China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

The digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s initiative to invest in critical telecommunications and emerging technology in foreign countries, is a vehicle to lower the barriers to cyber coercion and propagate the digital curtain. By embedding its “model of technology-enabled authoritarianism” in recipient nations, Beijing seeks to shape the digital ecosystems of other countries in ways that serve its strategic interests. Such attempts call for a proactive and coordinated response from the United States and its regional partners—one that builds a resilient, tech-driven organization capable of countering China’s digital expansion across the the Indo-Pacific.

The United States and China are engaged in a great power competition, one which has seeped into multiple theaters and domains. The Indo-Pacific region is generally understood to be the frontline of this contest.

However, China’s burgeoning technological capacity has led to cyberspace being a critical juncture in this competition; one where traditional borders fade, thereby allowing the proliferation of gray zone tactics. Such tactics are deployed in various ways—infiltrating critical infrastructure, cyber espionage, and disinformation campaigns—on key democracies in the region.

Considering the geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific, China’s attempts to use cyber coercion to cleave the region from the United States’ sphere of influence highlights a calculated strategy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The region is home to over 50 percent of the world’s population, and 80 percent of global trade volume transits through its channels. It houses “seven of the world’s largest militaries, and five American treaty allies.”

Moreover, digital connectivity and internet adoption rates are the fastest growing compared to any region in the word, making it rife with opportunities and threats. These vulnerabilities not only indicate further volatility for regional governments but could also undermine American national security.

The list of cyber incidents already attributed to Chinese state-sponsored entities is extensive, and its targets are equally expansive. Advanced persistent threat (APT)—long-term, sophisticated, and entrenched cyber intrusions designed to hack, steal, and/or neutralize systems—have been a weapon of choice for those entities. For instance, APT-30 and APT-40, which targeted Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and New Zealand’s government, respectively, are reportedly linked to the Chinese government.

Furthermore, American intelligence and cybersecurity agencies recently confirmed that Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored entity, compromised American critical infrastructure ranging from telecommunications to water systems; its reach even included US territories such as Guam.

While the specter of ATPs and digital intrusions have entered the purview of several governments in the Indo-Pacific region, individual efforts to deter those threats are futile. This is often due to strategic inertia, a shortage of specialized workers, and asymmetric capabilities.

A consolidated effort by the United States and its regional partners is needed to build consensus, direct resources, and establish a digital enforcement body. This could address those issues while mitigating any potential upheaval from China’s tactics. Fortunately, the groundwork for such a partnership is already in place.

On July 1, 2025, the 10th Quad foreign ministers’ meeting was hosted by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where he was joined by his counterparts from Japan, India, and Australia. It was the second such meeting since January, signifying the importance placed on the vision of the group by the Trump administration.

The measures agreed upon as a result are further evidence to that fact—initiatives to bolster maritime and transnational security, economic security, critical and emerging technology, among others. Therefore, the vast security mandates of those initiatives provide a viable path to constructing a techno-centric partnership while addressing the region’s strategic, skills, and capabilities gaps when it comes to deterring China’s digital incursions.

The decision to expand the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)—a technology-focused initiative to augment the maritime security landscape—provides a practical foundation for a techno-centric partnership. Its stated goal of developing a “common operating picture” for the IPMDA could lead to the basis for a strategic consensus among potential members.

Furthermore, incorporating insights from the first Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) workshop could assist in closing the skills gap for a regional digital workforce, further adding to the partnership’s feasibility.

Additional features which could be utilized for the partnership and address the capabilities gap include the Quad Cyber Challenge and the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. The Cyber Challenge seeks to enhance the cyber ecosystem, digital awareness, and resourcing among member nations.

The Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience, on the other hand, bears a more tactical responsibility of strengthening telecommunications infrastructure, specifically, undersea cables—arguably the most critical component of the digital ecosystem. Although these initiatives are focused on Quad member-nations, they could be expanded in a larger forum to engage ASEAN and Pacific subregional organizations such as the Pacific Island Forum, providing more opportunities for resource allocation.

There is institutional and strategic momentum behind the formation of a tech-centric partnership, not to mention the critical security imperative that exists. The broad consensus, coupled with the runway to take near-term action, makes this a prospective enterprise. Such concrete action is necessitated if the US and its regional allies expect to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and establish an active deterrent to China, which seeks to write the rules and draw the margins of the evolving digital age.

