In February 2022, days after Russian forces crossed into Ukraine, Putin placed his nuclear arsenal on high alert and warned that any nation interfering would face consequences unlike any in its history. The warning to those who might intervene – specifically NATO. Four years on, NATO has provided extensive military and economic support to Ukraine without paying the price Putin had threatened. However, the threat still begs a question the U.S. has never answered. How would Washington protect the homeland, rather than merely avenge a nuclear strike? President Biden warned Moscow of severe consequences for any nuclear use in Ukraine but kept the American response ambiguous. The U.S. may or may not use nuclear weapons against Russia in defense of Ukraine, but a different reaction may occur if the target were a NATO country.  

Because of the distance between the two countries, a Russian strike on the U.S. would likely require long-range ballistic missiles launched from land or submarine. Even though eighty years of deterrence have kept that prospect remote, a single failure such as a misinterpretation or escalatory mobilization of forces could lead to a catastrophic reaction. The U.S. fields layered interceptors, yet the possibility of wide devastation remains. In January 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14186 which launched the “Golden Dome” initiative. The order, titled “The Iron Dome for America,” directed the Pentagon to develop a more sophisticated, layered shield against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. The concept is analogous in purpose to Israel’s “Iron Dome,” but the planned U.S. architecture is far broader. It calls for space-based sensors, interceptors, and  non-kinetic capabilities. Potential systems could even include directed-energy weapons such as lasers.  

Antimissile defense is not new. In the 1980s, President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative, more widely known as Star Wars. The program envisioned, among others, a space-based antimissile system that could provide a comprehensive defense against enemy missiles. That vision never came to fruition. However, technology has evolved, and the U.S. now operates Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, Aegis, THAAD and Patriot which are foundations for Golden Dome. These could build on and be consolidated to add new space-based antimissile capabilities. However, there are problems with this approach. The Government Accounting Office has documented challenges in transitioning DOD directed-energy prototypes, including high-energy lasers, into operational use and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assesses that directed-energy weapons, such as lasers, are unlikely to be fielded soon. Another problem is that the Golden Dome’s cost is still unknown. The CBO’s estimate is that a national missile defense architecture broadly consistent with the executive order could cost upwards of $1.2 trillion to develop, deploy, and operate over two decades. Every dollar carries an opportunity cost, reducing the: money that could be used to modernize other systems or reduce the national debt.  

Further, determining the Golden Dome’s effectiveness is problematic due to the difficulty of  intercepting ballistic missiles, and the need is to stop multiple missiles or further influence an adversary’s actions. The CBO found that a national missile defense architecture of this type could fully engage a regional-adversary attack or a small-scale attack by a peer adversary, but it could be overwhelmed by a full-scale attack from Russia or China.  

The CBO also warned that deployment could prompt adversaries to increase missile inventories, expand long-range arsenals, or pursue more effective countermeasures, including nuclear weapons. While the intention of the dome would be to make America safer, it could do the opposite. A commonly cited anecdote, known as the cobra effect, offers a warning about best-laid plans. This anecdote purports that British officials in colonial India offered a bounty for dead cobras; residents allegedly began breeding them for the reward, and when the bounty ended, the snakes were released which made the metropolitan areas in India more unsafe. A policy intended to reduce the cobra population produced the opposite result. The same could be true of the Golden Dome and must be considered in the calculus for its implementation.  

Concerns for Golden Dome go beyond the dome antimissile defense. A shield intended to reduce American vulnerability could make an adversary feel more exposed, encouraging it to build or diversify forces in other areas. Russia condemned Golden Dome arguing weapons in space are a provocation and they militarize space. The Soviets had a similar reaction to the Star Wars program. Russia may simply build more missiles and decoys to ensure enough survive. Russia is positioned to do so with impunity given that New START expired in February 2026. For the first time in decades the largest arsenals on earth are no longer bound by a bilateral cap.  

Whoever follows Putin may well prove worse. Even thought the forgoing text focusses on Russia, other adversaries are not far behind. North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities. China continues a major expansion of its nuclear and missile forces. An even with the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the Iranian regime continues to show an unwillingness to curb their pursuit of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.  

