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		<title>Meet the Human in Nuclear Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/meet-the-human-in-nuclear-deterrence/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Kittinger]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Dec 2025 12:55:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[acquired color vision deficiency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air Force 711th Human Performance Wing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[always/never reliability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CAD color vision test]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cognitive psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[color blindness]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31925</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Not long ago, uttering words like “human element” or “psychology” at a physics or engineering national laboratory would make scientists’ eyes roll. Their silence was a clear “does not compute” message.  It was as if Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, or Edward Teller had forbidden the “soft sciences” from entering those hallowed laboratory grounds. Those days are [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/meet-the-human-in-nuclear-deterrence/">Meet the Human in Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Not long ago, uttering words like “human element” or “psychology” at a physics or engineering national laboratory would make scientists’ eyes roll. Their silence was a clear “does not compute” message.  It was as if Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, or Edward Teller had forbidden the “soft sciences” from entering those hallowed laboratory grounds. Those days are over.</p>
<p>Physicists and engineers now realize that just as most car crashes stem from driver error rather than mechanical failure, the same logic applies to nuclear weapons, their platforms, and their potential use. Whether Americans like it or not, humans are in the system and humans are, almost certainly, the weakest link.</p>
<p>Humans are the weakest component in the quantification of margins and uncertainty (QMU) sense. Engineers often test individual components and larger systems of nuclear weapons to a 1-in-1,000 certainty that they will function correctly. There has long been a view that nuclear weapons should always detonate when employed and never when they are not. To achieve this “always/never” goal, systems are engineered to perfection while largely ignoring sources of human error.</p>
<p>Humans design and manufacture the components, assemble the weapons, complete the wiring, and install systems onto delivery platforms (i.e., subs, silos, and bombers). Humans verify satellite signals of potential attacks from US Strategic Command, communicate those findings to the President, and, depending on the response, draft and transmit emergency action messages (EAMs). This is a gross simplification because fragile humans play a much larger role, but it illustrates the embeddedness of the human element in the system.</p>
<p>One example of human fragility that took place in September 2023 at the <a href="https://www.exchangemonitor.com/report-crossed-wires-inside-nuke-make-it-past-pantex-quality-control-inspection/">Pantex Plant</a> is instructive. It appears a worker mistakenly cross-connected color-coded electrical wires inside a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>Across the world this very task might be performed by a civilian or by an Air Force 2W2X1 Nuclear Weapons Specialist. At first glance, it seems simple; connect the red wire to the red wire and the green wire to the green wire. But around 8 percent of men are born with red-green color vision deficiency (color blindness) that makes it difficult for them to differentiate between red and green (and many other color combinations. The US Air Force correctly requires normal color vision for this role.</p>
<p>Not all color tests are created equal. Some vision tests catch 99 percent of people with colorblindness and others catch 90 or even 50 percent of colorblind individuals. An analogy may be useful in illustrating this point.</p>
<p>If, for example, a worker was testing a component and needed to detect 14MeV neutrons, a detector that simply says “between 2 and 20 MeV neutrons were detected” would be unacceptable. A tester with adequate sensitivity is required to test critical components. Detectors that verify the specific reading may even be required. Sensitive tests for humans who work on nuclear weapons is also required.</p>
<p>The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently updated its <a href="https://www.faa.gov/ame_guide/app_process/exam_tech/item52/et">standards</a>, rejecting the century-old Ishihara color vision test and the D-15 test due to known shortcomings. The Ishihara test is fairly good at detecting red-green defects but will miss 100 percent of blue (Tritan) defects. Humans have red, green, and blue light sensitive cones in their eyes, and the Ishihara only tests two cones and ignores blue vision entirely. The D-15 test can <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/col.22596">pass up to half of individuals</a> with color blindness, depending on how its administered (a test commonly used by police departments).</p>
<p><strong>Figure 1. Simulated Color Vision Defects and Wire Color</strong></p>
<p><strong> <img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-31932" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/color-vision-defects.png" alt="" width="271" height="286" /></strong></p>
<p>Even if Pantex adopted one of the FAA’s “best in class” tests, such as the CAD, Rabin, or Waggoner Computerized Color Vision Test (WCCVT), there is still another issue—test frequency. Color vision should be tested periodically, not just once.</p>
