Deterrence does not rest solely on possessing nuclear weapons. It also depends on the assurance that those weapons cannot be neutralized, constrained, or rendered ineffective by an adversary’s ability to maneuver, surveil, or strike first. Geography, therefore, matters. In the emerging strategic environment, Greenland occupies one of the most consequential geographic positions in the world.

Denial as the Foundation of Nuclear Survivability

The survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, particularly the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, is the cornerstone of strategic stability. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) provide the most secure retaliatory capability precisely because they operate undetected at sea. But stealth is not automatic. Submarines must transit known maritime corridors to reach patrol areas, and those corridors create opportunities for adversary interference.

For U.S. and allied forces operating in the Atlantic and Arctic, two choke points are decisive: the GIUK Gap (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom) and the Bear Gap between Greenland and Svalbard. These routes connect the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic and serve as the primary pathways for submarines moving between bastion areas and open-ocean operating zones.

If Russian or Chinese submarines could transit these gaps freely, they would be able to threaten NATO SSBNs, target transatlantic sea lines of communication, and position themselves for nuclear or conventional strikes against NATO territory and U.S. nuclear forces. Denying that access—rather than reacting after the fact—is what preserves nuclear survivability. Greenland makes such denial far more feasible.

Greenland as a Strategic Gatekeeper

Greenland’s location enables persistent surveillance, early warning, and anti-submarine warfare operations across the Arctic–Atlantic interface. Sensors, airfields, space and radar infrastructure, and command-and-control nodes associated with Greenland enable the United States and NATO to monitor adversary movements and constrain their ability to maneuver undetected.

This is not about tactical confrontation; it is about strategic denial. Greenland’s geography makes it exceedingly difficult for Russian or Chinese forces to move quietly from the Arctic into the Atlantic, increasing the likelihood that such efforts would be detected, tracked, and, if necessary, intercepted. When combined with American technology, Greenland adds uncertainty, constrains their options, complicates operational planning, and reduces incentives for escalation.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy and the Olenya Complex

Russia’s own posture reinforces Greenland’s importance. Moscow has invested heavily in the Arctic, operating 32 bases, expanding air and missile defenses, and increasing submarine activity across the High North. The Kola Peninsula hosts a substantial portion of Russia’s nuclear forces, supported by infrastructure such as the Olenya nuclear weapons storage facility, which underpins long-range aviation and missile operations.

Russia’s objective is twofold: to shield its own nuclear forces within a protected Arctic bastion, and to enable submarines and aircraft to push outward into the Atlantic when required. Those outward movements would be designed to threaten NATO’s reinforcement routes, hold allied territory at risk, and directly threaten U.S. strategic forces and American cities.

By enabling the U.S. and NATO to better monitor and deny access through the Arctic gaps, Greenland limits Russia’s ability to mobilize and deploy 40 percent of its submarine force. This denial mission directly strengthens Euro-Atlantic security by reducing the coercive value of Russian nuclear signalling or capacity for destruction.

China, the Arctic, and Global Deterrence

Although China is not an Arctic power by geography, it increasingly behaves like one strategically. Beijing’s naval expansion and interest in Arctic routes reflect its ambition to operate on a global scale. Chinese submarines operating in cooperation with Russia, or benefiting from shared intelligence and surveillance, could complicate the maritime balance in the North Atlantic.

Preventing Chinese submarines from accessing these waters is therefore as important as containing Russian forces. Even a limited Chinese presence would require diverting allied assets and introducing new strategic risks. Greenland helps pre-empt that outcome by reinforcing allied control over Arctic approaches and denying adversaries the ability to open a northern axis of competition.

This denial function links Greenland directly to Indo-Pacific security. The same U.S. nuclear forces that deter conflict in Asia depend on freedom of manoeuvre and survivability in the Atlantic and Arctic. If those forces are threatened in one theatre, credibility erodes in all others.

Air, Missile, and Early Warning Dimensions

The Arctic is also a critical domain for air and missile operations—America’s planned “Golden Dome.” Long-range bombers and ballistic missiles generally follow polar trajectories to maximize range and payload and minimize warning time. Greenland’s position enables early detection, tracking, and integration into broader air and missile defense architectures.

By denying adversaries access to Arctic airspace, Greenland reinforces strategic stability by reducing incentives for first-strike calculations over the North Pole. This capability is essential in an era of increasingly compressed decision timelines.