Will Russia’s current nuclear weapons levels increase like the cobras in India? It is unknown, but regardless, the argument for the dome is strong. An imperfect defense would still complicate Russia’s planning and could improve protection against limited or accidental launches. Golden Dome could make America safer, however there is risk that it may do the opposite; no one can yet say. However, uncertainty is not a reason to abandon the concept, but a reason to keep exploring and to field it once it is ready. The dangers are not diminishing, and the world is growing less predictable. A nation must mitigate the dangers that exist and find a way not to release the bounty on the cobras.  

Darrell Allen II is a graduate student in the Defense and Strategic Studies program at Missouri State University, where his research focuses on national security, deterrence, and international affairs. He also publishes a newsletter on Substack. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Would Golden Dome Make America Safer? was originally published on Global Security Review.

To many, the end of the Cold War signaled hope for a more restrained nuclear era. As the rivalry between the US and USSR settled in the early 1990s, the imperative for the two states to expand their nuclear arsenals also decreased. During the same period, global efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation accelerated. In 1991 South Africa became the only country, ever, to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons program before they joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), highlighting what was to be a new nuclear era. There were drawbacks, such as Indian and Pakistani nuclear development and testing in 1998, and North Korea’s 2003 withdrawal from the NPT and later demonstration of nuclear weapon technology. However, until recently, nuclear threats and coercion have been largely restrained. 

In parallel, civilian nuclear energy has followed a similar trajectory. Although there was initial enthusiasm for a fossil-fuel-free alternative to meet global energy demands, momentum behind nuclear power waned after the Fukushima disaster in 2011. The incident involved a devastating tsunami that shed light on the inherent risks of civil nuclear programs and led governments worldwide to reassess their nuclear energy ambitions. Almost immediately afterward, Germany, accelerated its Energiewende program, shifting the state’s energy infrastructure away from nuclear power and toward renewable wind and solar energy, while Switzerland abandoned its plans to build new reactors. 

Now, the era of restraint appears to be waning. In February 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last binding agreement limiting the US and Russia’s nuclear arsenals, expired and brought a formal end to the post-Cold-War arms control regime. That same year, the US signed a landmark civil nuclear agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), giving it a path toward domestic uranium enrichment. While noteworthy on its own, a less discussed aspect of the agreement is what it represents. States are beginning to shift their attitudes toward use of nuclear technologies once again. 

Developments in recent years further support this shift. In 2026, Japan restarted its largest nuclear power station, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, for the first time since the Fukushima accident, while China approved a new five-year plan, aiming to increase its nuclear power capacity from 62.5 gigawatts to 110 gigawatts by 2030. Similarly, India finalized a long-term uranium supply deal with Canada’s Cameco and reached an agreement to expand uranium exports from Australia after years of hesitation over proliferation risks. These developments contrast with the expectations decades ago. Rising energy costs due to increased energy demands, including increased demands for data centers and rapid industrial growth in Asia, have indeed contributed greatly to this renewed interest in nuclear power. 

Energy production holds increased geopolitical dimensions that cannot be ignored. Recent conflicts highlight the downsides of interdependence on fossil fuel resources. The 2022 Russia-Ukraine war effected energy prices in response to reduced transportation and risks. States had to confront their import dependence in a volatile geopolitical climate. The need for self-reliance and alternative energy resources became further stressed with the US-Iran conflict, in which oil shipment disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz negatively affected entire state economies. 

Many Middle Eastern governments are now reassessing their reliance on external security guarantees as neighboring conflicts become potential threats and there are concerns about US limitations in protecting allies. These raise doubts about relying solely on US assurances. This may prompt regional powers to pursue independent nuclear deterrents or latent nuclear power production capabilities. 

In this context, the distinction between pursuing civilian and military nuclear programs becomes blurry. Nuclear technology is inherently dual-use. The same centrifuges used to enrich uranium  to 3-5 percent U-235 for civilian reactors can also be used to produce weapons-grade uranium, at around 90 percent U-235. Additionally, spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors can be reprocessed to extract plutonium for weapons. Although reaching weapons-grade enrichment is no easy task, the greatest technical challenge largely lies in developing the initial enrichment infrastructure. 