<p>While 8 percent of men and 0.5 percent of women) are born with color blindness, it is expected that <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15742829/">15 percent of all people</a> will develop an acquired color vision deficiency during their lifetime, most often affecting blue vision. Most people assume color vision is a static ability, but it is more like hearing loss, which is impacted by age and environmental factors.</p>
<p>Changes in color vision ability can occur rapidly due to medications, diseases, or environmental conditions. For critical roles, annual color vision testing should be a minimum standard.</p>
<p>Finally, different color vision tests examine different axes within the visible spectrum of light, meaning that a person could pass the Rabin but fail the WCCVT based on individual differences and the specific axis tested by each test. This is truer for mild vision defects but mild defects can still cause sub-par performance on real world tasks (i.e., <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12568436/">reacting to red traffic lights</a>).</p>
<p>Across the United States, teams are working to quantify this human element in complex, high-consequence systems. These include the Air Force’s 711th Human Performance Wing and the social scientists at Sandia National Laboratories.</p>
<p>The next time you hear about a cognitive psychologist, industrial-organizational psychologist, or human factors researcher at a national lab, do not assume they’re experimenting with LSD and goats to perfect psychic warfare. They’re far more likely to be studying how humans interact with technology—quantifying behavior, limitations, cognition, and the human’s reliability within critical systems.</p>
<p>Organizations should, whenever possible, bring these human-focused professionals into projects. They will identify issues most engineers never consider across a variety of scales, “from neurons to nations.” Factors like color vision, tool slips, (as in the Louis Slotin “demon core” incident), dropped sockets (as in the Titan II missile explosion in Damascus, Arkansas), mismatched job abilities, fatigue, attention lapses, and even intentional sabotage can all impact the nation’s deterrence posture. When processes are optimized to include the human, overall risk is minimized.</p>
<p>In the end, deterrence is not just about weapons. It is about the humans behind the weapons, the fallible, unpredictable, indispensable human element that remains both our greatest strength and our greatest risk.</p>
<p><em>Rob Kittenger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Meet-the-Human-in-Nuclear-Deterrence.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="230" height="64" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 230px) 100vw, 230px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/meet-the-human-in-nuclear-deterrence/">Meet the Human in Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>How Civilian Dual-Use Technologies Are Reshaping Global Security Policies</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-civilian-dual-use-technologies-are-reshaping-global-security-policies/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-civilian-dual-use-technologies-are-reshaping-global-security-policies/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harry Geisler]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Jul 2025 12:17:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[AUKUS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[autonomous weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civilian dual-use technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collective defense]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[export control regimes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FPV drones]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[procurement pathways]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[resilience]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sabotage]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[transportation hubs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unmanned aircraft systems]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31187</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, police in northern Germany chased a fleet of drones loitering over critical infrastructure: a decommissioned nuclear plant, a chemical facility, and a Baltic liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal. The drones flew with impunity, reportedly reaching 100 kilometres an hour to evade police. Authorities launched an espionage investigation, suspecting the drones were scouting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-civilian-dual-use-technologies-are-reshaping-global-security-policies/">How Civilian Dual-Use Technologies Are Reshaping Global Security Policies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In August 2024, <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/08/29/drone-sightings-near-bases-infrastructure-unnerve-german-officials">police in northern Germany</a> chased a fleet of drones loitering over critical infrastructure: a decommissioned nuclear plant, a chemical facility, and a Baltic liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal. The drones flew with impunity, reportedly reaching 100 kilometres an hour to evade police. Authorities launched an espionage investigation, suspecting the drones were scouting for sabotage.</p>
<p>This was not an isolated incident. Civilian-grade drones and other dual-use technologies are increasingly being used to survey or target public infrastructure. From energy grids to airports, the connective tissue of modern life is exposed to risks once confined to traditional warzones. These developments are reshaping global security policies and blurring the boundary between civilian and military domains.</p>
<h3><strong>Civilian Tech, Strategic Impact</strong></h3>