Conclusion

Greenland matters because it enables strategic denial by denying Russian and Chinese submarines, aircraft, and missiles access through the Arctic and North Atlantic gaps that connect global theatres. That denial preserves the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, protects allied homelands, and sustains the credibility of extended deterrence across both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

In an age defined by competition over access and geography, Greenland is not peripheral but essential to maintaining the balance of power and preventing great-power conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Greenland, Strategic Denial, and the Survivability of U.S. Nuclear Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

That contradiction has come into sharp relief during the presidency of Donald Trump, whose blunt interest in Greenland exposed what European diplomacy had long obscured. The controversy was framed as eccentricity or provocation, but the underlying grievance was familiar. For decades, the United States has underwritten European security while European governments reduced their defense investments in favor of generous welfare systems and subsidized industry, confident that the American half of the alliance would absorb the risk. The Greenland crisis has simply made that imbalance visible.

Greenland’s Strategic Reality

Greenland occupies a unique strategic position. It sits in the western hemisphere astride the Arctic approaches to the “GIUK Gap,” hosting critical space and missile-warning infrastructure essential to NATO’s early-warning architecture. The 2004 Defense Greenland Agreement between the United States and Denmark, Amending and Supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951, explicitly limits the US defense area in Greenland to Thule (Pituffik) Air (Space) Base only.

With Arctic sea lanes opening and undersea infrastructure becoming a focal point of competition, Greenland’s strategic importance is no longer peripheral but central. The question now confronting Europe is whether the small Kingdom of Denmark and, by extension, Europe, can demonstrate even minimal sovereignty over a territory it insists is non-negotiable but has left undefended for some 250 years.

Article 3 of the NATO Treaty states: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Put plainly, Denmark is obligated to maintain—on its own and on a continuous basis—the capacity to defend all its territory. By that standard, Denmark has failed to meet its Article 3 responsibilities for a very long time, if it ever has.

Despite its strategic importance, Greenland remains vulnerable and economically neglected. This is not an accident or a bureaucratic oversight. It is the result of a long-standing assumption—that the United States would indefinitely guarantee European sovereignty and sustain its social-economic model. That assumption no longer holds. Strategic competition is shifting away from open confrontation toward constant pressure, probing actions, and fait accompli. In this world, sovereignty is not something you can merely declare. It is something you must demonstrate.

Trump, Europe, and the Sovereignty Question

Trump’s narrative about Greenland was widely dismissed as transactional or unserious. Stripped of tone, however, the message was structural: As the Arctic presents opportunity, Greenland is even more strategically vital to North American security than ever before, and someone must take responsibility for securing and developing it.

This tension among NATO allies reflects a broader post–Cold War pattern. Europe expanded its regulatory, economic, and political influence while allowing NATO military funding and capability to atrophy. The resulting system elevated process, norms, and legalism over hard power security, sovereignty, and deterrence.

The renewed United States demand for Greenland exposes the limits of that model. If Denmark cannot even mount a minimal defense of its own territory, the problem is not American overreach, but European credibility.

The UK Corollary

In a striking act of geopolitical idealism, the United Kingdom has agreed to cede sovereignty over Diego Garcia to Mauritius—an “own goal” that harms US interests. Long regarded as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” Diego Garcia has been a cornerstone of US and UK power projection across the Middle East, East Africa, South Asia, and beyond for decades.

After years of legal and diplomatic pressure—culminating in adverse rulings from international courts and the United Nations—the UK concluded that continued unilateral control of the Chagos Archipelago was politically unsustainable in this rules-based international order. In 2024, London agreed to transfer sovereignty to Mauritius, a state increasingly influenced by Beijing, while attempting to preserve military access through a long-term, UK-funded lease.

On paper, operations continue. Leverage shifts from occupant to owner. Sovereignty matters: once surrendered, access rests on political permission rather than power. A future Beijing-aligned Mauritius could abrogate agreements or revoke leases, leaving the US and UK strategically stranded, “out of runway” and out of business in the Indian Ocean.

Like Diego Garcia, Greenland’s strategic value lies in assured access. Trusting that allies will always act in America’s best interest is folly. Access without ownership is always conditional; sovereignty without power is fragile. Both cases reveal the same risk—vital territory left exposed at a moment when great-power competition demands clarity, presence, and resolve.

Sovereignty Requires Adequate Organic Defense

Defending Greenland does not require national militarization on Cold War terms. It does not require large permanent formations or aggressive posturing. But it does require capability, presence, and integration of real forces tied to real geography. The fantasy of the [European] Liberal [global] Rules-based order is no longer sufficient alone.