Abrar Rahman Namir is currently interning at Associated Universities and assisting in the Batteries and Energies to Advance Commercialization and National Security program as a supply chains and trade analyst.

Tech-centric Partnership in the Indo-Pacific to Deter Digital Curtain was originally published on Global Security Review.

While certification is contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its own submarine production rate, which is struggling to meet the planned two Virginia-class submarines per year, Australia would benefit greatly from their acquisition. Overall, it is worth noting that AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II are likely to significantly enhance US undersea capabilities in the long term. Pillar I includes the rotational presence of one UK Astute-class submarine and up to four US Virginia-class submarines at HMAS Stirling, Western Australia, from 2027. HMAS Stirling provides the United States with greater access for the forward presence of nuclear-powered submarines in the Indo-Pacific.

Indo-Pacific access is further expanded via the new submarine base that is planned for the east coast of Australia by 2043. The authorized consolidated Commonwealth-owned Defence Precinct at Western Australia’s Henderson shipyard will provide contingency-docking and depot-level maintenance for AUKUS submarines by 2033, potentially alleviating some of the burden on US-based maintenance facilities. Pillar II will provide the advanced technology necessary to enhance US, UK, and Australian undersea capabilities, particularly for longer term advantages in mobility, survivability, lethality, and sustainability of allied forces.

Conversely, the SLCM-N is likely a significant factor in retaining American undersea capabilities. The SLCM-N will provide the US with flexible deterrence options in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, particularly as the US needs to provide extended nuclear deterrence to 32 NATO allies plus Australia, Japan, and South Korea. There are three options to consider when attempting to deter China, North Korea, and Russia.

First, the United States can provide Australia three to five conventionally armed Virginia-class submarines. This option is likely to significantly degrade American undersea capabilities through a lack of flexible response options for strategic deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. Plus, Australia will need to manage three classes of submarines: the Collins-class, the AUKUS-class, and the SSN-AUKUS under this option.

Second, Australia can field a dual-capable submarines (DCS) mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. This option requires the establishment of a nuclear planning group (NPG) to plan for a DCS mission for Australian Virginia-class submarines. These submarines would be capable of carrying the SLCM-N. This nuclear-armed option is unlikely to degrade US undersea capabilities, as Australia could support some US missions in the Indo-Pacific and provide flexible deterrence options. Australia will still need to manage three submarine classes under this option.

Third, the United States does not sell Virginia-class submarines to Australia, but instead bases submarines armed with SLCM-N in Australia, either on a permanent or rotational basis. This option does not degrade US undersea capabilities. However, under this option Australia should negotiate for extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. This option is not the end of AUKUS, but Australia will need to build sovereign SSN-AUKUS submarines to fill the gap left by Australia’s aging Collins-class submarines when they are retired.

Policymakers should not be afraid to consider a flexible nuclear-armed option in light of recent and historic Russian and Chinese rhetoric on AUKUS, especially when this rhetoric concerns “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability.” Having a nuclear-armed option would provide enough flexibility to backstop and limit conventional war.

On April 18, 2025, Russia’s envoy to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, defended military ties with Jakarta and did not deny claims that Russia seeks to station long-range military aircraft at the Manuhua Air Force Base at Biak Numfor, about 1400 kilometers north of Darwin, Australia. Russia asserted that AUKUS is more of a threat to the Asia-Pacific than Russian ties with Indonesia, which are “not aimed against any third countries and poses no threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region.” Tolchenov added that challenges to regional stability

are more likely to arise from the rotational deployment of large military contingents from extra-regional states on Australian territory, including the provision of airfields for the landing of strategic bombers and port infrastructure for visits by nuclear-powered submarines. Particularly alarming are the currently discussed plans to deploy the US intermediate-range missiles in Australia, which would put ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries, including Indonesia, within its range, as well as the acquisition by the Royal Australian Navy of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS trilateral partnership.

These comments are consistent with Putin’s rhetoric against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This is not the first time Russia and China accused the US, UK, and Australia of risking an intensified arms race and military confrontation in the Indo-Pacific. A report by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, China Nuclear Strategic Planning Research Institute, and the Russian Energy and Security Research Centre stated, “non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability, being provided to Australia, will affect nuclear deterrence and strategic stability.” The report goes on to say that “[w]hile current non-nuclear strategic weapons cannot carry out all the missions assigned to nuclear weapons those still can produce strategic effects.” The report further criticizes AUKUS’ nuclear submarine cooperation, which the report suggests will trigger a regional submarine arms race.

