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	<title>Topic:Nigeria &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arman Sidhu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 12:15:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 11, 2026 Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 11, 2026</em></p>
<p>Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basin-s-military-bases-in-iswap-s-crosshairs">overran</a> at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.</p>
<p>Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 <a href="https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/36158/us-africa-command-conducts-strike-against-isis-in-nigeria">U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes</a> on Nigerian soil and the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2026/03/22/us-troops-in-nigeria-using-drones-to-detect-and-disrupt-terrorist-activity/">deployment</a> of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.</p>
<p><strong>The Mosul Parallel</strong></p>
<p>Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/12/11/how-iraqs-ghost-soldiers-helped-isil">50,000 ghost soldiers</a> on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/ghost-soldiers-britains-shadow-war-in-west-africa/">Leaked</a> UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. <a href="https://ti-defence.org/gdi/">Transparency International</a> gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.</p>
<p>The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/documentary-reveals-low-morale-in-nigerian-army">deployed</a> without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.</p>
<p><strong>ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor</strong></p>
<p>ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2025/08/iswap-assaults-target-military-bases-in-lake-chad-region/">destroyed</a> forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2025/11/17/nigerian-army-commander-brig-gen-uba-killed-iswap-after-terrorists-intercepted-his">intercepted</a> his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.</p>
<p>The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s <a href="https://www.military.africa/2025/03/niger-withdraws-from-mnjtf-counter-terror-coalition/">withdrawal</a> from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-february-6/">Lakurawa</a>, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/sahel-monitoring-may-2025">attack</a> on Nigerian soil in 2025.</p>
<p><strong>The Air Power Deficit</strong></p>
<p>The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians <a href="https://impactpolicies.org/news/483/zamfara-airstrike-tragedy-understanding-civilian-casualties-and-security-challenges-in-nigeria">killed</a> in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/africa/nigeria/massacre-kwara-state-heightens-nigerias-security-challenges">February 2026 Woro massacre</a> showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.</p>
<p><strong>External Partners and the Limits of Assistance</strong></p>
<p>The United States launched <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/25/politics/us-strikes-isis-nigeria">16 Tomahawk cruise missiles</a> against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-united-states-conduct-strikes-nigeria">CSIS assessed</a> that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/africa-report-n-237-nigeria-challenge-military-reform">International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint</a> called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.</p>
<p><strong>The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus</strong></p>
<p>Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.</p>
<p>A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/07/24/when-rebels-rule-iswap-formula-winning-support-nigeria-northeast-tax-control">estimated</a> $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-november-25/">$1.42 billion in ransom</a> in a single year.</p>
<p>Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.</p>
<p><strong>Outlook</strong></p>
<p>The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/president-tinubu-presents-%E2%82%A658-18-trillion-2026-appropriation-bill-vows-stronger-discipline-in-budget-execution/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThese%20outcomes%20are%20not%20accidental,revenue%20of%20%E2%82%A634.33%20trillion.">5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion)</a>. However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.</p>
<p>Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.</p>
<p><em>Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic &amp; Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Hollow-RanksGhost-Soldiers-Nigerias-Corruption-Fueled-Security-Collapse-.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/it-is-difficult-to-break-the-russia-india-link/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amit Gupta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2024 11:55:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27347</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When the Ukraine war broke out, India implemented a series of policy measures that took the West by surprise. In the United Nations General Assembly, it refused to condemn the Russian invasion and, instead, along with 34 other nations, chose to abstain from the vote. That meant that 4.4 billion people, a majority of the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/it-is-difficult-to-break-the-russia-india-link/">It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When the Ukraine war broke out, India implemented a series of policy measures that took the West by surprise. In the United Nations General Assembly, it refused to condemn the Russian invasion and, instead, along with 34 other nations, chose to abstain from the vote. That meant that 4.4 billion people, a majority of the world’s population, refused to condemn the Russians.</p>