A credible defense posture requires permanent ground, air, and naval forces. Presence must be sufficient to assert territorial control, secure the Arctic approaches, and protect key infrastructure. Additionally, it requires fifth-generation airpower, supported by NATO enablers sufficient to project air sovereignty and assert control over the airspace of the GIUK, along with integrated maritime and subsurface awareness to control approaches, advanced air and missile defense for critical nodes, and the logistics infrastructure required to sustain operations in an Arctic environment.

This is not an escalation; it is the minimum viable defense posture for the territory Denmark claims sovereignty over, NATO depends upon, and the Western Hemisphere demands. Anything less than that is not restraint; it is abdication.

What Denmark Can Do

For Denmark to retain its kingdom, it must fervently acknowledge that China and Russia are expanding their Arctic ambitions and that continuing to ignore or neglect this threat risks losing Greenland to another great power’s orbit. Denmark does not need to defend Greenland alone, but it must lead and meet its Article 3 responsibilities. Sovereignty cannot be subcontracted. First, Denmark must accept that a visible, persistent presence is non-negotiable. A battalion-sized force and a fighter squadron on Greenlandic soil are not a burden; they are a declaration of responsibility.

Second, Denmark must align force posture with geography. Arctic defense is not a side mission; it is central to Denmark’s strategic responsibilities and credibility. That requires prioritizing basing, sustainment, and readiness over symbolic deployments there or elsewhere.

Third, Denmark must integrate defense with economic development. Resource extraction, energy production, and infrastructure are not separate from security; they are its foundation. Without an economic base, defense remains episodic and less affordable. For the collective West, energy and critical element security is national security. If Denmark cannot execute these steps—even with allied support—then sovereignty is no longer exercised; it is merely asserted.

How Europe Can Contribute Without Posturing

Greenland offers Europe an opportunity to demonstrate what regional shared deterrence looks like. Contributions need not be equal in scale, but they must be meaningful in effect. Rotational air defense units, maritime patrol aircraft, icebreaking capacity, logistics support, and infrastructure investment tied directly to defense requirements would materially strengthen deterrence without grandstanding.

This is where Europe’s economic power must finally align with its strategic claims. Shared deterrence is not about symbolism or declarations. It is about complementary capability and sustained commitment.

Can Europe Move Fast Enough?

The decisive variable is time. Ten-year roadmaps and aspirational targets are irrelevant. Greenland’s exposure is immediate. The longer Europe delays, the more it reinforces the perception that sovereignty exists only on paper. Delay only serves to validate President Trump’s strategic demand.

Credible deterrence must begin within weeks, not months or years. Initial deployments need not be perfect, but they cannot be symbolic political statements devoid of the credible military capacity required for the mission. They need to be visible, permanent, and expandable.

The Consequences of Failure

Failure in Greenland would reverberate far beyond the Arctic. If Denmark cannot defend Greenland with allied assistance, then European claims of strategic autonomy collapse and NATO’s credibility fractures geographically. The United States will either act unilaterally or disengage selectively. Resource development will proceed without European leverage. Most damaging of all, failure would confirm a lesson Europe can no longer afford: that idealism and process cannot substitute for balance-of-power realism, and that international norms cannot enforce themselves. Where previous US presidential administrations relied on alliances, basing agreements, and quiet influence, President Trump has framed the issue in transactional terms: if Greenland was strategically vital, someone had to take responsibility for securing and developing it.

Conclusion

Greenland is not a crisis invented in Washington. It is the result of allied neglect and free riding. Persistent underinvestment in defense, miscalculation of threats, and a readiness among many allies to subordinate their sovereignty to international norms have produced a growing crisis of confidence in the United States. This can only be reversed with real power projection and a NATO commitment to peace through strength.

Denmark does not need to match American power. It needs to demonstrate agency, urgency, and empathy. Denmark and greater NATO must listen to its most powerful ally and address its security concerns with great alacrity. Rather than escalating the rhetoric, Denmark should admit its negligence and mitigate the shortfall now. Europe does not need to replace the United States or drive it out of the alliance. It needs to stop pretending that sovereignty is cost-free or that it can be reliably substituted with treaties in perpetuity.

This President demands more of the alliance to defend America’s northern approaches. If Denmark and the rest of NATO cannot meet that demand, the United States will. What is being asked is reasonable. The Arctic is now NATO’s second front. If Europe cannot meet that demand here, it has become sovereignty insolvent and should stop speaking of autonomy elsewhere. Because in the end, reality does not respond to intention, only to real and persistent power.

Col (Ret.) Kirk Fansher is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed by the authors are their own.

Can Denmark Defend Greenland from Trump? was originally published on Global Security Review.

