While the coming days will clarify what will happen in Venezuela, security studies scholars are concerned with broader systemic implications of this operation. Specifically, what effect will this have on nuclear proliferation? While some may think actions like this (and the bombing of nuclear sites in Iran) will hasten proliferation, this article argues that this may not necessarily be the case.

 Causes of Proliferation

The academic literature on nuclear proliferation has identified several factors that affect a state’s decision, including security, technology, economic, and normative-institutional factors. The realist school argues that security is the foremost reason behind states’ motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Due to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, they are deemed a guarantor for a state’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons can deter both nuclear attacks and conventional attacks from more powerful states.

Concerns over sovereignty have been attributed to nuclear programs of several states in the past (including successful pursuits such as North Korea, Pakistan, and Israel, and unsuccessful pursuits such as Sweden, Taiwan, and Libya). As such, many security studies scholars and experts have argued that external intervention (like what is happening in Venezuela) would have systemic effects and hasten nuclear proliferation, potentially undoing the years of good done by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.

Lessons from Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine: Would Nuclear Weapons Have Helped?

Those who argue regime change would accelerate proliferation often point toward Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine. In all of these, they argue, nuclear weapons would have prevented regime change (or an attempt at it in Ukraine’s case). They further argue that other states would learn the lesson and seek a bomb to secure their state.

How true are these assertions? In Libya and Iraq, they had active nuclear weapons programs that they shut down due to external pressure (sanctions in Libya, the air campaign during the Gulf War in Iraq). It is likely that had they continued nuclear pursuit the United States would have more forcefully attempted to stop it. Ukraine is different; while it inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, it never had direct control over them, and had it not given them up, it is unlikely they could have been used.

Another country proliferation pessimists point to is North Korea. They argue that because North Korea has nuclear weapons, the U.S. has not attempted regime change. This overlooks three facts. Firstly, North Korea only tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006. If nuclear weapons prevented an American invasion, why did the U.S. not invade North Korea prior to that? Secondly, it is likely the massive artillery force North Korea has aimed at Seoul, South Korea’s capital and most populous city, has acted as a deterrent against external intervention, even as its effectiveness has declined over time. Lastly, China’s support for North Korea, and possible involvement in any war over it, means that the U.S. is unlikely to engage in forced regime change even if North Korea never acquired nuclear weapons.

Changes in The Proliferation Landscape

It is unlikely the regime change operation in Venezuela will drastically change the proliferation landscape. Nuclear proliferation is an extremely complex decision with several factors. A single event, however important, is unlikely to tip over a state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Even if one accepts the realist argument that nuclear acquisition is primarily rooted in security fears, the Venezuela incident changes little. A state vulnerable to external intervention would not be more vulnerable after the incident, even if they feel the probability of intervention has increased. A state cannot draw any lesson that it already did not draw from Iraq, Libya, or Ukraine.

Not to mention, the required technological knowledge and industrial base for a nuclear weapons program is immense. Not every state has the capacity to initiate one. In fact, the intersection of states which have the capability to start a nuclear program and are in the crosshairs of the United States for regime change is small. Moreover, any state that decides it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself from external intervention must also contend with the fact that until it acquires them, it remains vulnerable (with the added incentive of an external power to conduct intervention before the potential proliferator acquires nuclear weapons).

Who is the Next Proliferator?

With Iran previously on the precipice of acquiring nuclear weapons for a while, it seemed only a matter of time before the Middle East devolved into a nuclear domino scenario. However, strikes on Iranian nuclear sites appear to have extended the timeline for Iran to successfully acquire a nuclear weapon, if not extinguished the possibility altogether. This also means states like Saudi Arabia, which were most likely to respond to Iranian acquisition with their own nuclear program, are now further from the cliff’s edge.

U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites have another systemic implication: they signal that the United States would not stand by and let someone violate the nonproliferation regime by acquiring nuclear weapons and is willing to back this with force. Despite the turbulent nature of international politics in the last half decade, there is no evidence the world is on the verge of a

new wave of nuclear proliferation. The barriers to a program (political, economic, and technical) remain high, while benefits remain uncertain. It is unlikely that many, if any, new states will embark on a serious nuclear weapons program in the near to medium future.

Soumyadeep Bidyanta is a doctoral candidate at the University of Cincinnati, conducting research on the causes of nuclear proliferation. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Much Ado About Nothing: The Proliferation Debate Post Venezuela was originally published on Global Security Review.

The strategy emerged from a moment of truth. Years of military overstretch, industrial erosion, and fiscal strain have collided with domestic anxieties over migration, trade imbalances, and energy security. The document acknowledges, indirectly, that the United States can no longer afford to be everywhere, doing everything, for everyone. In response, it narrows the definition of what truly matters for the United States––the Western Hemisphere.

The Western Hemisphere is elevated as the primary theater of concern by invoking a 200-year-old policy of the Monroe Doctrine that rejects external influence close to home. The Middle East is quietly downgraded, its strategic relevance diminished by American energy independence. Europe, which was once a central theater to Washington’s worldview, is urged to take primary responsibility for its own security and political future by restoring stability within the region.

The strategy is not one of isolationism, as the NSS is careful to reject that label. As per the document, the United States will continue to prevent adversaries from dominating key regions. Nowhere is this commitment clearer than in the Indo-Pacific, where China is described as a main competitor. But while the ends remain familiar, the means have changed. The burden of maintaining or reinforcing regional balance is no longer something Washington is willing, or claims it should ever have been expected, to carry alone.

The Indo-Pacific strategy outlined in the NSS revolves around the First Island Chain, the arc of territory stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. This geography is cast as the front line of any future conflict in East Asia. The United States pledges to build a force capable of denying aggression anywhere along this chain; however, it also emphasizes that such denial must be collective. Diplomacy will be used to press allies to increase defense spending and investment in deterrence-focused capabilities. In effect, the strategy seeks to integrate partnered militaries into a dense denial network in which primary responsibility lies with regional partners, with the U.S. aiding through commercial matters, technology sharing, and defense procurement.

There is a cold logic to this approach. If successful, it would complicate any Chinese military campaign, raising costs through layered defenses, maritime surveillance, anti-ship missiles, cyber capabilities, and hardened infrastructure. It would allow the United States to concentrate on high-end enablers such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and missile defense, while others invest in the less glamorous but more geographically exposed components of deterrence. This move can be seen as a reconfiguration designed to make competition with China cheaper and more sustainable for Washington.

Nevertheless, for America’s partners, the strategy feels less like empowerment and more like exposure. Japan offers the clearest example. Tokyo is amid a historic military buildup. Its defense budget now exceeds 9 trillion yen and is on track to reach 2 percent of its GDP, a threshold once unthinkable in a country shaped by postwar pacifism. Japan is acquiring long-range standoff missiles, expanding coastal defenses, and revising its security doctrines to prepare for contingencies that explicitly include Taiwan. These steps reflect genuine threat perceptions, particularly as Chinese military activity intensifies near Japanese territory. But they also reveal how burden shifting works in practice, and Japan is expected to bear frontline risks in a conflict whose escalation dynamics it might not be able to fully control.

South Korea’s dilemma is even starker. Long praised as a model non-proliferation state, Seoul built its security on trust in the American nuclear umbrella. That trust is now fraying. North Korea’s arsenal has grown more sophisticated, and its missiles are more mobile and survivable. At the same time, the South Koreans are increasingly skeptical that Washington would risk Los Angeles or New York to save Seoul, particularly amid U.S. political polarization and the personalization of foreign policy under President Donald Trump. The NSS urges partners to spend more and do more for collective defense, but it cannot dispel the fundamental fear that extended deterrence may fail at the moment of truth. The result is a once-taboo debate over whether South Korea needs its own nuclear weapons, a debate that speaks volumes about how burden shifting erodes confidence even as it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

The Philippines illustrates another facet of this strategy. Cast as a frontline state in the South China Sea, Manila is offered expanded U.S. access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The benefits are tangible; however, the risks are also profound. Philippine lawmakers have openly questioned whether hosting U.S. forces makes the country a target without ensuring reciprocal American vulnerability. There is a lingering fear of becoming a buffer state, absorbing grey-zone pressure while great powers manage escalation elsewhere. These developments urged Manila to deepen ties with Washington, but simultaneously diversify partnerships with Japan, France, India, and regional neighbors to avoid being locked into a proxy role.

These anxieties are compounded by the broader signals the NSS sends about American leadership. The document features President Trump with unusual prominence, underscoring how closely U.S. strategy is now associated with a single, mercurial figure. Its harsh treatment of European allies will not go unnoticed in Asia, where confidence in U.S. commitments has always rested as much on perception as on capability. The strategy also stated that “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations is a timeless truth of international relations.” This assertion is most striking because it indicates that international order rests on the rule of the major powers. This framing implicitly places major powers (Washington, Moscow, and Beijing) in an exclusive tier of decisive actors and reminds the middle powers that their agency has limits. For allies asked to shoulder greater burdens, such language offers little reassurance.

A familiar Asia strategy thus sits alongside a more disquieting and unsettled redefinition of global leadership. The United States still seeks to shape outcomes, deter adversaries, and preserve its primacy. But it increasingly does so by asking others to stand closer to the fire. Whether allies will continue to accept that role, without firmer guarantees and clearer commitments, may determine not only the future of the Indo-Pacific but the credibility of American power itself.

Sidra Shaukat is a Research Officer at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a leading Pakistani think tank focused on nuclear and strategic affairs. Her research and commentary have addressed peaceful uses of nuclear technologies, Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, nuclear diplomacy, and broader geostrategic developments in South Asia, Europe, and the Middle East across various platforms. A full list of her publications is available on SVI’s website. Views Expressed in this article are author’s own.

America’s Managed Retreat: How the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy Shifts the Burden to Allies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Most the world’s approximately 12,100 nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly 87 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately 5,500 and the US holding approximately 5,177, declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated 600 operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated 50 nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.

These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.

Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.

Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel’s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.

Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a “crucial year” for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.

Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.

In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own.

The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

As of today, ChatGPT-5 Pro is said to have an IQ of 148, as tested officially by Mensa Norway. It is now significantly smarter than most adult humans in the United States (who average 99.7). Grok 4 may be weeks away from becoming even smarter, but the progress at which AI reasoning inches ahead matters little when humans write code for these programs. However, AI has started to write its own code. In tandem, Mark Zuckerberg is building a super team dubbed the “superintelligence AI” lab and he offered a single person, Daniel Francis, $1.25 Billion for a four-year contract (or a $312 million per year salary). Further, Zuckerberg has gone on to poach the top AI talent from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google, nearing 24 people in total out of a team of only 44.

Unfortunately, U.S. companies are also allowed to funnel money into Chinese AI companies, in part because it is a less expensive alternative than U.S. developed AI. China, as a near-peer adversary cannot be allowed to reach superintelligence first because whoever wins the AI race to superintelligence will have nearly unlimited computing ability and will be able to launch devastating cyber-attacks with ease.

If there are two teams approaching the finish line in a winner-take-all superintelligence race, then there is also a direct implication for long-term deterrence on global war. Imagine the following scenarios:

SCENARIO 1: The U.S. is ahead in the race to superintelligence, but China works diligently to steal code, launch cyber-attacks, and intimidate U.S. scientists. Eventually, China assassinates critical AI scientists, prompting the U.S. to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against China to stop its attacks. Yet, just before all-out war, China ceases its efforts, having become successful in its bid to cripple the U.S. AI industry so it can reach superintelligence first.

SCENARIO 2: The U.S. is ahead, but China is only barely behind. China uses its innovative AI models to wargame nearly unlimited sequences and calculates what it believes is the perfect attack to prevent the U.S. from reaching superintelligence first. In this scenario, the attacks never ramp up. Instead, it results in a massive, unprovoked first strike that incapacitates the U.S. This might be a nuclear strike or simply an EMP strike that decimates the U.S. power grid. Either way, China wins again.

SCENARIO 3: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress. Public companies continue progressing toward superintelligence, but one or both achieve it in a military or national laboratory behind closed doors. They ponder the best way to use it, leveraging it like the nuclear football in global diplomacy (i.e., setting the briefcase on the floor next to the President). They may have accessed superintelligence but lack confidence in the technology to use it for the near future.

SCENARIO 4: The U.S. and China hide their governments’ AI progress, and both achieve superintelligence behind closed doors. Then one day, one of them launches an attack on the other, prompting the other side to launch its own superintelligence response. The two AI agents battle across every sector of society, arm-wrestling for control. Seemingly trivial differences between one model and another let one win in one sector and the other win in another.

This article does not presume that the outcome of a superintelligence race is represented in one of these four scenarios. Rather, it argues that AI will inevitably complicate the landscape of deterrence as it may give confidence of victory in otherwise stable situations. This moment in history is nothing less than the moment when scientists Leo Szilard and Albert Einstein wrote President Roosevelt to warn of the potential use of fission in bombs.

The United States government must think carefully about the current state of AI in the world and what it will mean for deterrence strategy. We need to have a planned response if a superintelligence cyberattack is launched against the U.S. This includes physically isolating our command-and-control systems and planning for surprise attacks, itself planned by another country’s AI technology. Worse yet, military planners need to consider how to detect and respond to multiple grey zone micro-attacks that may be a component of a larger cascading attack.

We are amid our generation’s Manhattan Project moment. The 2023 Oppenheimer movie culminates in the detonation of the 1945 Trinity test. Perhaps if the United States plans well, in 80 years, we may all be able to enjoy a movie about Zuckerberg forming his superintelligence lab.

