<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:UK &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/uk/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/uk/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 11:36:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sidra Shaukat]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 13:36:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence & Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms embargo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ballistic missile technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[coercion vs. diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[E3 (France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic adaptation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European powers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[financial sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[JCPOA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Look East strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Masoud Pezeshkian]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[maximum pressure strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Non-Proliferation Treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear facilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oil revenues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sanctions relief]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[snapback sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trust collapse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Nations Security Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Western diplomacy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31779</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 28, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed previously lifted sanctions against Iran. The move occurred when the European powers triggered the “snapback” mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on August 28, 2025. This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/">Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On September 28, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) re-imposed previously lifted sanctions against Iran. The move occurred when the European powers triggered the “snapback” mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on August 28, 2025.</p>
<p>This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.</p>
<p>The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to <a href="https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/new-iaea-resolution/">2005</a> when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8928.doc.htm">2006</a>, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2007/sc8980.doc.htm">2007</a> and <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2008/03/251122">2008</a> further tightened the restrictions. In <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2010/sc9948.doc.htm">2010</a>, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran">oil revenues and banking sector</a>, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.</p>
<p>These sanctions were lifted under the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf">JCPOA</a> in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/27/middleeast/iran-snapback-nuclear-sanctions-intl">snapback clause</a>; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10330/">August 28, 2025</a>, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.</p>
<p>The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-iran">2006–2010</a>. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.</p>
<p>Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39rpgpvwy1o">condemned</a> the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran <a href="https://en.mehrnews.com/news/237003/Iran-recalls-ambassadors-from-Germany-France-UK?utm_source=politico.eu&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=politico.eu&amp;utm_referrer=politico.eu">recalled</a> its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but <a href="https://www.barrons.com/news/iran-president-says-no-plans-to-leave-non-proliferation-treaty-106cec44">clarified</a> it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.</p>
<p>The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-07/news/israel-and-us-strike-irans-nuclear-program">Coordinated attacks</a> by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.</p>
<p>While <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/09/1165974">Russia and China</a> echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/e3-joint-statement-on-iran-activation-of-the-snapback">maintained</a> that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also <a href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/iran-vote-on-a-draft-resolution-to-delay-the-snapback-of-un-sanctions.php">emphasized</a> that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.</p>
<p>The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that <a href="https://www.brandeis.edu/stories/2025/june/inside-iran.html">internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure</a> would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2025-06/zero-enrichment-unnecessary-unrealistic-objective-prevent-iranian-bomb">zero enrichment</a> and even presented <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/19/iran-hits-out-ahead-of-un-vote-on-nuclear-sanctions">partial solutions</a> at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its <a href="https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/irans-eastern-strategy/">Look East</a> strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.</p>
<p>The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.</p>
<p>The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/3/us-says-its-strikes-degraded-irans-nuclear-programme-by-one-to-two-years">two years</a>, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.</p>
<p>The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.</p>
<p>For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.</p>
<p>The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.</p>
<p><em>Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Snapback.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="223" height="62" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 223px) 100vw, 223px" /></a></p>

<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/">Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/snapback-sanctions-the-collapse-of-western-diplomacy-with-iran/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/more-political-uncertainties-affecting-europes-defense-build-up/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/more-political-uncertainties-affecting-europes-defense-build-up/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jan 2025 12:47:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Alternative for Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[budget deficit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emmanuel Macron]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[François Bayrou]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Friedrich Merz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GDP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gerhard Scholz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Keir Starmer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Michel Barnier]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political instability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Romania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[social disruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vladimir Putin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wealth gap]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[welfare state]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29829</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Politics in Europe are growing increasingly unstable. The Starmer government in the United Kingdom (UK) is stalled and the German coalition of Gerhard Scholz dissolved, with elections coming. Under French President Emmanuel Macron, the government of Prime Minister Michel Barnier lasted barely three months, as it recently collapsed upon a no-confidence vote by a parliament [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/more-political-uncertainties-affecting-europes-defense-build-up/">More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Politics in Europe are growing increasingly unstable. The Starmer government in the United Kingdom (UK) is stalled and the German coalition of Gerhard Scholz dissolved, with elections coming. Under French President Emmanuel Macron, the government of Prime Minister Michel Barnier lasted barely three months, as it recently collapsed upon a no-confidence vote by a parliament where Macron lacks a majority.</p>
<p>In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) <a href="https://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2024/11/15/failure-is-now-hard-wired-into-all-that-labour-is-doing/">growth</a> has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/nov/09/uk-defence-spending-gdp-trump-britain-military-budget-gdp">may not emerge</a> until the Summer of 2025.</p>
<p>In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-chancellor-olaf-scholz-social-democratic-party-spd-leadership-german-election-politics/">snap elections</a> in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kT08v9rBez0">chatted</a> with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/germany-has-committed-to-improving-its-defense-its-budget-needs-to-reflect-this/">defense budget</a> at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.</p>
<p>Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-scholz-arrives-kyiv-surprise-visit-zdf-reports-2024-12-02/">early December 2024</a>, committed to deliver <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/12/06/in-germany-chancellor-olaf-scholz-and-his-conservative-rival-friedrich-merz-clash-over-military-aid-to-ukraine_6735313_4.html">Patriot systems</a> in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-defense-math-does-not-add-up/">defense math</a> just does not add up.</p>
<p>In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.</p>
<p>France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.</p>
<p>The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 <a href="https://euro-sd.com/2024/01/articles/36190/examining-the-french-military-programming-act-2024-2030/">Military Programming Act</a> (<em>Loi de Programmation Militaire</em>).</p>
<p>President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/france-doubles-down-on-space-defense-tech/">civilian and military space</a>.</p>
<p>At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-nordic-baltic-states-are-leading-the-way-on-european-security/">becoming increasingly significant</a> players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/how-sweden-and-finlands-membership-in-nato-affects-the-high-north/">central role</a> in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/nordic-countries-supercharge-natos-deterrence/">supercharge NATO’s deterrence</a>.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/02/europe/putin-russia-defense-budget-ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html">steadily increased</a> over the past two years. Of course, this <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/studies/russian-military-manpower-after-two-and-half-years-war-ukraine">strains society’s resources</a> and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/an-endgame-in-ukraine/">endgame</a> pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/putins-nuclear-swagger/">nuclear swagger</a> at the highest level.</p>
<p>For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.</p>
<p>The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/37347819-22ba-4b6d-a815-ec6115a8f5af">Russian interference</a>.</p>
<p>The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.</p>
<p>The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.</p>
<p>By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent <a href="https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1877948465516257646">exchange on X (Twitter)</a> between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.</p>
<p>Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”</p>