These domains and areas are being weaponized for strategic purposes, as adversaries target cross-domain North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interests with the intent of weakening the Western security architecture and fragmenting alliance cohesion. The Trump administration must work closely with NATO allies to confront the many challenges that face them.

Strategic challenges, such as the Arctic, deep sea, and space, and the threats they pose require improved joint military readiness, enhanced deterrence by denial capabilities, and improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

“Over the last 15 years,” writes Scott Savits, “the Arctic has become a renewed theatre of military competition…. [T]op Russian officials have referred to the Arctic as Russia’s ‘Mecca,’ and a large fraction of Russia’s economy is based on Arctic fossil fuels and minerals.” Frustrating Russian efforts to gain a strategic advantage in the Arctic is of paramount importance to NATO’s deterrence mission.

Russia gaining an advantage in the Arctic will enhance its ability to establish escalation dominance against NATO in the event of a conflict with the alliance. Deterring Russia from broadening the scope of conflict, by threatening NATO’s vital interests in the Arctic, remains critical in dissuading other adversaries, such as China, from seeking to gain similar advantage.

With China developing and deploying new detection technologies in anti-submarine warfare, American nuclear submarine capabilities are becoming increasingly vulnerable to detection and targeting. China’s “Death Star” satellite claims to possess detection capabilities that renders the ocean transparent for up to 500 meters beneath the surface, putting American submarines at risk.

In the space domain, it is estimated that loss of access to space would come at a cost of roughly One billion pounds per day to the British economy. The reported deployment of Russian anti-satellite weapons systems (ASAT) in space are clearly coercive moves designed to threaten NATO’s space assets.

Russia’s weaponization of space is especially concerning as NATO depends on space to conduct an array of operations across the spectrum of deterrence and defence. Most notably, NATO airpower relies on space-based and space-dependent systems to fulfil a series of critical security functions. Leveraging robust deterrence capabilities in orbit, through targeting Russian and Chinese space-based military and non-military assets, is critical to securing NATO’s vital interests in space.

Beyond seeking strategic advantage, China is also expanding and modernising its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented rate since the end of the Cold War. The Pentagon forecasts that China will be a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035. The latest figures published by the Federation of American Scientists show that China now possesses at least 500 operationally deployed nuclear weapons—up 43 percent from 2020.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to undermine international norms by persisting in threats to use battlefield nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Russia also deploys dual-use satellite technologies in space, capable of carrying nuclear warheads into orbit, in direct contravention of long-standing international treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits the weaponization and nuclearization of space.

Meanwhile, Iran, a latent nuclear state, coerces the West by threatening the weaponization of its nuclear program. Iran also infiltrated the West by creating extremist networks through community centers, laundering money in major European and American cities that is used by criminal gangs to plot and execute terrorist attacks.

Proxies supported by Iran, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, can also launch increasingly devastating attacks. Furthermore, attacks like October 7, 2024, or September 11, 2001, do not warrant nuclear retaliation. A nuclear response to a terrorist attack, depending on the attack, is likely a disproportionate response.

China and Russia also engage in subversive activities within the cyber domain, sowing discord by using disinformation, intellectual property theft, and malign interference to destabilize NATO member states. Cyberattacks on critical national infrastructure can also inflict severe levels of damage. The appropriateness of cross-domain responses is yet to be decided.

The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, which lasted for 22 days, did not result in the triggering of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause. Yet, it was an attack on a NATO member state. The character of the attack complicated the process by which a viable and appropriate retaliatory response could be devised. In a multidomain threat landscape, hostile state actors conducting their operations in the grey zone can claim plausible deniability.

China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea also hold joint exercises, share intelligence, exchange military capabilities, and share a diplomatic and political kinship. This axis of Western adversaries shares the same geopolitical and economic objectives. They seek to replace the international rules-based order and establish alternative institutional frameworks to global order that undermine concepts such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and national sovereignty.

Militarily, nowhere is this more apparent than in Russia, where Iranian drones and North Korean soldiers were provided to aid Putin’s war in Ukraine. Politically, emerging international blocs such as the BRICS demonstrate the extent to which countries like China and Russia are gaining traction in driving alternatives to the current order.

“As hybrid threats evolve to encompass the whole of digital and networked societies,” wrote Sean Monaghan, “so too will the capabilities required to deter them. A more complex threat environment will make predicting attacks and vulnerabilities more difficult, so nations may rely more on resilience.”

Hence, for deterrence to be effective today, credibility must incorporate more than hard power capabilities. Red lines must be communicated effectively across different channels. Resolve must be demonstrated through a force posture that includes a willingness to establish escalation dominance in a crisis scenario. The art of deterrence is also about determining and holding at risk what an adversary values.

