The Strait of Hormuz crisis and the continuing crisis in the Bab al-Mandab Strait have shown that narrow maritime passages can and will be used as political weapons in future conflicts. The state actors in Tehran and the non-state actors in Sanaa, however, may not be the only ones that may leverage these choke points in future. For example, Oman’s ports could present an essential part of any land route alternatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) that avoid both the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz. However, they have also faced drone attacks in the current war and will likely face political instabilities in future. An alternative that has come into greater focus is the North Sea Route (NSR) or the Arctic route. Surprisingly, recent reductions in Arctic ice levels have increased the feasibility of using the NSR, now potentially facilitating the movement of goods. 

Iran asserts its right to regulate shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Under its 1993 law, innocent passage is subject to prior authorization based on Iran’s national security. The present crisis created by the Iran war has highlighted how the food security of many countries is connected to oil through fertilizer prices, which have witnessed a price surge. Before the war, around 30% of global fertilizers were exported by gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, 20% of global liquified natural gas is used as the feedstock for making fertilizers and much traveled through the Suez Canal before the Houthis disrupted trade. While the rest of the world will face higher food prices, the Gulf countries, which import up to 85% of their food, are still affected. Asian countries like China, India, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore are highly dependent on oil imports from the Middle East and must now find alternatives. In the present crisis, increased imports from the U.S. have provided relief to these countries, but the Cape of Good Hope route, needed for this transport, is time-consuming and increases costs.  

The NSR is also not without its share of complex legal matters. Russia has established laws and codes for regulating passage through NSR. Russia classifies the NSR as its internal waters and does not recognize the international right of innocent passage through it. All ships need prior authorization while foreign warships must notify their intended passage 90 days in advance. Ships may be required to use the services of Russian icebreaker escorts and pilots. Russia justifies its claim under article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Known as the “Arctic Exception,” it applies to all “Ice-covered areas.” It grants coastal states the right to enforce non-discriminatory laws in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to prevent marine pollution in the ice-covered areas. The U.S. and other countries argue that UNCLOS protects innocent passage through territorial seas and hence the Russian law is contrary to the provisions of UNCLOS. 

Unlike the Middle East shipping passages, however, the NSR has been in conflict and has not had any kinetic combat or active armed conflict. The free navigation operations may operate here because the U.S. may be reluctant to indulge in hostilities against and may not be equipped to do so. Simultaneously, there may be U.S. interest in selling its oil to East, Southeast, and South Asia through this route. Russia may also find advantage in developing this route and is seeking partners to develop it. Several countries have already reached agreements with Russia to take advantage of the NSR. 

Russia is already using its Arctic coast seasonally to deliver LNG from its Yamal project to Europe and Asia. With increasing arctic warming and higher investment in icebreakers, this may change to round-the-year operations. The present bonhomie between Putin and Xi Jinping had already led to the October 2025 Harbin agreement to make NSR a strategic Arctic trade corridor. NSR suits China for another reason. It reduces heavy Chinese dependence on transit through the Malacca Strait, where India is developing an island base with potential to choke that passage. 

India is diplomatically very heavily invested in the Middle East and has been seeking a route to Europe through Iran and through IMEC. If India were to shift to oil and gas imports through NSR it could face strong pushback and heavy geopolitical pressure. The shift will come with another risk; the conflict zone in the Middle East will be swapped for the possible U.S.-Russian tensions in the narrow Bering Strait and make India dependent on a Sino-Russian architecture beyond its control. Even so, that scenario may still be a long way off. A positive aspect is India’s long-standing trade and military engagement with Russia that has proved its strength in crises. In December 2025, Russia and India signed an agreement formalizing Indian military access to Russia’s Arctic naval ports. Long-term contracts for oil and gas and equity participation in the Arctic infrastructure and shipping capacity may follow. 