<p>As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Further-Uncertainty-Affecting-Europes-Defense-Build-Up_EDIT_Jan_2025_.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 " src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="302" height="84" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 302px) 100vw, 302px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/more-political-uncertainties-affecting-europes-defense-build-up/">More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/more-political-uncertainties-affecting-europes-defense-build-up/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iran’s 1953 Coup that Wasn’t</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-1953-coup-that-wasnt/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-1953-coup-that-wasnt/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy&nbsp;&&nbsp;Joe Buff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Aug 2024 11:55:13 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1953 Coup]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Role]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anglo-Persian Oil Company]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Constitutional monarchy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Constitutional order]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[False narrative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[General Fazlollah Zahedi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geostrategic issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Court of Justice]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic fundamentalist theocracy. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamic Revolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Marxist-inspired revolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military support]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mohammad Mosaddeq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mullahs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nationalization of oil reserves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[President Dwight D. Eisenhower]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prime Minister]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Soviet state]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Soviet Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tudeh Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28759</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In August 1953, the Shah of Iran removed his prime minister, Mohamad Mosaddeq, from his office. The prime minister, who served at the pleasure of the Shah, was in the midst of leading a Marxist-inspired revolution to topple the constitutional monarchy of Iran. Contrary to the story often told, Mosaddeq was not removed in any [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-1953-coup-that-wasnt/">Iran’s 1953 Coup that Wasn’t</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In August 1953, the Shah of Iran removed his prime minister, Mohamad Mosaddeq, from his office. The prime minister, who served at the pleasure of the Shah, was in the midst of leading a Marxist-inspired revolution to topple the constitutional monarchy of Iran. Contrary to the story often told, Mosaddeq was not removed in any coup. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi determined his prime minister was a threat to the Iranian constitution and legitimately chose to remove him as the head of his government. It was Mosaddeq’s revolutionary actions and unwillingness to follow the Shah’s command that forced the military to support the Shah’s defense of the constitution.</p>
<p>While many readers may not be familiar with the inner workings of constitutional monarchies, it is important to keep in mind that a prime minister serves at the pleasure of the monarch, in whose name the prime minister forms a government. While not common, the monarch can remove the prime minister due to a loss of confidence. In the case of Iran (1953), the Shah saw Mosaddeq as a threat to the constitutional order, which, in fact, he was.</p>
<p>The Shah’s restoration of constitutional order in 1953 also addressed three important geostrategic issues. The first concerned the nature of Iran’s government and how its leadership would be determined. In 1951, as a member of the <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/Majles">parliament or Majles</a>, and subsequently as prime minister, Mosaddeq pushed for a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Iran-CIA-Fall-Mosaddeq-Revisited/dp/0230579272/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1LLPYT0L4Z0OP&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.tOfFOtLQnoefgxJoQlh9-b5fMqZLIoP-mI0aEqst_y8.25TnVZflvLtyMCwNmhIeo5j4EwJCxDXXAq-WztyhYZw&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;keywords=iran+cia+%2C+bayandor&amp;qid=1722167901&amp;s=books&amp;sprefix=iran+cia+%2C+bayandor%2Cstripbooks%2C90&amp;sr=1-1">public referendum</a> to have the parliament dismissed and the constitutional monarchy eliminated, which would have given him virtual dictatorial powers to rule.</p>
<p>By 1953, as prime minister, Mosaddeq again called for just such a public referendum to choose between his government by decree and what he viewed as an antiquated monarchy. The referendum passed overwhelmingly, and Mosaddeq signed a decree calling for the results to be implemented although Iran’s constitution recognized no such role for referendums. The prime minister was clearly seeking to engage in unconstitutional activities.</p>
<p>The second issue was Mosaddeq’s long sought effort to nationalize Iran’s oil reserves, then controlled jointly through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 1951, prior to becoming prime minister, he led parliament to pass legislation nationalizing Iranian oil assets. The United Kingdom took Iran to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but because Iran did not recognize the authority of the ICJ, the court <a href="https://www.icj-cij.org/case/16">dismissed the lawsuit</a> in 1952. This ultimately led the UK to organize a boycott of Iranian oil exports, which was effective in preventing Iranian oil, 50 percent of the nation’s foreign currency assets, from being sold on the international market.</p>
<p>The third issue was Mosaddeq’s growing rapprochement with the Soviet Union (USSR) and reliance on the pro-Soviet <a href="https://merip.org/1980/03/the-tudeh-party-in-iranian-politics/">Tudeh Party</a> as an important source of political support. Moscow was looking to control more oil resources, particularly those in Iran and the Middle East, which led the Soviets to actively engage in the spread of communist propaganda and revolutionary efforts in the region.</p>
<p><strong>The American Role</strong></p>
<p>For supporters of today’s regime in Tehran, it is an article of faith that the US and UK illegitimately overthrew a popular and democratic ruler, Mosaddeq, over a desire to keep Iranian oil resources under British control and an unwarranted fear of communism.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-1953-coup-us-tensions-3d391c0255308a7c13d32d3c88e5f54f">Associated Press</a> for example, concluded that what they saw was a “reactionary CIA-led 1953 coup against revolutionary Mosaddeq” which “lit the fuse” for the 1979 Islamic revolution a quarter century later. All the elements were there—greed for oil, a supposed push to stop popular democracy, and an irrational fear of communism—to make the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat#:~:text=The%201953%20Iranian%20coup%20d,Pahlavi%2C%20on%2019%20August%201953%2C">the “bad guys” in this narrative</a>.</p>
<p>By accepting the narrative that Iran’s path toward progressive democracy was hijacked by the CIA, wholesale excuses are possible to explain away <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4545257-a-triple-threat-in-the-middle-east-hamas-hezbollah-and-the-houthis/">Iran’s terrorist enterprise</a> over the past four decades. For many fellow travelers in the West, the fictional “coup” against Mosaddeq provided an excuse for avoiding a confrontation with Iran over its rogue behavior.</p>
<p>Iran’s mullahs describe American and British action from 1953–1979 as “the great arrogance”—the meddling in Iranian affairs by <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Behind-1953-Coup-Iran-Turncoats/dp/1107429757/ref=sr_1_1?crid=WHB9MRC7F187&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.u1hfvtVUii11orXk4NIF1A.ljlbF8SVwl4TpIkuNe0Cg_4g4_OFFLQSlHySj9_2tjU&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;keywords=behind+the+1953+coup+in+iran+rahnema&amp;qid=1719430293&amp;s=books&amp;sprefix=behind+the+1953+coup+in+iran+rahnema%2Cstripbooks%2C75&amp;sr=1-1">foreign interests</a>. However, the legitimate constitutional restoration of the Shah (1953) was led by a completely legitimate <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Iran-CIA-Fall-Mosaddeq-Revisited/dp/0230579272/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3PCPIV8X181CU&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.4iMKXlad-UL5l5-ickRFTl09_evBmkGj_jfMOn1RFcYPQ-FX3EeLjH-USrB_dcB-.J_DA-lU7hPHoXvwQIw0PhywM0gSNEwguJyzu2ZabHW8&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;keywords=iran%2C+bayandor&amp;qid=1722169302&amp;s=books&amp;sprefix=iran%2C+bayandor%2Cstripbooks%2C180&amp;sr=1-1">loyalist-royalist coalition</a> made up of members of the Iranian military, the Iranian theocracy, Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi’s supporters, and supporters of the Iranian constitution. The Shah legitimately issued two decrees on August 19, 1953, dismissing Mosaddeq as prime minister and appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister.</p>
<p>The American desire to staunch the spread of communism was a perfectly legitimate concern that led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to support constitutional government under the Shah. For the British, without whose investment in infrastructure, processing, and export there would be no Iranian oil to export, legitimate financial interests were at stake. The Soviet Union also cared about oil. In the early 1950s, Iranian oil and gas reserves were a growing part of known oil and gas reserves. Control over them would provide economic and diplomatic leverage for an economically impoverished Soviet state.</p>
<p>It should come as no surprise that a false narrative surrounding Mosaddeq’s removal developed almost immediately. Reality, however, is far different. Mohammad Mosaddeq was legitimately removed from power for attempting to topple the constitutional monarchy on behalf of the Soviet-supported Tudeh party. American and British support was exactly what the Shah required to restore the constitution. The ultimate collapse of the Shah’s government and its replacement with an Islamic fundamentalist theocracy is a tragedy the United States regrets even to this day.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy and Joe Buff are Senior Fellows at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are their own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Historical-Mythology-and-Deterring-Iran.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28497 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Download3.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-1953-coup-that-wasnt/">Iran’s 1953 Coup that Wasn’t</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-1953-coup-that-wasnt/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Investing in National Security: The Case for Fostering Competition in the Defense Industry</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/investing-in-national-security-the-case-for-fostering-competition-in-the-defense-industry/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/investing-in-national-security-the-case-for-fostering-competition-in-the-defense-industry/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 May 2024 12:05:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[acquisition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aircraft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cold war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contracting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FEMA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICBM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[industrial base]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[manufacturing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Minuteman III]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Navy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shelter]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ships]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shipyards]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SpaceX]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trident II]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27954</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States stands at a critical juncture. As tensions rise and threats from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran evolve, it is paramount that the nation ensure it possess the strength needed to defend against adversary aggression. Central to this effort is the need to foster competition in key areas of the defense industrial [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/investing-in-national-security-the-case-for-fostering-competition-in-the-defense-industry/">Investing in National Security: The Case for Fostering Competition in the Defense Industry</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States stands at a critical juncture. As <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/us-sends-antony-blinken-china-amid-geopolitical-tensions-1894189">tensions rise</a> and threats from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran evolve, it is paramount that the nation ensure it possess the strength needed to defend against adversary aggression. Central to this effort is the need to foster competition in key areas of the defense industrial base, including naval shipyards, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) manufacturing, nuclear weapons design and manufacturing, and aircraft production. Such investments are not only vital for maintaining America’s military edge but also for safeguarding our nation against emerging threats.</p>
