Traditionally, major nuclear powers have developed and deployed strategic nuclear forces across three legs. This configuration, known as a nuclear triad, includes land-, sea-, and air-based strategic nuclear forces designed to ensure a survivable deterrent by complicating an adversary’s ability to eliminate a country’s nuclear retaliatory capability in a single attack.

First, the land-leg consists of silo-based and/or road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The benefit of this leg is responsiveness in a launch-on-warning scenario and survivability for dispersed road-mobile ICBMs. Some posit that the silo-based systems also function as a “warhead sink”, targets meant to absorb an attacker’s first strike. Second, the sea-leg entails long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Due to the concealed nature of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), the advantage of this leg is survivability. Third, the air leg comprises strategic bombers with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) or bombs. The additional value of this leg is flexibility and visibility. In other words, an air leg is useful for signaling resolve toward adversaries and reassuring allies. There are thus reinforcing military-strategic reasons to have these different capabilities.

In February 2024, the U.S. claimed that Russia is developing a nuclear anti-satellite capability. Such a capability could put current U.S. space-based nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) at risk, and in the future, space-based components of the Golden Dome missile defense shield. Such a capability could enhance the effectiveness of the other legs of Russia’s strategic deterrent, for example, by disabling or destroying space-based missile-defense and warning assets prior to a ballistic missile strike. In short, Russia is adding a space-based leg to its strategic forces, thereby moving towards a nuclear tetrad posture. Subsequently, this commentary will focus on the novel capabilities intended to bolster Russia’s strategic forces.

Recent Russian Tests

During the past few months, Russia has been testing multiple novel, destabilizing nuclear capabilities that are intended to overcome U.S. missile defense systems. First, on October 21, 2025, Russia seemed to have successfully tested the 9M730 Burevestnik/Skyfall ground-launched, nuclear-armed, and nuclear-powered cruise missile. Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, claimed that the missile flew 14,000 kilometers in 15 hours. While the system is slow, its extremely long range can result in an unpredictable flight path, evading missile defense, or even lingering over a specific area as a deterrence signal. Moreover, intercepting such a system can be challenging due to the nuclear-powered engine and subsequent radiation hazard.

A test of the Poseidon/Kanyon long-range, dual-capable, nuclear-powered uninhabited underwater vehicle (UUV) occurred at the end of October 2025. The Poseidon will be deployed on specific nuclear-powered submarines, such as the operation Belgorod and the future Khabarovsk, which is under construction. The obvious advantage of a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered UUV is that it cannot be intercepted easily, but the potential targets are confined to naval assets, such as a carrier strike group, and coastal areas.

More recently, Russia successfully tested the new RS-28 Sarmat heavy ICBM on May 12, 2026. According to Russian media, this system can carry different payloads, such as “10 large nuclear warheads, 16 smaller ones, a combination of warheads and countermeasures, or hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.” Notably, President Putin mentioned that the missile could strike targets “over 35,000 kilometers” and maintain a “suborbital” trajectory.

A suborbital trajectory may reference either the Avangard nuclear-capable, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. However, the open-source range is only over 6,000 kilometers. Or it could indicate that Russia is potentially redeploying a so-called Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) capability. Such a system was deployed by the Soviet Union from 1968 to 1983, namely the R-36-O (RS-SS-9 Mod 3 Scarp). While it only covers a fraction of an orbital trajectory, a FOBS can be considered as a space-based weapon. China is similarly developing a FOBS. An additional theoretical space-based nuclear capability is a multiple-orbit bombardment system (MOBS). The difference between FOBS and MOBS is that the latter system would “complete one or more orbits before descending on its target.”

As stated in the introduction, Russia is developing a proper space-based option, specifically a nuclear anti-satellite capability. Many details of the program remain classified. However, on April 25, 2025, U.S. officials reported that a Russian satellite involved in the development of a space-based nuclear weapon, named Cosmos 2553, was malfunctioning. This is concerning because a nuclear detonation in space can result in a variety  of effects depending on the altitude. For example, a detonation in medium Earth orbit (MEO), at altitudes between 2,000 and 36,000 kilometers, could disrupt navigation systems such as the U.S. Global Positioning System and the European Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System.

Beyond MEO are the geosynchronous and geostationary Earth orbits, used by the U.S. Space Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency System, which is a joint service satellite communications system for tactical and strategic forces, and the Space-Based Infrared System that detects and tracks ballistic missile launches. With a MEO system Russia can hold an asymmetric advantage, as it can threaten the satellite capabilities on which the U.S. and NATO depend heavily. While this nuclear anti-satellite capability, once operational, probably will not stay permanently in orbit, the potential to launch such a system during conflict or war gives Russia an extra option to escalate. In other words, moving from a triad to a tetrad sends a clear strategic message to the adversary and add another way to “escalate to de-escalate.”

The U.S. Response

Given the second Trump Administration’s decision to create the Golden Dome, described by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth as “a next-generation missile defense shield,” the U.S. may have calculated that the renewal of the strategic triad is insufficient to face the two-peer nuclear challenge. Nonetheless, with recent adversary developments of novel capabilities, such as the Burevestnik, Poseidon, and FOBS, and the move towards a nuclear tetrad which include a nuclear anti-satellite capability, Russia can undermine the credibility and effectiveness of such a deterrence-by-denial capability. Therefore, deterrence by punishment, or having credible retaliatory strategic forces, should remain the backbone of U.S. and allied security.

Wannes Verstraete is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and an Associate Fellow at Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, researching European nuclear weapon policies. His work has been published in The Washington Quarterly, European Foreign Affairs Review, Defense & Security Analysis, Journal of Policy & Strategy, and Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

From Triad to Tetrad: Recent Developments in Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word diplōma, meaning “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is defined as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is defined as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.

In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.

China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China’s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.

The United States’ current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.

Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, argue that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”

Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. sanctions intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.

For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is deterrence by denial, as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in Thucydides’ Trap, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.

Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia’s posture. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as described by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”

It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.

While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.

Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.

It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.

Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.

Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.

To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.

The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.

Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.

Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.

A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.

An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.

The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”

Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. 

Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

One of the cornerstones of this modernization is the development of the B-21 Raider, the nation’s first sixth-generation aircraft and second stealth bomber. Poised to replace the B-1 and B-2 bomber fleets, the B-21 embodies the pinnacle of airpower, offering dual-use capabilities and unparalleled lethality. Currently, the B-21 is in its flight test phase, and with multiple aircraft progressing through the assembly line, the B-21 program is largely on schedule and within budget, a testament to its efficient development. Once deployed, this capability will present a significant challenge to potential adversaries and strengthen America’s capacity to project power and effectively threaten vital enemy targets. Low observable stealth and other on-board technologies can ensure successful penetration and retaliation, placing high-value targets at risk in any cost-imposing deterrence strategy, even against the strongest defenses. This threat, along with the fear instilled by the B-21, will certainly cause any aggressor to reconsider attacking the United States or its allies. While the Air Force is currently funded to buy 100 B-21 bombers, the US Strategic Command commander recently testified that 145 units are needed “to cope with the increased threats to U.S. security.”

