Space exploration has expanded dramatically in scope, actors, and applications. This growth has fueled innovation for humanity but also produced congestion, competition, and rising security concerns. As more States rely on satellites for national security and civilian needs, counterspace capabilities have evolved in parallel. Secure World Foundation declared co-orbital weapons as one of the counterspace capabilities in its Global Counterspace Threat Assessment (2026). It defines a co-orbital weapon as “weapons that are placed into orbit and then maneuver to approach the target to attack it by various means, including destructive and non-destructive.” 

Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPOs) technologies are inherently dual-use and come under the umbrella of co-orbital weapons. Rendezvous is the process of intentionally bringing two or more space objects into an orbit by orbital maneuvers such as “matching the plane altitude and phasing.” Proximity operations are a series of maneuvers a satellite does in the same or nearly the same orbit in the vicinity of another space object for a specific time duration to accomplish mission objectives. 

RPOs have civilian and commercial uses such as refueling, repairing, on-orbit inspection, and life extension. However, RPO technologies can come under counterspace capabilities, as the intention of maneuvering a satellite can be misinterpreted. States’ risk assessment plays a key role in perceiving an RPO satellite as a threat or not. Moreover, RPO satellites can perform functions such as surveillance, disruption, or decryption of signals, jamming communication, interference with optical sensors, grabbing a satellite, and releasing high- or low-velocity co-orbital kinetic anti-satellite weapons.  

RPOs are not a new phenomenon. However, States are increasingly building sophisticated RPO technologies amid today’s space competition. The U.S., Russia, and China have conducted multiple RPOs and exhibited their capabilities. The U.S. does not have any dedicated program for developing co-orbital counterspace weapons; however, it conducted multiple RPOs in both Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). These activities included targeting, tracking, and hit-to-kill (HTK) intercept technologies that can be potential co-orbital anti-satellite capabilities. The U.S. conducted 5 RPOs in 2025 in GEO that maneuvered closely to their own satellites and Chinese satellites as well. Moreover, the Delta 180 mission was a showcase of offensive capabilities such as physical collision to destroy a satellite. 

Russia has actively invested in and performed various RPOs in recent decades in both LEO and GEO. Russia is building its anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities out of the mothballs of the Cold War. Many satellites of the Cosmos series and Luch satellites were launched under RPOs for purposes such as co-orbit inspection, intelligence collection, and surveillance. Some of these satellites, such the Cosmos series, were co-planar with U.S. satellites. Such RPOs can result in supporting target identification and tracking, intercepting broadcasts, or jamming radio waves, thus hampering satellite communications. Russia did not explicitly test co-orbit hit-to-kill (HTK) weapons. However, it has assessed deployment of aerosol or cloud, and multiple subsatellites or payloads at low and high velocities. There are speculations that the Burevestnik program may have been launched by Russia to develop a co-orbital ASAT program. Russia can develop a co-orbital ASAT weapon by deploying a high-velocity payload. 

China is also a major actor in space. It has conducted various RPOs in both LEO and GEO. The first RPO by China was conducted in 2010 that involved SJ-12 and SJ-06F satellites. In 2025, China launched SJ-21 and SJ-12 02 for RPOs. The latter came within 60 km of the U.S. satellite USA336. The closest RPO was conducted by SJ-17, which had a robotic arm, which approached the target satellite within 1 km for detailed inspection. The potential military utility of Chinese RPOs is to demonstrate on-orbit space situational awareness (SSA), satellite servicing, inspection, and imaging capability. There is no publicly known evidence that China has tested any offensive co-orbital weapons to destroy any space object. 

RPOs of major powers tighten the security dilemma as States perceive others’ actions as offensive. There is a legal loophole in the Outer Space Treaty (OST) (1967) on RPOs. Some general clauses explain how a State should conduct an RPO, however, it is largely founded in the basic guidelines. For instance, Article XI of OST obligates States to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public, and the international scientific community. However, States only provide generic descriptions and avoid transparency. Similarly, Article IV (Registration Convention) requires States to register specific details, but they can register information that meets a general function to avoid revealing potential dual uses. Article XI (OST) suggests that States shall act with “due regard” to the other States’ interests. “Due regard” is vague, as inspecting and surveilling a satellite might not be considered as offensive as kinetic ASATs. There is no legal way to limit the extent of proximity between two satellites involved in RPO. Another problem that international space law cannot address is the intent of an RPO. States can undertake RPO for military purposes but publicly project it as peaceful uses. The absence of baseline norms increases the risk of misreading intent, which can prompt sudden escalation. 