For India and Southeast Asian countries, the year-round availability of the NSR will increase overall energy resilience by creating an alternative route that will dampen price surges during the frequent Middle East crises. It will make it more feasible for these countries to tap into multiple oil and gas sources including Russia and the U.S. and, in addition, provide a faster sea route to Europe. There is also the feasibility of synergy between the energy needs of India, the ship-building capacity of South Korea, and the NSR. While the Arctic route will not be a silver bullet for Asian countries to have risk-free access to oil and gas, the shift of focus from the tropics to the North Pole shall reduce the historic leverage by the Middle East and will help keep prices and access stable even during the recurring Middle East flare-ups. 

R.N. Prasher is a retired member from Indian Administrative Service (IAS). His primary expertise is in geopolitics where he has published in RealClear Defense, Asia Times, and The National Maritime Foundation. He has published the book “Geopolitics: Impact on Energy Transition and Energy Security” and has an upcoming publication “Revisiting the Chinese Screen” The views are the author’s own.

The North Sea Route as an Alternative to the Hormuz-Red Sea Conundrum was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the region’s economic and security landscape continues to evolve, and as Chinese interests in the region grow, the United States government must increase its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through two avenues: first, by confirming an ambassador to ASEAN, and second, by sending President Trump as the head of the U.S. delegation to the 2019 East Asia Summit (EAS). These two actions would send a powerful message about American interest in promoting economic partnership, balancing against Chinese influence, and promoting a rules-based order in Southeast Asia.

The East Asia Summit represents one of the most important diplomatic events in the region. Featuring heads of state and government from ASEAN members and invited guests, the EAS provides a forum for high-level engagement in a key strategic part of the world for American security and trade interests. In recognition of this reality, President Obama attended the event on five separate occasions after the United States first received an invitation to the summit in 2011. In the past two years, however, former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Vice President Mike Pence have attended the summit instead of the president. Leading the American delegation to this year’s EAS would allow President Trump to show partners in ASEAN that America remains committed to dialogue and collaboration in the region, even as China increasingly asserts its own interests there.

The president’s attendance at the East Asian Summit would provide the United States with a high-profile opportunity to demonstrate resolve in Southeast Asia. Additionally, filling the vacant position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would expand the number of channels for more sustained engagement. At this pivotal point for the region, the U.S. government must deepen its dialogue with regional partners even as the president attends this year’s summit to convey America’s high-level interest in Southeast Asia. China has recognized the importance of sending an ambassador to ASEAN, maintaining this representation without interruption since 2008. Given last year’s adoption of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision 2030, this role will only grow in importance.

These steps forward in American engagement with ASEAN member states are increasingly necessary.

According to the China Global Investment Tracker, a collaboration between the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation, Chinese overseas investment in ASEAN member states has exceeded $55 billion since 2017. In Vietnam, for example, Chinese foreign investment has totaled almost $4 billion since the beginning of 2017. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the host country of the U.S. Mission to ASEAN, Chinese investment reached nearly $9 billion in the same time period.

As February’s controversy surrounding the role of Chinese firm Huawei Technologies in the Thai government’s 5G infrastructure initiative demonstrates, however, increased economic integration between China and ASEAN member states can come at a significant cost. In this environment, the United States must utilize diplomatic means to underscore continued economic engagement in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, these actions would send a message to the region: the United States seeks deeper diplomatic, economic, and strategic engagement with the nations of Southeast Asia, both on a more consistent basis and at the highest possible levels. Following last year’s passage of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), confirming a nominee for the position of U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN would also signal continued support for heightened American involvement in the region by both the U.S. Congress and the executive branch. As China seeks to extend its influence among ASEAN member states through the simultaneous uses of inducement and intimidation, protecting U.S. interests in the region needs a whole-of-government response.

ASEAN presents the United States with more opportunities than challenges.