Rob Kittinger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The AI Revolution’s Outsized Impact on Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Physicists and engineers now realize that just as most car crashes stem from driver error rather than mechanical failure, the same logic applies to nuclear weapons, their platforms, and their potential use. Whether Americans like it or not, humans are in the system and humans are, almost certainly, the weakest link.

Humans are the weakest component in the quantification of margins and uncertainty (QMU) sense. Engineers often test individual components and larger systems of nuclear weapons to a 1-in-1,000 certainty that they will function correctly. There has long been a view that nuclear weapons should always detonate when employed and never when they are not. To achieve this “always/never” goal, systems are engineered to perfection while largely ignoring sources of human error.

Humans design and manufacture the components, assemble the weapons, complete the wiring, and install systems onto delivery platforms (i.e., subs, silos, and bombers). Humans verify satellite signals of potential attacks from US Strategic Command, communicate those findings to the President, and, depending on the response, draft and transmit emergency action messages (EAMs). This is a gross simplification because fragile humans play a much larger role, but it illustrates the embeddedness of the human element in the system.

One example of human fragility that took place in September 2023 at the Pantex Plant is instructive. It appears a worker mistakenly cross-connected color-coded electrical wires inside a nuclear weapon.

Across the world this very task might be performed by a civilian or by an Air Force 2W2X1 Nuclear Weapons Specialist. At first glance, it seems simple; connect the red wire to the red wire and the green wire to the green wire. But around 8 percent of men are born with red-green color vision deficiency (color blindness) that makes it difficult for them to differentiate between red and green (and many other color combinations. The US Air Force correctly requires normal color vision for this role.

Not all color tests are created equal. Some vision tests catch 99 percent of people with colorblindness and others catch 90 or even 50 percent of colorblind individuals. An analogy may be useful in illustrating this point.

If, for example, a worker was testing a component and needed to detect 14MeV neutrons, a detector that simply says “between 2 and 20 MeV neutrons were detected” would be unacceptable. A tester with adequate sensitivity is required to test critical components. Detectors that verify the specific reading may even be required. Sensitive tests for humans who work on nuclear weapons is also required.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently updated its standards, rejecting the century-old Ishihara color vision test and the D-15 test due to known shortcomings. The Ishihara test is fairly good at detecting red-green defects but will miss 100 percent of blue (Tritan) defects. Humans have red, green, and blue light sensitive cones in their eyes, and the Ishihara only tests two cones and ignores blue vision entirely. The D-15 test can pass up to half of individuals with color blindness, depending on how its administered (a test commonly used by police departments).

Figure 1. Simulated Color Vision Defects and Wire Color

Even if Pantex adopted one of the FAA’s “best in class” tests, such as the CAD, Rabin, or Waggoner Computerized Color Vision Test (WCCVT), there is still another issue—test frequency. Color vision should be tested periodically, not just once.

While 8 percent of men and 0.5 percent of women) are born with color blindness, it is expected that 15 percent of all people will develop an acquired color vision deficiency during their lifetime, most often affecting blue vision. Most people assume color vision is a static ability, but it is more like hearing loss, which is impacted by age and environmental factors.

Changes in color vision ability can occur rapidly due to medications, diseases, or environmental conditions. For critical roles, annual color vision testing should be a minimum standard.

Finally, different color vision tests examine different axes within the visible spectrum of light, meaning that a person could pass the Rabin but fail the WCCVT based on individual differences and the specific axis tested by each test. This is truer for mild vision defects but mild defects can still cause sub-par performance on real world tasks (i.e., reacting to red traffic lights).

Across the United States, teams are working to quantify this human element in complex, high-consequence systems. These include the Air Force’s 711th Human Performance Wing and the social scientists at Sandia National Laboratories.

The next time you hear about a cognitive psychologist, industrial-organizational psychologist, or human factors researcher at a national lab, do not assume they’re experimenting with LSD and goats to perfect psychic warfare. They’re far more likely to be studying how humans interact with technology—quantifying behavior, limitations, cognition, and the human’s reliability within critical systems.

Organizations should, whenever possible, bring these human-focused professionals into projects. They will identify issues most engineers never consider across a variety of scales, “from neurons to nations.” Factors like color vision, tool slips, (as in the Louis Slotin “demon core” incident), dropped sockets (as in the Titan II missile explosion in Damascus, Arkansas), mismatched job abilities, fatigue, attention lapses, and even intentional sabotage can all impact the nation’s deterrence posture. When processes are optimized to include the human, overall risk is minimized.

In the end, deterrence is not just about weapons. It is about the humans behind the weapons, the fallible, unpredictable, indispensable human element that remains both our greatest strength and our greatest risk.

Rob Kittenger, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Meet the Human in Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an estimated 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.

An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.

Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other major American objectives include safeguarding the free flow of commerce, countering transnational threats, preventing regional domination or aggression, and advancing nonproliferation.

The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); arms sales to Taiwan; and military exercises with allies.

More recently, the Trump administration emphasized increased allied defense spending to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US maintains efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.

Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian protection of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.

This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of simultaneous conflict with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.

The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which does not formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.

Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States prefers to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will employ kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons” that the US conducted kinetic attack.

The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are challenging given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.

Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its control over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also unclear how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network persists, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.

None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation shifts focus to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy. Some critics note that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.

As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.

Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.

Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

American allies are unanimous in rejecting extended deterrence that does not include the potential use of nuclear weapons. NFU would give a nuclear-armed adversary, such as Russia, a sanctuary from which to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Removing American nuclear forces as a credible deterrent cedes all bargaining power to Moscow, China, and any other would-be nuclear or conventional adversary.

Associated with this campaign is an effort to remove the president’s authority to employ nuclear weapons without at least two additional officials supporting such a decision. They also claim the president would have very little time to decide to retaliate with nuclear weapons, should the US face a nuclear first strike. Of course, ending the president’s “sole authority” would only exacerbate the challenge.

There is a false argument often repeated that American nuclear weapons are on “hair trigger alert” and the president might make a reckless decision to launch, given the assumed minimal time available to determine whether a nuclear response is warranted. It is of course clear how such a decision-making process is significantly impeded if the president must receive concurrence from other officials to make a decision. Such a move reduces the credibility of American deterrence in the minds of adversaries.

Three other factors are also being brought to bear in this campaign to adopt a NFU strategy. First, there is an assertion that the president could be reckless and impetuous and might unnecessarily order the use of nuclear weapons. Second, there is an assertion that a president’s order may be illegal and thus having a “second confirmation authority/opinion” is a good thing. Third, there is an assertion that American deterrence strategy requires the use of nuclear weapons against cities and urban areas—with the objective of killing millions of civilians.

All three assertions are false. The first assertion is belied by the fact that every president understands the dangers of nuclear war. President Donald Trump made several statements to this effect, so the notion he, or any president, would be “reckless and impetuous” does not bear scrutiny. His administration’s major investments in deterrence illustrate the seriousness with which the country seeks to prevent any use of nuclear weapons.

The second assertion on the “illegality” of ordering nuclear use ignores the constitutional role of the president as commander in chief. States wage war regardless of whether the United Nations says it is illegal. Nuclear weapons are merely tools of war. They are not special. They simply pack more explosive energy in a smaller package than a conventional weapon.

The third assertion ignores the Department of Defense Law of War Manual, which explicitly states that attacks against unarmed civilians and non-combatants violate just war principles and are prohibited. American nuclear deterrence strategy explicitly rules out the purposeful targeting of civilian populations and cities, a posture many nuclear abolitionists oppose as they advocate city busting.

Given US deterrence strategy strictly forbids the targeting of cities and civilian populations, there is no basis for believing that carrying out the president’s order to employ weapons will be or be seen as illegal by either civilian or military officials. Thus, there is no need for multiple individuals involved in releasing weapons, all while the president is working through an already compressed and stressful timeline.

A recent “study” by the University of Massachusetts and the Human Security Lab cooked the books by asking both military and civilian officials whether they would oppose an “illegal” presidential order requiring the US to launch nuclear weapons against civilians. Many respondents, having been coached to believe such orders were realistically probable, said they would oppose such orders or at least seek to question the orders. These results were then hijacked to create a false narrative that even military officials now doubt President Trump’s leadership and would not obey the commander in chief if ordered to employ nuclear weapons. Given the survey was conducted during the Israel and US military strikes against Iran, the results were designed to call into question the reasonableness of conventional strikes on Iran.

The campaign to call into question American deterrence policy is based on a willful misrepresentation of states policy and strategic reality. Annie Jacobsen dramatized this misinformation in her book Nuclear War: A Scenario, in which she described US nuclear deterrence strategy as crazy. She proposed jettisoning the use of nuclear weapons for deterrence, whether used first or second, and taking such capability completely off the table. When asked what replacement she recommended, Jacobsen claimed such a question was beyond her expertise.

Leaving the nuclear deterrent off the table is part of a concerted disarmament campaign pushed by nuclear abolitionists. These groups were able to ensure the United Nations passed a treaty that bans nuclear weapons, which is as valuable as a treaty which bans war. While 73 nations signed the treaty, none are nuclear weapons states.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is seeking to stop nuclear modernization in the United States, which is strange considering Russia and China are in the midst of major modernization programs. There is nothing less effective than taking a knife to a gunfight, which is exactly what advocates of nuclear disarmament would impose on the free world. For nearly 80 years the US has made sure the nation fields the systems needed to ensure deterrence works. Now is not the time to abandon a successful strategy for the sake of feel-good activism.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Campaign to End Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

Little doubt exists that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to American airstrikes. Although Iran is a signatory to the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long complained of Iranian efforts to hinder IAEA inspections. Iran started its nuclear energy program in the 1950s when President Dwight Eisenhower and the Shah had a good relationship and the Atoms for Peace program was a noble effort.

The relationship between Iran and the United States collapsed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. When the Iranian government was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the US took on the moniker of “the Great Satan” and the Islamic Republic never stopped condemning the United States, all while spending the past four decades supporting terror groups that attack American targets. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic began looking into the development of nuclear weapons but did not take major strides in that effort until after the American response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Given the long animosity between the United States and Iran, neither Israel nor the United States would have opposed regime change had the “Twelve Day War” led to such a result. A new, pro-American, regime would certainly desire a nuclear weapon less than the current regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current ruler, was not toppled and is now cracking down on Iranian society as dissidents are rounded up and often executed.

Although China and Russia did not intervene on Iran’s behalf during the war, within 24 hours of the American attack messages of support for the regime were issued by authoritarians, like Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Set aside former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s claim that “some countries” might give Iran nuclear weapons because of the American strike. Such a remark was unserious. But Russia very well may help Iran reconstitute its nuclear program.

What does matter is that the post-war behavior of Ayatollah Khamenei shows a pattern of continued aggression in the face of defeat, which is supported by Russia for its own interests. It is unlikely Russia or China will play a constructive role in helping the United States find a lasting resolution to the Iran problem.

Israel’s recent air campaign and covert operations in Iran should shock the Iranian regime into reconsidering its fundamental approach, but Iran’s raison d’etre (reason for being) is to both fight the Americans and the Jews. It offers little else. Thus, making peace with the Gret Satan and “the Jews” challenges five decades of anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. For the Ayatollah and his regime, such a change in direction is destabilizing at best.

The Israeli assassination of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals and Iran’s leading nuclear scientists was both a practical solution to a difficult problem and a warning to Israel’s enemies. Whether or not these assassinations have a long-term effect is uncertain.

There is certainly a pipeline of scientists training in China and Russia that will step in where their predecessors left off. Given their own interest in creating a distraction for the United States, China and Russia will likely continue to support Iran’s aspirations. So, too, will North Korea. This may allow Iran to learn from its recent experience and rebuild more effectively.

There is also the battle damage assessment, which, absent on-the-ground intelligence, can only make informed assessments about the destruction of facilities like Fordow. Undoubtedly, the American mission was impressive and executed flawlessly, but Iran always knew its facilities were an enticing target for American stealth bombers. Hopefully, American intelligence estimates are correct and the GBU-57s destroyed their intended targets, setting back the Iranian nuclear program for years. Better yet, enriched uranium is buried under hundreds of feet of debris.

However, should American and Israeli efforts fail, and Iran somehow reconstitutes its nuclear program and is able to field a working nuclear weapon, both Israel and the United States still have the ability to deter Iran from using such a weapon. Iranians are an ancient people who can trace their civilization back 3,000 years. When Darius the Great established the world’s greatest empire (522–486 BC), he set Iran on the path to becoming one of the planet’s great civilizations. Ayatollah Khamenei, for all his bluster, is not willing to see that history destroyed along with the Iranian people.

Unquestionably, the situation is complex and will continue to evolve. Let us hope that President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can reach an agreement that ensures the security of all three countries. But if Iran refuses to negotiate in good faith, let us hope Israeli intelligence remains effective and Iranian air defenses are still unable to see American stealth bombers.

Sam Stanton is a Professor of International Relations at Grove City College and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Results in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The talk challenges conventional thinking and calls for renewed strategic clarity in deterring nuclear proliferation threats.

Huessy Seminar: After Iran, What Will Policing Nonproliferation Require? with Henry Sokolski was originally published on Global Security Review.

The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.

The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.

In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.

Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.

In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.

Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.

Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.

To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.

The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.

These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.

How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.

With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.

The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.

Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

One thing is clear: Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely focused on India. Claims to the contrary misrepresent Pakistan’s doctrinal posture while creating unfounded geostrategic fears.

Unlike North Korea or Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-focused and regionally confined. Even when it became a nuclear power, it was not the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan’s missile inventory includes the Shaheen, Ghauri, Ababeel, and other series of missiles. They are all short- or medium-range missile systems to counter Indian nuclear capabilities. Even Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)–capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ababeel, has a range of 2,200 km and is a response to India’s ballistic missile defense system.