As a result, states that can acquire domestic enrichment capabilities automatically possess nuclear latency, the ability to develop nuclear weapons relatively quickly should a political decision be made. “A key example is India’s 1974 ‘peaceful nuclear explosion,’ which relied on plutonium produced in a Canadian-supplied civilian research reactor. 

Although the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) exists to prevent civilian-military expansion. However, recent actions have caused concerns about the IAEA becoming politically contentious. In June 2025, the Agency found Iran non-compliant with safeguards but later acknowledged Iran lacked a structured nuclear weapons program. This seeming ambiguity led in part to Israel’s strikes on Iranian facilities, and raised questions about the IAEA’s entanglement with geopolitical interests. In the Middle East, Israel is the region’s only potential nuclear-armed state despite not signing the NPT. This, along with US nuclear rhetoric, suggests that nuclear rules are unclear and that nuclear capability makes strategic autonomy complex.  

The case of Ukraine offers another warning. After surrendering the nuclear weapons it inherited from the USSR, Ukraine joined the NPT in return for security assurances under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022 have inevitably weakened confidence in such assurances. How this would have played out if Ukraine did have nuclear weapons is unknown, but it does support the argument that external guarantees may ultimately be less reliable than an independent deterrent. 

Thus, while recent developments point to a renewed interest in nuclear technologies, whether this shift will ultimately translate into latent or breakout capabilities remains to be seen. What is already clear, however, is the strategic paradox confronting many states. On the one hand, 21st century conflicts have reinforced the value of a nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring long-term security. On the other, the experiences of Iraq and Iran illustrate how even the perception of an emerging nuclear weapons program can trigger military and/or economic responses. In this sense, not possessing a nuclear program may leave a state vulnerable, yet attempting to acquire one may also make it a target for economic sanctions or worse. 

If the international system were genuinely consistent and capable of providing equal security, the incentives for nuclear proliferation would be far weaker. However, as it stands, the system remains unequal and is ultimately shaped by power. Until that changes, nuclear arms will continue to appear to states as insurance against an international order they do not fully trust. The real question, therefore, is whether that order can convince states that they are safer without a nuclear weapons program. 

Sajal Shahid is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Islamabad, conducting research on South Asian security. Her work has been published on national and international platforms, including Green Network Asia, The Independent Singapore, Fair Observer, and Modern Diplomacy. She can be reached at cassthinkers@casstt.com. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Return of Nuclear Hedging was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the New START’s expiration on February 5, 2026, the world has entered a new era in nuclear arms control, reflecting the evolving realities of the contemporary nuclear order. The United States believes that nuclear limits on warheads and launchers imposed under the New START no longer serve its interests, or those of its nuclear adversaries, highlighting Washington’s lack of appetite for a renewed bilateral arrangement. Dr. Christopher Yeaw, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, shared the U.S. perspective at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), shifting from exclusive U.S.-Russia strategic constraints toward a more inclusive yet complex multilateral framework that could shape the future of global nuclear stability. This transition shows a broader shift in arms control policy of the U.S., emphasizing the need for a new arms control arrangement that reflects a transition from a bilateral framework to a multilateral charter, holding all five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (P-5) equally responsible for making serious efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

While addressing the CD, Dr. Yeaw used the shortcomings of the New START to advance a broader strategic argument rather than merely listing Russian violations. By emphasizing Russia’s sizeable stockpile of non-strategic (theatre) nuclear weapons that are estimated to be around 2,000 warheads and the production of novel systems like nuclear-armed Skyfall cruise missile and the nuclear powered Poseidon torpedo, Washington aimed to highlight that New START was overly focused on deployed strategic warheads and completely overlooked the full range of modern nuclear risks.

Dr. Yeaw further linked these loopholes with China’s emergence as a major nuclear actor, arguing that the New START bilateral structure left a structural gap by excluding Beijing at a time of unprecedented expansion in its nuclear arsenal. While projecting on China’s official defense white papers, he cautioned that Beijing could attain strategic parity in the next four to five years and may possess fissile material sufficient for more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, which was roughly 200 at the time the treaty was signed in 2010. Additionally, he highlighted concerns about Russian cooperation on China’s CFR-600 reactors, framing this collaboration as further complicating U.S. threat perceptions. Through these arguments, Washington justifies a shift from a bilateral arms control framework with Russia toward a multilateral platform that includes additional nuclear stakeholders, reflecting a recalibration of the U.S. arms control policy in the contemporary multipolar nuclear landscape.