<p>Encouraging competition and redirecting investments away from major defense contractors such as <a href="https://www.rtx.com/">Raytheon</a>, <a href="https://www.gd.com/">General Dynamics</a>, <a href="https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/index.html">Lockheed Martin</a>, <a href="https://www.boeing.com/">Boeing</a>, and <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/">Northrop Grumman</a>, towards emerging companies (<a href="https://www.spacex.com/">Space X</a>, <a href="https://lookingglassusa.com/">Looking Glass</a>, <a href="https://kodiak.ai/">Kodiak</a>) with innovative approaches and cost-effective capabilities, can enhance national security. This shift has the potential to lower defense procurement costs, provide technological advantages, and reduce the <a href="https://www.sanders.senate.gov/op-eds/defense-contractors-are-bilking-the-american-people/">monopolistic control</a> and <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pentagon-budget-price-gouging-military-contractors-60-minutes-2023-05-21/">price gouging</a> these major contractors have over government defense contracts.</p>
<p><strong>Shipyards</strong></p>
<p>Naval shipyards are the backbone of maritime defense, yet their <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2024/04/the-navys-shipbuilding-doldrums-have-been-mostly-self-inflicted/">capacity and efficiency were challenged in recent years</a>. Currently, the top military shipbuilding corporations are General Dynamics, <a href="https://hii.com/">Huntington Ingles</a>, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. The nation cannot continue to rely on these companies to produce cost-effective, on-time results for the Navy. The simple truth is almost every contract awarded to these companies ends up <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/03/15/aircraft-carrier-enterprise-delivery-delayed-by-18-months-says-navy?utm_source=USNI+News&amp;utm_campaign=f741cbf602-USNI_NEWS_DAILY&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_0dd4a1450b-f741cbf602-231849665&amp;mc_cid=f741cbf602&amp;mc_eid=1f01aea19e">over budget and delayed years</a>.</p>
<p>By fostering competition among up-and-coming companies we can revitalize our shipbuilding industry, introducing new technologies and innovative approaches that improve cost-effectiveness and speed of construction. Paramount to the issue, the US needs to <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/united-states-must-improve-its-shipbuilding-capacity">invest in developing additional shipyards</a> to combat the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-navy-shrinking-china-biggest-fleet-shipbuilding-taiwan-2024-4">growing Chinese capabilities</a> as a new maritime superpower. This will not only strengthen the US naval fleet, but also allow the Navy to counter the rising threat and reverse the nation’s downward trajectory, creating jobs and stimulating economic growth.</p>
<p><strong>ICBM Manufacturing</strong></p>
<p>Enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities is essential for maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. Currently, Boeing is responsible for producing key components for US and UK <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/trident/">Trident II (D5) missiles</a> and <a href="https://www.afnwc.af.mil/Weapon-Systems/Minuteman-III-LGM-30G/">US Minuteman III ICBMs</a>, while General Dynamics manufactures key components for US and UK Trident II (D5) missiles. Lockheed Martin plays a role in upgrading Trident II (D5) missiles for the US and UK, as well as Minuteman III, and also manages a UK nuclear weapons laboratory along with several US nuclear weapons facilities.</p>
<p>Northrop Grumman is involved in similar activities, including Trident II (D5) missile upgrades for the US and UK, Minuteman III, and management of some US nuclear weapons facilities. Additionally, in 2020, Northrop Grumman was awarded a sole-source $13.3 billion contract for engineering and manufacturing <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/sentinel">Sentinel missiles</a> to replace the current arsenal of 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs. They have also acquired Orbital ATK, which has similar involvements.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, every nuclear modernization project went <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-04/news/us-nuclear-costs-projections-continue-rise">over budget</a> and was<a href="https://www.gao.gov/blog/over-budget-and-delayed-whats-next-u.s.-nuclear-weapons-research-and-production-projects"> delayed</a> despite tens of billions of dollars pledged towards the modernization goal. Ultimately, increasing competition in this sector can spur innovation, resulting in more dependable and advanced missile systems at a more cost-effective price. Encouraging companies like <a href="https://www.spacex.com/">SpaceX</a>, <a href="https://www.blueorigin.com/">Blue Origin</a>, and <a href="https://www.virgingalactic.com/">Virgin Galactic</a> to invest in defense manufacturing of rocket technology, possibly through government contracts, could drive progress. Furthermore, diversifying the manufacturing base can mitigate the risk of supply-chain disruptions, ensuring a consistent supply of these critical weapons.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Nuclear Weapons Facilities</strong></p>
<p>Nuclear weapons design and manufacturing facilities are another area where competition can yield significant benefits. Currently, the <a href="https://www.dshs.texas.gov/texas-radiation-control/emergency-preparedness-radiation-control-program/pantex-nuclear-weapons-facility#:~:text=Pantex%20Plant%20is%20America's%20only,Highway%2060%20in%20Carson%20County.">Pantex Plant</a> in Amarillo, Texas, is the only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility. The nation needs more than a single facility for this task. This is a national security concern. Any issue with this facility, and assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons is hampered. By encouraging competition, the nation can modernize the nuclear arsenal, ensuring it remains safe, secure, and effective. Moreover, competition in the assembly and disassembly process can lead to cost savings, which enables the nation to allocate resources to other pressing defense needs.</p>
<p><strong>Aircraft Manufacturing</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>The need for a robust aircraft manufacturing capability is paramount. Navy Adm. John C. Aquilino, the head of US Indo-Pacific Command said, in recent congressional testimony, that <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/indopacom-boss-china-soon-world-largest-air-force/">China has the world’s largest navy and is soon to be the world’s largest air force</a>. With potential adversaries <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-fighter-jet-fleet-growing-size-capability-pentagon-2023-10">investing heavily in advanced aircraft</a>, America must maintain a competitive edge. With the looming prospect of having to fight and fund a three-front war (Ukraine-Russia, Israel-Iran, and China-Taiwan), the US needs to maintain its ability to obtain and provide air superiority in whatever conflicts it enters.</p>
<p>By fostering competition, we can spur innovation in aircraft design and production, ensuring air superiority in future conflicts. Investing in <a href="https://www.axios.com/2024/03/15/drone-swarms-ai-military-war">cost-effective drone swarms</a> and continued advancements of our <a href="https://www.f35.com/f35/about/5th-gen-capabilities.html">5th- and 6th-generation fighters</a> is essential. Furthermore, the US must increase the number of strategic stealth bombers in its arsenal from 20 to 200 to 300. Development and purchase of 100 <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-21-raider">B-21 Raider</a>s is a good start, but there needs to be more competition or <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/northrop-grumman-1-56-billion-loss-b-21/">manufacturing supply-chain issues</a> will continue to plague this modernization process.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Fallout Shelter Investments</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>Investing in a more robust fallout shelter system is crucial for ensuring the safety and protection of the American population in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event. While <a href="https://dahp.wa.gov/sites/default/files/FamilyShelterDesigns.pdf">government efforts have historically been the primary driver of fallout shelter development</a>, there is also a role for private entities to play in this important endeavor.</p>
<p>During <a href="https://www.history.com/news/cold-war-fallout-shelter-survival-rations-food">the Cold War, the United States undertook a massive effort to build fallout shelters</a> in anticipation of a potential nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. <a href="https://www.orau.org/blog/museum/the-history-of-fallout-shelters-in-the-united-states.html#:~:text=We%20never%20got%20to%20see,rooms%20as%20they%20were%20decommissioned.">The government constructed thousands of public fallout shelters</a> in buildings such as schools, government offices, and subway stations. Private individuals and organizations also built their own shelters to protect against nuclear fallout.</p>
<p>The government entities involved with fallout shelters are the <a href="https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/publication-one_english_2010.pdf">Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)</a> and the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/">Department of Defense (DoD)</a>. FEMA is responsible for coordinating federal government efforts in disaster response and recovery, including the development and maintenance of fallout shelters. The DoD is involved in the construction and maintenance of fallout shelters, particularly those designed to protect military personnel and assets such as the <a href="https://www.northcom.mil/CheyenneMountain/">Cheyenne Mountain Complex</a>.</p>
<p>The primary private entities involved in developing and manufacturing fallout shelters are <a href="https://atlassurvivalshelters.com/">Atlas Survival Shelters</a>, <a href="https://risingsbunkers.com/">Rising S Company</a>, and <a href="https://www.hardenedstructures.com/">Hardened Structures</a>. Atlas Survival Shelters specializes in the design and construction of underground shelters for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats. Rising S offers a range of underground bunkers and shelters for protection against various threats, including nuclear fallout. Similarly, Hardened Structures provides custom-designed shelters and bunkers for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.</p>
<p>While the <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/where-are-all-nuclear-bunkers-1761447">number of public fallout shelters declined</a> since the end of the Cold War, there are still thousands of designated shelters across the country, although most are unknown, rundown, and primarily used for storage. They should be refurbished and updated to properly address the sheer number of citizens that would be required to shield from not only the initial blast, but any possible fallout.</p>
<p>Ultimately, it is essential that efforts to develop and maintain fallout shelters continue, as the threat of nuclear conflict remains a major concern in today’s world. By fostering competition in this sector, the nation can drive innovation and ensure that every American has access to adequate protection in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The United States must prioritize investments in fostering competition and innovation across key areas of the defense industry to strengthen national security. By redirecting investments from major defense contractors towards emerging companies with cost-effective military capabilities, the nation can enhance its military edge, reduce costs, and mitigate the near-monopolistic control of government defense contracts.</p>
<p>Revitalizing naval shipyards, enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities, modernizing nuclear weapons facilities, advancing aircraft manufacturing, and investing in a robust fallout shelter system are critical steps in safeguarding our nation against emerging threats.</p>
