The failure of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive pressure, military signaling, and elevated risk of miscalculation. This risk is driven by the threat Iran continues to pose to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and by its remaining ballistic capabilities, which allow it to erratically target neighboring Arab states and regional U.S. allies.

Furthermore, the announcement of a U.S.-led maritime blockade over Iranian ports fundamentally alters the operational and strategic landscape aimed at confining the Iranian threat. The main question now is no longer whether tensions will rise, they already have, but whether the current trajectory leads toward controlled escalation, negotiated recalibration, or systemic full-scale conflict.

Structural Drivers of Escalation

At the core of the U.S.-Iran negotiations lies a set of structural but irreconcilable objectives. The U.S. continues to frame its demands around three pillars: curtailment of Iran’s nuclear development program, limitations on ballistic missile capabilities development, and the rollback of Iran’s regional proxy networks. Iran, on the opposite side, views these elements as essential to regime survival and sovereign deterrence. Accordingly, this is not a negotiation gap; it is a strategic contradiction.

Iran’s nuclear posture has evolved from a bargaining chip into a core pillar of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) and the regime’s survival. Any perceived concession risks undermining internal legitimacy and external deterrence credibility. Accordingly, ongoing diplomatic negotiations are performative rather than transformative, thus aimed at managing escalation rather than resolving underlying disputes. Additionally, the U.S. decision to impose a maritime blockade represents a calibrated escalation designed to exert economic and psychological pressure without the need to immediately resort back to kinetic operations. However, the strategic implications are profound.

Iran’s economy relies mainly on maritime oil exports. A blockade directly targets this vulnerability, threatening revenue streams, which then impacts the domestic stability, in addition to regional influence operations funded through such revenues. From Tehran’s perspective, failure to respond would signal weakness not only to the U.S. but also to its network of non-state groups across the region. This creates a classic escalation dilemma for Iran. On one hand, not responding risks strategic erosion of the IRGC and the current regime’s image. On the other hand, the response risks triggering military confrontation, which Iran cannot withstand. In such conditions, even any Iranian action such as harassment of commercial shipping, or proxy attacks carry a high probability of escalation.

Another key driver for the escalation is the pre-positioned military capabilities. Unlike previous crises, the current environment is characterized by pre-positioned military assets and operational readiness on both sides. U.S. naval, air, and ground forces in the Middle East are already configured for rapid response operations, while Iran’s IRGC maintains asymmetric capabilities are carefully tailored for maritime disruption, drone attacks, ballistic missile launches, and regional proxy warfare.

Regional Spillover Risks

The Strait of Hormuz remains the most critical geographic variable in this confrontational equation given that one-fifth of global oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Iran has long signaled its capability and strategic intent to disrupt traffic through asymmetric means, including naval mines, drones, and anti-ship missiles. While full closure remains unlikely due to the overwhelming U.S. response it would provoke, disruption has already been taking place via targeted attacks on passing vessels, which is more than enough to deter commercial liners. Even limited interference could generate outsized economic and political effects, particularly for energy-dependent economies. All that said, the Houthis in Yemen remain on standby mode to disrupt the maritime flow via resumption of attacks on vessels passing via Bab-el Mandeb to and from the Red Sea.

Iran’s strategic depth lies not in conventional military parity but in its network of regional proxies. Groups aligned with Tehran, including those in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, provide Iran with operational flexibility. Given Israel’s successful campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah as well as the Iran-backed Iraqi militias preoccupied with the deterrence posed by the U.S. forces, the Houthis in Yemen remain the final card for Tehran. Intensified maritime threats from Houthi forces in the Red Sea are likely to reemerge at any moment. This allows Iran to impose costs on U.S. and allied interests without triggering immediate large-scale retaliation. However, the cumulative effect of a multi-chokepoint pressure strategy could compel a broader and internationally supported response.

Strategic Calculus: War vs. Controlled Escalation

Some believe that neither the U.S. nor Iran appears to seek full-scale war given that the costs (military, economic, and political) would be immense and unpredictable. For the U.S., a major conflict with Iran would disrupt global energy markets, divert resources from strategic competition with China, and risk regional destabilization affecting key allies in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). For Iran, a continuation of a direct war would expose critical infrastructure to sustained strikes and threaten regime survivability.

The most probable scenario over the next 2–3 weeks is a phase of controlled escalation characterized by maritime harassment incidents in the Gulf, limited proxy attacks, and intensified rhetoric and signaling. This scenario allows both sides to demonstrate resolve while avoiding irreversible steps toward war. However, it is susceptible to disruption by unforeseen incidents at any moment.

An increasingly possible scenario would be one that involves targeted military actions, such as U.S. strikes on IRGC assets or critical infrastructure vs. Iranian retaliatory indiscriminate strikes on U.S. regional allies. Such exchanges would likely be calibrated to avoid full-scale war but could easily escalate if casualties or strategic assets are impacted.

Lastly, a less likely but still possible scenario is the return to productive negotiations, driven by economic pressures including oil market volatility, as well as diplomatic intervention by third parties, including the Gulf states, China, or European actors.

The highest-impact and most consequential scenarios involve a rapid escalation into full-scale conflict, potentially triggered by Iran’s full refusal to give up on its nuclear program or ballistic missile development program. Other triggers for a full-scale conflict would include any major incident in the Strait of Hormuz, high-casualty attacks on U.S. forces, or a direct confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military assets. Such a conflict would likely expand beyond bilateral engagement, drawing in regional actors and severely disrupting global economic systems.

Key Indicators to Watch

Several indicators are going to be crucial in assessing the trajectory of the ongoing conflict. This includes maritime activity where increased Iranian harassment of shipping continues to take place. Proxy operations are also a critical indicator where the frequency and intensity of proxy attacks, and the Red Sea specifically start to rise. Finally, force posture changes remain one of the key indicators, as they are mostly based on advanced intelligence assessments, which are not available to the public or markets. That said, deployment of additional U.S. and allied assets to the region remains the clearest indicator of how the situation will move forward and provides early signs of shifts from controlled escalation to broader conflict.

For defense strategists, the imperative is clear: preparing for escalation, planning for contingencies across multiple theaters, and achieving consensus that in the current environment, the most dangerous outcomes are not those that are intended but those unintended.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly taking place in the “gray zone”—the space between routine state competition and open warfare. Rather than relying solely on conventional military confrontation, states are employing hybrid tactics such as economic coercion, cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and limited military provocations to gradually shift the strategic balance in their favour.

China, North Korea, and Russia are among the most active practitioners of gray zone strategy. Their activities are deliberately calibrated to remain below the threshold that would trigger a large-scale military response, allowing a to challenge the rules-based order while avoiding outright conflict.

For policymakers and military planners, this presents a difficult dilemma. Traditional deterrence models were designed to prevent major wars, not persistent low-level coercion. As gray-zone competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, regional states must consider how to deter and respond to these activities without inadvertently escalating the situation.

Understanding the actors involved, and the tactics they employ, is therefore essential. The following sections outline how China, North Korea, and Russia conduct gray zone campaigns across the Indo-Pacific and how these activities collectively challenge regional stability.

China: Gradual Strategic Expansion

China arguably conducts the most sophisticated and comprehensive gray zone campaign in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s approach combines military presence, maritime coercion, economic pressure, and legal strategies to expand its influence while avoiding direct confrontation.

In the maritime domain, China frequently uses coast guard vessels and maritime militia to harass foreign ships in disputed waters, particularly in the South China Sea. These forces operate in ways that blur the line between civilian and military activity, allowing Beijing to apply pressure while maintaining plausible deniability.

China also conducts frequent aircraft incursions and large-scale military exercises near Taiwan, while maintaining persistent patrols around the Senkaku Islands. These operations serve multiple purposes: demonstrating military capability, testing regional responses, and normalizing Chinese presence in contested areas. Moreover, Beijing employs cyber espionage, economic coercion, and diplomatic strategies sometimes described as “lawfare,” often passing domestic laws that extend jurisdiction into contested spaces to codify expansive claims, selectively invoking international law, and using legal ambiguity to its advantage. These efforts allow China to reinforce its territorial claims and political narratives while staying below the threshold of open conflict. Over time, such actions gradually reshape the strategic environment in China’s favour.

North Korea: Coercion Through Provocation

North Korea relies heavily on gray zone tactics to pressure its opponents while avoiding the disastrous consequences of full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula.