The U.S. believes that New START’s expiration arrived at the fortuitous time, urging all states, not just the nuclear-weapon states, to strive for a better arms control framework. Under the new proposal, Washington aims to transition from a bilateral arms control agreement with Russia to a multilateral platform as a necessary next step in ongoing arms control discussions. Such a multilateral format can prevent an unmitigated nuclear arms race, restrain the build-up of nuclear arms, and address issues surrounding non-NPT states with nuclear weapons. In a multilateral format, the Trump administration says all options are on the table as it discusses the future of nuclear arms control in the current security environment. Washington wants to conduct negotiations on strategic stability and arms control on multiple avenues, including the P5 forum where NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon states already meet to discuss issues of strategic importance. The Trump administration maintains that all five nuclear-weapon states (P5) are under an obligation to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith under Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that disarmament efforts are not limited to those states with the largest arsenals. Under this new proposal, the U.S. wants nuclear weapon states like Russia and China to participate in a multilateral process for effective debate on the elements of arms control arrangements.

In the evolving multipolar nuclear order, bringing together all five nuclear-weapon states to the NPT – Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. admits that today’s strategic stability extends beyond Russia-U.S. dynamics. This forum could prove effective in preserving normative commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, asymmetries in nuclear capabilities and divergent threat perceptions limit the viability of such a multilateral forum. The U.S. and Russia still possess 80 percent of the global nuclear arsenal, while Beijing would resist numerical limits without prior reductions by the U.S. and Russia. France may support such a multilateral dialogue with other P5 states, maintaining its independent nuclear deterrent. However, Paris would likely resist any binding multilateral commitments that could limit its small arsenal. The United Kingdom may support the U.S. initiative for expanding P5 engagement.

The imperative of arms control is encouraging, but given the evolving global nuclear order, where New START failed to achieve its objectives, it is difficult to see how the proposed multilateral, modernized approach might succeed soon. In this scenario, a multilateral forum like the P5 would remain a consultative platform rather than serve as a substitute for enforcing arms control agreements.

In conclusion, after New START’s expiration, the U.S. has moved from bilateral arms control with Russia to a broader multilateral strategy, encouraging all NPT nuclear-weapon states, through forums like the P5, to share responsibility for strategic stability. This favors a more flexible approach to multilateral engagements over the binding bilateral constraints of the past in a changing security environment.

Nawal Nawaz is a researcher at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS) in Islamabad. She is pursuing her MPhil in Strategic Studies at the National Defence University in Islamabad, focusing on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and regional strategic stability.

From Bilateralism to Multilateralism: Washington’s Push for Strategic Stability Through the P5 was originally published on Global Security Review.

What Is the Third Nuclear Age?

The world can be divided into three eras of nuclear weapons history, each defined by distinct weapons dynamics and geopolitical relationships, and distinguished by major proliferation or treaty events of its time.

The first nuclear era was characterized by a bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1980s. At its peak, the number of warheads held by both countries is estimated to have reached around 60,000 in 1986. This era was marked by limited arms control agreements and significant arms racing.

The second nuclear era, spanning from 1991 to 2013, saw significant disarmament through bilateral U.S.–Russia treaties such as START I and New START, which reduced global warhead numbers by a considerable amount. However, this period was also marked by nuclear proliferation efforts by regional actors, including the nuclearization of South Asia, particularly India, followed by Pakistan, and then North Korea’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

Beginning in 2014, the third nuclear era emerged, typified by the current, chaotic, multipolar environment. Russia has unilaterally suspended participation in New START monitoring and verification, a treaty that expired on February 5^th, 2026. Both the United Kingdom and France have commenced modernization and expansion of their nuclear forces. China is rapidly nearing an estimated 600 warheads, North Korea continues to test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and Russia has modernized its weapons systems and deployed short-range nuclear weapons in Belarus. Iran continues to signal that it is nearing the nuclear threshold, opacity persists regarding Israel’s nuclear capabilities, and the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan has created multiple additional flashpoints, all of which underscore the need for new international multilateral guardrails.