<p>Cheap unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are now accessible worldwide. While drones were initially developed for military use, the most commonly deployed platforms today, such as DJI’s Mavic series, were originally built for civilian applications like aerial photography and videography. Their affordability, portability, and high-spec cameras made them commercially popular, but those same features have made them easy to repurpose for military contexts.</p>
<p>In particular, first-person view (FPV) drones, designed for immersive recreational flying, were rapidly adapted for frontline use in conflict. These drones are now routinely deployed with improvised explosives or used for precision reconnaissance. In Ukraine, both sides repurposed off-the-shelf drones in vast numbers; nearly two million were produced in 2024 alone. Many of these are equipped with AI-enabled navigation and targeting, underscoring how quickly civilian tech can be weaponised.</p>
<p>Non-state actors are following suit. Armed groups are using FPV drones for low-cost, high impact strikes on infrastructure, blurring the lines between military and civilian threats. This second drone age shows that national security vulnerabilities now stem as much from consumer technology as from conventional arsenals.</p>
<p>The broader implication is clear: private-sector innovations, often created without any defense intent, are shaping the battlefield. These companies bring novel use cases, technical advantages, or agile design processes that legacy defense contractors may overlook. Civilian tech is not just a risk; it is a potential strategic asset. Tapping into this ecosystem, especially among start-ups and experts, could redefine how the country protects critical infrastructure in an era of hybrid conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Infrastructure in the Crosshairs</strong></p>
<p>Modern infrastructure is a key target in modern conflicts or hybrid attacks, just like military bases traditionally were. In 2022, after the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/sep/29/nord-stream-attacks-highlight-vulnerability-undersea-pipelines-west">sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines</a>, over 70 drone sightings were reported near Norwegian offshore oil platforms. Oslo feared Russian-linked hybrid operations targeting Europe’s energy supply and deployed naval assets and invited NATO allies to assist in patrols.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, Ukraine’s energy grid suffered repeated drone and missile attacks, with waves of <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/drone-saturation-russias-shahed-campaign">low-cost Shahed drones</a> used to disable power plants. By spring 2024, <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/czvvj4j4p8ro">roughly half of Ukraine’s electricity capacity</a> was destroyed, forcing nationwide blackouts.</p>
<p>Outside conflict zones, attacks on infrastructure are also rising. In Sudan, a <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx20x8g2nego">drone strike on a power station caused regional outages,</a> and other drone attacks on water purification stations left the country on the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3v5n5ynl59o">brink of a significant Cholera outbreak</a>. In the US, federal officials stopped an attack on a power grid by a man using an <a href="https://domesticpreparedness.com/articles/protecting-critical-infrastructure-from-weaponized-drones">explosive-carrying drone</a>.</p>
<p>Transportation hubs are vulnerable, too. In January 2025, <a href="https://d-fendsolutions.com/blog/europes-drone-challenge-and-countermeasures-in-2025/">drone activity shut down Riga Airport</a>, disrupting dozens of flights.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Gaps in Governance</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Despite growing risks, legal and operational frameworks remain fragmented. Drones and AI-driven surveillance systems often fall outside traditional arms control regimes. As a recent<a href="https://www.flyingmag.com/white-house-unveils-package-of-drone-measures-in-executive-order/"> executive order</a> put it, “Criminals, terrorists, and hostile foreign actors have intensified their weaponization of drone technologies, creating new and serious threats to our homeland.”</p>
<p>Jurisdictional confusion is common. In many countries, local authorities lack legal authority to respond to rogue drones above critical sites. Aviation safety rules and privacy laws create hesitation, giving bad actors a head start.</p>
<p>Even when threat awareness exists, coordination is inconsistent. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warns that drones are used for surveillance and sabotage, yet they lack the comprehensive tools to oversee private-sector resilience or cross-border response.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>A Global Security Challenge</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Drone and AI threats are not confined by borders. In 2023, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/cipr/items/805599/en">European Commission launched a new counter-drone strategy</a>, urging member states to harden infrastructure and coordinate airspace protections. NATO has added counter-UAS exercises to its joint drills, while AUKUS partners are beginning to share emerging drone and AI tactics.</p>
<p>But international law is lagging. There is still no global treaty governing the use of armed drones or autonomous surveillance. Export control regimes struggle to manage proliferation of AI-enabling components. At the UN, efforts to establish binding norms on autonomous weapons are stalled. Ad hoc coordination is, however, slowly improving.</p>
<p>When Norway’s oil platforms were threatened, NATO allies were called in within days. After drone sightings near Dutch and Belgian ports, neighboring governments exchanged countermeasure plans. These models suggest a path forward: rapid and collective responses based on shared tools, shared doctrine, and shared threat intelligence.</p>
