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	<title>Topic:Social Media &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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	<title>Topic:Social Media &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Justin Miller]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 13:15:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2020 ban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2024 return]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American buyer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ByteDance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese government]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[data privacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electoral politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[foreign influence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political pawn]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political rhetoric]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pragmatic governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public good]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security threat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TikTok]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30150</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In modern politics, decisions often seem driven more by narrow interests than by a genuine concern for the public good. A prime example of this is the evolving stance on TikTok in American political discourse. In 2020, President Donald Trump led a campaign to ban TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/">TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In modern politics, decisions often seem driven more by narrow interests than by a genuine concern for the public good. A prime example of this is the evolving stance on TikTok in American political discourse.</p>
<p>In 2020, President Donald Trump led a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/08/06/900019185/trump-signs-executive-order-that-will-effectively-ban-use-of-tiktok-in-the-u-s">campaign to ban</a> TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership and compromise of private data by the Chinese government. Four years later, Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/tiktok-goes-dark-us-users-trump-says-save-tiktok-2025-01-19/">delayed the removal</a> of TikTok from the American market as he looks to find an American buyer for the popular app. This apparent reversal raises the question, is this change motivated by legitimate considerations or political advantage?</p>
<p><strong>The 2020 Ban: National Security or Politics?</strong></p>
<p>During his first term, President Trump pushed to ban TikTok. This effort was framed as a national security measure. Concerns were raised that the app’s parent company, ByteDance, was sharing user data with the Chinese government, posing a threat to American citizens and government operations.</p>
<p>While these concerns were legitimate, critics argued the move was also a political maneuver. It allowed Trump to position himself as tough on China, appealing to his base and broader nationalistic sentiments during an election year. Few analysts considered that both can be true. Politics, particularly those surrounding a beloved video app, were too divisive.</p>
<p><strong>2024: The Return of TikTok?</strong></p>
<p>Fast forward to 2024, and the reported pivot to support TikTok’s return appears incongruous. The core issues cited in 2020—national security and data privacy—have not fundamentally changed. In fact, Americans better understand what it means to have sensitive personal data captured and potentially used for nefarious purposes by an adversary state. Highly contentious congressional testimony by the leaders of social media companies in 2024 only shined a further spotlight on how such firms do not work for the good of users.</p>
<p>Why then would President Trump seek to save the platform? One possible explanation is the platform’s immense popularity, particularly among younger demographics—a voting bloc Trump struggled to capture. Saving TikTok from the US Supreme Court’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/scotus/395462/supreme-court-tik-tok-garland-first-amendment-china">ruling</a> and ensuring its sale to an American firm could signal an attempt to appeal to these voters, making the move less about the app’s merits and more about electoral politics.</p>
<p><strong>Is It about the Public Good?</strong></p>
<p>President Trump’s changing perspective on TikTok may reveal a broader trend in modern politics—the prioritization of optics over substance. Leaders often take contradictory stances to align with prevailing public opinion or to cater to specific constituencies. In the case of TikTok, the narrative seems less about resolving genuine concerns and more about capitalizing on its cultural ubiquity. If national security was a pressing concern in 2020, the question remains why it would be any less urgent today.</p>
<p>Ironically, users fleeing from TikTok prior to its designated cutoff date did not flock to American social media platforms as some might expect, but other Chinese platforms similar to TikTok. It seems Americans are angrier and more concerned that Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat are manipulating them than anything the Chinese Communist Party may do. Whether this is the wisest choice is yet to be determined.</p>
<p><strong>Political Rhetoric or Pragmatism?</strong></p>
<p>Ultimately, the fluctuating stance on TikTok underscores the blurred line between political rhetoric and pragmatic governance. Decisions on complex issues like technology and national security require consistency and transparency, yet they are often reduced to tools for political gain. This is a bipartisan issue that was not invented by President Trump. It has a long tradition dating back to the early days of the Republic. In fact, it is endemic to democratic systems.</p>
<p>Whether Trump’s recent position reflects a genuine change of heart or strategic posturing, it highlights the broader issue of political inconsistency. Leaders across the political spectrum often adjust their positions based on electoral strategy rather than principle, yet accountability for these shifts is rare. For example, former Vice President Kamala Harris initially endorsed “Medicare for All” during the 2020 Democrat primary, only to later soften her stance to appeal to moderate voters. These shifts demonstrate how political beliefs are easily adjusted to maximize votes. Whether on healthcare, national security, or technology policy, such reversals can erode public trust if not clearly explained to the electorate.</p>
