The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and it has achieved remarkable success. Since the treaty was entered into force in 1970, only three states have managed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The collective West initially opted for peaceful measures to ensure non-proliferation, such as the formation of NSG after India’s 1974 test aimed at limiting the flow of nuclear fuel and technology to “could be” nuclear states.

However, there have also been forceful measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly engaged in counterproliferation (CP) and in some cases, “offensive counterproliferation” such as in Iraq, and Syria, and most recently Iran. But does this forceful compliance achieve lasting non-proliferation goals? Or does it entrench the target state’s psychological dependence on nuclear weapons for survival?

As the decade of 1980s unfolded, non-proliferation efforts turned violent when the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was attacked by Israel and subsequently destroyed. Although the reactor program was severely damaged, Iraq continued to pursue a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the Gulf-War of 1991 put an end to Iraq’s nuclear program forever. Although Richard Betts argues otherwise; he notes that Osirak was not the key component to weapons production.

Like Osirak, the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2007. The site was alleged to be a plutonium production facility based on a North Korean reactor. Syria, a signatory of the NPT, could not protest Israeli violation of its airspace and the destruction of a site undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2008, the IAEA concluded, after a visit, that chemically processed uranium traces were found around the site of the destroyed reactor. The IAEA requested further inspection, but the Syrian government denied access. The attack on Al-Kibar demonstrates limited success in offensive CP. Although it is not yet certain whether Syria was close to making a bomb or even attempting to make one, the attack certainly imposed a logistical setback on Syria, triggered the IAEA inspections on a site which was undeclared to the agency, and resulted in greater international scrutiny of Syrian nuclear activities.

The most significant factor in the Israeli CP strategy is Iran. The CP strategy in Iran was marked by the targeted assassination of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was considered responsible for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in 2020. In addition to this, another peculiarity of the Iran CP involves the use of cyber-attacks to disrupt reactor operations. The infamous Stuxnet had damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz nuclear facility and highlighted lapses and vulnerabilities in its cyber and operational security.

In 2025, Iranian nuclear facilities became targets of kinetic attacks by the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. claimed victory by announcing the “obliteration” of the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Iran, several independent analysts, and even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagreed with the U.S. president. Nonetheless, the twelve-day war concluded in a ceasefire, which did not last and the U.S. and Israel resumed actions to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Contrary to the instances in Iraq and Syria, the IAEA agrees more with Iran than with the U.S. and Israel on matters of Iran’s enrichment, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons ambitions. As the war began in early hours of March 2026, the IAEA chief Antonnio Grossi said that Iran has “no structured program to build nuclear weapons”. Not to mention Iran is a signatory to the NPT, its government has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and the late Ayatollah Khamenei had even issued a religious verdict, acting as the principal block to Iran’s nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it can be argued that offensive CP yields unsatisfactory results and often backfires on legitimate, peaceful non-proliferation efforts. The 2003 U.S. invasion, which forced regime change in Iraq, was initiated under the pretext of Iraqi WMDs and nuclear weapons program. It was later concluded that no substantial proof existed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program continued after the 1991 Gulf War. David Allison and Tyler Brown note that “The Gulf War destroyed much of Iraq’s ability to acquire material for a nuclear weapon, and the program was abandoned in the early 1990s in the face of international sanctions and inspections.”

But the Iranian case might become the most striking example of a failed offensive CP effort. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, politico-military leadership, and nuclear facilities has only emboldened Iran and the hardliners within. According to John J. Mearsheimer, Iran’s new Ayatollah may consider going nuclear. Although offensive CP may reduce a state’s opportunity to build a nuclear weapon, it always backfires as far as the willingness of the target country to acquire nuclear weapons is concerned. A state that becomes vulnerable to foreign invasions/surgical strikes will certainly be more inclined than before to acquire nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, non-proliferation efforts tend to yield positive results if they remain peaceful. The NPT’s peaceful mechanisms have prevented even technologically capable states, such as Japan and Germany, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is to the NPT’s credit that Libya stopped its nuclear program. Ukraine was disarmed in 1994, and South Africa abandoned its fully operational nuclear weapons between 1989 and 1991. Using military means against a proliferator not only does not dismantle the target nuclear program but may instead bolster the target country’s resolve to rely more on nuclear deterrence to secure state sovereignty. The same effect is generated in other states too, those who may fear their survival and seek nuclear weapons to offset adversary disarmament or decapitating strikes. With treaties faltering, increased signaling, and continued breach of state sovereignty, states that subscribe to hardcore realist points-of-view will inevitably choose the nuclear route over arms control.

Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network. He writes on Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Control, and Emerging Disruptive Technology. He can be reached at aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com.  Views expressed in the article are the author’s own. 

The Pitfalls of Offensive Counterproliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Far from being a mere slip of the tongue, the episode revealed the extent to which BRICS have established themselves as increasingly influential players in international politics and economics. The fear aroused by those words was no accident; it reflected the growing perception that this bloc represents a direct challenge to the established international order.

The informal BRICS alliance was formed in 2009, when several emerging economies decided to coordinate their efforts to strengthen their financial, economic, and political cooperation. Brazil, Russia, India, and China formed the group, which was joined by South Africa in 2010. Since then, the bloc has steadily increased its influence, becoming a central player in the international system. It currently represents about 50% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity.