Moreover, Pakistan’s Shaheen III land-based MRBM has a range of 2,750 to cover Indian far-off strategic bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These missile ranges are not even close to the ICBM threshold of at least 5,500 km.

Unlike nuclear weapon states that have ICBMs, Pakistan does not possess the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, terrestrial or space-based, needed to accurately launch nuclear weapons half-way across the planet. India, not Pakistan, is working on not just ICBMs, but also the global ISR infrastructure to effectively employ such weapons. India has not only tested the Agni-V, which has a range of 8,000+ km but is also developing the Agni-VI with a 12,000 km range. The K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with intercontinental strike capability, is also in development.

It is alarming to note that the deployment of K-5 SLBMs on expansive ocean patrols can enable India to target Europe, Russia, Israel, and American Pacific territories. Such Indian military and nuclear buildup are not consistent with India’s policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD).

Currently, India is accelerating the deployment of 52 military satellites for ISR. These satellites will support ICBM employment and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities.

Indian naval nuclear projection also indicates that it will develop military bases abroad in accord with its ambitions to be a blue-water navy. India is developing overseas military facilities across the Indian Ocean region, including in the Seychelles, Tajikistan, Oman, the Maldives, and Mauritius. India also has signed logistic support agreements (LSAs) with states for mutual logistic support at ports and bases. These agreements also include ISR agreements with Australia, France, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the US, and Vietnam.

Pakistan’s strategic culture and historic interests reflect a deep concern with losing a conflict against India. This is because Pakistan does not have the geography that allows for a defense in depth against an attacking Indian Army. Thus, both conventional and nuclear forces are designed to deter and defeat that specific threat.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is defined by the logic of CMD. Its full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) posture also falls under CMD at all levels of threat, including tactical, operational, and strategic. The development of an ICBM is inconsistent with every aspect of Pakistani military thinking and action.

Pakistan already fields the capabilities needed to strike any target in India. Pakistan has no ambitions regarding global power projection. From a Pakistani perspective, building nuclear weapons for the sake of coercing or striking the United States only makes the relationship with the United States worse and invites American intervention in Pakistan.

When Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, Indian Americans, published an article in Foreign Affairs in which they suggested Pakistan is building an ICBM whose target is the United States, they engaged in blatant information warfare. Their assertion is unfounded.

India’s shift from deterrence-by-denial to a more aggressive nuclear posture, including deterrence by compellence and punishment, certainly has Pakistan concerned. This change is tolerated by the United States because India is seen as a counterweight to China in Asia.

It is important for Americans to learn a critical lesson from the 2020 China-India crisis; India is unlikely to fight with the US against China if a war comes. China is the second-largest trade partner of India after the US with total trade reaching $127.7 billion in 2024–2025. There is ample reason for India to do what it has always done, play both sides.

Admittedly, Pakistan has a problem with terrorism and a difficult time effectively controlling terrorists operating from the Afghan border region, which grew worse when Pakistan partnered with the US to fight the War on Terror. Pakistan is now the second most negatively affected country when it comes to terrorism.

Over recent years, Islamabad alone lost 80,000 civilian and security personnel to the menace of terrorism. India has also been involved in terror activities in Pakistan, irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement was provided to UN Secretary-General.

Keep in mind, the vast majority of Pakistanis want to live in a country that looks like the United States, not one that looks like Afghanistan or China—when it comes to democracy, economic prosperity, freedom, and stability. Pakistanis want increased economic trade and development with the United States, not nuclear war.

As India expands its capabilities, Pakistan is likely to follow India’s lead. This is, however, done for the purpose of ensuring India cannot launch a disarming strike against Pakistan. Platforms like SSBNs may be necessary as Pakistan is compelled to diversify, not globalize, its range of nuclear weapons.

If the US is sincere in its desire to create stability in South Asia, encouraging India to cease building nuclear weapons that are a direct threat to Pakistan would be helpful. The US can also invest in arms control dialogue and crisis communication in South Asia. President Trump played a key role in ending the most recent conflict. He also ended the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel. Given his concern for preventing war, President Trump can play a critical role in South Asia.

Pakistan has partnered with the United States since its independence from India. It was a partner during the Cold War when India was not and worked closely with the United States for two decades during the conflict in Afghanistan. Admittedly, Pakistan faces some internal challenges, but educated Pakistanis want nothing more than a good relationship with the United States.

Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, a Youth Leader Fund (YLF) Mentor with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project.

Pakistan Is Not Building an ICBM to Attack America was originally published on Global Security Review.

For eighty years the United States pursued a policy of globalism with worldwide military commands to implement this policy. It is prohibitively expensive and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Observers point out that the US defense budget was $849 billion in 2024, but this is only part of the overall annual expenditure on defense. Most countries include veterans benefits in their defense budgets. The United States treats these costs differently. Today the Veterans Administration (VA) budget stands at $369.3 billion and is rising rapidly because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove healthcare and retirement costs higher.

As Table 1 shows, the VA budget rose about 10 percent per annum, resulting in the VA budget rising to the second largest amount of discretionary funding in the federal budget.  Further, as the breakdown of annual expenditure shows, medical costs are growing as the soldiers who went to war as young people are now in their forties and their health issues are becoming chronic while the injuries they suffered are becoming more difficult to treat due to age-related complications.

Table 1

Veterans Administration Budget 2018–2025

Source: US Veterans Administration (2024)

Combined expenditures for fiscal year 2025 will surpass $1 trillion. Given America’s growing debt such expenditure is difficult to sustain, especially if Washington’s global military footprint continues to expand at a rapid pace. Finding the manpower to wage war is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States.

The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts saw the United States suffer 8,492 combat fatalities.  Compared to the 58,000 deaths in Vietnam and 53,000 in Korea this number was significantly smaller. A critical reason was excellent triage care and swift evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield. To get soldiers to serve in an all-volunteer force, the United States was offering $20,000 to $40,000 enlistment bonuses. Today, those numbers are even higher.

Further, in his autobiography, Hillbilly Elegy, Vice President J. D. Vance discussed how the American working class, which his family belonged to, blamed George W. Bush and Barack Obama for making them cannon fodder in Afghanistan and Iraq. This feeling, combined with the high number of walking wounded (over 50,000) who came back from the wars with physical and psychological trauma, led to a growing reluctance amongst America’s combat-age population to go to war. In such circumstances, reducing military expenditures and the nation’s global military footprint makes sense.

In this context, Trump’s plan for hemispheric defense is a return to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century, where the United States maintained its military supremacy over the Western hemisphere and kept out foreign powers. Defending the Western hemisphere is easy. As Otto von Bismark once said, “The Americans are a very lucky people. They’re bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors, and to the east and west by fish.”

In the 21st century, the United States remains the predominant naval power in the Atlantic Ocean as well as in the Eastern and South Pacific, making it difficult for any aggressor to penetrate America’s defensive walls. Fielding an American military force that is based around a blue-water Navy and a globally deployable Air Force is a cost-effective strategy because it takes away the expense of overseas bases. In fact, recognizing that in a conflict with China there could be political unwillingness in Asia to host F-35s, the first Trump administration decided to build a new generation of lower yield nuclear weapons that could be launched from cruise missile–carrying submarines.

The Quest for Territory

Since coming to power, Donald Trump suggested Canada become the 51st state and the purchase of Greenland. Denmark has stated that Greenland is not for sale while in Canada Trump’s statements led to a revival of Canadian nationalism and a boost in the fortunes of a very unpopular liberal party. President Trump’s motivation for such efforts is clear.

In terms of minerals, a United States that has full access to minerals in Canada and Greenland is on par with the mineral wealth of Russia. Acquiring Canada and Greenland would also make the United States and Russia the two most prominent Arctic states and would freeze out attempts by China to acquire influence in the region.

Trump’s demands caused global leaders to wonder about the rationality of such pronouncements but what he said is based in political and historical facts. The United States purchased the Virgin Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John from Copenhagen in 1917 and, subsequently, bought Water Island from a private Danish company in 1944. If the citizens of Greenland choose, via referenda, to join the United States, such a purchase has historical precedent.

In the case of Canada, the Quebecois have periodically asked for independence and Ottawa conducted referendums to see if the population of Quebec wants to secede. So far, secessionists suffer defeat each time. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic provinces of Canada—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—previously said that Quebec’s secession would lead to their joining the United States. British Columbia, which is divided from Canada by the Rockies and whose economy is tied to the West coast of the United States, would potentially follow suit. Canada would then consist of Ontario and the northern part of Quebec where the native population has made it clear that they have no interest in joining the Francophone nationalists.

The fact is that Canada has a fragile economy that could breed long-term discontent.  Further, in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois’ charismatic leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon, who is likely to win the provincial election in April, wants a third independence referendum by 2030. If that happens, Trump’s territorial realignment may come to pass. In a world where all or part of Canada is part of the United States and Greenland is an American territory, the United States is in far less need of Europe or Asia. With only 11 percent of the American economy derived from exports, an internally focused United States is not a nation in a bad position.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow in the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal. He may be contacted at amit.gupta1856@gmail.com.

Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as key American allies, should strengthen their conventional military capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to reinforce regional deterrence. Two critical steps are needed. First, Japan and South Korea must expand their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s missile launchers. Second, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System to create an integrated deterrence framework.

So far, to address concerns over potential nuclear decoupling, the US, Japan, and South Korea have explored multiple options. In addition to Washington’s repeated assurances that its nuclear extended deterrence remains intact, discussions have included modernizing American nuclear weapons, expanding nuclear-sharing agreements, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, and even the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear arsenal.

However, South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons remains highly improbable due to its significant political costs. From the 1960s to the 1980s, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states feared the US might hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear strike on Europe. While NATO pursued multiple strategies—most notably the dual-key system and the deployment of Pershing II missiles—these measures never fully resolved nuclear decoupling concerns.

Ultimately, NATO never confronted the full extent of this dilemma as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Since the issue lies not in the US’s ability to retaliate but in its willingness to do so under specific conditions, the most practical approach is to adopt deterrence measures that North Korea perceives as credible.

First, Japan and South Korea should prioritize expanding their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear missile launchers. A key advantage for the US, Japan, and South Korea—compared to NATO during the Cold War—is that North Korea is estimated to have around 50 nuclear warheads, far fewer than the tens of thousands in the Soviet arsenal.

In this context, Japan’s planned acquisition of enemy base strike capabilities should focus not only on expanding the number of available strike assets but also on improving their precision and destructive power to ensure maximum effectiveness against North Korean launch sites. At the same time, South Korea’s kill chain should further enhance its deep-strike capabilities by increasing assets like the Hyunmoo-4 missile, which is designed to penetrate deeply buried facilities.

Additionally, South Korea’s Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, should undergo a major expansion in drone assets capable of effectively detecting, tracking, and striking North Korean missile launchers. By integrating high-precision missiles and unmanned systems, both Japan and South Korea can significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to deliver nuclear strikes, thereby reinforcing deterrence.

Second, as Japan and South Korea expand their strike capabilities, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System. This integration would allow both countries to allocate their finite military assets more effectively when targeting North Korea’s nuclear-related ground units. For example, given the geographic distance, Japan could focus on striking fixed targets such as command centers and underground missile storage sites while South Korea concentrates on eliminating mobile launchers that require rapid response and precision strikes.

Additionally, harmonizing Japan and South Korea’s missile defense structures would improve the likelihood of intercepting North Korean missiles. While Japan has developed its missile defense in close coordination with the United States, South Korea has opted to develop its own independent missile defense system, instead of fully integrating into the American-led ballistic missile defense framework.

However, aligning the two countries’ missile defense systems would significantly enhance regional interception capabilities. A fully integrated defense network would not only establish a more layered interception system against incoming North Korean missiles but also enable earlier response times—as Japan and South Korea deepen their real-time missile-tracking cooperation—South Korea’s response times could improve further. By improving both offensive and defensive coordination, Japan and South Korea can maximize deterrence and reduce North Korea’s nuclear strike effectiveness.

By implementing these measures, North Korea would be left with only a limited number of launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While it is possible that some missiles could still be launched from the remaining launchers and a few might evade American missile defenses, North Korea would have to consider allocating few nuclear warheads against Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This would be necessary both to achieve its long-term political objectives and to deter US-ROK combined forces and US Forces Japan (USFJ) from retaliating in the short term.

Moreover, North Korean leadership would face significant uncertainty about whether its remaining nuclear missiles could successfully penetrate American missile defenses. In essence, by increasing their conventional strike capabilities and aligning their military strategies, Japan and South Korea could ensure that a substantial number of North Korean launchers are neutralized. This would force Pyongyang to operate with significantly reduced military options, making its attempt to create nuclear decoupling less credible.

However, this strategy is only viable as long as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains limited. If Pyongyang dramatically expands its warhead stockpile and launch platforms, conventional deterrence alone will no longer be sufficient, and the risk of nuclear decoupling will escalate beyond control. The US, Japan, and South Korea must act decisively—before the balance of power shifts irreversibly in North Korea’s favor. Time is running out.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.

A new version, the Shahed-136B, is available for use in conflict. With an extended range of 4,000 kilometers, the increasing capability of Iran’s long-range drone raises important strategic questions as this weapon’s potential uses beyond Ukraine are considered. Consider Iran’s potential response to an American attack on its nuclear facilities, should the United States and Iran fail to reach an agreement that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Shahed-136 in the Russia-Ukraine War

Iran is supplying the Shahed-136 to Russia as supply of the drone is available. Russia often uses the drone to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and military positions. The design of this Shahed-136 allows it to bypass traditional air defense systems due to its low radar cross-section and ability to deploy in swarms—ensuring the drone will always get through, at least some portion.

