Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting geopolitical alliances.  

From Bipolar to Multipolar Competition and Arms Racing  

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a massive arms buildup driven by deterrence theory, ideological rivalry, and fears of vulnerability. The end of the Cold War lowered tensions and decreased the number of nuclear weapons, but it did not eliminate them completely. Instead, the global system has evolved into a multipolar environment with nine nuclear-armed states, each with distinct strategic cultures and security concerns. Although most states in the United Nations have endorsed the principle of nuclear disarmament, no current nuclear weapons state has embraced the concept or taken even small steps in that direction.  

New Drivers of Competition  

The current nuclear environment is shaped by a mix of technological advances, growing regional rivalries, diminishing arms control agreements, and renewed great-power competition. Unlike the organized bipolar order of the Cold War, today’s strategic landscape is becoming more multipolar, faster-paced, and less predictable based on emerging factors. 

 Technological innovation: Hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and missile defense systems introduce new uncertainties about the survivability of nuclear arsenals. Another source of potential instability is the growing effectiveness of conventional weapons for long‑range precision strike, with destructive capabilities that might provoke a responsive nuclear first use or first strike. In addition, modern information and manufacturing systems, compared to earlier generations, shorten the timelines between concept and prototype, and between prototype and mass production.  

Regional rivalries: Regional military competition between India and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea, China and India, and among China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States, threatens to escalate conventional war into nuclear first use, and even short of crossing the nuclear threshold, exacerbate regional and global nuclear tensions.  

Erosion of arms control: The termination of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty, has created a situation of arms control anomie that invites competitive distrust among nuclear powers and increases uncertainty about their nuclear‑strategic thinking.  

Great‑power competition: The almost inevitable arrival of China as a third nuclear superpower creates an additional axis of uncertainty compared to the two‑sided Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China’s involvement in a tripartite format for exchanging strategic thinking on nuclear weapons and arms control is an important, albeit challenging, imperative for all three states and their military leaders.  

Risks and Consequences of Renewed Arms Races  

The modern nuclear landscape is increasingly defined not only by military competition but also by growing concerns over strategic stability, economic sustainability, and ethical responsibility.  

Strategic Instability: As states pursue more sophisticated and diversified arsenals, the risk of miscalculation grows. Technologies that compress decision‑making time—such as hypersonic glide vehicles or AI‑enabled early‑warning systems—could increase the likelihood of accidental or preemptive nuclear use. AI‑enhanced technology for intelligence, warning, and estimation of others’ options and intentions will become standardized among great powers, raising the issue of shared guardrails in military applications of AI technology for crisis management.  

Economic and Opportunity Costs: Nuclear modernization programs require enormous financial investments. For many states, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities reflects a tradeoff between perceived security benefits and long‑term societal needs. Even within the umbrella of defense needs per se, there are important tradeoffs among preferred weapons systems and supporting infrastructure. For example, in the case of the United States, the costs of developing and deploying the proposed Golden Dome antimissile defense system may compete with the demands of military services for new generations of offensive strategic nuclear weapons.  

Normative and Ethical Concerns: The continued reliance on nuclear weapons raises profound ethical questions. The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange—intentional or accidental—would be catastrophic. The potential erosion of norms against nuclear testing and against cavalier threats of nuclear first use threatens decades of progress toward the avoidance and management of nuclear crises.  

Future Pathways: Escalation or Restraint?  

As nuclear and non-nuclear systems become increasingly entangled, states, international institutions, and civil society organizations will play an important role in developing risk-reduction measures, strengthening strategic dialogue, and preserving norms to prevent nuclear escalation and maintain global stability.  

Technological Governance: Technological “black swans” have the potential to upend previously understood mechanisms for reassuring nuclear-weapon states against fears of preemptive nuclear attack. As AI, cyber operations, and autonomous systems become intertwined with nuclear command and control, states may need new norms or agreements to prevent destabilizing uses. Establishing shared understandings of “red lines” in cyber‑nuclear interactions could be a starting point.  

Regional Security Architectures: In regions with acute nuclear tensions, tailored diplomatic frameworks may help reduce risks. Confidence‑building measures in South Asia, renewed dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and discussions on European security could all contribute to stability. The containment of growth in the numbers and lethality of non‑strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, in the context of preserving regional deterrence and security, is of immediate importance.  