Complementing the B-21 and B-52 is the nuclear-tipped Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile. Designed to replace the 40-year-old nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) currently deployed on the B-52, the LRSO is a crucial component of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Impressively, the LRSO program is presently on track regarding schedule and budget, which is a welcome anomaly in major defense acquisitions. Its success is further highlighted by three successful flight tests in 2025 alone, demonstrating its maturity and readiness. The critical question, however, remains: how many LRSO missiles does the nation truly need to maintain a robust deterrent? This calculus involves intricate geopolitical considerations, technological advancements, and the evolving threat landscape. As of 2023, the Air Force plans to procure 1,087 missiles, with some 67 to be expended during the development phase.

Across the Atlantic, the NATO nuclear deterrent is undergoing its own transformation, centered on the F-35 fighter jet and the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb. All planned units of the B61-12 have been produced, and the F-35 has achieved certification for nuclear operations. While several European allies have already certified their F-35 jets for this crucial mission, others are still awaiting delivery of their aircraft or are in the process of certification. This phased integration underscores the collaborative nature of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the ongoing commitment to collective security. The F-35 is a nimble, adaptable, high-performance multirole fighter combining stealth, sensor fusion, and extraordinary situational awareness, enhancing the lethality of NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability.

The venerable senior citizen B-52H Stratofortress, a workhorse of the bomber fleet, is also receiving a suite of vital upgrades. These enhancements include new engines, radar systems, and upgraded nuclear communications systems.  While progress is being made on these upgrades, they are encountering higher costs and longer timelines than initially projected. Nevertheless, the program is not “off the rails” and remains a critical effort to extend this enduring platform’s operational life and capabilities. When complete, the B-52J will be a more fuel-efficient, reliable, modern, and better-integrated platform going into the second half of the 21^st century. Should the B-52J modernization effort be overly delayed or cancelled, it will likely be replaced with additional B-21 bombers.

Finally, the Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program represents a monumental undertaking. Beyond merely replacing the now 50-year-old Minuteman III missile, Sentinel involves a complete overhaul of the vast infrastructure spanning five missile fields. Following a Nunn-McCurdy recertification last year, all three stages of the missile, including the post-boost section, have undergone successful testing. The next crucial steps include laying some 7,000 miles of fiber optic cables across five states to establish robust command and control capabilities for the deployed weapons. A significant cost driver that contributed to the Nunn-McCurdy breach was the escalating cost of rebuilding the individual launch facilities. General Gebara reminded the audience that with 450 launch facilities (LF), any growth or cost increases in one LF can be multiplied by 450. Therefore, a $1 million increase in the design, construction, or reconditioning of one LF equates to adding half a billion dollars to the program, highlighting the scale and complexity of this vital modernization effort. General Bussiere, commander of the Air Force’s Global Strike Command, describes the Sentinel ICBM project as “the largest works project ever taken in fifty years [likely] since Eisenhower’s interstate program.”

The birth of the United States Air Force coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age and the rapid escalation of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence quickly became a central and defining mission, profoundly shaping USAF structure, development, and doctrine throughout the Cold War and beyond. In today’s complex era of great power competition, the USAF is, as it should be, deeply committed to modernizing and revitalizing its nuclear deterrent. While programs like the LRSO and B-21 demonstrate impressive progress, others, such as the B-52 upgrades and Sentinel ICBM, face inherent challenges. These efforts, though costly and complex, are essential to maintaining a credible and effective deterrent in a dynamic global environment, ensuring national security for decades to come. This must be America’s number one priority!

As the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley once affirmed, as a believer in humanity, he deplored the use of the atomic bomb; however, as a soldier, he respected it. The United States should be prepared to utilize the full psychological and military impact of the bomb to prevent a war and, if attacked, to win the war. He was right in October 1949, and his sentiment remains valid today; the Air Force must ensure that its segment of the strategic nuclear triad is prepared to deter war well into the century.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

The Air Force’s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary Hegseth, a veteran with combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, emerged from a military culture defined by counterinsurgency warfare, rapid technological adaptation, and constrained rules of engagement. His formative years were shaped by the leadership of prominent figures like General (Ret.) David Petraeus and General (Ret.) James Mattis, who emphasized adaptive leadership, decisive action, and strategic communication. The norms of that era often prioritized minimizing civilian casualties, leveraging asymmetric warfare, and coalition-based operations. Given this background, Hegseth’s emphasis on restoring a warrior ethos and projecting unyielding strength likely stems from his own military experiences and the influential leaders who shaped his perspective.

Hegseth’s message signals a deliberate shift away from the strategic ambiguity that may embolden adversaries. The emphasis on deterrence through strength suggests a belief that Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship, China’s rapid arsenal expansion, and North Korea’s unpredictability stem from a perception of American hesitancy. One might observe that the concept of strategic ambiguity, once hailed as a nuanced tool of deterrence, now appears as outdated as the punch-card computers that once calculated nuclear trajectories.

This shift reflects a growing concern about the credibility of extended deterrence and the need for more explicit signaling of American resolve. By modernizing the nuclear triad and reaffirming America’s willingness to use force, the Pentagon aims to reinstate fear as a core pillar of deterrence.

The emphasis on reviving the warrior ethos implies that nuclear deterrence must be as much about mindset as it is about capability. It is striking to note that the last time a Secretary of Defense emphasized a similar warrior ethos, the world was still reeling from the Cuban Missile Crisis, a stark reminder of the high stakes involved. The focus on a warfighting mentality suggests a move away from the bureaucratic approach that dominated nuclear policy in recent decades. It is a move toward a more operational and combat-focused posture.

The intent may be to move away from a risk-averse approach, ensuring that warfighters at all levels understand nuclear deterrence as an active, rather than passive, responsibility. This shift could result in more frequent readiness drills, a recalibration of nuclear employment thresholds, and strategic force posturing that prioritizes offensive capabilities over restraint.

China is projected to reach nuclear parity with the US by 2035, while Russia continues aggressive arsenal expansion and hybrid warfare tactics. Hegseth’s directive appears motivated by a desire to prevent a world where nuclear deterrence is no longer dictated by American supremacy. This shift away from the established norms of strategic restraint is a necessary adaptation to a multipolar world, or it could be a dangerous escalation that precipitates a new arms race.

