Indian Ocean security. These stealthy, autonomous systems enhance India’s naval capabilities in surveillance and anti-submarine warfare and increase the risk of unintended encounters with other countries’ forces, especially Pakistan, as the autonomous nature of AUVs makes them less predictable and harder to monitor.

Furthermore, a cyberattack on surveillance or intelligence systems can create monitoring “blind spots,” leading to potential misinterpretations of naval activities. If one country’s radar is disabled, it might incorrectly assess the other’s movements, prompting a more aggressive stance. This risk escalates if command and control communications are also affected, as either side could misinterpret a blackout as a threat, potentially deploying additional naval assets and leading to unintended confrontations.

The presence of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine near another state’s naval assets might be perceived as a prelude to an act of aggression, especially during times of heightened tensions. A stark example of this occurred during the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis between India and Pakistan. In the milieu of the Pulwama crisis, the Indian Navy declared that its carrier battle group, including the Indian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, was on a deterrence patrol, which was “swiftly shifted from exercise to operational disposition” amid the crisis.

After the crisis, Pakistan reportedly detected an Indian submarine, suspected of being armed with nuclear weapons, within its maritime zone. The lack of transparency surrounding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine movements makes it difficult for states to distinguish between routine operations and potential threats, increasing the risk of miscalculation.

This is particularly noteworthy in the IOR where numerous states assert their interests in strategically significant areas as well as crucial chokepoints for trade routes, namely the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Thus, misinterpretation of naval maneuvers, especially involving nuclear-armed submarines, heightens the risk of maritime entanglement between India and Pakistan, which will create challenges for all the players involved and disrupt the SLOCs and transportation. These developments demand the opening of effective CBMs between India and Pakistan to prevent any risks in the maritime domain. 

Proposed Confidence-Building Measures

In the context of India and Pakistan, several CBMs are applicable. First, establishing a mutual notification and data-sharing mechanism on cybersecurity threats between India and Pakistan is essential, given the growing reliance on digital systems for naval and maritime operations. This mechanism would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent the misattribution of cyber incidents to state actors.

Second, an agreement on prior notifications of naval activities such as naval exercises or critical movements of submarines is needed. This will enhance transparency and trust by ensuring that routine movements, such as those involving nuclear submarines, are not misinterpreted as hostile actions.

Third, an agreement on managing incidents at sea can also be formalized by setting up clear protocols for their behavior during unintended or unexpected encounters at sea. This would help both countries to turn dangerous eventualities into normal situations. The two states can create standardized rules of engagement for naval forces operating nearby and develop crisis-management protocols to handle maritime incidents.

Fourth, another risk-reduction initiative could be a submarine rescue agreement, enabling cooperation in case of climate-prone or any natural crisis-led accidents involving rescuing crew and sunk submarines, and sheltering the survivors on board.

Fifth, the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deployment notification and safety protocol CBM proposes that India notify Pakistan, via a neutral third party or direct hotline, about routine SSBN deployments near Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Arabian Sea. It includes communication protocols to prevent accidental encounters from escalating, with India providing limited, non-sensitive information on SSBN timing and location near shared maritime boundaries.

Sixth, an agreement on the non-deployment of AUVs between India and Pakistan is essential to mitigate risks associated with autonomous systems in sensitive maritime areas. Establishing no-deployment zones, particularly near nuclear sites, disputed areas, and key naval bases, would reduce the chances of misinterpretation and accidental confrontations, offering a safety buffer in shared waters.

Seventh, India and Pakistan could establish a code of conduct (CoC) for the Arabian Sea to manage maritime interactions, reduce confrontation risks, and promote peaceful sea use amid regional tensions. Modeled after the South China Sea CoC. This CBM would provide a framework of rules for behavior in contested areas, particularly near disputed zones like Sir Creek and along shared maritime boundaries.

Eighth, direct bilateral maritime cooperation and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan would ideally be the most effective approach. Given the current state of relations between the two countries, this option remains politically challenging.

Therefore, a more feasible path to promote bilateral trust would come through multilateral forums. For example, the Indian Ocean Rim Association can be a valuable avenue to which both nations are already members. This forum provides a platform for indirect cooperation on shared maritime issues such as security, trade, and disaster-related risk management.

Expanding their collaboration within this multilateral forum, particularly on non-sensitive issues like anti-piracy efforts and environmental protection, could help build trust between them. As multilateral engagement deepens, it could serve as a steppingstone toward more focused and issue-specific dialogues between India and Pakistan at a bilateral level.

Implementation of the above agreements would provide a structured approach to promote a more secure and stable maritime environment in the IOR preventing miscommunication or misunderstandings and ensuring safety during maritime operations, contributing to greater stability in the IOR.

Rizwana Abbasi is an associate professor of security studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a visiting fellow at the Central European University of Austria. 

Maryyum Masood is a Research Officer and Associate Editor at CISS and an M. Phil Scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad.

Proposing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Indeed, as of this writing such probes are already occurring. Sino-Russian aerial probes against Alaska recently occurred in the Arctic. While American officials claim this is the first time this happened, Chinese officials stated that this is the eighth such joint aerial probe. Moreover, the probe took place immediately following Sino-Russian bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

In a similar fashion, there is evidence that China is providing missile technology to North Korea. This follows the new mutual security pact signed by North Korea and Russia, which came after North Korea made itself a supplier of missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russian assistance to North Korea’s satellite program is also reportedly taking place.

In the Middle East, China’s negotiation of an agreement on Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity not only conforms to long-standing Russian objectives, but it also facilitates further Sino-Russo-Iranian influence among Palestinians—making a durable Middle East peace even less likely. Pyongyang’s willingness to proliferate nuclear and missile technology to Iran and a de facto Russo-Iranian alliance, only further destabilizes the region and makes a larger scale war more likely.

The same is true in Europe where China emerged as the primary source of Russian revenues, defense technologies, and diplomatic support for its war on Ukraine. Without Chinese support, Russia would be hard-pressed to continue the war. At the same time, numerous accounts show that Russia is engaged in cyber war against Europe, attacking infrastructure and cyber networks. Russia is also planning assassinations of key figures and other mayhem within the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia is not alone in engaging in these behaviors. While the attacks on France’s national railway system on the eve of the Olympics was very likely a Russian plot, Iran is concurrently threatening Israeli athletes at the Olympic games through cyberattacks.