 Conclusion 

Addressing RPO-related risks requires a multi-pronged approach centered on dialogue, transparency, and verification. States should begin by discussing agreed definitions of behavior for military space activities, as the phrase “peaceful exploration” is vague. A shared definition of threatening RPOs will help avoid any misinterpretation by any country. States shall make pre-notifications and avoid going into others’ “keep-out” zones, i.e., high-value GEO assets. A multilateral Space Situational Awareness mechanism would reduce the threat for States with weaker tracker systems. Defining an escalation framework for RPOs using clear vocab, for example, “likely benign,” “warrants inquiry,” and “imminent threatening, will avoid any offensive response based on perceived worst-case scenarios. Direct, fast-channel, bilateral crisis hotlines should be established to reduce miscalculation risk. 

Ultimately, RPOs are dual‑use technologies that can quickly be perceived as offensive. All major powers use them for inspection and imaging, yet proximity to another State’s satellites will always raise alarms. Without norms and transparency, RPOs risk triggering dangerous episodes in outer space. Major powers must prioritize stability and take concrete steps to prevent escalation and preserve peace in an increasingly contested domain. 

Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views of the author are her own. 

Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in the Legal Grey Zone of International Space Law was originally published on Global Security Review.

Under the 1967 United Nations Outer Space Treaty, states recognize that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for peaceful purposes, for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, and as the province of all mankind. Yet decades of reluctance to establish an enforceable framework for responsible behavior in space have left the domain governed by outdated rules and significant legal ambiguity. While diplomats continue to negotiate, military space programs continue to advance, widening the gap between treaty principles and operational reality. The result is a dangerous strategic environment in which technological capabilities are advancing far more rapidly than the international legal framework designed to regulate them.

Russia and China have proposed a treaty that would prohibit the testing of weapons in space. The United States has rejected the proposal, citing vague language and the absence of credible verification and enforcement mechanisms. Those concerns are legitimate, but they also expose an unfortunate situation. The United States has been testing anti-satellite capabilities since the 1980s and continues to develop them. Russia and China, have likewise expanded their own anti-satellite programs while simultaneously advocating for the peaceful use of outer space. This contradiction illustrates one of the defining challenges of modern space diplomacy. The nations capable of establishing a space weapons program are also the ones preventing a meaningful international agreement to restrain one. Every major space power argues that its own activities are defensive while portraying those of its competitors as destabilizing, making genuine progress increasingly difficult.

Even if governments genuinely sought a comprehensive agreement, practical obstacles remain. Many technologies with military applications in space also serve legitimate commercial purposes, making it difficult to distinguish between civilian and military systems. Systems capable of disrupting satellite communications, for example, often rely on the same underlying technologies used in commercial telecommunications. Rendezvous and proximity operations can be used to inspect or repair satellites, but the same capabilities could also be employed to interfere with or disable another nation’s spacecraft. Without an internationally accepted definition of what constitutes a space weapon, any treaty regulating weapons in space will struggle to establish meaningful legal obligations. This dual-use nature of space technology complicates verification efforts and makes traditional arms control models far more difficult to apply than they were during the Cold War.

A nuclear weapon detonation in orbital space presents consequences unlike those of conventional military actions because of its indiscriminate, long-lasting, and unpredictable nature. A large detonation could disable or destroy many satellites in a single event while enhancing radiation belts for years or even decades. The resulting debris and radiation could make certain orbital regions unusable, limiting access not only for military satellites but also for civilian and commercial spacecraft. Since modern societies depend on satellites for communications, navigation, weather forecasting, financial transactions, emergency response, precision agriculture,

and countless other essential services,  the effect is far beyond military operations, affecting virtually every nation and every individual. In early 2022, Russia launched a satellite into an unusual orbit, prompting analysts to speculate that the activity was connected to its reported nuclear anti-satellite weapons program. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, prohibits placing nuclear weapons in orbit or otherwise stationing them in outer space. However, the treaty was written during the early years of the Space Age, and it is a growing vulnerability made more dangerous by the inability of the international community to modernize the rules governing space before a crisis forces the issue. This is just one example of the limits of the treaty.