Chinese and Russian threats should not limit or contain AUKUS to non-nuclear options. This is particularly true when the US has historically provided non-nuclear long-range precision-strike capability. In the past this included the F-111 Aardvark, F/A-18F Super Hornet, E/A-18G Growler, and F-35A Lightning II.

Under the UN Charter, members have “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.” Hence, Australia and its allies should stand by the expression, si vis pacem, para bellum. Australia and its AUKUS allies should not back down from non-nuclear long-range precision strike capability or nuclear-armed deterrence options that provide more flexible responses.

Although, the sale of Virginia-class submarines to Australia under the AUKUS agreement may be contingent on the US Navy’s ability to maintain its submarine production rate. It is worth noting that American undersea capabilities, particularly in the long term, may be greatly enhanced through other means under AUKUS Pillar I and Pillar II.

In the new era of nuclear disorder, the key to maintaining American undersea capabilities will likely be the SLCM-N deployed on Virginia-class attack submarines. The SLCM-N will provide AUKUS flexible deterrence options and limit risk of conflict in austere Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres.

Natalie A. Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. She is the Australian Company Director of Alpha–India Consultancy. Natalie formerly contracted to the Australian Department of Defence. Views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies, or positions of any organization, employer, or affiliated group.

SLCM-N, the Virginia-Class Submarine, and AUKUS was originally published on Global Security Review.

An example of possible obstruction to diplomacy is the clash between the United States and China. An article in the New York Times stated that “Mr. Trump was scathing as he accused Beijing of concealing the outbreak first detected in Wuhan that has become a pandemic now paralyzing the United States.” The contentions were also become worse because of the words used by President Trump during his speech in White House briefing in calling coronavirus as “Chinese virus” and the term “Wuhan virus,” which was used by the Secretary of State Mr. Pompeo. Moreover, other top American officials also expressed their criticism against the Chinese government, particularly on withholding and distorting vital health data, which could create a global health risk. In response, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that there might be a conspiracy theory that the US Army might have produced the virus and brought it to Wuhan. Another picture of obstruction to diplomacy is the halting of trade relations between Southeast Asian countries and China.

Due to the restrictions in the travel of both humans and goods to prevent virus transmission, imports and exports are greatly affected. The spreading of coronavirus has been an obstruction to many economic relations, especially to Southeast Asia, which has been over-reliant on China as its vast market and trade partner in recent years. Furthermore, it is not only trade relations that have been affected by the COVID-19, but it also temporarily stops diplomatic meetings. A Foreign Policy article mentioned that “The coronavirus has all but halted the world of international diplomacy, derailing major summits and leaving diplomats stranded as governments temporarily ban international travel.” Socially, racism could also be experienced by the Chinese people as their country is the epicenter of the virus outbreak. Now there is a stigma among peoples that they are more likely to be carriers.

The above scenarios have described COVID-19 as obstructing diplomatic relations. However, there are also opportunities for diplomacy that could be seen in the world, along with fighting this pandemic disease. These are revealed in the actions initiated by the states in terms of collaborative efforts to stop the spreading of the virus. The continuous extension of help and donations across borders as well as the thawing of diplomatic ties despite political tensions. For instance, the meeting that was conducted last February 20, 2020, to talk about joint measures in combating COVID-19 has become an opportunity to bring closer the ASEAN member states and China.

Despite the ongoing territorial disputes between China and other Southeast Asian neighbors, this crisis has become an avenue for the contending parties to be united, prioritizing regional and global health and safety. Writing in The Diplomat, Lucio Blanco Pitlo said: “The meeting was remarkable for tackling not only the health dimension of the crisis but also its social and economic impacts, as well as how technology can be harnessed to mitigate the fallout.” China is currently working on mitigating the lasting damage of the virus in the region and also aiming to reinstate regional unity with its Southeast Asian partners. Additionally, it was noted by Faisal Al Yafai, “Such disaster diplomacy is vital in the moment. It sends an important message that political tensions, no matter how grave, can eventually be overcome by common humanity. But longer-term, it could also lead to better politics.” This hope can be seen by what happened recently when North Korea sent a letter to South Korea expressing condolences due to the COVID-19 outbreak in the country. Canada also helped China by giving medical equipment despite the latest issue on the arrest of the Huawei executive in Vancouver. Recently, Japan generously donated masks with a poem, “Although we are separated by mountains and rivers, we live under the same sky.” In the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has extended its help to Iran, which is often at odds with its Arab neighbors, by giving 7.5 metric tons of medical supplies.