China has recognized the strategic importance of the region and taken action to engage economically and diplomatically. The combined gross domestic product of ASEAN member states exceeds $2.5 trillion. Defense spending among littoral states surrounding the South China Sea will likely reach $250 billion annually by 2020. The president should travel to the East Asia Summit this year in pursuit of those opportunities for partnership, and he should nominate someone to serve as U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN to do the same.

In the past, the United States led the way in engaging with ASEAN. The government sent an ambassador to the organization’s headquarters and established a diplomatic mission there before any other non-member state. President Obama represented the United States at the East Asia Summit five times in six years; President Xi Jinping has yet to attend the gathering, and President Vladimir Putin attended for the first time last year. Confirming a qualified individual for the vacant ambassadorship and sending the president to this year’s summit would signify American leadership in engaging with ASEAN once again.

Two Ways for the United States to Deepen Diplomatic Engagement with ASEAN was originally published on Global Security Review.

In reference to China’s foreign policy strategy, Deng Xiaoping once said: “hide your strength, bide your time.” For three decades, Chinese foreign policy was implemented accordingly. As China realigned itself as a market economy, it seemed content in its role as the  “world’s factory;” at the same time, the rest of the world was content with cheap consumer goods that were produced in China.

In recent years, however, Xi Jinping has overseen a significant shift in China’s foreign policy. China has become increasingly assertive in pursuit of its national security, foreign policy, and economic interests both in the Indo-Pacific region and throughout the world, from Asia to Latin America. China’s policies and behaviors, from the massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea, are clear indicators that Beijing is done hiding and biding.

Significant amounts of natural resources and secure trade routes for exports are essential to ensure China’s continued economic growth. As the land components of the BRI expand across Central and Southeast Asia, the South China Sea remains a point of geopolitical volatility. The South China Sea is host to some of the world’s most critical shipping lanes. Eighty percent of China’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca, strategically positioned between the countries of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia—all of which are American allies.

China seeks to place the South China Sea firmly within its sphere of influence. Doing so would see China move from a position of geopolitical vulnerability to one of strength, effectively maintaining a “Great Maritime Wall” that would ensure China’s unfettered access to both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Consolidating and solidifying its sphere of influence will be the most significant Chinese foreign policy challenge of the twenty-first century while maintaining the status quo and retaining its strategic advantage will be that of the United States.

Estimates currently project that China will be operating a fully-fledged blue-water navy by 2030. It is likely that, around this time, China will be pushing to break through the First Island Chain in the East and South China Seas that are currently controlled by U.S. allies. Until China’s hard power capabilities are fully matured, China will continue to vie for influence using diplomacy and other soft power vehicles.

China’s Soft Power Capabilities

The canonical conception of soft power is centered mainly around ideas like constitutionalism, liberal democracy, and human rights, none of which are on offer from an unapologetically authoritarian China.  While Chinese universities are drawing growing levels of international students, the fact remains that, on the whole, China’s cultural pull is meager. Its most famous artist lives in exile, state media outlet Xinhua gets little traction outside of China, and while K-pop and J-pop are widely played outside of Korea and Japan respectively, Chinese popular music has failed to capture international attention.

China may not have much to offer as an alternative to the American Dream for populations around the world, but for the leaders and governments of developing states, China presents an attractive partner. Rather than seeking investment and financial support from the Bretton Woods institutions, which require governance and human rights reforms, many governments are turning to Beijing, which attaches far fewer strings.

While China’s lack of democratization does damage its international reputation, that damage must be viewed in the context of the relative decline of American soft power. The post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have harmed the global impression of the United States as a “bringer of democracy,” to the extent that such a phrase are now mostly invoked in irony.

In Latin America, the United States’ historical sphere of influence, many states are signing bilateral agreements with China on everything from hydropower projects to the development of telecommunication networks. China’s engagement in Central and South America has resulted in it becoming the region’s largest creditor. Furthermore, as U.S. levels of domestic shale production increase, there will be less U.S. demand for foreign energy. China’s thirst for oil, on the other hand, will continue unabated. For many Latin American nations, the choice of China as an economic partner has been a straightforward one.