Today, BRICS is once again at the center of global debate. For those who failed to understand the significance of Trump’s words, or the reasons for the nervousness they provoked, it is essential to pause and analyze exactly what this organization is and why its rise is generating growing concerns about the international balance of power. The question, in this context, is inevitable: why is this institution attracting so much attention today?

After the end of World War II, the United States and the major Western democracies promoted a framework of rules, institutions, and relationships that is now known as the “liberal international order.” This system was based on liberal principles—both political and economic—and cooperation among states through multilateral organizations designed to ensure stability, growth, and collective security.

However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system, the international scene underwent a profound transformation. Washington emerged as the sole global superpower, a situation that led Francis Fukuyama to formulate his thesis of the “end of history.”

Over the last few decades, Uncle Sam has maintained its hegemony through the liberal international order, relying on political and military alliances, shared norms, and universalist values, with institutions such as NATO and the IMF serving as fundamental pillars. This framework has guaranteed the hegemony of the dollar and its so-called “exorbitant privilege,” which has allowed the United States to borrow on more favorable terms than any other country, finance its deficits without immediate risk, and consolidate its debt as the safest asset in the global financial system.

To fully understand this analysis, it is essential to add another key element of the Western system’s success: the SWIFT network. This global payment infrastructure connects most of the world’s banks and acts as an intermediary in international transfers, the vast majority of which are conducted in dollars. In this way, the dollar has become the dominant currency worldwide. However, despite its power and influence, the liberal international order is beginning to show increasingly evident cracks.

Over time, a series of events have contributed to weakening this system. The financial crises of recent decades have undermined confidence in Western elites’ ability to manage the global economic order, while the U.S. strategy of shaping the world according to its own interests has fostered a coalition of states that reject its hegemony. Similarly, specific episodes such as Brexit in 2016, President Obama’s blockade of the WTO Appellate Body—considered the guardian of free trade—and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have intensified doubts about the soundness and legitimacy of this system.

Added to this context is the use of the dollar as a tool of political pressure, particularly visible in the sanctions imposed on Russia, a move that has reinforced the perception that the U.S. currency also functions as a geopolitical instrument.

This set of factors has led many powers to seek alternatives that reduce their dependence on the system dominated by the U.S. In this scenario of a weakening liberal international order, recent moves by BRICS are perceived as a direct threat to Washington, once again placing the bloc at the center of global debate.

As already noted, the BRICS is an informal intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase its global influence and offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Since its creation, the bloc has progressively expanded its reach and sought to reduce its dependence on the U.S.-led international financial system.

A key step in this strategy was the 2014 creation of the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in emerging economies, as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100 billion fund designed to protect member countries from financial crises. These initiatives are perceived as direct challenges to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, essential pillars of the liberal international order.

Added to this institutional progress is the growing economic weight of the bloc. BRICS countries have established themselves as one of the main drivers of global growth, accounting for a significant share of industrial production and strategic resources.

It is in this context that BRICS found an historic opportunity to challenge the rules of the international economic game. In addition to developing their own institutions, in 2018 BRICS introduced a new international payment mechanism called “NIPS,” later known as BRICS Pay. Although the project progressed slowly for several years, it regained prominence in October 2024 during the 16th BRICS Summit, held that same year. On this occasion, the member countries formally presented and endorsed what was now called BRICS Pay.

BRICS Pay aims to facilitate international transactions in local currencies and reduce the centrality of the dollar. The system would rely on DCMS, a decentralized messaging network developed in Russia and distributed among member countries, allowing each state to control its own financial infrastructure and trade without using the dollar, thereby weakening its dominance. At the same time, the absence of a hegemonic actor within the system aims to foster more balanced cooperation and potentially reduce geopolitical tensions.

This project represents a direct challenge to both the United States and the SWIFT system and, by extension, to the liberal international order. If BRICS countries succeed in consolidating the success of BRICS Pay in the future, we could be witnessing a notable change in the world order as we know it today.

However, significant obstacles remain between ambition and reality. Although an initial prototype of BRICS Pay has been presented in Moscow, and it has been suggested that it could be operational by 2026, the path to a fully functional system is complex. The experience of the European Union shows that financial integration requires time, coordination, and a high degree of economic convergence.

Furthermore, BRICS countries have profound differences in their levels of development, monetary policies, and strategic priorities, which makes it difficult to build a stable and cohesive framework. Similarly, despite their growing economic weight, their global political influence remains limited and, for the time being, it is insufficient to displace Western primacy.

Even so, the bloc’s rapid rise in a brief time has altered the international balance and raised fundamental questions about the future of the global system. The central question is whether BRICS countries will succeed in consolidating themselves as a real alternative to the liberal order led by the United States or whether their challenge will remain, at least for now, a symptom of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world.

Ana Lorenzo López is a geopolitical analyst currently collaborating with The Political Room, where she writes in-depth political and strategic analysis on international affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

BRICS: The Emerging Bloc That Threatens the Liberal International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August 2023 led to the restructuring of the Wagner Group into several new entities. At least four new groups reorganized thousands of former Wagner fighters, with a significant portion now operating under the Russian Defense Ministry and other intelligence services.