Cyber operations are one of Pyongyang’s most important tools. Groups such as the Lazarus Group have conducted large-scale hacking campaigns targeting financial institutions, governments, and cryptocurrency exchanges. These cyber activities not only generate revenue for the regime but also demonstrate North Korea’s growing technological capabilities.

In addition to cyber operations, North Korea regularly conducts missile launches, artillery exchanges near disputed maritime boundaries, and military demonstrations aimed at raising tensions in the region. These examples are limited military provocations designed to signal resolve without triggering open conflict.

North Korea also operates extensive sanctions-evasion networks. Through covert maritime trade, smuggling operations, and cyber-enabled financial crime, the regime generates revenue while circumventing international restrictions. These activities allow Pyongyang to sustain its economy and military programs despite heavy sanctions pressure.

Taken together, North Korea’s gray zone strategy enables the regime to coerce its adversaries, generate financial resources, and maintain strategic relevance without crossing the threshold of major war.

Russia: Information Warfare and Strategic Signalling

Although Russia’s primary strategic focus lies in Europe, Moscow also conducts gray zone activities in the Indo-Pacific that challenge regional stability and Western influence.

Cyber operations remain a central element of Russia’s approach. Moscow-linked actors have been associated with intrusions targeting government systems and critical infrastructure in countries such as Japan and Australia. These operations are often accompanied by online disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public trust and influencing domestic political debates.

Russia also engages in strategic military signalling across the region. Long-range bomber patrols and naval deployments near areas such as the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea demonstrate Russia’s military reach and reinforce its presence in the Indo-Pacific. In some cases, these activities occur alongside Chinese forces, highlighting increasing coordination between Moscow and Beijing. Such cooperation amplifies the strategic message that Russia and China are capable of jointly contesting Western and allied presence in the region.

Russia also maintains sanctions-evasion networks that facilitate illicit maritime trade, including ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea. These networks allow Moscow to sustain economic ties while bypassing international restrictions.

The Strategic Challenge of Gray Zone Competition

Gray-zone campaigns pose a growing strategic challenge for Indo-Pacific states. Because these activities remain below the threshold of armed conflict, they are difficult to deter using traditional military tools. Yet over time, they can gradually erode regional stability and shift the balance of power. This raises an important question for policymakers: how should states respond to persistent gray zone coercion without escalating into major conflict?

One approach is to use limited, proportionate conventional responses to push back against gray-zone activities. However, such responses must be carefully calibrated to prevent unintended escalation. This is where broader strategic deterrence may play an important role.

A stronger Indo-Pacific security framework—potentially including deeper military integration among regional allies and partners—could provide the stability needed to manage escalation risks. In particular, a future Indo-Pacific nuclear security architecture could serve as a strategic backstop. As much as nuclear deterrence underpins NATO’s conventional defence posture in Europe, a similar framework in the Indo-Pacific could help ensure that responses to gray zone provocations remain limited rather than spiralling into major war.

Preparing for Persistent Competition

Gray zone competition is likely to remain a defining feature of Indo-Pacific security in the coming decades. China, North Korea, and Russia are already using these tactics to challenge the existing strategic order while avoiding direct confrontation.

For regional states, the challenge is not simply responding to individual incidents. It is developing a deterrence framework capable of managing persistent, low-level coercion across multiple domains. Without such a framework, gray zone activities will continue to stress the limits of allied resolve and gradually reshape the strategic landscape. Strengthening regional cooperation, improving resilience against hybrid tactics, and reinforcing strategic deterrence will therefore be essential steps in preserving stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 2: Gray zone campaigns and activities conducted by China, North Korea, and Russia in the Indo-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

The partnership is a result of a long-standing history of defense partnerships but does not represent a paradigm shift in defense collaborations. However, the nature of this defense collaboration continues to evolve concerning the relationship of Pakistan to the United States and India. Examining the India-US defense partnership with an eye to the history, agreement details, and overall implications is worth the effort. Chanakya’s philosophical concepts, which are discussed below, are also instructive.

History

The United States and India are not new defense partners. The current agreement is an extension of those older agreements. This series of partnerships began in 2002 under the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA).

The most recent agreement expands the areas of cooperative defense to cyber and maritime security issues. This agreement will help bring the American and Indian militaries into alignment and make their defense capabilities and strategies align more effectively.

This US-India defense partnership is one of the ways that India can move toward greater defense independence and create “self-reliant” defense industries. The goal of this effort is to encourage the development of defense systems produced domestically or developed through technology transfers from other countries and to allow India to produce and export these products globally.

The US-India partnership also anticipates India having an upgraded military, being able to project maritime power more effectively, and enhancing its ability to deter aggression. The improvements in India’s military capabilities and its nuclear posture align with India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy; however, India’s evolving security environment is beginning to mirror the American security environment.

The partnership between the US and India will also help to reinforce the Quad framework (US, Japan, Australia, and India) as a key element of American Indo-Pacific Strategy, creating a free, open, and rules-based regional order. It is also anticipated that increased defense cooperation between the US and India will provide an enhanced collective deterrent against Chinese assertiveness and will enable the US and India to conduct more frequent and extensive joint naval and air exercises, such as the Malabar exercise.

Similar to other forms of strategic wisdom that are based upon the doctrines of Chanakya, the US-India defense agreement appears to reflect the concepts of not engaging directly with an adversary, depleting an adversary’s resources, and winning when the circumstances are appropriate. As such, it appears that India is employing a similar approach (building partnerships, establishing a defense industrial base, attaining strategic independence, and then waiting until the opportunity presents itself to engage) with similar replenishment concepts (economic and diplomatic) that were outlined in Chanakya’s playbook to allow India to capitalize on a potential weakening of the enemy due to internal politics.

While this agreement does provide a framework for cooperation and addresses some of the regional security concerns, including India’s negative view of China as an aggressive actor in the Indo-Pacific, the agreement does not establish a legally binding security arrangement, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Rather, the agreement reflects an increasing level of strategic convergence and represents a cooperative structure for defense. Media coverage of the agreement frequently exaggerates the significance of the agreement, while downplaying the fact that defense relationships between the US and India are not new and have little impact on the strategic balance between India and Pakistan.

While some in Pakistan see this latest agreement as a threat, the best option for Pakistan is to employ diplomacy, act in good faith to prevent future terror attacks in Indian territory, and avoid escalating tensions due to a false perception of encirclement. Positive dialogue with India and other regional actors will decrease the chance of conflict and build trust.

The US can serve as a stabilizing force to create dialogue between India and Pakistan and enhance regional cooperative mechanisms. Regional actors, such as China, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, etc., need to develop new policies to maintain an equilibrium in South Asia and not take action that exacerbates existing regional tensions.

The latest US-India agreement serves as a foundation for increased cooperation and may benefit regional stability and the overall security of the Indo-Pacific region. The degree to which this defense agreement has the ability to positively contribute to the strategic stability of South Asia depends on successful implementation of its provisions and the degree to which the United States and India can work with other regional states to address emerging challenges.

Harsa Kakar is as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. The views expressed are personal. She can be reached at Kakarhsa01@gmail.com.

The Impact of the India-US Growing Strategic Partnership on South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

This marked the collapse of a decade-long diplomatic agreement that once promised to restrain Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran through the JCPOA snapback mechanism underscores not only Iran’s isolation, but also the failure of Western diplomacy. By abandoning reciprocity, relying on coercion, and aligning with Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy, European powers not only eroded trust but also exposed their inability to sustain credible agreements, making sanctions a symbol of diplomatic defeat rather than success.

The roots of Iran’s sanctions regime date back to 2005 when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declared Iran non-compliant with its safeguard obligations. In 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved sanctions restricting uranium enrichment materials, missile technology, and related financial transactions. Successive resolutions in 2007 and 2008 further tightened the restrictions. In 2010, sanctions were expanded to target Iran’s oil revenues and banking sector, linking them directly to proliferation concerns.

These sanctions were lifted under the JCPOA in 2015, an agreement between Iran and world powers. The agreement also included a snapback clause; if Iran violated its obligations, any party to the agreement can activate the snapback mechanism and re-impose sanctions before the expiration date of the JCPOA on October 18, 2025. On August 28, 2025, after repeatedly accusing Iran of non-compliance, the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) activated the snapback mechanism that will re-impose UNSC sanctions on Iran after a 30-day time period.