There is an inherent tension between maintaining strategic dominance and fostering international stability. Modernization efforts—accelerated intercontinental ballistic missile production, hypersonic weapons, and a stronger nuclear-capable bomber fleet—align with an intent to sustain America’s dominant position before near-peer threats fully materialize.

The call to rebuild the military by rapidly fielding emerging technologies may suggest a strategic push toward AI tools that enable improved nuclear command and control, quantum-resistant encryption, and space-based early warning systems. The intent behind these investments appears twofold. First, there is a desire to ensure American nuclear forces cannot be neutralized by cyber, space, or electronic warfare. Second, there is a desire to establish deterrence dominance through superior technological integration before adversaries close the gap.

If this is a return to a bold, George S. Patton-style of leadership, where decisive action and unwavering resolve are paramount, it could also risk a dangerous overemphasis on military solutions at the expense of diplomacy. This approach raises crucial questions about the balance between technological innovation and strategic prudence.

Hegseth’s message reaffirms commitment to American allies, signaling that extended deterrence remains a central policy. The intent appears to be preempting concerns of American disengagement from NATO and Indo-Pacific security commitments while simultaneously warning adversaries, especially China, that American nuclear resolve is non-negotiable. Some may assume that a more aggressive posture inherently breeds instability, paradoxically, it could also create a more stable balance of power by clearly defining red lines and deterring potential aggression.

This strategy hinges on the assumption that adversaries will respond rationally to demonstrations of force. This could translate into increased nuclear deployments to allied territories; stronger trilateral deterrence initiatives between the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS); and a renewed focus on NATO’s nuclear-sharing agreements to counter Russian regional threats.

Secretary Hegseth’s “Message to the Force” signals an intentional and urgent shift in US nuclear strategy—one motivated by a belief that deterrence is eroding and must be aggressively rebuilt. Whether through new weapons systems, a hardened warrior mindset, or the integration of cutting-edge technology, the modernization push under his tenure will likely define the next era of American nuclear policy.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Hegseth’s Doctrine: A Rebirth and Redefinition of American Deterrence? was originally published on Global Security Review.

• General Anthony Cotton: Emphasizes the importance of the Sentinel project and regrets the simultaneous tackling of multiple strategic modernization programs. ​
• Strategic Command: Highlights the vital role of the Nuclear Triad in national security. ​
• USAF Vice Chief of Staff General James Slife: Stresses the necessity of maintaining a nuclear arsenal. ​

Essay of the Week: Ukraine, Proliferation, & Deterrence ​

• Peter Huessy: Discusses the complexities of the US and NATO’s approach to Ukraine, the implications of a ceasefire, and the need for a robust deterrent against Russian aggression. ​
• Key Points:
  • Historical failures in responding to Russian aggression. ​
  • Current defense spending and military assistance to Ukraine.
  • The importance of a strategic security arrangement involving NATO and Ukraine. ​

Event of the Week ​

• Defense Conference: General Anthony Cotton calls for more B-21 bombers and underscores the urgency of nuclear modernization. ​

Administration Developments ​

• Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth: Plans to increase spending on space operations, highlighting the importance of the space domain in future warfare. ​

The AF Chiefs Corner ​

• Air Force Chief Gen. David Allvin: Sees an opportunity for additional funding for missile defense and nuclear modernization. ​

The Commanders Corner

• General Cotton: Advocates for increased production rates of B-21 bombers and more Long Range Stand-Off weapons due to evolving security threats. ​

Strategic Developments ​

• Taiwan: Defense budget to exceed 3% of GDP due to rising threats from China. ​
• NATO Air Command: Demonstrates interoperability and transatlantic unity through Bomber Task Force missions. ​

Top Essays of the Week ​

• Essay #1: Discusses the uncertainty surrounding US extended deterrence guarantees and the potential for nuclear proliferation among US allies. ​
• Essay #2: Emphasizes the importance of maintaining the US nuclear umbrella over its allies. ​

Congressional Budget Developments ​

• Defense Spending Tips: Recommendations for cuts and increases in various defense programs, including missile procurement and Air Force programs. ​

Economic Developments

• Stephen Moore: Highlights the shift towards a production-driven economy and its impact on inflation and economic growth. ​

Proliferation Concerns ​

• Colin Demarest: Discusses the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the implications for international security. ​

Ukraine Corner ​

• Clifford May: Advocates for a realistic goal of achieving a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, leading to a frozen conflict. ​

Media Error of the Week ​

• Wall Street Journal: Criticized for suggesting negotiations with Houthis terrorists, which could lead to endless conflict.

ICBM EAR Report Week of March 17-23 was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Canyon begins her article by employing the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of where diplomacy rather than military force carried the day. Her explanation is simple disinformation and misunderstands how nuclear deterrence works.

Early in the crisis, President John F. Kennedy moved nuclear-armed bombers to Air Force bases in Florida, lining them up wing tip to wing tip, as a visible display of the nuclear hell both Cuba and the Soviet Union would face if Nikita Khruschev did not remove nuclear weapons from Cuba. That signal was seen by the Soviets.

President Kennedy also called the then-recent deployment of Minuteman I intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) his “ace in the hole.” He credited his ICBMs with forcing the Soviets to back down. Minuteman I was very much American escalation dominance that the Soviets could not match.

He also implemented a blockade around Cuba. When the Soviet submarine B-59 attempted to run the blockade, the USS Beale depth charged the submarine. Rather than launching its nuclear torpedoes against the Beale, B-59 retreated.

Contrary to Canyon’s assertion that diplomacy carried the day, it was military strength and nuclear superiority that carried the day. General Secretary Khruschev knew that the United States had a superior nuclear arsenal and backed down.

Arms Racing

Canyon is also concerned that the United States will invite an arms race should it develop the full spectrum of capabilities that are required to effectively deter China, North Korea, and Russia. The reality is the race has already begun. The only participant that is yet to leave the starting block is the United States.

Russian strategic nuclear modernization is nearly complete, with Russia also maintaining at least a 10 to 1 advantage in theater nuclear weapons. China is adding at least 100 new nuclear weapons per year and will soon outmatch the United States.

North Korea is now capable of striking the homeland with intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Kim Jung Un, North Korea will build an arsenal of 500 nuclear weapons.

It is only the United States that is yet to field a new nuclear delivery system. The newest American nuclear delivery vehicle, the B2 bomber, is three decades old.

Contrary to the aspirations of nuclear disarmament advocates in the United States, not a single nuclear-armed adversary is willing to follow the United States down the path of disarmament. The post–Cold War era, three decades now, is a glaring example of the failures of the disarmament delusion.

Canyon is completely wrong when she asserts that China and Russia are modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals because of American nuclear modernization. They began their own nuclear modernization and expansion efforts long before the United States began its effort to replace aging weapons with new variants.