The entity operating as Africa Corps continues Wagner’s operations across Africa, including in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Libya. Estimates suggest that these reconstituted paramilitary groups have around 5,000 members stationed across Africa. These forces are a mix of former Wagner operatives, new recruits, and other mercenaries. They are involved in a variety of roles such as providing security, training, combat operations, support to local regimes, and support to specific factions—like the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Haftar forces in Libya. Generally, they have contracts to provide security to unstable regimes in the region.

The presence of Russian troops in certain African nations is a cause for concern. As an illustration, it is worth noting that Russia recently bolstered its military presence in Libya. This includes the deployment of significant military equipment and personnel to provide support for General Khalifa Haftar with towed artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and rocket launchers. Russia is very clearly attempting to bolster its strategic position in the region as it supports aspirations for a naval base in Libya.

This move will amplify Russian influence in North Africa and pose a potential threat to Europe from the southern Mediterranean. In eastern Libya, there are air bases, such as al-Jufra, that serve as refuelling stations for Russian military flights before continuing to other African countries.

There are reports suggesting that Russia is close to setting up a naval base in Sudan, specifically in the vicinity of Port Sudan. In Sahel countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, Russian forces, including those from the Africa Corps, are helping military juntas. They also participate in operations against insurgencies and safeguard governments. The Russian presence in the Sahel significantly increased after French forces departed from the area. In the CAR, for example, there is a significant paramilitary presence from Russia, and there are plans to establish a formal Russian military base in Berengo. It is anticipated that this base will accommodate a maximum of 10,000 Russian soldiers, bolstering its influence in the region.

The increasing involvement of Russia in Africa has numerous adverse consequences on a global level. In the case of the European Union (EU), the exploitation of migration routes by Russian-backed forces intensifies the issue of irregular migration to Europe, resulting in political and social tensions within EU countries. In addition, the control that Russia can potentially exercise over the oil and gas resources in Libya, for example, gives it the ability to manipulate energy supplies, which undermines the efforts of the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian energy.

For the United States, there are concerns about Russia’s strategic relationship with African regimes, which have the potential to undermine American influence and complicate its counterterrorism and military operations in the region, especially in the Sahel, where extremist groups are growing more active. The US has already taken steps to address security concerns in the Sahel and Maghreb by implementing initiatives like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

These efforts aim to strengthen the ability of countries in the region to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Nevertheless, the current initiatives fall short in addressing the magnitude and intricacy of the violence and governance shortcomings. The involvement of the Russian military in countries like Sudan and Libya has far-reaching consequences for the overall security situation in the Middle East. It has the potential to disrupt neighbouring regions and shape geopolitical decisions. Furthermore, the presence of Russian influence on African resources brings about fresh contenders for control and export of gold, oil, and gas.

To counter the growing presence of Russian forces and influence in Africa, the US and the EU, in coordination with key regional African and Arab partners, must adopt a multi-faceted strategy focusing on military, economic, diplomatic, and soft power measures. Strengthening military cooperation with a selected set of African nations, namely those who share borders with those who experienced a coup over the past three years. Joint exercises, training programs, and the provision of military aid and equipment are crucial, particularly in light of the noticeable decline in Western influence in most Sahel states and the eastern states of Sudan.

In Niger, for example, following the coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, the military junta rejected all US and regional diplomatic initiatives. As a result, we are emphasizing the importance of increasing Western cooperation with countries bordering Niger. Every year, the US conducts Flintlock, the largest annual special operations forces exercise by US Africa Command, with the aim of enhancing combined partner force collaboration in Africa alongside international and NATO special operations forces.

Exercise Africa Lion is also a large-scale US-led annual exercise that involves multiple African and allied nations, focusing on enhancing military readiness and interoperability. However, given the unprecedented level of political instability in Africa over the past few years, as well as the growing influence of Russian groups, it is now a critical time to intensify the West’s security cooperation with regional African partners.

It is essential for the West to strengthen its economic ties with Africa as a means of countering Russian influence in the short term as well as that of the Chinese in the long term. By prioritizing investments in infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other development projects, the West can tackle the underlying issues that contribute to instability. This approach will not only bring tangible benefits to local populations, but also foster domestic goodwill. In doing so, it can diminish the appeal of external support from countries like China and Russia, which have been making significant infrastructure investments in Africa. Providing targeted expertise in mining, agriculture, and energy sectors to strategic African countries will contribute to sustainable development and reduce dependency on foreign entities.

Regardless of its declining effectiveness, diplomatic efforts continue to play a crucial role in countering Russian influence in Africa. Strengthening partnerships with important African nations and regional organizations like the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, along with specific political groups in unstable African countries, can support the diplomatic efforts of the West and influence the overall narrative. Efforts in the realm of diplomacy should prioritize the promotion of positive governance, human rights, and democratic institutions. This will also enable the implementation of targeted sanctions against entities and individuals engaged in destabilizing activities in Africa with support from Russian groups.

Addressing the challenge of countering Russian influence in Africa requires recognizing the significance of soft power and cultural diplomacy. These aspects play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of disinformation campaigns that aim to manipulate African information systems. It is worth noting that such campaigns have seen a significant rise, nearly quadrupling since 2022.