Current Global Nuclear Trends

The United States has initiated a $1.7 trillion nuclear triad modernization plan, which includes submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles. Russia has been testing nuclear-powered cruise missiles such as Burevestnik, while China is expanding its nuclear weapons capability at a rapid pace amid rising tensions over Taiwan.

In addition, strategic non-nuclear weapons, including hypersonic systems, AI-driven command structures, and missile defense, are contributing to an escalatory environment in which the nuclear ladder has become increasingly slippery to climb and equally difficult to descend. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has set its “Doomsday Clock” at 89 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been since 1947, reflecting its assessment that the erosion of arms control, the expansion of nuclear capabilities, and the persistence of conflict have significantly increased the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

Escalating Global Nuclear Challenges

The U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations have ceased over Ukraine, and President Putin has reduced stated nuclear use thresholds. At the same time, U.S. military strikes against Iran have alarmed some observers who argue that such actions undermine norms governing sovereignty. NATO countries are increasingly exploring their own European deterrence capabilities.

A defining feature of the third nuclear age is the growing complexity of the strategic environment and the inability to manage global risks through simple bilateral frameworks.

Technological advancements that accelerate escalation risks include hypersonic weapons that challenge missile defense systems, artificial intelligence that may misinterpret launch indicators, and cyber operations that could inadvertently contribute to nuclear escalation—echoing historical false-alarm incidents in 1983. Meanwhile, China’s evolving relationship with Russia further complicates U.S. efforts to deter aggression across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

The Way Forward

With New START having expired, significant future limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by major powers appear unlikely, accelerating competition and instability. By the mid-2030s, the convergence of nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities may become normalized as tools of coercion rather than deterrence, while additional states may seek nuclear weapons should nonproliferation barriers erode. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has identified the emergence of the “third nuclear age” as the top global risk in 2026.

Accordingly, new mechanisms for arms control and nuclear disarmament consistent with commitments made by major nuclear-weapon states under the NPT framework are urgently required. These include enhanced verification technologies, AI-assisted monitoring, restraints on the development of destabilizing new weapons, and sustained strategic-stability dialogue aimed at separating and disentangling nuclear and conventional escalation pathways. Additional measures to promote norms of responsible nuclear behavior are also necessary, although opposition from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council remains a significant barrier to progress. Ensuring the global security of radioactive materials must remain a priority.

The third nuclear age has placed humanity in unprecedented danger. Existing disarmament mechanisms have proven ineffective as new rivalries emerge, and technological changes accelerate. History demonstrates that diplomacy can work: New START reduced nuclear arsenals to their lowest levels since the early years of the first nuclear era. Today’s leaders must again prioritize cooperation and restraint, or risk allowing miscalculation to turn expanding arsenals into catastrophe. The alternative is too terrible to ignore.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Understanding the Third Nuclear Age: Why 2026 Matters was originally published on Global Security Review.

The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia declared itself compliant with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.

In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration emphasized that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already been paused since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already completed over 70 percent of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. “inequality” in support of Ukraine.

New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.

Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its 10-16 multiple warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.

Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.

The U.S. nuclear triad modernization program is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.

Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a physical inspection method in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s final compliance report concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.

Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement” in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, some experts estimate the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at 1,000 to 5,000, a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.

Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including parity approaches, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge with all such posts is that they never tell the whole story. Yes, Russia and China are refusing to enter arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia is believed to be conducting hydronuclear tests that produce a nuclear yield, but the President’s post does not mean what you may think.

Contrary to the wailing and gnashing of teeth of arms control advocates after Trump’s post, he is not calling for a return to detonating nuclear warheads under the Nevada desert. He is calling for something much different, which is why his post included, “…on an equal basis.” This point is important and was seemingly lost on many.

What many Americans may not know is that the United States last tested a nuclear weapon in 1992 and has, since at least 1996, interpreted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to mean that nuclear testing cannot produce a nuclear yield. Thus, the United States, has voluntarily followed the CTBT and produced “zero yield” in the many tests it has conducted over the past three decades. American scientists were able to verify the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal without producing an explosive yield.