<p>Despite pressure from the Biden administration, the Indian government stuck to its position and, instead, bought Russian oil at discount prices only to refine it and sell it to Europe. The Indians also continued to buy arms from Russia and have sought to rebuild the defense arsenal and civilian scientific sector with Russian technology. Why have the Indians stuck to the Russians despite a warming relationship with the United States? What are the implications of India’s continued relationship with Russia?</p>
<p><strong>The Military Linkage</strong></p>
<p>First and foremost, India sees Russia as the source of weaponry, military technology, and the provider of systems that the West is unwilling to sell. Thus, the Indians leased nuclear submarines from the Russians which proved invaluable in training personnel for India’s own domestically manufactured nuclear boats. Negotiations continue for the <a href="https://idrw.org/uncertainty-surrounds-indias-lease-of-russian-nuclear-submarine-amid-ukraine-conflict/#:~:text=The%20Chakra%20III%20deal%20included,leased%20to%20the%20Indian%20Navy.">lease of another Akula/Nerpa nuclear submarine from Russia although the international sanctions imposed on Moscow</a> following the invasion of Ukraine have made payments difficult.</p>
<p>Similarly, the Su-30 MKI now forms the backbone of the Indian Air Force (IAF) fleet (with over 270 aircraft). The Indian government has proposed <a href="https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/india-approves-procurement-of-additional-su-30s#:~:text=India%27s%20Defence%20Acquisition%20Council%20(DAC,(MoD)%20on%2015%20September.">the purchase of 12 more Sukhois</a> to help replenish India’s declining strength in air combat squadrons. The government officially authorizes 42 squadrons, but the IAF is down to roughly 31 squadrons against a continued two-front threat from Pakistan and China.</p>
<p>Even at the most basic level, after years of trying to indigenize the development and production of an assault rifle, the Indians set up a factory <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/col-nagial/ak-203-kalashnikov-assault-rifles-to-be-manufactured-in-india/">to build the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-203</a>. For a country that has both internal and external security concerns, having a capable assault rifle for both its military and security forces remains a priority.</p>
<p>The more important factor is not just the ability to replenish the military supplies of the country but rather the fact that the Russians are providing the technologies India seeks to become a technologically advanced nation in the production of weaponry.</p>
<p>The India-Russia collaboration has led the country to jointly develop the Brahmos supersonic missile. The next generation of the weapon is supposed to <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-to-build-brahmos-hypersonic-version/articleshow/99222651.cms?from=mdr">have a hypersonic capability</a>. That would put India in the same league as the United States, Russia, and China in terms of its missile capabilities.</p>
<p>Equally important is the fact that the Indians secured an <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-set-to-begin-delivery-of-brahmos-missiles-to-philippines-101706187940193.html">export order from the Philippines for the Brahmos</a>. Discussions are ongoing to sell the missile to Indonesia. This fulfills a long-term Indian ambition to become an arms exporting nation. While India seeks to sell its indigenously developed Tejas fighter to countries as varied as Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Philippines, it has not met with success. It will also be interesting to see if the United States permits a plane with an American engine to be sold to countries that are potential customers for American aircraft.</p>
<p>Similarly, India’s space program, which has impressive accomplishments like missions to Mars and the Moon, was built on Russian heavy launch engines. Now, the Indians are negotiating for the next generation of <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/with-war-curbs-on-russian-engine-exports-moscow-keen-on-selling-its-rocket-engine-rd-191-to-india/articleshow/99411657.cms">cryo-engine from Russia</a> to further their ambitions in space.</p>
<p>On the other hand, there are problems in the mechanics of the relationship that lead, on the Indian side, to a degree of frustration. Spare parts remain a problem, although India has started to use its domestic industry to reverse engineer Russian systems. There are also delays in getting completed systems from the Russians as witnessed by the lengthy delays in acquiring the Gorshkov aircraft carrier because the shipyard could not carry out the retrofit in a timely manner.</p>
<p>The other problem is that post-Ukraine sanctions make it difficult to purchase weaponry from Russia. This is not a problem for heavily sanctioned countries like North Korea and Iran, but India sees itself as a part of the international community and a supporter of a rules-based international order. Consequently, New Delhi walks a fine line between purchasing weapons systems while not disregarding international concerns. This complicates the purchase of the S-400 anti-missile system from Moscow as India has troubles working out how to make the payment through internationally acceptable rules.</p>