International space law was largely written in 1967, when only two countries operated satellites and outer space was viewed primarily as a scientific frontier. It was never designed for today’s environment, where governments, commercial companies, and private organizations operate thousands of satellites that underpin the global economy. The legal framework has failed to keep pace with these technological and geopolitical realities, leaving the international community increasingly reliant on norms and voluntary commitments that lack meaningful enforcement.

A comprehensive treaty prohibiting all space weapons is unlikely soon. That does not mean meaningful progress is impossible. Countries could formalize a ban on destructive anti-satellite missile testing, building upon voluntary commitments that several nations have already adopted. Transforming those political pledges into binding international obligations would represent a realistic first step. Likewise, civilian satellite systems could receive legal protections like those afforded under international humanitarian law to hospitals, electrical grids, and other civilian infrastructure during armed conflict. States could also expand voluntary exchanges of space situational awareness data, improving transparency regarding objects in orbit while creating the trust and technical foundation necessary for future arms control negotiations. Incremental agreements may lack the ambition of a comprehensive treaty, but history demonstrates that confidence-building measures often lay the groundwork for broader and more durable arms control frameworks.

The United Nations Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space held the third session in July 2026. The meeting made progress by deepening negotiations and narrowing discussion around threats, legal frameworks, and potential future rules for military activities in space, but it did not conclude with a binding agreement. If negotiations continue to stall, however, the costs of inaction will not be borne solely by the governments responsible for the impasse. They will be borne by every society that depends on space-based infrastructure, which means virtually the entire world.

Outer space is a shared domain that, in principle, belongs to all humanity. Allowing it to become a militarized arena governed by outdated laws and diplomatic paralysis is not inevitable. It is a policy choice. By failing to act, the international community is making that choice by default.

The author is Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network at BUITEMS Quetta. He can be reached at muneebnasar@yahoo.com. The views of the author are his own.

Space: The Ungoverned Orbit was originally published on Global Security Review.

The announcement of a mid-June 2026 agreement between the United States and Iran on a framework for resolving the conflict that began on February 28 promised immediate relief for transit through the Strait of Hormuz and raised hopes of unblocking international maritime trade and reducing oil prices. The conflict with Iran, or Operation Epic Fury, has become a defining moment for global security, injecting volatility into an already fragile international system. While the immediate humanitarian and geopolitical consequences are important, the conflict’s deeper, longer‑term implications may be felt most acutely in the realm of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. 

For decades, the global nonproliferation regime, anchored by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements, has sought to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. Yet the conflict in Iran has exposed structural weaknesses in this regime, challenged long-standing assumptions about deterrence and diplomacy, and risked additional proliferation pressures in one of the world’s most strategically sensitive regions. 

Erosion of Trust in Diplomatic Agreements 

Iran’s nuclear program has been at the center of international diplomacy for many years. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated by the P5+1 countries in 2015, demonstrated that sustained negotiation could address nuclear activities through verification, inducements, and incentives. Its unraveling, however, weakened the credibility of diplomatic agreements and signaled to states worldwide that nuclear deals may be vulnerable to political shifts. 

Current and historical animosities over a variety of issues have deepened skepticism about the effectiveness of multilateral agreements in containing proliferation. States observing this conflict may conclude that compliance with agreements is often a matter of perception, and that external actors may still resort to military force if threats are recognized despite formal commitments and diplomatic assurances. Conversely, states considering future negotiations may fear that concessions made today could be rendered meaningless by tomorrow’s geopolitical realignments. This erosion of trust undermines diplomatic tools that have historically underpinned nonproliferation efforts. 

Over three decades and six presidential administrations, both Democratic and Republican, one fundamental national security principle has remained constant: The United States will not permit Iran to have a nuclear weapon under any circumstances. 

Conversely, the war could hinder efforts to revive or renegotiate agreements with Iran and other nuclear-aspiring nations. Diplomatic efforts have been exhausted, and the political risks of making concessions have risen. Without credible negotiation pathways, countries may increasingly resort to unilateral actions, such as secretly advancing nuclear programs or emphasizing deterrence. Regarding Iran, the ruling elites, worn down by months of anti-regime strikes, are likely to delay denuclearization and other military restrictions. 