It is crucial to counter Russian disinformation by supporting independent media and promoting accurate information about the benefits of partnerships with the US and EU. This encompasses a range of initiatives, such as providing financial support for media literacy programs, bolstering the skills of local journalists, and backing civil society organizations and grassroots movements dedicated to promoting democratic reforms in Africa.

It is also crucial to prioritize the expansion of educational and cultural exchange programs. These initiatives aim to foster lasting connections with African youth and future leaders, ultimately contributing to the development of strong relationships. This becomes particularly significant in the context of a changing world, where younger generations are increasingly influenced by Western cultures. Educational scholarships, academic partnerships, and cultural initiatives can contribute to the development of mutual understanding and cooperation.

Engaging in a clear dialogue with African leaders to gain insight into their viewpoints and consistently addressing the geopolitical concerns of African countries will help ensure that their interests are considered in international policies. Thus, this approach should help foster a relationship that aligns more closely with Western values and principles. To address the issue of Russian influence in Africa, it is crucial to establish a collaborative international effort.

This would involve the cooperation of various international partners, including the US and EU, as well as key regional African and Arab nations. Collaborative efforts can greatly enhance the effectiveness and present a united front. Emphasizing regional security initiatives and frameworks that foster stability and cooperation among African countries, including capacity-building programs, will continue to be crucial in addressing the increasing presence and influence of Russian forces on the continent.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed are his own. 

Countering Russia’s Influence in Africa: Strategy and Actions was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, there is concern that rogue states and terrorist groups with nuclear weapons would seek to bring on the very Armageddon deterrence is designed to prevent. Ensuring this concern is never materialized is a clear objective of the United States.

Second, adding new countries to the nuclear club increases the risks of accidents and theft as safely deploying and testing nuclear weapons is not something learned at a few evening seminars. It took the United States several decades to perfect nuclear safety measures.

Third, further proliferation by any signatories would violate the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and might begin its unravelling. Although the NPT does allow a ratifying state to withdraw on three months’ notice for reasons of supreme national interests, it does not make legal any prior acts in violation of the treaty or mitigate the consequences of withdrawal.

Fourth, adding to the nuclear club would dangerously complicate maintaining stability during an international crisis in that any use of nuclear force might very well trigger multiple conflicts that could easily get out of hand. In short, additional nuclear states could create greater uncertainty.

Fifth, with added nuclear states in the world, there is a potential for greater risks of horizontal and vertical escalation in the event nuclear deterrence fails. Such risks are hard to predict because states may act in unexpected ways to overcome a threat.

Although the United States is a reliable nonproliferation partner, there are growing doubts about the reliability of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. America’s allies are increasingly contemplating whether to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. This includes the creation of an independent European nuclear capability, as recently proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. A key ingredient to the increasing doubt is the growing nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, both designed to coerce the United States into standing down in a crisis or conflict.

Complicating matters is the fact that many allies still seek enhanced trade and investment ties with both Russia and China, which leads them to take different positions on issues like the war in Ukraine and Taiwan’s sovereignty. These challenges should not lead the United States to give up its long-established opposition to the spread of nuclear arms. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Asian allies are, despite economic interests, grappling with the consequences of growing nuclear arsenals and connected nuclear threats from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Germany, Japan, and South Korea are beneficiaries of American extended deterrence, but they are also nations with domestic publics increasingly discussing the pursuit of independent nuclear arsenals. The thinking goes: independent arsenals in these states would serve as checks on Russian or Chinese coercion and aggression. Arguing in favor of such proliferation, analysts suggest that if Ukraine kept those Russian nuclear weapons on its territory after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia would not have invaded. This argument has many flaws, but the overriding point is valid.

Unlike the United States, which never had expansionist desires in Afghanistan or Iraq, Russia and China have territorial ambitions in the states that fear them the most. This makes the security environment more troubling for our allies. Having nuclear weapons to defend one’s territorial integrity is one thing; possessing nuclear weapons as a security shield behind which one can undertake military adventures is another.

Some 174 nations do not have nuclear weapons and are not repeat victims of invasion by nuclear-armed states or their non-nuclear neighbors. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa all voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons. South Africa did not want a communist-oriented African National Congress to have nuclear weapons should it come into power. The three Soviet Republics were guaranteed independence in return for giving up the Soviet nuclear forces they inherited. This was all to prevent an additional three nuclear powers from emerging on Russia’s borders.

Despite nuclear disarmament efforts, national leaders around the world clearly understand that nuclear weapons are effective at deterring adversary attack and invasion. The United States’ nuclear umbrella has, for six decades, protected European and Asian allies from existential harm. The confidence of past decades is now wavering and may lead to the very nuclear proliferation the United States has spent seven decades attempting to prevent. Should it occur, it may not only be friends who proliferate but additional foes.

In fact, the weakness of American extended deterrence may set off a proliferation cascade that dramatically increases the probability of nuclear use. When Donald Rumsfeld once said, “Weakness is provocative,” he was right. A strong extended deterrent is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with more than three decades in the analysis of risk. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own

America’s Vital Nonproliferation Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

Several months ago, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists published an article by Zak Kallenborn in which he defended nuclear weapons and their utility. Rebuttal articles published made two fundamental arguments. First, realism predicts the unavoidability of war, which requires the elimination of nuclear weapons. Second, deterrence is unreliable because previous close calls predict future failure.