As the outgoing US Secretary of Defence General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin said in 2022, cross-domain deterrence “is the right mix of technology, operational concepts, and capabilities—all woven together and networked in a way that is credible, flexible and so formidable that it will give any adversary pause…. [It is] multidomain, spans numerous geographic areas of responsibility, is united with allies and partners, and is fortified by all instruments of national power.”

Ultimately, deterrence is about credibly threatening to impose unacceptable costs, by denial or punishment, on a would-be aggressor. Those costs must convince the would-be aggressor that they outweigh any potential gains made.

Therefore, it is imperative for the US and NATO to increase cross-domain capabilities to match those of adversaries. Adopting a combination of different violent and non-violent means, to conduct deterrence credibly across multiple domains and at various levels of intensity, will enhance NATO’s ability to secure its vital interests in an increasingly volatile era of global strategic competition.

Alex Alfirraz Scheers holds a diploma in Politics and History from the Open University, a bachelor’s degree in War Studies and History from King’s College London, and a master’s degree in National Security Studies from King’s College London. He has held research positions at the Henry Jackson Society and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, and his articles have been published in the Diplomat, Times of Israel, RealClearDefense, and the Royal United Services Institute. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Deterrence and NATO’s Emerging Security Environment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia – Militarization, Oil, and Gas

Russia’s approach to the Arctic is heavily informed by its geographic and historic place as an Arctic power. Fifty-three percent of Russia’s coastline is in the Arctic, which makes it a prime place to project power. Russia also has the largest population of Indigenous People in the Arctic, numbering around 1.4 million. Most importantly, however, Russia has a huge economic interest in oil and gas extraction in the Arctic as well as the further economic development of the Northern Sea Route. For Russia, then, the Arctic is a place of high stakes. Over the past few years, Russia has been steadily increasing its military and commercial presence in the Arctic, developing new bases as well as refurbishing old ones. Further, Russia is also constructing new icebreakers and submarines – some of which are nuclear powered – making it the country that likely has a distinct advantage in terms of actual military equipment.

Although Russia’s current military buildup in the Arctic is primarily defensive, some of its actions can be perceived as dually offensive and defensive. For example, in 2014, Russia established a new Strategic Command center for the Arctic both to increase Arctic security as well as to defend its interests – leading to an increase in Arctic exercises. Russia has also built more than 475 new military outputs and 16 new deep-water ports.

While this militarization might paint a very aggressive picture, it’s important to note that Russia’s interest in the Arctic also revolves around oil and gas. Much of the untapped resources in Russia’s territorial boundaries lies in the Arctic, leading the region to be extraordinarily economically important to the country. As a country that historically has prided itself on resource exports, Russia’s aggressive control over the Northern Sea Route, twenty icebreakers, and interest in the Arctic makes more sense. Regardless, Russia’s Arctic focus is certainly notable and will play an important role as the ice continues to melt, and resources become easier to access.

China: The Near-Arctic Newcomer

China plays another interesting role in the Arctic. Notably, it is not one of the Arctic Eight represented in the Arctic Council. Instead, it considers itself a near-Arctic power, joining the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013 – and in 2018 released its first white paper on Arctic Strategy. In this paper, China presented its Polar Silk Road component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most importantly, the white paper claims that China will develop new shipping lanes that have been opened by global warming. Beyond that, China sees the development of oil, gas, fishing, and tourism as key industries to become involved in as global warming progresses.

Although China’s interest appears to be economic and commercial for now, other states do not view it as such. Former US Secretary of State Pompeo, for example, called China a threat to Arctic peace and pointed to its actions in the South China Sea as an example of what could happen in the Arctic if China’s inroads were allowed to continue. Another flashpoint between the US and China is Greenland. Recently, China attempted to buy an older naval base and build a new airport in Greenland – an effort that was halted by the US government, who allegedly has claimed they will invest in these projects instead of China. However, China is still moving forward to build investment relationships with Greenland, Iceland, and Finland concerning geothermal energy and potentially a data silk road.

Another partner in the Arctic for China may be Russia. Russia and China are increasingly working together on Arctic development, where China has been providing funding for Russian infrastructure and energy project in the Arctic. It remains to be seen whether these two powers, who arguably do not have a historically close relationship, will continue to work together moving forward.

