According to Reuters, the first point calls for “Ukraine’s sovereignty to be reconfirmed.” It does this by partitioning a sovereign state victimized by unprovoked aggression. Equally odd is the fact that the agreement would be signed by a regime in Moscow that does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state.

The second point suggests, “There will be a total and complete comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe.” However, such agreements were in force in 2014 when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his first invasion of Ukraine.

In 1994, Russia pledged to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.” In 1997, Russia signed a treaty with Ukraine pledging “mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, [and] the non-use of force or threat of force.” Russia violated all of these pledges.

The third point suggests “There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbors, and NATO will not expand further.” In addition to the 1994 and 1997 agreements, the United Nations Charter and Helsinki Final Act include the “expectation” that Russia does not invade its neighbors. Russia currently occupies parts of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) embraces an open-door policy. Any external limitation on this policy impinges upon NATO’s independence, encroaches on the sovereignty of 32 member-states, sentences NATO aspirants to Russian vassalage, and serves as a green light to further Russian aggression.

Putin and his defenders believe Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 because Ukraine wanted to join NATO, but they have it precisely backwards; Ukraine wanted to join NATO because Putin invaded in 2014. Sovereign nations seek NATO membership because they distrust Moscow and view NATO as the surest route to security in Europe.

The fourth point stipulates, “A dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States, will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment.” The US is a founding member of NATO—not a disinterested third party. To suggest the US could be a moderator between NATO’s chief adversary and NATO’s members is to undermine NATO’s unity.

The fifth point states, “Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees.” The guarantees are not robust by any reasonable definition of the term. They are limited and conditional.

To make matters worse, point six stipulates that, “The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be capped at 600,000.” This undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty. Given Russia’s size, capabilities, actions, and aims, agreeing to this would jeopardize Ukraine’s future security.

The seventh point requires that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to pass in its bylaws not to accept Ukraine at any point in the future.” Not only did Putin make these demands before his 2022 assault on Ukraine, but it is now known that this 28-point plan is based on Russian proposals.

The eighth point guarantees that “NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine.” This obliterates the notion of robust security guarantees and would leave Ukraine exposed to further Russian aggression. NATO members, if not NATO itself, will need to play a role in postwar Ukraine’s security.

The ninth point states that “European fighter-jets will be stationed in Poland.”
The use of “European” here, rather than “NATO,” raises further questions about the transatlantic bond, which has ensured deterrence in Europe since NATO’s founding. Are we to infer that US fighter-jets will not be stationed in Poland? They are there now on a rotational basis.

The tenth point states that American security guarantees are forfeit “if Ukraine invades Russia” or “fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg.” This is gratuitous. Ukraine did not invade Russia in 2014 or 2022. Ukraine’s incursions and missile-strikes in Russia are a response to Russian aggression.

The thirteenth point states that Russia will be “re-integrated into the global economy” and “invited back into the G8.” Russia was expelled from the G8 because it invaded Ukraine in 2014. It is important to remember that the G7 was founded as a club of wealthy, industrialized, free-market democracies. Yeltsin’s Russia was none of those when it was invited into the G7 in 1998. Putin’s Russia is none of those today.

The fifteenth point says, “A joint US-Russian security taskforce will be established to promote and enforce compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement.” Elevating Russia to the status of American security partner ignores the fact that Russia is the main threat to the security of Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Sidelining NATO from any role in postwar security shows a disregard for the transatlantic community, for NATO’s capabilities in peacekeeping operations, and for NATO’s postwar planning.

The drafters of the 28-point plan are oblivious of the fact that NATO has an entire command focused on security assistance and training for Ukraine and that the British army developed plans to lead a multinational force in Ukraine. Are they opposed to NATO playing those roles?

The seventeenth point stipulates that “The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation control treaties, including the START I Treaty. This is fine in theory, but Russia is in violation of numerous arms-control treaties that served as the foundation of post-Cold War stability and security in Europe.

The eighteenth point is particularly troublesome for Ukraine. It requires, “Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state.” In 1994, Ukraine surrendered its entire nuclear arsenal in exchange for Russia’s commitment to respect Ukraine’s “sovereignty” and “existing borders.” The free world’s failure to back up those words after Putin’s 2014 invasion not only set the stage for 2022, it crippled the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.

Russia’s war on Ukraine serves as an object lesson of the deterrent power of nuclear weapons—and the danger of not having them. Ukraine, South Korea, Poland, and others are pondering that lesson.