We can see that in these difficult times, diplomacy should be of great concern. COVID-19 is now a problem for all countries and all peoples of the world. A global challenge must be overcome globally. This virus might not only affect the physical health of humankind but also cause the outbreak of a global conflict among countries if diplomatic relations are obstructed. On the other hand, this global health crisis might also be an opportunity for the unity of the world because common humanity will be prioritized over political, economic, and social rivalry.

COVID-19: Diplomatic Obstruction or Opportunity? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In January of this year, General Secretary Xi Jinping of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Myanmar, where he laid the foundations of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Xi signed dozens of bilateral agreements while lauding the Burmese leadership for its efforts to combat terrorism while bypassing entirely the internationally condemned treatment of Myanmar’s Rohingya ethnic minority.

Beijing has been steadily encircling India since 2013 when General Secretary Xi announced the start of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its constituent projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the CMEC (China-Malaysia Economic Corridor), or the China-Sri Lanka Economic Corridor, to name a few.

India Encircled by a String of Pearls

Thus far, India has followed a sheepish approach to Beijing’s voracious appetite for geopolitical influence, as exhibited by its much-publicized “String of Pearls” strategy to exercise geo-economic and military domination across the globe by making massive infrastructure and trade investments.

Strategic Chinese acquisitions in its “String of Pearls” include the purchase of a port in the West African state of Djibouti, the Hambantota Port of Sri Lanka, the Gwadar port in Pakistan, and more recently, a deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu, Myanmar. Bejing is already on track to exert the regional dominance reminiscent of Chinese hegemony in the 5^th century AD.

India is involved a geopolitical quagmire with China, an adversarial power, yet an important strategic partner. While China is India’s second-largest bilateral trade partner, it is also rapidly consolidating its influence throughout South Asia. India, therefore, is at risk of encirclement, restricting its ability to exert its still-considerable influence in the world, particularly in Africa, and, to an extent, in South Asia.

How Should India Respond?

India has consistently rejected the idea of participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, citing concerns over sovereignty. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through Baluchistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, has been a point of contention for New Delhi, albeit one that has been mildly expressed. Despite economic and strategic conditions that are seemingly in Beijing’s favor, there are several steps that New Delhi can take to counter China’s expanding influence in India’s backyard.

First, it’s clear that India cannot match China in terms of economic strength, at least not in bilateral terms. However, India can use its regional influence to strengthen multilateral geo-economic organizations of which it is a member, such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) by embarking on multilateral economic projects in the iron and steel, oil and petroleum, and textile sectors, as well as leveraging its considerable expertise in the information technology sector.

Second, New Delhi must double-down on a carrot-and-stick approach to managing geo-economic competition with China. India has massive market potential, with a population of over 1.3 billion people. The country is one of the world’s largest markets for electronics, IT, logistics, and, more recently, defense. At the same time, India must intensify scrutiny of Chinese goods by strengthening the Harmonized System Nomenclature (HSN) and by cracking down on imported products of substandard quality—a critical step to take considering that 45% of India’s imported goods are of Chinese origin.

Third, India must take further steps to bolster its exports to countries increasingly wary of China’s growing influence, particularly as global scrutiny of the sustainability of China’s Belt and Road Initiative gains traction. At the same time, New Delhi should facilitate Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreements with other countries in sectors where India is traditionally strong, such as logistics, defense, agriculture, and dairy. India must increase its use of its soft power by undertaking proactive cultural, economic, and political diplomacy in key BRI participant-countries, including Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Brunei, while simultaneously bolstering defense ties through bilateral and multilateral military exercises and training programs.

Finally, India must strengthen its economic relations with ASEAN member-states, particularly with the Vietnam-South Korea-Japan trilateral grouping. More robust economic ties between the ASEAN group and India will be an essential component in countering China’s hegemonic trade practices. Thus, India’s withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was an unfortunate setback in the efforts to build a healthier and more equitable multilateral economic partnership.

