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		<title>Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/making-nuclear-blackmail-great-again/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2025 12:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31702</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>After World War I, the United States and its allies sought arms control solutions to what were political problems. Proposals such as a ban on war and restrictions on the size of naval vessels and army divisions were adopted. These efforts came to naught by 1936, when Germany began its aggressive march across Europe. After [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/making-nuclear-blackmail-great-again/">Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After World War I, the United States and its allies sought arms control solutions to what were political problems. Proposals such as a ban on war and restrictions on the size of naval vessels and army divisions were adopted. These efforts came to naught by 1936, when Germany began its aggressive march across Europe.</p>
<p>After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.</p>
<p>It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.</p>
<p>Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.</p>
<p>Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.</p>
<p>To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.</p>
<p>The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.</p>
<p>Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.</p>
<p>Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.</p>
<p>A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.</p>
<p>An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.</p>
<p>The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.</p>
<p>The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”</p>
<p>Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Making-Nuclear-Coercion-and-Blackmail-Great-Again.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="263" height="73" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 263px) 100vw, 263px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/making-nuclear-blackmail-great-again/">Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report &#8211; Summary for October 25th</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-summary-for-october-25th/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-summary-for-october-25th/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Oct 2024 12:08:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[No First Use Policy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear threats]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29244</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM EAR Summary for the Week of October 25th, 2024 Key Essays: Extended Deterrence and No First Use Policy: The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Nihon Hidankyo, emphasizing nuclear abolition. The U.S. policy of extended deterrence involves the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, biological, or chemical attacks.​ The Biden administration [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-summary-for-october-25th/">ICBM EAR Report &#8211; Summary for October 25th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM EAR Summary for the Week of October 25th, 2024</strong></p>
<p><strong>Key Essays:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Extended Deterrence and No First Use Policy</strong>:
<ul>
<li>The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Nihon Hidankyo, emphasizing nuclear abolition.</li>
<li>The U.S. policy of extended deterrence involves the potential use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional, biological, or chemical attacks.​</li>
<li>The Biden administration considered a &#8220;No First Use&#8221; policy, which could undermine the U.S. extended deterrent strategy.​</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Nuclear Security Challenges</strong>:
<ul>
<li>The U.S. faces nuclear threats from China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.</li>
<li>Significant investments in both conventional and nuclear forces are necessary.​</li>
<li>The U.S. must address the coordinated campaign of unrestricted warfare by these nations.​</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Cost of Nuclear Modernization</strong>:
<ul>
<li>The U.S. plans to spend $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years on nuclear deterrence.​</li>
<li>Modernization is essential to replace aging systems like the MMIII ICBMs, B52 and B2 bombers, and Ohio-class submarines.​</li>
<li>The annual cost of modernization is around $19 billion, which is 3.5% of the current defense budget.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong><em><u>“President Zelenskyy</u></em></strong> says Ukraine expects N. Korean troops to be deployed in battlefield in few days” and also sees the choice between joining NATO or going nuclear.</li>
<li><strong>Congressman Don Bacon</strong>: Emphasized the need to strengthen U.S. nuclear command and control due to the Russia-China alliance.​</li>
<li><strong>Sen. Mike Rounds</strong>: Highlighted the importance of preparing for the B-21 stealth bomber at Ellsworth AFB.​</li>
<li><strong>Noah Robertson</strong>: Reported on China&#8217;s rapid nuclear arsenal expansion.​</li>
<li><strong>Wang Zhen</strong>: Criticized the U.S. for misrepresenting China&#8217;s nuclear development.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Strategic Developments:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Iran&#8217;s Nuclear Ambitions</strong>: Some essays support Iran acquiring nuclear weapons to establish deterrence against the U.S. and Israel.</li>
<li><strong>China&#8217;s Nuclear Strategy</strong>: China maintains a minimum deterrent strategy and proposes a &#8220;No First Use&#8221; treaty.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Budget Comparisons:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Medicaid Costs</strong>: The cost of Medicaid to illegal aliens over three years is $16.2 billion, nearly equal to the annual cost of U.S. nuclear modernization platforms for FY25 ($16.4 billion).​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Important Commentary:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>AEI Essay</strong>: Urges the next U.S. president to address the aging nuclear arsenal and consider stop-gap measures to mitigate long-term issues.​</li>
<li><strong>Chinese Disarmament Stance</strong>: China calls for the U.S. to stop misrepresenting its nuclear policy and emphasizes its no-first-use stance.​</li>
</ul>
<p>To read the report visit the Global Security Review <a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ICBM-EAR-October-25th.pdf">ICBM EAR report</a>.</p>
<p>​</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-summary-for-october-25th/">ICBM EAR Report &#8211; Summary for October 25th</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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