<p>Although the Russians are careful about how India uses the nuclear technology it provides (asking for full-scope safeguards), it does not sanction the Indian use of Russian conventional systems and allows New Delhi to use Russian systems to carry strategic weaponry. Thus, the Su-30 can be used to carry nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>In contrast, all weapon sales from the United States lack guarantees that, in the event of a conflict Washington opposes, weapons are sanction- and embargo-free. This is one of the reasons India preferred the Rafale over the F-16—since the former could be used as a nuclear delivery system. For a country that is far from self-sufficient in weapons production, this is a major factor in deciding arms purchases.</p>
<p>Diplomatically, the Indians are getting closer to the United States. However, New Delhi does not want to antagonize Russia or China, especially because the American relationship, as <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/he-flawed-us-india-military-relationship/">discussed</a>, comes with its own set of constraints and limitations. Thus, while the Indians see China as an existential threat, they are careful not to cross the point of no return with Beijing by pressing for a full-blown conflict. Similarly, when it comes to the supply of raw materials, Russia remains an important partner.</p>
<p>Even though India’s largest trading partners are China and the United States, the economic link with Russia remains vital to Indian developmental interests. American sanctions on Tehran forced India to wean itself off Iranian oil. The Russian supply of oil has been beneficial to India. Not only <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-oil-shaves-indias-import-costs-by-about-27-bln-2023-11-08/">did it reduce import costs</a>, but it allowed India to refine the crude and sell it on the international market—particularly to Europe.</p>
<p>In the short to medium term, the oil supply chain from Russia cannot be disrupted since India has few alternatives. This is of importance because Middle East oil becoming more expensive due to production cutbacks.</p>
<p>Lastly, a negative factor shapes the desire to keep open ties with Russia. New Delhi worries that if Moscow and Beijing get too close, it narrows India’s maneuvering space in the international system.</p>
<p>In a post-Ukraine war world, Moscow will likely give up its aspiration of being considered a western power and, instead, is highlighting its identity as a Eurasian nation with close ties to China. A Russia that sides with China against India would be New Delhi’s worst nightmare. This problem is compounded if Washington takes an even-handed approach to an India-China confrontation as <a href="https://www.businessinsider.in/defense/news/donald-trump-offers-to-mediate-india-china-border-dispute/articleshow/76037792.cms">Trump did, when, in 2020, he offered to</a> mediate after Indian and Chinese forces engaged in fisticuffs along the border. Thus, India will continue the relationship with Russia until guaranteed military and economic alternatives are provided to India by the West.</p>
<p><em>Amit Gupta is a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this article are his own. He can be reached at agupta1856@gmail.com.</em></p>
<p>Start the debate! Let us know your thoughts in the comments section.</p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/it-is-difficult-to-break-the-russia-india-link/">It Is Difficult to Break the Russia-India Link</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Cyber Insecurity is Harming Emerging Markets</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/cyber-insecurity-harming-emerging-markets/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Spandana Singh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Dec 2018 14:28:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economics & Trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cyber Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Morocco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nigeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=8955</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Emerging Market Businesses Want to Grow, But Can They Succeed Without Cybersecurity? Data breaches seem to be the name of the game in tech this year, and the latest, a software flaw that exposed the private data of hundreds of thousands of Google+ users, has just snagged the spotlight. Despite the fact that data breaches [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cyber-insecurity-harming-emerging-markets/">Cyber Insecurity is Harming Emerging Markets</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Emerging Market Businesses Want to Grow, But Can They Succeed Without Cybersecurity?</h2>
<p>Data breaches seem to be the name of the game in tech this year, and the latest, a <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-exposed-user-data-feared-repercussions-of-disclosing-to-public-1539017194">software flaw</a> that exposed the private data of hundreds of thousands of Google+ users, has just snagged the spotlight. Despite the fact that data breaches and cybersecurity attacks occur across the globe, their occurrences in major technology markets such as the United States and the European Union (EU) tend to take policy precedence and draw greater media attention.</p>