President Trump is simply enabling American scientists to conduct hydronuclear tests that can provide higher fidelity results as the nation modernizes its existing nuclear warheads and begins building the first new nuclear warhead in more than a generation. This is a very important distinction.

The President, who often speaks in generalities, can be faulted for not offering a level of detail that explained his post more clearly, but articles claiming he does not understand nuclear testing may be less accurate than the President’s critics believe. The relationship between the Department of War and the Department of Energy, when it comes to nuclear weapons, is symbiotic. The Department of Energy designs and builds the weapons at its federally funded and privately operated labs, under the management of the National Nuclear Security Agency, but the Department of War drives the demand for capabilities. Thus, criticizing the President for saying the Department of War will do the testing is a bit of a hollow victory.

With Russia unwilling to extend New START and China’s continuing unwillingness to join multilateral arms control negotiations, President Trump’s statement was an attempt at demonstrating American resolve in the face of America’s declining nuclear position. The reality is that Russia understands its strength is in its nuclear forces, not its conventional capabilities.

If President Trump deserves criticism for anything, it is incorrectly suggesting that the American nuclear arsenal is superior to that of Russia; it is not. Russia’s arsenal is both newer and larger than that of the United States.

Russia may also breakout of New START limits upon the treaty’s expiration, which is a worrying prospect for the United States. Russia’s abrogation the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023, in retaliation for Western support of Ukraine, is also concerning. It is, however, unsurprising. Before, Russia at least tried to ensure any violations of the “zero yield” understanding was hidden from the global public. That may cease if the Ukraine war continues. Although, President Trump’s announcement may have contained Russian ambitions.

Russia may have announced “reciprocal measures” if the United States begins testing, but Vladimir Putin knows the US is looking to conduct tests at the same level as Russia’s existing tests. China called on the US to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing, but China may have also violated the “zero yield” threshold in its effort to build advanced nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese nor Russian programs is particularly visible to Western monitoring efforts.

The prospects for Russo-American cooperation are low, but this should come as no surprise considering nuclear weapons are Russia’s trump card, no pun intended, when it comes to limiting Western support to Ukraine. Putin cannot afford to lose in Ukraine. His head, quite literally, is on the line.

Chinese nuclear forces are still inferior to American nuclear forces, but not for long. Thus, joining multilateral negotiations are not in China’s core interests as the Chinese Communist Party builds a nuclear arsenal fit for deterring American intervention with Chinese plans to seize Taiwan and perhaps other disputed territories. Of course China responded to President Trump’s post by calling it “unreasonable and unrealistic.” Hypocrisy on nuclear issues will not, however, stop Chinese communists from expanding their arsenal.

President Trump’s post is understandable given the world in which he finds himself. The President must try to deter continued Chinese and Russian aggression. If resuming nuclear testing helps, it is well worth the effort. What the President’s words will not do is start an arms race. That would require the United States to be a participant, and the Chinese and Russians left the starting blocks long ago.

Adam Lowther is the Co-founder and VP for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Understanding President Trump’s Truth Social Post on Nuclear Testing? was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.

It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.

Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.

Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.

To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.

The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.

Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.

Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.

A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.

An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.

The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”

Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. 

Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These economic conflicts erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.

Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the supply chain. Moreover, it can weaken American global leadership as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.

The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and strategic stability. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.

American technological superiority, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately 70 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.

However, the American military is already in decline according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”

The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than three destroyers annually. By contrast, China possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.

The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a zero-sum strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly provocative rhetoric from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.

Traditionally, China rejects arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.

Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the great powers declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the verification process, and the supply chain supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.

Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.

Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.

In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of New START remains uncertain and fragile.

At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.

Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.

South Korea, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.

Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.

How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Major events shaping the current arms control landscape include the unraveling of key treaties. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was triggered by Russian violations and the subsequent withdrawal by the United States—signaling a dangerous erosion of strategic stability. When coupled with the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limits American and Russian operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, there are concerns about a return to unconstrained nuclear competition.