The United States – Reactor-in-Chief

Out of the US China, and Russia, the US is likely the most reactive of the three powers. Most of its policies are in response to what it sees as unwelcome incursions of China and Russia. The American approach to the Arctic is to see the region as the next theatre in great power competition, slowly increasing its presence militarily and economically. For example, the US recently commissioned the construction of two new icebreakers. With the advent of the Biden administration, however, the US has shown a growing interest in the region. Both the US Navy and the US Department of Homeland Security released new Arctic strategies for the first time this year – illustrating the country’s renewed Arctic focus. In short, while the US is not nearly as aggressive as Russia, American rhetoric is becoming more pointed at keeping Chinese influence low and containing what it sees as Russian militarization.

While the three powers certainly are not going to head to total war anytime soon, it bears watching that rhetoric on all sides of the region is becoming more bellicose and sharper. With the new Biden administration, it will be interesting to watch the extent to which American rhetoric may change or whether temperatures and pressures will continue to rise in the Arctic.

Arctic Great Power Competition: The United States, Russia and China was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Geopolitically-Fraught Northern Sea Route

In March, the Kremlin published an Arctic decree, paving policy plans for the next fifteen years that focus on the industrialization of the region and its’ military defense. Perhaps the most topical geopolitical approach in the decree is the importance of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR decreases the sailing time from China to Europe by 40% compared to traveling through the Suez Canal—making it a popular route for trade. With melting polar ice caps and increasing climate change, the NSR is also becoming more passable than ever.

While Russia views the NSR as an internal waterway, most of the international community does not. This makes the decree’s allotment of responsibility to Rosatom to limit traffic in the NSR from foreign warships without a 45-day notification a clear indication of Russia’s claim in the region. Other states, such as the United States, do not agree with Russia’s claim of sovereignty. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in 2019, “In the Northern Sea Route, Moscow already illegally demands that other nations request permission to pass, requires Russian maritime pilots to be aboard foreign ships, and threatens to use military force to sink any that fail to comply.”

Beyond the usage of the NSR waterway, Russia’s military posture in the Arctic demonstrates a clear and present focus on the region for the foreseeable future. With the reopening of 50 previously closed Soviet-era military posts, Russia currently emphasizes early warning and defense as its military doctrine. To fulfill this doctrine, Russia has recently tested new capabilities, including hypersonic cruise missiles and nuclear-powered undersea drones. These new capabilities are supported by Russia’s nuclear and non-nuclear icebreaker 40 ship fleet, which is the largest in the world.

Russia’s interests are more than geopolitical—they’re also economic.

Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned oil company, is currently developing the Zapadno-Irkinsky field and building 2000 km of new long-distance pipelines and 7000 km in local-branch pipelines. They are also building 50 new ice-class tankers, three new airports, and 10 helipads. Their goal is to produce 115 million tons of oil per year by 2030.

Rosneft is also building the Sever terminal and engaging in drilling in the Kara Sea, both of which will be instrumental in NSR shipments. Tourism is also on the rise in the Arctic, with the Russian government incentivizing tourism initiatives in the region.

The Arctic’s importance for Russia cannot be underestimated

With the intersection of economic and geopolitical interests in the region, it is important to not discount the Arctic’s importance within Russia’s grand strategy. In the same way that Russia sees former Soviet states such as Ukraine and Georgia as part of its sphere of influence, the Arctic is to Russia part of its historic geography. For policymakers, this means being cognizant of Arctic policies.

However, the melting Arctic ice leaves Russia stuck between eventual necessary cooperation and growing regional militarization. It is true that the Arctic is critical to Russian policy, but the impacts of climate change will become an issue that Russia cannot solve alone. In other words, climate change will eventually necessitate cooperation amongst states in the region. In all likelihood, however, this cooperation will not take place for some time. For now, the growing militarization of the region will continue for the foreseeable future. Russia’s interest in the region is not going away anytime soon and will actually probably increase over time, leading to increasing claims of economic interest and military defense.

Russian Ambitions in the Arctic: What to Expect was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Arctic is rapidly becoming a major geopolitical hot spot. While the melting ice in the region is presenting significant challenges to the environment, it is also creating opportunities for Arctic states and major global powers who seek to exploit the effects of climate change. One such opportunity is the growing access to deposits of natural resources, including abundant quantities of oil and natural gas. Another fraught issue is the dispute over the opening of the Northwest Passage, as shorter maritime navigation routes become available and states argue over who controls those waterways. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that shipping via these new routes will be two weeks faster than traditional routes, such as the Suez Canal.