The authors believe that reducing nuclear weapons to [near] zero limits the danger in inevitable future wars because future cheating or proliferation would only take place in small numbers, thereby limiting the damage of nuclear use. History and game theory prove this argument dangerously flawed.

For two millennia, major power wars occurred several times per century. Oxford’s Max Roser charts this bloody cost over the past 600 years. In that time 5–10 people per 100,000 population died in these wars, most of them civilians. In the past century deaths topped 100–200 deaths per 100,000 population.

Then after World War II something happened. Over the past seven decades this death rate has plummeted 99 percent to near zero (0.1/100,000 population). This is in spite of small spikes, which are attributable primarily to ethnic genocide in the (non-nuclear) global South. The world did not magically become more pacific. It built nuclear weapons.

The same abolitionists who criticize Kallenborn are horrified by the scale of the slaughter in Gaza and Ukraine. Over 315,000 Russian and 31,000 Ukraine troops are dead in Ukraine and 12,000 Hamas fighters in Gaza. Nuclear abolitionists fail to grasp, this is a mere drop in the bucket compared to great power war.

For example, during World War I, there were 480,000 casualties in 7 days at the Battle of the Marne. There were 848,614 casualties at Passendaele and another 946,000 at Verdun. During World War II, more than 61,000 British civilians died in the Battle of Britain. Over 83,000 British and American airmen died over Germany

European deaths during World War II are estimated at 28.7 million people. Great-power war gave rise to Joseph Stalin and Adolph Hitler, who exterminated over 30 million people between them. Stalin’s genocide of  3.5 to 7 million Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933 is the historical context for Ukrainian resistance today.

When it comes to killing civilians, the Japanese beat Stalin and Hitler combined. They killed over 300,000 Chinese during the “Rape of Nanjing.” China suffered over 35 million casualties during the Japanese occupation. When atomic bombs dropped on Japan, the Japanese army was still killing an estimated 250,000 Chinese every month.

During World War II, conventional bombing raids killed more civilians in a single night than both atomic bombs. In the Dresden firestorm, caused by allied conventional bombing, 135,000 Germans were incinerated. The ability of today’s conventional weapons is even greater.

The only answer to the horror of war is to keep the peace through effective deterrence.  To do this, those who would wage war must know the reward does not justify the risk. Deterrence does this at every level of conflict.

Arms control treaty regimes, the source of stability for nuclear disarmament advocates, are largely a failure. Despite the existence of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa all sought or obtained the bomb. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also failed to stop nuclear testing, with the violations of India, North Korea, and Pakistan. China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States have either not signed or ratified the treaty.

Russia breached the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty during the Obama administration and then suspended participation in New START in 2023. As a result, for the first time in five decades, there is no nuclear arms limitation treaty between the United States and Russia/Soviet Union. Russia already maintained a policy of escalate to de-escalate during New START negotiations and, in fact, Chinese, North Korean, and Russian military doctrines all contemplate nuclear warfighting across the spectrum of conflict.

Deterrence is working every day and is not reserved for discussions of nuclear war. As China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia coalesce in an authoritarian coalition, deterrence remains the last best hope for averting war. It works along the entire continuum of conflict, reducing the likelihood of war. In short, nuclear weapons save lives.

Colonel Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Nuclear Weapons Abolition Will Kill Millions (Again) was originally published on Global Security Review.

There are two ways to achieve the regime’s objectives. First, Iran can cross the nuclear threshold and turn the tables on the United States, Israel, and the Sunni Arab states. Second, Iran can continue engaging in conflict and terrorism via proxies.

This approach took shape with the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, which drove the US out of Lebanon. The United States and Israel’s current conflict with Iranian proxies is at best a strategic distraction that cost the lives of American troops and drains Israel of resources. Houthis militias not only disrupt 15–25 percent of global shipping, but they are also a vector for testing increasingly lethal weapons and tactics.

When recently fighting Islamist militias in Idlib, Syria, Iranian forces demonstrated the brand new Kheibar Shekan ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 kilometers (900 miles). This puts Israel within range, making the Iranian threat to “raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground” even more explicit.

While the West is distracted by the persistence of proxy attacks, Iran’s laser-sharp focus on nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities continues to deliver results. As of early 2024, Iran is capable of Uranium enrichment above the 80 percent threshold, while it keeps growing its stockpile of Uranium enriched to 60 percent. Iran might not have yet mastered Uranium-metal machining and the implosion trigger, but it eventually will, albeit with a little bit of help from the enemies of the United States. It is not a question of if but when will Iran field a nuclear weapon.

Iran has long developed the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. It took nearly three decades for Europe to acknowledge that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities were a growing threat. Western inability to deploy coercive nonproliferation tools that effectively compel Iran to cease and desist with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs demonstrates that efforts to deter Iran are an epic failure. It is in that context that Iran’s space launch vehicle programs provide a pathway toward longer-range ballistic missile systems, something not fundamentally different from North Korea’s approach.

The current American bombing campaign in retaliation for the attack on American troops in Jordan, while targeting proxies, does not change Iran’s tactical or strategic objectives. It is not a stretch to anticipate that Iran may consider a theater nuclear paradigm. For this to be adopted, Russian tutelage of Iran as to the utility of its nuclear doctrine is needed.