The number of global attacks and coordination among these four actors, all of whom use nuclear weapons to deter the West from responding to their gray zone attacks, is increasing. Once Iran fields its own nuclear arsenal, which seems increasingly likely, more terror campaigns against Israel, other Middle East states, and international shipping (by Iranian proxies) is likely.  Indeed, the Houthis granted safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea while Moscow is considering giving them anti-ship missiles. These facts also raise the issue of their use of cyber and hacking devices, if not GPS, to direct and track ships in the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the West faces a multi-domain threat linking all the domains of warfare, including nuclear escalation. These autocracies already incorporated nuclear deterrence, if not escalation, into their strategies against the US and its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  North Korea, as well as China and Russia, is building a larger and more diversified arsenal. Soon, North Korea will field a nuclear triad of fighter-bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

As a result of their policies, there is virtually no hope of arms control in the near future. China’s recent walkout from nuclear talks exemplifies the utter impossibility of arranging arms control with either Beijing or Moscow. By the same token nonproliferation and the nonproliferation treaty are evidently on their last legs. Beijing’s announcement of its commitment to that treaty’s renewed credibility is thus a grim joke given its ongoing record of support for proliferation. For the next administration, which must deal with facts rather than wish-fulfillment in its defense policy, it is clear that a sustained program of conventional and nuclear modernization, if not an actual increase, is necessary. Moreover, nuclear proliferation appears increasingly likely.

If Iran goes nuclear, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit increases exponentially. Egypt and Turkey may also follow suit, leading to a Middle East that is equally unstable, but with more nuclear powers.

South Korean public opinion is apparently increasingly supportive of an independent nuclear arsenal, which would lead Japan to follow suit. In short, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all making the world a less safe place as they challenge world order.

While Americans already live in interesting times, the times are likely to become even more interesting as they become more threatening. The United States will face a nuclear-armed autocratic quartet that is focused on supplanting American power. That quartet is also likely to be more dangerous than ever before because the threat, if not the actual use of nuclear weapons, offsets their conventional inferiority and increases their war-making power.

The fevered rhetoric of the current presidential campaign will soon end. The intractable realities will neither end nor give the next administration any respite. They will challenge the nation and force Americans to turn their inward gaze outward.

Steve Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The New Nuclear Alliance Against the West was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, China enjoys a positional advantage within the First Island Chain, which allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to enjoy interior lines of communication and supply to move forces more efficiently along an inner arc, compared to American-led coalition forces that will operate on an outer arc. This strategic advantage facilitates faster mobilization and concentration of military power by the PLA, enhancing its ability to project force within the region.

To counter China’s geographic advantage, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. argues in Archipelagic Defense 2.0 that the United States and its coalition partners should prioritize establishing robust fixed defenses at critical points along the First Island Chain (an arc of islands stretching from Japan to the Philippines). These fixed defenses can stock deep magazines, harden positions, and complicate PLA scouting efforts. By situating ground forces on key islands these defenses can slow down if not prevent China’s aggressive mobility and provocation capabilities.

The islands of the First Island Chain, along with the flanking states (South Korea in the north and Vietnam in the south), form natural chokepoints that can impede China’s access to open seas. Coalition forces can play a crucial role in enhancing defense by focusing on these chokepoints. Deploying undersea sensor networks, submarines, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), antiship missiles, and mines can effectively limit PLA naval and air operations.

Ground forces can significantly contribute to the defense of maritime chokepoints as well. By establishing strongholds at key locations, they can free up more mobile forces for counter-concentration efforts. This static defense strategy, coupled with mobile strike capabilities, creates a layered defense system that complicates the PLA’s operational planning and execution.

On March 8, 2024, the Philippines Secretary of National Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr. emphasized the importance of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The CADC leverages the positional advantage of the Philippine section of the First Island Chain. This arc forms a natural barrier against Chinese maritime expansion, and its strategic significance lies in its potential to restrict the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) movements.

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States could do more to enhance archipelagic defense. The Balikatan Exercise in April 2024 exemplifies the ongoing military cooperation aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the region.

However, recent developments, such as the planned construction of a new port in the Batanes Islands, without US help, highlight the Philippines’ efforts to bolster its infrastructure and defense independently. This move, while avoiding direct US involvement, ensures that the Philippines remains vigilant and prepared to counter potential threats from Chinese expansion. The strategic importance of the Batanes Islands is that it is located less than 200 kilometers from Taiwan and separated by the Bashi Channel. These islands, along with Itbayat and Basco in the Luzon Strait, form critical chokepoints in the western Pacific and the South China Sea. In the event of Chinese aggression towards Taiwan or the Philippines, controlling these islands becomes paramount.

For its part, China has built bases on three atolls (Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef) and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island) and is continually harming Filipino sailors and ships within the sovereign territory of the Philippines. Further, Chinese military activities near Japan are increasing such as when the PLAN sent survey ships, like the Chen Jingrun, into Japan’s uncontested waters between the Iriomote and Yonaguni Islands.

The addition of the tenth dash to the nine-dash line is China’s claim to Senkaku, which necessitates a comprehensive archipelagic defense strategy. The Philippines and Japan, in collaboration with the US and its allies, must enhance fixed defenses, leverage positional advantages, and fortify critical chokepoints within the First Island Chain. By doing so, they can effectively counterbalance China’s assertive maritime claims and increasing hostility.

The CADC, supported by initiatives like the EDCA represents the beginning of a much-needed effort towards safeguarding the Philippines’ national sovereignty and maintaining the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. As geopolitical dynamics continue to work against Taiwan’s de facto independence, the US must work closely with Japan and the Philippines to harden the Yonaguni Islands that stretch from the south of Japan to the north of Taiwan and the Batanes Islands that reach from the north of the Philippines to the south of Taiwan.

These Philippine and Japanese territories off Taiwan’s coast are particularly valuable entry points because of the Ryukyu Trench and the Philippine Sea Plate which provide easy access to the Pacific Ocean. If Taiwan falls to China, the US and its Pacific allies should already be in a position to plan for the next phase of China’s aggression as it will not stop with Taiwan.

If the US, together with the Philippines and Japan, fail to fortify these strategic island networks, American Pacific power will be pushed back to Hawaii. Allies will also face an authoritarian and mercantilist regional order that they do not wish to see return. China can be contained, but the time to act is now.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived in Taiwan and China for two decades. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Increasing the Archipelagic Defense from the Philippines to Japan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario was originally published on Global Security Review.

The world is now reminded of the normality of war in human existence by the aggression of revisionist Russia and China. The United States, leader of the free world, must once again deter the aggression of authoritarian regimes. This time, however, the United States is no longer in the same dominant position it once held.

American nuclear deterrence plays a critical role in managing the modern international system—the latest iteration of which is tripolar. Whilst many analysts in the arms control and disarmament community accuse those in the deterrence community of “Cold War thinking,” they make grossly inaccurate assertions that poorly reflect reality. The Cold War, which placed much of the world on the precipice of a nuclear exchange, generated unprecedented strategic thinking about how to manage great-power relationships and deter war between them.

The concepts underpinning deterrence: second strike, damage limitation, escalation control, delegation authority, and many others, are concepts that remain relevant today and require a careful re-thinking as the tripolar era moves forward. The implications of new technologies like effective missile defenses, hypersonic glide vehicles, and drones may change perceptions in unexpected ways.