New Delhi must move rapidly to boost India-ASEAN trade and investment levels. The slower India is in responding to China’s aggressive economic moves; the more India will end up losing in the era of great power competition.

A study conducted by the Research Bureau of the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry has predicted that Indian trade with ASEAN economies will double by 2025, from the current level of $142 billion (2018) to $300 billion. Measures the Indian government can take include enhancing incentives for Indian exporters, implementing policies to significantly boost the international presence of India’s service sector, undertaking a continuous review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement, simplifying customs procedures, bolstering private sector engagement, and improving access to financial and banking services.

Is India at Risk of Losing the Game of Great Power Competition? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the region’s economic and security landscape continues to evolve, and as Chinese interests in the region grow, the United States government must increase its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through two avenues: first, by confirming an ambassador to ASEAN, and second, by sending President Trump as the head of the U.S. delegation to the 2019 East Asia Summit (EAS). These two actions would send a powerful message about American interest in promoting economic partnership, balancing against Chinese influence, and promoting a rules-based order in Southeast Asia.

The East Asia Summit represents one of the most important diplomatic events in the region. Featuring heads of state and government from ASEAN members and invited guests, the EAS provides a forum for high-level engagement in a key strategic part of the world for American security and trade interests. In recognition of this reality, President Obama attended the event on five separate occasions after the United States first received an invitation to the summit in 2011. In the past two years, however, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Vice President Mike Pence have attended the summit instead of the president. Leading the American delegation to this year’s EAS would allow President Trump to show partners in ASEAN that America remains committed to dialogue and collaboration in the region, even as China increasingly asserts its own interests there.

The president’s attendance at the East Asian Summit would provide the United States with a high-profile opportunity to demonstrate resolve in Southeast Asia. Additionally, filling the vacant position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would expand the number of channels for more sustained engagement. At this pivotal point for the region, the U.S. government must deepen its dialogue with regional partners even as the president attends this year’s summit to convey America’s high-level interest in Southeast Asia. China has recognized the importance of sending an ambassador to ASEAN, maintaining this representation without interruption since 2008. Given last year’s adoption of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, this role will only grow in importance.

These steps forward in American engagement with ASEAN member states are increasingly necessary.

According to the China Global Investment Tracker, a collaboration between the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation, Chinese overseas investment in ASEAN member states has exceeded $55 billion since 2017. In Vietnam, for example, Chinese foreign investment has totaled almost $4 billion since the beginning of 2017. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the host country of the U.S. Mission to ASEAN, Chinese investment reached nearly $9 billion in the same time period.

As February’s controversy surrounding the role of Chinese firm Huawei Technologies in the Thai government’s 5G infrastructure initiative demonstrates, however, increased economic integration between China and ASEAN member states can come at a significant cost. In this environment, the United States must utilize diplomatic means to underscore continued economic engagement in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, these actions would send a message to the region: the United States seeks deeper diplomatic, economic, and strategic engagement with the nations of Southeast Asia, both on a more consistent basis and at the highest possible levels. Following last year’s passage of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), confirming a nominee for the position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would also signal continued support for heightened American involvement in the region by both the U.S. Congress and the executive branch. As China seeks to extend its influence among ASEAN member states through the simultaneous uses of inducement and intimidation, protecting U.S. interests in the region needs a whole-of-government response.

ASEAN presents the United States with more opportunities than challenges.

China has recognized the strategic importance of the region and taken action to engage economically and diplomatically. The combined gross domestic product of ASEAN member states exceeds $2.5 trillion. Defense spending among littoral states surrounding the South China Sea will likely reach $250 billion annually by 2020. The president should travel to the East Asia Summit this year in pursuit of those opportunities for partnership, and he should nominate someone to serve as U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN to do the same.

In the past, the United States led the way in engaging with ASEAN. The government sent an ambassador to the organization’s headquarters and established a diplomatic mission there before any other non-member state. President Obama represented the United States at the East Asia Summit five times in six years; President Xi Jinping has yet to attend the gathering, and President Vladimir Putin attended for the first time last year. Confirming a qualified individual for the vacant ambassadorship and sending the president to this year’s summit would signify American leadership in engaging with ASEAN once again.

Two Ways for the United States to Deepen Diplomatic Engagement with ASEAN was originally published on Global Security Review.