There remain several issues to consider. These include warhead miniaturization, mating with a Shahab 3 missile, and missile guidance, which require assistance from Russia, China, or North Korea. North Korea spent the past decade working on these very issues and is likely to share its knowledge for a price.

China relies heavily on Iran and Iran-controlled Iraq for its oil imports. Iran’s export of crude oil recently reached a 5-year high with China as the top buyer. Sanctions simply do not work. In addition to the expanded Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) and the Global South’s emerging alternative payment systems, which bypasses dollar-based control infrastructures, illegal weapons/technology proliferation continues unabated. While it is concerning that components used in Iranian missiles are reported to have made their way from the United States to Iran via China, the obvious question is what export-control designated items should never have made it out of the United States in the first place.

By staging a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and accelerating the expansion of the BRICS to countries that are primarily oil and gas suppliers, China is further consolidating its energy security and its appeal as an alternative to the Western-led world order. Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of His Royal Highness Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, maintains bridges with Iran while performing diplomatic damage control such as in Lebanon. This does not mean that Saudi Arabia will ultimately turn its back on the West. But by keeping its options open, Saudi Arabia’s smart diplomacy does not lose sight of its own strategic goals—leveraging any weight China already carries around the Middle East and globally.

In January 2024, a Qaem 100 rocket from the Aerospace Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, for the first time, launched a Soraya satellite to an altitude of 750 kilometers. Not long after this first success, a Simorgh (Phoenix) rocket launched 3 small satellites into orbit.  Iran’s missile program, under the guise of a space program, demonstrated significant breakthroughs just as Iran is on the brink of reaching its technical goals for its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs. As the West contemplates failed deterrence policies, the United States and other western nations must contemplate how much longer they can continue to fail without having to pay a price for their eroding regional and global leadership.

Iranian effort to reassert itself to regional hegemony after a long period of mediocrity will not go unchallenged by the Saudis (Sunni Arab) or Turks (Sunni Turkish). American preeminence in the region kept old animosity at bay but may not for much longer. We will all be worse off for it.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Iran’s Quest for Middle East Hegemony was originally published on Global Security Review.

Data breaches seem to be the name of the game in tech this year, and the latest, a software flaw that exposed the private data of hundreds of thousands of Google+ users, has just snagged the spotlight. Despite the fact that data breaches and cybersecurity attacks occur across the globe, their occurrences in major technology markets such as the United States and the European Union (EU) tend to take policy precedence and draw greater media attention.

However, as emerging market nations—such as Indonesia and those in Sub-Saharan Africa—continue to rapidly digitize and foster new technology-based businesses, more attention needs to be paid to the risks these markets and their users face. Failure to do so will significantly hinder economic growth and business development in these regions.

Over 90% of African businesses operate under the cybersecurity poverty line, which means they are unable to adequately protect themselves from vulnerabilities and losses. Although Africa has comparatively limited communications infrastructure, the continent has a high penetration rate of new technologies, and as a result is a prime target for digital attacks. In 2017, cybercrime cost the continent $3.5 billion and yet 96% of online security incidents went unreported. Large and expanding digital hubs such as Nigeria and Kenya particularly suffered, accruing losses of $649 million and $210 million, respectively.

Cybercrime in Africa has targeted startups, corporations, institutions and governments alike. This June, South African insurance company Liberty Holdings Ltd. was held ransom by hackers who were able to access sensitive data including emails. The company is responsible for overseeing 2.5 million life-insurance policies and administering over 10,000 retirement plans and 500,000 individual and institutional investment customers, raising concerns about the consequences of such a hack. Some progress, however, is being made: there was a 73% increase of Information Security Management System certified companies on the continent between 2015 and 2016, the majority of which are based in South Africa, Nigeria and Morocco.

Similarly, in the Asia-Pacific region, cybercrime poses a serious threat to economic success. A study commissioned by Microsoft found that the total potential losses to the region from cyber attacks was $1.745 trillion, or 7% of the region’s current gross domestic product (GDP). These risks are particularly apparent in the ASEAN region, where nations invest an average of 0.07% of their GDP in cybersecurity infrastructure and operations. The consequences of such underfunded and undervalued cybersecurity initiatives can be seen in practice in Indonesia, where the country’s highest valued startup on record, Go-Jek, was found to have significant security vulnerabilities. 

Go-Jek is a ride-sharing and logistics startup that has over 15 million weekly active users and is widely considered a major competitor to global brands such as Uber and Lyft. In March 2017, Fallible, an Indian security firm claimed they were able to extract information such as GPS coordinates of rides and user data such as phone numbers and pick up and drop off points from two problematic APIs on the app. The firm also claimed they were able to exploit a vulnerability which enabled them to manipulate notifications users received. An Indonesian hacker based in Thailand identified similar vulnerabilities in 2016. Go-Jek is Indonesia’s first startup to become a unicorn (meaning it became valued at $1 billion), and over the past year, the company has invested heavily in expanding their services to include mobile payments. 