The Role of Civil Society and International Institutions: Nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and international bodies continue to play a vital role in shaping public discourse, conducting research, and advocating for risk-reduction measures. Their influence may be especially crucial as formal diplomatic channels encounter political obstacles. One challenge is the relative shortage of nuclear deterrence and arms control studies in research university departments nowadays, compared to the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods.  

Conclusion  

In the twenty-first century, nuclear arms racing is no longer defined by the relatively stable bipolar logic of the Cold War, but by a far more complex and uncertain multipolar environment shaped by emerging technologies, regional rivalries, weakened arms control structures, and renewed great-power competition. The combination of emerging technology and increasingly sophisticated strike systems has compressed decision-making timelines and introduced new risks of miscalculation, escalation, and strategic instability among nuclear-armed states. At the same time, the financial costs of nuclear arsenals and the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange continue to raise profound ethical and political questions about unchecked nuclear capacities.  

Preventing future nuclear crises will require renewed commitments to arms control, technological governance, regional confidence-building measures, and sustained dialogue among both states and nonstate actors. In an era when formal diplomatic channels are increasingly strained, international institutions, academic communities, and civil society organizations may help preserve norms of restraint and advance practical risk-reduction measures. Ultimately, the challenge facing the international community is not only how to manage nuclear competition, but how to prevent technological change, geopolitical rivalry, and strategic mistrust from producing a new era of nuclear instability with potentially irreversible consequences.  

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps was originally published on Global Security Review.

What Is the Third Nuclear Age?

The world can be divided into three eras of nuclear weapons history, each defined by distinct weapons dynamics and geopolitical relationships, and distinguished by major proliferation or treaty events of its time.

The first nuclear era was characterized by a bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1980s. At its peak, the number of warheads held by both countries is estimated to have reached around 60,000 in 1986. This era was marked by limited arms control agreements and significant arms racing.

The second nuclear era, spanning from 1991 to 2013, saw significant disarmament through bilateral U.S.–Russia treaties such as START I and New START, which reduced global warhead numbers by a considerable amount. However, this period was also marked by nuclear proliferation efforts by regional actors, including the nuclearization of South Asia, particularly India, followed by Pakistan, and then North Korea’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

Beginning in 2014, the third nuclear era emerged, typified by the current, chaotic, multipolar environment. Russia has unilaterally suspended participation in New START monitoring and verification, a treaty that expired on February 5^th, 2026. Both the United Kingdom and France have commenced modernization and expansion of their nuclear forces. China is rapidly nearing an estimated 600 warheads, North Korea continues to test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and Russia has modernized its weapons systems and deployed short-range nuclear weapons in Belarus. Iran continues to signal that it is nearing the nuclear threshold, opacity persists regarding Israel’s nuclear capabilities, and the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan has created multiple additional flashpoints, all of which underscore the need for new international multilateral guardrails.

Current Global Nuclear Trends

The United States has initiated a $1.7 trillion nuclear triad modernization plan, which includes submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles. Russia has been testing nuclear-powered cruise missiles such as Burevestnik, while China is expanding its nuclear weapons capability at a rapid pace amid rising tensions over Taiwan.

In addition, strategic non-nuclear weapons, including hypersonic systems, AI-driven command structures, and missile defense, are contributing to an escalatory environment in which the nuclear ladder has become increasingly slippery to climb and equally difficult to descend. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has set its “Doomsday Clock” at 89 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been since 1947, reflecting its assessment that the erosion of arms control, the expansion of nuclear capabilities, and the persistence of conflict have significantly increased the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

Escalating Global Nuclear Challenges

The U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations have ceased over Ukraine, and President Putin has reduced stated nuclear use thresholds. At the same time, U.S. military strikes against Iran have alarmed some observers who argue that such actions undermine norms governing sovereignty. NATO countries are increasingly exploring their own European deterrence capabilities.

A defining feature of the third nuclear age is the growing complexity of the strategic environment and the inability to manage global risks through simple bilateral frameworks.

Technological advancements that accelerate escalation risks include hypersonic weapons that challenge missile defense systems, artificial intelligence that may misinterpret launch indicators, and cyber operations that could inadvertently contribute to nuclear escalation—echoing historical false-alarm incidents in 1983. Meanwhile, China’s evolving relationship with Russia further complicates U.S. efforts to deter aggression across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

The Way Forward

With New START having expired, significant future limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by major powers appear unlikely, accelerating competition and instability. By the mid-2030s, the convergence of nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities may become normalized as tools of coercion rather than deterrence, while additional states may seek nuclear weapons should nonproliferation barriers erode. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has identified the emergence of the “third nuclear age” as the top global risk in 2026.