The appeal of China as an alternative isn’t due to Beijing’s alignment with specific ideological criteria. Instead, China is appealing because it is an alternative. China profits from the extent to which the U.S. influence declines relative to its own, not from the gravitational pull of some cultural or ideological preponderance. This means that even those pursuing Western-style governance structures will see opportunities to engage with China. For these countries, if the United States won’t purchase foreign oil, or the World Bank won’t fund a development project, China will.

China’s Carrot and Stick

The allure of the Chinese alternative is visible in the South China Sea also. In this rather authoritarian region, liberal democratic values are held in lower regard than economic prosperity and political stability. Singapore stands as a shining example that liberalism is not a prerequisite for success in these metrics. To a working class citizen in an underdeveloped province of Indonesia or the Philippines, democracy—or “democrazy” as it is sometimes termed in the region—can seem stultified and inefficient. China, as it would have the world believe, has demonstrated that its model for global engagement achieves results.

China has attempted to satisfy concerns about the nature of its investment and economic policies. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, founded and led by China, is an attempt to increase engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The AIIB is a signal to countries in the region that Chinese investment isn’t solely for Latin America or Africa. Furthermore, China has been willing to engage in multilateral forums and agreements as it tries to convince its neighbors that its intentions are benign.

However, Beijing has mostly failed in this regard. Chinese military activity has increased in the South China Sea. China’s naval presence in the region has increased dramatically; the Chinese Coast Guard has even escorted fishing trawlers into Indonesian waters. Beijing is working diligently—and successfully—to reduce Taiwan’s international relations.  The Nine-Dash Line (which outlines China’s South China Sea claims) continues to be a significant source of tension; the region is flush with complex, multilateral territorial disputes, any of which could erupt into conflict with little warning. 

China, for its part, never intended to assuage its neighbors’ concerns completely. Instead, China is trying to show that, while it carries a big stick, it can be reasoned with.

Indo-Pacific states are now engaged in a continuous balancing act. Each country is weighing the benefits and costs of their relationship with the established superpower (the United States) against the incipient one (China). While China moves towards the maturation of its hard power, it is perhaps operating within the last phase of biding its time. China has attempted to sell a narrative where it is the reliable power in the Indo-Pacific, rather than a country several thousand miles across the Pacific, from which the echoes of “America first” can be heard.

Alliances are Essential for Maintaining the Status Quo in Southeast Asia

Nevertheless, regional alignment remains with the U.S.—for now. Staring down vociferous Chinese criticism, South Korea placed an American anti-ballistic missile defense system on its soil. Taiwan continues to hedge against a Chinese threat by seeking closer ties with the U.S. as regular arms sales have resumed under the Trump administration. The U.S. has turned a blind eye to Japan’s latent nuclear capabilities and encouraged the evolution of its nominal self-defense force into something more potent.

The United States’ network of alliances in Southeast Asia is intact but fragile. The U.S. must remain credible to each state individually to be credible to all states collectively. Should the U.S. signal a lack of interest—such as by withdrawing from the TPP, publicly questioning the value of a de-facto independent Taiwan, or demonstrating a hesitation to fight alongside South Korea in a conflict with North Korea—its network of alliances may be compromised.

In the twenty-first century battle for influence in the South China Sea, credibility is everything. China currently sees what it perceives as a power vacuum, and it is only too happy to slide into it. Affirming its influence and presence in the Indo-Pacific will be a key U.S. foreign policy objective over the next century. To succeed, the U.S. must act with determination yet delicacy, so that it may maintain the network of alliances that currently safeguards a strategic advantage over an emergent China.  

The Hard Edge of China’s Soft Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

This signal was sent in 2013 when four Asian states were admitted into the Arctic Council as observers: China, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.