<p>The ultimate resolution of TikTok’s future will depend on whether the app is sold to an American firm, as President Trump has stipulated, or whether it continues operating without a sale. Given the heightened concerns over data security and foreign influence, a lack of clarity on this issue could further weaken public confidence. While political reversals are common, abrupt shifts without clear explanations can make leadership appear inconsistent or opportunistic. Greater transparency from President Trump regarding his rationale would not only provide insight into the decision-making process but could also help mitigate skepticism about his motivations. At a time when trust in government is already fragile, reinforcing accountability and open communication is critical to maintaining public confidence.</p>
<p>The TikTok saga serves as a reminder that political decisions, especially those framed as national security concerns, are often entangled with strategic interests. In an era where public trust in government is fragile, transparency and consistency are essential. Without them, shifting narratives risk further eroding confidence in leadership—not just on TikTok, but on the larger issues that shape democracy itself.</p>
<p>Offering further explanation into President Trump’s plan and thinking would give the American people a better understanding of the variables under consideration and could potentially assuage some of the speculation into his motivation. Democracies require open communication between the citizenry and their representatives. TikTok is an example of just that.</p>
<p><em>Justin Miller is Associate Professor of Practice in the School of Cyber Studies at the </em><a href="https://cybersecurityonline.utulsa.edu/"><em>University of Tulsa</em></a><em>.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/TikTok_-Security-Threat-or-Political-Pawn_-Regardless-America-deserves-better.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="367" height="102" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 367px) 100vw, 367px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/">TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-election-may-be-over-but-the-threat-of-foreign-interference-is-not/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-election-may-be-over-but-the-threat-of-foreign-interference-is-not/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Craig Albert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 13:08:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[adversarial nation-states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Craig Albert ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyberwarfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disinformation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[divisiveness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[foreign interference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[inauguration day]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[influence operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intelligence agencies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[malinformation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[misinformation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[polarization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political process]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public confidence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vigilance]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29554</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Election day came and went relatively smoothly. There was none of the violence or unrest people feared. What if, however, the real danger has not passed but is just beginning? It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-election-may-be-over-but-the-threat-of-foreign-interference-is-not/">The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Election day came and went relatively smoothly. There was none of the violence or unrest people feared. What if, however, the real danger has not passed but is just beginning?</p>
<p>It is important to remember that election-related violence and unrest do not just happen spontaneously. There is a long build-up of tension leading to such events, and much of this tension is deliberately instigated by adversarial nation-states that are engaged in spreading misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation through social media influence operations.</p>
<p>During non-election times, the general goal of these influence operations is simply to cause as much polarization and divisiveness within American society as possible. But during election time the goal becomes more specific: sow confusion, suspicion, mistrust, and chaos regarding the American political process to undermine democracy.</p>
<p>The problem is that this post-election period is still a prime time to achieve that specific goal. To ensure the peaceful transfer of power and preserve democracy, it is essential to understand why the level of risk remains high.</p>
<p><strong>More Actors Are Getting Involved</strong></p>
<p>The first factor to consider is that the number of adversaries Americans should be legitimately concerned about, with respect to social media information operations, continues to grow. Where Russia and China were the two primary nation-states to worry about, Iran is increasingly entering the picture as a formidable adversary. While Iran is already a threat in terms of conventional cyberwarfare, it is not known for its prowess in influence operations.</p>
<p>However, this is changing, and Iran is proving itself a formidable adversary on the information warfare front. Just last August, for example, American intelligence officials revealed that Iran attempted to hack the presidential campaigns.</p>
<p>They were successful in hacking the Trump campaign, but this was not a conventional cyberattack. Their main objective was not the hack itself. Rather, it was the influence operations made possible by the information gained from that hack.</p>