The twentieth point calls on Ukraine and Russia to “commit to education programs in schools and throughout their society that promote the understanding and tolerance of different cultures” and for “all Nazi ideology…renounced and forbidden.” Of course, Putin has pushed the lie that Ukraine is “not a real country,” that Ukraine was “entirely created by Russia,” and that Ukraine is governed by “a gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis.” The irony about “Nazi ideology” is that by concocting phantom enemies, rewriting history, trying to rebuild a dead empire, and waging aggressive war, Putin is the one who is imitating the Nazis.

The twenty-first point recognizes Russian control over the territories it currently occupies; requires Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their own territory, which “they currently control;” and calls for that territory to be turned into a “demilitarized buffer zone.”

The twenty-second point calls on Russia and Ukraine “not to change these arrangements by force.” Force is the only language Putin understands. He has employed military force in Ukraine and Georgia and is probing NATO with drone attacks and sabotage operations.

The twenty-third point stipulates that “Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnieper River.” This underscores the perverse nature of this document. Russia should have no role, no say, and no ability to obstruct Ukraine’s use of the hundreds of miles of the Dnieper River that run through the heart of Ukraine.

The twenty-fourth point establishes “a humanitarian committee” to deal with issues related to prisoners, hostages, and “family reunification.” Such initiatives are only necessary because Russia abducted Ukrainian children; imprisoned Ukrainian civilians in “filtration camps;” and forcibly transferred thousands of Ukrainians to Russia.

Point twenty-five demands that Ukraine hold elections within 100 days. This echoes Putin’s talking points. The only way Ukraine and its NATO partners should agree to this is if Russia also holds OSCE-monitored elections within 100 days.

The twenty-sixth point declares that “All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions.” This is another bonus for bad behavior. There would be no need for amnesty were it not for Putin’s war crimes.

The first of these crimes is the very way the war started; the 2014 assault on Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine constitute a war of aggression. However, that was only the beginning of Putin’s war crimes, which include targeting hospitals, population centers, and energy, food, and water supplies; destroying schools and places of worship; torturing and massacring civilians; and conducting a campaign of sexual violence.

Point twenty-seven declares the agreement will be “monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, chaired by President Donald J. Trump.” The president of the United States has plenty of responsibilities to occupy his attention. Proconsul of postwar Ukraine should not be added to that list.

Finally, point twenty-eight calls for a ceasefire once the parties agree to the plan. The good news is that the plan presented by Washington is a dead letter. The better news is that European leaders used it as a starting point for a peace initiative that focuses on Ukraine’s sovereignty, Europe’s security, and NATO’s unity. Let’s hope a US-Europe compromise plan will emerge that brings Ukraine a step closer to an endpoint all people of goodwill can agree on, a sovereign and secure Ukraine in a stable and peaceful Europe.

Alan Dowd is director of the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.  Views expressed are his own. 

Points, Counterpoints, and Starting Points was originally published on Global Security Review.

After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.

It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.

Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.

Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.

To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.

The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.

Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.

Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.

A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.

An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.

The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.

The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”

Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. 

Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As Winston Churchill famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.

Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.

Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.

First Things First

American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.

The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.

Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance

A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.

The Cold War’s doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. China’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.

Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.

Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation

Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.

The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.”

Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “adversaries exploit perceived gaps in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”

The Risks of a Passive Posture

Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.

Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized, with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. China is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons with growing missile survivability and regional reach.

Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.

By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.

Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.

Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive

Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by credible deterrence.

The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”

Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment

The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.

A 2023 RAND study found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within NATO, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.

Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity

Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.

National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.

Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check

Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.

In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.

The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.

Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.

The Real Existential Threats

Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.

Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.

Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership

Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.

The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.

American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet empire, subsequent defense cuts and the failure to sustain and enhance the American nuclear deterrent left the United States facing the prospect of two nuclear-armed peers in Russia and China, with combined nuclear arsenals approaching some 10,000 nuclear weapons—well beyond the size and capability of the American arsenal.

Behind this reversal in nuclear arms reductions lies a set of assumptions reflected in recent American nuclear posture reviews and nuclear policy that assumed nuclear reductions and restraint would be permanent and positive. For example, the recent Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States’ straightforward America’s Strategic Posture highlights differences in “understandings of the threats” with the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

The 2022 NPR assumed greater cooperation between Russia, China, and the United States in addressing nuclear matters, especially preventing terror organizations and sponsoring states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moscow, however, regularly violates arms treaties. China has never signed a bilateral nuclear arms agreement with the US.