Members of the academic and think tank communities were warning governments over a decade ago about the impending return of great-power competition in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific. There is a benefit to studying history. It is the ability to see trends without assuming they are certain to repeat themselves. The constancy of human nature, however, makes Thucydides’ admonitions equally useful today as they were 2,500 years ago.

It is time to re-think how to apply the classic strategic theories and concepts that aided in navigating the first nuclear age. They can aid the West in successfully navigating this era of tripolar superpower competition.

The bipolar Cold War construct was a unique development in history. This construct of two nuclear-armed superpowers competing for global influence was the new dynamic of what international great-power competition looked like historically. What appeared to be a global competition, was, in practice, a regional one focused on Western Europe and NATO, with second- and third-order effects for the rest of the world. The Asia-Pacific primarily received the leftovers in terms of the consequences and interests in the Cold War.

Thinking about concepts such as strategic stability, deterrence, extended deterrence, and arms control (developed during the Cold War) as the West contemplates confrontation across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific is a challenge. This is especially important as China ramps up its aggressive activity in the South China Sea, expands its nuclear arsenal, and builds a military specifically designed to defeat the United States.

The prospect of war between the great powers raises the question of how America’s post-war alliances, formed at the dawn of the nuclear age, might endure and function in such a world. Strategic concepts and connotations of the first nuclear age will have to be re-conceptualized to formulate strategies that reassure allies and deter adversaries. Ultimately, the credibility of American extended deterrence may not endure as the world enters a period akin to what William Walker termed nuclear disorder.

Walker suggests that the establishment, in the late 1960s, of nuclear order was based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule bound. There was a degree of familiarity in the dyadic deterrence relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits. This took place concomitantly with the provision of a nuclear umbrella and a stable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems provided the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for several key states to rely on American extended deterrence for their national survival.

There are several elements that characterise the nuclear order underpinning the structural foundations for the credibility of that extended deterrence. First, the number of nuclear weapons states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered bigger and better conventional weapons—as they once were. Third, there are strong norms against possession and use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no existential threats to American allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely—even with Russian threats.

In the mid-2000s nuclear order began unravelling. That process increased in speed with the invasion of Ukraine and China’s nuclear breakout. With this came a need to re-think the strategic theory and concepts that helped navigate the first nuclear age. After all, the future lasts a long time.

There are still many known unknowns and potentially even more unknown unknowns. What is known is that no other weapon has the gravitational force of nuclear weapons. Thus, it is important to adapt strategic theory and concepts to deal with a dangerous era of international politics that is not well understood. Despite idealist claims that war and nuclear weapons can or will cease to exist, conflict is a fundamental element of humanity, and the technology to do so continues to proliferate. Getting smarter at deterring it should be the goal. Nuclear weapons and strategic theory help achieve that objective.

Christine Leah, PhD is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are her own.

Nuclear Weapons and Trilateral Superpower Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two issues are at play today. First, a direct military confrontation between the United States and China appears inevitable, despite the economic entanglement that was intended to prevent it. Second, two nations that are so closely tied economically have rarely waged war, leaving such conflict’s second and third order effects unknown. Should the United States follow Reagan’s approach and challenge China’s economic rise, there may be a path to avoiding conflict. Oil may be a good place to begin such an effort because China is so highly dependent on oil imports.

President Reagan began by initiating a change in US oil price policy that commenced what National Security Council official Roger Robinson called a policy of “economic warfare” against the Soviet Union. One of Reagan’s first moves was to decontrol the price of oil. This lowered the price of oil and markedly decreased the earnings of the Soviet government, which relied heavily on oil and gas sales to generate foreign currency reserves.

A second move was to encourage the expansion of American oil and gas production over the long-term—driving down prices. In 1984, President Reagan persuaded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to markedly increase oil production by seven million barrels a day, again seriously reducing Moscow’s export earnings. As an importer of oil, driving prices down would help, not hurt, the Chinese economy. Thus, the United States would need to put Chinese oil imports at risk and more expensive.

China is growing its ability to project military power astride key maritime choke points which see the transit of 60 percent of global oil production—58.9 million barrels of oil per day. This includes four choke points where China is seeking a military presence. These include: the Straits of Hormuz (with the help of Iran); the Straits of Malacca (through military construction in the South China Sea); Bab el-Mandeb (with Iranian/Houthi help); and the Suez Canal.

While China fears an oil cut-off during a military conflict, it appears China is seeking to turn the tables on the United States. As part of China’s belt and roads initiative, overland routes for petroleum export are under construction, with a specific design to prevent American interference.

Given the stakes, the United States must act with urgency and circumspection as it looks for ways to economically disentangle from China—a country which clearly seeks to supplant American global influence. As the Chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger warned in a recent “Xi’s Pearl Harbor”  broadcast, many American institutions may not be up to the challenge. Employing oil as a deterrent force is no simple task.

If China were to achieve a stranglehold on oil tanker transportation, America’s NATO allies stand to suffer most. Michael Klein and Robert Zubrin point out that it is no coincidence that each recession since 1975 began with sharp spikes in oil prices.

Currently, the United States is the largest oil producer in the world despite the Biden administration’s efforts to constrain oil production. Should administration’s change or President Biden change his position on hydrocarbons, the United States could, in a time of crisis, ramp up production to counter Chinese efforts to constrain oil flows.

There is real value in the United States securing the sea-lanes and thwarting Chinese plans to build overseas bases at key the key geographic points mentioned above. One of China’s weaknesses is that it uses economics in a purely coercive way that seem attractive at first, but always carry heavy burden on the back end. States participating in the Belt and Road Initiative are now coming to regret their decision. Buyer’s regret is a key tool the United States can use to thwart Chinese expansionist efforts.

Maintaining a sufficiently sized and capable US Navy that can patrol sea lanes remains a core capability and coercive tool of American diplomacy. The sight of American warships in foreign ports, rather than Chinese warships, speaks volumes to those countries considering which superpower to support. This is proving particularly true in the Middle East as oil rich nations are reconsidering their cooperation with the United States.

In a future strategic environment where China attempts to use oil as a coercive tool, the United States must be prepared to push back or prevent such a set of circumstances from ever materializing. The time is now for American policymakers to contemplate the role oil can play in economic warfare with China. Xi Jinping is certainly thinking about it.

Peter Huessy is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Economic Deterrence: Chinese Style was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s notion of the “Middle Kingdom” is not just a historical concept; it is a guiding force shaping the nation’s foreign policy. Seen in initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and military expansion, it portrays China as the cultural, political, and economic epicenter of the world. This intentional effort to shape the global system involves territorial disputes, diplomatic pressures, and information warfare, projecting China’s influence far beyond its borders.