<p>This was evidenced by Iran offering the Biden campaign access to information stolen from the Trump campaign. The Biden campaign did not respond.</p>
<p>In addition to the more obvious nation-states such as China, Iran, and Russia, there are also potential influence operations being carried out or in planning by other threat actors that the US must not ignore. Overly focusing on just the usual suspects can lead to overlooking other players in the game which include not just external nation-state adversaries but also domestic threat actors.</p>
<p>Despite Iran’s hack of the Trump campaign, in this and in other election-related influence operations, the goal is not necessarily to favor one presidential candidate over the other. With Trump’s victory, that is now a moot point anyway. Instead, the goal is to use misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation to confuse and overwhelm Americans, regardless of their political persuasions, and to trigger their negative emotions to sow as much chaos and discord as possible.</p>
<p>The ultimate end game is to get the American populace to lose trust in their political system, thereby undermining democratic society. This, in turn, would open the way for these nation-state adversaries to further assert their own interests.</p>
<p><strong>Election Day Was Just the Beginning</strong></p>
<p>Thankfully, election day came and went with few and only minor incidents. This was not due to lack of harmful activity. In fact, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued joint statements advising the public that their respective agencies observed adversarial states—namely Iran and Russia—conducting influence operations “intended to undermine public confidence in the integrity of US elections and stoke divisions among Americans.” They added, “The IC expects these activities to intensify through election day and in the coming weeks, and that foreign influence narratives will focus on swing states.”</p>
<p>First, the fact that these three agencies felt the need to issue joint statements is highly significant and they would not have done so had the level of risk not justified it. The lack of major incidents is therefore a testament to their vigilance. But pay special attention to this part of their statement: “These activities will intensify through election day and in the coming weeks.”</p>
<p>What this means is that even though there is a clear winner, and the public has peacefully accepted the outcome, from the viewpoint of the nation’s adversaries, now is the time to strike. Now is the time to flood social media with misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation.</p>
<p>In fact, adversaries may very well have prepared months’ worth of content in advance to use in the case of either presidential candidate’s victory. That way, regardless of who won, they were ready.</p>
<p>A quick search of popular media platforms brings up posts claiming that the winner cheated. Are these sincere, good faith actors with real evidence to back up their claims? Or are they part of an influence operation? In today’s age, especially with powerful AI tools widely available, it is difficult for citizens to tell at a glance.</p>
<p>As a nation, regardless of individual politics, the US has gone through too much and fought too hard to preserve its democracy to allow malicious actors to put that hard-won fact at risk. Although it passed an important milestone, the election itself, it is not time for the country to breathe a collective sigh of relief.</p>
<p>It should not be assumed that the time between now and inauguration day, January 20, 2025, will be uneventful. Now is precisely when the intelligence and cybersecurity communities, the media (especially social media platforms), and the American people need to remain watchful and vigilant.</p>
<p><em>Craig Albert, PhD, is Professor of Political Science &amp; Graduate Director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Augusta University. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/The-Election-May-Be-Over.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-election-may-be-over-but-the-threat-of-foreign-interference-is-not/">The Election May Be Over, but the Threat of Foreign Interference Is Not</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Social Media&#8217;s Role in Disaster Preparedness &#038; Crisis Management</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/critical-role-social-media-intelligence-defense-law-enforcement-preparedness/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2020 15:47:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[COVID-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disinformation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public Health]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Social Media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Terrorism]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=14879</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>There were over 4.5 billion active internet users around the world as of January 2020—roughly 60 percent of the global population. In an average month, over 3 billion are active on social media platforms. This scale means individuals can disseminate an unprecedented amount of information more efficiently than ever. On Facebook alone, more than 300 [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/critical-role-social-media-intelligence-defense-law-enforcement-preparedness/">Social Media&#8217;s Role in Disaster Preparedness &#038; Crisis Management</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There were over 4.5 billion active internet users around the world as of January <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/">2020</a>—roughly 60 percent of the global population. In an average month, over 3 billion are <a href="https://wearesocial.com/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018">active</a> on social media platforms. This scale means individuals can disseminate an unprecedented amount of information more efficiently than ever. On Facebook alone, <a href="https://www.omnicoreagency.com/facebook-statistics/">more</a> than 300 million photos are uploaded each day—while every 60 seconds, <a href="https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/">approximately</a> 510,000 comments and 293,000 status updates are posted. On Twitter, an <a href="https://www.dsayce.com/social-media/tweets-day/">average</a> of 350,000 tweets are sent per minute—equivalent to 500 million each day, or 200 billion per year.</p>