Military officials in Ukraine and the West identified the Shahed-136 as a persistent and cost-effective threat capable of overwhelming advanced air defense systems. In the case of the Shahad-136, quantity has a quality all its own. Russia’s use of this drone is giving Iran valuable battlefield data that allows designers to refine and improve the capabilities of the Shahed-136B, which is proving an even more lethal weapon.

Strategic Implications in a US-Iran Conflict

If tensions between the US and Iran escalate—particularly if the US conducts strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites—the Shahed-136B could become a key component of Iran’s retaliation strategy. With a 4,000-kilometer range, the Shahad-136B has the potential to strike American strategic assets across the region. With a large American presence spread across the Middle East, there are a large number of Americans and military targets that would make inviting targets. Although the Shahed-136B does not have the legs to strike targets beyond Southern Europe and the Middle East, the number of American bases and assets within the drone’s striking radius are significant.

Iran may also try to launch attacks from unfriendly nations in the Western hemisphere like Cuba or Venezuela or even work with Mexican drug cartels. This proximity, should such an approach work, could allow for attacks on critical targets in the United States. Iran believes the United States is seeking regime change, which will lead the regime to see any fight as a fight for survival.

While military analysts can debate the effectiveness and impact of such a response, the psychological effect achieved is significant. Israelis, for example, live in constant fear of attack from the air. An American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities or other assets would surely elicit an Iranian attack from Iran’s most advanced capabilities.

Iran has a sophisticated network of asymmetric capabilities that extend across the Middle East and Europe. This means any direct confrontation with Tehran could lead to severe and unpredictable consequences for American security. Ensuring Iran does not field a nuclear weapon may be worth the risk of an Iranian response, but it is certainly unknown just how Iran may respond and how effectively the United States and its allies can limit the effect of any response.

Rather than pushing the region toward war, President Donald Trump, who presents himself as a pragmatic negotiator, should consider engaging Iran in constructive dialogue. Despite the difficulties in recent efforts by President Trump to work with the Iranian regime, a return to diplomacy could prevent a devastating conflict that neither side can afford.

Keep in mind, the regime in Tehran feels the United States is attempting to end the regime. The desire for nuclear weapons was spurred by American forces in Iraq, Iran’s western neighbor, and Afghanistan, Iran’s northern neighbor. Ratcheting down tensions will require an American effort to create a sense of security within the Iranian leadership.

While the Shahed-136B is not the only tool in Iran’s toolkit, it is an example of the growing capability fielded by Iran. It is also a strategic consideration for the United States. Iran is unlikely to let any attack go unanswered.

Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash is an independent defense analyst in Tehran.

Shahed-136: Iran’s Long-Range Drone and Its Potential Role in a US Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Podcast – Future-Proofing National Security: We Can’t Just Wish for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report Week of 10 Mar was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Overview

The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.

Key Themes & Highlights

1. Strategic Nuclear Posture & Modernization:
   • U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.
   • The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.
   • Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.
2. Policy & Leadership Insights:
   • Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.
   • House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.
   • Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.
3. Geopolitical Developments & Deterrence Challenges:
   • Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.
   • Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.
   • The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.
4. Ukraine Conflict & U.S. Policy:
   • Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.
   • Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.
5. Congressional & Budgetary Updates:
   • The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.
   • Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.
6. Emerging Threats & Strategic Risks:
   • Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.
   • Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.

Download the full report

ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

A decade ago, Paul Bracken warned of such possibilities in his book, The Second Nuclear Age. Because deterrence theory went out of vogue for so long in the West, analysts are now woefully unprepared to think about these challenges and their implications. Today, all possible threats to our Western notions of peace and stability have been jumbled into one giant intellectual recycling bin of deterrence theory. It is time to talk much more seriously about (1) the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence and (2) the role of nuclear deterrence in a new era of nuclear disorder in the Asia-Pacific.

Nuclear weapons play a unique and unprecedented role in how nations think about geopolitical order. They have fundamentally altered how countries think about alliances and the nature of international order. William Walker wrote about the establishment, in the late 1960s, of a nuclear order based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system “whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound,” and in which there was a degree of familiarity in essentially dyadic deterrence relationships.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system “whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits,” concomitantly with the provision of nuclear umbrellas and a stable Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession, but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems would provide the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for states to rely on the US for their national survival.

There are several elements that gradually developed after the second world war that characterized this nuclear order—dissuading countries from developing nuclear weapons. First, the number of nuclear weapon states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered merely bigger and better conventional weapons. Third, there are strong norms against possession and the use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no direct and immediate military threats to US allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely.

This and the prospects for nuclear proliferation are relatively limited. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) proposed in the late 1960s eventually attract more and more states, thus contributing to a norm against nuclear proliferation. It also contributed to nuclear and conventional arms control as concepts and policies in the international community. The world was able to more easily navigate crises and confrontations as thinking evolved about strategic theory and concepts and their application to real world politics and diplomacy.

The international (nuclear) order held together. It is now slowly eroding. China is modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces, all while growing increasingly bellicose and regularly threatening to invade Taiwan.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The West did nothing and never imagined this would be followed by a full-scale invasion eight years later—with regular Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.

Now, Australian academic Peter Layton is writing about “this nuclear threat business.” Until recently, this behavior was reserved for rogue states like North Korea. Such behavior was beneath great powers such as Russia and the United States. Not only does the West have to think about deterrence in a multipolar setting, but it must face nuclear dictators.

Nuclear arsenals in Asia are also expanding. From China’s rapid nuclear expansion to questions about the future of Pakistan’s nuclear posture, the future is uncertain. There are renewed questions about the future of South Korea and nuclear weapons.

Arms control is also breaking down. Much to the chagrin of arms control careerists, who argue for unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral nuclear arms control as a public good sui generis, arms control is not carrying the day. Bereft of the intellectual foundations of deterrence that guided impressive negotiations in SALT I and II, and even START I, discussing nuclear strategy is now taboo in the West.

The nuclear order that existed during the Cold War and the post–Cold War peace dividend, especially in the Asia-Pacific, is eroding rapidly. For many nuclear historians, this trend is not new. Now is the time to grieve the loss of the utopian dream and think seriously about how to navigate this new era of disorder and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and promoting peace.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Order and Disorder in the Asia-Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains uncertain, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.

In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel launched Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.

This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.

Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos raided an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also captured Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.

Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency stated that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.

However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.

Degraded Proxy Capabilities

In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.

Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.

Israeli operations significantly degraded Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian S-300s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.

Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire economic situation of the country as well as the increasing repression by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.

Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, energy shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.

That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.

Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the installation of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.

Iran’s foreign minister recently stated that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.

Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in minimal progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.

Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing options in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.

Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.

While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.

Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.

Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.

Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense may not emerge until the Summer of 2025.

In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after snap elections in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently chatted with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its defense budget at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.

Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in early December 2024, committed to deliver Patriot systems in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s defense math just does not add up.

In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.

France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.

The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire).

President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in civilian and military space.

At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all becoming increasingly significant players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a central role in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to supercharge NATO’s deterrence.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget steadily increased over the past two years. Of course, this strains society’s resources and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an endgame pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his nuclear swagger at the highest level.

For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.

The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged Russian interference.

The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.

The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.

By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent exchange on X (Twitter) between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.

Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”

As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.

Quotes of the Week

• Xi Jinping (China): “No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.”
• U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea): Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.
• DPRK Kim Jong Un: Committed to implementing the “toughest” anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.
• Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State): Highlighted Russia’s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.
• NATO Official: Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.

Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events

1. January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM: Robert Soofer & Mark Massa on “The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.”
2. January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM: Shoshana Bryen & Ilan Berman on “Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.”
3. February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Stephen Blank & Mark Schneider on “Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.”
4. February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM: Hon. Madelyn Creedon & Hon. Frank Miller on “Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.”
5. March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM: Gordon Chang & Rick Fisher on “The Chinese Nuclear Threat & Implications for US Security.”

Nuclear Derangement Syndrome

• Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.
• The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.
• The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.

The Biden-Trump Arms Race

• Criticism: The Biden and Trump administrations’ claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.
• Reality: Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.
• Key Concern: Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.
• Counterarguments: Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.

Download the full report.

ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the symbol Pu on the Periodic Table, plutonium is an element with an atomic number of 94, which means its nucleus has 94 protons. As a heavy metal it has many more neutrons than protons, but more on that later.

Plutonium is categorized as a heavy metal that is unstable, which means it is radioactive. More importantly, it is fissionable, meaning it splits apart easily when neutrons collide with a plutonium atom. This collision releases energy.

Interestingly uranium gives life to plutonium in the sense that plutonium is produced through beta decay from uranium. Once plutonium is produced, uranium is needed to help plutonium live up to its full potential.

Plutonium-239 is a key material for nuclear weapons, particularly in an implosion-type nuclear weapon, primarily found in modern arsenals. These weapons use conventional explosives to compress a plutonium core to a supercritical state, initiating a chain reaction.

In a nuclear weapon, the plutonium pit is compressed by conventional explosives, which is timed to create a symmetrical implosion, applying the same inward pressure on the entire pit. Thus, the pit reaches a supercritical state. This means that the plutonium nuclei are packed densely enough for neutrons released by fission to cause further fissions at an accelerating rate—cause a stable chain reaction.

To start a chain reaction, an external neutron source, often a device called a neutron initiator, is used. This ensures enough neutrons are present at the moment the pit becomes supercritical.

In a thermonuclear weapon, the energy released from the fission reaction in the plutonium pit compresses and heats a secondary fusion stage. This secondary stage usually contains isotopes like deuterium (discovered by American chemist Harold C. Urey for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1934) and tritium (discovered in 1934 by the physicists Ernest Rutherford, M. L. Oliphant, and Paul Harteck), which undergo fusion reactions under the extreme conditions generated by the primary fission explosion.

Precise engineering ensures that both uranium and plutonium interact seamlessly, achieving the desired explosive yield. While uranium and plutonium are both “heavy metals,” a “classical” metaphor will prove useful to explain how uranium and plutonium work together with uranium as the conductor of an orchestra and plutonium as the star soloist.

Uranium, particularly uranium-235, sets the stage for the entire nuclear reaction. Just as a maestro leads the orchestra and ensures that all elements come together harmoniously, uranium initiates the nuclear chain reaction in the secondary stage of a thermonuclear weapon where it leads to a more significant fusion reaction. The virtuoso plutonium-239, with its higher likelihood of fission upon neutron impact, takes on the pivotal role of driving the core fission reaction in modern nuclear weapons. Plutonium’s implosion mechanism requires precision for its masterful execution.

Plutonium’s implosion reaction is the centerpiece, releasing immense energy and driving the explosive power of the bomb. Its ability to sustain a rapid chain reaction is crucial, similar to how a virtuoso’s skill ensures the success of a performance. Both elements must work in harmony.

To continue with the metaphor of an orchestra, just as some orchestras perform in the orchestra pit, uranium and plutonium work together via a pit. To optimize yield and efficiency of uranium-235 and plutonium-239, a plutonium pit is surrounded by a uranium tamper in a thermonuclear weapon. This arrangement leverages the high-speed neutrons produced by fusion to induce additional fission in the uranium-235, thereby boosting the explosion’s overall yield.

The plutonium pit is typically composed of a sphere or shell of plutonium-239, a fissile isotope capable of sustaining a nuclear chain reaction. The pit often contains a small amount of gallium to stabilize its crystal structure, preventing the plutonium from becoming brittle.

On October 1, 2024, the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) verified completion of the first production unit (FPU) of a plutonium pit for the W87-1 modification program. A plutonium pit is a necessary component in America’s nuclear warheads. The NNSA is currently rebuilding the capability to manufacture plutonium pits, at the rate of no fewer than 80 pits per year.

In the end, what is important to keep in mind is that plutonium and uranium work together in the nation’s nuclear weapons. Through great science and even better designs, plutonium and uranium work together to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

Alex Littlefield is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). The views expressed are his own.

Plutonium-239 and Its Relationship with Uranium-235 in Thermonuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

A driving factor is the rising nuclear threat posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. Such a threat requires effective nuclear deterrence. Another concern is continuing doubts as to whether America’s extended deterrence is reliable in a serious international crisis or a major shooting war.

It is true that when authoritarian states brandish their nuclear arsenals for coercion, repeatedly threatening nuclear attack, any nation would be concerned and look to its guarantor of security for help. Unfortunately, the United States is proving slow to field the kind of arsenal that can not only deter or defeat aggression against itself, but also provide that same capability for almost three dozen allies.

The US is now in a position where it must modernize and expand its own nuclear arsenal and right-size those numbers to sustain dynamic parity with adversaries. Legally and morally, there is indeed an inescapable duty to deter. For Japan and South Korea, that duty will be met by the United States or themselves.

Nuclear participation by America’s allies in Asia would be in direct contravention to US policy, and would violate both the letter and the spirit of the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but it would certainly prove understandable. Australia, Japan, and South Korea all signed the treaty, but a voracious and aggressive China and North Korea are proving a real threat to all three states.

Rather than take a position for or against ally nuclear participation, an overview of the main arguments on both sides of the issue are instructive.

Pros

First, recall that Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have a level of experience with the nuclear issue. Japan, of course, faced atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, as Japan up-arms to deter China and North Korea, Tokyo might decide to field its own nuclear weapons.