The snapback that went into effect on September 28, 2025, reinstates UNSC sanctions, originally imposed 2006–2010. These sanctions include an arms embargo, ban on ballistic missile technology transfers, and restrictions on oil revenues and financial services—including Iran’s central bank. This decision aligns Europe more closely with the American position, despite Washington having withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018. However, the sanctions are not binding on China and Russia, and both remain aligned with Iran and critical of the European move.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian condemned the sanctions as “unfair, unjust, and illegal.” Tehran recalled its ambassadors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for consultations but clarified it had no immediate plans to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any further response, however, will likely be determined by the Iranian parliament.

The JCPOA was built on reciprocity and trust, but after the US withdrew, Europe failed to deliver promised economic benefits. Instead, Iran faced escalating accusations and even sabotage.

Coordinated attacks by the US and Israel in June 2025 on Iran’s nuclear facilities during negotiations eroded any remaining trust in Western intentions. Today, Iranian officials view Western diplomacy less as a pathway to compromise and more as a tool for coercion and deception.

While Russia and China echoed Iran’s position and warned that the European move would fuel further instability in the region, the E3 maintained that Iran’s nuclear activity crossed red lines. E3 members also emphasized that diplomacy was not over by offering to delay sanctions for six months if Iran restored access for inspectors and engaged in talks with the US.

The reactivation of sanctions primarily reflects Europe’s failure to secure diplomatic gains after the 12-day war earlier this year. Western powers assumed Iran’s weakened position, given that internal unrest, economic strain, and military pressure would push it toward compromise. Instead, Iran resisted demands for zero enrichment and even presented partial solutions at the UN, which were rejected. The E3’s alignment with Washington now resembles Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy, raising the risk of further escalation rather than resolution.

Nevertheless, the first brunt of these sanctions will fall on ordinary Iranians. Currency devaluation, unemployment, and economic stagnation will intensify along with the hardships caused by protests and war. The Iranian banking sector, already fragile, faces further isolation. Yet for Iran’s leadership, these sanctions may not dramatically alter strategic calculations. Having endured American sanctions since 2018, Tehran has adapted by relying increasingly on its Look East strategy to deepen economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia.

The energy sector will again come under strain, but much depends on how aggressively the US enforces secondary sanctions, particularly against China, one of Iran’s largest oil buyers. If oil exports continue through alternative routes, Iran will remain financially afloat, albeit constrained. Thus, the sanctions are more likely to weaken Iran internally while leaving its external policies largely intact.

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of the snapback is the possibility of renewed Israeli strikes against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In June 2025, Israel used IAEA findings as justification for bombing Iranian facilities, sparking a costly 12-day conflict. Israel could again resume attack under the guise of re-imposition of UNSC sanctions.

The attacks stalled Iran’s nuclear program by roughly two years, thus dragging the US into a wider regional confrontation with little strategic gain. By contrast, the JCPOA achieved restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program without military confrontation and provided economic benefits and political openings for both sides. It shows that diplomacy slows proliferation more effectively and cheaply than war. Yet with sanctions restored, Israel may once again seek a military solution, raising the risk of escalation across the region.

The re-imposition of UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism signals both the collapse of trust in the JCPOA framework and the deepening rift between Iran and the West. For Iran, the sanctions reinforce the perception that Western promises are unreliable, and diplomacy is a trap.

For Europe, the move highlights its limited influence, as it increasingly gravitates toward Washington’s approach rather than pursuing independent solutions. Ultimately, sanctions will punish ordinary Iranians more than they will alter Tehran’s strategic direction. With China and Russia unlikely to comply, Iran’s external lifelines remain intact. What has been lost, however, is the fragile trust built over a decade of negotiations.

The JCPOA demonstrated that diplomacy could restrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions without war; the snapback demonstrates how easily that progress is undone. As tensions rise, the international community faces a choice, either double down on coercion or return to diplomacy. The lesson of the past decade is unmistakable: military and economic pressure may delay Iran’s nuclear program, but only diplomacy can stop it.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at SVI. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Snapback Sanctions: The Collapse of Western Diplomacy with Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

In PNG, the Pukpuk Treaty not only strengthens its defense relationship with Australia but also prompts a realignment of Australian strategy, influencing how major powers like China, the United States, and others engage in the region. The treaty demonstrates that small states are not merely reactive; they can take the initiative to defend their interests and manage the challenges of superpower competition.

The Pukpuk Treaty reflects how PNG is repositioning itself strategically due to limited capacity, geographic vulnerability, and internal security pressures. PNG has recognized its weaknesses in defense forces, including border patrol, sea patrols, internal security, police, and the equipment and software of its defense (training, doctrine, etc.).

The treaty will address these gaps by enhancing capacity, fostering interoperability with Australia, exploring recruitment of PNG staff into the Australian Defence Force (ADF), promoting joint training, and modernizing the military. By requesting the treaty, PNG is not merely accepting foreign assistance but choosing a partner and clearly defining the nature of cooperation, with its sovereignty as a central concern.

The political elite in PNG are using the treaty as a tool to influence the broader competition between the great powers. Part of the treaty’s design is a clear strategic counter-pressure by Australia against the rising Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Canberra is concerned that China’s growing influence through trade, investment, infrastructure, or even security arrangements with Pacific nations could pose a threat to Australia along its northern borders. The Pukpuk Treaty thus becomes a key part of Australia’s strategy to secure its neighborhood.

However, PNG is not passive; its foreign affairs ministry explicitly stated that the treaty will not include a third-party cooperation exception, and that PNG retains its constitutional right to engage in defense cooperation with other countries. This balancing act allows PNG to welcome Australian protection and investment while also trying to preserve flexibility in its foreign policy.

The Pukpuk Treaty shows how legal, constitutional, and domestic political constraints can serve as practical tools for small states to influence great powers. In Papua New Guinea, there is an ongoing debate: recently, retired Major General Jerry Singirok questioned concepts of sovereignty, non-alignment, and constitutionality, specifically whether integrating the PNG Defence Force into the ADF structures or adopting Australian military doctrine would be unconstitutional under PNG law.

Papua New Guinea also issued warnings that public consultation, parliamentary ratification, and legal safeguards are practical considerations. These constraints suggest that Australian strategic ambitions are not pursued unconditionally but require negotiation and moderation. PNG is leveraging its internal political processes to ensure its interests are protected. This demonstrates that small states are not merely vassals but hold significant agency through institutional rules, constitutional mechanisms, and civil-military relations.

The treaty reshapes how we view alliances and security in the Pacific. Currently, Australia has only a few formal mutual defense treaties. The Pukpuk Treaty is the first new treaty-level defense alliance in Australia in over 70 years. This indicates a shift from informal security cooperation, training, aid, and soft security towards more formalized mutual defense commitments.

For the Pacific, this means smaller states seeking such formal agreements gain greater bargaining power, more reliable security arrangements, and improved access to resources. It also increases the stakes in global competition. Any formal alliance is likely to provoke countermeasures by other major powers. In fact, China already warned PNG not to sign a treaty that restricts collaboration with other nations and stressed the importance of maintaining sovereignty and decision-making independence.

Being this close to Australia will limit PNG’s options, potentially tying it to Australia’s strategic interests, which may not align with those of PNG, leaving PNG vulnerable to diplomatic repercussions in its dealings with China.

There is also a constitutional risk; PNG’s legal framework might have to balance issues such as dual staffing, foreign military doctrine, foreign operational control, or access to bases. The treaty must protect PNG’s sovereignty while enabling productive cooperation. Additionally, there is a domestic political risk. A perception of lost sovereignty or involvement in an unwanted conflict could provoke public and political instability.

The case of PNG signals that small states are no longer just battlegrounds, but active creators of regional order. By taking the lead and signing such a treaty, PNG clarifies what it requires regarding defense cooperation, sovereignty safeguards, and strategic balance. Using domestic legal procedures (parliamentary ratification, constitutional review, popular debate), PNG ensures that any potential arrangement is stronger than past cooperation and aligns with its long-term interests. Other small states will observe this and may be encouraged to pursue more formal engagements and specific defense partnerships instead of informal or ad hoc arrangements.

Fawad Afridi is an MPhil Scholar at the National Defense University. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

What the Pukpuk Mutual Defense Treaty Tells Us about the Pacific Security Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.

These capabilities are considered key to a state’s escalation dominance strategy. However, India’s escalation dominance in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.

In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.

Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named Cold Start, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.