This expansion into a field that engages with even more sensitive user data underscores the need for a greater cybersecurity focus, as well as a complementary regulatory environment that similarly prioritizes security in tandem with growth. In 2017, the Government of Indonesia took steps in this regard, establishing a National Cyber Agency (NCA) to develop an integrated cyber defense strategy. However, given that in the same year, almost half of Indonesia’s companies were impacted by over 205 million cyber-attacks, costing $34 billion in direct financial losses and long-term reputational damage, there is a great deal of work to be done. 

In larger and more developed technology markets, data security and privacy laws such as the recently passed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) compel companies to invest more time and resources into developing and maintaining robust security infrastructure. However, in markets, such as in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific, where such regulations and cybersecurity-focused policy environments are weaker or lacking in enforcement, commensurate practices by businesses are less common.

Going forward, emerging market businesses and governments need to recognize that to achieve economic growth and reap the benefits of the ongoing digital boom, cybersecurity needs to be a priority. In practice, this means that there needs to be greater emphasis on operating and maintaining updated and robust security systems; training and expanding cybersecurity workforces; developing long-term cyber resilience strategies that account for all levels of corporate or institutional operations; raising awareness about the importance of such security practices; and generating legislation that adequately offers protections and remediations. 

Greater investment in regionally-specific cybersecurity infrastructure can also open up noteworthy business opportunities. The cybersecurity market is expected to be worth $2 billion by 2020, and thus far the African continent has not released any commercially viable cybersecurity products, while ASEAN nations, although having made some progress, also have room to grow.

The average cost of cybercrime for businesses and governments across the globe is increasing at a rapid rate, and emerging markets are at significant risk. Developing more robust cybersecurity infrastructure, policies, programs and cultures must be prioritized. This is particularly important now as these regions will soon be host to the majority of global internet users, as well as a large share of future digital businesses and services. 

Cyber Insecurity is Harming Emerging Markets was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is worth considering Britain’s wider role in Africa as Theresa May visits this critical part of the world on a trade and investment tour. This latest diplomatic endeavor provides an opportunity to evolve UK’s Africa strategy in the context of forging a new path for a global Britain that seeks to maximize the opportunities of leaving the European Union. This is a crucial area of a global Britain approach, ensuring that the UK remains competitive in an ever-increasingly competitive global market.

In Cape Town, the prime minister announced an ambitious new approach to Britain’s spending on the continent, wishing to overtake the US by 2022 as the largest foreign investor in Africa, which would see Britain becoming Africa’s largest trading partner in the G7. This would seek to build upon the already high levels of existing British investment in Africa; with bilateral trade between the UK and Africa totaling $37 billion in 2016 and set to increase further post-Brexit.

With 29 business executives accompanying the prime minister and other officials on this trip, the overriding purpose of the mission is clear: to drum up business with some of the world’s fastest growing economies. The key stops on the Prime Minister’s tour include South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya. These three countries, traditionally strong British allies, are widely regarded as the core engine of future African growth.

By 2030, household consumption across the continent is expected to reach $2.5 trillion, up from $1.1 trillion in 2015. A third of that will come from these three states alone. Other countries with high growth rate forecasts over the next decade include Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia and Ghana. They all maintain strong relations with Britain, leaving considerable scope for developing these ties further.

Britain’s combined imports and exports with African countries more than doubled between 2005 and 2014, however exports to Africa still only represents 2.5% of total British exports. Considering Africa is a continent whose the population is set to increase by half a billion people by 2030–43% of whom will acquire middle and upper class status–it is remarkable that Britain has not sent such a top trade delegation to Africa sooner.

In that sense, Britain is somewhat late to the party. The U.S., despite seeing exports to Africa halve from 2014 – 2016, still has a bilateral trading relationship with the continent worth $53 billion. However. even this is dwarfed by both China and the E.U.-27’s trade numbers with Africa: in 2015 worth $188 billion, and $269 billion respectively.

In particular Beijing’s role in Africa has solidified in recent years. This trend goes well beyond the seven fold increase in trade with the continent since 2005. China is also seemingly aiming to become the preeminent security actor across Africa in an attempt to displace the legacy role still played by the former European colonial powers. In addition to establishing its first overseas base in Djibouti in 2017, Beijing also has 2,466 troops currently on active duty across Africa.

In recent years, Chinese military personnel have taken part in United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sudan, with an 800-strong combat deployment sent to South Sudan in 2015, a country with significant Chinese oil investments. The security relationship between China and the UN contrasts sharply with the majority of western states, often more militarily risk-adverse regarding African deployments.

However, after meeting with Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari, Mrs. May announced the two countries had signed a defense and security partnership which would see the British forces train full Nigerian army units to combat insurgents in the north-east of Nigeria. Furthermore, the UK will assist Nigeria in countering the use of improvised explosive devices used by Boko Haram, and in strengthening Nigeria’s lawless northern borders.

In order for the UK Government’s post-Brexit Africa strategy to really pay off, especially in the face of increasingly stiff international competition from the Chinese, Britain’s strengths as a security partner must be firmly emphasized as a reminder of why we should remain the firmest African ally. By leveraging Britain’s increasing role as a security actor in Africa, it should seek to press this advantage regarding trade deals post-Brexit.