Southern and western Australia were the sites of over a dozen British nuclear weapon tests between 1952 and 1963. This is a fact too few understand.

South Korea had its own nuclear weapon research and development program during the Cold War, which was abandoned because of American pressure. South Korea does rely on nuclear power for its generation of electricity.

Second, note that these American allies do possess civilian nuclear power industries, sophisticated militaries, sizable economies, and advanced science and technology capabilities. All three countries could build nuclear weapons in relatively short order. On the positive side, the fielding of Australian, Japanese, and South Korean nuclear forces would make aggression far more complicated for China and North Korea.

The inclusion of allied nuclear forces would disperse and diversify the collective nuclear deterrent available for employment and increase the number of targets China or North Korea must strike in a conflict. Allied nuclear participation is also an alternative to overseas nuclear basing agreements, like those that existed during the Cold War. Given the lack of available American weapons, such an arrangement could prove very beneficial.

Lastly, nuclear participation would put an end to the endless debate over the credibility of  American extended deterrence. Rather, the focus would turn to integrating nuclear forces in the event of a conflict.

Cons

There are some well-known arguments for continued nuclear nonproliferation. They include the longtime prohibition in US policy and the NPT prohibition against it. There are also pragmatic concerns.

First, if a country were to withdraw from the NPT, although allowed by Article X, it would create significant diplomatic tensions between the US and the country withdrawing from the treaty. American sanctions could significantly harm the economy of Australia, Japan, or South Korea.

Second, any democratic state pursuing nuclear weapons would undermine Western efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons development. Worse, it could open the floodgates of nuclear proliferation among states that are certain to prove less responsible with those weapons.

Third, China might see the pursuit of nuclear weapons by American allies as a sufficient reason to launch a “defensive” nuclear strike. China’s “active defense” strategy clearly supports the use of preventive attacks.

Fourth, the Nuclear Supplier’s Group would end all support to the civilian nuclear programs of Australia, Japan, and/or South Korea. Such a decision would cause great difficulty for power generators.

Conclusion

For Australia, American promises and the continent’s geographic position may prove sufficient to prevent a move to a nuclear weapons program. For Japan and South Korea, the threat is much closer. How these countries evaluate the threat is yet to be determined. They are signaling the United States that they want stronger assurances of American commitment.

Such assurance will prove difficult for the United States for many reasons. Neither China nor North Korea should take for granted that America’s allies will remain under the nuclear umbrella. It is only because of flagrant aggression that South Korea, and most recently, Japan, are even talking about the need for indigenous nuclear forces.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.

The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Participation in the Pacific was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

Instability and American Aid

Pakistan is not a stable country. There are concerns that the state may disintegrate. Its military and ISI are infiltrated by individuals linked to terrorist groups. Without focused American engagement, Pakistan’s instability could lead to either the theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists or the sabotage of a nuclear facility. Moreover, a long-running territorial dispute over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism could easily escalate into a conflict or nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan gets a free ride. Between 1948 and 2016, it received over $78.3 billion in US military and economic support. In return, it is duplicitous. Over half of this aid was allocated to counterterrorism efforts, yet Pakistan’s military and the ISI continue supporting the Taliban and other extremists. The US annually provides Pakistan $2 billion in military and economic aid without proper oversight. Of this amount, $100 million is allocated to the Strategic Plans Division to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal. Despite this assistance, Pakistan provides safe haven to dozens of terrorist organizations and their leadership. Its military’s continued support for them increases the risk of a catastrophic nuclear attack by a proxy.

The Case for a Joint US-Pakistan Task Force

A joint US-Pakistan task force is necessary to enforce oversight, strengthen strategic ties, and provide a direct US role in securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A formal framework will mitigate the risks of mismanagement or unauthorized access and maintain control over critical aspects of nuclear security. It will enhance collaboration between military and intelligence agencies, enabling both sides to identify and respond to emerging threats while leveraging their combined expertise in human intelligence and counterterrorism.

A joint task force will also enhance nuclear security through specialized training. American experts in nuclear security and cyber defense can provide essential training to Pakistani forces, strengthening their operational readiness and capability to protect nuclear sites. Both nations conduct regular nuclear security drills—often referred to as “Armageddon tests” to assess vulnerabilities at nuclear sites. These drills help identify personnel weaknesses and prevent potential security breaches.

Deterrence, Sovereignty, and Regional Tensions

The presence of US military personnel in Pakistan will also serve as a powerful deterrent to terrorist organizations. US support in securing nuclear facilities reduces the probability of terrorist attempts to infiltrate and breach nuclear facilities or execute large-scale attacks. This cooperation also signals the seriousness of nuclear security in the region to potential adversaries.

Establishing an American military presence in Pakistan could be perceived as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, US involvement would be limited to advisory, intelligence, and technical support roles. This role would enable Pakistan to retain full control over its nuclear assets and security operations.

A US military presence in Pakistan could also escalate regional tensions—particularly with India. The two states have irreconcilable differences when it comes to Kashmir, and both sides believe they should control all of Kashmir, not just one part of it. An attack on civilians or military forces on either side of the line of control in Kashmir could easily escalate into a major conflict. However, the US can use diplomatic channels to ensure regional actors, including India, are aware of the task force’s defensive nature. The task force aims to secure nuclear sites and combat terrorism, not alter the region’s strategic balance.

Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

The world cannot afford nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. By establishing a Joint US-Pakistan task force, the US both protects global security and reaffirms its leadership in the fight against nuclear terrorism. This partnership strengthens nuclear safeguard, prevents nuclear theft, and stabilizes the region. The US must act now to ensure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are protected. Together, we can turn a potential crisis into a collaborative success. The time to act is now for a safer and more stable world.

Timor Nawabi is currently pursuing a master’s degree in security policy studies with a concentration in Science and Technology, focusing mainly on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Why a Joint US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Task Force Is Necessary was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hezbollah, now attempting to fend off Israel’s September 30 ground operation, is simultaneously working to adapt its own approach to technology, and, if history is any indicator of the future, the terror group will likely continue as it has, answering Israel’s high-tech efforts with ironically harder to trace low-tech options. That Hezbollah was even using pagers was to avoid cellular detection. And as they adapt, their communications will likely go even more analog, perhaps communicating only through couriers, as Osama Bin Laden was known to do, or using physical handwritten notes and dead drops, as militant Italian anarchist groups did in the early 2000s.

While the idea of a terrorist group obtaining a more technologically advanced arsenal, such as nuclear or chemical weapons, or instituting a mass cyberattack is daunting, it is not exactly uncommon due to expense and required expertise. What is far more likely is that Hezbollah and other terrorist groups will downgrade methods, opting for cheaper and easier to implement weapons and methods which are more than capable of lethal outcomes.

Time and time again, society has seen heavy damage wrought on person and property via methods that seem relatively primitive.

In 2021, the Gaza-based terrorist group Hamas increased their use of incendiary balloons when attacking Israel, causing more than 20 fires in southern Israel, straining civilian and IDF emergency service resources, and burning upward of 10,000 acres of farmland over the preceding three years. These “balloons are easily constructed and require little setup to launch compared to rockets, which are expensive and time-consuming to produce” but are still incredibly effective.

In 2013, a US power plant in California was victim of an as yet unsolved shooting attack, damaging multiple transformers. Surprisingly set up with little to no security, the plant’s perimeter was breached and approximately 100 rounds of high-powered rifle ammunition were fired into 17 transformers before police arrived. The damage was severe enough that to avoid blackouts across Silicon Valley power had to be diverted from other areas during the months-long repair.

While these incidents are high profile, given the critical infrastructure connections, they did not result in any fatalities. However, that is not always the goal of terrorists and is hardly the reality for other common low-tech methods. Shootings, bombings, and melee attacks continue to make up the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks. Research from the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that from 2015 to 2020,  85 percent of terror attacks employed one of these methods, with 12 percent being unrealized threats, 2 percent other, and 1 percent vehicle ramming.

The numbers are remarkably similar for lethal attacks in 2023 according to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index published by Vision of Humanity. Out of the 50 most lethal terrorist attacks, only one, an incident in the Homs Province of Syria, featuring an explosive-laden unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) targeting a military graduation ceremony which killed 89 people, could be thought of as a high-tech weapon. The other 49 were made up of 43 armed assaults, five bombings, and one explosive projectile.

As terrorist groups get backed into a corner by high-tech counter methods like the Israeli pager attack, it is increasingly likely they will rely on time-proven simple methods. The world may even see them adapting and learning from accidents such as the September 2024 car crash into a gas pipeline in Texas which caused an explosion or the 2017 Hamburg, Germany, airport evacuation which resulted from the accidental discharge of a simple, lipstick-sized can of pepper spray. While these were both accidents, one can imagine the economic and fear-induced impact if a terrorist group were to try to replicate the outcomes.

There are, of course, outliers to the terrorist use of low-tech methods. There is the terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo’s launch of the notorious Tokyo Sarin gas attack in 1995 or drone attacks along the lines of  2023’s drone attack in Syria, as well as other groups’ potential use of commercial drones. But today’s would-be terrorist is likely not resorting to high-tech weapon or communication devices, and more often than not, going for something easy and/or available. To borrow from Chistopher Nolan’s Joker in the Dark Knight, items like “dynamite, and gunpowder, and gasoline [are] cheap” and are going to comprise the bulk of the future threats from terrorist groups.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Counter Terror’s High-tech to Low-tech Backfire was originally published on Global Security Review.

This year, outbreaks of antisemitism across American college campuses, including at the most elite private colleges and universities, remind commentators of the turbulent year 1968. That year was marked by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy, together with antiwar demonstrations at many colleges and riots at the Democrat National Convention in Chicago.

Some saw, in the upsurge of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations a possible prelude to a similar upheaval at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 2024. The Biden administration was under attack from its progressive wing and for its support of Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza.

Democrat doubters about the administration’s foreign policy were already worried about the polls showing Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump competitive against Vice President Kamala Harris in the seven key swing states of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And irony of ironies, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., was running as a third-party candidate who might conceivably take away votes from either Biden or Trump—eventually withdrawing and throwing his support to Trump.

In 1968, Democrat dissidents and message malaise opened the door for Richard Nixon to come back from the graveyard of politics and win the White House. Would the Democrat Party recreate that debacle in 2024 and usher Donald Trump into the presidency for a second term?

Unfortunately for political prognosticators, 2024 is only superficially reminiscent of 1968. Pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses are not catching fire with the public as did antiwar protests in 1968. To the contrary, college presidents are under siege from various quarters for not doing enough to resist outbreaks of antisemitism and pro-Hamas demonstrations.

Jewish students feel unsafe on many college campuses, and parents of college students began to file lawsuits against schools that refuse to enact policies that protect Jewish students against harassment. In addition, a majority of American voters support Biden’s policy of favoring Israel’s right to defend itself against attack, while sharing some reservations about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the war in Gaza. Not every criticism of Israel’s policy is antisemitism. As Israel moves toward the final stages of its campaign against Hamas, controversy will almost certainly surround its choice of military tactics and the costs of war for civilian noncombatants.

Given current events, the foreign policy center of gravity for the 2024 presidential campaign is not only the war in the Middle East, but also the war in Ukraine. The most recent tranche of American military assistance to Ukraine was held up in Congress by endless delays based on a variety of complaints from conservatives in the House. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, ended this deadlock by agreeing with a majority of Democrats to pass legislation providing aid to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine in separate bills.

For his anti-isolationist temerity, Johnson was threatened by his House Republican colleagues with a vote to vacate the speakership as soon as practicable. Some House Republicans gave as their reason for opposing Johnson the absence of a companion bill providing additional funding for controlling the southern border. However, the problem at the border is not a lack of funding, but a fundamental policy disagreement between the Biden administration and its critics about whether to enforce existing immigration law and or allow the near-free flow of illegal aliens to enter the country.

The war in Ukraine, on the other hand, is a fundamental test of American resolve to defend the international order based on rules and expectations that preserved security and freedom in Europe from the end of World War II until well into the twenty-first century. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is an overt attempt to overthrow a legitimate government in Europe, based on reading history through a glass darkly and on ambition to restore Russian greatness as seen by its clique of siloviki, oligarchs, and propagandists.

Apologists for Russia attribute its belligerence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post–Cold War expansion, the United States’ drive for unipolar dominance, and Ukraine’s illegitimacy as a unique culture and civilization. None of this may be true or original on the part of Russia. It is Aleksandr Dugin marinated in twenty-first century Moscow-centric geopolitics.

The tragedy is that Russia is a great civilization, with a history and culture that provided some of the world’s great literature, music, art, higher education, and excellence in professional military studies. Russia’s history is the story of an advanced civilization ruined by a succession of retro autocratic governments.

NATO has admirably rallied in the face of Russian military aggression by providing Ukraine with necessary military assistance, including weapons, intelligence, and training. But NATO has dragged this out to an extent that jeopardizes Ukraine’s ability to fight successfully even on the defensive, let alone on offense, for anything more ambitious than a military stalemate. Russia still hopes that an offensive before winter might turn the tide decisively against Ukraine—to the extent that the latter would have an insubstantial position for any post-conflict peace agreement.

Disparities between Russian and Ukrainian personnel- and military-related resources favor Russia as the war becomes more extended in time and space. Ukraine can only be saved by American and NATO firmness in the face of repeated threats of horizontal (extending military operations into NATO territory) or vertical (nuclear weapons) escalation. NATO’s combined gross domestic product is about thirty times that of Russia, but Russia has a far larger nuclear arsenal. Such problems all await the next president.