On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its operational capability and survivability, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.

The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.

India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a bunker-buster. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.

These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.

It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.

Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its military capabilities and technological strides.

On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, Trump’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high tariffs was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.

India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.

India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.

The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

The election took on a new importance following the breakdown of the once powerful alliance between the Marcos and Duterte political dynasties—after the rapid political decline of the previously popular Duterte family. The Dutertes accused President Marcos of leading a deliberate effort to eliminate his most significant political rivals.

What began as a unified political force that dominated the 2022 elections disintegrated into a bitter rivalry, characterized by personal attacks and an impeachment move against Vice President Sara Duterte. She faces allegations of fund misuse, unexplained wealth accumulation, and even issuing threats against President Marcos, the First Lady, and the House Speaker.

The outcome of the Senate race was crucial, as senators will serve as jurors in the impeachment trial of the vice president. To convict Duterte and permanently bar her from public office, at least 16 of the 24 senators must vote in favor of removal.

The elections, which determined half of the Senate, the entire House of Representatives, and thousands of local officials, revealed a surprisingly even split between Marcos- and Duterte-aligned candidates, defying pre-election polling that predicted a weaker performance from the Duterte faction. The final tally of votes shows that neither Marcos nor Duterte were the big winner in the Senate. Instead, a solid block of both Marcos and Duterte supporters was joined by various reformist candidates who are likely to serve as wild cards in both an impeachment trial and future legislative debates.

Meanwhile, former President Rodrigo Duterte was elected by a massive margin in his bid to reclaim the mayorship of Davao City, despite being detained by the International Criminal Court (ICC). He remained eligible to run because he has not been convicted of any crime. Unexpectedly, the strong showing from the Duterte bloc, combined with the deepening political divide, raises concerns about potential unrest, power consolidation efforts, or gridlock within key institutions even in the intelligence community. As rival factions jostle for influence, the risk of politically motivated violence, destabilizing protests, or coercive maneuvers at both the national and local levels may increase, threatening the country’s governance stability and democratic integrity.

President Marcos publicly distanced himself from the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Duterte. The President denies accusations that he is pursuing a personal vendetta against the Duterte family. Instead, Marcos focused his campaign narrative on the country’s economic progress and his firm stance on defending national sovereignty, highlighting his administration’s opposition to China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea. With tensions over Beijing’s regional behavior rising, China is a major political flashpoint in this election cycle.

By downplaying his involvement in the impeachment process, Marcos aims to protect his image as a unifying leader above partisan revenge, possibly to appeal to moderates. This move also helps shift public discourse away from the political feud and refocus it on policy, allowing him to sidestep accusations of using state power to silence rivals.

Marcos’s hardline rhetoric on China serves as a strategic appeal to nationalist sentiment, which grew amid repeated maritime confrontations in the South China Sea. By taking a strong position against Beijing, he seeks to rally public support, differentiate himself from Duterte’s historically China-friendly stance, and secure backing from defense-focused and pro-sovereignty voters.

The spotlight on China in the campaign reflects a broader trend of foreign policy becoming a domestic political issue. This signals a growing alignment between national security concerns and electoral strategy.

Marcos’s tougher China policy also aligns with American interests in the region, potentially strengthening his international legitimacy while further polarizing his rivalry with the Dutertes, who are seen as closer to China.

Conclusion

The convergence of internal political rivalries, external geopolitical interests, and a shifting demographic base marks a potentially volatile era for Philippine democracy where political missteps could quickly escalate into security threats or international incidents. While the Philippines has a civic society and the institutional framework necessary for democratic resilience, political reform, especially an enforceable anti-dynasty law, is essential to revitalize governance.

The results from the Philippine midterm elections illustrate not only the enduring power of political dynasties, but also the rising intensity of intra-elite competition, as both the Marcos and Duterte factions entrench their influence in the Senate. The election’s implications extend beyond politics into questions of institutional credibility, legal accountability, and long-term political stability. How this battle unfolds will shape the Philippines’ democracy in the face of deepening polarization.

The Philippine midterm elections are no longer routine legislative exercises. They are a crucible for deeper structural tensions in the country’s democracy. With institutional legitimacy, political accountability, and regional stability at stake, the results of elections could redefine the Philippines’ democratic trajectory and security outlook in the years to come.

Jumel G. Estrañero is a defense, security, and political analyst and a university lecturer in the Philippines. He worked in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Civil Defense, National Security Council-Office of the President, and currently in the Department of the National Defense.

Power Play in the Philippine Midterm Election was originally published on Global Security Review.

Golden Dome is focused on specific missile threats to the American homeland. AUKUS pillar two is designed to reduce the significant lead China has in dual-use emerging technologies. An “extended” Golden Dome approach that produces strong and resilient allies may provide greater strategic deterrence than an America alone approach.

As stronger allies contribute more to collective defense through burden sharing, this can reduce the financial and military burden on the United States. Capable allies can deter aggression and manage local conflicts, promoting regional stability without constant American intervention.

If allies are seen as weak and easily overrun, it may undermine the credibility of alliances and security guarantees, thereby emboldening adversaries. Strong allies often bring advanced technologies and capabilities that enhance joint operations through interoperability and innovation.

Defeating fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), hypersonic glide weapons, and land-attack cruise missile threats is the focus of Golden Dome, which “proposes a multilayered defense network capable of intercepting threats during the boost, midcourse, and terminal stages of missile flight.” Some analysts argue that it is easiest to target these threats in the boost/ascent phase.

Targeting the boost phase can either occur from allied territory, targeting North Korean missiles from South Korea, or the homeland. The boost phase can also be targeted from space. However, targeting from space is not without its own unique set of challenges. Either way, it will not be solved by America without its allies.

Arguably, five-eyes countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) are already entangled in American nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). Furthermore, the US operates in coordination with other military forces as part of broader coalition operations. Hence, extending Golden Dome to allies is not only possible, but can further leverage the AUKUS pillar two effort. Moreover, a missile defense system consists of sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control systems that work together to detect, track, and intercept incoming missiles.

These necessary components exist in AUKUS pillar two working groups like the cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities, innovation and information sharing, and the deep-space advanced radar capability program (DARC).

AUKUS pillar two leadership should prioritize the development of technologies and supporting systems for an effective extended Golden Dome architecture. America is unlikely to solve the problem in isolation by building a “tightly integrated system of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial radar stations, directed-energy platforms, and kinetic interceptors” that senses, decides, and neutralizes incoming missiles. The linkages and opportunities for the prioritization of advanced technology development for missile defense can be found in the following summaries.

Cyber capabilities encompass both offensive and defensive operations for missile defense. Offensive cyber tools are used to deter adversaries and disrupt their operations through tactics such as cyber-reconnaissance, communication isolation, targeted strikes, and network intrusions. Defensively, military forces can prioritize robust network protection, active threat disruption, and seamless coordination across units to safeguard critical systems. Cyber operations can enhance intelligence gathering, command and control, and information warfare to shape public perception and the broader information environment. As conflict evolves, training personnel in cyber tactics and integrating machine learning for threat detection and analysis can maintain strategic advantage.

AI and autonomy can transform missile defense and military operations by enhancing efficiency, precision, and decision-making. Autonomous weapon systems are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat missions. AI-driven wargaming platforms simulate real-world combat scenarios to help strategists test tactics and improve readiness. In command and control, AI supports real-time data processing and analysis. AI optimizes logistics by improving resource allocation, supply-chain management, and transportation.

In intelligence and surveillance, AI analyzes vast datasets to detect patterns and identify threats. Additionally, AI monitors threats and predicts future events. Human-machine teaming allows AI systems to collaborate with human operators, combining strengths and minimizing errors.

Quantum technologies transform missile defenses through enhanced security, operational efficiency, and advanced training. In cybersecurity, quantum-resistant cryptography is being developed to protect against the threat quantum computers pose to traditional encryption. Quantum key distribution offers highly secure communication by transmitting encryption keys through quantum channels, making interception nearly impossible.

In military operations, quantum algorithms can optimize logistics, supply chains, and battlefield strategies by analyzing complex data in real time. Quantum computing could process data in real time, enabling missile defense systems to rapidly analyze incoming threats, allowing for quicker decision-making and more effective interception. Additionally, quantum computing could enable highly accurate simulations of complex systems like nuclear reactions and weapon designs.