<p>However, as emerging market nations—such as Indonesia and those in Sub-Saharan Africa—continue to rapidly digitize and foster new technology-based businesses, more attention needs to be paid to the risks these markets and their users face. Failure to do so will significantly hinder economic growth and business development in these regions.</p>
<p>Over <a href="http://www.serianu.com/downloads/AfricaCyberSecurityReport2017.pdf">90%</a> of African businesses operate under the <a href="https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/75-health-orgs-live-below-cybersecurity-poverty-line">cybersecurity poverty line</a>, which means they are unable to adequately protect themselves from vulnerabilities and losses. Although Africa has comparatively limited communications infrastructure, the continent has a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/05/30/global-cybercrimes-and-weak-cybersecurity-threaten-businesses-in-africa/">high penetration rate of new technologies</a>, and as a result is a prime target for digital attacks. In 2017, cybercrime <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1303532/cybercrime-costs-businesses-in-kenya-south-africa-nigeria-billions/">cost</a> the continent $3.5 billion and yet 96% of online security incidents went unreported. Large and expanding digital hubs such as Nigeria and Kenya <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/05/30/global-cybercrimes-and-weak-cybersecurity-threaten-businesses-in-africa/">particularly suffered</a>, accruing losses of $649 million and $210 million, respectively.</p>
<p>Cybercrime in Africa has targeted startups, corporations, institutions and governments alike. This June, South African insurance company Liberty Holdings Ltd. was <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-17/south-africa-s-liberty-says-payment-demand-refused-after-breach">held ransom</a> by hackers who were able to access sensitive data including emails. The company is <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-17/south-africa-s-liberty-says-payment-demand-refused-after-breach">responsible</a> for overseeing 2.5 million life-insurance policies and administering over 10,000 retirement plans and 500,000 individual and institutional investment customers, raising concerns about the consequences of such a hack. Some progress, however, is being made: there was a <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/06/04/cybersecurity-in-africa-securing-businesses-with-a-local-approach-with-global-standards/">73% increase</a> of Information Security Management System certified companies on the continent between 2015 and 2016, the majority of which are based in South Africa, Nigeria and Morocco.</p>
<p>Similarly, in the Asia-Pacific region, cybercrime poses a serious threat to economic success. A study commissioned by Microsoft <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/business/indonesia-firms-face-34b-losses-due-cyber-attacks-report/">found</a> that the total potential losses to the region from cyber attacks was $1.745 trillion, or 7% of the region’s current gross domestic product (GDP). These risks are particularly apparent in the ASEAN region, where nations <a href="https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2018/01/25/310915156/Indonesia-Prone-to-Cyber-Attacks-up-to-the-Year-2025">invest</a> an average of 0.07% of their GDP in cybersecurity infrastructure and operations. The consequences of such underfunded and undervalued cybersecurity initiatives can be seen in practice in Indonesia, where the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-16/go-jek-is-said-in-talks-to-raise-at-least-2-billion-in-funding">country’s highest valued startup on record</a>, Go-Jek, was found to have significant security vulnerabilities.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Go-Jek is a ride-sharing and logistics startup that has <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Google-invests-in-Go-Jek-in-its-first-big-Indonesian-venture">over 15 million weekly active users</a> and is widely considered a major competitor to global brands such as Uber and Lyft. In March 2017, Fallible, an Indian security firm <a href="https://www.techinasia.com/indian-firm-exposes-go-jek-data-leaks">claimed</a> they were able to extract information such as GPS coordinates of rides and user data such as phone numbers and pick up and drop off points from two problematic APIs on the app. The firm also claimed they were able to exploit a vulnerability which enabled them to manipulate notifications users received. An Indonesian hacker based in Thailand <a href="https://www.techinasia.com/indonesia-go-jek-security-loopholes">identified</a> similar vulnerabilities in 2016. Go-Jek is Indonesia’s<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/02/nadiem-makarim-and-indonesias-billion-dollar-unicorn-start-up-go-jek.html"> first startup to become a unicorn</a> (meaning it became valued at $1 billion), and over the past year, the company has <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/14/go-jek-buys-three-startups-to-advance-its-mobile-payment-business/">invested heavily</a> in expanding their services to include mobile payments.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>This expansion into a field that engages with even more sensitive user data underscores the need for a greater cybersecurity focus, as well as a complementary regulatory environment that similarly prioritizes security in tandem with growth. In 2017, the Government of Indonesia took steps in this regard, <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/does-indonesia-need-a-new-cyber-agency/">establishing</a> a National Cyber Agency (NCA) to develop an integrated cyber defense strategy. However, given that in the same year, almost half of Indonesia’s companies were <a href="https://jakartaglobe.id/business/indonesia-firms-face-34b-losses-due-cyber-attacks-report/">impacted</a> by over 205 million cyber-attacks, costing $34 billion in direct financial losses and long-term reputational damage, there is a great deal of work to be done.<span class="Apple-converted-space">  </span></p>