<p>The future of civilian dual-use technologies will not be defined by innovators alone. Whether drones or AI software, these tools are already reshaping how adversaries threaten public safety and economic continuity. What is at stake is not just national security, but the resilience of infrastructure that supports daily life.</p>
<p><strong>The Crucial Role of Start-ups in National Defense</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Civilian-origin technologies are now driving the next wave of defense capability. From FPV drones to AI surveillance tools, some of the most disruptive military applications today are emerging not from traditional defense primes but from commercial markets, often developed by start-ups with no military background.</p>
<p>A coordinated international framework is urgently needed, one that does not just support innovation and infrastructure protection but actively integrates civilian tech into defense planning. This means lowering the barriers for experts and start-ups to meaningfully contribute alongside legacy contractors. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad#:~:text=Industry%2Dbacked.,new%2C%20segmented%20approach%20to%20procurement:&amp;text=Major%20modular%20platforms%20(contracting%20within,on%20novel%20technologies%20each%20year.">United Kingdom’s recent <em>Defence Review</em></a> hinted at this shift, recognising that smaller firms are vital to national resilience, particularly when civilian infrastructure is under threat.</p>
<p>What is truly needed is a NATO-wide or broader allied framework that enables cross-border collaboration, streamlines regulation, and opens up procurement pathways.</p>
<p>Today, many start-ups working at the intersection of security and technology face steep hurdles: limited access to capital, opaque compliance regimes, and procurement processes designed around, and for, large incumbents. Yet by creating space for their innovation, we can modernize collective defense from the ground up, using the very same civilian tools that adversaries are already turning into weapons.</p>
<p>A coordinated international framework is urgently needed, one that not only supports innovation and infrastructure protection but also lowers barriers to experts and start-ups to contribute more meaningfully alongside traditional defense primes. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad/the-strategic-defence-review-2025-making-britain-safer-secure-at-home-strong-abroad#:~:text=Industry%2Dbacked.,new%2C%20segmented%20approach%20to%20procurement:&amp;text=Major%20modular%20platforms%20(contracting%20within,on%20novel%20technologies%20each%20year.">UK’s recent <em>Defence</em> <em>Review </em>hinted at this shift</a>, recognizing the value smaller firms bring to national resilience. It is time to take similar action at home.</p>
<p><em>Harry Geisler is the CEO of YAVA.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/How-Civilian-Dual-Use-Technologies-Are-Reshaping-Global-Security-Policies.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="180" height="50" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 180px) 100vw, 180px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-civilian-dual-use-technologies-are-reshaping-global-security-policies/">How Civilian Dual-Use Technologies Are Reshaping Global Security Policies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 12:09:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30811</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s military doctrine, honed through decades of sparse experience and adapted in the post-Soviet era, emphasizes the projection of power and the defense of its vast territory. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed a critical weakness: a systemic inability to implement effective force protection measures, resulting in significant vulnerabilities for Russia’s critical infrastructure, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/">Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s military doctrine, honed through decades of sparse experience and adapted in the post-Soviet era, emphasizes the projection of power and the defense of its vast territory. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed a critical weakness: a systemic inability to implement effective force protection measures, resulting in significant vulnerabilities for Russia’s critical infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. This failure stems from a complex interplay of factors, ranging from tactical miscalculations and logistical shortcomings to a potential underestimation of the adversary’s capabilities and a possible overconfidence in Russia’s own defensive capabilities.</p>
<p>Force protection, in its broadest sense, encompasses all measures taken to safeguard personnel, equipment, and facilities from hostile actions. For the military, this includes battlefield tactics, intelligence gathering, logistics security, and the establishment of robust defensive perimeters. For critical infrastructure, it involves physical security, cybersecurity, and contingency planning to mitigate the impact of attacks. Russia’s struggles in both areas are glaringly apparent.</p>
<p>On the battlefield, Russian forces repeatedly demonstrated a lack of effective force protection. From the initial botched attempts to seize Kyiv to the protracted and costly battles in eastern Ukraine, Russian units suffered heavy casualties. This was often due to a combination of poor tactical decisions, inadequate reconnaissance, and a failure to adapt to the evolving battlefield. Ambushes, artillery strikes, and drone attacks took a heavy toll, revealing vulnerabilities in their supply lines and a lack of situational awareness. This inability to protect its forces has not only hampered Russia’s military objectives but also had a cascading effect on the security of its critical infrastructure.</p>