Regional Challenges to Nonproliferation 

The Middle East has long been a region of latent nuclear potential. Several states possess advanced civilian nuclear infrastructures, and many have expressed interest in developing fuel‑cycle capabilities. The conflict with Iran has intensified these dynamics by heightening perceptions of vulnerability. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt may interpret the conflict as evidence that regional security guarantees are unreliable. 

As a result, they or others may pursue nuclear hedging strategies by developing civilian programs that shorten the timeline for potential weapons development without overtly violating the NPT. Others  may sign mutual defense pacts with other nuclear-armed states. This hedging behavior could trigger a proliferation cascade, in which each state’s actions prompt others to follow suit. 

If multiple states in the region begin to pursue nuclear latency or weapons capabilities, the Middle East could become the world’s most volatile nuclear arena. Such a development would strain the NPT, challenge IAEA safeguards, and increase the likelihood of miscalculation or escalation. 

Spiking Great‑Power Competition  

The conflict with Iran erupted amid intensifying competition among the United States, China, and Russia for international preeminence. These powers have distinct strategic interests in the Middle East and can use nuclear diplomacy as a tool of influence. Their rivalry and differing interests complicate efforts to build consensus on nonproliferation issues, including the ultimate determination about the status of Iran’s nuclear program. 

Great‑power divisions have already weakened the effectiveness of institutions such as the UN Security Council. When major powers cannot agree on enforcement measures, sanctions, or diplomatic strategies, the credibility of the nonproliferation regime suffers. The war has amplified these divisions, making coordinated responses more difficult. As great‑power competition intensifies and long‑standing norms, such as the taboo against nuclear proliferation, may weaken. States may perceive that geopolitical alignment matters more than compliance, reducing the incentive to adhere to international rules. 

Risks to the Nonproliferation Regime’s Tool Kit 

War creates conditions that undermine the ability of the IAEA and other bodies to monitor nuclear activities. Inspectors may lose access to facilities, satellite imagery may be obscured by conflict, and supply chains for nuclear materials may become harder to track. Conflict zones are fertile ground for illicit networks seeking nuclear materials. 

In some cases, the breakdown of state authority increases the risk that sensitive technologies or materials could be diverted, stolen, or sold on the black market. Sanctions on regimes depend on stable political conditions and international cooperation. During local or regional wars, enforcement becomes more difficult, and states may prioritize military objectives over compliance with international obligations. 

Opportunities for Post-Conflict Innovation 

In contrast to the above, major conflicts have sometimes encouraged breakthroughs in arms control. The Cuban Missile Crisis led to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the Cold War produced the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and other reduction treaties. The war in Iran may similarly prompt a reassessment of existing frameworks. The conflict could motivate states to explore new regional security architectures, such as a Middle East nuclear‑weapons‑free zone, or enhanced transparency measures. 

Although politically challenging, such initiatives could reduce pressures to proliferate. In addition, emerging technologies, such as remote sensing, AI‑assisted monitoring, and blockchain‑based tracking of nuclear materials, could strengthen verification regimes. Post–Epic Fury consultations may accelerate investment in these tools as states seek more resilient oversight mechanisms. 

Conclusion: Future Pathways 

The war in Iran has brought the global nonproliferation regime to a crossroads. One path leads toward fragmentation: weakened norms, regional arms races, and diminished trust in diplomacy. The other path, albeit politically challenging, offers the possibility of progress with new agreements, modernized verification tools, and renewed commitment to cooperative security. Which path the international community ultimately follows will depend on states’ willingness to learn from the conflict and recognize that nuclear stability cannot be taken for granted. If the wider postwar Middle Eastern political alignments sought by the Trump administration comes to pass, including a lasting rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the nonproliferation regime may be a beneficiary from reduced regional political toxicity and increased regional military cooperation. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

The Iran War and Nuclear Weapons: Paths Forward or Backward? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “nuclear-AI nexus” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as experts recently cautioned at the “Atoms for Algorithms” webinar, we need to cut through the speculative “AI hype” to ensure this technology remains a means for peace, not an avenue for unintentional escalation.