Accordingly, new mechanisms for arms control and nuclear disarmament consistent with commitments made by major nuclear-weapon states under the NPT framework are urgently required. These include enhanced verification technologies, AI-assisted monitoring, restraints on the development of destabilizing new weapons, and sustained strategic-stability dialogue aimed at separating and disentangling nuclear and conventional escalation pathways. Additional measures to promote norms of responsible nuclear behavior are also necessary, although opposition from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council remains a significant barrier to progress. Ensuring the global security of radioactive materials must remain a priority.

The third nuclear age has placed humanity in unprecedented danger. Existing disarmament mechanisms have proven ineffective as new rivalries emerge, and technological changes accelerate. History demonstrates that diplomacy can work: New START reduced nuclear arsenals to their lowest levels since the early years of the first nuclear era. Today’s leaders must again prioritize cooperation and restraint, or risk allowing miscalculation to turn expanding arsenals into catastrophe. The alternative is too terrible to ignore.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Understanding the Third Nuclear Age: Why 2026 Matters was originally published on Global Security Review.

As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These economic conflicts erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.

Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the supply chain. Moreover, it can weaken American global leadership as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.

The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and strategic stability. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.

American technological superiority, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately 70 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.

However, the American military is already in decline according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”

The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than three destroyers annually. By contrast, China possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.

The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a zero-sum strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly provocative rhetoric from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.

Traditionally, China rejects arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.

Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the great powers declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the verification process, and the supply chain supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.

Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.

Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.

In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of New START remains uncertain and fragile.

At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.

Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.

South Korea, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.

Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.

How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Buff asserts that the US must invest heavily in full-spectrum military capabilities to deter adversaries. However, history shows that militarization alone often escalates tensions rather than resolving them. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis—a frequent example in escalation dominance arguments—was resolved through diplomacy, not military action.

President John F. Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate behind the scenes prevented catastrophe. This underscores the need for diplomacy as a primary tool of deterrence, rather than relying solely on military might.

The concept of escalation dominance inherently invites an arms race. If the Americans aim for superiority at every “rung” of the escalation ladder, adversaries will predictably respond by developing their own capabilities, leading to a dangerous spiral of militarization.

This is evident in the ongoing nuclear arms race with Russia and China, where both nations responded to American advancements with their own. Far from ensuring security, this creates an unstable environment where miscalculation or miscommunication can lead to catastrophic conflict.

Buff’s advocacy for relentless dominance neglects the immense human and ethical costs of prolonged conflict. The destruction in Ukraine serves as a stark warning of the devastation that unchecked militarization can bring. Escalation dominance does not account for the millions of civilians who suffer in war zones, the refugees who flee their homes, or the global economic and environmental impacts of sustained conflict. A more humane approach prioritizes conflict prevention through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and economic development.

The article frames restraint as synonymous with appeasement, a reductive argument that misrepresents modern security strategies. Restraint does not mean inaction—it means carefully measured responses that avoid unnecessary escalation while maintaining credibility.

The assumption that adversaries only understand brute force disregards the nuanced motivations behind their actions. Engaging adversaries through dialogue and understanding, rather than confrontation, is often a more effective way to address their concerns and reduce hostilities.

The push for escalation dominance ignores the domestic consequences of prioritizing military spending over critical needs like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Buff argues that America’s survival depends on overwhelming military capability, yet the true strength of a nation lies in the well-being of its people. Allocating resources to address systemic inequalities and bolster resilience at home is a more sustainable approach to national security than pouring trillions into the Pentagon.

Rather than focusing solely on military dominance, the US should adopt a balanced approach to deterrence. It should incorporate four major objectives.

First, diplomacy should always be the first option. Prioritizing dialogue and international cooperation to resolve conflicts must always precede conflict and escalation.

Second, arms control is a necessary component of national strategy. Reinvigorating arms control agreements to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and rebuilding trust with adversaries is a must.

Third, humanitarian engagement is core to American foreign policy. Addressing root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and climate change, through global partnerships, can prevent conflict.