<p>In larger and more developed technology markets, data security and privacy laws such as the recently passed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) compel companies to invest more time and resources into developing and maintaining robust security infrastructure. However, in markets, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific, where such regulations and cybersecurity-focused policy environments are weaker or lacking in enforcement, commensurate practices by businesses are less common.</p>
<p>Going forward, emerging market businesses and governments need to recognize that to achieve economic growth and reap the benefits of the ongoing digital boom, cybersecurity needs to be a priority. In practice, this means that there needs to be greater emphasis on operating and maintaining updated and robust security systems; training and expanding cybersecurity workforces; developing long-term cyber resilience strategies that account for all levels of corporate or institutional operations; raising awareness about the importance of such security practices; and generating legislation that adequately offers protections and remediations.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Greater investment in regionally-specific cybersecurity infrastructure can also open up noteworthy business opportunities. The cybersecurity market is expected to be <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1303532/cybercrime-costs-businesses-in-kenya-south-africa-nigeria-billions/">worth</a> $2 billion by 2020, and thus far the African continent has not released any commercially viable cybersecurity products, while ASEAN nations, although having made some progress, also have room to grow.</p>
<p>The average cost of cybercrime for businesses and governments across the globe is increasing at a rapid rate, and emerging markets are at significant risk. Developing more robust cybersecurity infrastructure, policies, programs and cultures must be prioritized. This is particularly important now as these regions will soon be host to the majority of global internet users, as well as a large share of future digital businesses and services.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/cyber-insecurity-harming-emerging-markets/">Cyber Insecurity is Harming Emerging Markets</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Security and Trade: The Need for a Global Britain Approach in Africa</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/security-trade-need-for-global-britain-approach-africa/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Clark]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Sep 2018 15:36:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democratic Republic of the Congo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ethiopia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kenya]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nigeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uganda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=8192</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As UK Prime Minister Theresa May leads a trade and investment tour in Africa this week, Britain must seek to forge new partnerships in the region, in addition to solidifying old alliances. It is worth considering Britain’s wider role in Africa as Theresa May visits this critical part of the world on a trade and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/security-trade-need-for-global-britain-approach-africa/">Security and Trade: The Need for a Global Britain Approach in Africa</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>As UK Prime Minister Theresa May leads a trade and investment tour in Africa this week, Britain must seek to forge new partnerships in the region, in addition to solidifying old alliances.</h2>
<p>It is worth considering Britain’s wider role in Africa as Theresa May visits this critical part of the world on a trade and investment tour. This latest diplomatic endeavor provides an opportunity to evolve UK’s Africa strategy in the context of forging a new path for a global Britain that seeks to maximize the opportunities of leaving the European Union. This is a crucial area of a global Britain approach, ensuring that the UK remains competitive in an ever-increasingly competitive global market.</p>
<p>In Cape Town, the prime minister announced an ambitious new approach to Britain&#8217;s spending on the continent, <a href="http://www.theweek.co.uk/96080/what-is-theresa-may-s-new-approach-to-african-aid">wishing to overtake</a> the US by 2022 as the largest foreign investor in Africa, which would see Britain becoming Africa’s largest trading partner in the G7. This would seek to build upon the already high levels of existing British investment in Africa; with <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/trade-policy-minister-sets-out-future-uk-africa-trading-relationship">bilateral trade</a> between the UK and Africa totaling $37 billion in 2016 and set to <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/city-of-london-will-boost-africa-investment-after-brexit-says-theresa-may-z0g0b7z5d">increase further</a> post-Brexit.</p>