It was not American nuclear weapons that drove Chinese and Russian modernization to begin with. It is American superiority in conventional precision-guided weapons, which neither adversary can match, that led them to follow a strategy like President Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look Policy.

For some reason, Canyon claims that the ability to maintain nuclear escalation dominance is advocating “unchecked militarization.” Nothing could be further from the truth. Nuclear forces are a deterrent to conventional military aggression. Historically, great powers wage war four to six times per century, killing millions in the process. Nuclear weapons put an end to great power war and led to a more than 90 percent decline in conflict-related casualties. Lest Canyon forget, the last great power war, World War II, led to the death of 70 million people and saw the United States spend almost half of its gross domestic product fighting the war.

Canyon, like many in the disarmament community, mistakenly believes that weakness leads to peace. They incorrectly impose their own aversion to conflict onto Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jung Un. In reality, these authoritarians, who are actively seeking to topple the American-led international order, only see American passivity as weakness and an opportunity to coerce the United States.

Peace through strength is no mere slogan. It is the most accurate and effective way to deter America’s adversaries and ensure they never believe that they can achieve their objectives through conflict.

Defense Spending

Canyon also argues that defense spending is too high and the need to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad is wasteful. Instead, she proposes increasing spending on social programs. Any examination of federal, state, and local budgets illustrates that Canyon is again incorrect.

In 2024, the federal budget was $6.75 trillion. Of this, $841.4 billion, 14 percent, went to defense spending. Of defense spending, about $50 billion was dedicated to current operation and modernization. This was about 6 percent of defense spending and less than 0.1 percent of federal spending.

Federal, state, and local governments spent more than $10 trillion in 2024. The federal government alone spent 69 percent of its budget on social programs. That is approximately $4.6 trillion—more than all federal revenue collected ($4.4 trillion) in 2024. Excluding federal pass-through funds, state and local governments spent an additional $4 trillion in 2024. State and local governments spent 65 percent of their budgets on social programs—another $2.6 trillion. Federal, state, and local governments spent $1.8 trillion just on anti-poverty programs—more than twice the defense budget.

According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency that runs these two programs, Medicare and Medicaid lose more than $100 billion every year to waste, fraud, and abuse. That is twice the cost of the entire nuclear enterprise. Surprisingly, Canyon is not bothered by this and other waste, fraud, and abuse in federal, state, and local programs. They are affordable. In her mind, it is nuclear spending that is breaking the bank.

The simple fact is that social justice warriors have never seen a dollar they do not want to spend. After all, more than 100 percent of federal revenues are already spent on their preferred programs. State and local governments spend two-thirds of their budgets on social programs. Americans also spend more than $450 billion a year in charitable donations. Despite the spending on social programs, the demand only grows.

Defense spending, however, is at a 70-year low. At 3.4 percent of gross domestic product, these rates of defense spending have not been seen since prior to World War II.

Thus, when Canyon argues that too much is spent on defense and nuclear modernization, she is flat wrong. It is just the opposite.

Americans now live in a nation where social programs crowd out defense spending at a time when avoiding war is only possible by fielding a military and a nuclear force that is powerful enough to not only deter Russian aggression, but Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian as well. That can never be done by good intentions. Weakness is provocative. Peace comes through strength and an unwillingness by aggressive adversaries to challenge the United States.

Canyon is wrong in her reading of history, wrong in her understanding of strategy, and wrong about government spending. The time is now to have a guns-versus-butter debate because it may soon be too late.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Escalation Dominance Does Matter was originally published on Global Security Review.

This week’s EAR Report brings critical updates on global security dynamics in a world fraught with geopolitical tensions and nuclear threats. ​ From the evolving nuclear doctrines of major powers to the strategic imperatives of missile defense, we provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of international security. ​ Understanding these developments is crucial for policymakers and the public as nations grapple with the complexities of deterrence and defense. ​

Strategic Developments: New Russian Nuclear Doctrine Summary ​

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ratified a revised nuclear doctrine, emphasizing nuclear deterrence against potential adversaries, including countries and military alliances that view Russia as an enemy. ​ The doctrine allows for nuclear responses to significant threats to Russia’s sovereignty, even from conventional weapons, and includes the possibility of nuclear retaliation if Belarus, as part of the Union State, is attacked. ​

Homeland Missile Defense ​

North Korea, Russia, and China continue to enhance their long-range missile capabilities, posing a threat to the U.S. homeland. ​ The next U.S. president must prioritize restoring credible missile defense. ​ Recommendations include developing space-based sensors for persistent missile tracking, advancing boost-phase intercept technologies, and creating a multi-layered defense framework incorporating land, sea, air, and space interceptors. ​ The goal is to counter both rogue state missile salvos and limited nuclear launches from major powers. ​

Deterring the Nuclear Dictators: Foreign Affairs by Madelyn Creedon and Franklin Miller ​

The U.S. faces renewed nuclear threats from Russia, China, and North Korea. ​ The Biden administration has updated nuclear-targeting guidance to deter these adversaries simultaneously. ​ However, modernization efforts for the U.S. nuclear deterrent are hampered by industrial base limitations, material shortages, and funding gaps. ​ The next administration should expedite modernization without extensive policy reviews, focusing on replacing aging systems and enhancing the defense industrial base. ​

Key Takeaways

1. Russian Nuclear Doctrine: Emphasizes deterrence against adversaries and allows nuclear responses to significant threats, including conventional attacks. ​
2. Missile Defense: Urgent need for a comprehensive, layered missile defense system incorporating advanced technologies and space-based sensors. ​
3. U.S. Nuclear Deterrence: Updated guidance to deter multiple adversaries; modernization efforts must be accelerated to address current and future threats. ​
4. Industrial Base Challenges: Modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is hindered by industrial limitations and funding issues. ​
5. Strategic Imperatives: The U.S. must maintain a robust nuclear triad and enhance its defense capabilities to ensure national and allied security. ​

ICBM EAR Report – November 22 was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the webinar, Lowther briefly touched on the alternative and numerically weaker concept of sizing America’s nuclear triad based upon “strategic sufficiency.” This approach would mean deploying just enough nuclear warheads to launch a counterforce first strike on the deployed nuclear delivery platforms of America’s adversaries. For example, it may be possible to strike eight nuclear-capable bombers, which carry 12 nuclear weapons each, with one intercontinental ballistic missile. Thus, the ratio, in this case, would be one American nuclear weapon for 96 (8×12) adversary nuclear weapons. One is strategically sufficient for 96.

Unfortunately, there are a number of challenges with strategic sufficiency as a concept. Let me explain.

It should first be noted that nuclear weapons do not exercise effective deterrence simply by their existence in the American inventory, nor merely by matching friendly weapons to enemy weapons on paper. American planners need to go much further.