To regulate the nuclear-AI connection, we first need to understand the technology. As a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research researcher, Dr. Yasmina Fina suggests, AI is not a monolithic entity, but a “construct” and a “system of systems,” made up of code, software, data, hardware, and sensors. It is a system used to fulfill certain functions, not a threat capable of usurping human decision-making. The risk is the “speed and scale” of AI, which can have myriad implications for performance and strategy. Moreover, Fina warns that comparing nuclear governance to AI governance is unhelpful because the technologies are not the same; nuclear materials are limited and tangible, whereas AI is ubiquitous and digital.

In the context of non-proliferation, AI is touted as a game-changing verification tool. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could potentially use “AI agents,” semi-autonomous machines capable of processing large data streams and satellite images to verify the accuracy of declarations by states at a pace humans cannot match. However, Dr. Ian Stewart, Executive Director of the CNS Washington, states that AI will not help states develop nuclear weapons they could not otherwise build, for two physical reasons: AI cannot “magic up” fissile material, and there is no evidence that large language models can transfer the “tacit knowledge” necessary for weaponization.

When it comes to AI and nuclear weapons, political concerns are high. States have been reluctant to allow the IAEA to use open-source data or “black box” algorithms. Should an AI detect an event, the absence of “explainability” or how the machine arrived at its decision could lead to a crisis of political legitimacy for the safeguards system.

The most fraught part of the nexus is disarmament. We are now seeing a “race to adopt” AI in military strategies due to the perceived speed advantage it offers. AI can speed up threat identification and data integration, potentially freeing up more time for decision-making (or, on the other hand, reducing decision-making cycles to the point that humans are simply rubber-stamping decisions).

Aliche Sultini, senior research lead at the Rhode Island School of Design, explains that AI systems create new levels of uncertainty. If a state cannot grasp how an adversary’s AI operates in its decision-making, it might fall into worst-case scenarios, reinforcing alert postures that prevent disarmament. To support disarmament, AI must be used to enhance technical verification and confidence, not to shorten the path to war. Possibly the most disruptive aspect of this interaction is the NPT’s third pillar: peaceful nuclear energy applications. According to Mr. Shota Kamishima of the IAEA, an “affinity” is emerging between nuclear power and AI. We are now moving into a world where energy-hungry AI data centers need the clean, scalable, and reliable power offered by nuclear power, and where nuclear generation and maintenance are improved through AI.

This alliance is especially important for the rollout of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), for which AI-optimized construction schedules and supply chains are critical. By enhancing predictability and avoiding cost overruns, a major issue for nuclear construction, AI could make nuclear projects more “bankable” and thus more attractive for the global shift towards clean energy. Despite technological progress, the experts agree: human responsibility is essential. Whether it is a safeguards inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a human commander in a nuclear-armed nation, humans are the “last line of defence”.

“Black box” systems are incompatible with a strong safety culture. Governance policies must ensure that AI is implemented with transparency, traceability, and “explainability”. We must also be alert to the potential for AI to be employed by “agents” to monitor sites, which could result in disinformation and the distortion of threat perception through “anomaly detections.” As the 2026 Review Conference draws near, policymakers’ mission should be to “denoise.” Nuclear policy decisions must not be based on science fiction or fear of competition. Rather, we should prioritize “lower stakes” opportunities where AI can help us now, such as employing AI agents to navigate the overwhelming output of the NPT process — making it searchable and highlighting inconsistencies in delegation positions.

The relationship between nuclear and AI is not a bug to be fixed with more software, but a circumstance to be managed by the international community. By prioritizing evidence-based policy and law, human-in-the-loop systems, and the common ground of the peaceful “Atoms for Algorithms” alliance, we can ensure that the digital revolution supports, rather than undermines, the global nuclear order. In the end, the fate of the NPT will not be determined by algorithms, but by human intelligence.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus was originally published on Global Security Review.

For more than half a century, U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control has served as a central mechanism for managing strategic competition. Beginning with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), successive agreements institutionalized transparency, predictability, and mutual restraint. New START, which entered into force in 2011, represents the culmination of this bilateral architecture. Its limits on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems, combined with an intrusive verification regime, helped sustain stability even as geopolitical relations deteriorated.

However, Russia’s suspension of participation in 2023 and the treaty’s expiration in 2026 mark a significant turning point. The breakdown of the broader arms control framework—evident in the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020—suggests a structural shift in the valuation of negotiated restraint. Assessing the prospects for post–New START arms control, it is important to consider these developments within both the historical context of bilateral relations and the shifting dynamics of current great power competition.