Theresa May met members of the British military contingent based in Kenya, east Africa’s economic power and the focus of Britain’s greatest African security commitment. Kenya is utilized as a training area for British troops going on high readiness operations in other theaters, in addition to providing training and support for regional states engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab across east Africa. Ranging from Mali to Djibouti, Kenya to Gabon, the British military maintains a significant involvement across sub-Saharan Africa.

Currently providing training and support to no less than nine African states, small teams of specialized British personnel conduct a range of missions, from counter-terrorism to anti-piracy and anti-poaching. These missions are designed to build up the capability of host nations, by training their leaders and instructors in military skills often hard-learnt over recent British campaigns, now passed on to other states to assist in their own security development.

These training missions have tangible impact and results. For example, over 22 separate training missions by British forces in Uganda since 2011 have developed the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces, who undertake the majority of the heavy fighting in Somalia under the African Union mission. The success witnessed by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has led to increased international confidence in the security situation in Somalia, resulting in a gradual reduction in African Union personnel from the Horn of Africa.

Mrs May will seek to highlight the threats posed to both European and international stability through letting the security challenges occurring across Africa go unaddressed. These challenges include the current situation in the DRC; ongoing Ebola outbreaks across the country, coupled with increasing civic strife has led to over four million internally displaced people throughout the DRC.

Considering the rising numbers of individuals wishing to flee internal conflicts, ethnic tensions, human trafficking and large scale poverty and corruption, Europe faces potentially a second wave of millions of migrants from the African continent escaping war and famine and seeking new opportunities. The case has already been made that Britain, in ensuring a strategic partnership with Africa, can do more to help mitigate these developments by training security personnel in the DRC to better cope with the country’s many crises.

Additionally, al-Shabaab poses a lethal security threat in the east of the continent, while Boko Haram and al-Qaeda affiliates threaten its western areas. UK military assistance is a key part of the multi-national efforts to contain and ultimately defeat these terrorist organisations. Concurrently with training Kenyans, Ugandans and Somalis in the fight against al-Shabaab, Britain has also trained over 30,000 Nigerian soldiers since 2015 in counter-insurgency operations to help the fight against Islamic militancy in Nigeria.

By highlighting the threats facing African security, combined with the pragmatic methods with which Britain utilizes its armed forces in developing local-level state actor security, a Global Britain approach to a new Africa strategy should therefore seek to combine increased trade and investment into African economies, with a renewed focus on strengthening existing bilateral military relationships.

This twin-tracked approach based around trade and security will seek to achieve the government’s target to be the G7’s largest African trading partner post-Brexit; filling a geostrategic void left in the wake of a withdrawing US. If Britain is to assert itself as Africa’s most valuable G7 trading partner, then Britain must seek to fulfill African desires for investment whilst simultaneously offering the continent a type of security assistance that is beyond China’s military skills and capabilities.

Security and Trade: The Need for a Global Britain Approach in Africa was originally published on Global Security Review.

Beijing and Moscow will seek to lock in competitive advantages and also to right what they bill are historical wrongs before economic and demographics headwinds further slow their material progress and the West regains its foundation.

Both China and Russia maintain worldviews where they’re rightfully dominant in their regions and able to form regional politics and economics to match their security and material interests.

Both have moved aggressively in latest years to exert more considerable influence in their regions, to contest the US geopolitically, and also to force Washington to accept exclusionary regional spheres of influence—a situation that the US has historically opposed.

National Security and Energy Interests of Rising and Declining Powers

For instance, China views the continuing presence of the US Navy in the Western Pacific, the centrality of US alliances in the region, and US protection of Taiwan as obsolete and representative of the continuation of China’s “one hundred years of humiliation.” Recent cooperation has been tactical and is likely to come back to competition if Beijing jeopardizes China’s dramatic growth has highlighted greater gaps between poor and rich.

Russian interests in Central Asia and as Beijing enjoys options for inexpensive energy supply beyond Russia. Furthermore, it isn’t clear whether there’s a mutually acceptable boundary between what Russia and China consider their natural spheres of influence.

India navigates its path

In the meantime, India’s growing economic power and profile in the region will further complicate these calculations, as New Delhi navigates relations with Beijing, Moscow, and Washington to shield its own expanding interests. Russian assertiveness will harden viewpoints in the Baltics along with other portions of Europe, escalating the potential risk of conflict.

Russia will seek, and sometimes feign, international cooperation, although openly challenging norms and rules it perceives as a counter to its interests and providing support for leaders of fellow “handled democracies” which promote resistance to American policies and personal tastes.

Moscow has little stake in the rules of the international economics and may be counted on to take actions that weaken the United States’ and European Union’s institutional advantages. Moscow will test NATO and resolve, seeking to undermine Western authenticity; it will attempt to exploit splits between Europe’s both north and south and east and west, and also to drive a wedge between the US and the EU.

Likewise, Moscow will become more active in the Middle East and these areas of the world wherein it believes it can check US influence. Lastly, Russia will Stay dedicated to atomic weapons as a deterrent and as a counter to stronger conventional military forces, as well as it’s ticket to superpower status.

Russian military doctrine allegedly includes the limited use of nuclear weapons in a situation where Russia’s vital interests are at stake to “de-escalate” a conflict by demonstrating that continued conventional conflict risks escalating the emergency to a large-scale nuclear exchange.

The Assertions of Rising and Declining World Powers was originally published on Global Security Review.