The US needs to base its nuclear deterrent arsenal size, and its nuclear deterrent strategy and posture, on a realistic evaluation of possible scenarios. Adversaries will certainly perform such risk analysis. If America’s nuclear readiness falls short, in their minds, adversaries may seek openings to attack.

The American nuclear deterrent needs to include survivable, damage-limiting, and damage-equalizing second-strike capabilities, against both numerous enemy armed forces and extensive enemy countervailing (political control) assets. The US should also have the ability to restore intra-war deterrence and to have leverage during post-war armistice talks, a significant further number of warheads and delivery platforms deployed or in secure stockpiles.

Strategic Sufficiency

In the webinar, Lowther offers as an illustrative case where China’s new missile field deploys three hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), each with eight warheads. In this case, strategic sufficiency may require fifty ICBMs to hold the three hundred Chinese missiles at risk. Dynamic parity, in contrast, would dictate the US should field an arsenal closer in size to China’s, which in this limited example would be 300 missiles with a similar number of warheads.

Admittedly, strategic sufficiency is attractive for a country with a smaller arsenal, but it is also attractive to an adversary with a larger arsenal. The adversary may see strategic sufficiency as a strategy of weakness and built on a lack of will. The approach has a number of flawed assumptions.

First, strategic sufficiency assumes that all American nuclear weapons will succeed in striking their targets and destroying them. While American delivery systems are reliable, they have no experience under the harsh conditions of a nuclear conflict. Some weapons may malfunction, others will be destroyed in a first strike, weapons may not hit their target, and some will be destroyed by enemy defensive systems.

This is why targeteers often allocate two or more warheads to one enemy silo, for example, which is generally considered necessary for a successful counterforce strike. On this count alone, strategic sufficiency underestimates sizing requirements.

Second, a more serious flaw is the assumption that the United States can always launch a counterforce first strike. An adversary’s remaining weapons will still be in their silos, or in their hangars, when American warheads arrive. This is a foolish assumption. The US is unlikely to initiate a first strike, which means it must be able to absorb a strike and respond. Strategic sufficiency does not allow that.

Making the situation much worse is that China, North Korea, and Russia possess nuclear delivery platforms that are mobile, making them far harder to strike. Ballistic missile submarines at sea are, for now, hard to strike. Mobile ICBM launchers move positions constantly, and might also be camouflaged, for example, while inside shipping containers or railroad freight cars. Strategic bombers can maintain airborne alert. Other ICBM launchers can be hidden inside caves or tunnels until the moment they are ready to fire.

Third, the US is highly unlikely, as said above, to employ nuclear weapons in a first strike. A number of wargames played by the military and senior government leaders only underscores the cultural aversion to nuclear weapons use. This means the homeland is likely to face a nuclear attack before the president responds with whatever nuclear weapons remain. If the American arsenal is already smaller than the arsenals of adversaries, the US becomes an inviting target for a second strike or a strike from a different adversary.

Fourth, strategic sufficiency gives allies the impression that the United States has too few weapons to defend North America and both Europe and Asia. This belief may lead allies to seek their own arsenals.

As McGiffin and Lowther argue, dynamic parity is designed to address these specific challenges. China, North Korea, and Russia are very clearly looking to topple the American-led international system. Should the United States seek to build an arsenal that is too small to effectively deter the Authoritarian triad discussed here, not only will Americans suffer, but so will the free world. Moving from 5 percent of the defense budget to modernize the current arsenal to 8 to 10 percent of the defense budget to build the arsenal needed is not in the “too hard to do” category. It is time to recognize that strategic sufficiency is not sufficient.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Strategic Sufficiency Is Not Enough was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump said, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.

Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which highlighted the need to revitalize the nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.

Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term

Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russian violations, and signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.

Under Trump, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead, which was deployed on Ohio-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the Sentinel ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.

However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “fire and fury” rhetoric toward North Korea and his famous twitter threat that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.

While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.

 The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors

Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a contest for top national security positions, with figures like Richard Grenell and Elbridge Colby emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for focusing military efforts on countering China, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.

The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.

What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?

If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the Columbia-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.

A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.

At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.

 Conclusion

 A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.

Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cirincione begins his article, “President Joe Biden has a terrible nuclear policy. A re-elected President Donald Trump’s would be much worse.” President Trump, should he win, will likely follow the path of every new president since 1994 and conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, and, like the last three presidents, follow a path that reflects the threat facing the United States. Until something concrete takes place, Cirincione is merely speculating by attributing the plan of some conservative organizations, Project 2025, to Donald Trump.

Cirincione also willfully misrepresents the record of the Biden administration when he writes that Biden has “authorized the largest nuclear weapons budgets since the Cold War.” This suggests President Biden supports nuclear weapons. The Biden Nuclear Posture Review called for the retirement of the B-83, the nation’s only megaton class nuclear capability. Biden also proposed canceling the sea launched cruise missile-nuclear (SLCM-N) and eliminating the nuclear hedge. Neither of these efforts are the actions of a man who supports the nuclear arsenal. Biden, however, had the misfortune of dealing with a reality that was inconsistent with his ideology, something that is never a problem for disarmament groups because they have no responsibility to protect the country.

Cirincione claims that Trump’s nuclear policy is informed by the “new conservative manifesto Project 2025.” When Trump was recently asked about Project 2025 he said that he has never heard of it. He even went on Truth Social to write, “I know nothing about Project 2025.” This is certainly not something Trump would lie about. Trump is, in fact, relying on a small number of officials from his first administration for advice and guidance. He does not need the Heritage Foundation or any other think tanks to tell him what to think.

Understood for what it says, rather than the conspiratorial insinuations of many progressives, Project 2025’s nuclear arsenal related proposals are largely accurate and well-reasoned. An honest assessment of the coming decade clearly indicates a need to expand the American nuclear arsenal to counter a growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capability. When Cirincione writes, “These proposals [from Project 2025] would add unnecessary new weapons to an already expansive nuclear arsenal” he is merely denying the reality facing the United States.

This country is already well behind Russia in the size and capability of its nuclear arsenal and will fall behind China within a decade. The United States will soon face three autocratic regimes with a collective arsenal several times greater than the American arsenal.

Cirincione goes on to criticize every nuclear policy prescription in Project 2025, suggesting that none are necessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to his critique, prioritizing nuclear weapons programs over other defense programs is a wise move. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of American defense policy—ensuring that adversaries think twice before considering aggressive action against the United States.

Interestingly, Cirincione fails to acknowledge that former President Barack Obama made an agreement with the US Senate in 2010 in which the Senate agreed to ratify New START in return for modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden all honored this agreement in the main, even if they sought change on the margins.