<p>The decentralization of the ability to disseminate information at scale poses a challenge in the event of national and global security threats and incidents like terrorism, instability in post-conflict states, natural disasters, and public health crises, such as the pandemic we are currently experiencing. In all the examples above, without exception, individuals use social media to share opinions, news, photos, and videos of the incident and its aftermath. First responders and the relevant authorities—whether defense, intelligence, national security, law enforcement, and public health agencies—require accurate information in real-time, and can use social media as a tool for such information to assist in planning and response.</p>
<p>While social media is already widely used by law enforcement and national security agencies as to gather and disseminate information, this author argues there is an essential need to advance the use of social media in the public sector as a source of real-time information to enhance situational awareness, crisis preparedness, and disaster response efforts.</p>
<p>Social media is already utilized in counter-terrorism, criminal investigations, threat forecasting, and information operations. However, social networks can be even further harnessed by public sector agencies as a continuous, real-time source of intelligence, if leveraged appropriately, particularly given that improvements in technology applications mean that any individual with a basic camera-equipped smartphone can serve as a source of on-the-ground information at the epicenter of a significant incident.</p>
<p>Many would argue that continuous, in-depth analysis of social media content infringes on civil liberties and is invasive to the privacy of individuals, yet such an argument exposes a double standard relating to the use of information on social networks by public sector agencies. Many social media users share content publicly, therefore, analysis of publicly-available social media content by public sector agencies wouldn&#8217;t be a violation of user privacy. In the Intelligence Community, the use of social networks as a source of intelligence falls into the OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) category.</p>
<p>Regardless, whether used by law enforcement, defense agencies, the intelligence community, or the general public, social media is an immeasurably powerful tool for reaching and connecting people at scale. Relevant social media content and &#8220;hashtags&#8221; trend around the globe within minutes of a crisis event—such as an act of terrorism, political violence, a natural disaster, or a public health emergency—particularly when an incident rapidly escalates and is unpredictable in nature.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s therefore critical that defense, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, maintain and have access to continuous monitoring of social media trends as they develop in real-time. In high priority incidents, individuals on the scene are likely to share photographs, videos, and text updates—information of great value in a crisis. Intelligence gathered from real-time analysis of social networks would include, but not be limited to, preliminary assessments of the situation&#8217;s complexity and the response required, as well as forecasting future consequences that could arise.</p>
<p>Citizen journalism and &#8220;whistleblowing&#8221; over social media can also serve as a critical indicator and a warning sign of worsening situations. A recent example of this was Dr. Li Wenliang, the Chinese doctor who issued a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51364382">warning</a> in a message shared on the Chinese social media platform Weibo on December 30th, 2019 about a “strange new virus,” which is now a pandemic impacting nearly <a href="https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html">every</a> country in some way. In hindsight, had his post been viewed by intelligence agencies as an early warning sign, many states may have taken stricter measures earlier on to limit the impact of <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/index.html">COVID-19</a>.</p>
<p>In addition to systematic social media monitoring, automated text, and sentiment analysis of publicly shared user posts can provide crucial insights into the attitude of the general public and reactions towards an incident. This would further help first responders and security authorities when communicating with the public in an emergency, such as implementing enhanced security screening, border closures, and evacuations. Moreover, automated analysis of social media posts would assist first responders in their response factoring to avoid contributing to a public panic.</p>
<p>Social media in a crisis is a double-edged sword. As a crisis takes hold, a state&#8217;s adversaries are likely to take advantage of the situation and unleash a barrage of online disinformation and propaganda through social media channels in an attempt to foment public unrest. Such campaigns, usually initiated with a political agenda in mind to use the general public as unwitting proxy actors, present an additional challenge that further emphasizes the importance of maintaining continuous, real-time monitoring of publicly available user-generated social media content. Such a capability would effectively reinforce the efforts of first responders on-the-ground, and allow for public sector authorities to better mitigate the consequences of malicious disinformation campaigns.</p>
<p>Furthermore, continuous monitoring of social media platforms by a state&#8217;s security agencies enables those agencies to anticipate and counter unintentional misinformation. The spread of inaccurate rumors may have an adverse impact on public safety, a possible reason for the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Ghrebreysus, <a href="https://theconversation.com/covid19-social-media-both-a-blessing-and-a-curse-during-coronavirus-pandemic-133596">advocated</a> for urgent measures to be taken to mitigate the fallout from the coronavirus &#8220;infodemic.&#8221;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/critical-role-social-media-intelligence-defense-law-enforcement-preparedness/">Social Media&#8217;s Role in Disaster Preparedness &#038; Crisis Management</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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