The council is the Arctic region’s preeminent regional discussion forum, focused on issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. Of these four Asian states, China receives the most media attention, for a number of obvious reasons, such as the size of the country’s growing economy and its expanding Arctic capabilities, including icebreakers.

All eyes on the Chinese dragon

The Arctic states are aware of China’s strength and its willingness to push forward with its international agenda, including in the Arctic. This has been met with a combination of fear and pragmatic openness.

The Kingdom of Denmark, to name one example, has expressed weariness over China’s intentions in the Arctic. In 2017, Denmark turned down an offer received in 2016 from a Chinese mining company, General Nice Group, to purchase an abandoned naval base in Greenland, citing security concerns as the justification.

Simultaneously, China has been developing business links in the region. It has been working with Russia to develop shipping along the Northern Sea Route and it reached an agreement to build a natural gas pipeline project in Alaska.

In January, China published its first Arctic policy paper. Not publishing a policy paper was interpreted by some as China’s effort to downplay its menacing image as a threat to Arctic state interests. Though the paper articulates many commonly held assumptions about China’s views of the Arctic region, including its belief that Arctic waterways, such as the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route are international straits, it generated much discussion about China’s reach into the Arctic.

‘Near-Arctic state’

One statement in particular stood out.

China has labelled itself a “near-Arctic state.” This signals China’s intent to push against Arctic state hegemony and the common term “non-Arctic state” in order to insist on having a say in how the region is used.

Even before the Arctic policy paper, however, coverage of China’s motivations for its Arctic involvement have been commonplace, such as discussions about its mining interests in Iceland and its investment in the modernization of the Northern Sea Route.

At the same time, however, all the focus on China means that the actions of other Asian states on the Arctic often go unreported. Singapore is an interesting case in point.

Singapore in the Arctic

Unlike China, Singapore has successfully cultivated the image of a benign state. As such, Singapore’s Arctic interests and how it’s pursuing them have received much less attention. As a micro-state, Singapore is more limited in how it can assert itself internationally. Rather than see this as a weakness, Singapore has made this a strength.

Singapore is only 719 square kilometres in area. The country is dependent on its neighbour, Malaysia, for its fresh water since it has minimal natural resources of its own. Though Singapore invests a lot in its military defence — more than 18 per cent of its budget in 2018 — it does not have a history of using military force.

Singapore also has positive relations with both Western and Eastern countries. Singapore’s fostering of positive defence relations with multiple states is strategic.

Singapore’s defence and foreign policy is driven by its pragmatic approach toward politics. Singapore is keenly aware that its prime position in the current global shipping network is critical to both its economy and its survival.

The anticipated development of Arctic shipping routes are a potential threat to Singapore as they will redirect some maritime traffic away from it, undercutting its economy. Recognizing this, Singapore aims to be involved in Arctic development.

One area where Singapore might be of assistance is ship-building and other maritime technology. As part of its strategy, for example, Singapore is fostering bilateral relations with Russia. Economic development and modernization in Russia is the focus.

Cultural and linguistic differences have slowed the pace of bilateral relations, but both parties are open to pursuing the relationship, with the persistence of Western sanctions making relations with Singapore more immediately appealing for Russia.

Additionally, Singapore has committed itself to being a cooperative ally to the Arctic states and peoples in the Arctic Council. It has been heavily involved in the CAFF Arctic Council working group project on migratory birds, hosting a workshop in Singapore in January.

It has also created the Singapore-Arctic Council Permanent Participant Cooperation Package to give free education opportunities in Singapore to Indigenous peoples from the Arctic region.

Singapore’s deepening ties with Russia, its involvement in Arctic cooperation and the implications of both are overshadowed by discussion about China’s Arctic ambitions and investments.

It’s time for us to broaden our view of Asian involvement in the Arctic region. Otherwise, all the focus on China will blind us to the intentions, actions and involvement of other actors.

With all eyes on China, Singapore makes its own Arctic moves was originally published on Global Security Review.