With analysts projecting Russia and China will field approximately 10,000 theater and strategic nuclear weapons by 2035–2045, a significant reversal of events is taking place that is unavoidable. A chronological look at arms treaties from 1967–2010 reveals whether American assumptions about arms control stood the test of time, particularly with respect to the lasting import of such deals and effects on American security requirements. In that context, examining the implications of American arms control agreements is instructive.

First, the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives assumed that American restraint in nuclear forces and deployments would lead to the restrain of other nuclear powers. This assumption was incorrect.

Second, the critics of START I and II and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) assumed that the Reagan nuclear build-up would trigger a similar Soviet effort and limit any deal on nuclear weapons reductions. While Gorbachev initially increased SS-20 missile deployments, increased troops in Afghanistan, walked out of the arms talks over opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and increased assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua, Reagan eventually prevailed. Peace through strength worked, contrary to the opinion of disarmament advocates.

Third, opponents of proliferation see the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a guarantor of sharply limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, when in fact NPT members China and Russia hid their rogue behavior and facilitated the spread of nuclear programs to Pakistan and North Korea and thus consequently to Iran, Libya, Syria, and possibly Iraq.

Fourth, arms control advocates blame the United States for North Korean, Syrian, and Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. This blame is neither supported by facts nor a firm understanding of the security dynamics at play for each of these countries.

Fifth, because nuclear modernization often requires concomitant nuclear arms control efforts (New START ratification for nuclear modernization) to maintain support from Congress and the White House, an adversary can refuse to enter arms control agreements as a means of compromising American nuclear modernization. Constant efforts to stall modernization would leave the United States in an increasingly weak position.

Sixth, the START II process underscored Soviet efforts to kill any American ballistic missile defenses. Such efforts were supported by the arms control community. Russian President Vladimir Putin also continues to push for termination of missile defenses, which are now a central component of integrated deterrence.

Seventh, while New START achieved modest reductions from the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), the pursuit of still lower numbers as part of seeking abolition or “global zero” is likely to reach a point where strategic stability fails. A world without nuclear weapons is a world once again safe for great-power conventional wars.

Eighth, the 1999 Russian Duma’s rejection of the START II arms control treaty and the ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) is consistent with the findings of the Strategic Posture Commission, which clearly laid out Russia’s willingness to use nuclear coercion. For the arms control community, this potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia was dismissed—again proving how wrong disarmament advocates were.

For American deterrence to reflect the lessons above, it is also necessary for the United States to jettison bad thinking that still undermines deterrence effectiveness. Many arms control advocates believe conventional arms are sufficient to retaliate against an enemy’s nuclear strike, which would allow the United States to adopt a minimum deterrent of just a few hundred nuclear weapons.

A corollary to this thinking is the view that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence, rather than warfighting. This view undermines the credibility of deterrence by undermining American seriousness in the eyes of an adversary. Absent a willingness to fight, deterrence is not credible.

Similarly detrimental to credibility is the idea that on-alert nuclear forces are destabilizing. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the fact that nuclear forces are on-alert that makes them a less attractive target—improving deterrence credibility.

As the Strategic Posture Commission explained, China and Russia see nuclear weapons not just as a deterrent to prevent aggression, but as weapons for theater blackmail and coercion to allow aggression to succeed and keep the United States from supporting Ukraine and Taiwan.

Americans must understand that arms control efforts between the United States and adversaries is no solution for strategic stability. Arms control just for its own sake is foolish. Its utility is only in advancing American interests.

Given the current breathtaking modernization and expansion of Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals, in conjunction with their near-alliance, Americans must carefully weigh whether any arms control proposal advances American interests.

Deterrence at the strategic level remains robust since no power has the ability to launch a disarming strike. Theater-level deterrence is much weaker, with the United States at a distinct disadvantage.

For the foreseeable future, arms control has no realistic prospects. It is even difficult to argue that nonproliferation efforts are worthwhile since the United States may need the assistance of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan to stabilize tension in East Asia and prevent North Korean or Chinese aggression.

Instead, the United States should press forward with modernization of the strategic nuclear triad, while also looking at ways to expand theater nuclear capabilities. Rightsizing the arsenal and developing effective ballistic missile defenses are a must. Rejecting wrong-headed ideas that impede these initiatives is also necessary.

Finally, Congress must pass a defense budget on time. Over the past four decades, defense appropriations passed on time only four times. Bipartisan budget reform measures sought by the House Budget Committee will hopefully address the issue and none too soon. There is too much riding on it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary and former submarine technothriller author now researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. Views expressed by the authors in this article are their own. 