<p>By encouraging competition and diversifying the manufacturing base, the nation can drive innovation, ensure a continuous supply of critical weapons, and maintain a technological edge over adversaries. It is imperative that the nation act now to secure the future of our national security.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. </em><em>The views expressed in this article are the authors own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Investing-in-National-Security-The-Case-for-Fostering-Competition-in-the-Defense-Industry.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-27949 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Free-Download.png" alt="Download button" width="197" height="84" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/investing-in-national-security-the-case-for-fostering-competition-in-the-defense-industry/">Investing in National Security: The Case for Fostering Competition in the Defense Industry</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/investing-in-national-security-the-case-for-fostering-competition-in-the-defense-industry/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Where Next for Australia’s Defence Force in Space?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/where-next-for-australias-defence-force-in-space/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/where-next-for-australias-defence-force-in-space/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Malcolm Davis]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2024 12:14:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ASAT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AUKUS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[commercial space]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DARC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Space Command]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Space Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defence Strategic Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GEO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LEO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NDS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[satellite]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27902</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Albanese government’s 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), and its accompanying Integrated Investment Program (IIP), both released on April 17, represent the beginning of a biennial process of defense policy development called for in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and represent official Australian defense policy. All three documents note the importance of the space [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/where-next-for-australias-defence-force-in-space/">Where Next for Australia’s Defence Force in Space?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Albanese government’s 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS), and its accompanying Integrated Investment Program (IIP), both <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program">released</a> on April 17, represent the beginning of a biennial process of defense policy development called for in the 2023 <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review">Defence Strategic Review</a> (DSR) and represent official Australian defense policy. All three documents note the importance of the space domain for the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) future capability and strategy, but they represent more continuity than change from previous defense policy documents’ statements on space.</p>
<p>They continue similar priorities and themes to the previous coalition government’s 2020 <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update">Defence Strategic Update</a> and <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-force-structure-plan">Force Structure Plan</a> on the space domain. As with those documents, the 2024 NDS and IIP highlight the importance of space as a critical enabler for terrestrial military operations and an operational domain in a multi-domain approach to a strategy of deterrence by denial.</p>
<p>Furthermore, they identify three broad capability areas for further development.  These include (1) the provision of space support, notably through satellite communications to be provided by Australian-owned satellites through project JP9102 in geosynchronous orbit; (2) the establishment of enhanced space domain awareness, with the <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/seeing-through-the-darc-deep-into-space/">establishment</a> of a Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) at Exmouth in Western Australia—part of a global network of three such sensors—in collaboration with the US and UK; and (3) the development of space control capabilities.</p>
<p>This last aspect of the NDS and IIP opens some intriguing possibilities for future development that could be announced in subsequent policy documents, with the next NDS and IIP due in 2026. It also raises the possibility that space could start to play a larger role as a priority area in AUKUS Pillar 2. Already, the agreement to establish DARC is seen as part of AUKUS and will extend Australia’s ability to undertake space domain awareness out to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at 36,500 kilometers. That complements the existing C-Band radar and space surveillance telescope already located at Exmouth and will dramatically enhance the ability of Australia to undertake space surveillance under <a href="https://www.defence.gov.au/defence-activities/operations/dyurra">Operation Dyurra</a>. This is an essential requirement for Australia to undertake the space control mission, so it would make sense to bring this role into AUKUS Pillar 2 as well and see the two missions as integrated.</p>
<p>Just how Australia will undertake space control needs further clarification. There is only the following paragraph in the IIP, which states that space control will include “measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations.”</p>
<p>Australia has signed the <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/signing-of-anti-satellite-weapons-ban-a-positive-step-for-australia-in-space/">ban</a> on undertaking <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2022-10-27/australia-advances-responsible-action-space">destructive testing</a> of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as part of steps to promote responsible action in space, and it is extremely unlikely that Australia would pursue destructive “kinetic kill”’ ASATs, either direct-ascent or co-orbital in design. Exactly what Australia could pursue in terms of space control is open to speculation at this stage. Defence has undertaken work toward a space-electronic warfare capability under <a href="https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2021-07-29/defence-explores-options-space-electronic-warfare">Defence Project DEF 9358</a>, and this would be consistent with the 2024 IIP’s stated approach to space control, as well as the 2020 Force Structure Plan.</p>
<p>A “soft kill” capability, which is either ground-based or co-orbital, that could deliver scalable and reversible effects without creating space debris would contribute directly to the need for space control in a manner that is also consistent with Australian approaches to responsible actions in space. In the same way, other non-kinetic approaches—directed-energy or cyber—might open up opportunities for Australia to develop space control in the future.</p>
<p>The 2022 <a href="https://www.airforce.gov.au/our-work/strategy/defence-space-strategy">Defence Space Strategy</a>, released by Defence Space Command, makes clear the importance of assured access to space. This can be achieved in part through resilience of space support, including through defending satellites on-orbit via space control. But it also can be strengthened through enhancing sovereign launch capability. It is in this area where the 2024 NDS and IIP misses a <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/national-defence-strategy-a-missed-opportunity-for-space/">valuable opportunity to</a> integrate the space needs of defense with the growing commercial space sector.</p>
<p>There is no mention whatsoever of Australia’s vibrant commercial space sector in the 2024 NDS and IIP. It is almost as if the view from Defence is that this growing sector does not exist. Yet, Australia’s space sector is fast emerging as the basis for an end-to-end ecosystem, comprising not only the ground segment, but also satellite design and manufacturing through to sovereign launch capabilities.</p>
<p>Indeed, Australia is truly blessed in geographic terms for sovereign launch, with <a href="https://www.aspi.org.au/report/australias-north-and-space">launch sites in the north</a> located close to the equator to take full advantage of Earth’s rotational energy for cheaper cost per kilogram into equatorial low-earth orbit, and launch sites along the south of the continent that are well placed to access polar and sun synchronous orbits. Australia’s launch geography is a key factor prompting the <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/starships-from-the-north/">signing</a> of a Technology Safeguards Agreement with the United States on launches and returns.</p>
<p>Defence missed this opportunity to strengthen space resilience through supporting sovereign launch of small satellites that could complement large satellites in GEO, such as those envisaged for JP9102 with proliferated LEO (pLEO) constellations of small satellites for satellite communications and earth observation, to support both civil and defense needs. It missed the clear benefits of sovereign launch to reinforce assured access to space, through rapid augmentation of existing space capabilities in a crisis—or reconstitution of those capabilities in the event of an adversary employing counterspace capabilities against Australian satellites. It missed the opportunity for Australia to take a new step forward to do more to burden share in orbit with allies and strengthen the resilience of space support in the face of counterspace threats from China and Russia.</p>
<p>As the NDS and IIP are biennial documents, the opportunity is still there for Defence to embrace a bolder vision for Australia in space in the next release in 2026, whilst government more fully supports the growth of the commercial space sector. The question is whether Defence and the government will have the vision and determination to do something new. They have begun to think in these terms, given their support for developing space control capabilities, but they can do so much more.</p>
<p><em>Malcolm Davis, PhD, is a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.  </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Where-Next-for-Australias-Defense-Force-in-Space.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/where-next-for-australias-defence-force-in-space/">Where Next for Australia’s Defence Force in Space?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/where-next-for-australias-defence-force-in-space/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Realpolitik and Fake News Complicate Nuclear Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/realpolitik-and-fake-news-complicate-nuclear-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/realpolitik-and-fake-news-complicate-nuclear-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Buff&nbsp;&&nbsp;Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2024 12:09:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deception]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disinformation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fake News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychological profiling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[three body problem]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27746</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>For America to pragmatically solve the nuclear strategy three body problem—simultaneously deterring Russia, China, and North Korea—the United States must compensate for three characteristics of the international system: realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathic dictators. These, unfortunately for global peacekeeping, interact in a feedback loop, which forms a deadly three-player game of its own. In game [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/realpolitik-and-fake-news-complicate-nuclear-deterrence/">Realpolitik and Fake News Complicate Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For America to pragmatically solve the nuclear strategy <a href="https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/2869997/the-three-body-problem-the-us-china-and-russia/#:~:text=Today%20the%20United%20States%20faces,constant%20state%20of%20dynamic%20tension.">three body problem</a>—simultaneously deterring Russia, China, and North Korea—the United States must compensate for three characteristics of the international system: realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathic dictators. These, unfortunately for global peacekeeping, interact in a feedback loop, which forms a deadly three-player game of its own. In <a href="https://www.britannica.com/science/game-theory">game theory</a>, three-player games are <a href="https://economics.stackexchange.com/questions/34297/pure-nash-equilibria-3-players-game">notoriously difficult to analyze</a> and sometimes the weakest player wins big.</p>
<p>Realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathic dictators are nothing new. They date back more than two millennia. In their time, the social mechanisms and technology of the day were employed. Ancient Rome’s <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Augustus-Roman-emperor">Emperor Augustus</a> is but one example. The word <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2017-04-14/realpolitik-history">realpolitik</a>, <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2017-04-14/realpolitik-history">invented in Germany</a> in the mid-nineteenth century, describes the application of diplomacy and force in the pursuit of selfish state interests. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/biography/Otto-von-Bismarck/Imperial-chancellor">Count Otto von Bismarck</a>, the “Iron Chancellor,” was another master of ruthless realpolitik.</p>
<p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fake_news">Fake news</a> is modern slang for purposeful disinformation spread as real news. Fake news makes claims that the maker knows to be false, but intentionally packages and distributes to seem genuine, to serve their political and military purposes. English-language fake news, used as wartime propaganda, was already commonplace by the time of the <a href="https://britishcivilwars.ncl.ac.uk/propaganda-printing/political-pamphlets-cartoons/">English Civil War</a> (1642–1651). It also <a href="https://www.nps.gov/planyourvisit/event-details.htm?id=64367664-03CF-B6BD-AE8DE9E449949761">vexed the American founding fathers</a> during the American Revolution (1775–1781).</p>