However, beneath the peaceful platitudes lies a shadow. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China’s human rights landscape has taken a dark turn. From the oppression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the challenges faced by Tibetans and Hong Kongers, China’s stance on basic freedoms is increasingly disconcerting. Moreover, China’s influence extends globally, touching on economic coercion, cyberattacks, and support for authoritarian regimes, challenging international human rights institutions and norms.

China’s challenge to the US and the post-1945 international system manifests in various forms, presenting a multifaceted threat. The ambition to displace, rather than replace, the US raises concerns about potential conflicts and instability. At its core is an ideological clash—China’s authoritarian capitalism versus the liberal democratic order that is the cornerstone of the international system. The corridors of power in the West are replete with recommendations: fortify alliances, champion human rights, and competently engage with the rising power.

As the world stands on the brink of a new global order, there is a sense of urgency to understand Chinese aspirations and prevent them from turning into conflict with the United States. The intertwining of power and principles calls for careful navigation of uncharted waters. The profound impact on human rights and freedoms demands a collective response—a strategic dance between nations, not merely in policy but in the very fabric of conscience.

To delve deeper into the implications of China’s global power projection, it is crucial to explore the ripple effects across various spheres. Economically, China’s rise has reshaped the global economic landscape. Its Belt and Road Initiative, spanning continents, creates a web of economic dependencies, presenting both opportunities and challenges for those nations involved. While some benefit from infrastructure development and economic partnerships, others find themselves vulnerable to China’s economic leverage. Ultimately, the terms of receiving Chinese aid often leave the recipient turning over ownership of ports, airports, railways, and other key infrastructure to the Chinese.

In the realm of technology, China is a formidable player. With advanced capabilities in artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and quantum computing, the country is positioning itself as a leader in the fourth industrial revolution. This technological prowess not only impacts the global market but also raises concerns about surveillance, privacy, and the potential

weaponization of technology for authoritarian control—something the Chinese Communist Party is already doing at home.

Moreover, China’s increasing military capabilities and assertiveness in territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, have geopolitical implications. The potential for conflicts or tensions in these areas pose a challenge to regional stability and global peace. The international community grapples with how to address and manage these challenges while avoiding the escalation of conflicts.

China’s global power projection also extends to the realm of soft power. Through cultural initiatives, media influence, and educational exchanges, China seeks to shape international narratives and perceptions. This cultural diplomacy aims to foster a positive image of China globally, further enhancing its influence and challenging the dominance of Western narratives.

In the economic and diplomatic arenas, China’s growing influence in international organizations and forums cannot be ignored. As the country becomes a key player in shaping global policies, there is a need for a recalibration of international governance structures to accommodate a multipolar world.

The implications of China’s global power projection are vast and multifaceted. From economic shifts to technological advancements, geopolitical tensions, and soft power strategies, China’s ascent reverberates across the globe. Navigating this complex landscape requires a nuanced understanding and proactive engagement from the international community to ensure a balance between cooperative partnerships and safeguard universal principles of human rights and freedom. The ongoing dialogue and strategic decisions made today will undoubtedly shape the course of international relations in the years to come.

Shane McNeil is an American intelligence professional with over 20 years of experience in the military, as a contractor, and as a government civilian.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

China’s Rise: Unraveling Power and Principle was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, international order is breaking down. Essays by Walter Russell Mead, Victor Davis Hanson, and Nadya Schadow, for example, detail this breakdown, and all reference China and Russia as top culprits. The October 2023 report from the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States likewise weighs in with an acute warning that China, Russia, North Korea (DPRK), (and soon Iran) are now in the business of using nuclear weapons as a coercive tool with which to secure their objectives—raising the danger of nuclear conflict to the highest level since the 1945 dawn of the nuclear age.

American nuclear deterrent strategy is part of the international order and prevented direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Throughout the Cold War, American extended deterrence over NATO and allies in the Pacific prevented, respectively, a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and a repeat of the DPRK invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

During the Cold War’s nearly five-decade-long struggle, the US faced one nuclear-armed peer adversary. In  2022 as the head of US Strategic Command warned, the US will soon face not one but two nuclear-armed peer competitors and do so for the first time in its history.

The unique dangers of this environment are reflected by the manner with which Russia and China see deterrence. Their goals are not designed to prevent war, but to embolden both nations to successfully engage in aggression—such as against Ukraine and potentially against Taiwan. Their nuclear capability acts as an umbrella under which they succeed in preventing the United States from defending the rules-based order. If the US stands down, military aggression succeeds and is not deterred.

Today’s emerging strategic environment contains a change that is not fully appreciated. American conventional military superiority, for example, is believed to help guarantee American and allied security. The US kicked Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, and decimated ISIS a decade later—all through conventional military superiority. American strategy, then and now, relies on superior technology and precision weapons, all backed by the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

However, when President Yeltsin decreed in April 1999 that the Russian military would develop highly accurate and very low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons, he set Russia on a path that now enables President Vladimir Putin to dominate warfare in Europe. China is in the process of adopting a strategy that threatens to introduce limited nuclear strikes into the conventional battlefield mix—“escalate to win”—leading the former commander of US Strategic Command to conclude that American conventional battlefield superiority “cannot hold.”

Without a robust and credible nuclear deterrent to restrain adversaries from using nuclear weapons, American plans to prevail on the conventional battlefield will no longer hold. And equally invalid is the Global Zero assumption that the US can prevail on the battlefield if the United States relies on conventional forces in a conflict that goes nuclear.

What then can the US make of the push by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to rewrite the rules of international behavior? That is, what should Americans make of what Russia describes as the unfair unipolar agenda and Iran describes as the great “global arrogance”? Americans should certainly worry that the nation is unprepared for the years ahead.

China’s growing nuclear arsenal emboldens President Xi Jinping to run roughshod over the South China Sea and its Philippine neighbors—flying military aircraft and steaming naval vessels recklessly in international waters. China may also be assisting Venezuela’s effort to grab oil-rich areas of Guyana. This is all taking place at a time when China is seeking bases on the Persian Gulf and near Gibraltar.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and regular threats to use nuclear weapons need little description. This is at a time when Russia maintains at least a 10 to 1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons over the United States.

Nearly nuclear-armed Iran, partially under the protection of Moscow and Beijing, wages war through Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis. The Iranians and their allies are killing thousands, grabbing commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf, assassinating regime opponents, and ransoming hostages. The American response is, at best, muted.

North Korea recklessly and with impunity fires hundreds of missiles over Japanese and ROK territory and manages a vast international criminal complex of drug running, human trafficking, and weapons transfers, all while imprisoning millions of its own people in the world’s worse gulag. This is all made possible by China. It is through Chinese banks that North Korea avoids sanctions and finances its ongoing mayhem, including its nuclear program.