Academic debates on arms control offer a helpful context for understanding the current impasse. Traditional arms‑control theory, rooted in rationalist models, views treaty agreements as tools for reducing uncertainty, preventing arms races, and stabilizing deterrence. From this perspective, verification mechanisms and numerical limits mitigate the security dilemma by reducing incentives for worst‑case planning. While other scholars emphasize the role of domestic politics, bureaucratic interests, and leadership perceptions. Arms control agreements often reflect internal political coalitions, institutional preferences, and the ideological orientation of decision makers. The current U.S.-Russian environment, which is characterized by mutual suspicion and nationalist rhetoric complicates the formation of pro-arms control coalitions. Moreover, constructivist analyses highlight the normative dimension of arms control, arguing that treaties shape expectations, legitimize restraint, and embed cooperative practices. The erosion of these norms over the past decade has contributed to a broader delegitimization of negotiated limits.

These theoretical perspectives underscore that the challenges facing post–New START arms control are not merely technical but deeply embedded in political and normative contexts. The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped U.S.-Russian relations. Moscow’s framing of the conflict as a confrontation with the West, combined with U.S. and allied NATO support for Ukraine, has created a political environment in which formal negotiations are viewed as strategically risky or politically unacceptable.

The U.S. seeks to address Russia’s large arsenal of non‑strategic nuclear weapons and its development of novel systems such as nuclear-powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia, in turn, prioritizes constraints on U.S. missile defenses and long-range conventional strike capabilities. These asymmetries complicate the search for mutually acceptable trade-offs. Furthermore, verification has long been a cornerstone of bilateral arms control. Russia’s suspension of inspections and data exchanges under New START has undermined transparency and raised questions about the feasibility of future verification regimes. Designing agreements that satisfy both sides’ security concerns will be a central challenge.

The U.S. increasingly argues that future arms control must account for China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. Russia rejects trilateral frameworks, viewing them as attempts to dilute U.S.–Russian parity. Thus far, China shows little interest in formal arms control negotiations. This triangular dynamic introduces new complexities absent from earlier bilateral negotiations.

Despite the hostile political environment, arms control still matters. The strategic reasons for arms control include specific factors that deserve attention from states. Agreements reduce incentives for preemption and miscalculation, which can increase crisis stability. Data exchanges and inspections improve transparency by reducing uncertainty and reliance on worst-case assumptions. Arms races can impose significant economic burdens, even for the U.S.’ trillion-dollar defense budget and Russia’s constrained economy. Finally, U.S.–Russian cooperation reinforces the legitimacy of the global nonproliferation regime. These lasting incentives suggest that both states have structural reasons to pursue at least minimal engagement.

So, what are the pathways for Post–New START arms control? Political commitments to maintain New START limits, even without a formal treaty, could involve both sides making parallel political statements to uphold New START’s numerical limits. While these have no legal force, such commitments could help prevent rapid nuclear arsenal expansion and maintain stability and predictability.

Other paths could include more Issue‑Specific or Modular Agreements. Rather than pursuing a new comprehensive treaty, negotiators could focus on discrete issues, such as notifications of major strategic exercises, transparency measures for new strategic systems, and agreements to avoid dangerous military incidents. These modular arrangements could serve as building blocks for more ambitious frameworks. Next, revitalizing crisis‑management mechanisms by reestablishing military-to-military communication channels could reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation. Such mechanisms do not require treaty-level negotiations and can function even amid broader political tensions. Finally, promote multilateral and norm-building initiatives such as broader dialogues involving China, NATO allies, and other nuclear-armed states to help shape norms around transparency and risk reduction. Multilateral workshops, data exchange initiatives, or voluntary reporting mechanisms may be more practical than formal treaties.

The expiration of New START marks a critical turning point in the history of U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control. The structural, political, and technological challenges facing a successor agreement are formidable, and a new comprehensive treaty is unlikely in the near term. Yet the logic of arms control, rooted in the need to manage existential risks, remains important. Incremental, issue-specific, and politically binding measures offer a pragmatic path forward, preserving essential elements of strategic stability until conditions allow for more ambitious negotiations. The future of arms control will depend not only on geopolitical developments but also on policymakers’ ability to adapt traditional frameworks to a more complex, multipolar nuclear landscape. Without some form of negotiated restraint, the world risks entering an era of unconstrained nuclear competition for the first time in over half a century.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia declared itself compliant with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.