<p>The vulnerability of Russia’s infrastructure, particularly its energy sector, is a direct consequence of these force protection failures. Oil and natural gas fields, pipelines, and processing facilities, often located in remote areas, require robust security to prevent sabotage or attack. However, the demands of the war in Ukraine stretched Russia’s military resources thin, leaving critical infrastructure exposed.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep within Russian territory, including energy facilities, demonstrates this vulnerability. These attacks not only disrupt energy production and supply but also have a significant psychological impact, undermining public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and vital assets.</p>
<p>Several factors contribute to Russia’s struggles with force protection and the resulting infrastructure vulnerabilities. Firstly, the sheer size of Russia and the length of its borders make it incredibly challenging to secure all potential targets. This geographical challenge is compounded by the fact that many critical infrastructure sites are dispersed and remote, making them difficult to defend effectively. Secondly, there are indications of potential intelligence failures. Russia may have underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and its ability to conduct effective counter-offensives, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of preparedness for attacks on its own territory. Thirdly, logistical issues plague the Russian military. Supply-chain disruptions, shortages of essential equipment, and a lack of well-trained personnel have all contributed to the erosion of force protection capabilities.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the potential for internal dissent and sabotage cannot be discounted. The war in Ukraine fuels anti-government sentiment in Russia, and there is a risk that individuals or groups opposed to the regime may seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to express their discontent. Such internal threats further complicate the task of ensuring the security of these facilities.</p>
<p>The implications of Russia’s failure to implement effective force protection are far-reaching. The disruption of energy supplies can have a devastating impact on the Russian economy, leading to shortages, price increases, and social unrest. Moreover, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure can undermine Russia’s international standing and its ability to project power. The perception of weakness can embolden adversaries and erode alliances, further isolating Russia on the world stage.</p>
<p>Russia’s ongoing struggles with force protection in the context of the Ukraine conflict have exposed critical vulnerabilities in its infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. These vulnerabilities stem from a combination of tactical miscalculations, logistical shortcomings, intelligence failures, and the inherent challenges of securing a vast and geographically dispersed territory. The consequences of these failures are significant, with the potential to destabilize the Russian economy, undermine public confidence, and weaken Russia’s international standing. As the conflict continues, Russia will need to address these shortcomings if it hopes to protect its critical infrastructure and safeguard its national interests. The ability to learn from these failures and adapt its security strategies will be crucial for Russia’s long-term stability and its ability to project power in the region and beyond.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a><em> and doctoral student at Missouri State University. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Joshua currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Russias-Vulnerable-Underbelly_-The-Failure-of-Force-Protection-and-its-Impact-on-Critical-Infrastructure.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="187" height="52" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 187px) 100vw, 187px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/">Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Syeda Fizzah Shuja]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 May 2025 12:06:36 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30754</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>War no longer announces itself with the roar of fighter jets or the march of soldiers. It now lurks in the shadows where the front line is undefined. The recent sabotage of Estlink 2 power cables, disruptions to Taiwan’s undersea communication lines, and the increasing presence of unidentified commercial vessels near critical infrastructure are signs [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/">The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>War no longer announces itself with the roar of fighter jets or the march of soldiers. It now lurks in the shadows where the front line is undefined. </strong>The recent sabotage of <strong>Estlink 2 power cables</strong>, disruptions to <strong>Taiwan’s undersea communication lines</strong>, and the increasing presence of <strong>unidentified commercial vessels near critical infrastructure</strong> are <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/beneath-the-surface-the-strategic-implications-of-seabed-warfare">signs</a> <strong>of 5th-generation warfare (5GW). Moreover, a high spike in emerging incidents like Russian hybrid tactics in Europe, artificial intelligence (AI)-powered cyberattacks on maritime infrastructure, and the weaponization of social media for disinformation</strong> suggests the evolving nature of contemporary warfare.</p>
