If you’ve not heard of Transnistria—the de-facto state nestled between Moldova and Ukrain—you could easily be forgiven. The territory is just over 4,000 square kilometers, is home to just under 500,000 people and recognized only by three additional de-facto states. While Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Artsakh may treat Transnistria as an independent state, the rest of the world sees Transnistria as a breakaway portion of Moldova. Moldova itself calls the tiny strip of land on the eastern bank of the Dniester river an autonomous territorial unit with special legal status.

Since the conflict that led to its secession in 1992, Transnistria has used its uncertain legal status to act as a thriving market for illegal arms. The country is estimated to house Europe’s largest ammunition stockpile. This stockpile alongside easily corrupted officials and porous borders has allowed Transnistria to operate as prime real estate for much business that cannot be conducted openly in many other countries. This business includes the monopoly Sheriff corporation, Sheriff LLC, which is owned and founded by Viktor Gushan, a former Soviet KGB officer.

What makes Transnistria so popular for illegal trade?

Perhaps Transnistria’s largest asset for illegal trade is its proximity to Odessa, Ukraine’s Black Sea port which operates as a prime spot for most Eurasian trade. Transnistria’s main exports are cigarettes, arms, alcohol, and food. Historically, much of this trade was unable to go through Moldova or to the European Union due to trade boycotts. Instead, Transnistria relied on the porous borders between itself and Ukraine. However, given the ongoing civil war in Ukraine, that approach has shifted.

After 2014, Ukraine’s border policy has become much more aggressive. Instead of allowing illegal products to travel to Odessa, Ukraine border patrols are much stricter now both regarding products and people. In its place, Transnistria has been forced to turn westward. After a long series of negotiations, Moldova signed a tariff-free trade deal with the European Union in 2014. This deal additionally allowed trade to be conducted from Transnistria with a few caveats. Businesses in Transnistria could take advantage of this deal so long as they were registered in Moldova and agreed to customs inspections. This shift within Transnistria gave way to massive change. While in 2014, While in 2014, 27 percent of exports went to the European Union, in 2016, that data point increased to 58 percent.

Will Transnistria continue to be an illegal trade hub?

While Transnistria has certainly shifted most of its trade to the West, it remains to be seen whether or not it has ended its reliance on illegal trade. Sheriff LLC, for example, has a monopoly not only on all domestic business within Transnistria but also on illicit trade. Even with increased trade with the European Union, it is unlikely that such a behemoth like Sheriff would give up a significant portion of its income. Moreover, while it certainly appears as though Transnistria is slowly turning westward, its historical connection with Russia cannot be understated.

This relationship with Russia implies that even with stricter Ukrainian border policies, there will be a portion of the population that feels close to and therefore travels to Russia. Naturally, not all of this travel will involve illegal trade. Given Transnistria’s experience with smuggling, it would be surprising if black market trade ceased simply due to new border restrictions.

Transnistria: No Longer an Illegal Trade Hub? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Neighborhood Policy—the program’s predecessor—was initiated in 2004 to promote cooperation and stability in former Soviet European states. Five years later, the Eastern Partnership Program was inaugurated. The program encourages countries—specifically Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—to undertake democratic reforms in return for economic incentives.

As the program is getting older, the E.U. High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the bloc’s de facto foreign minister) and the six participating countries will meet in May 2019 to discuss the Eastern Partnership Program beyond 2020. This may perturb Russia, which has expressed concerns that the program is detrimental to Russian interests.

The Contentious Eastern Partnership Program

Although the goal of the EPP was ostentatiously to bring the six countries mentioned above closer to the E.U., Russia sees the situation differently. Rather than seeing these partnerships as an effort toward stabilization in the region, Russia considers the E.U. to be trespassing within its sphere of influence. In essence, Russia sees any policy that is “without Russia” as “against Russia.”

Russian concerns are not without merit. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have all struck association agreements with the E.U. since the start of the EPP program—and Azerbaijan is expected to do so as well in the near future. While each country has its reasons for taking part in the EPP, Russia sees a concerted effort to impede its influence.

In response, Russia has taken steps to ensure that these countries remain in its orbit. In Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, Russian troops continue to occupy territory with separatist militants, while Russian troops are actively stationed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Moreover, Russia has enacted politically-motivated economic sanctions against Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

What does the future hold for the EPP?

While some countries have treated the EPP as the first stepping stone to full European Union membership, it’s clear that the E.U. doesn’t consider these as potential member-states. No consensus exists over whether these post-Soviet states should have the opportunity of joining the E.U. Furthermore, corruption in many of the EPP states is often ignored in favor of closer relations to further the promotion of democracy and free markets.

Any Western promise of Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership serves to further destabilize the region and suggests that the EPP is only symbolic. With no actual proof that NATO or E.U. membership is forthcoming, many of these country’s populations become disillusioned with Western values. Such rhetoric also provides a rationale for Russia to act aggressively against these countries.

In Ukraine, the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbass regions suggest that the Kremlin wanted to act before any further NATO or EU membership was adopted. In Georgia and Moldova, the presence of Russian troops force both countries to consider possible Russian reactions before taking any serious steps towards integrating with western institutions.

While diplomats will meet in May to discuss the future of the EPP, the program’s future success is heavily reliant upon how Russia and the E.U. choose to act going forward. The E.U. must acknowledge that these countries are far from meeting the requirements for joining the E.U. and NATO. At the same time, Russia must be led to perceive stabilization as a positive development rather than as a threat to its sovereignty and sphere of influence.

What’s the Future of the E.U.’s Eastern Partnership Program? was originally published on Global Security Review.