<p>With 29 business executives accompanying the prime minister and other officials on this trip, the overriding purpose of the mission is clear: to drum up business with some of the world’s fastest growing economies. The key stops on the Prime Minister’s tour include South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. These three countries, traditionally strong British allies, are widely regarded as the core engine of future African growth.</p>
<p>By 2030, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/capturing-africas-high-returns/">household consumption</a> across the continent is expected to reach $2.5 trillion, up from $1.1 trillion in 2015. A third of that will come from these three states alone. Other countries with high growth rate forecasts over the next decade include Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Ghana. They all maintain strong relations with Britain, leaving considerable scope for developing these ties further.</p>
<p>Britain’s combined imports and exports with African countries more than doubled between 2005 and 2014, however exports to Africa still only represents 2.5% of <a href="http://www.worldstopexports.com/united-kingdoms-top-exports/">total British exports</a>. Considering Africa is a continent whose the population is set to increase by <a href="https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key_Findings_WPP_2015.pdf">half a billion people</a> by 2030<a class="description">–</a>43% of whom will acquire middle and upper class status<a class="description">–</a>it is remarkable that Britain has not sent such a top trade delegation to Africa sooner.</p>
<p>In that sense, Britain is somewhat late to the party. The U.S., despite seeing exports to Africa <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/capturing-africas-high-returns/">halve from 2014 – 2016</a>, still has a bilateral trading relationship with the continent worth $53 billion. However. even this is dwarfed by both <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45298656">China and the E.U.</a>-27’s trade numbers with Africa: in 2015 worth $188 billion, and $269 billion respectively.</p>
<p>In particular Beijing’s role in Africa has solidified in recent years. This trend goes well beyond the seven fold increase in trade with the continent since 2005. China is also seemingly aiming to become the preeminent security actor across Africa in an attempt to displace the legacy role still played by the former European colonial powers. In addition to establishing its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, Beijing also has 2,466 troops currently <a href="https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113436/china-completes-registration-8000-strong-un">on active duty</a> across Africa.</p>
<p>In recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sudan, with an 800-strong combat deployment sent to South Sudan in 2015, a country with significant Chinese oil investments. The security relationship between China and the UN contrasts sharply with the majority of western states, often more militarily risk-adverse regarding African deployments.</p>
<p>However, after meeting with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, Mrs. May <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45338036">announced</a> the two countries had signed a defense and security partnership which would see the British forces train full Nigerian army units to combat insurgents in the north-east of Nigeria. Furthermore, the UK will assist Nigeria in countering the use of improvised explosive devices used by Boko Haram, and in strengthening Nigeria’s lawless northern borders.</p>
<p>In order for the UK Government’s post-Brexit Africa strategy to really pay off, especially in the face of increasingly stiff international competition from the Chinese, Britain’s strengths as a security partner must be firmly emphasized as a reminder of why we should remain the firmest African ally. By leveraging Britain’s increasing role as a security actor in Africa, it should seek to press this advantage regarding trade deals post-Brexit.</p>
<p>Theresa May met members of the British military contingent based in Kenya, east Africa’s economic power and the focus of Britain’s <a href="https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/africa/">greatest African security commitment</a>. Kenya is utilized as a training area for British troops going on high readiness operations in other theaters, in addition to providing training and support for regional states engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab across east Africa. Ranging from Mali to Djibouti, Kenya to Gabon, the British military maintains a significant involvement across sub-Saharan Africa.</p>
<p>Currently providing training and support to no less than nine African states, small teams of specialized British personnel conduct a range of missions, from counter-terrorism to anti-piracy and anti-poaching. These missions are designed to build up the capability of host nations, by training their leaders and instructors in military skills often hard-learnt over recent British campaigns, now passed on to other states to assist in their own security development.</p>