<p><a href="https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/11/25/5th-generation-war-a-war-without-borders-and-its-impact-on-global-security/">5GW</a><strong> includes </strong>information dominance and manipulation, social engineering, economic coercion, cyber sabotage, and hybrid influence operations. It thrives on ambiguity, exploiting vulnerabilities without traditional combat. In 5GW, the lines between war and peace are blurred. No declarations, no clear enemies, just a relentless assault on stability. The goal is not to conquer land or destroy armies, but to cripple a nation’s spirit, economy, and infrastructure from within.</p>
<p>One of the most potent asymmetric tools of 5GW is economic manipulation. <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/11/02/palau-is-under-attack-from-prc/">Palau</a>, a serene archipelago of over <strong>500 islands</strong>, were untouched by war <strong>until 2017.</strong> Palau dared to reject <strong>Beijing’s “One China Policy.”</strong> This move sent shockwaves through its fragile economy in the form of economic strangulation. In a masterstroke of economic coercion, <strong>China’s state-backed tour operators erased Palau from the Web.</strong></p>
<p>Travel agencies stopped selling trips. Online searches yielded no results. <strong>Palau’s tourism industry, which accounted for </strong><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/sep/08/palau-against-china-the-tiny-island-defying-the-worlds-biggest-country">45 percent of gross domestic product</a> (GDP)<strong>, collapsed.</strong> Hotels emptied, airlines shut down, and the once-thriving economy suffocated.</p>
<p>This was not an anomaly, but a pattern<strong>.</strong> In <strong>2016, South Korea agreed to facilitate the American </strong><a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/south-korea-and-us-agree-to-deploy-thaad-missile-defence-system">THAAD missile defense system</a><strong>.</strong> China retaliated not with weapons but with <strong>economic muscle.</strong> Mysterious “fire and safety” violations suddenly appeared in South Korean businesses across China. <strong>A </strong><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/augustrick/2017/12/21/how-beijing-played-hardball-with-south-korea-using-the-2018-olympic-ticket-sales/">nine-month ban</a><strong> on Chinese tourism cost Seoul $6.5 billion.</strong> <strong>Retail giants like Lotte crumbled, thousands lost jobs, and yet, no war was declared.</strong></p>
<p>The more interconnected the world economy becomes, <strong>the more vulnerable nations are to economic blackmail.</strong> Even <strong>Venezuela, despite its fiery anti-American rhetoric,</strong> was bound to the US economy. In 2018, despite Washington branding <strong>Nicolás Maduro a dictator</strong> and Caracas calling the US a <strong>“white supremacist regime,”</strong> the two nations still had <strong>$24 billion in trade, </strong>a quarter of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/9/13/venezuelas-crisis-in-numbers">Venezuela’s GDP</a>.</p>
<p>Yet, when Washington imposed <strong>sweeping financial sanctions,</strong> Venezuela’s <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-tragedy-of-venezuela-1527177202">economy shrunk</a><strong> by 35 percent in a single year.</strong> After all, the United States does not just impose sanctions; <strong>it controls the very financial system that runs the world.</strong> The US dollar is the bloodline of global trade, and those who defy it <strong>find themselves cut off from international markets, unable to access capital or even conduct basic transactions. However, </strong>economic warfare breeds resistance.</p>
<p><strong>Russia and China saw the writing on the wall.</strong> Between 2017 and 2020, <strong>Moscow </strong><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-cuts-holdings-us-bonds-may-end-dollar-payments/29429653.html">slashed its holdings</a><strong> of US Treasury securities from $105 billion to just $3.8 billion</strong> and shifted towards China’s <strong>Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (</strong><a href="https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/why-chinas-cips-matters-and-not-for-the-reasons-you-think">CIPS</a><strong>),</strong> sidestepping American financial hegemony.</p>
<p>The true <strong>commanding heights of global dominance</strong> lie at the intersection of <strong>technology, finance, and unchecked ambition. China is not just selling 5G networks, it is embedding itself into the nervous system of global communication. On the other hand, the US does not just dominate finance, it controls the SWIFT banking system, ensuring economic warfare is just a sanction away. Similarly, corporations do not just innovate, they monopolize, influence, and quietly dictate policy behind closed doors.</strong></p>
<p><em>“Surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.”</em> A battle cry? <strong>Indeed.</strong> Not from a general on the battlefield, but from <strong>Ren Zhengfei, the founder of Huawei</strong>, a company waging a war not just against competitors but against entire nations. Britain’s telecom networks are suspected to have <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53329005">Chinese backdoors</a>.</p>
<p>I<strong>nformation is now what oil was in the 1970s, a critical commodity to be controlled.</strong> Today, <strong>data is the new crude</strong>, and the battle to monopolize its flow has already begun. <strong>Quantum computing, AI, and machine learning</strong> are the new oil rigs, and the nations that dominate these technologies will dictate the future. Unlike oil, <strong>information is easily stolen, manipulated, or even weaponized in ways no physical resource ever could. </strong></p>
<p>The first lethal autonomous drone strike in Libya, recorded in <strong>March 2020</strong>, was a grim reminder of what is to come. <strong>A suicide drone, powered by AI, needed no human command—just a target. </strong><a href="https://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/361">Fire and forget</a><strong> was the name of the game. </strong>Imagine the next phase: <strong>terrorist organizations deploying AI-powered swarms, able to strike with precision, invulnerability, and zero risk to human operatives.</strong> They would not negotiate, would not retreat, and would prove hard to stop. <strong> </strong></p>