Therefore, the proper analogy is not between 2024 and 1968, but 2024 and 1938. Before the end of 1938, Germany had already crossed several red lines that anticipated an unlimited appetite for political coercion supported by the threat of military conquest. Then, as now, isolationists in the US and apologists for Hitler in Europe called for conciliation of Germany and appeasement of its demands. History never repeats itself exactly, as the saying goes, but it does rhyme.

The question for the United States and democratic Europe, now, as then, is not whether to resist aggression, but how and when. History suggests that tyrants’ appetite grows with the eating. The United States needs neither a return to its “unipolar moment” nor a willy-nilly reboot into forever wars among non-Western cultures. It does need to lead NATO’s resistance to Russia’s mistaken revanchism in Europe with smart strategy and politics until the climate improves for a viable peace settlement.

With regard to wars in the Middle East, the United States and its allies must also confront the foreboding reality of Iran’s wars against Israel, the United States, and the international order.

Iran’s instigation of Hamas’ attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, together with its support for proxy attacks on Israel and American troops elsewhere (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-supported terrorists in Iraq and Syria) has thus far met with less than intimidating responses. In addition to these failures in US and allied conventional deterrence, Iran is now a threshold nuclear weapons state potentially capable of threatening its immediate neighbors and targets outside the region.

An Iranian bomb could also stimulate Saudi Arabia and other Middle East powers to follow suit and destabilize the region. In addition, a nuclear Iran might pass nuclear materials and know-how to proxies for the construction of so-called dirty bombs or suitcase nukes. A nuclear Iran can destabilize the Middle East without firing a nuclear weapon.

Tehran can use the bomb for coercive diplomacy against Israel and other enemies, including threats of nuclear first use in response to any losses in a conventional war. In this respect, as well, 2024 may resemble 1938. Imagine Hitler with the bomb in 1938. A strategy of appeasement would have been far more appealing to political leaders in Britain and France, and a posture of isolationism to Americans—compared to what actually happened. Iran must be stopped by political negotiation or other means before it crosses this Rubicon.

Whether the world’s worst fears are recognized in the years ahead, as they were in and after 1938, or whether conflict is avoided will likely result, in large part, from the actions of the next president. This is a daunting future for either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD is a distinguished professor at Pennsylvania State University—Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the authors own.  

It’s 1938, not 1968 was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today, modernization efforts are underway among all nuclear weapons states (NWS), who must acknowledge how their nuclear-based actions and rhetoric impacts global security through incentivizing proliferation for non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). Moreover, the world must not forget the effects of actual nuclear use or the potential for catastrophic escalation to follow. Hiroshima and Nagasaki may represent victory achieved by nuclear use to some, but there is no direct analogy to the present day.

On the Horizon?

The potential for nuclear war began in August 1949, when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb. After the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), bilateral and multilateral treaties focused on nuclear arms control. Such efforts served a vital role then, as they do today, for strategic stability and mutual security.

The cornerstones of nuclear arms control include 2011’s New START, plus the original nuclear agreement, and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Russia suspended participation in New START in August 2022, ultimately exacerbating tensions amidst the war in Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats are also increasing nuclear tensions. While the NPT remains active with 191 signatory states, its intention to prevent the further spread of nuclear proliferation is threatened by increasingly aggressive nuclear rhetoric surrounding nuclear strikes and first use. Such concerns stem from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as its, China’s, and North Korea’s vertical proliferation.

Japan is one of many states with the ability to develop nuclear weapons and is experiencing increasing incentives to do so. The cost-benefit analysis of nuclear proliferation is a frequent focus amongst theorists, with the commonality being credible existential threat(s) to a state. Japan experiences this regionally from China and North Korea and more broadly from Russia. Though the United States provides a nuclear umbrella to its Pacific allies, which it continuously reaffirms, discussion in South Korea and Japan suggests growing support for independent nuclear arsenals. This adds to the concern that Japan, for example, might develop its own nuclear weapons.

The Japanese Perspective

Even with existential threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries, most Japanese citizens are opposed to nuclear proliferation and nuclear use. According to public opinion polls, 75 percent of Japanese citizens support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). They believe so strongly in the nuclear taboo that 58 percent denounce nuclear use, even in retaliation to a nuclear attack.

This sentiment is strong in no small part because of their very direct experience through Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Survivors of the Hiroshima bombing—alongside Nagasaki—advocate for peace. They see warfare and the employment of nuclear weapons as unavoidably devastating to civil society. Survivor Toshiko Tanaka advocates for peace through nuclear disarmament, arguing that the world must remain consciously aware of nuclear war’s aftermath. The city of Hiroshima also holds annual commemorations on the bombing’s anniversary—along with housing museums and memorials intended to be a stark reminder of the consequences of war.

“The Only Winning Move is [Still] Not to Play”

Japanese surrender in 1945 stemmed from several factors that cannot be replicated in the age of multiple nuclear-armed states. Imperial Japan started the war in the Pacific with invasions of China and other Asian nations before eventually launching a surprise attack on the United States. By the time Japan surrendered, it took the emperor imposing his will on a military that sought to fight to the bitter end. For some of the military leadership, the physical effects of the atomic bombs were comparable to the firebombing long underway.

Today, however, nuclear weapons are far larger and more numerous, making the effects far greater for any society that may experience nuclear employment. Thus, avoiding highly destructive conventional wars with the potential for uncontrolled nuclear escalation is important.

The threat posed by nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states may be much higher than previously believed. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Ukraine are worrisome. Expanding Chinese and North Korean nuclear arsenals and Iran’s likely nuclear breakout are also worrisome. Moreover, some US political thinking combines with its ballistic missile defenses to lean into isolationist tendencies that stress extended deterrence credibility.

Any nuclear use is likely to receive strong condemnation from the international community. The consequences of international condemnation and the uncertain consequences for use may be enough to prevent the employment of nuclear weapons, but there is no guarantee. Whether limited or large scale, the use of nuclear weapons will likely end efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, including 79 years of historical precedent prioritizing diplomacy, reduction, and verification. This would be a world that neither NWS nor NNWS should wish to see. And to its survivors, remembering the Hiroshima of 1945 serves as a stark reminder of the cost of nuclear employment.

Deterring the use of nuclear weapons must remain a priority for the United States. The optimism for disarmament that won former President Barack Obama the Nobel Prize in 2009 has mostly eroded, and nuclear-armed adversaries show little interest in resuming talks much less action. Therefore, the United States must accomplish its nonproliferation objectives through the strength found in its nuclear modernization and commitments to allied defense.

Amanda Hart is a recent graduate from Virginia Tech, currently working in the field of C-WMD planning and support. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Proliferation Motivations and Modern Japan: Lessons Since Hiroshima was originally published on Global Security Review.

Indeed, as of this writing such probes are already occurring. Sino-Russian aerial probes against Alaska recently occurred in the Arctic. While American officials claim this is the first time this happened, Chinese officials stated that this is the eighth such joint aerial probe. Moreover, the probe took place immediately following Sino-Russian bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

In a similar fashion, there is evidence that China is providing missile technology to North Korea. This follows the new mutual security pact signed by North Korea and Russia, which came after North Korea made itself a supplier of missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russian assistance to North Korea’s satellite program is also reportedly taking place.

In the Middle East, China’s negotiation of an agreement on Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity not only conforms to long-standing Russian objectives, but it also facilitates further Sino-Russo-Iranian influence among Palestinians—making a durable Middle East peace even less likely. Pyongyang’s willingness to proliferate nuclear and missile technology to Iran and a de facto Russo-Iranian alliance, only further destabilizes the region and makes a larger scale war more likely.

The same is true in Europe where China emerged as the primary source of Russian revenues, defense technologies, and diplomatic support for its war on Ukraine. Without Chinese support, Russia would be hard-pressed to continue the war. At the same time, numerous accounts show that Russia is engaged in cyber war against Europe, attacking infrastructure and cyber networks. Russia is also planning assassinations of key figures and other mayhem within the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia is not alone in engaging in these behaviors. While the attacks on France’s national railway system on the eve of the Olympics was very likely a Russian plot, Iran is concurrently threatening Israeli athletes at the Olympic games through cyberattacks.

The number of global attacks and coordination among these four actors, all of whom use nuclear weapons to deter the West from responding to their gray zone attacks, is increasing. Once Iran fields its own nuclear arsenal, which seems increasingly likely, more terror campaigns against Israel, other Middle East states, and international shipping (by Iranian proxies) is likely.  Indeed, the Houthis granted safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea while Moscow is considering giving them anti-ship missiles. These facts also raise the issue of their use of cyber and hacking devices, if not GPS, to direct and track ships in the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the West faces a multi-domain threat linking all the domains of warfare, including nuclear escalation. These autocracies already incorporated nuclear deterrence, if not escalation, into their strategies against the US and its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  North Korea, as well as China and Russia, is building a larger and more diversified arsenal. Soon, North Korea will field a nuclear triad of fighter-bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

As a result of their policies, there is virtually no hope of arms control in the near future. China’s recent walkout from nuclear talks exemplifies the utter impossibility of arranging arms control with either Beijing or Moscow. By the same token nonproliferation and the nonproliferation treaty are evidently on their last legs. Beijing’s announcement of its commitment to that treaty’s renewed credibility is thus a grim joke given its ongoing record of support for proliferation. For the next administration, which must deal with facts rather than wish-fulfillment in its defense policy, it is clear that a sustained program of conventional and nuclear modernization, if not an actual increase, is necessary. Moreover, nuclear proliferation appears increasingly likely.

If Iran goes nuclear, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit increases exponentially. Egypt and Turkey may also follow suit, leading to a Middle East that is equally unstable, but with more nuclear powers.

South Korean public opinion is apparently increasingly supportive of an independent nuclear arsenal, which would lead Japan to follow suit. In short, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all making the world a less safe place as they challenge world order.

While Americans already live in interesting times, the times are likely to become even more interesting as they become more threatening. The United States will face a nuclear-armed autocratic quartet that is focused on supplanting American power. That quartet is also likely to be more dangerous than ever before because the threat, if not the actual use of nuclear weapons, offsets their conventional inferiority and increases their war-making power.

The fevered rhetoric of the current presidential campaign will soon end. The intractable realities will neither end nor give the next administration any respite. They will challenge the nation and force Americans to turn their inward gaze outward.

Steve Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The New Nuclear Alliance Against the West was originally published on Global Security Review.

Eight recent assessments of future prospects for strategic stability in light of growing nuclear dangers have been brought forward for consideration including (1) a Brookings Institute essay by Caitlyn Talmadge on the Biden and Trump approaches to nuclear deterrence; (2) Representative and Intelligence Chair Mike Turner’s nuclear and space related remarks at CSIS; (3) Joe Cirincione’s description of the Biden and Trump nuclear agenda’s as dangerously bad and worse, respectively; (4) Professor Wittmer’s complaint that everything Trump might do or has done on nuclear deterrence has accelerated the “arms race”; (5) Brad Robert’s top-notch look into the future about what the LLNL program director describes as “unwelcome” truths  that must be faced; (6) Mark Schneider’s welcome assessment of what French President Macron is trying to do with extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the related pitfalls; (7) Mathew Kroenig and Mark Massa review the value of ICBMs and particularly what is required for future ICBM related nuclear deterrence–and in their usual scholarly manner; and (8) commentary by Mike Albertson of LLNL and (9) Con Coughlin of Gatestone about what the US  and its allies are facing over the next few decades in the nuclear arena and why meeting the deterrent challenge is both very interesting but also absolutely challenging. Coughlin’s top concern is the US non-confrontational policy with respect to Iran and the relative loss of credible US deterrent capability.

The Critics

Talmadge, Wittmer, and Cirincione portray former President Trump as some kind of nuclear Mad Hatter or Dr. Strangelove who will bring about nuclear Armageddon, although all three largely get  recent nuclear deterrent history wrong. However, their narrative is common with Hollywood and reflected in both the new Oppenheimer film, as well as in Annie Jacobson book that describes current US nuclear deterrent strategy as “Mad” and immoral. Cirincione even describes the Biden nuclear modernization program as highly dangerous even though its entirety fits within the confines of the New START agreement of 2010.

As for Whitmer’s claim the “arms race” accelerated after 2017, the facts are that as of 2010, Russia had already planned the deployment of some 29 new types of strategic and theater nuclear weapons, which have remained on schedule and are now over 90% complete.

As for whether the US should have shown restraint, an amendment to kill the ICBM leg of the Triad was offered by Representative Garamendi in June 2021 in the HASC and House floor, with the Democrats in the majority, and lost 49-9 in Committee and 308-119 on the House floor. And as Dr. David Trachtenberg has shown in a previous essay, the idea that US restraint in US deployments of nuclear weapons will generate similar restraint among our adversaries is debunked by history. As former defense secretary Harold Brown once quipped, “We build, they build. We stop, they build.”

Steady as You Go & Enhancements Needed?  .

Another perspective comes from the essays of Dr. Roberts, Dr. Kroenig and Mr. Massa. They both are excellent contributions to the growing proposals of how to meet the challenge of what Admiral Charles Richard described as a projected two peer nuclear armed enemies of the United States by 2035. Both analyze the program of record which is based on the force structure planned in 2010 and which fits within the New START agreement which has been observed for the past three administrations, including that of President Donald Trump for 2017-21.

Kroenig and Massa explore former HASC Chairman Smith’s proposal to eliminate all ICBMs. Their unique contribution is to point out if ICBMs are so needed they might be launched promptly during an attack, it makes no sense to eliminate their capability, especially as it would eliminate a key required deterrent capability while also leaving the US with roughly 12 targets on land and at sea which if eliminated would put the US out of the nuclear business. As former NDU President General Mike Dunn once explained, “Why would we make it easier for our enemies to disarm us?”

