In an age of persistent great power competition, the fight for influence is the decisive precursor to any potential conflict. Adversaries like Iran, who cannot compete symmetrically with the U.S., have poured resources into the information domain, recognizing it as the critical battlespace. As detailed in “In an Asymmetrical War, Iran Seeks an Edge With Its Information War,” Iran is waging a sophisticated offensive to win the war of perception first, shaping the cognitive battlefield to paralyze U.S. decision-making. This poses a direct challenge to the U.S. Department of War’s core focus on “maximum lethality,” as outlined in the 2026 National Defense Strategy. That goal, however, is unachievable if the information battlespace is lost. Cognitive dominance in the operational information environment is not a distraction from lethality; it is the fundamental prerequisite for it. To win, the joint forces must complement their pursuit of kinetic overmatch with a mastery of the cognitive domain. 

Iran’s gray zone strategy, a mix of proxy warfare and calibrated escalation detailed in analyses by CSIS and Michael Eisenstadt, is designed to create dilemmas and exploit the seams in Western military thought. The U.S. response was to elevate “Information” to a joint function, a critical doctrinal step. But as then-Brigadier General Grynkewich noted when introducing the concept, doctrine-on-a-shelf changes nothing without a corresponding shift in the force’s “cultural mindsets.” The real work is building cognitive architecture to apply it. 

This is where a “Global Mindset,” defined by scholars in “A Whole New Global Mindset for Leadership” as “the capability to influence others unlike yourself,” becomes a warfighting imperative. This mindset is not an abstract virtue, but a tangible capability built on three pillars: (1) Intellectual Capital: The cognitive horsepower to understand the complex web of political, cultural, and social factors in a contested environment. (2) Psychological Capital: The resilience and fortitude to operate effectively in ambiguous, long-term struggles, countering an adversary’s “long game.” (3) Social Capital: The behavioral skill to build trust and show intercultural empathy, allowing for the creation of authentic partnerships and resonant counter-narratives. 

Yet, how do you build this mindset at scale? The answer lies in a structured, teachable framework. The Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model, a methodology developed at The Air University and Defense Information School. It was designed specifically to make the abstract actionable. It provides a repeatable process for planners to solve “wicked problems” in the information domain. Its five core elements are: 

(1) Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking: This foundational mindset shifts planners from linear predictable models to seeing the information environment as a dynamic ecosystem. It allows them to anticipate ripple effects and identify high-leverage nodes in an adversary’s network. 

(2) PESTLE and Ecosystem Analysis: Using a structured analysis of the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, and Environmental domains, this step builds the deep situational awareness required to uncover the root grievances an adversary like Iran exploits. 

(3) Cynefin Sensemaking Framework: This framework helps leaders correctly categorize the environment. The gray zone is a “Complex” domain, where the only effective approach is to “Probe-Sense-Respond,” in essence to conduct small-scale, reversible actions, see how the system reacts, and adapt accordingly. This neutralizes an adversary’s probing tactics and reduces the risk of miscalculation. 

(4) Wicked Solutions for Complex Problems: This approach is the engine for building social capital. It forces planners to see the problem from the diverse perspectives of all stakeholders, enabling the creation of sustainable, locally resonant strategies that can “flip the script” on an adversary’s propaganda. 

(5) Strategic Foresight: This element breaks Iran’s “long game” advantage by shifting the U.S. focus from short-term reactions to long-term competition, allowing planners to anticipate future conflict domains and build strategic patience. 

Defeating our adversaries in the gray zone is a cognitive, not purely a kinetic, challenge. To achieve the Department of War’s goal of decisive lethality, we must first win the war of ideas. The time has come for U.S. military leaders to stop treating information as a supporting effort and recognize it as the central battlefield in modern competition. This requires a deliberate, sustained investment in the intellectual and cultural readiness of our warfighters. We must integrate cognitive frameworks like the Olympus Mons model into professional military education and operational planning. This is not just about improving human decision-making today; it is about future-proofing our force. The structured, logic-based nature of this model is the most compatible framework for integration with the Information Advantage large language models that will define the next generation of warfare, allowing our warfighters to serve as the critical ‘human-in-the-loop’ for AI-enabled operations in the information environment. 

The character of conflict is evolving, but the core of American strength, the ingenuity and adaptability of its warfighters, remains unchanged. The next generation of warfare will not be won by military might and technology alone, but by those who can master the cognitive battlefield of the Operational Information Environment which includes the complex human terrain where influence is wielded and will is broken. Frameworks like the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model do not replace the warrior’s ethos; they sharpen it, forging leaders who can out-think, out-maneuver, and out-compete our adversaries in the war of ideas. Seizing this cognitive high ground is the ultimate expression of ‘peace through strength.’ The tools to build this future are within our grasp; what is required now is the vision and the will to forge the victory of tomorrow. 

Oshawn Jefferson is a national security professional and strategic communication expert with over two decades of experience in the U.S. military and academic sectors. He is the creator of the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model and a leading voice on developing cognitive readiness and a global mindset within the Joint Force. The views of the author are his own. 

Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

This issue is not new. In his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger made a controversial, yet analytically compelling, argument for the possible utility of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars. He warned that massive retaliation was neither credible nor effective for deterring limited aggression and that a rigid dichotomy between conventional and strategic nuclear responses risked inviting coercion at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. For Kissinger, introducing the possibility of limited nuclear use was not a call to war, but a recognition of strategic reality; the ability to escalate with restraint could deter adversaries from escalating first.

Fast forward to the 2030 scenarios modeled in Guardian Tiger I and II, and Kissinger’s insights remain disturbingly relevant. In the exercise, North Korea carried out a low-yield nuclear strike targeting South Korean naval vessels. American decision-makers, faced with the risk of horizontal escalation with China and the lack of consensus among allies, struggled to identify a proportional yet credible response. The idea of a retaliatory tactical nuclear strike was floated, but the simulated American leadership hesitated, reflecting both doctrinal ambiguity and an operational gap in American nuclear capabilities.

The risks of such hesitation are manifold. First, American restraint may be misinterpreted as indecision or weakness, particularly by allies like South Korea and Japan, who are directly exposed to North Korean and Chinese threats. Second, it creates an opening for adversaries to believe they can escalate to the nuclear level without inviting proportional retaliation. Third, it undermines the entire architecture of extended deterrence that underpins regional security.

Critics will rightly point out the perils of normalizing nuclear use. Introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a conflict zone invites moral hazards, increases the risk of miscalculation, and breaks long-standing nuclear taboos. It also challenges existing declaratory policies, such as the 2022 P5 Joint Statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But these arguments, while valid in principle, must be weighed against the operational reality that a low-yield nuclear strike by an adversary may not be deterred by threats of massive retaliation. As the Atlantic Council report noted, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine increasingly incorporates elements of pre-delegated authority, tactical nuclear use, and efforts toward a more survivable second-strike posture. If the United States signals that it will not respond proportionally to a limited nuclear attack, North Korea may calculate that it can use nuclear weapons to coerce the South or constrain American action without triggering regime-ending consequences.

Moreover, the credibility problem is not confined to North Korea. China, observing Washington’s reluctance to respond in kind, may also be emboldened to engage in horizontal escalation, confident that the United States’s nuclear threshold is politically—and perhaps operationally—immobile. This perception could unravel the strategic coherence of integrated deterrence.

To address these challenges, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Indo-Pacific Command should adopt a more robust approach across multiple dimensions. First, the United States should consider forward-deploying platforms capable of delivering low-yield nuclear weapons. This could include the reintroduction of dual-capable aircraft or sea-based assets positioned in or near the Korean Peninsula. Such deployments must be both survivable and possess the ability to clearly signal an adversary of will, while being fully integrated into bilateral operational planning with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Second, escalation options must be clarified through updates to American declaratory policy. This does not mean issuing public ultimatums or fixed thresholds but rather ensuring that adversaries understand the United States is willing to conduct proportional nuclear responses if deterrence fails. Strategic ambiguity must not become strategic paralysis.

Third, while the US and South Korea launched the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023 to enhance extended deterrence coordination, further institutionalization is needed. A structure modeled more closely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group would help deepen transparency, signal unity of purpose, and reduce the risk of fragmented responses during crises.

Fourth, both US and ROK forces must be equipped and trained to operate in the aftermath of a limited nuclear strike. This includes rehearsals and exercises focused on base survivability, radiological detection and decontamination, logistics continuity, and the resilience of command-and-control (C2) systems.

Fifth, strategic communication must be strengthened. Clear and consistent messaging to both adversaries and allies is critical. Deterrence depends not only on military capabilities, but also on the perceived credibility of those capabilities and the intentions behind them.

Ultimately, the goal of these measures is not to normalize the use of nuclear weapons, but to reinforce the threshold against their use by making deterrence more credible and responsive.

If that threshold is ever crossed and the United States fails to respond proportionately, the credibility of its extended deterrence architecture could unravel. The Guardian Tiger exercises highlight this grim possibility and should serve as a clarion call to action for policy and defense leaders alike.

As Kissinger warned in 1957, the danger of total war arises not so much from a deliberate decision to embark on it as from a series of actions which, though rational in themselves, cumulatively lead to disaster. The United States must ensure that its rational desire to avoid nuclear escalation does not lead to an irrational loss of deterrence. Tactical nuclear flexibility, responsibly exercised and credibly signaled, may be the painful but necessary insurance policy to uphold peace in East Asia.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

The Case for US Low-Yield Nuclear Options in Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

Missile flight time between both India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and decide to launch a retaliatory strike on warning.

In Pakistan, a high-ranking Pakistani military officer contacts Pakistan’s prime minister to tell him India has initiated a nuclear strike, and an immediate response is required. The prime minister immediately orders a counterstrike. Pakistan proceeds to counterstrike protocols.

Missiles begin crossing borders between India and Pakistan as the world hurtles towards a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. The world’s worst fears are realized. It is only later realized that the high-ranking Indian military officer’s message to an Indian commander was made by a nuclear command-and-control system embedded with generative artificial intelligence (AI).