<p>In a world where biological warfare is outlawed, <strong>the selective control of food, aid, and healthcare has replaced mass destruction with slow, calculated suffocation.</strong> Nations can now <strong>deny access to the very essentials of life</strong> to break their adversaries in a <strong>siege without walls and a war without battlefields. </strong>Over <a href="https://www.wri.org/insights/highest-water-stressed-countries">40 percent</a><strong> of the world’s population</strong> faces water scarcity, and by 2030, <a href="https://www.who.int/health-topics/drought#tab=tab_1">drought</a> could displace <strong>700 million people.</strong> The <strong>Turkish-backed militias that had control over the Alouk water station in Syria</strong> in 2020 was a stark reminder—<strong>when resources are weaponized, suffering becomes policy.</strong></p>
<p><strong>Interestingly, the battle of perception is gaining momentum more than ever. </strong>In an era of <strong>clickbait headlines and disinformation campaigns, lies travel faster than truth. The </strong><a href="https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-twitter-false-news-travels-faster-true-stories-0308">Massachusetts Institute of Technology</a> found that <strong>false news spreads 70 percent faster than real news.</strong> From <strong>the Soviet KGB planting the rumor in the 1980s that the US government created AIDS </strong>to modern <strong>deepfake propaganda,</strong> deception is the new artillery.</p>
<p>Even culture is not immune. <strong>Hollywood exported American ideals, Bollywood spread Indian influence, and K-pop turned South Korea into a global powerhouse. For instance,</strong> the Cold War was not just won by missiles, it was won when a <strong>West German band sang “Wind of Change,” which then became the anthem of the Berlin Wall’s collapse.</strong></p>
<p>If <strong>hunger, water, and financial systems</strong> hare already weaponized, the next battlefield is clear—space and the seabed<strong>.</strong> <strong>Subsea communication cables are responsible for carrying 97 percent of global data traffic and are the arteries of the modern economy. They enable over $10 trillion in financial transactions every single day.</strong> Yet, these vital lifelines remain <strong>shockingly unprotected and are vulnerable to sabotage, espionage, and strategic disruption.</strong> A targeted attack on just a handful of these cables could <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/beneath-the-surface-the-strategic-implications-of-seabed-warfare">cripple stock markets</a><strong>, paralyze banking systems, and sever military command structures—all without a single warship being deployed.</strong></p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <strong>race for space dominance is accelerating.</strong> From <strong>$63.66 billion in 2024 to an estimated $74.4 billion by 2028,</strong> the <a href="https://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/5735299/military-satellites-market-report#:~:text=It%20will%20grow%20from%20$60.92%20billion%20in,compound%20annual%20growth%20rate%20(CAGR)%20of%204.5%.">global military satellite </a>market is growing, fueled by the realization that <strong>power no longer lies in boots on the ground, but in eyes in the sky.</strong> Satellites provide <strong>precision-strike capabilities, secure communication, and real-time battlefield intelligence.</strong> The <strong>Pentagon warns</strong> that the US is already vulnerable, with <strong>China and Russia developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.</strong></p>
<p>In this realm, one can say that modern states wage wars without battlefields, where the goal is not to destroy but to <strong>subdue</strong>—crippling economies, infiltrating cyber networks, and manipulating narratives <strong>without a single shot fired.</strong> What is never openly begun is rarely officially ended. <strong>In 5th-generation warfare, silence is a weapon, perception is the battlefield, and survival means accepting that war never truly ends.</strong></p>
<p><em>Syeda Fizzah Shuja is a Research Associate at Pakistan Navy War College and an Mphil scholar in Peace and Counter Terrorism. Her work focuses on hybrid warfare and maritime terrorism. She can be contacted at fizzasyed2k@gmail.com.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/The-5GW-Playbook.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="245" height="68" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 245px) 100vw, 245px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-5gw-playbook-silent-wars-and-invisible-battlefields/">The 5GW Playbook: Silent Wars and Invisible Battlefields</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Impact of Hungary’s New Liberal Immigration Standards</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-impact-of-hungarys-new-liberal-immigration-standards/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dan G. Cox]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Oct 2024 12:25:55 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29106</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Policymakers in the West often fail to take a holistic view of security. China and Russia are doing just that as they prosecute warfare below the threshold of overt conventional fighting. This allows China and Russia to actively degrade the security of the United States and the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-impact-of-hungarys-new-liberal-immigration-standards/">The Impact of Hungary’s New Liberal Immigration Standards</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Policymakers in the West often fail to take a holistic view of security. China and Russia are doing just that as they prosecute warfare below the threshold of overt conventional fighting. This allows China and Russia to actively degrade the security of the United States and the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without really understanding the effort their adversaries are undertaking.</p>