To adapt to the changes brought about in the Arctic, the United States, Russia, and China have all devised strategies for how they intend to pursue their respective interests. The U.S. introduced the National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013, and in 2018 China released its own Arctic Policy. But far and away the most active Arctic power has been Russia, who has taken efforts to assert its maritime claims, develop resources, and even begin militarizing the region. In comparison, the United States is woefully behind as, even today, it owns a total of two active icebreakers—of which only one is functional.

To make matters worse, the United States finds itself at odds with even some of its closest partners in the region. Canada, a steadfast ally, and the United States have contrary positions on the ownership of the Northwest Passage. Canada insists the Northwest Passage is intrinsically Canadian while the United States maintains the idea the Northwest Passage is an international strait and should remain open for free navigation.

Surprisingly, this debate with our northern neighbor creates an opportunity for American cooperation with China. Much like the United States, China insists the region belongs to the “common heritage of mankind” and remains opposed to the kind of sovereignty Russia and Canada wish to apply to the region. China’s motivation is transparent: as a non-Arctic power, China cannot make the kind of territorial claims other Arctic powers can, and unless the area is internationalized, China would be dependent on adjacent countries—namely, Russia and Canada—to use these waterways. And the benefits of using these waterways would be enormous for China as Chinese shipping companies could shorten the length of their routes by approximately 30 percent, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars while also avoiding risks from piracy.

As the United States continues to play catch up in the region, Washington should consider working with Beijing to make freedom of navigation a reality in the region. Chinese support could help tip the balance within the Arctic Council and ensure Arctic waterways remain open by leveraging Chinese influence and resources in the region to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS).

China, which is no stranger to American FONOPS, has been on the receiving end of FONOPs-related lawsuits from the United States, which has challenged Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea—claims that are more spurious than those China refutes in the Arctic. China does risk undermining its stance in the South China Sea by endorsing this approach, but the enormous benefits of free access through the Arctic may very well be worth that risk.

There are several challenges to realizing this level of cooperation. First, increasing tensions between the United States and China may make it difficult to reach an agreement, despite this issue being a place where both countries can mutually gain. Second, China may be able to independently work out a favorable deal with Russia to allow passage for its ships and use of Russian icebreakers. This is a real possibility, as evidenced by China and Russia’s willingness to cooperate in other strategic areas. And, lastly, if the United States is unable or unwilling to help China make a case for FONOPS, a Sino-Russian deal might be China’s best option.

This is not to say cooperation with China is without risks. Pompeo is right to worry about Chinese investments and influence potentially eroding the base of support that the United States already has in the region. And giving China too much power within the Arctic Council runs the risk of upsetting a political balance of power that is roughly arrayed in favor of the United States. But, these disagreements should not prevent the United States from working with China in one of the few areas where interests are aligned. It’s even possible that further cooperation in the Arctic may help cool otherwise tumultuous relations between the United States and China.

The United States Must Work with China to Ensure Freedom of Navigation in the Arctic was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over the years, global climate change severely and observably impacted the environment, resulting in rapidly melting glaciers, ice covers on rivers and lakes breaking up much earlier than anticipated, and unprecedented levels of animal migration, as increasing numbers are displaced from their natural habitats. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the global temperature could increase from 2.5 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century.

The effects of climate change are more visible than ever before in the Arctic. The Arctic sea ice extent for October 2018 averaged 6.06 million square kilometers (approximately 2.34 million square miles), the third-lowest level recorded in October from 1979 to 2018. To put this in perspective, the sea ice extent was 2.29 million square kilometers (1.42 million square miles) below the 1981 to 2010 average, and 170,000 square kilometers (105,633 square miles) greater than the record low observed for October 2012. As global temperatures rise, the natural resources within the Arctic region are increasingly easier to access, prompting greater frustration from environmentalists.

The melting of the Arctic sea ice has coincided with the discovery of energy deposits as well as the development of the technology needed to access those resources. These developments have caused the members of the Arctic Council—states with territorial claims in the Arctic—to pay increased levels of attention to the region.

The Arctic Council is made up of Canada, Finland, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (Alaska). Of these, Canada and Russia hold the most territory (Russia controls the most Arctic territory of any Arctic state). Being a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which states that a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone extends 200 nautical miles offshore, Russian claims cover approximately 40 percent of the Arctic.

The Arctic plays host to substantial natural resources. A 2008 report released by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Arctic holds around 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 44 billion barrels of liquid natural gas, and 90 billion barrels of oil—the vast majority of these being offshore. As more territory becomes accessible, excess reserves of gold, zinc, nickel, and iron already found in part of the Arctic may be discovered. From the connectivity perspective, the two major sea routes that permit ships to pass through the Arctic run along the Russian and Canadian coasts, i.e., the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage.