<p><a href="https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/sociopathy">Sociopathic dictators</a> have a serious psychological disorder characterized by constant deceitful manipulation and a complete lack of regard for other people. When a very ambitious and successful sociopath rises to be head of state, taking control of national armies and arsenals and even nuclear weapons, the results can be devastating.</p>
<p>Infamous examples of twentieth-century dictators who practiced realpolitik, propagated fake news, and were sociopaths include Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Mao Zedong. Between them, their amoral aggression and complete disregard for lives caused the deaths of tens of millions.</p>
<p>Understanding these three historical and contemporary phenomena is essential for America to effectively address national security concerns. Acting together, realpolitik, fake news, and sociopathy shape adversary strategic behavior and work to the United States’ serious detriment. During the nuclear age and the social media era, the risks due to this “trinary weapon” skyrocketed.</p>
<p>Coping with these clear and present dangers calls for a nuanced and multidisciplinary, multiagency approach to deterrence and defense. This approach needs to go well beyond traditional military strategy that focuses on applying force while maintaining secrecy. Three lines of effort are important to help mitigate the above-mentioned trinary aspects of coercive statecraft.</p>
<p>First, multilateral engagement is important for combating the ill effects of enemy realpolitik. Just as in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, collective international efforts by like-minded democracies are vital to resisting expansionist tyranny. Further strengthening <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilateralism">multilateral frameworks and alliances</a>, to address common security challenges and deter adversarial behavior, is a useful approach. Important examples include expanding NATO and rationalizing its burden sharing. Expanding AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US, to include Japan and other Asia-Pacific allies, such as South Korea and Canada, is another option.</p>
<p>Second, strategic communication and information resilience is important. These hybrid-warfare, offensive and defensive weapons need further development by the United States. Clear and consistent messaging is indispensable to effectively convey America’s values and goals and to counteract bad-actor manipulation. This can help immunize allies against falling for adversary disinformation and protect victims of repression from enemy brainwashing.</p>
<p>To this end, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/information-resilience-countering-disinformation-and-its-threat-to-the-u-s-alliance-system/">enhancing resilience against fake news</a> requires expansion within the United States. This can be done using media literacy programs, non-partisan fact-checking mechanisms, and widespread public awareness campaigns. Any information warfare efforts the US employs to target adversary populations needs to meet high legal and ethical standards. It must also be tempered by stark realism about the utility of disinformation. In short, unconstrained free speech requires an informed public.</p>
<p>Third, <a href="https://www.ucf.edu/online/criminal-justice/news/what-is-criminal-profiling-and-what-is-its-role-in-law-enforcement/">psychological profiling techniques</a>, now standard practice in law enforcement, need further development to identify and mitigate the influence of sociopathic dictators in shaping strategic events. Such hyper-threatening individuals could, perhaps, be identified mid-career, before rising to lead nations. Overt and covert efforts to remediate or interdict the rise of such dangerously pathological persons is a tricky matter, but one the Pentagon, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency should not neglect. This line of effort can adapt and extend approaches refined since September 11, 2001, to <a href="https://eknygos.lsmu.lt/springer/605/169-188.pdf">better understand and short circuit mental processes behind progressive radicalization leading to violent terrorism</a>.</p>
<p>These lines of effort need more urgent furthering on a truly whole-of-nation basis. Government officials and private-sector executives can turn their efforts to developing the required capabilities. Social media companies are already expert at manipulating Americans. Perhaps it is time their efforts are employed for the nation rather than against it.</p>
<p>By addressing these new-old challenges head-on and implementing effective countering strategies, America can enhance its defense against the realpolitik and disinformation employed by sociopathic dictators. By doing so, the United States and its allies safely navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics and growing three body problem.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Realpolitik-and-Fake-News-Complicate-Nuclear-Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/realpolitik-and-fake-news-complicate-nuclear-deterrence/">Realpolitik and Fake News Complicate Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/realpolitik-and-fake-news-complicate-nuclear-deterrence/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Rebuilding a Credible European Nuclear Deterrent</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/rebuilding-a-credible-european-nuclear-deterrent/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/rebuilding-a-credible-european-nuclear-deterrent/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2024 14:20:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[French]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[German]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear arsenal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27672</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The topic of rebuilding a European nuclear deterrent in a world of finite American resources was the topic discussed by Max Hoell in one of Peter Huessy’s recent online seminars. The discussion touched on the evolving challenges to American extended deterrence in Europe amidst growing nuclear capabilities and assertiveness from China, North Korea, Russia, and, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/rebuilding-a-credible-european-nuclear-deterrent/">Rebuilding a Credible European Nuclear Deterrent</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The topic of rebuilding a European nuclear deterrent in a world of finite American resources was the topic discussed by <a href="https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/person/max-hoell/">Max Hoell</a> in one of Peter Huessy’s recent online seminars. The discussion touched on the evolving challenges to American extended deterrence in Europe amidst growing nuclear capabilities and assertiveness from China, North Korea, Russia, and, potentially, <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-quest-for-middle-east-hegemony/">Iran</a>. This is prompting European debate on nuclear deterrence and strategic alignment. While attempting to summarize these complex issues, the article makes a number of recommendations for advancing European deterrence.</p>
<p>European nations’ responses to the Russia challenge remain fragmented. They also show little concern about threats from China and North Korea. This led to a lack of strategic alignment between the US and Europe on the problem of facing the combined threat of China, North Korea, and Russia.</p>
<p>France and Germany prevented the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from qualifying China as a threat. France also torpedoed a NATO attempt to open a representative office in Japan. Neither does Europe plan to get involved in a Taiwan conflict. Max Hoell, during his talk, said, “European strategic autonomy thus appears to translate into a quasi-equidistance between Washington and Beijing.” This perspective appears correct.</p>
<p>The European political discourse is replete with concerns that a second Donald Trump presidency will usher in a post-NATO world. Such concerns miss the point. Regardless of who is in the White House in Washington, DC, the views of American presidents evolve as resources become finite. Europe needs to step up to the plate and not only pay their fair share for Europe’s defense, but also understand the need for a division of labor to defend a world threatened by revisionist powers. British and French deterrence face a credibility challenge. If faced with a conflict against China or Russia, Europe’s nuclear arsenals may not deter absent American support.</p>
<p>Realpolitik is to advocate a stronger transatlantic cooperation in extended deterrence. To rely solely on national European deterrence introduces reliability issues, such as the security of one country depending on the presidential power of another. Certain political parties, if victorious in French or German elections, would opt to appease China and Russia—possibly ending NATO and a European nuclear deterrent. Ideally, Europe should increase its contributions to deterrence efforts, including strategic alignment with NATO, increasing defense spending, and expanding European nuclear capabilities within the framework of transatlantic cooperation.</p>
<p>There is a need, though, for political leadership to engage domestic audiences in understanding the importance of nuclear deterrence to garner support for necessary security policies. Educating the public on nuclear realities and strategic imperatives is vital. European nations should continue evaluating their security strategies in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics and disruptive technological advancements. Only modernization can ensure adaptability and effectiveness in deterrence efforts.</p>
<p>Practically speaking, what are the options for a European nuclear deterrent involving France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) that operate in concert with the United States? A joint European nuclear force, unified under joint command and control involving France, Germany, and the UK, could provide a deterrent against threats to European security, but at a level well below that of Russia. Another option, an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella under a bilateral arrangement between the UK and France to cover other European nations, could provide security guarantees and potentially share nuclear assets.</p>
<p>Independently maintaining and enhancing European nuclear capabilities and further developing their own nuclear arsenal and deterrence strategy may be a necessary step. But that would further fragment the approach to European security. Alternatively, Europe could create a European federation where a unified nuclear force is established. Spearheaded by France, Germany, and the UK, it could support a “European Federation Nuclear Force.” This option, which is no less than the Holy Grail of European unity and strategic autonomy, would require significant political integration and coordination among European states. Nationalist tendencies would prove problematic. This not only sounds far-fetched, based on decades of previous attempts, but the contemporary climate of election interference and electoral tactics make it not only a remote prospect, but also a repellant to a majority of voters.</p>
<p>A fiscally sustainable endgame could be an expanded NATO nuclear-sharing agreement, with additional European countries sharing the burden of nuclear responsibilities within the alliance, together with France and the UK. The feasibility and desirability of these options would depend on various factors, including intra-European political will and transatlantic cooperation, while getting the China and Russia strategic picture right. A combination of realist threat perception and American-led deterrence realpolitik can generate the kind of tremendous pressure under which Europe will prove itself to be adaptive and step up to demonstrate its ability to lead and deter.</p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Rebuilding-a-Credible-European-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/rebuilding-a-credible-european-nuclear-deterrent/">Rebuilding a Credible European Nuclear Deterrent</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/rebuilding-a-credible-european-nuclear-deterrent/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>NATO’s Fledgling Nuclear Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-fledgling-nuclear-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-fledgling-nuclear-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Todd Clawson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2024 11:46:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[allies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Britain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extended deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27421</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) many strategic documents, leader speeches, and summit communiques regularly repeat the moniker, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” This is an acknowledgement of reality and the fact that nuclear weapons are fundamental to the alliance. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group also provides participating allies [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-fledgling-nuclear-deterrence/">NATO’s Fledgling Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) many <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/144032.htm">strategic documents</a>, <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_218734.htm?selectedLocale=en">leader speeches</a>, and <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en">summit communiques</a> regularly repeat the moniker, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.” This is an acknowledgement of reality and the fact that nuclear weapons are fundamental to the alliance.</p>