The Problem with Arms Control Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the Minuteman III ICBM fleet now 50 years old and 35 years beyond its planned service life, there is no option but to build a new ICBM. Although Northrup Grumman, the prime contractor on the Sentinel program, made a good faith effort to estimate the cost of building a new missile and retrofitting Minuteman III launch control centers and launch facilities with the new hardware required for the new missile, no company has engaged in this kind of activity in five decades.

Thus, in many respects, any estimate of costs can be no more than a ballpark estimate at best. Think about it. Have you ever tried to do a home improvement project for the very first time and it went exactly as you planned—without a hitch? Of course not. What about those home improvement shows where the contractor always finds something hidden behind the drywall that sends the remodel cost way up? Doing something once every 50 years with a workforce that has zero experience with such a project is a recipe for cost overruns.

This is the choice the nation made and must live with. It is hypocritical of arms control advocates to charge that Sentinel’s cost overruns mean the program should be cancelled. If they applied that same logic to all government programs, we would also kill Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and student loans. In fact, we would kill just about every federal program ever funded. Almost all estimates of government programs are wrong—and wildly wrong.

Instead, we must deal with a reality that leaves the United States little choice but to move forward because the strategic environment is rapidly deteriorating, and no amount of optimism and idealism will change that fact. It is time reality overrides aspirations.

The facts are simple. Russia already has a superior arsenal to the United States and maintains a capacity to produce about 1,000 new nuclear weapons every year. And with Russia no longer bound by the New START treaty, Vladimir Putin can double or triple the size of his nuclear arsenal before the end of the decade. He already maintains at least a 10-to-1 advantage in theater nuclear weapons.

China’s nuclear breakout also caught the United States on its heals. The DF-41 ICBM, for example, carries multiple reentry vehicles and is expected to fill the 300 new ICBM silos discovered in 2021. DF-41s filling those new silos could alone exceed the size of the entire American nuclear arsenal.

That says nothing of the new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons China is deploying. To deter such capabilities America requires a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent, which must include the Sentinel.

Why Does America Still Need ICBMs?

The fact that the basics of the ICBM mission have not changed much since they were first fielded may explain why some believe they are outdated. Before we commit to killing Sentinel and retiring the Minuteman, it is important to consider some of their benefits.

First, ICBMs provide an excellent deterrent to nuclear attack on the homeland. The 400 Minuteman III silos spread across the American West are invulnerable to all but a massive nuclear missile attack. Thus, their existence sets a high threshold for attacking the United States, either conventionally or with nuclear weapons. Without ICBMs, our strategic nuclear targets shrink from over 500 to about a dozen, which could all be destroyed with conventional strikes. Only ICBM silos require a nuclear strike.

Second, ICBMs cost less than the other two legs of the nuclear triad—even with cost overruns. While Sentinel will cost an estimated $130–150 billion over the next two to three decades, it is likely to prove operationally cost-effective over the long term. Remember, ICBMs are used every single day to deter the Russians and the Chinese. Our adversaries understand the power of an ICBM, which is why their nuclear forces are primarily composed of ICBMs.

Third, building a Sentinel provides the US an opportunity to consider deploying ICBMs in new and creative ways. With the United States government depending on the private sector for its space launch capability, the Sentinel also has some non-traditional missions that a common launch vehicle might provide. These include:

1. The ability to deploy time critical space assets like sensors, navigation, or communications satellites in response to a contingency; and
2. Closer to traditional missions are ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite kill vehicles, and conventional prompt global strike.

The benefit of such a system would be the ability to replace the top of a missile with a different payload to carry out a niche mission. At the same time, nuclear deterrence is preserved by those ICBMs still on alert.

Nuclear deterrence works by creating the fear of a massive retaliatory response. It achieves a psychological effect in the mind of an adversary. Non-traditional missions can support deterrence by taking away an adversary’s belief in his potential success in achieving some advantage.

A prompt global strike capability, for example, would also fill a niche role, if needed, allowing the US to strike targets quickly without escalating to nuclear use. Sentinel makes that possible. Given its cost, only a small number of such weapons would be feasible, and all while complicating adversary strategy.

These are just some additional uses for Sentinel, but they do not change the fundamental reason for building a new ICBM—Minuteman III is 50 years old and well past its service life. Yes, there are cost overruns, but can we really expect any less when we build something once every half-century?

Conclusion

In short, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping would love for the United States to cancel the Sentinel program. We should not give them what they want.

Adam Lowther, PhD, is the Vice President of research and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The view’s expressed are the authors own. 

Why America Needs ICBMs was originally published on Global Security Review.