Dr. Brad Roberts explains the positive days of 2010 are now gone, and the unwelcome truths are that we are entering a very dangerous nuclear era but which we must squarely face. He is concerned a future US administration might fail to continue the US extended deterrent over NATO and our Pacific allies, with the possible consequence that our allies seek their own nuclear deterrent, which could have serious consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. And his top concern is the relative lack of urgency with which US national leaders take to the nuclear table, as the consequence of inaction or delay could be deadly.

NIPP’s Mark Schneider looks at what President Macron is proposing for extended deterrence in Europe as wholly inadequate for NATO’s security but should be fully examined. It is important to note when discussing the US relationship with NATO that under the previous administration, the DoD resources devoted to defending our NATO allies increased significantly, as did the number of NATO members that met the 2% spending target for defense, completely consistent with previous President Trump’s recent declaration that he is “100%” with NATO.

House Intelligence Chair Mike Turner explores with Dr. Kari Bingen of CSIS the big threats facing the US (which the critics reviewed here hardly mention). The Russian deployment of ASAT nuclear forces is a serious threat says Turner to US space assets, while the Posture Commission support for widespread missile defense capabilities is a big breakthrough and hopefully will lead to rapid new US deployments says the Ohio representative.

The highlight of the new NIPP study by Schneider is the chart on what Russia is currently building or has in development—some 26 new nuclear types of weapons while the US has five. The Russian force moderation is near 93% complete according to the Kremlin while the US modernization effort has yet to place its first SNDV or strategic nuclear delivery vehicle into the force.

Program of Record Plus

The three critics of current modernization are primarily concerned with four augmentations to the program of record, as well as the rhetoric and diplomatic actions of the former President, even in the case of Cirincione thinking even the Obama era current program of record is highly dangerous.

As the Strategic Posture Commission report emphasized, the current program of record is necessary even critical but it is not adequate to the deterrent task before us. One thing being proposed by Brad Roberts, for example, is the development of a Navy cruise missile that would be nuclear armed, a Tomahawk technology removed from the theater nuclear force inventory by President Herbert Walker Bush but then dismantled by the Obama administration.

The stealthy, prompt and survivable at sea theater system would meet all the criteria needed for a sound theater deterrent and would meet the current gap between US vs Russian and Chinese theater systems in the European and Pacific theaters. The number that might be deployed would probably be in the intermediate dozens of such weapons, but certainly not anywhere near the 1900 Russian theater systems identified by the US intelligence community, to say nothing of what the Chinese may have deployed. But as Franklin Miller writes July 10^th, “a U.S. nuclear sea-launched cruise missile would enhance deterrence and reassure allies in peacetime and crisis, and, in wartime, provide a President with additional options to prevent enemy nuclear escalation. The W 76-2 is an excellent weapon, but any President deserves more than one option; the combination of the ballistic W 76-2 and the airbreathing SLCM-N would provide a President with significant flexibility to manage a crisis.’

Another augmentation has been completed and that has been adding low-yield nuclear weapons to the D-5 missiles, again for a total number of such weapons in the low dozens at most, an added capability endorsed by the current administration. Both the low-yield D-5 and a SLCM-N would help rectify the current theater imbalance and be able to deter the use of such weapons at the low end of the nuclear spectrum, which itself enhances deterrence, avoiding what then Senator John Kennedy declared in 1959 was the bad choice between all out Armageddon, (massive retaliation), or surrender (standing down.) .

Additional elements of enhancing the US deterrent posture especially after New START expires would be adding warheads to the US ICBM and SLBM force of 692 missiles as envisioned by the 12 Columbia class submarines (the minimum needed) and 192 D-5 missiles and the 400 Sentinel missiles, although there are proposals on the table for also deploying the 50 reserve ICBMs allowed as a hedge under New START. As well as to upload our B52s and other bombers.

Implementing the Hedge?

When taken together, the US has a hedge capability of around 1000 additional warheads the US could add to its strategic nuclear posture and could do so over a period of 3-4 years depending on how fast the US could deploy additional ICBM warheads on either the legacy MMIII ICBMs or the new Sentinel system. Whatever is the case, the roughly 2800+ warheads the US could have in its strategic nuclear force by 2035 would be dwarfed by the projected Russia and China nuclear forces, which Professor Chris Yeaw, at the 20^{th of} June Triad Symposium at LSUS,  has projected will reach some 10,000 warheads.

In short, what proponents of nuclear enhancements vs nuclear restraint are arguing over is the deployment of some 1000 US warheads or an augmentation of the US strategic force of some fifty percent of the current US strategic, long-range force. Even if one adds in a force of 300 theater systems including the current gravity bombs in Europe and the projected new SLCM-N theater forces, the total buildup for the United States would at best reach 3000 warheads by the middle of the next decade. Or more likely the following decade some 20 years hence if the fully modernized force of 12 Columbia class submarines and SLEP D-5 missiles, 20 B21 bombers and associated cruise missiles and 400-50 Sentinel missiles, is fielded.

Given the breathtaking expansion of Russian and Chinese forces already underway, such a US response is nothing but practical and proportionate and well within a reasonable calculation of what is required, as Franklin Miller has noted, to right the current deterrent imbalance, without necessarily matching warhead for warhead the projected deployed Russian and Chinese forces.

The critics of enhancement, however, spend almost no time doing an informed review of how they would correct the current imbalance except to claim the US is unnecessarily leading a new arms race (demonstrably wrong), or as Cirincione put it, seeking to wage nuclear war (again demonstrably absurd).

The next US Administration and the JCPOA, North Korea, INF and Arms Control.

What the critics concentrate on is the rhetoric and diplomatic action of the previous administration. These actions include withdrawal from the JCPOA, the joint nuclear agreement with Iran, the withdrawal from the INF treaty, and the US relationship with North Korea and its nuclear and missile forces.

North Korea and the Button

The former President did remind the leader of North Korea that the US did have a more formidable nuclear deterrent than the DPRK and that our deterrent after decade of testing actually worked. Both comments were perfectly consistent with the time-honored point of the US deterrent strategy: (1) our deterrent is very large and (2) we have the will to use it should North Korea attack the United States. Interestingly, the NPRK did not test a nuclear weapon or test an ICBM range missile during 2017-20.

Iran & The JCPOA

The United States never ratified the Iranian JCPOA as the votes were not there in the US Senate. The deal could not be ratified because it was a bad deal. Instead, the previous Obama administration used a clever rube goldbergian strategy to secure an occasional review of the agreement by the US Senate. The agreement allowed the Iranians to build up an enhanced capability to produce weapons grade nuclear fuel, with the requirement that the low-level produced fuel be exported—primarily to Russia. However, since all the provisions in the deal expire soon, where are the diplomatic efforts over the past 2 ½ years to extended the agreement or make it permanent if its provisions are so demonstrably good? The fact that Iran may have been adhering to the provisions of the deal does not magically change the terms of the deal from terrible to good!

And where is the diplomatic effort for the US  to sign back up to the JCPOA and this time get the Senate to agree? In fact, much of the opposite has occurred including the US dropping sanctions against Iran, which then provided to Tehran tens of billions in hard currency. On top of which, despite the US restraint, Iran has attacked the US some 170 times between October 2023 and January 2024.

Including killing and wounding US servicemen and women, to saying nothing of planning, arming and financing the horrible Hamas slaughter of Israel’s last October and the launching of hundreds of missiles and rockets against Israel this spring. No such attacks occurred during the previous administration as Iranian hard currency reserves fell to around $10 billon, which is near 1/10^th their current level, and contributed significantly to the Iranian lack of resources to conduct its serial terrorist activities.

Even more dangerous is that Iran in cooperation with China, Russia, and the terrorist group Houthis, has engineered a  new form of piracy where ocean borne freight traffic, including oil tankers are denied access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal unless they agree to abide by new Chinese rules, a kind of ocean toll road regime, as outlined recently by the group Committee on the Present Danger-China.

And as a former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress about the Somalia based “pirates,” they could only locate ships at sea with the use of GPS—which as only the US and Russia could provide such technology it was obvious with what country  the pirates were doing business.

INF & Arms Control Prospects?

The previous administration did try and bring China and Russia do the arms control table but were harshly criticized for thinking China would agree to any such warhead ceilings while trailing the US inventory—although the Soviets did just that in SALT I with respect to the balance in strategic forces in 1972. And despite being outgunned 2000/1 by the Soviets SS-20 deployments, President Ronald Reagan successfully secured the removal of all Soviet SS-20 missiles from both Europe and Asia, while strengthening NATO and our Pacific alliances.

As for the INF treaty, it is widely known the Russians were serially cheating on the agreement. Having only one party to a treaty that is complying with is hardly the way international agreements work, although perhaps the critics have some suggestions which were absent from their essays.

The Record of Arms Control Deals

The tendency for the critics of former President Trump is to claim those with whom they disagree are somehow “against arms control,” in favor of arms races and want to fight nuclear war. These claims were made against President Reagan, who in fact once quipped his domestic critics were harsher in their opposition to his nuclear modernization plans than was the USSR!

In hosting some multiple hundreds of arms control seminars from 1983 through 2024, the actual facts are startling: Republican Presidents cut US strategic long-range nuclear forces from over 10,000 to roughly 2200, and reduced theater nuclear forces by additional multiples of ten thousand warheads, while also securing –for a multiple of reasons– massive reductions in Soviet and then Russian nuclear weapons amounting to also multiple tens of thousands.

Where and When Did Modernization Start?

Unfortunately, as retired General John Hyten explained during the last ten years of his military leadership as Deputy Commander of the USAF Space Command, then  as Commander of US Strategic Command, and then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Putin had a plan to fully modernize his forces starting in 2004 and not continue on the path of further nuclear reductions but to actually augment the Russian force to multiples of the New START allowable force.

According to Rick Fisher and Bradley Thayer and Mark Schnieder, the Chinese too had plans to build up to over 1500 strategic nuclear warheads, fully adopted in the 2008-9 timeframe, both demonstrably before the Trump administration, which completely obliterates Professor Wittmer’s complaint that the Chinese and Russian nuclear buildups are all Trump’s fault.

The Great Unravelling

Indeed, the arms control progress assumed to be holding from START I to New START has come unraveled. Although it’s tempting to “always blame America” for the rogue behavior of Xi and Putin, their nuclear transgressions are all their own as the Posture Commission explained—to them nuclear weapons are instruments of coercion and blackmail, to serve not to deter the interests of military aggression.

But on the current administration’s watch as Ms. Talmadge admits, things no longer hold: “Iran is now closer to a nuclear weapon. North Korea’s arsenal can more directly threaten the United States. China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding as it becomes increasingly confrontational toward Taiwan…and Russia is now engaged in a major conventional war on NATO’s border.’ The origin of the relative loss of US deterrent capability may be a complicated subject, but that the US has lost some deterrent strength is unquestioned. The key will be, as the Strategic Posture Commission boldly explained, to restore US deterrent strength on a bipartisan, lasting basis so we can successfully meet the challenges of the new nuclear era.

GET THE FULL REPORT

The Prospects for Nuclear Deterrence in the Next American Administration was originally published on Global Security Review.

1. Foreword and Executive Summary:
   • The ASC program has utilized high-performance computing for nearly three decades to support U.S. nuclear deterrence following the 1992 ban on underground nuclear testing.
   • The integration of AI technologies aims to accelerate problem-solving for national security challenges.
   • The strategy emphasizes combining AI with existing modeling and simulation capabilities to enhance the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program.
2. AI4ND Strategy Objectives:
   • Apply AI methods to nuclear security missions, focusing on design, production, and analysis.
   • Develop ML tools to function with limited data and stringent accuracy requirements.
   • Create scalable and secure data infrastructures to support ML applications.
   • Foster a data-driven workforce by investing in training and developing expertise in AI and ML.
3. Motivations for AI in Nuclear Deterrence:
   • AI can reduce time for material discovery, model development, manufacturing, and maintenance.
   • AI/ML technologies promise to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons lifecycle, including discovery, design optimization, manufacturing, certification, and maintenance.
4. Enabling Capabilities and Investment Areas:
   • Physics-Informed Machine Learning (PIML): Embedding physical constraints in ML models to ensure accuracy and speed in simulations.
   • Limited and Sparse Data Sets: Developing methods to work with limited experimental data and augmenting it with simulations.
   • Verification, Validation, Uncertainty Qualification, and AI Trustworthiness: Ensuring AI models are reliable and explainable, integrating existing verification practices.
   • Data Infrastructure: Investing in performant data storage, federated data environments, and flexible data access interfaces.
   • Machine Learning Architectures and Systems: Developing high-performance ML systems integrated with existing HPC platforms.
5. Workforce, Collaborations, and Partnerships:
   • Establishing partnerships with industry, academia, and other U.S. government agencies to leverage external advancements in AI/ML.
   • Developing international collaborations with similar programs in France, the UK, and Japan.
   • Building a capable workforce through training programs and collaboration with universities.
6. Conclusion:
   • The successful execution of this AI4ND strategy will enhance the ASC program’s ability to meet national security needs, increase efficiency, and attract specialized talent.
   • Collaboration with academia, industry, and other government agencies is crucial to achieving these goals.

The document emphasizes the transformative potential of AI in ensuring a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent through strategic investments in technology, data infrastructure, and workforce development. Get the report.