Undersea capabilities encompass a wide range of offensive and defensive functions that contribute to missile defense. Offensively, submarines and other undersea platforms can strike surface vessels, submarines, and land-based targets. They are also instrumental in inserting special forces into hostile territory for reconnaissance or sabotage missions. Undersea vehicles play a key role in mine warfare, either by laying mines or clearing minefields. On the defensive side, these platforms are vital for anti-submarine warfare, enabling the detection and neutralization of enemy submarines. They also support surveillance and reconnaissance efforts, gathering intelligence on enemy naval movements. Undersea systems help protect vital infrastructure such as pipelines and communication cables and help ensure safe navigation.

Hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic systems are vital to missile defense operations. Hypersonic glide weapons and hypersonic cruise missiles are designed to strike targets with exceptional speed, maneuverability, and precision while evading traditional defenses. Counter-hypersonic capabilities include advanced sensors and tracking systems like radar and satellite imaging to detect and monitor hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic interceptors aim to neutralize threats mid-flight, while high-power lasers and microwave weapons can disrupt their guidance systems. Effective command-and-control systems are essential for coordinating these defenses, and soft-kill measures such as cyberattacks offer additional means to interfere with hypersonic weapons.

Electronic warfare is fundamental for gaining military advantages in cross-domain missile defense. Electronic attack includes jamming enemy communications, radar, and navigation systems. It also includes spoofing—sending false signals to enemy forces. Electromagnetic or directed-energy weapons disable or destroy enemy assets. Electronic protection ensures secure communication through encryption and satellite links and employs electronic countermeasures (ECM) to defend against attack. Electronic counter-countermeasures are used to overcome enemy ECM and maintain operational effectiveness. Electronic support can be focused on gathering intelligence through signals interception, using sensors for surveillance and target acquisition, and detecting threats in the electromagnetic spectrum.

            In short, under the auspices of AUKUS pillar two, Australia and the United Kingdom can contribute to Golden Dome in ways that many may not be thinking about. As longtime allies with a shared culture, history, and values, working together on Golden Dome just makes sense.

Natalie Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), a Non-Resident Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, and a cohost of the NIDS Deterrence Down Under Podcast.

Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a rare and refreshingly direct conversation, a senior international defense partner outlines why the growing tensions between India and China are raising alarms far beyond the region.

Why it matters:

• Strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific hinge on stability between these two nuclear powers.
• Border disputes aren’t just bilateral—they ripple across regional defense planning.
• Allies are preparing for scenarios where diplomatic friction could escalate into something far more dangerous.

This isn’t just a warning—it’s a call for greater alignment, deterrence, cooperation, and strategic foresight across like-minded nations.

If you’re in security policy, defense strategy, or Indo-Pacific affairs, this is essential viewing.

#IndoPacific #IndiaChina #StrategicAlliances #Deterrence #DefenseDiplomacy #GlobalSecurityReview #ThinkDeterrence #NationalSecurity #AlliedStrategy #Geopolitics

Watch the interview: https://youtu.be/2m-uj8G0RkA

Irregular Warfare: An Indian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Considering several key factors, including KSA’s concerns and evolving security calculus in Syria post-Assad, as well as the growing competition with Iran, Turkey, and Israel, Riyadh’s multidimensional approach to turning Syria from a threat zone into a buffer state can be highlighted, where it can be assumed that in the eyes of Saudi policymakers, Syria today is not just a crisis—it is a frontline of national defense.

A Post-Assad Vacuum and Saudi Strategic Anxiety

The collapse of the Assad regime, though celebrated in some Arab capitals as the end of a brutal era, has opened a power vacuum in Damascus that threatens to unleash a new phase of instability. For KSA, this vacuum is not just a theoretical concern—it is a real-time geostrategic challenge. The kingdom’s national security architecture is heavily shaped by two core threats emanating from northern Arab lands: the spread of Iranian proxies and the return of extremist networks exploiting failed governance. Syria, with its shattered institutions, porous borders, and competing militias, presents both.

The memory of Iraq’s fragmentation after 2003 lingers heavily. Riyadh understands that when Arab state sovereignty collapses, the resulting anarchy can cross borders. KSA’s southern security challenges in Yemen are still active; to see a similar threat emerge from the north would overstretch its security posture. Thus, Syria has become a high-stakes arena—one that Riyadh cannot afford to ignore.

Competing Powers in Syria’s New Chessboard

Iran: A Threat Undiminished

Despite Assad’s downfall and the recent tactical retreats of Iranian-aligned forces, Tehran is not likely to withdraw easily. On the contrary, it is adapting. Iranian-backed militias, particularly in southern Syria and the Qalamoun region, will likely continue to consolidate control over trade routes and urban districts under the guise of local tribes and militias. In this regard, Tehran’s objectives are threefold. Firstly, it aims to maintain influence in the Levant through non-state actors. Secondly, it seeks to sustain a logistics corridor linking Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, expanding its asymmetric capabilities—such as drone operations and Captagon trafficking—to destabilize adversaries indirectly remains to be among Iran’s objectives.

Riyadh sees the situation for what it is: a long-term entrenchment strategy. Iranian influence in Syria is no longer contingent on the Assad regime’s survival; it is embedded in paramilitary networks, ideological infrastructure, and narco-trafficking cartels. The proliferation of Captagon—a synthetic drug smuggled extensively into Saudi Arabia—has already become a national crisis. It is both a public health threat and a political signal from Iran: proxy warfare can take many forms.

Turkey: Strategic Expansionism in the North

While Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria is largely framed as an anti-Kurdish campaign, its ambitions extend further. Ankara has built governance mechanisms, school education systems, police units, and currency networks (using the Turkish lira) across key zones from Afrin to Jarabulus.

Saudi Arabia is concerned about Turkey’s influence on multiple fronts. On one hand, it supports factions influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Riyadh opposes ideologically. In addition, it presents an alternative Sunni leadership model in the region, weakening Saudi Arabia’s position of being the central voice of Sunni politics. On the other hand, it fragments Syria’s territorial integrity, which undermines efforts to rebuild a centralized Arab-led post-conflict state.

Though tensions between Riyadh and Ankara have eased recently, especially post-2021 diplomatic resets, deep-seated rivalry remains. Syria is where that rivalry plays out subtly—through reconstruction bids, tribal influence, and diplomatic patronage.

Israel: Security-Driven Fragmentation

Israel’s posture in Syria is surgical, not expansive—but it is no less consequential. Through persistent airstrikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah assets, covert liaisons with Druze militias in Suwayda, and alleged backing of anti-Iran groups in southern Syria, Israel is carving out spheres of strong influence.

While KSA shares Israel’s concerns over Iranian militarization, it is wary of the side effects. Israel’s support for minority autonomy (especially the Druze) or indirect fragmentation of Syria risks turning the country into a loose collection of zones governed by foreign interests. For Riyadh, the fragmentation of Syria not only endangers Arab unity—it opens space for criminal syndicates, extremist revival, and ideological confusion that could destabilize Jordan and, by extension, Saudi Arabia’s northern frontier.

Riyadh’s Multi-layered Response: From Passive Diplomacy to Strategic Projection

Faced with this hostile mosaic of actors, KSA is executing a comprehensive policy in Syria that mixes security, economics, diplomacy, and media influence.

1. Hard Security: Countering Extremism and Trafficking

Saudi security agencies are likely to expand coordination with Jordan and Iraq to monitor cross-border infiltration and drug routes. The Captagon crisis has led Riyadh to treat Syrian drug trafficking not merely as criminal activity, but as hybrid warfare. Defensive fortifications, signal intelligence operations, and counter-smuggling raids are being intensified along the northern corridor.

Simultaneously, Riyadh is likely to be tracking the resurgence of ISIS remnants in eastern Syria. It is likely investing in tribal militias and vetted opposition units capable of neutralizing terrorist footholds without creating long-term militias that could evolve into new threats.

2. Economic Leverage: Buying Strategic Influence

Saudi Arabia’s pivot to reconstruction diplomacy is both humanitarian and strategic. By calling for sanctions relief, Riyadh aims to reduce Syria’s reliance on Iran and Russia and reintegrate it into the Arab economic order. Saudi intent in paying Syria’s debt to the world bank as well as possible strategic investments in infrastructure, energy, and services—particularly in Sunni-majority urban centers like Aleppo and Daraa—is intended to build loyalty and dependency.