<p>The recent decision by Hungary’s Prime Minister, Victor Orban, to open its borders to Russian and Belarusian immigrants is an example of a NATO member-state failing to see the large security implications of an act that is not directly tied to security. The mistake could, however, have broader implications for Europe.</p>
<p>Hungary&#8217;s recent decision to implement a liberal immigration policy, allowing Russian and Belarusian citizens to enter as guest workers without vetting or security checks, poses a significant threat because it will allow Russian agents, and there are certainly Russian agents mixed within the larger mass of migrants, to freely move within European Union (EU) member-states. With the policy also allowing guest workers to bring their family with them, without vetting for ties to the Russian military or security services, makes the concern that Russian agents will infiltrate Europe even more likely. Russian efforts to undermine European democracies through disinformation and misinformation is already well known. There is certainly no need to make the problem worse.</p>
<p>This policy flies in the face of an EU ban on <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/b2a4ebd8-df41-43fe-8d63-602c1d50e899">Russian airlines to the Schengen</a> Area (the borderless area inside the EU that does not require a passports for travel) and individual bans of hundreds of people connected to the Kremlin and the War in Ukraine. This is also contrary to the actions of many other EU countries. For example, Finland closed its border with Russia, preventing all immigration, noting serious security concerns.</p>
<p>Hungary did not consult with the EU or NATO. Strangely, this act took place while Orban is serving as the rotational head of the EU. The body is now <a href="https://euromaidenpress.com/2024/07/30/from-guest-workers-to-residents-hungary-opens-doors-to-russians-amid-security-concerns/">considering legislation</a> designed to halt Hungary’s immigration policy.</p>
<p>Orban is the only head of an EU or NATO member-state that <a href="https://euromaidenpress.com/2024/07/30/from-guest-workers-to-residents-hungary-opens-doors-to-russians-amid-security-concerns/">maintains ties</a> with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia since Russia’s <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3686148/two-years-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-continues-to-pose-threat-to-global-security">invasion of Ukraine</a>. Orban is sometimes called a pawn of Putin and one of his “useful idiots”—a term used by Soviet leaders to describe unsuspecting collaborators in the West.</p>
<p>However, it is unclear whether or not Orban is aligning himself with Putin because of <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/11/orban-putin-hungary-russia-war-politics-eu#cookie_message_anchor">ideological similarity, economic necessity</a>, or both. During his time in office, Hungary <a href="https://mondediplo.com/2022/12/05hungary">voted to sanction</a> Russia in the European Parliament and even condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. More recently, however, Orban tried to rally Central Europe behind Russia.</p>
<p>The question regarding Orban’s motivations is vital because the EU needs to reverse this new policy as quickly and painlessly as possible or Russia will gain a significant strategic advantage. This is particularly important as NATO ramps up efforts to counter Russian aggression elsewhere across Europe.</p>
<p>The infiltration of Russian spies across Europe is no trivial matter. In Western democracies, personal freedoms make it harder to determine who is working for an adversary government. Once into the Schengen Area, movement is unchecked to 29 participating states. Given the recent attacks on the French high-speed rail line before the 2024 Olympics in Paris, there is clear reason to worry.</p>
<p>The attack that shut down France’s <a href="reuters.com/world/Europe/vandals-target-frances-high-speed-rail-network-olympics-get-underway-2024-07-26/)">high-speed rail</a> for almost a week was low-cost and required very little training on the part of the saboteurs. Simple arson and explosive attacks on the rail lines wreaked havoc on travel. The attack is suspected to have emanated from <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20250729-far-left-extremists-likely-behind-france-rail-sabotage-minister-says">far-left French extremists</a>, but that does not preclude Russia from encouraging, training, and equipping domestic groups from undertaking such attacks. The Russians also use their special forces for covert attacks against civil targets.</p>
<p>Hungary’s liberalization of immigration policy, favoring easy access for Russian and Belarusian citizens, is detrimental to the security of the European Union and NATO. At this early stage, Western leaders must ascertain whether it is possible to persuade Victor Orban away from openly supporting Russia in word and deed. This latest development gives Russia a strategic weapon that is useful in conducting warfare below the threshold of conventional war.</p>
<p>The Russians cannot be given greater operational freedom. It may become necessary to punish or alienate Hungary if it will not act in solidarity with other Western nations.</p>
<p><em>Dan Cox, PhD is a professor of political science at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Hungary-Immigration-and-Russia.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-impact-of-hungarys-new-liberal-immigration-standards/">The Impact of Hungary’s New Liberal Immigration Standards</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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