Fourth, smart defense spending is critical to an affordable defense. Invest in modern, cost-effective defense strategies while reallocating excess military funds to domestic needs is important for the nation.

Buff’s call for escalation dominance reflects a worldview that prioritizes power over pragmatism and ignores the interconnected realities of the 21st century. True security comes not from the constant threat of overwhelming force, but from fostering global stability through cooperation, understanding, and sustainable policies. The US must resist the temptation to revert to Cold War thinking and instead embrace strategies that build a more peaceful and equitable world.

Katerina Canyon is the Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project. The views expressed are her own.

Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Historically, adversaries, ranging from Imperial Japan to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, badly miscalculated American resolve. This was, in part, because the US did not effectively communicate national will and the country’s ability to generate combat power.

While nuclear deterrence held during the Cold War, a worrisome erosion of America’s nuclear deterrence appears underway. A combination of unilateral cuts to the American arsenal, sluggish nuclear modernization, and “nuclear psychosis” (fear of one’s own nuclear arsenal) likely led Russian President Vladimir Putin to develop an escalate to win nuclear doctrine. The same factors may also contribute to China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia issuing mounting conventional and nuclear threats against the West.

Americans need to remember that escalation dominance is an essential ingredient in effectively maintaining deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies. Escalation dominance means having the option to retaliate up or down the escalation ladder—at America’s choosing. This means developing and fielding capabilities that at least achieve parity, if not superiority, at each rung of the escalation ladder.

Without the US investing in the needed capabilities for full-spectrum conflict, all-domain escalation dominance, adversaries can study America’s capabilities and identify gaps. They can then develop and execute successful strategies that exploit those gaps. They can also incorrectly believe gaps exist, because of a failure of American messaging. Either way, American deterrence might fail.

The US once understood the art and science of escalation dominance—including how to weigh and manage uncertainties and unavoidable risks. At the most dangerous point in the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the US out-thought, outmaneuvered, and overmatched the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev backed down. President Ronald Reagan successfully escalated an arms race while also waging economic warfare. The Soviet Union collapsed.

America now faces multiple adversaries it must engage across the spectrum of conflict. Both horizontal and vertical escalation are certain. With the potential for conflicts to start in the cyber or space domain, the United States must have the ability to limit damaging incursions and malicious interference, while out-escalating an adversary.

History shows that America’s enemies, whomever they might be, tend to be relentless, brutal, casualty acceptant, and even genocidal. Current events, in conflict zones around the world, prove that this has not changed. Appeasement is as ill-advised today as it was with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Restraint is also as ill-advised now as it was then.

Sound theories of American victory need to be developed. Sound American strategy requires the proper matching of objectives to means. Without these in place, deterrence might not hold.

The stakes could not be higher. Conventional war is still almost always a prolonged and very bloody business, in which civilians are caught in the middle and have no safe refuge. If America’s strategic deterrence ever fails, the homeland might suffer devastating attack. Destruction in Ukraine is a small example of what such destruction could look like.

Nuclear war would likely prove unimaginably worse. Nuclear deterrence demands the ability to respond with proportional retaliatory strikes. It also requires the ability to match enemy escalation. The US cannot allow itself to be self-deterred by either a lack of will or a lack of capability. Self-deterrence is to give license to adversaries.

Yet some in the US continue to advocate for policies that eschew escalation at any cost.  This is a theory of defeat, not victory. Attempts to avoid risks only increase the cost of risk.

Such advocates need to be reminded that bullies will always test those they despise. Saving face and taking safe off-ramps are not a priority. For the US to be unable or unwilling to respond with sufficient force when necessary will only invite further and far worse aggression.

In the Cold War now underway, there is a danger of rapid escalation. To cede the military initiative to adversaries, to abandon America’s time-honored strategic culture of retaining full-spectrum escalation dominance, is to invite a nuclear strike against the nation and/or its allies. Adversary malign-influence campaigning is underway and now pervades American information.  Succumbing to these efforts to convince American society that isolation and pacifism are the nation’s best option is a mistake.

Appeasement never satisfies autocratic aggression. The United States must instead invest in the capabilities required to re-master the art and science of strong-stomached escalation dominance. This will support deterrence of America’s adversaries, assurance of America’s allies, and defense of the homeland. Now is the time to act.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance was originally published on Global Security Review.