The last time such foundational treaties were absent the world was illuminated by the glow of vacuum tubes and dial telephones, not the intricate web of digital connectivity that now exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, also suffered a significant blow when the first Trump administration lost faith in its validity—fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for regional proliferation.

Trends in arms control are marked by a resurgence of great power competition and a decline in multilateralism. The rise of China as a military power, coupled with its rapid nuclear modernization, challenges the existing arms control framework, which largely focused on Russo-American relations. It is noteworthy that the US sided with Russia against a Western-led effort to further punish Russia at the United Nations for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This was perhaps a move to spur Russian agreement to a truce in the conflict but is unusual.

The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, further complicates arms control efforts, as these technologies have the power to threaten national sovereignty. The increasing use of cyber warfare and space-based weapons also creates new domains of conflict that are difficult to regulate.

Themes that dominate contemporary arms control discourse include the erosion of trust and the rise of strategic ambiguity. The breakdown of established treaties and the lack of transparency in military modernization programs are fueling distrust among nations. This apparent shift in doctrine may represent a genuine erosion of trust, or a calculated and abrupt pivot designed to reset a paradigm that is overly reliant on American leadership. The strategic ambiguity surrounding emerging technologies and the intentions of potential adversaries creates a climate of uncertainty. The rise of nationalist agendas and the decline of multilateral institutions can undermine efforts to build consensus on arms control and nonproliferation.

President Trump’s America First agenda and its associated call for allies to bare a larger burden of their own security impacts the arms control landscape. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA was, for some, a rejection of multilateral agreements and a preference for unilateral action.

This approach stood to alienate allies and emboldened adversaries, undermining efforts to build international consensus on arms control. The Trump administration’s skepticism towards international institutions and its emphasis on American strength over international collaboration, which the administration sees as often at the expense of the United States, may contribute to the erosion of the remaining arms control framework. The reduction of funding for arms control initiatives and the appointment of officials with limited experience in this field signals a diminished commitment to nonproliferation.

The current arms control and nonproliferation landscape is marked by unprecedented challenges. The unraveling of key treaties, the resurgence of great power competition, and the rise of nationalist agendas create a volatile environment that may take unexpected turns. President Trump’s America First agenda and its efforts to require greater cost sharing leave adversaries wondering if the United States intends to leave existing alliances. Addressing the challenges posed by the changes requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue. Only through concerted international efforts can the world hope to mitigate the risks posed by unconstrained proliferation and ensure a more stable and secure future.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR – Week of February 24, 2025

Deterrence at a Crossroads: A Call for Strength and Resolve

America is pivotal in nuclear modernization, strategic deterrence, and global security. As threats from Russia and China escalate, U.S. defense policy must adapt—or risk catastrophic consequences.

Key Strategic Insights

Nuclear Deterrence Imperative – The Minuteman III test launch underscores the critical need for modernization. General Tom Bussiere warns: “We must recapitalize our nuclear forces while maintaining the old—an unprecedented challenge.”

The Russian Threat – Moscow’s aggression is reinforced by information warfare and nuclear coercion. Sergei Shoigu states: “We must undermine the political, economic, and social system of the West.” The impending New START Treaty expiration (2026) raises concerns of a Russian nuclear breakout.

China’s Strategic Decline – $168 billion in foreign direct investment fled China in 2024. Its aggressive military expansion—the largest since WWII—coupled with its alliance with Russia, isolates Beijing internationally.

Global Realignment & Defense Priorities –
Britain increases defense spending (2.5% GDP by 2027).
South Korea considers nuclear options in response to North Korea.
The U.S. must act decisively to maintain strategic dominance.

The Cost of Hesitation

From Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament to past Western miscalculations on Russia, history warns against underestimating adversaries. De-escalation as a default strategy has failed.

The Air Force Association calls for a $45 billion annual increase in USAF and Space Force funding. As Stephen Feinberg, Deputy Secretary of Defense nominee, bluntly states:

“If we do not plug our capability gaps, we will lose to China.”

Call to Action: Strength Through Deterrence

Fully modernize the U.S. nuclear triad
Accelerate next-generation air and missile defense
Fund a credible and flexible deterrent

Deterrence is not optional—it is the foundation of peace. America must lead with strength, invest in security, and ensure our adversaries understand that aggression will never be left unanswered.