Cirincione even goes so far as to criticize modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and production complex. This is not a radical move but a sensible effort that was needed decades ago. The desire of Joe Cirincione and other disarmament advocates to allow the nuclear weapons complex to atrophy into obsolescence is a dangerous path that only wealthy idealists with tall fences can contemplate. It is only because of three decades of neglect that Americans are now forced to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad.

In other words, Joe Cirincione and his fellow travelers in the disarmament community advocated for the actions that led the nation down the path it is now on. Today, both Republican and Democrat administrations recognize the trouble facing the nation, even as disarmament advocates complain about efforts to fix the problems they helped create. It is simply an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect at work.

Tying Donald Trump to Project 2025 and vilifying both is an effort to obfuscate and avoid having a substantive discussion about the nuclear breakout of China, Russia’s nuclear threats, and other meaningful issues that challenge the mantra of the disarmament community.

What is perhaps most disappointing is just how far the Bulletin has fallen. Rather than engaging in meaningful discussion on nuclear issues, the journal is increasingly publishing articles that read more like an excerpt from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks or Herbert Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” They, like Cirincione’s own article, seem more interested in advancing the radical ideology of modern-day Marxists than having a fact-based debate over the role of nuclear weapons in national security. This penchant for the absurd makes it hard to take a once-conscientious publication and its contributors seriously.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Joe Cirincione is Wrong about Donald Trump was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Nuanced Continuity

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will likely continue the multilateral strategy that characterizes the Biden administration. As vice president, she demonstrated a deep commitment to international alliances and a keen understanding of national security. This suggests that a Harris administration will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national defense, while also advocating for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Additionally, a Harris administration will benefit from a seasoned foreign policy team. Her national security advisor, Phil Gordon, and his deputy, Rebecca Lissner, are experienced Washington hands who advocate for a balanced approach to American leadership. Their influence will likely steer Harris towards policies that emphasize deterrence without escalation and maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal while pursuing arms reductions.

Modernization with a Purpose

The Biden-Harris administration supports nuclear modernization as a component of national security. This includes updating existing systems and ensuring that the nuclear triad’s land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers remain effective and secure. Modernization efforts are aimed at addressing the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia, who are investing in advanced nuclear capabilities.

Additionally, during her tenure as a senator, Harris endorsed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived weaknesses. Her support for modernization reflects a recognition that technological advancements and evolving geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reliable and secure nuclear arsenal. This perspective aligns with her broader commitment to national defense and security.

Generational Shift in Perspective

Kamala Harris represents a generational shift. Unlike her predecessors, she brings a globalized outlook shaped by her immigrant heritage and diverse experiences. This worldview is likely to influence her approach to nuclear policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of global security. Harris has frequently spoken about the importance of addressing modern threats such as climate change and human rights, which she sees as intertwined with traditional security concerns. This broader perspective could lead to a more integrated approach to deterrence, considering a wider array of factors influencing global stability.

Engagement with Allies

Harris’s extensive engagement with international partners signals a strong commitment to collective security. Her active participation in high-profile international summits, such as the Munich Security Conference, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, and the Conference of Paris (COP) climate summit in Dubai, underscores her belief in the power of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Harris has also demonstrated unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, reflecting her dedication to upholding international norms and supporting allies under threat.

Under her leadership, the US is likely to continue strengthening NATO and other strategic partnerships—presenting a unified front against nuclear threats. Harris’ approach would emphasize the importance of solidarity among allies to ensure that deterrence strategies are robust and effective. Her support for multilateralism suggests she will work closely with allies to enhance deterrence capabilities, sharing intelligence and coordinating military strategies to address potential nuclear challenges.

Moreover, Harris’ experience on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, combined with her background as a prosecutor, equips her with the skills to navigate complex security issues and engage in rigorous policy discussions. This expertise is instrumental in developing nuanced and comprehensive approaches to nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the US and its allies are well-prepared to counter any threats.

Strategic Restraint and Humanitarian Concerns

Harris’ stance on Israel and Gaza underscores her readiness to challenge established policies when humanitarian concerns are prominent. This approach reflects a broader principle that could significantly impact her handling of American nuclear deterrence. Harris’ sensitivity to the human costs of conflict suggests a preference for strategies that go beyond military force. Harris’ focus on humanitarian issues and her critical stance on the conduct of international conflicts indicate that she will prioritize the development of policies that not only ensure national security but also reflect ethical considerations.

Policy Evolution and Public Sentiment

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will also reflect evolving public sentiment, particularly among younger Americans who prioritize issues like climate change and human rights. This demographic shift indicates a growing preference for a security strategy that integrates traditional defense measures with contemporary global challenges.

Her administration could leverage this support to advance comprehensive security policies that address both traditional and emerging threats. This means not only maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to deter adversaries but also incorporating measures to combat climate change, promote human rights, and address cyber threats. By doing so, Harris can appeal to a new generation of Americans who demand a more holistic and forward-thinking approach to national and global security.

Conclusion

A Kamala Harris presidency may be positioned well to navigate the complexities of nuclear deterrence with a blend of strategic continuity and innovative evolution. Harris’ experience and commitment to multilateralism suggests a firm dedication to maintaining a credible and secure nuclear arsenal while actively pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Her support for nuclear modernization underscores the necessity of a reliable deterrent in the face of evolving global threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach to national security.

At the same time, Harris offers a generational shift in perspective and emphasis on global interconnectedness. Her focus on integrating humanitarian concerns, strategic restraint, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a more balanced and ethical approach to deterrence. This perspective aligns with her commitment to addressing contemporary global challenges, such as climate change and human rights.

Harris’ extensive international engagement and support for multilateral cooperation highlight her belief in the power of alliances to bolster deterrence and manage nuclear risks. Her administration will likely continue to strengthen NATO and other strategic partners—ensuring that American nuclear policy is both robust and cooperative.

As public sentiment evolves, particularly among younger generations who prioritize a holistic security strategy, Harris’ approach may resonate strongly with voters. By integrating traditional defense measures with contemporary priorities, her presidency may offer a nuanced and forward-thinking approach to nuclear deterrence, addressing both immediate security needs and long-term global stability.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

What a Kamala Harris Presidency Means for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the B-21 bomber enters the Air Force inventory the number of nuclear-capable bomber bases sees very little change. With the nation preparing for the geopolitical era ahead, it is time to discuss the re-commissioning of Cold War–era United States Air Force (USAF) bases, whose geographic positions can once again play an important role in deterring the axis of autocracy that is forming in opposition to American and Western leadership.

The changing strategic landscape and re-emergence of great-power competition should prompt discussion of renewing a committed focus towards strategic deterrence and the nuclear capabilities needed to deter China, North Korea, and Russia. Many Cold War–era bases were strategically located to project power and respond to threats. Re-commissioning these bases could provide needed dispersal for a bomber force that is located at only three bases. While upgrades and modernization are necessary, existing infrastructure at bases that remain in use by National Guard units, for example, or other organizations could significantly reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient bomber leg of the nuclear triad. Tankers and other supporting components to the bomber mission would also benefit.