Moreover, the Kingdom is leveraging sovereign funds and private sector tools to position itself as Syria’s main Arab partner in the post-war phase. It wants to ensure that the rebuilding of Syria does not become a Turkish or Iranian-led project.

An Evolving Alignment with Turkey: Tactical Convergence

Ironically, Syria is also offering Saudi Arabia and Turkey an opportunity for pragmatic convergence. While mutual distrust remains, both states share certain interests. This includes preventing full Iranian dominance, keeping extremist groups marginalized, and rebuilding economic influence in Syria to offset Western retreat.

This has possibly opened a window for joint intelligence sharing and perhaps coordinated reconstruction projects, especially in areas where Sunni communities dominate. For Riyadh, this is most likely not an alliance but a temporary alignment of interests that must be carefully managed.

Supporting Syria’s Transitional Government: A Bid for Arab Sovereignty

Perhaps most crucially, KSA is throwing its weight behind the Syrian transitional government emerging from the post-Assad political framework. Riyadh’s objectives are clear, and these are to reunify Syria under an Arab-oriented administration, prevent federalization or sectarian fragmentation, and, most importantly, marginalize Iranian-aligned or extremist political actors.

Backed by Gulf states, this new Syrian leadership is presumably envisioned as a technocratic, security-minded, and pro-Sunni Arab entity unlike the Assad regime which was viewed as a pro-Iranian. Saudi Arabia’s goal is not to install a puppet but to ensure that the new government aligns with regional stability, Arab League integration, and mutual security commitments.

Syria as a Forward Defense Zone

Saudi Arabia’s posture toward Syria has shifted dramatically—from cautious observation to assertive engagement. The kingdom is likely to be treating Syria not only as a humanitarian concern but as a critical northern front for its long-term security. It is investing in hard power, economic influence, and regional diplomacy to shape Syria’s post-conflict architecture.

In doing so, Riyadh is acknowledging a broader regional truth: the fate of failed or transitioning Arab states cannot be left to the mercy of non-Arab powers, including Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Israel. From Damascus to Daraa, Syria is no longer a distant conflict—it is a forward defense zone for Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity, generational stability, and regional leadership. However, the challenge ahead lies in sustaining this engagement without overreach, balancing power projection with local legitimacy, and ensuring that Saudi Arabia’s Syria policy remains strategic—not reactive.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Syria and Saudi Arabia’s Northern Front: A New Theatre for the Kingdom’s Security Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current responses, ranging from US, UK, and Israeli airstrikes to maritime task forces, aim to degrade the Houthis’ operational capabilities. Except for recent American bombing efforts, they have fallen short of effectively neutralizing the group’s capacity to pose a critical threat to maritime trade in the Red Sea as well as the wider threat of destabilizing the region.

What it would truly take to dismantle the Houthi threat, in a sustainable and strategic manner, requires a multi-dimensional, coalition-led effort that combines kinetic force, strategic isolation, regional realignment, and political recalibration. Many of these key strategic components are still missing in the current response to the Houthis’ actions.

The Houthi Threat: Tactical Capabilities, Strategic Leverage

Beginning in 2023, the Houthis began escalating their attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and even the Gulf of Aden—utilizing Iranian-supplied drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned suicide boats. These attacks achieved several objectives for the group and its backers in Tehran. First, the attacks successfully disrupted global shipping, raising insurance rates and negatively impacting Egypt’s Suez Canal, which saw a decrease of almost 60 percent of its annual revenue from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Second, the Houthis’ attacks provided a clear projection of Iranian deterrence without a confrontation with the US. Third, the attacks repositioned the Houthis as a pan-regional “resistance” actor, not merely a Yemeni faction.

Despite Israel’s effective strike on Yemen’s sea port of Hudaydah followed by another set of strikes a day later, including ones on the main airport in Sanaa, which probably prompted the Houthis to inform the US that they “don’t want to fight anymore,” the Houthi leadership still exists and their armed capabilities are far from degraded.

If anything is beneficial out of such ceasefire, it is only for the Houthis as it would ultimately allow them to reorganize their resistance and offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Houthis’ obvious ballistic missile and drone capabilities pose a threat to Israel more than ever before.

The Inadequacy of Current Approaches

Western-led responses include airstrikes on Houthi launch sites, naval deployments like Operation Prosperity Guardian, and diplomatic pressure via the UN Security Council. Yet, these actions failed to produce long-term deterrence for four main reasons.

First, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, lack strategic unity regarding Yemen. Conflicting Arab views on how to engage the Houthi threat, along with differing opinions on the alignment of the US military response to the Houthis, are significantly limiting the effectiveness of the US efforts to degrade Houthi capabilities.

Second, Houthi adaptability and decentralized operations make targeting difficult. Houthi leadership, in several interviews, praised their unique structure and claimed it is different from that of Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of not relying on any communication technologies within the group and yet having a decentralized distribution in the mountains in Yemen.

Third, Iranian support continues uninterrupted through land and maritime smuggling. Reports from 2024 revealed that UN mechanisms failed to inspect most ships heading to Houthi-controlled ports.

Fourth, the proximity of civilian infrastructure to military targets limits the rules of engagement for Western forces. Furthermore, there is no insufficient political strategy to undercut Houthi legitimacy among Yemenis, and still, many of the Yemeni population appeal to the Houthi group. Based on the above, an effective strategy for neutralizing the Houthis’ capabilities requires escalation dominance across the military, economic, information, and political domains.

A Multi-Domain Campaign to Neutralize the Houthis

A shift to precision airstrikes by the United States was necessary, but more is needed. This includes high-value targeting of command-and-control (C2) nodes, drone operation sites, missile production sites, and technical assembly sites. Covert special operations strikes by Arab and American forces, to sabotage radar arrays, smuggling depots, and launchpads in areas like Al-Hudaydah and Sa’ada, is also needed.

Furthermore, border security cooperation from Oman is crucial in addition to placing an effective security cooperation framework with Eastern African states, where much of the Iranian weapons smuggling is taking place. Enforcement of naval dominance will occur through the establishment of exclusion zones in the Red Sea, supported by AEGIS destroyers and Gulf-based airpower.

Although the US Navy is taking the lead role in such functions, establishing a regional US-Arab naval cooperation is a key factor in eliminating the threats posed by the Houthis as well as further preventing the smuggling of weapons, missile components, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components to the Houthis via the sea. Cyber disruptions targeting the Houthis’ satellite navigation, drone-control networks, and internal communications is needed. This function is far more complex than it may appear, given that reports indicate that Russia supports the Houthis with targeting data.

Furthermore, it is also reported that the Houthi leadership coordinates directly with Chinese officials regarding safe passage for Chinese vessels. In addition to US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms, providing evidence that China’s technological support strengthens Houthi capabilities is needed.

Accordingly, effective US-Arab intelligence cooperation should be further enhanced to isolate Houthi access to foreign powers. This military approach must be continuous, not episodic, and paired with intelligence fusion centers involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egyptians.

Strategic Isolation of the Houthis from Iran

Without eliminating the Houthi connection to Tehran, no solution can succeed. This requires the interdiction of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime routes, especially between the Bandar Abbas–Socotra–Horn of Africa corridor. Hence, the situation ultimately requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including the use of satellites to ensure effective monitoring of vessels coming to Yemen, not to mention the essential need for regional security cooperation among all the nations surrounding these locations.

The financial isolation of the Houthis and associated members by pressuring banking entities and crypto exchanges that facilitate Iranian transfers to Houthis requires improvement. Continuously drying up the cash sources provided to the Houthis is a key factor in dismantling their operational capabilities. Additionally, increasing regional pressure on Oman to improve its border monitoring and security efforts is crucial for reducing overland routes used for arms and cash smuggling.

Overall, Iran’s support for the Houthis is part of its “ring of fire” doctrine. To dismantle this arc, the Houthis must be made a liability, not an asset, for Tehran.

Recalibrating the Regional Arab Response

Arab unity is a missing ingredient in the fight against the Houthis. A new Red Sea Defense Compact is required, comprising a joint command structure involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and, ultimately, Oman. Having a regional naval and airbase integration with a primary role for Egypt and Saudi Arabia would provide a forward-operating presence across the Red Sea. Given that Houthi disruption of Red Sea commerce and maritime passage directly threatens Egypt’s economic security, strategic re-engagement is particularly important. Such an arrangement would also create a strategic opportunity for a further deepening of US-Egypt defense cooperation and alignment of mutual regional interests.