<p>NATO’s <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50069.htm">Nuclear Planning Group</a> also provides participating allies a forum to discuss and develop the alliance’s nuclear policies, demonstrating a unified view on nuclear weapons. Today, <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/nuclear-weapons-europe-mapping-us-and-russian-deployments">six of NATO’s</a> 30 European allies store nuclear weapons in their countries. These sites are vital to NATO’s strategic deterrence posture. With the end of the Cold War, NATO made the proper choice to reduce the stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe from more than 5,000 in 1991 as a means for building goodwill and assurances with Russia.</p>
<p>However, the current state of NATO’s nuclear posture and its ability deter aggression is seriously weakened. First, recent British <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/second-failed-trident-test-time-scrap-or-expand-britains-nuclear-capabilities">failures</a> with their Trident submarine ballistic missile forces is a major concern for NATO. If the United Kingdom’s (UK) single nuclear deterrent appears unreliable, then British leaders must look to expand the nuclear arsenal beyond the four submarines they currently field.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/second-failed-trident-test-time-scrap-or-expand-britains-nuclear-capabilities">Downplaying recent failures</a> is a mistake. Indeed, British Trident missile failures are leading defense experts to call for radical changes in the UK’s deterrent posture. While the United Kingdom is increasing the size of its nuclear stockpile, the UK should no longer rely on its single nuclear system to deter aggression. Developing an additional warhead and delivery system to ensure the success of this no-fail mission is the right decision. With Russia making overt <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2021.1912309">threats against the United Kingdom</a>, maintaining a visible and credible nuclear deterrent is not only vital for British survival but for NATO’s survival.</p>
<p>French President Emmanuel Macron’s <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/france-emmanuel-macron-nuclear-attack-russia-ukraine/">recent nuclear-use declaration</a> appears to undermine alliance nuclear deterrence. While France <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm">does not participate</a> in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, the alliance does rely on France’s strategic weapons to deter aggression.  President Macron stating that France will only employ nuclear weapons to defend its interests creates doubt among alliance members.</p>
<p>Finally, the ongoing <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/02/14/trump-nato-allies-00141590">political turmoil</a> in the United States is causing serious concerns among NATO member-states. Looking beyond political rhetoric during an election year, NATO should be more concerned with the United States’ ability to modernize its nuclear forces. American adherence to a defunct arms control treaty and a deemphasis on the utility of nuclear weapons leaves the US unable to produce nuclear weapons at the speed and scale required to meet today’s security environment.</p>
<p>Reports concerning the high costs of manufacturing <a href="https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4510010-plutonium-pits-us-nuclear-ambitions-sentinel/">plutonium pits</a>, largely due to divestment of manufacturing capability, threatens to create undue delays in the modernization programs which will place the country and NATO at risk. With British failures, French questionable commitment, and American modernization struggles, NATO’s nuclear deterrent appears hollow. It is no wonder <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/germans-debatethe-once-unthinkable-do-we-need-nuclear-weapons-13fa7e68">Germany</a> and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/news/turkey-shows-nuclear-weapons-interest">Turkey</a> are engaged in political discussions surrounding the pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent.</p>
<p>Current realities require NATO to make a serious assessment of its nuclear deterrence strategy.  For instance, NATO’s continued pursuit of arms control limits its deterrence strategy. And with Russia claiming <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/putin-says-95-russias-nuclear-forces-have-been-modernised-2024-02-23/">95 percent modernization</a> of its nuclear forces, NATO’s limited nuclear force places the alliance at a serious strategic disadvantage.</p>
<p>Moreover, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) <a href="https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/future-nuclear-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-danger">fails to fulfill its intent</a> as more nations seek to acquire nuclear weapons or grow their <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/">current arsenals</a>. While NATO made significant strides in global stability through nuclear reductions and adherence to the NPT and other arms control agreements, NATO’s adversaries violate these agreements at will to gain strategic advantage.</p>
<p>NATO needs to reverse course from the “<a href="https://www.baks.bund.de/en/working-papers/2021/germany-and-natos-nuclear-deterrent">three nos</a>” from the 1990s to policies that increase the alliance’s credibility. Allies must say yes to reintroducing strategic weapons across NATO territory. Moreover, more allies accepting a direct role in nuclear deterrence will go far in addressing the “burden sharing” question.</p>
<p>Member-states could meet the 2 percent defense spending requirement, which could support nuclear deterrence. Demonstrating a willingness to support nuclear sharing by <a href="https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/09/29/the-urgent-imperative-to-maintain-natos-nuclear-deterrence/index.html">dispersing nuclear capabilities and forces</a> throughout the European theater would silence burden-sharing critics.</p>
<p>Since these weapons would remain under US or UK control, NATO would continue to abide by arms control treaties. While there would undoubtedly be objections from that anti-nuclear groups or those who want their nations to join the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/">Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a>, today’s strategic environment requires NATO to pursue a realistic nuclear strategy that will address threats from Russia and emerging nuclear powers while sharing the deterrence burden across the alliance.</p>
<p>When the next Secretary General of NATO takes the helm, the new leader should state, “As long as nuclear weapons exist and hostile powers threaten the alliance, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance and maintain a robust deterrent shared by member-states.” Possessing a credible, reliable, survivable, and redundant strategic deterrent, shared by all allies, is how NATO deters future conflict.</p>
<p><em>CDR (Ret.) Todd Clawson is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<hr />
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/NATO-Fledgling-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<hr />
<h2><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/contact/submissions/"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-27430" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Write-For-GSR-Banner.png" alt="" width="248" height="248" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Write-For-GSR-Banner.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Write-For-GSR-Banner-150x150.png 150w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Write-For-GSR-Banner-70x70.png 70w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" /></a><br />
<style id="wpforms-css-vars-25798">
				#wpforms-25798 {
				
			}
			</style><div class="wpforms-container wpforms-container-full wpforms-render-modern" id="wpforms-25798"><form id="wpforms-form-25798" class="wpforms-validate wpforms-form wpforms-ajax-form" data-formid="25798" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data" action="/subject/uk/feed/" data-token="2ba769dabe2176ff2e9b6ebe3638efa2" data-token-time="1780320069"><div class="wpforms-head-container"></div><noscript class="wpforms-error-noscript">Please enable JavaScript in your browser to complete this form.</noscript><div id="wpforms-error-noscript" style="display: none;">Please enable JavaScript in your browser to complete this form.</div><div class="wpforms-field-container"><div id="wpforms-25798-field_1-container" class="wpforms-field wpforms-field-name" data-field-id="1"><fieldset><legend class="wpforms-field-label">Name <span class="wpforms-required-label" aria-hidden="true">*</span></legend><div class="wpforms-field-row wpforms-field-medium"><div class="wpforms-field-row-block wpforms-first wpforms-one-half"><input type="text" id="wpforms-25798-field_1" class="wpforms-field-name-first wpforms-field-required" name="wpforms[fields][1][first]" aria-errormessage="wpforms-25798-field_1-error" required><label for="wpforms-25798-field_1" class="wpforms-field-sublabel after">First</label></div><div class="wpforms-field-row-block wpforms-one-half"><input type="text" id="wpforms-25798-field_1-last" class="wpforms-field-name-last wpforms-field-required" name="wpforms[fields][1][last]" aria-errormessage="wpforms-25798-field_1-last-error" required><label for="wpforms-25798-field_1-last" class="wpforms-field-sublabel after">Last</label></div></div></fieldset></div><div id="wpforms-25798-field_2-container" class="wpforms-field wpforms-field-email" data-field-id="2"><fieldset><legend class="wpforms-field-label">Email <span class="wpforms-required-label" aria-hidden="true">*</span></legend><div class="wpforms-field-row wpforms-field-medium"><div class="wpforms-field-row-block wpforms-one-half wpforms-first"><input type="email" id="wpforms-25798-field_2" class="wpforms-field-required wpforms-field-email-primary" name="wpforms[fields][2][primary]" placeholder="info@yourdomain.com" spellcheck="false" aria-errormessage="wpforms-25798-field_2-error" aria-describedby="wpforms-25798-field_2-description" required><label for="wpforms-25798-field_2" class="wpforms-field-sublabel after">Email</label></div><div class="wpforms-field-row-block wpforms-one-half"><input type="email" id="wpforms-25798-field_2-secondary" class="wpforms-field-email-secondary wpforms-field-required" data-rule-confirm="#wpforms-25798-field_2" name="wpforms[fields][2][secondary]" spellcheck="false" aria-errormessage="wpforms-25798-field_2-secondary-error" aria-describedby="wpforms-25798-field_2-description" required><label for="wpforms-25798-field_2-secondary" class="wpforms-field-sublabel after">Confirm Email</label></div></div><div id="wpforms-25798-field_2-description" class="wpforms-field-description">please provide your contact email address. </div></fieldset></div><div id="wpforms-25798-field_3-container" class="wpforms-field wpforms-field-textarea" data-field-id="3"><label class="wpforms-field-label" for="wpforms-25798-field_3">Tell Us About Your Project <span class="wpforms-required-label" aria-hidden="true">*</span></label><textarea id="wpforms-25798-field_3" class="wpforms-field-medium wpforms-field-required" name="wpforms[fields][3]" aria-errormessage="wpforms-25798-field_3-error" aria-describedby="wpforms-25798-field_3-description" required></textarea><div id="wpforms-25798-field_3-description" class="wpforms-field-description">Give us an idea of the subject matter. </div></div><div id="wpforms-25798-field_4-container" class="wpforms-field wpforms-field-select wpforms-field-select-style-modern" data-field-id="4"><label class="wpforms-field-label" for="wpforms-25798-field_4">What Areas Are You Interested In?</label><select id="wpforms-25798-field_4" class="wpforms-field-medium choicesjs-select" data-size-class="wpforms-field-row wpforms-field-medium" data-search-enabled="" name="wpforms[fields][4][]" multiple="multiple"><option value="" class="placeholder" disabled ></option><option value="Emerging Threats"  class="choice-1 depth-1"  >Emerging Threats</option><option value="Allies and Extended Deterrence"  class="choice-2 depth-1"  >Allies and Extended Deterrence</option><option value="Strategic Adversaries"  class="choice-3 depth-1"  >Strategic Adversaries</option><option value="Modernization and Deterrence"  class="choice-4 depth-1"  >Modernization and Deterrence</option><option value="Arms Control and Non-proliferation"  class="choice-5 depth-1"  >Arms Control and Non-proliferation</option></select><div id="wpforms-25798-field_4-description" class="wpforms-field-description">Please tell us the areas match your interest.  