<p>These <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-reaffirms-support-for-east-african-stability/">training missions</a> have tangible impact and results. For example, over 22 separate training missions by British forces in Uganda since 2011 have developed the Ugandan People&#8217;s Defense Forces, who undertake the majority of the heavy fighting in Somalia under the African Union mission. The success witnessed by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has led to increased international confidence in the security situation in Somalia, resulting in a <a href="http://amisom-au.org/2018/07/brussels-meeting-acknowledges-progress-made-in-stabilizing-somalia/">gradual reduction</a> in African Union personnel from the Horn of Africa.</p>
<p>Mrs May will seek to highlight the threats posed to both European and international stability through letting the security challenges occurring across Africa go unaddressed. These challenges include the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-45295217">current situation</a> in the DRC; ongoing Ebola outbreaks across the country, coupled with increasing civic strife has led to over four million <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-internally-displaced-persons-and-4">internally displaced people</a> throughout the DRC.</p>
<p>Considering the rising numbers of individuals wishing to flee internal conflicts, ethnic tensions, human trafficking and large scale poverty and corruption, Europe faces potentially a second wave of millions of migrants from the African continent escaping war and famine and seeking new opportunities. The case has <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/crisis-in-the-congo-a-new-role-for-natos-southern-hub/">already been made</a> that Britain, in ensuring a strategic partnership with Africa, can do more to help mitigate these developments by training security personnel in the DRC to better cope with the country’s many crises.</p>
<p>Additionally, al-Shabaab poses a lethal security threat in the east of the continent, while Boko Haram and al-Qaeda affiliates threaten its western areas. UK military assistance is a key part of the multi-national efforts to contain and ultimately defeat these terrorist organisations. Concurrently with training Kenyans, Ugandans and Somalis in the fight against al-Shabaab, Britain has also trained <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45338036">over 30,000 Nigerian soldiers</a> since 2015 in counter-insurgency operations to help the fight against Islamic militancy in Nigeria.</p>
<p>By highlighting the threats facing African security, combined with the pragmatic methods with which Britain utilizes its armed forces in developing local-level state actor security, a Global Britain approach to a new Africa strategy should therefore seek to combine increased trade and investment into African economies, with a renewed focus on strengthening existing bilateral military relationships.</p>
<p>This twin-tracked approach based around trade and security will seek to achieve the government’s target to be the G7’s largest African trading partner post-Brexit; filling a geostrategic void left in the wake of a withdrawing US. If Britain is to assert itself as Africa’s most valuable G7 trading partner, then Britain must seek to fulfill African desires for investment whilst simultaneously offering the continent a type of security assistance that is beyond China’s military skills and capabilities.</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/security-trade-need-for-global-britain-approach-africa/">Security and Trade: The Need for a Global Britain Approach in Africa</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/will-global-economic-order-2050-look-like/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Ball]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Apr 2018 04:00:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economics & Trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brazil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indonesia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Italy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mexico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nigeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vietnam]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=3003</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By 2050, economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France. The seven largest emerging market countries could grow, on average, around two times as fast as advanced G7 economies. Six of the seven largest economies in the world are projected to be emerging economies. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/will-global-economic-order-2050-look-like/">Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>By 2050, economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France.</h2>
<ul class="bs-shortcode-list list-style-check">
<li class="bs-intro">The seven largest emerging market countries could grow, on average, around two times as fast as advanced G7 economies.</li>
<li class="bs-intro">Six of the seven largest economies in the world are projected to be emerging economies. In 2050, the global economy will be led by China, with India in second place, followed by Indonesia in fourth place.</li>
<li class="bs-intro">The United States is projected to be the world&#8217;s third-largest economy in 2050, based on gross domestic product (GDP).</li>
<li class="bs-intro">The European Union&#8217;s share of world GDP could fall below 10% by 2050.</li>
<li class="bs-intro">The U.K. could drop to tenth place, with France potentially cut from the top 10, and Italy falling from the top 20. They are projected to be overtaken by countries with faster-growing economies like Mexico, Turkey, and Vietnam (respectively).</li>
</ul>