In short, the United States faces a daunting challenge that it must manage if the American-led international order has any hope of surviving the growing challenges the mayhem brothers present. The time to act is now.

The Mayhem Brothers: Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

In reference to China’s foreign policy strategy, Deng Xiaoping once said: “hide your strength, bide your time.” For three decades, Chinese foreign policy was implemented accordingly. As China realigned itself as a market economy, it seemed content in its role as the  “world’s factory;” at the same time, the rest of the world was content with cheap consumer goods that were produced in China.

In recent years, however, Xi Jinping has overseen a significant shift in China’s foreign policy. China has become increasingly assertive in pursuit of its national security, foreign policy, and economic interests both in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world, from Asia to Latin America. China’s policies and behaviors, from the massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea, are clear indicators that Beijing is done hiding and biding.

Significant amounts of natural resources and secure trade routes for exports are essential to ensure China’s continued economic growth. As the land components of the BRI expand across Central and Southeast Asia, the South China Sea remains a point of geopolitical volatility. The South China Sea is host to some of the world’s most critical shipping lanes. Eighty percent of China’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, strategically positioned between the countries of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia—all of which are American allies.

China seeks to place the South China Sea firmly within its sphere of influence. Doing so would see China move from a position of geopolitical vulnerability to one of strength, effectively maintaining a “Great Maritime Wall” that would ensure China’s unfettered access to both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Consolidating and solidifying its sphere of influence will be the most significant Chinese foreign policy challenge of the twenty-first century while maintaining the status quo and retaining its strategic advantage will be that of the United States.

Estimates currently project that China will be operating a fully-fledged blue-water navy by 2030. It is likely that, around this time, China will be pushing to break through the First Island Chain in the East and South China Seas that are currently controlled by U.S. allies. Until China’s hard power capabilities are fully matured, China will continue to vie for influence using diplomacy and other soft power vehicles.

China’s Soft Power Capabilities

The canonical conception of soft power is centered mainly around ideas like constitutionalism, liberal democracy, and human rights, none of which are on offer from an unapologetically authoritarian China.  While Chinese universities are drawing growing levels of international students, the fact remains that, on the whole, China’s cultural pull is meager. Its most famous artist lives in exile, state media outlet Xinhua gets little traction outside of China, and while K-pop and J-pop are widely played outside of Korea and Japan respectively, Chinese popular music has failed to capture international attention.

China may not have much to offer as an alternative to the American Dream for populations around the world, but for the leaders and governments of developing states, China presents an attractive partner. Rather than seeking investment and financial support from the Bretton Woods institutions, which require governance and human rights reforms, many governments are turning to Beijing, which attaches far fewer strings.

While China’s lack of democratization does damage its international reputation, that damage must be viewed in the context of the relative decline of American soft power. The post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have harmed the global impression of the United States as a “bringer of democracy,” to the extent that such a phrase are now mostly invoked in irony.

In Latin America, the United States’ historical sphere of influence, many states are signing bilateral agreements with China on everything from hydropower projects to the development of telecommunication networks. China’s engagement in Central and South America has resulted in it becoming the region’s largest creditor. Furthermore, as U.S. levels of domestic shale production increase, there will be less U.S. demand for foreign energy. China’s thirst for oil, on the other hand, will continue unabated. For many Latin American nations, the choice of China as an economic partner has been a straightforward one.

The appeal of China as an alternative isn’t due to Beijing’s alignment with specific ideological criteria. Instead, China is appealing because it is an alternative. China profits from the extent to which the U.S. influence declines relative to its own, not from the gravitational pull of some cultural or ideological preponderance. This means that even those pursuing Western-style governance structures will see opportunities to engage with China. For these countries, if the United States won’t purchase foreign oil, or the World Bank won’t fund a development project, China will.

China’s Carrot and Stick

The allure of the Chinese alternative is visible in the South China Sea also. In this rather authoritarian region, liberal democratic values are held in lower regard than economic prosperity and political stability. Singapore stands as a shining example that liberalism is not a prerequisite for success in these metrics. To a working class citizen in an underdeveloped province of Indonesia or the Philippines, democracy—or “democrazy” as it is sometimes termed in the region—can seem stultified and inefficient. China, as it would have the world believe, has demonstrated that its model for global engagement achieves results.

China has attempted to satisfy concerns about the nature of its investment and economic policies. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, founded and led by China, is an attempt to increase engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The AIIB is a signal to countries in the region that Chinese investment isn’t solely for Latin America or Africa. Furthermore, China has been willing to engage in multilateral forums and agreements as it tries to convince its neighbors that its intentions are benign.

However, Beijing has mostly failed in this regard. Chinese military activity has increased in the South China Sea. China’s naval presence in the region has increased dramatically; the Chinese Coast Guard has even escorted fishing trawlers into Indonesian waters. Beijing is working diligently—and successfully—to reduce Taiwan’s international relations.  The Nine-Dash Line (which outlines China’s South China Sea claims) continues to be a significant source of tension; the region is flush with complex, multilateral territorial disputes, any of which could erupt into conflict with little warning. 

China, for its part, never intended to assuage its neighbors’ concerns completely. Instead, China is trying to show that, while it carries a big stick, it can be reasoned with.

Indo-Pacific states are now engaged in a continuous balancing act. Each country is weighing the benefits and costs of their relationship with the established superpower (the United States) against the incipient one (China). While China moves towards the maturation of its hard power, it is perhaps operating within the last phase of biding its time. China has attempted to sell a narrative where it is the reliable power in the Indo-Pacific, rather than a country several thousand miles across the Pacific, from which the echoes of “America first” can be heard.

Alliances are Essential for Maintaining the Status Quo in Southeast Asia

Nevertheless, regional alignment remains with the U.S.—for now. Staring down vociferous Chinese criticism, South Korea placed an American anti-ballistic missile defense system on its soil. Taiwan continues to hedge against a Chinese threat by seeking closer ties with the U.S. as regular arms sales have resumed under the Trump administration. The U.S. has turned a blind eye to Japan’s latent nuclear capabilities and encouraged the evolution of its nominal self-defense force into something more potent.

The United States’ network of alliances in Southeast Asia is intact but fragile. The U.S. must remain credible to each state individually to be credible to all states collectively. Should the U.S. signal a lack of interest—such as by withdrawing from the TPP, publicly questioning the value of a de-facto independent Taiwan, or demonstrating a hesitation to fight alongside South Korea in a conflict with North Korea—its network of alliances may be compromised.

In the twenty-first century battle for influence in the South China Sea, credibility is everything. China currently sees what it perceives as a power vacuum, and it is only too happy to slide into it. Affirming its influence and presence in the Indo-Pacific will be a key U.S. foreign policy objective over the next century. To succeed, the U.S. must act with determination yet delicacy, so that it may maintain the network of alliances that currently safeguards a strategic advantage over an emergent China.  