The future is watching. We must be ready.

ICBM EAR Week of Feb 24th was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cirincione begins his article, “President Joe Biden has a terrible nuclear policy. A re-elected President Donald Trump’s would be much worse.” President Trump, should he win, will likely follow the path of every new president since 1994 and conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, and, like the last three presidents, follow a path that reflects the threat facing the United States. Until something concrete takes place, Cirincione is merely speculating by attributing the plan of some conservative organizations, Project 2025, to Donald Trump.

Cirincione also willfully misrepresents the record of the Biden administration when he writes that Biden has “authorized the largest nuclear weapons budgets since the Cold War.” This suggests President Biden supports nuclear weapons. The Biden Nuclear Posture Review called for the retirement of the B-83, the nation’s only megaton class nuclear capability. Biden also proposed canceling the sea launched cruise missile-nuclear (SLCM-N) and eliminating the nuclear hedge. Neither of these efforts are the actions of a man who supports the nuclear arsenal. Biden, however, had the misfortune of dealing with a reality that was inconsistent with his ideology, something that is never a problem for disarmament groups because they have no responsibility to protect the country.

Cirincione claims that Trump’s nuclear policy is informed by the “new conservative manifesto Project 2025.” When Trump was recently asked about Project 2025 he said that he has never heard of it. He even went on Truth Social to write, “I know nothing about Project 2025.” This is certainly not something Trump would lie about. Trump is, in fact, relying on a small number of officials from his first administration for advice and guidance. He does not need the Heritage Foundation or any other think tanks to tell him what to think.

Understood for what it says, rather than the conspiratorial insinuations of many progressives, Project 2025’s nuclear arsenal related proposals are largely accurate and well-reasoned. An honest assessment of the coming decade clearly indicates a need to expand the American nuclear arsenal to counter a growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capability. When Cirincione writes, “These proposals [from Project 2025] would add unnecessary new weapons to an already expansive nuclear arsenal” he is merely denying the reality facing the United States.

This country is already well behind Russia in the size and capability of its nuclear arsenal and will fall behind China within a decade. The United States will soon face three autocratic regimes with a collective arsenal several times greater than the American arsenal.

Cirincione goes on to criticize every nuclear policy prescription in Project 2025, suggesting that none are necessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to his critique, prioritizing nuclear weapons programs over other defense programs is a wise move. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of American defense policy—ensuring that adversaries think twice before considering aggressive action against the United States.

Interestingly, Cirincione fails to acknowledge that former President Barack Obama made an agreement with the US Senate in 2010 in which the Senate agreed to ratify New START in return for modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden all honored this agreement in the main, even if they sought change on the margins.

Cirincione even goes so far as to criticize modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and production complex. This is not a radical move but a sensible effort that was needed decades ago. The desire of Joe Cirincione and other disarmament advocates to allow the nuclear weapons complex to atrophy into obsolescence is a dangerous path that only wealthy idealists with tall fences can contemplate. It is only because of three decades of neglect that Americans are now forced to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad.

In other words, Joe Cirincione and his fellow travelers in the disarmament community advocated for the actions that led the nation down the path it is now on. Today, both Republican and Democrat administrations recognize the trouble facing the nation, even as disarmament advocates complain about efforts to fix the problems they helped create. It is simply an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect at work.

Tying Donald Trump to Project 2025 and vilifying both is an effort to obfuscate and avoid having a substantive discussion about the nuclear breakout of China, Russia’s nuclear threats, and other meaningful issues that challenge the mantra of the disarmament community.

What is perhaps most disappointing is just how far the Bulletin has fallen. Rather than engaging in meaningful discussion on nuclear issues, the journal is increasingly publishing articles that read more like an excerpt from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks or Herbert Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” They, like Cirincione’s own article, seem more interested in advancing the radical ideology of modern-day Marxists than having a fact-based debate over the role of nuclear weapons in national security. This penchant for the absurd makes it hard to take a once-conscientious publication and its contributors seriously.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Joe Cirincione is Wrong about Donald Trump was originally published on Global Security Review.