Utilizing existing bases could minimize environmental impacts, construction costs, and impact on local communities. While the Base Realignment and Closure effort that followed the Cold War’s end allowed the United States to reduce defense spending through dramatic cuts to infrastructure, the three-decade hiatus from great-power competition is over and the consolidation impacted deployability and introduced strategic force vulnerabilities. Today’s accelerating threat requires the urgent re-establishment of a ready network of dispersal and forward bases.

In tandem with re-commissioning Cold War–era Air Force bases, the strategic value of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) must also be considered. As a critical asset in ensuring energy security, the SPR provides a buffer against potential disruptions in oil supply that could arise from geopolitical tensions or conflicts. Ensuring that military operations are not hampered by fuel shortages is paramount, especially when considering the logistical demands of dispersed air bases. By maintaining and potentially expanding the SPR, the US can safeguard its military readiness and resilience, ensuring that energy constraints do not undermine strategic deterrence and defense capabilities.

The expansion of the American strategic nuclear arsenal—including increasing the number of SSBNs, making Sentinel road-mobile, and acquiring more than the planned 100 B-21 stealth bombers, which are all required in the current strategic environment—underscores the need for re-commissioned bases. Not only are these bases useful for dispersal of bombers, but they have the potential to offer areas from which road-mobile ICBMs can disperse.

Admittedly, significant investment is required to modernize shuddered bases, including upgrades to runways, hangars, communication systems, and security. Environmental assessments and remediation efforts may also be necessary to address potential contamination from previous operations, adding to the cost and timeline. Re-commissioning could also disrupt local communities and raise concerns about noise pollution, safety, and environmental impacts, necessitating careful planning and community engagement. However, many towns devastated by the closure of bases would gladly welcome their return.

Significant resources are required to refurbish or rebuild facilities, integrate new aircraft and technology with existing infrastructure, coordinate with local authorities, and establish new supply chains and support networks. Legacy infrastructure at Air National Guard bases, for example, can reduce the cost and time required to build a more resilient force structure while reducing costs. ICBMs, tankers, and other support elements would also benefit.

During the Cold War, the U.S. military employed a dispersal strategy to mitigate the risk of concentrated attacks on its airbases, scattering aircraft across multiple locations to enhance survivability and ensure retaliatory capabilities. This approach was vital in countering the Soviet threat—reducing the vulnerability of strategic assets. In today’s context of renewed great-power competition, with rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia, adjusting the current strategy is essential.

Ultimately, the decision to expand the basing footprint should be built on a comprehensive analysis of costs and benefits and a thorough understanding of strategic implications. By carefully weighing these factors, policymakers can make informed decisions that enhance national security while minimizing negative impacts on communities and the environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise. His background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. Views express are his own.  

Reviving Cold War Air Bases: A Strategic Move for Modern Deterrence? was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the Minuteman III ICBM fleet now 50 years old and 35 years beyond its planned service life, there is no option but to build a new ICBM. Although Northrup Grumman, the prime contractor on the Sentinel program, made a good faith effort to estimate the cost of building a new missile and retrofitting Minuteman III launch control centers and launch facilities with the new hardware required for the new missile, no company has engaged in this kind of activity in five decades.

Thus, in many respects, any estimate of costs can be no more than a ballpark estimate at best. Think about it. Have you ever tried to do a home improvement project for the very first time and it went exactly as you planned—without a hitch? Of course not. What about those home improvement shows where the contractor always finds something hidden behind the drywall that sends the remodel cost way up? Doing something once every 50 years with a workforce that has zero experience with such a project is a recipe for cost overruns.

This is the choice the nation made and must live with. It is hypocritical of arms control advocates to charge that Sentinel’s cost overruns mean the program should be cancelled. If they applied that same logic to all government programs, we would also kill Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and student loans. In fact, we would kill just about every federal program ever funded. Almost all estimates of government programs are wrong—and wildly wrong.

Instead, we must deal with a reality that leaves the United States little choice but to move forward because the strategic environment is rapidly deteriorating, and no amount of optimism and idealism will change that fact. It is time reality overrides aspirations.

The facts are simple. Russia already has a superior arsenal to the United States and maintains a capacity to produce about 1,000 new nuclear weapons every year. And with Russia no longer bound by the New START treaty, Vladimir Putin can double or triple the size of his nuclear arsenal before the end of the decade. He already maintains at least a 10-to-1 advantage in theater nuclear weapons.

China’s nuclear breakout also caught the United States on its heals. The DF-41 ICBM, for example, carries multiple reentry vehicles and is expected to fill the 300 new ICBM silos discovered in 2021. DF-41s filling those new silos could alone exceed the size of the entire American nuclear arsenal.

That says nothing of the new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons China is deploying. To deter such capabilities America requires a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent, which must include the Sentinel.

Why Does America Still Need ICBMs?

The fact that the basics of the ICBM mission have not changed much since they were first fielded may explain why some believe they are outdated. Before we commit to killing Sentinel and retiring the Minuteman, it is important to consider some of their benefits.

First, ICBMs provide an excellent deterrent to nuclear attack on the homeland. The 400 Minuteman III silos spread across the American West are invulnerable to all but a massive nuclear missile attack. Thus, their existence sets a high threshold for attacking the United States, either conventionally or with nuclear weapons. Without ICBMs, our strategic nuclear targets shrink from over 500 to about a dozen, which could all be destroyed with conventional strikes. Only ICBM silos require a nuclear strike.

Second, ICBMs cost less than the other two legs of the nuclear triad—even with cost overruns. While Sentinel will cost an estimated $130–150 billion over the next two to three decades, it is likely to prove operationally cost-effective over the long term. Remember, ICBMs are used every single day to deter the Russians and the Chinese. Our adversaries understand the power of an ICBM, which is why their nuclear forces are primarily composed of ICBMs.

Third, building a Sentinel provides the US an opportunity to consider deploying ICBMs in new and creative ways. With the United States government depending on the private sector for its space launch capability, the Sentinel also has some non-traditional missions that a common launch vehicle might provide. These include:

1. The ability to deploy time critical space assets like sensors, navigation, or communications satellites in response to a contingency; and
2. Closer to traditional missions are ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite kill vehicles, and conventional prompt global strike.

The benefit of such a system would be the ability to replace the top of a missile with a different payload to carry out a niche mission. At the same time, nuclear deterrence is preserved by those ICBMs still on alert.