The Hard Edge of China’s Soft Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

What’s Happening?

The PLA hierarchy is being overhauled to elevate officers more receptive to Beijing’s desires to build a modern military force.

Key Insights

• President Xi’s sweeping reforms aim to develop a more centralized military force that has stronger joint operational capabilities.
• If successful, the reforms could complicate Taiwanese moves towards independence and the ability of the U.S. to operate close to China.
• New capabilities may lead to increased assertiveness in the South China Sea and on the Indian border, but China will not seek to provoke conflict.

One of the key transitions expected from the 19th Congress of the Chinese Community Party (CCP), which commences on October 18, is that of the extensive overhauling of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leadership. In the lead up to the Congress multiple generals on the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the eleven-member top military governing body—have been dropped under suspicion of corruption. President Xi Jinping’s anti-graft crackdown has been ongoing for several years. However, the escalation of investigations into PLA leadership so close to the Congress reflects Beijing’s recognition of the need to spring clean the military’s senior hierarchy and organizational structure to support its desire for a more assertive stance on the world stage.

Centralization, Centralization, Centralization

President Xi laid out the reform’s driving factors in a speech at the beginning of August: “To achieve the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must quicken the pace of building the people’s army into a world-class army… To build a strong army, we must unswervingly adhere to the party’s absolute leadership over the army”. This requires centralization of two forms: in leadership and in organizational structure.

The sacked generals have been replaced by officials whose careers have for long periods been aligned with Xi, signaling the president’s desire to surround himself with those who subscribe to his vision. This is not surprising. Xi’s military reform program is vast and unprecedented; he needs people in top positions who he can rely on to push his desired changes through the inevitable resistance in the military bureaucracy.

The creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) in December 2015 is a sign of the sort of bureaucratic centralization that will continue to accompany the centralization of PLA leadership under the auspices of the reform program. The SSF subsumed the former Third Department of the People’s Liberation Army’s General Staff Department (3PLA), the former Fourth Department (4PLA), and elements of the PLA General Political Department. This gave it a sweeping mandate encompassing all of the PLA’s cyber espionage, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems, information operations, propaganda, and psychological warfare.

The salient feature of the SSF is its creation directly under CMC command, giving Xi’s inner circle close control over its operations. This represents recognition among CCP senior leadership of the limitations inherent in the military bureaucracy that has for so long stifled progress.

From a Green to Purple Military

The increasingly hybrid and non-traditional nature of war and the expanded scope of missions required to respond to modern security threats have exposed PLA shortcomings in contemporary military affairs. The PLA’s long-standing embodiment of a ‘green’ military—one overwhelmingly oriented toward the conduct of large-scale ground combat—means it lacks the ability to operate as a nimble joint force (a ‘purple’ military) capable of meeting contemporary security challenges. As a result, the PLA’s operational capabilities still lag behind the modern militaries of most major powers.

Ever since assuming the CMC leadership in 2012, Xi has unfolded successive stages of military reform to rectify this shortcoming in joint operational capability. In addition to the SSF’s launch, Xi reorganized the previous seven military commands into five as part of wider moves to make the organizational structure leaner and more agile. Additionally, a joint command-and-control system was established. This replaced the previous system whereby each service branch would report to their respective headquarters during peacetime, with an ad hoc headquarters being set up during a crisis.

A further obstacle to an advanced joint operational capability was the below-par quality of PLA officers and leaders. When Deng Xiaoping cut funding to the military in order to focus on China’s colossal economic recovery beginning in 1978, the implicit bargain was that the PLA could devise ways to profit from their services in order to stay afloat. This led to a culture of systemic and institutionalized corruption on a scale so severe that many PLA officials openly admit that China’s ability to wage war is entirely insufficient. Increasing PLA professionalism so that warfighting, rather than profit-making, is the priority has been a key concern of Xi’s reforms; the necessity being that the right personnel must be in place to implement the modernization initiatives.

Improved PLA Deterrence?

The sweeping reform process is geared toward enhancing PLA deterrence capabilities, primarily to prevent further moves by Taiwan towards independence and to dissuade U.S. reconnaissance missions close to China’s coastline as well as U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the Western Pacific. If the centralization initiatives and moves toward improving the PLA’s joint operational capability are successful, then the potency and range of Chinese military power will be closer to meeting these deterrence objectives.

Beijing is highly unlikely to test any newfound military acumen by provoking combat against an adversary. However, a newfound deterrence capability will likely see China become increasingly assertive in its peripheral regions. The expansion of Chinese sovereignty claims in the South China Sea seems the most likely arena in which this will unfold. Here, the PLA Navy and the various PRC civil-military bodies have been successful—and will likely continue to be—in incrementally furthering Chinese territorial designs without triggering military hostility from rival claimants and the U.S. This relatively free run is in contrast to Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands which are more tightly enmeshed in U.S security guarantees, making assertiveness of any degree from China more fraught. Considering that the PLA remains deployed in close proximity to Doklam—a border area dispute ostensibly resolved with India in August—it seems that this region will also continue to be a key theatre in which the PLA will look to test itself.

When considering the scale the reforms, the PLA is undergoing; the human element must be kept in the equation. While the PRC military establishment is unlikely to seek conflict if a volatile situation does arise then the newly anointed vanguard of youthful PLA officials may be keen to prove their worth. The potential then arises for miscalculation. Considering the PLA’s relative failure in the recent Doklam dispute, if the issue were to flare up again further down the track, then PLA leadership may again fail to calibrate goals with capabilities.

As PLA leaders themselves admit, there is still some way to go before the reforms will bear significant fruit; overhauling the leadership style and operational mindset is a generational process. Nonetheless, if the expected leadership reforms at the upcoming Party Congress are implemented and the broader PLA streamlining reforms continue, then the PRC will be on its way to building the military required for Beijing’s broader strategic vision.

The PRC has definitively abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘hide your strength, bide your time’ foreign relations paradigm for Xi’s ‘China dream,’ and Beijing is pushing to restore Chinese pride on the world stage. It now needs a military able to support an assertive foreign policy. The recent military stand-off with India in Doklam exposed PLA shortcomings in being the agile, capable and modern force needed to support PRC assertiveness. As such, expect to see efforts to address these vulnerabilities continue with vigor going forward. If the reforms are executed successfully, then a newfound deterrence capability will change the character of contested areas like the South China Sea.

The PLA in Transition: In Pursuit of the ‘China Dream’ was originally published on Global Security Review.

Security is an inherently contested concept, encompassing a wide variety of scenarios, and is commonly used in reference to a range of personal and societal activities and situations.

Security can be distinguished between day-to-day security at the individual level (nutritional, economic, safety), security for favorable conditions (the rule of law and due process, societal development, political freedom), and security against adverse conditions or threats (war and violence, crime, climate change).