In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration emphasized that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already been paused since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already completed over 70 percent of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. “inequality” in support of Ukraine.

New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.

Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its 10-16 multiple warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.

Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.

The U.S. nuclear triad modernization program is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.

Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a physical inspection method in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s final compliance report concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.

Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement” in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, some experts estimate the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at 1,000 to 5,000, a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.

Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including parity approaches, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START was originally published on Global Security Review.

At the time, the Soviet Union and United States committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons, and allowing thorough onsite inspections to ensure treaty compliance. During the Cold War, the INF Treaty served as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in the global nuclear order. Historically, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 were the first of several agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, both sides agreed to reduce their strategic weaponry, which included ballistic missile defenses, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Additionally, they established inspection procedures to make sure both parties followed the agreement. Due to the treaty, 2,600 missiles were destroyed, marking a significant Cold War breakthrough. Despite decades of arms control, the US and Russia still field the largest nuclear forces. Although it is challenging to determine the exact extent of their stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the US possesses 5,328 warheads, while Russia has 5,580.

In August 2025, Russia declared it would no longer fulfil its commitments under the INF Treaty, citing increasing threats from the United States and other Western nations. When the US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 because of Russian noncompliance with treaty limitations, Moscow stated that it would not use such weapons as long as Washington did not. This may have served as an effective ruse, but it served a purpose.

Questions are increasing about the utility of nuclear proliferation, the threat of arms racing, and the future of nuclear deterrence following the decision of Russia to fully abrogate the INF Treaty. The collapse of the INF Treaty represents a significant shift in the trajectory of international arms control.

The situation took a more dramatic turn as President Donald Trump announced that the US would move two of its nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia in reaction to the “inflammatory statements” issued by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This action highlights the challenge that arises when arms control breaks down—the potential for misunderstandings and overreactions increase.

Among nuclear-armed states, communication, predictability, and a certain measure of self-control are essential elements of nuclear deterrence. They were shaped by the INF Treaty, which placed verifiable limitations on missile sites. With the failure of the INF Treaty, useful tools were removed.

The future deployment of intermediate-range systems in regions that were shielded from them may prove an urgent strategic issue. Once at the epicenter of Cold War nuclear worries, Europe may have to host such weapons once more, but with improved accuracy, shorter travel times, and, perhaps, lower yields.

Deterrence dynamics in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult, especially between the US, China, and Russia, after the INF Treaty. The great powers are now accelerating nuclear modernization, while non-nuclear states are reconsidering their nonproliferation commitments. A replay of the Cold War–era European missile crisis has emerged with the collapse of the treaty.

Now, both Russia and the US are free to use and develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles without any official restraints. One more issue concerns the intentions of other governments, who may be influenced by the deterioration of controls on nuclear systems. States that did not previously possess nuclear weapons may choose to acquire them. Modern arms racing may be fast, less predictable, and more destabilizing due to technological advancements, such as autonomous delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and AI-assisted targeting.

There are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation between the US and Russia. The two largest nuclear powers have a special duty to control and limit the scope of their competition.

Measures that encourage openness, trust, and communication between nuclear and non-nuclear governments will be crucial. In the absence of a global treaty, regional security accords, tailored to today’s security challenges, can effectively restrict risky deployments and restrain great powers from further modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Nations in the Asia-Pacific can, for example, agree to mutual missile deployment restrictions similar to those in the INF Treaty’s verification procedures, which include regular inspections and satellite monitoring by mutual compliance. This would prevent insecure military build-ups in the region and reduce mistrust between states. Whatever course nations take, the importance of preventing escalation to nuclear use is foremost.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These economic conflicts erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.

Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the supply chain. Moreover, it can weaken American global leadership as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.

The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and strategic stability. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.

American technological superiority, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately 70 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.

However, the American military is already in decline according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”

The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than three destroyers annually. By contrast, China possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.

The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a zero-sum strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly provocative rhetoric from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.

Traditionally, China rejects arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.

Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the great powers declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the verification process, and the supply chain supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.

Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.

Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.

In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of New START remains uncertain and fragile.

At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.

Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.

South Korea, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.

Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.

How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.