You can contribute in multiple areas. </div></div><div id="wpforms-25798-field_5-container" class="wpforms-field wpforms-field-textarea" data-field-id="5"><label class="wpforms-field-label" for="wpforms-25798-field_5">Previously Published Work</label><textarea id="wpforms-25798-field_5" class="wpforms-field-large" name="wpforms[fields][5]" aria-errormessage="wpforms-25798-field_5-error" aria-describedby="wpforms-25798-field_5-description" ></textarea><div id="wpforms-25798-field_5-description" class="wpforms-field-description">Let us know if you have previously published elsewhere. </div></div></div><!-- .wpforms-field-container --><div class="wpforms-submit-container" ><input type="hidden" name="wpforms[id]" value="25798"><input type="hidden" name="page_title" value="UK"><input type="hidden" name="page_url" value="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/uk/feed/"><input type="hidden" name="url_referer" value=""><button type="submit" name="wpforms[submit]" id="wpforms-submit-25798" class="wpforms-submit" data-alt-text="Sending..." data-submit-text="Submit" aria-live="assertive" value="wpforms-submit">Submit</button><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" src="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/plugins/wpforms-lite/assets/images/submit-spin.svg" class="wpforms-submit-spinner" style="display: none;" width="26" height="26" alt="Loading"></div></form></div>  <!-- .wpforms-container --></h2>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-fledgling-nuclear-deterrence/">NATO’s Fledgling Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/natos-fledgling-nuclear-deterrence/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Is Trump Right About Europe?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-trump-right-about-europe/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-trump-right-about-europe/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amit Gupta]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 05 Mar 2024 14:07:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[British]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[French]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[GDP]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Greece]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Italy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear Rubicon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[partner nations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Poland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sweden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UN]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27324</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Former President Donald Trump’s views on Europe are consistent. He has long criticized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states for their failure to spend the required 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. For Trump, free riding is anathema. He recently said he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want” [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-trump-right-about-europe/">Is Trump Right About Europe?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Former President Donald Trump’s views on Europe are consistent. He has long criticized North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states for their failure to spend the required 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. For Trump, free riding is anathema. He recently said <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/feb/15/trump-russia-attack-nato-campaign-biden">he would encourage Russia</a> to do “whatever the hell they want” to any NATO member country that does not meet spending guidelines on defense. As the former president put it, “NATO was busted until I came along.” He added, “I said, ‘Everybody’s gonna pay.’ They said, ‘Well, if we don’t pay, are you still going to protect us?’ I said, ‘Absolutely not.’ They couldn’t believe the answer.”</p>
<p>In Washington policy and political circles, the former President’s comments are met with both shock and disdain. The familiar tropes about the indispensability of the Western alliance and the civilizational connection with Europe are trotted out to defend NATO. In the Pentagon, there is even an optimistic belief that Europe is the security partner of future expeditionary missions around the world.</p>
<p>While Trump may talk like a shock jock, what he says about NATO and Europe hold true. Unless some tough love is imposed on the Europeans, American taxpayers will foot Europe’s security bill indefinitely. What Europe needs to understand is that America is changing, and with it Europe’s free pass is getting rescinded.</p>
<p><strong>The Demographic Transition</strong></p>
<p>One reason the Trans-Atlantic political and military alliance will change is the demographic transition in both the United States and Europe. In the US, by about 2045, citizens not of European extraction become a slim majority. Surveys of the next generation show that the affinity for Europe and with traditional American foreign policy imperatives is shrinking. The younger generation’s position on the Palestine-Israel conflict is a case in point. Latinos, Asians, and black Americans do not have emotional ties to Europe. They are, therefore, less inclined to tolerate and support the subsidizing of European defense efforts.</p>
<p>Instead, much like Trump, they will call on Europe to pay its bills. Europe, however, cannot pay those bills since it is an aging society with a large welfare state. As <strong>Table 1</strong> shows, major European societies are rapidly aging. Not only that, but their median age is also going to rise to the extent that they will have a hard time fielding women and men of a fighting age.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Table 1</strong></p>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="89"><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td width="89"><strong>Population 2020 (millions)</strong></td>
<td width="89"><strong>Population 2030 (millions)</strong></td>
<td width="89"><strong>Population 2050 (millions)</strong></td>
<td width="89"><strong>Median Age 2020</strong></td>
<td width="89"><strong>Median Age 2030</strong></td>
<td width="89"><strong>Median Age 2050</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">United Kingdom</td>
<td width="89">67.8</td>
<td width="89">70.4</td>
<td width="89">74.08</td>
<td width="89">40.5</td>
<td width="89">42.4</td>
<td width="89">44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">France</td>
<td width="89">65.2</td>
<td width="89">66.6</td>
<td width="89">67.5</td>
<td width="89">42.3</td>
<td width="89">44.1</td>
<td width="89">45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">Germany</td>
<td width="89">83.7</td>
<td width="89">83.1</td>
<td width="89">80.1</td>
<td width="89">45.7</td>
<td width="89">47</td>
<td width="89">49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">Greece</td>
<td width="89">10.4</td>
<td width="89">9.9</td>
<td width="89">9.02</td>
<td width="89">45.6</td>
<td width="89">49.8</td>
<td width="89">53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">Italy</td>
<td width="89">60.4</td>
<td width="89">59.03</td>
<td width="89">54.3</td>
<td width="89">47.3</td>
<td width="89">50.8</td>
<td width="89">53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">Portugal</td>
<td width="89">10.2</td>
<td width="89">9.91</td>
<td width="89">9.08</td>
<td width="89">46.2</td>
<td width="89">49.8</td>
<td width="89">52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">Spain</td>
<td width="89">46.7</td>
<td width="89">46.2</td>
<td width="89">43.6</td>
<td width="89">44.9</td>
<td width="89">49.6</td>
<td width="89">53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">Sweden</td>
<td width="89">10.09</td>
<td width="89">10.6</td>
<td width="89">11.3</td>
<td width="89">41.1</td>
<td width="89">42.2</td>
<td width="89">43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="89">Turkey</td>
<td width="89">84.3</td>
<td width="89">89.1</td>
<td width="89">97.1</td>
<td width="89">31.6</td>
<td width="89">35</td>
<td width="89">41.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>Source:  Data retrieved from UN Population Revision 2019. </em>(<em>These numbers do not account for the recent population transfer from Ukraine to Russia or to the millions of Ukrainian refugees now in other parts of Europe who are unlikely to return.</em>)</p>
<p>These numbers paint a bleak future. The nations listed above have the largest and most capable armed forces among NATO. In short, they all have greying populations and, by 2030, except for Turkey, will have a median age that is greater than 40. Italy, for example, is in serious demographic trouble with a median age of 50.8. Spain and Greece also have a median age of nearly 50. Worse, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain are all going to see a major decline in their populations. The priority of these countries is focused on meeting the social needs of their populations—something which is very expensive and can only come at the cost of reduced defense expenditure.</p>
<p>The other big problem for the Europeans is finding people who are willing to join the armed forces. After the Cold War, most European countries eliminated conscription. Reintroducing it would be political suicide for even the most conservative politician. Thus, while German Prime Minister Olof Schulz has committed 100 billion euros to defense modernization, he cannot realistically bring about force expansion without bringing back conscription. Further, 100 billion euros are not primarily going to buy more weapons but, instead, refurbish and modernize the existing force, much of which is mothballed.</p>
<p>The fact that the European nations lack manpower and the fact that rebuilding the forces will be expensive leads to the modest size of the militaries of the major NATO countries (as shown in Table 2). The question then arises, how many troops and weapons can these nations realistically field in modern combat? The answer is very few as these countries are likely to be casualty averse given their shrinking and aging demographics.</p>
<p><strong>Table 2: Cuts in Force Levels of Major European Nations</strong></p>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="100"><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td width="91"><strong>Army 1972</strong></td>
<td width="91"><strong>Army 2017</strong></td>
<td width="77"><strong>Army 2023</strong></td>
<td width="94"><strong>Aircraft 1972</strong></td>
<td width="94"><strong>Aircraft 2017</strong></td>
<td width="75"><strong>Aircraft 2023</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="100">United Kingdom</td>
<td width="91">180,458</td>
<td width="91">85,600</td>
<td width="77">79,350</td>
<td width="94">500</td>
<td width="94">254</td>
<td width="75">201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="100">France</td>
<td width="91">328,000</td>
<td width="91">111,650</td>
<td width="77">114,000</td>
<td width="94">500</td>
<td width="94">281</td>
<td width="75">261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="100">Germany</td>
<td width="91">327,000</td>
<td width="91">111,650</td>
<td width="77">62,950</td>
<td width="94">459</td>
<td width="94">235</td>
<td width="75">226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="100">Italy</td>
<td width="91">306,000</td>
<td width="91">102,200</td>
<td width="77">93,100</td>
<td width="94">320</td>
<td width="94">244</td>
<td width="75">231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p><em>Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, and 2023 editions.</em></p>
<p><strong>The Two Percent Myth</strong></p>
<p>The other myth that Europe must stop hyping is that of how these countries are going to reach 2 percent of GDP in their defense spending. A remilitarization of Europe would require the Germans to cross the 2 percent threshold, but, by the end of 2022, the German government was admitting that it is unlikely to raise defense expenditure to 2 percent of GDP.</p>
<p><strong>Table 3: NATO Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 2023 </strong></p>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="312"><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td width="312"><strong>Percentage of GDP Spent on Defense</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">France</td>
<td width="312">1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">Germany</td>
<td width="312">1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">Greece</td>
<td width="312">3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">Italy</td>
<td width="312">1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">Netherlands</td>
<td width="312">1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">Spain</td>
<td width="312">1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">Turkey</td>
<td width="312">1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">United Kingdom</td>
<td width="312">2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="312">United States</td>
<td width="312">3.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Source: <em>Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries</em> (2014–2023), <em>NATO Communique</em>, July 7, 2023.</p>
<p><strong>            </strong>The news is not all bad. Those NATO member-states who most fear Russia, or, in the cases of Greece and Turkey, are spending the required 2 percent of GDP on defense. However, except for the United Kingdom, the further geographically from Russia a NATO member-state gets, the less the country spends on defense.</p>
<p><strong>Table 4: NATO Nations Spending Two Percent of GDP on Defense</strong></p>