The term security is used in three broad segments. The first is the general, everyday use of the term. In this instance, security refers to the desire for safety or protection. Second is the usage of the word for political purposes; relating to political processes, structures, and actions utilized to ensure a given political unit or entity is secure.  The term “security” is frequently used as a political tool to assign priority to a given issue or perceived threat within the broader political realm.

Third, and finally, “security” can be employed as an analytical concept to identify, define, conceptualize, explain, or forecast societal developments such as security policy, institutions, and governance structures.

Politically speaking, the usage of the term “security” increased drastically in the second half of the twentieth century. Following the allied victory that ended World War II, the United States government’s military and intelligence institutions underwent a major restructuring.

The Advent of National Security

The National Security Act of 1947 not only created a “National Military Establishment,” which would later become the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency; the Act established the National Security Council (NSC) to serve as the primary vehicle for coordinating national security and defense policy across multiple government agencies.

The National Security Advisor oversees the U.S. National Security Council. This structure would become a model for other countries; the governments of Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the United Kingdom, to name a few, all maintain NSCs responsible for coordinating policy and advising heads of government or state on national security issues.

The advent of national security as a concept enabled states, and their political leaders, to rhetorically pursue a particular security policy. National security policy is broader than defense policy or military policy, and it is more than merely preparing for armed conflict or responding to security threats.  National security policy encompasses all of the above while also aiming to avoid war.

National security includes both internal and external security, foreign policy, economic development, and education. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put it, “security is development.”

National security policy became a critical tool for states to protect and further their interests within the broader international system. International security policy, which the United Nations was responsible for promoting, was often at odds with the national security interests of individual member states. Thus, the UN lost much of its influence as the world become increasingly divided between the U.S.-led West and the Soviet Union-led East.

It was in this context that the understanding of national security as a concept expanded from being based mainly on defense and military issues to focusing on those matters in conjunction with diplomatic, economic, and political issues, both domestically and internationally. Two major geopolitical blocs competed for global influence, but differently than great powers of the past. The UN provided a forum for the two superpowers to engage with one another to avoid another, likely far more destructive, global conflict.

A Shifting International Security Landscape

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the international landscape changed fundamentally. The previously bipolar world order was restructured under as a unipolar order. The United States, being the sole remaining superpower, was ideally positioned as the global hegemon.

A new international security framework was required when the Cold War ended. The previously bipolar international system became replaced by a unipolar global order dominated by the United States. Globally, the odds of a major war between two great powers were increasingly low. From the 1990s through the first decade of the twenty-first century, major conflicts were asymmetrical. The United States and its allies, with or without a mandate from the UN Security Council, employed the use of force multiple times arguing that they were doing so on behalf of the international community.

Some actions, such as the first Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, enjoyed broad support from the international community. The only time (to date) that Article 5 of the NATO charter has been enacted was following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These operations were authorized by the United Nations Security Council, which has the responsibility of acting on behalf of all UN member states in matters of global security. The threat of significant conflict between two sovereign states substantially dissipated, for a time.

Security is Everything

With a return to great power competition, national security priorities are shifting. States, rather than non-state actors like terrorist groups or insurgencies, are the primary security threat. The idea that security encompasses more than military and defense issues alone has returned, particularly in light of threats posed by rising nationalism and hostile foreign information operations. The security paradigm of the twenty-first century has expanded to nearly every facet of human life.

Rising nationalism is driving ontological and societal insecurity. This trend is fueled, in part, by economic inequality and stagnation, coupled with an influx of migrants and refugees fleeing violent conflicts, humanitarian disasters, and economic hardship. Unless Western societies implement substantial reforms for integrating immigrants and refugees, existing social divisions will widen, damaging the legitimacy of democratic institutions and polluting national identities with xenophobic sentiments.

There is also growing concern over gang violence, radicalization, transnational crime, privacy threats, and human rights violations worldwide. These issues all impact individual or personal security, and the widespread use of social media and other mass-communications technologies only serve to heighten the emphasis individuals and societies place on individual security.

Issues like climate change and pollution are also increasingly regarded through a security lens. These issues jeopardize human security, meaning they pose a threat to both individuals and humanity as a species.

Finally, cyberspace presents a whole host of new security threats. Cyber attacks not only compromise personal data and steal information, they can cause physical destruction, as well. Critical infrastructure like communications, power plants, water treatment centers, and oil refineries are all vulnerable to a debilitating cyber attack. Such an attack could disrupt operations, inflict sabotage, and even destroy the target facility. Cyber operations can be used by state and non-state actors to complement or augment kinetic operations to achieve a political goal. This is exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine.

In the twenty-first century, the concept of security is all-encompassing. The geopolitical element of great-power competition is further exacerbated by a transnational cyberspace, rapidly developing and increasingly accessible technologies, alongside a global economic system which has created complex inter-dependencies between states. In this new order, the traditional security debate between those who see it as a military and defense matter, and those who subscribe to the broader perspective that everything is security.

In this context, national security objectives can be only be achieved when hard power is seen as a compliment to soft power initiatives such as reducing societal and economic inequities, providing access to education and healthcare, and promoting intellectual and technological innovation.

What is Security? Everything. was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s vast amounts of territory are inhabited by diverse groups of people—each with distinct cultural, political, economic, and religious traditions. Today, the Chinese Communist Party aims to forge a single, homogeneous “Chinese” national identity. Beijing is implementing policies designed to effectuate the forced ethnic and cultural assimilation of minorities like the Tibetans and the Uyghurs of Xinjiang.

This lack of a singular national identity was further compounded by a geographical landscape that impeded the establishment of a multipolar regional order like that of Europe. Europe’s plains and uplands are divided by rivers and mountain ranges—a vast swath of territory that enabled the rise of multiple, sovereign nation-states.

Eventually, European imperialist ambitions would extend this competition to the Americas, Africa, and Asia. As competing sovereign entities, European nation-states were actors an evolving political system that would eventually become known as the balance of power. This system upended the universalist status quo following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The term balance of power gained significance in the aftermath of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

China’s topography isn’t conducive to balance of power politics. Where the Europeans had space to expand and develop distinct national identities, China’s various competing groups had competed with one another for supremacy in the absence of a strong central authority. Each ruling dynasty followed a similar path to power, with minor exceptions.

Controlling the Chinese heartland allows for the control over all of China.

Until the tenth century, the Guanzhong Plain was the primary center of political power. Eventually, this concentration of wealth and power shifted to the North China Plain, which took on increased economic and cultural significance. The North China Plain then connected to the fertile Yangtze Plain. The importance of the North China Plain only increased as the Chinese empire expanded further to the north and the east.