The Role of Generative AI in Modern Warfare

The use of generative AI, which is best exemplified by ChatGPT, by an adversary, or third party, can impact deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. In a worst-case scenario, it could trigger a nuclear war, like the scene mentioned above. Should generative AI be embedded in nuclear command-and-control systems, it is theoretically possible that hyper-personalized messages, like the one described above, could be generated in a system that was not originally designed to allow such an outcome. The potential for a tailored message, for specific individuals, is possible.

Traditionally, content and information generation were based on human creativity. However, at present, generative artificial intelligence is being considered as a tool for digital transformation. Generative AI is a deep learning model which has the capability to generate synthetic media including text, video, and audio—dependent on training.

Perception Building and the Escalation of Crises

Generative AI can also play a distinctly different role in leading to nuclear crisis. In a deterrence framework, the development of a narrative and perception are crucial. Similarly, communication of deterrence threats is also achieved through perception-building of an adversary—concerning a state’s capabilities and credibility. In the specific case of India and Pakistan, India is creating misperceptions regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program. Recently, Pakistani Ambassador Munir Akram, at the United Nations Security Council’s high-level debate, stated that India is actively pursuing a state-led disinformation campaign to malign Pakistan.

He was referring to recent EU Disinfolab’s reports on how India is using fake nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, media outlets, and international organizations to malign Pakistan. Similarly, it is possible that India may use Generative AI to manipulate public opinion, thereby, creating misperceptions among Pakistan’s public. This could make the citizenry, as well as the government of both India and Pakistan, susceptible to separate facts from fiction—especially in a crisis situation. Hence, AI-driven narratives could push both countries to a crisis leading to warfighting.

Misinformation and Crisis Management Challenges in South Asia

Misinformation through generative AI can make crisis management and escalation dominance between India and Pakistan much more difficult. According to Heather Williams and Alexi Drew, Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder has transformed into a web across domains with multiple actors and alliances, especially in the age of social media. In South Asia, due to mated warheads and cannasterization of missiles by India, coupled with geographical contiguity with Pakistan, nuclear use may become ultimate escalation within minutes—without a ladder or a web. Social media could be a threat multiplier and can become lethal with the use of generative AI. Although, tweets are unlikely to independently start a crisis, tweets from government officials of India and Pakistan could be fabricated through utilizing hacking and generative AI to escalate an ongoing crisis.

Risks of Generative AI in Command-and-Control Systems

While Indian nuclear weapons may have an effective command and control where nuclear weapons have nuclear safety and security mechanisms, there was a “Brahmos missile crisis” in 2022. Inadvertent or accidental, the launch of a missile could trigger a reactionary strike by Pakistan as the missile is dual-capable. Furthermore, this fog of war could undermine strategic stability. As a Group Captain was blamed for the launch, many commanders like him, who may be capable of launching nuclear missiles, even on Indian nuclear submarines, could be manipulated via high-level orders created through generative AI.

False Flag Operations and Strategic Escalation

India has also opted for adventurism against Pakistan through its false flag operations and surgical strikes. Pakistan has adopted a conventional strategy of quid-pro-quo plus as a conventional response to such Indian limited strike. However, malicious false flag operations through disinformation and fake news by India to garner public support for electoral gains and domestic politics can result in crisis escalation in such a competitive strategic environment. It is due to mistrust within the adversarial relationship of India and Pakistan.

The Need for Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) in AI

There is a dire need for risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBM) between India and Pakistan in the domain of AI. However, the appetite for CBMs and dialogue on the Indian side is non-existent. India and Pakistan could establish bilateral AI incident reporting and mitigation centers to counter the use of AI as a tool for inducing false alarms and other escalatory actions. Furthermore, there is a need for India and Pakistan to further opt for unilateral AI security and regulation measures, especially for inter-organizational and inter-state strategic communications. If leading states like the United States, China, and Russia opt for an AI arms control agreement, less powerful states, including India and Pakistan, may be persuaded to follow suit. This will help establish a universal AI arms control regime regarding the use of AI for military purposes.

Generative AI and Deterrence Stability: A Scenario for De-escalation

It is the night of May 28, 2028, at India’s military command center. A high-ranking Indian military officer sends a message to a subordinate commander; Pakistan has initiated a preemptive strike. Prepare for a retaliatory strike. This is not a drill.

Flight time between India and Pakistan is a few minutes. Hence, commanders do not have time for verification and need to decide quickly whether to launch a retaliatory strike. He calls the command center to verify the message received.

India’s prime minister is contacted immediately concerning the message received by one of his commanders. He picks up the hotline to Pakistan’s prime minister and asks, “Have you launched nuclear weapons?”

Pakistan’s prime minister responds, “Not at all. This is fake!”

India’s prime minister informs the military command center. The crisis is averted, and nuclear weapons are not used.

Confidence-building measures, which were present in the second scenario, have the opportunity to change the outcome of a conflict. Given the potential for artificial intelligence to be used in nefarious ways, it is time to take action to avert such a crisis.

Ms. Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is also currently a Research Fellow at Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and a Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project led by Prof. Andrew Futter.

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Deterrence Stability between India and Pakistan was originally published on Global Security Review.