The Northern Sea Route runs from the Barents Sea, near Russia’s border with Norway to the Bering Strait between Siberia and Alaska. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) would dramatically reduce the transit time for ships traveling from East Asia to Western Europe. On the other hand, the Northwest Passage connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Shipping lanes connecting Europe with East Asia currently run from the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, transiting the Malacca before reaching East Asia. The distance is roughly 21,000 kilometers (13,049 miles) and the typical transit time is around 48 days. The Northern Sea Route would cut the distance to 12,800 kilometers, reducing transit time by 10 to 15 days. According to a paper published by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis:

“The direct impact of the opening of the NSR is that international shipping (volume by distance) is reduced by 0.43%, but global trade volumes increase by 0.21%. The total percentage of world trade that will be rerouted through the Northern Sea Route will be around 5.5%.”

The paper further estimates that 15% of all Chinese trade will be through the Northern Sea Route. The optimization of the NSR will result in a significant rerouting of the world shipping lines and would have a drastic impact on the usage of the Suez Canal and the Malacca Straits to reach the Southeastern and East Asian Markets. According to CPB research, roughly 8% of global trade currently transits the Suez Canal, and it is estimated that level would be reduced by two-thirds once the Northern Sea Route becomes fully operational. To illustrate, from 2008 to 2012 the average number of commercial ships transiting the Suez Canal each year was approximately 15,000—the re-routing of vessels through the NSR, according to CPB research, would reduce that number by 10,000.

The rapidly melting sea ice has prompted some analysts to predict that the shorter shipping route could largely replace the Suez Canal Route that connects the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. Such a conclusion overlooks the fact that ships using the Suez Canal Route make stops at ports in Southeast Asia and the Middle East when transiting between Europe and East Asia. In other words, to be commercially viable, large container ships using the Suez Canal route need to make deliveries to several customers along the way.

In contrast to the Suez Canal Route, the territory that lies along the Northern Sea Route is sparsely populated, meaning low demand for imported goods. Moreover, replacing one trade route with another could have a drastic impact on the economies of the countries that rely on the transit fees of the southern maritime trade route. Lastly, the Northern Sea Route is only safe to navigate during the summer when the straits are relatively ice-free. Even then, escort icebreaker vessels are often necessary to navigate the waters as there is always a risk of unpredictable ice conditions. Additional variables, such as a lack of search and rescue teams and support infrastructure, along with high insurance premiums for shipping vessels, need to be taken into account when evaluating the viability of the Northern Sea Route.

This is not to say, however, that the NSR is not a serious competitor to the southern sea route. Many scholars have argued that global shipping companies may become more interested in the NSR as it becomes more accessible and viable when compared with the longer and piracy-prone traditional Suez Canal Route. Specifically, the NSR makes more economic sense for shipments of oil and liquid natural gas (LNG). Increased energy trade through the NSR would largely benefit Russia, which has heavily invested in maritime transport ventures and energy projects in the Arctic.

The Russian government’s planned Murmansk Transport Hub will construct new roads, railway infrastructure, ports, and other facilities on the western side of the Kola Bay. It is described as one of the biggest infrastructure projects in Russia and by far the largest in the Arctic. There are also plans to upgrade the M18 highway between Murmansk and the Norwegian border. The new road will significantly improve the route between the border towns of Nikel, Russia and Kirkenes, Norway. The Sabetta Port project is a joint project undertaken by Novatek and the Russian Federal government to service the Yamal LNG project and a nearby gas field operated by Novatek. The port will facilitate gas shipments of both eastwards and westwards along the Northern Sea Route. Furthermore, the Russian government also plans to produce the LK-60 icebreaker and the LK-60 II icebreaker, which are required for cargo ships to access the NSR.

The economic benefits of the Northern Sea Route, combined with large-scale Arctic infrastructure development projects and the existence of substantial energy resources of energy resources to be tapped, make the Arctic a lucrative prospect for Russia and the other Arctic states. However, the strategic desirability of the Arctic trade route will depend on many factors, including the continuous melting of ice, development of modern vessels to sustain harsh weather conditions, an upward trend in global trade, increased demand in Asian markets, persistent piracy around the Horn of Africa, growing instability in the countries around the Suez Canal region, and heightened congestion in the Strait of Malacca. All these factors will further contribute to the geostrategic importance of the Arctic as a natural resource and transportation hub. At the same time, however, the growing importance of the region may also lead to increased competition.

Melting Arctic Sea Ice Opens New Maritime Shipping Route was originally published on Global Security Review.