The Yangtze Plain, by contrast, generated dynasties that instantly succumbed either to their weaknesses, like the Southern Song in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries or to their northerly competitors like the short-lived nationalist government did in the twentieth century.

The North China Plain’s political importance is primarily due to its geography. Unlike areas to the south, the North China Plain expands mostly uninterrupted by mountains and has fewer rivers. This facilitated rapid communication by horseback. This resulted in a mostly homogeneous linguistic makeup, relative to the many different languages and dialects that are found throughout southern China. The ability to communicate rapidly across a significant distance allowed political and economic power to be concentrated along the North China Plain.

While the North China Plain was primarily the political center of China after the tenth century, it was control over Zhongyuan (中原)—the Central Plains—that was central to the survival of any ruling dynasty. Each understood that control over the Central Plains—the Chinese heartland—would enable for the control over all of China. This principle, the “Heartland Theory” was laid out by British economic theorist Halford Mackinder in The Geographical Pivot of History.

Historically, China’s international relations were based on suzerainty rather than sovereignty.

The area that comprises the Chinese heartland is less than one-third the size of the European plains, albeit with a substantially higher population. These demographic and geographic variables inhibit the development of a system of competing sovereign states. As such, the concept of sovereignty was nonexistent in imperial China.

Whereas the great powers of Europe looked upon rival powers as peers and understood the concept of sovereignty, China held no such outlook. Up until the nineteenth century, China’s international relations were based on the idea of suzerainty. China considered itself to be without equal, seeing itself as the world’s cultural and political center. It managed its international relations through a tributary system.

The Mandarin word for China is Zhongguo (中国), which translates literally as the “Middle Kingdom.” This Sinocentric perception can be primarily be attributed to China’s geographical reality and the fact that it possessed no notion of national sovereignty. Political scientist Suzanne Ogden has discussed Chinese international relations as being fundamentally based on the concept of universal morality, one that is developed, implemented, and imposed on others by a single entity. This belief of “moral persuasion and cultural superiority” as Ogden puts it, is a significant driver of the narrative of Chinese exceptionalism.

The Chinese emperor was identified as the single “supreme authority under heaven.” The area “under heaven” was, therefore, subject to the emperor’s authority. The sole “supreme authority” was the emperor of the Middle Kingdom. During China’s imperial period, no word akin to “Chinese emperor” existed. In relations with other rulers, even those of European states, the Chinese viewed the emperor as a patriarchal figure to which there was no equal.

East Asia expert Alan M. Wachman explains that the Chinese emperor’s sovereignty or rule over the imperial Chinese state was “potential, not actual, control.” As such, the degree to which the emperor’s authority was accepted depended on the period and location in question. This belief guided the nation through generations of unification, expansion, fragmentation, and decline, prescribing an approach for handling each phase in the cycle.

At times of dynastic corrosion and rebellion, for example, defense and military strategy had been the answer for aspiring leaders. Furthermore, major infrastructure development projects like the Grand Canal and military incursions in the broader region helped a dynasty secure the “mandate of heaven”—thereby legitimizing its hold on power.

The bureaucracy was and is essential to central government’s exercise of political power. Auxiliary tiers of bureaucratic authorities within the central government’s control extended from the heartland to the rest of China, and beyond. Utilizing a tributary system of appointed officials and in rare circumstances, military forces, China’s leaders were able to diffuse their power within Central Asia, into the Korean Peninsula, and throughout Southeast Asia, consolidating their control over the heartland, China, and the world as they saw it.

Chinese notions of geopolitics failed to account for the importance of maritime power.

During the seventeenth century, however, the onset of the maritime era would interrupt China’s illusions of being a separate realm. Naval invaders began arriving on the nation’s shore, where the Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty, China’s last imperial dynasty, would eventually meet them.

Although the Manchu Qing possessed what Mackinder called the “superior mobility of horsemen and camelmen,” their approach to repelling invasions was no different from that of the previous ethnically Han Ming dynasty. Where the Han Ming dynasty constructed the Great Wall to protect against the Manchu, the Qing erected fortifications along the shoreline to keep foreign invaders at bay.

At that point, China hadn’t developed significant naval assets of its own, and its conceptualization of geopolitics wouldn’t include maritime power for three centuries. Even then, the geostrategic implications of robust naval power would garner little notice within China before Japan used its superior naval power to achieve victory over China in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and 1895.

China’s defeat marked the beginning of another era of decline and the demise of the Sinocentric view of international relations. It took the so-called “century of humiliation” for China to comprehend that this worldview was no longer compatible with the rest of the world.

The broader geopolitical strategy which prevailed in the West did not serve the European powers far better. After fighting for control of the Eurasian landmass, what Mackinder dubbed the World Island, they emerged from two world wars and innumerable smaller conflicts only to see that the center of international power had moved across the Atlantic Ocean to the United States.

Contemporary Chinese foreign policy is rooted in the successes and failures of the past.

As maritime and land-based powers (the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively) expanded their spheres of influence across the globe, the combination of territory on the border of the Eurasian landmass and a shoreline seemed to sentence China to be on the margins of the international system.

Nevertheless, under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, China overcame its geographical circumstances, and in the process, its reasoning has evolved. The trials and tribulations it suffered through in the second half of the twentieth century, including the wars on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam, a U.S. naval quarantine, and concurrent pressure from the Soviet Union, encouraged China to realize its capabilities. The geography that once seemed a curse to Chinese theorists now brimmed with possibility.

The country’s location, in the end, provides it access to developed economies overseas and overland access to precious energy assets in Central Asia and the Middle East, an edge that economic theorist Nicholas Spykman identified in the early 1940s. China’s geopolitical goal was now to tap into wealth in the east, and technological advancement in the west, as stated by Chinese scholar Zhang Wenmu.

China’s ascendancy to great power status in the twenty-first century was primarily enabled by a combination of geographic, political, and economic factors. It’s economic growth allowed in this century an unprecedented concentration on naval development. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has grown substantially over the previous two decades, enabling the overseas projection of Chinese military power.

As it has done throughout history, China is embarking on an expansionary course more out of necessity than out of ambition. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, aims to ease the country’s economic and logistical dependence on its eastern coast while developing its less-developed interior regions.

Similarly, Beijing’s increasingly assertive maritime policy is another attempt to secure its access to overseas markets and preclude a challenger from presenting a threat to its multiplying global interests. There are consequences, however, for China’s increasingly aggressive expansionism.

China will attempt to outmaneuver these consequences wherever possible, as it strives to revise the terms of the international order. Chinese expansionism is a policy that will yield unpredictable results after centuries of a Sinocentrist approach to international relations. However, if the U.S. and its allies fail to provide and sustain a viable alternative to counter China’s hegemonic ambitions, Beijing will find it increasingly easier to rewrite the rules of global trade and security.

How Chinese Exceptionalism Fuels an Expansionist Foreign Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.