Nuclear deterrence works by creating the fear of a massive retaliatory response. It achieves a psychological effect in the mind of an adversary. Non-traditional missions can support deterrence by taking away an adversary’s belief in his potential success in achieving some advantage.

A prompt global strike capability, for example, would also fill a niche role, if needed, allowing the US to strike targets quickly without escalating to nuclear use. Sentinel makes that possible. Given its cost, only a small number of such weapons would be feasible, and all while complicating adversary strategy.

These are just some additional uses for Sentinel, but they do not change the fundamental reason for building a new ICBM—Minuteman III is 50 years old and well past its service life. Yes, there are cost overruns, but can we really expect any less when we build something once every half-century?

Conclusion

In short, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping would love for the United States to cancel the Sentinel program. We should not give them what they want.

Adam Lowther, PhD, is the Vice President of research and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The view’s expressed are the authors own. 

Why America Needs ICBMs was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Americans, there must be a greater sense of urgency and realization of critical vulnerabilities that can include one or both potential realities. First, consider that a 2024 Chinese attack on Taiwan is feasible. Second, plan for the defense of Taiwan without the benefit of assets in Okinawa and Guam. There is a significant possibility both may prove true.

China has the confidence and believes it can control both conventional and nuclear escalation. China’s “no first-use” policy only exists in name only. China made it very clear, in state-run television, that it would use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Japan. That is, if Japan became involved in the domestic affairs of China during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (which the Chinese Communist Party sees as a domestic affair), then China may strike Japan with nuclear weapons. This would include Okinawa.

China has the capability and will to gain the advantage in the Asia-Pacific and Taiwan relatively quickly. It is said that amateurs think strategy and generals think logistics. If this is true, understanding China’s perspective is instructive.

First, China will not let Taiwan become the operational center of attention because that is where American attention is focused in wargaming and tabletop exercises (TTX) played in the United States. China, if it acts as expected, will not strike Taiwan, but elsewhere—only later taking Taiwan.

Imagine Taiwan as held between the thumb and finger of the US. Struggle to pry it loose and fail. Cut off the thumb and finger and Taiwan is released. The thumb is American forces on Okinawa and the finger is the US presence on Guam.

Okinawa is home to Kadena Air Base which hosts the 18th Wing, the Air Force’s largest combat air wing. The Kadena’s strategic importance is underscored by its array of advanced fighter aircraft, aerial refueling capabilities, and reconnaissance aircraft. It serves as a critical hub for air operations in the Pacific, offering rapid response capabilities for various regional contingencies. Okinawa is also home to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). The US Navy has several facilities in Okinawa, including White Beach Naval Facility, which supports naval operations in the region.

Guam hosts significant American military assets, including Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base. With Guam and Okinawa out, the US still has assets in Tokyo, the Philippines, Australia, and, further out, is Diego Garcia, and even further away is Hawaii.

To operationally execute a surprise attack on Okinawa and Guam, China could employ a stratagem beginning with a deliberate maritime provocation: a scenario where a less costly Chinese asset, such as a $20 million LY-132 warship, engages provocatively with a more valuable US asset, akin to a $2 billion Aegis destroyer. This mirrors past incidents in the South China Sea involving near-collisions, notably between a Chinese LY132 and the USS Chung-Hoon on June 4, 2023. In such a scenario, the Chinese vessel could aggressively maneuver across the bow of the US destroyer in internationally disputed waters, compelling the US ship to decelerate.

In the event of an actual collision, China could construe this as a hostile action by the US in what it claims as its sovereign territory. Leveraging this pretext for a counterstrike, China’s arsenal includes advanced military capabilities for rapid engagement against Okinawa and Guam. In September 2015, the DF-26 nicknamed the “Guam Killer,” which can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, was publicly revealed. Eight years later, China has added the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, the DF-27 missile, and 094-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), capable of delivering a nuclear strike.

The DF-27, a medium-range ballistic missile, augments China’s offensive reach, particularly in regional conflicts. Its range, speed, and accuracy render it a formidable threat to critical American positions in the Indo-Pacific, including military bases and naval forces. The DF-27 is designed to enhance China’s ability to hold targets at risk beyond the second island chain and possesses a high probability of penetrating American ballistic missile defenses. The newest weapon in the Chinese hypersonic inventory, the DF-27, with its range, speed, and ability to maneuver in flight, is a potent “carrier killer.” Additionally, it can hit targets as far as Hawaii.

Using these capabilities China has the option to hit American forces in the first two island chains fast and furiously.

Some may argue that Japan tried something similar in 1941—only to fail. Then, the United States had industrial capacity to quickly build and overpower Japan. Today, the industrial and labor capacity exists in China, not the US. Most importantly, after years of neglecting American nuclear capabilities while China worked toward perfecting their own, the Chinese now have greater regional nuclear capability than the United States. Retaliating for nuclear strikes on Okinawa and/or Guam would prove pyric because the only option is to strike the Chinese mainland. That would put American cities and populations at risk of annihilation.

Returning to the point of this article, 2024 is a good year to attack American forces in the Indo-Pacific for five reasons. First, the US is distracted by the upcoming presidential election. Second, the US is stretched thin with contingencies in Europe and the Middle East. Third, experts and leaders are myopically looking for a cross-strait conflict, rather than the conflict discussed above. Fourth, the US is busy trying to play catch up and strengthen its integrated deterrence with allies. China has the advantage and would prove unwise to give the United States time to prepare. Fifth, the US has more to lose than China in a nuclear conflict. The risk/reward calculation looks better for China than the US in 2024 and beyond.

Thus, 2024 is a good year for a Chinese attack on American military forces in the Indo-Pacific. It is time Americans wake up to the fact that the threat is already here and not somewhere in the future.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived two decades in Taiwan and China.

Why 2024 Is a Good Year for China to Attack American Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to the former commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, General Tim Ray in his testimony to the HASC Strategic subcommittee on 1 May 2019: “The vast majority of targets covered by the bomber leg of the triad require the employment of stand-off weapons.” The LRSO missile will ensure that the bomber force can target high-value threats deep within an advanced integrated air defense system (IADS), reducing risk to aircrew and aircraft.

The LRSO is key to American deterrence credibility. Flexible, survivable, and recallable, America’s bomber force forms the third leg of the strategic nuclear triad. Coupled with the bomber, the LRSO ensures the viability of the air leg which arguably is the most stabilizing force. The LRSO is a valuable tool in maintaining strategic stability because it does not pose a short-notice threat of disarming attack.

However, recognizing and fearing America’s ability to hold at-risk strategic targets deep behind enemy lines regardless of IADS efficacy is a key concern for any autocrat seeking to attack American interests. The LRSO is good news for deterrence.

USAF Seeking 1,000 LRSO Nuclear Cruise Missiles by 2030 was originally published on Global Security Review.