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="216"><strong>Country </strong></td>
<td width="220"><strong>Percentage of GDP on Defense 2022</strong></td>
<td width="187"><strong>Estimated Percentage of GDP 2023</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">Estonia</td>
<td width="220">2.28</td>
<td width="187">2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">Greece</td>
<td width="220">3.82</td>
<td width="187">3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">Latvia</td>
<td width="220">2.27</td>
<td width="187">2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">Lithuania</td>
<td width="220">2.03</td>
<td width="187">2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">Poland</td>
<td width="220">2.1</td>
<td width="187">3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">Romania</td>
<td width="220">2.02</td>
<td width="187">2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">United Kingdom</td>
<td width="220">2.29</td>
<td width="187">2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">United States</td>
<td width="220">3.52</td>
<td width="187">3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="216">Finland (new member 2023)</td>
<td width="220">n/a</td>
<td width="187">2.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Source: <em>Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries</em> (2014–2023), <em>NATO Communique</em>, July 7, 2023.</p>
<p>With only a third of NATO member-states contributing 2 percent of GDP, it begs the question to what end? Estonia, for example, has a population is 1.3 million. Is 2 percent of Estonia’s small GDP a meaningful contribution to the Continent’s collective defense? Latvia, similarly, has 1.9 million citizens. Lithuania has 2.79 million citizens. In practical terms, this means that for credible militarization the rich and populous states of Europe need to reach a similar level of defense expenditures.</p>
<p>Most NATO nations intend to raise their defense expenditure to 2 percent by 2026. Italy and Spain expect to reach it by 2028 and 2029, respectively. This is, however, a medium-term projection which does not consider the state of the economy. Neither does it explain where funding will come from. The social democracies of Europe are unlikely to agree to a transfer of resources from social welfare programs to defense expenditures. In fact, with rapidly aging populations the cost of elderly care will grow.</p>
<p>The other alternative, raising taxes, is unpopular in European societies, which already carry a heavy individual tax burden. Further, in some countries, notably Britain, the prevailing mood is to cut taxes, making it unfeasible to ask the citizenry to agree to a tax increase to fund defense expenditures. The question arises, therefore, where will the money come from to pay for new weapons, the development of a defense infrastructure, and the intake of more troops to boost larger military formations?</p>
<p><strong>A European Nuclear Deterrent</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>One way out is for Europe to field a Euro-centric nuclear umbrella. Talk is already ongoing as some suggest the French nuclear force transform into one requiring joint authority to permit employment. The British nuclear force, since 1962, has been committed to the protection of NATO members.</p>
<p>One way to achieve this integration painlessly would be to state which missions fell under the purview of the French or British nuclear authority and which would be covered by the joint command. Thus, a French decision to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response to a 9/11-style terror attack, for example, would be the country’s sovereign right while a Russian assault would fall under the category of a jointly authorized strike. NATO member states would contribute to the cost of maintaining and fielding the force—perhaps increasing its size and capability.</p>
<p>One can also speculate on whether other NATO states may decide to cross the nuclear Rubicon given the changed security environment on the continent. Sweden and Poland would certainly fall into this category given their fears of Russian expansionism. If this happens, it is well within the scope of nonproliferation laws since countries are allowed to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty if their core security interests are threatened (The problem for the US, however, is how to prevent non-Western states from taking a similar step).</p>
<p>While this may compensate for the inability to field adequate forces it would certainly meet with considerable opposition from the peace groups in Europe and the general population which is wary of nuclearization.   Which then brings the issue back to the need for conventional militarization.</p>
<p>Fielding capable militaries that can defend Europe and project power in alliance with the United States requires NATO member-states to make hard choices about spending and compulsory military service. For the reasons cited above that is unlikely. For the United States, therefore, the best course of action is to redefine its commitment to Europe and let the continent make the diplomatic and political compromises needed to bring about regional stability.</p>
<p>For those in the Pentagon who think Europe is a partner to help maintain global security, it is time to look for new security alliances. The evidence is clear. Europe has neither the funds nor the manpower to be a partner of the United States.</p>
<p><em>Amit Gupta was on the faculty of the USAF Air War College and is now a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this piece are his. He may be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Why-Trump-is-Right-About-Europe.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-trump-right-about-europe/">Is Trump Right About Europe?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-trump-right-about-europe/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Atchison]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jan 2024 13:07:40 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Space Deterrence & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ASAT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[five eyes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Royal Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=26805</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is acknowledged as the global leader in both military and commercial space. Today’s geopolitical landscape is multipolar due to the rise of China as a potential rival to American space dominance. While the US maintains strong alliances, China has few allies it can use to achieve its aims. Instead, China resorts to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/">Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is acknowledged as the global leader in both military and commercial space. Today’s geopolitical landscape is multipolar due to the rise of China as a potential rival to American space dominance. While the US maintains strong alliances, China has few allies it can use to achieve its aims. Instead, China resorts to coercion to achieve its terrestrial and space objectives. For the US to deter threats more effectively in space, in the long term, it must integrate like-minded nations to share the deterrence burden.</p>
<p>Today we see America’s allies supporting the fundamental rights of access to space and its derived services. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-push-for-landmark-un-resolution-to-agree-responsible-behaviour-in-space#:~:text=The%20UK%20is%20leading%20the,that%20could%20have%20catastrophic%20consequences.">United Kingdom</a> (UK) leads work in the United Nations to create a space norms of behavior mandate that will enable the UN to hold irresponsible nations accountable for their behavior. Holding nations accountable is vital. <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-03/features/russias-anti-satellite-weapons-asymmetric-response-us-aerospace-superiority">Russia</a> and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/saltzman-chinas-asat-test-was-pivot-point-in-space-operations/">China</a> are deploying anti-satellite (ASAT) and direct energy weapons (DEW) that can target commercial and military space infrastructure. The <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/22/2002942522/-1/-1/0/CSPO-VISION-2031.PDF">Combined Space Operations</a> (CSPO) Vision’s role is to develop and share a common understanding of military space operations and policy. It is a critical framework that serves as a foundation for such allied enforcement mechanisms. It recently expanded to include Italy, Japan, and Norway.</p>
<p>These new initiatives are not just a good idea, they are threat driven and a reaction to adversarial space activity that threatens allied space infrastructure. ASAT deployments and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) by China and Russia are of concern and the aggressor nations must be held to account—through strong allied military and political efforts. Attempts to reduce the risk of misunderstandings on orbit are also of paramount importance, because the United States does not want a Cuban Missile Crisis in space.</p>
<p>UK Space Command was created in April 2021 to act as the single UK military voice in allied enforcement efforts, and rather than duplicating American capabilities UK Space Command seeks to supplement American systems by enhancing resilience. This can be multifaceted. It can include the addition of novel sensors as well as increasing satellite communication capacity. CSPO members also provide capabilities that increase resilience and operational effectiveness. A few examples are instructive.</p>
<p>First, the UK and US share <a href="https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/celebrating-60-years-of-raf-fylingdales/">Royal Air Force (RAF) Base Fylingdales</a> in Yorkshire. This base combines missile warning and space surveillance at one place. In addition, RAF space operators and planners have been leveraged in numerous command-and-control facilities worldwide, including US Space Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The UK is a leader in providing satellite communications’ capabilities to NATO through the SKYNET constellation.</p>
<p>Second, Australia, like the UK, has a <a href="https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BriefingBook47p/OngoingMilitarisationSpace#:~:text=Australia%27s%20decision%20to%20establish%20the,%2C%20Sputnik%20I%2C%20in%201957.">Defence Space Command</a> and a civilian space agency working in unison. This civilian and military relationship ensures that if an adversary were to attack a commercial satellite the military could act to defend it. Australia has gone further to align itself to American space deterrence and warfighting capabilities by declaring possession of <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2023/03/aussie-space-command-looks-to-electronic-warfare-other-tech-to-deter-attacks-on-satellites/">offensive space control</a> capabilities. These capabilities are important to maintain credibility in the minds of adversaries. China maintains an “attack to deter” mindset, and without such capabilities the credibility of extended deterrence in space is lost.</p>
<p>Third, Canada contributes additional space situation awareness (SSA) capabilities, an example being their Sapphire satellite which feeds into several US and allied SSA systems. As is the case with the UK and Australia, Canada also contributes skilled space professionals to American and allied space commands, staffs, and space robotic systems to enhance resiliency in the face of threats in, from, and to space.</p>
<p>In addition to the “Five Eyes” partnership, NATO is a vital organization for deterrence in space and on earth. Article 5, and the commitment to collective defence, is one of the most potent forms of deterrence in place in any military alliance around the world and is applicable to elements of space infrastructure. To enhance NATO’s operational support to deterrence capabilities it established the <a href="https://www.space-coe.org/">NATO Space Centre of Excellence</a> in France and the NATO <a href="https://ac.nato.int/missions/we-coordinate-nato-space-matters">Space Operations Centre</a> in Germany. These initial steps enable NATO military commanders and political leaders to deter attacks on the critical space systems that enable successful terrestrial operations. For NATO to deter it must act upon the call for defensive capabilities and communicate coherently about rising threats. Failure to do so will erode the alliance’s unified front and therefore its credibility.</p>
<p>Deterrence in space is hard but by integrating the evolving capabilities of allies at a greater depth deterrence can be achieved not only in space but across all domains. The rise of allied space commands, capability integration, and enhancements of resiliency will only grow in importance as space expands its reach into the day to day lives of our peoples and societies.</p>
<p><em>Major Robert Atchison QRH is a British Army officer who serves as the Military Assistant to Commander of UK Space Command.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/The-Importance-of-Allied-Contributions-for-Combined-Space-Operations-and-Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/">Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/allied-contributions-for-combined-space-operations-and-deterrence/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