<p><span class="dropcap dropcap-simple">T</span>he global economy could more than double in size by 2050, far outstripping population growth, thanks to continued technology-driven productivity improvements. Emerging markets will drive global financial growth, and will progressively increase their share of world gross domestic product, based on an analysis of World Bank economic projection data. The global economy is projected to approximately double in size by 2042, growing at an annual average rate of around 2.6% between 2016 and 2050.</p>
<p>This growth is expected to be primarily driven by emerging market and developing nations, with the Emerging-Seven (E7) economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey growing at an annual average rate of almost 3.5% during the next 34 years, compared with an annual average growth rate of 1.6% for the G7 countries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.</p>
<figure id="attachment_3012" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-3012" style="width: 935px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="wp-image-3012 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/World_GDP_list_in_2050.png" alt="" width="935" height="590" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/World_GDP_list_in_2050.png 935w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/World_GDP_list_in_2050-300x189.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/World_GDP_list_in_2050-768x485.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 935px) 100vw, 935px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-3012" class="wp-caption-text">Projected Global GDP in 2050 by Country (Data: World Bank)</figcaption></figure>
<h3> Half of the seven largest economies in the world are still considered emerging markets.</h3>
<p>A continued shift will be observed in international economic power away from high-income advanced economies towards emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The E7 could account for nearly 50% of the globe&#8217;s gross domestic product by 2050, while the G7&#8217;s share of global GDP declines to just over 20%.</p>
<p>China has already overtaken the U.S. to become the world&#8217;s largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, while India currently stands in third place and is projected to overtake the U.S. by 2050. In terms of PPP, the United Kingdom is projected to. fall to tenth place, France is forecasted to fall out of the top ten, and Indonesia could climb to fourth place by 2050</p>
<p>While looking at Gross domestic product measured at market exchange rates (MERs), one doesn&#8217;t see quite such a radical shift in international economic power, representing the lower average price levels in emerging economies.</p>
<p>However, China is projected to be the world&#8217;s largest economy by 2030, and India the third largest in the world by 2050. This reveals a considerable and gradual shift in economic power towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.</p>
<figure id="attachment_6779" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-6779" style="width: 750px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="size-publisher-lg wp-image-6779" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/3037fcfb-cf90-4e38-bacd-b3ee410018ab-e1524696966950-750x430.png" alt="" width="750" height="430" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-6779" class="wp-caption-text">The so-called &#8220;E7&#8221; countries are in purple.</figcaption></figure>
<h3>Emerging economies will take center stage by 2050.</h3>
<p>By 2050 economies like Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico are likely to be bigger than those of the United Kingdom and France, while Egypt and Pakistan could overtake Italy and Canada. With regards to growth, Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh may be the most rapidly growing economies from 2015-2050, averaging an increase of around 5% annually.</p>
<p>Nigeria has the potential to be the fastest growing major African economy, and could potentially increase its national gross domestic product ranking from place to fourteenth by 2050. However, Nigeria will only realize this possibility if it can diversify its economy away from oil and strengthen its democratic institutions and national infrastructure.</p>
<p>Poland and Colombia exhibit great potential and are projected to be the quickest growing large economies in their respective regions; Latin America and the E.U. Many emerging economies will be supported by a relatively rapidly growing populations, boosting domestic demand and the size of the workforce.</p>
<p>Investments in education and improved economic freedoms are necessary to ensure there are enough jobs for the growing number of young individuals in these countries, providing a path <span style="background-color: #f5f6f5;">of sustainable growth for countries with emerging markets and developing economies.</span><span style="background-color: #f5f6f5;"> </span></p>
<p>Today&#8217;s advanced economies will continue to have higher average incomes, but developing countries will likely make progress towards eliminating that gap. With the possible exception of Italy, each of the G7 will rank above the E7 states in 2050, based on rankings of projected gross domestic product per capita.</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/will-global-economic-order-2050-look-like/">Emerging Economies Will Hold Increasing Amounts of Global Economic Power by 2050</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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