The need for a Saudi-UAE reconciliation over Yemen’s future is essential, possibly via American mediation. Otherwise, even after neutralizing the Houthi threat, the region risks a politically unstable Yemen. If Arab states continue to act independently, they risk being played against each other, benefiting Iran and prolonging the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

What It Takes to Neutralize the Houthi Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement brokered by President Barack Obama in 2015, as it “failed to protect America’s national security interests.” Trump justified his withdrawal by arguing that the agreement, as “a windfall of cash”, did not curbed Iran’s malign activities. Instead, he contended, it provided financial resources that “enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior.”

For Iran’s non-Persian national and ethnic groups, the failure of the JCPOA was also due to its disregard for human rights and domestic oppression. Western negotiators prioritized nuclear and missiles restrictions and regional security while sidelining the people’s suffering under an authoritarian regime. The economic relief from the deal landed in the hands of regime elites, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and their affiliates. Ordinary peoples saw little benefit. Instead, the regime doubled down on its crackdown against marginalized groups, including Kurds, Baloch, and Arabs. With reduced external pressure, Tehran felt emboldened to impose its Persian-Shia ideological hegemony even more aggressively.

Now, with talks of a renewed deal resurfacing, one must ask: will this agreement, like its predecessor, serve only the regime’s interests? Trump’s letter outlined conditions for sanctions relief, including an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, cessation of uranium enrichment, ceasing financial support to Hezbollah and halting arms transfers to the Houthis, and dismantling its militias in Iraq. However, these terms, like before, fail to address the human rights abuses within Iran. If a future deal ignores these realities, it will once again be the oppressed groups who pay the price.

The absence of human rights considerations in Western negotiations with Iran is not incidental—it is a consistent pattern. Historically, the West has often prioritized short-term strategic gains over the long-term aspirations of the people in Iran. The result has been a cycle of diplomatic engagements that empower the ruling elite while leaving everyday people in a deepening state of economic hardship and political repression. Sanctions relief, while theoretically aimed at improving the people’s economy, has instead served as a financial injection for the regime’s military-industrial complex, allowing it to tighten its grip on power.

For Iran’s diverse population—comprising Baluchis, Kurds, Armenians, Qashqais, Azeris, Arabs, Turkmens, Gilakis, Tabaris, Talyshis, and religious groups including Jews and Bahais—a nuclear deal that fails to address their plight could be devastating. The regime’s persecution of non-Persian groups has been marked by disproportionate executions of Kurds and Baluchis, arbitrary detentions, and systematic cultural suppression. Economic marginalization has left these groups disproportionately affected by unemployment, poverty, and lack of access to basic services. A deal that does not explicitly condition sanctions relief on improvements in human rights will serve as yet another tool for the government to sustain its policies of repression and forced assimilation. Moreover, the suppression of dissent extends to students, journalists, and activists who have faced severe crackdowns for expressing opposition to the regime’s policies.

This regime operates outside conventional norms, yet Western commentators in mainstream media, instead of acknowledging the ideological and religious motives of Iran’s Shi’ite rulers, continue to search for rational justifications that overlook the regime’s true nature. If the past is any indication, a nuclear deal without guarantees for the people of Iran will reinforce the status quo: economic benefits funneled to regime elites, intensified repression of national and ethnic minorities, and continued expansion of Iran’s regional influence at the expense of its citizens. A more “comprehensive” approach to diplomacy with Iran must incorporate human rights as a core negotiating principle. Strict oversight and accountability measures must be implemented to prevent state-controlled entities, such as the judiciary, from imposing verdicts on the people, and the IRGC from monopolizing financial resources and oppressing dissidents. Furthermore, human rights organizations and genuine opposition figures should have a voice in shaping the terms of any agreement.

Ultimately, the goal of any nuclear deal should also aim to create conditions that empower its people to pursue democratic aspirations. A policy that prioritizes human rights alongside the security of Israel and the US would be strategically effective in fostering long-term stability in the region.

Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Such an alliance is needed most in the Indo-Pacific region where China is attempting, with some success, to challenge the American-led rules-based international order. Growing American alliances and partnerships beyond current bilateral relationships is the solution.

A more tailored and comprehensive approach involving Australia, Japan, and South Korea should serve as the beginning of an alliance that could expand and counter Chinese efforts in more than just the military realm. Such an alliance could bolster American nuclear deterrence and assurance in the region and directly support regional stability. A need for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is a clear and obtainable objective.

Formalizing a Multilateral Treaty Organization

Creating a regional multilateral treaty-bound organization with Australia, Japan, and South Korea will institutionalize defense cooperation and bolster collective security. This organization could formally facilitate regular interoperability consultations, increase joint coalition exercises, and more effectively coordinate responses to regional threats. By formalizing these relationships, the US and its allies can ensure a cohesive and effective deterrence strategy with more eloquence throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Establishing a new treaty organization will be challenging, but the cost-benefit will be worthwhile in the long term. This formality directly supports the diplomatic leg of the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) model.

Equipping Allies with Nuclear-Capable F-35s

Expanding the sale of nuclear-capable F-35As to Australia, Japan, and South Korea represents a significant advancement in regional coverage of the US nuclear umbrella. These next-generation fighters provide a capable and credible nuclear capability to prepare allies for future conflict, allows increased power projection against potential adversaries, and bolsters the operational compatibility between American forces and allies.

By integrating these aircraft into their respective air forces, allies can contribute to a more dynamic and responsive deterrence posture if a need arises as the geopolitical environment changes. And, if the alliance expands as expected, F-35s can compensate for their range limitations by “island hopping” their way to the fight or allies can build their own aerial refueling capability.

The presence of highly mobile nuclear-capable platforms increases regional solidarity in a strategically tailored way that messages adversaries that aggression will not be tolerated. Given growing Chinese aggression, this is an important task.

Developing Supporting Infrastructure

To maximize the efficacy of these new capabilities, it is crucial to establish a robust infrastructure that supports the deployment and maintenance of nuclear-capable assets for

forward-based power projection. This includes upgrading the host nations’ airfields, maintenance facilities, and command-and-control systems.

Such infrastructure will allow seamless integration of allied forces into joint operations and ensure sustained operational readiness. The host nations will need to take charge of the economic development required to maintain the increase in capability and its continued sustainment in the long term—relieving some of the costs that would otherwise be borne by the American taxpayer.

Increasing SSBN Port Calls and Coalition Heavy Bomber Task Force Exercises

Boosting the frequency of American ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) port calls and conducting more coalition heavy bomber task force exercises will further strengthen the deterrence posture within the region. American SSBN presence provides a method to showcase a strategic, survivable deterrent, while heavy bombers enable power projection. Conducting joint operations further solidifies a multinational force’s allied resolve and compatibility.

Additionally, the United States could showcase the ability to provide a safe haven for the required heavy bomber task forces if the need arises. These activities would demonstrate an increase in enhancing regional security ties and reassuring allies of the continuation of American commitment. The United States could also sell the B1 and B2 bombers it plans to retire to its allies.

Conclusion

Strengthening American nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific requires a multifaceted approach that continues to foster positive alliances and partnerships that advance capabilities. Honoring these commitments showcases allied resolve to hold adversaries at risk with well-calculated multilateral decision-making processes and regional cooperation. By equipping Australia, Japan, and South Korea with nuclear-capable F-35As, establishing the necessary infrastructure, formalizing multilateral agreements, and increasing strategic exercises with ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers, the US and its allies can enhance deterrence.

These measures will solidify regional defense cooperation, amplify the efficacy of the nuclear umbrella, and ensure a regional multilateral response to potential nuclear threats, thereby reinforcing the American commitment to maintaining stability and countering China’s growing influence across the region.

William Atkins spent a career in the nuclear enterprise. The views expressed are his own.

Bolstering Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Instability and American Aid

Pakistan is not a stable country. There are concerns that the state may disintegrate. Its military and ISI are infiltrated by individuals linked to terrorist groups. Without focused American engagement, Pakistan’s instability could lead to either the theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists or the sabotage of a nuclear facility. Moreover, a long-running territorial dispute over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism could easily escalate into a conflict or nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan gets a free ride. Between 1948 and 2016, it received over $78.3 billion in US military and economic support. In return, it is duplicitous. Over half of this aid was allocated to counterterrorism efforts, yet Pakistan’s military and the ISI continue supporting the Taliban and other extremists. The US annually provides Pakistan $2 billion in military and economic aid without proper oversight. Of this amount, $100 million is allocated to the Strategic Plans Division to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal. Despite this assistance, Pakistan provides safe haven to dozens of terrorist organizations and their leadership. Its military’s continued support for them increases the risk of a catastrophic nuclear attack by a proxy.

The Case for a Joint US-Pakistan Task Force

A joint US-Pakistan task force is necessary to enforce oversight, strengthen strategic ties, and provide a direct US role in securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A formal framework will mitigate the risks of mismanagement or unauthorized access and maintain control over critical aspects of nuclear security. It will enhance collaboration between military and intelligence agencies, enabling both sides to identify and respond to emerging threats while leveraging their combined expertise in human intelligence and counterterrorism.

A joint task force will also enhance nuclear security through specialized training. American experts in nuclear security and cyber defense can provide essential training to Pakistani forces, strengthening their operational readiness and capability to protect nuclear sites. Both nations conduct regular nuclear security drills—often referred to as “Armageddon tests” to assess vulnerabilities at nuclear sites. These drills help identify personnel weaknesses and prevent potential security breaches.

Deterrence, Sovereignty, and Regional Tensions

The presence of US military personnel in Pakistan will also serve as a powerful deterrent to terrorist organizations. US support in securing nuclear facilities reduces the probability of terrorist attempts to infiltrate and breach nuclear facilities or execute large-scale attacks. This cooperation also signals the seriousness of nuclear security in the region to potential adversaries.

Establishing an American military presence in Pakistan could be perceived as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, US involvement would be limited to advisory, intelligence, and technical support roles. This role would enable Pakistan to retain full control over its nuclear assets and security operations.

A US military presence in Pakistan could also escalate regional tensions—particularly with India. The two states have irreconcilable differences when it comes to Kashmir, and both sides believe they should control all of Kashmir, not just one part of it. An attack on civilians or military forces on either side of the line of control in Kashmir could easily escalate into a major conflict. However, the US can use diplomatic channels to ensure regional actors, including India, are aware of the task force’s defensive nature. The task force aims to secure nuclear sites and combat terrorism, not alter the region’s strategic balance.

Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

The world cannot afford nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. By establishing a Joint US-Pakistan task force, the US both protects global security and reaffirms its leadership in the fight against nuclear terrorism. This partnership strengthens nuclear safeguard, prevents nuclear theft, and stabilizes the region. The US must act now to ensure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are protected. Together, we can turn a potential crisis into a collaborative success. The time to act is now for a safer and more stable world.

Timor Nawabi is currently pursuing a master’s degree in security policy studies with a concentration in Science and Technology, focusing mainly on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Why a Joint US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Task Force Is Necessary was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test, held on March 27, 2019, highlights its growing space capabilities and intent to weaponize space. India’s test, known as “Mission Shakti,” demonstrated its ability to intercept and destroy a satellite in low Earth orbit, positioning India as one of only four countries with such capabilities. While Indian officials maintain that the test was aimed at strengthening national security and not directed toward any particular country, such a capability would pose a significant threat to Pakistan’s space assets, which would undermine Pakistan’s situational awareness, communication, and command-and-control capabilities during a conflict.

The implications of India’s recent MIRV test to its intent in the space domain have received little scrutiny, with one Indian analyst suggesting that the country’s MIRV efforts complement its space ambitions. However, analysts did not address the potential implications on regional stability. India’s development and testing of advanced missile technologies suggest that New Delhi could use these capabilities for counter-space missions, including the targeting of satellites, and their expansion of counter-space weapons may disrupt the strategic equilibrium in South Asia.

Bringing MIRVs to Space

While the primary use of MIRV ballistic missiles is not in counter-space missions, there are scenarios and technologies related to MIRVs that could potentially be adapted for anti-satellite (ASAT) roles. Instead of carrying nuclear warheads, the MIRV could be equipped with kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) or other payloads designed to disable or destroy satellites through collision or other means. A missile equipped with MIRV technology could launch multiple payloads into space, each with its own propulsion and guidance systems, allowing them to maneuver into specific orbits close to target satellites. Moreover, the independent targeting capability of MIRVs means each payload could be directed to a different satellite, potentially allowing for simultaneous attacks on multiple targets in different orbits.

In addition, co-orbital systems can loiter in space and potentially engage targets when needed, providing a persistent threat compared to direct-ascent ASAT systems. MIRVs could be adapted for co-orbital ASAT missions by modifying their payloads and utilizing their independent targeting capabilities. Russia and China have demonstrated co-orbital ASAT systems, while the United States maintains advanced space technologies that could potentially be used in similar roles. The adaptation of MIRVs for such purposes would be complex and carry significant strategic and legal implications.

Implications for Regional Stability

Outer space is considered a global common, a concept established by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which ensures that space is free for exploration and use by all countries, cannot be claimed by any nation, must be used for peaceful purposes, and should be preserved for future generations. It is crucial that this principle should be consistently applied to preserve space for the benefit of all states for communication, navigation, weather monitoring, and scientific research. However, the growing overlap between military and space technologies is blurring the lines between these fields and raises apprehensions about the militarization and potential weaponization of the domain.

The advancements made by India in military technology and satellite capabilities, which integrate military and space capabilities, have raised significant concerns about the weaponization of space in Pakistani policy circles. Pakistan also tested a MIRV capability on its Ababeel missile. However, it never demonstrated its intent to develop counter-space weapons through policy or capability development. Pakistan’s space policy and activities are focused on peaceful uses of outer space, such as satellite communications, remote sensing, and scientific research. Islamabad has participated in international initiatives aimed at promoting the responsible and peaceful use of outer space, including discussions on space security and arms control within forums such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Considering India’s development and modernization of its military beyond traditional security needs, such as its ASAT capability and advanced missile ranges, there is a possibility that New Delhi may use MIRVs for counter-space missions in the future. In a scenario of escalating tensions with Pakistan, India could conduct counter-space missions by either placing co-orbital ASAT systems during a brewing crisis or launch KKVs during a conflict by using MIRV capability. This would enable India to destroy Pakistani satellites, severely impairing Pakistan’s situational awareness, disrupting secure military communications, and degrading command-and-control functions.

As New Delhi strengthens its counter-space capabilities, its potential development of counter-space capabilities can upset the balance maintained by Pakistan’s effective deterrence posture in South Asia. The complex interplay between nuclear and conventional forces maintains this balance. However, there is a growing asymmetry between India and Pakistan in space capabilities.

New Delhi’s substantial advancements and investments in space technology and infrastructure outmatch Pakistan’s space capabilities, creating a significant power disparity where India has a much greater capacity to deploy and utilize space-based assets for various purposes, including military and intelligence gathering. India’s disproportionate expansion of space capabilities not only poses a threat to Pakistan but also China. Their reliance on satellites for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) functions is growing to address genuine security needs. Pakistan recognizes the strategic importance of information superiority in modern warfare.

With evolving security challenges, including border surveillance and counter-terrorism operations, Islamabad is enhancing its C4ISR capabilities through significant technological upgrades such as satellite programs and advanced communication systems, along with the integration of centralized command centers and secure communication networks. The expansion includes increased use of drones for surveillance and reconnaissance, development of electronic warfare capabilities, and robust cybersecurity measures.

Human resources are being developed through specialized training and international collaboration, particularly with China and Turkey, to facilitate technology transfer and interoperability. These efforts aim to improve situational awareness, decisionmaking, and operational effectiveness, strengthening Pakistan’s overall national security.

During a crisis, Pakistan may face the risk of its satellite assets being targeted which could have significant impact on its military and strategic capabilities. Pakistan could face severe constraints in its C4ISR capability. Moreover, the integration of satellite communication into Pakistan’s drone operations and C4ISR framework highlights the dependence on these assets for maintaining robust communication. Hence, the loss of satellite communication could disrupt command-and-control functions, impairing coordination and timely decisionmaking across the armed forces.

In view of these reasons, it is possible to conclude that India’s MIRV test represents a dangerous shift in the domain of space weaponization. The integration of MIRV technology with India’s missile systems not only enhances its nuclear deterrence but also signals its potential use for counter-space capability. Therefore, while India’s achievements in missile technology and space capabilities are notable, they carry significant risks for regional stability.

Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the authors own.

India’s MIRV Development – A Latent Counter-space Capability was originally published on Global Security Review.