Artificial Intelligence for Nuclear Deterrence Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

A comparison of recommendations for multilateral diplomacy and sanctions written in 2007 and 2023 offer no evidence of success. Experts now say Tehran is within a few months of several working atom bombs, and a year or two at most from having nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching Israel and the European Union.

Israel’s bombings of plutonium-producing reactors under construction in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 are simpler examples of how to regain the initiative in civil defense—via prevention of nuclear attack to begin with. Iran’s underground nuclear weapon facilities at Natanz and Furdow should be neutralized with GBU57-A/B ground-penetrator ordnance, which are necessary to wreck their delicate centrifuges and cave in their adits (entrances).

Sanctions and diplomacy failed to stop North Korea from getting the bomb. Words and tighter sanctions will no longer work on Iran. Iran is a disruptive, warmongering, rogue state. Its repressive autocratic regime is entrenched.

Iran is controlled by a radical sect that believes killing perceived enemies is a sure route to Paradise. Iran’s leaders promise to “destroy Israel forever.”

The risk calculus, were Iran to field nuclear arms, would present the US, and Israel, especially, with something worse than the Cuban Missile Crisis. A nuclear-armed Iran is more intolerable than a nuclear-armed Cuba in 1962. The conditions favorable for a successful naval quarantine of Russia’s nuclear weapons, on the decks of cargo ships going to Cuba, do not apply to Iran.

It is unwise to look to nuclear deterrence against a nuclear-armed and radically hostile Iran to solve the problem, given their extremist ideology. Keeping nuclear weapons far away from bad actors is vital to effective nuclear counterterrorism.

Both Russia and China have separatist problems—including terrorists who might have or might develop Iran connections. Their best interests are aligned with the US and Israel in this instance. This is similar for Israel’s Arab neighbors. They should all want Tehran’s nuclear weapons program permanently terminated. Yet they stay on the sidelines, believing this is a Western problem.

North Korea shows that once a rogue state fields nuclear warheads on missiles, voluntary denuclearization becomes impossible. The US missed the opportunity to prevent the Kim regime from fielding a now-expanding nuclear arsenal.

As Iran’s supreme leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei surely realizes, “Israel is a one-bomb country” because of its small size. This means that a single nuclear weapon could devastate any of Israel’s major cities.

The Kim regime played several American presidents while North Korea came to own dozens of nuclear missiles threatening South Korea, Japan, and, now, the continental United States. The ayatollahs are probably playing a similar game. Hamas’s attack could be Tehran’s premeditated sleight of hand to buy the little time they need to go nuclear.

Iran’s latest threats to attack Israel’s nuclear facilities and finish their own atom bomb, should Israel attack Iran’s nuclear assets, has unacceptable odds of being more Tehran double-talk while Iran’s covert weapons work presses forward. Intel that such worked ceased—like the nonexistent or ignored “intel” before September 11, 2001, and October 7, 2023—might be, quite literally, fatally flawed.

A clandestine approach to building fission weapons underground might be beyond already overstretched Mossad and CIA abilities to detect. Typical intel lapses, bureaucratic sluggishness, and political paralysis within and between concerned countries could get millions killed.

Barely 4 percent of the ballistic missiles Iran fired at Israel got through the layered multinational defenses defending Israel on April 13. But with further attrition of interceptors and less help from the outside being possible over the next year, one atom bomb might reach Israeli soil. Missile defenses alone are not the answer. An Iranian bomb could instead be delivered covertly, by a ship or a truck…or a camel…or mule.

A nuclear attack is likely to take place without warning. The heat and overpressure from an air blast over Tel Aviv would prove devastating. A ground burst could blanket Israel’s cities and towns with fallout.

It would be better and wiser to fight a larger regional conventional war now than a limited nuclear war in the Middle East in the months or years ahead. Yet more “mowing the grass,” or reticent watchful waiting, are short-term non-answers.

As a Department of State spokesman recently said, “Iran has no credible civilian justification for enrichment up to sixty percent.” Iran has already crossed an unacceptable red line. As Israel’s Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu recently said, “Israel will do whatever it needs to defend itself.”

Israel does not need more lectures about restraint. Israel needs to prevent nuclear annihilation at the hands of Islamic terrorists certain their religious obligation requires them to strike with whatever deadly weapons they possess.

Joe Buff is a senior fellow for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran Shall Not Have the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.

Encouraging competition and redirecting investments away from major defense contractors such as Raytheon, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, towards emerging companies (Space X, Looking Glass, Kodiak) with innovative approaches and cost-effective capabilities, can enhance national security. This shift has the potential to lower defense procurement costs, provide technological advantages, and reduce the monopolistic control and price gouging these major contractors have over government defense contracts.

Shipyards

Naval shipyards are the backbone of maritime defense, yet their capacity and efficiency were challenged in recent years. Currently, the top military shipbuilding corporations are General Dynamics, Huntington Ingles, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. The nation cannot continue to rely on these companies to produce cost-effective, on-time results for the Navy. The simple truth is almost every contract awarded to these companies ends up over budget and delayed years.

By fostering competition among up-and-coming companies we can revitalize our shipbuilding industry, introducing new technologies and innovative approaches that improve cost-effectiveness and speed of construction. Paramount to the issue, the US needs to invest in developing additional shipyards to combat the growing Chinese capabilities as a new maritime superpower. This will not only strengthen the US naval fleet, but also allow the Navy to counter the rising threat and reverse the nation’s downward trajectory, creating jobs and stimulating economic growth.

ICBM Manufacturing

Enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities is essential for maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. Currently, Boeing is responsible for producing key components for US and UK Trident II (D5) missiles and US Minuteman III ICBMs, while General Dynamics manufactures key components for US and UK Trident II (D5) missiles. Lockheed Martin plays a role in upgrading Trident II (D5) missiles for the US and UK, as well as Minuteman III, and also manages a UK nuclear weapons laboratory along with several US nuclear weapons facilities.

Northrop Grumman is involved in similar activities, including Trident II (D5) missile upgrades for the US and UK, Minuteman III, and management of some US nuclear weapons facilities. Additionally, in 2020, Northrop Grumman was awarded a sole-source $13.3 billion contract for engineering and manufacturing Sentinel missiles to replace the current arsenal of 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs. They have also acquired Orbital ATK, which has similar involvements.

Unfortunately, every nuclear modernization project went over budget and was delayed despite tens of billions of dollars pledged towards the modernization goal. Ultimately, increasing competition in this sector can spur innovation, resulting in more dependable and advanced missile systems at a more cost-effective price. Encouraging companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic to invest in defense manufacturing of rocket technology, possibly through government contracts, could drive progress. Furthermore, diversifying the manufacturing base can mitigate the risk of supply-chain disruptions, ensuring a consistent supply of these critical weapons. 

Nuclear Weapons Facilities

Nuclear weapons design and manufacturing facilities are another area where competition can yield significant benefits. Currently, the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, is the only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility. The nation needs more than a single facility for this task. This is a national security concern. Any issue with this facility, and assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons is hampered. By encouraging competition, the nation can modernize the nuclear arsenal, ensuring it remains safe, secure, and effective. Moreover, competition in the assembly and disassembly process can lead to cost savings, which enables the nation to allocate resources to other pressing defense needs.

Aircraft Manufacturing 

The need for a robust aircraft manufacturing capability is paramount. Navy Adm. John C. Aquilino, the head of US Indo-Pacific Command said, in recent congressional testimony, that China has the world’s largest navy and is soon to be the world’s largest air force. With potential adversaries investing heavily in advanced aircraft, America must maintain a competitive edge. With the looming prospect of having to fight and fund a three-front war (Ukraine-Russia, Israel-Iran, and China-Taiwan), the US needs to maintain its ability to obtain and provide air superiority in whatever conflicts it enters.

By fostering competition, we can spur innovation in aircraft design and production, ensuring air superiority in future conflicts. Investing in cost-effective drone swarms and continued advancements of our 5th- and 6th-generation fighters is essential. Furthermore, the US must increase the number of strategic stealth bombers in its arsenal from 20 to 200 to 300. Development and purchase of 100 B-21 Raiders is a good start, but there needs to be more competition or manufacturing supply-chain issues will continue to plague this modernization process. 

Fallout Shelter Investments 

Investing in a more robust fallout shelter system is crucial for ensuring the safety and protection of the American population in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event. While government efforts have historically been the primary driver of fallout shelter development, there is also a role for private entities to play in this important endeavor.

During the Cold War, the United States undertook a massive effort to build fallout shelters in anticipation of a potential nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. The government constructed thousands of public fallout shelters in buildings such as schools, government offices, and subway stations. Private individuals and organizations also built their own shelters to protect against nuclear fallout.

The government entities involved with fallout shelters are the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). FEMA is responsible for coordinating federal government efforts in disaster response and recovery, including the development and maintenance of fallout shelters. The DoD is involved in the construction and maintenance of fallout shelters, particularly those designed to protect military personnel and assets such as the Cheyenne Mountain Complex.

The primary private entities involved in developing and manufacturing fallout shelters are Atlas Survival Shelters, Rising S Company, and Hardened Structures. Atlas Survival Shelters specializes in the design and construction of underground shelters for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats. Rising S offers a range of underground bunkers and shelters for protection against various threats, including nuclear fallout. Similarly, Hardened Structures provides custom-designed shelters and bunkers for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.

While the number of public fallout shelters declined since the end of the Cold War, there are still thousands of designated shelters across the country, although most are unknown, rundown, and primarily used for storage. They should be refurbished and updated to properly address the sheer number of citizens that would be required to shield from not only the initial blast, but any possible fallout.

Ultimately, it is essential that efforts to develop and maintain fallout shelters continue, as the threat of nuclear conflict remains a major concern in today’s world. By fostering competition in this sector, the nation can drive innovation and ensure that every American has access to adequate protection in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event. 

Conclusion

The United States must prioritize investments in fostering competition and innovation across key areas of the defense industry to strengthen national security. By redirecting investments from major defense contractors towards emerging companies with cost-effective military capabilities, the nation can enhance its military edge, reduce costs, and mitigate the near-monopolistic control of government defense contracts.

Revitalizing naval shipyards, enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities, modernizing nuclear weapons facilities, advancing aircraft manufacturing, and investing in a robust fallout shelter system are critical steps in safeguarding our nation against emerging threats.

By encouraging competition and diversifying the manufacturing base, the nation can drive innovation, ensure a continuous supply of critical weapons, and maintain a technological edge over adversaries. It is imperative that the nation act now to secure the future of our national security.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the authors own.

Investing in National Security: The Case for Fostering Competition in the Defense Industry was originally published on Global Security Review.

Challenges of the New Security Environment

Western decision-makers tend to think about what characterizes the current strategic environment in terms of great-power rivalry. As President Joseph R. Biden’s National Security Strategy asserts, “The post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.” Indeed, Russian military aggrandizement and Chinese economic, political, and military expansionism led American decision-makers to think and plan in terms of great-power competition. The problem set is, however, much greater.

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Strategic Culture

As Michael Eisenstadt notes, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), “The IRI’s strategic culture marked a distinct break with the strategic culture of Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule, which was heavily influenced by Western thought and practice.” Since then, the Islamic Republic of Iran perceived the United States of America and Israel as its arch enemies. To confront the two enemies, the IRI deployed its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as its main instrument of power.

Over the years, the IRGC’s power substantially increased within the Iranian system of government. Indeed, as strategic history shows, in a revolutionary state civil-military relations are in a state of flux. “Revolutions have a dynamic all their own. They begin with high ideals, but conclude with (military) dictatorship.” In Iran, the IRGC became so dominant an economic and political power that it has turned the theological system of government gradually into a theological-military system.

At the early stage of its establishment in the 1980s, “The notion of combating imperialism, in all its forms, was central to the operations of the IRGC.” Since then, the Revolutionary Guard saw its mission as “exporting the revolution,” the practice that is defined as “a form of revolutionary or radical internationalism, which, unlike other forms of internationalism (such as liberal or imperialist), sees international relations through the lens of [constant] conflict.”

Implications

Kenneth Waltz maintained that Iran should build nuclear weapons because a nuclear-armed Iran would restore stability to the Middle East. Waltz argued that the IRI, like other would-be nuclear powers, is run by rational ayatollahs with no propensity for self-destruction,  which would ensure deterrence holds. He also argued, “No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today.”

Waltz’s arguments were flawed at the time and remain so. Firstly, the mullahs, unlike leaders in current nuclear-armed states, are willing to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances that defy deterrence norms. The IRI and its military force, the IRGC, since their establishment, were, and are, engaged in “revolutionary internationalism” by way of irregular warfare and terrorism. As such, they conceive of nuclear weapons as an “equalizer” which compensates for their inferiority in conventional warfare.

Accordingly, nuclear weapons embolden ayatollahs and IRGC generals in their irregular activities against the United States and Israel. This increases malign activities and the “feeling” of having formidable power, which can lead to unintended direct confrontation with the United States. Most importantly, intended conventional confrontation with Israel whom the IRI’s leadership seeks to eliminate.

Waltz believed the nuclear threat against Iran prevents the IRI from achieving its policy objectives. Yet Waltz failed to consider two points. Firstly, any direct confrontation that the IRI finds itself in with Israel becomes a “war of honor.” In that case, the war becomes an ideological war for the religious government in which death for God’s sake is justified. Martyrdom is an important value in Shia Islam.

Secondly, Waltz confined his observations about the political system to the theological, failing to understand that, in strategic history, authoritarian and revolutionary systems of government are subject to political metamorphosis. Waltz was trapped by presentism.

The IRGC with its aggressive Islamic value system is the dominant power in Iran—increasing in power since Waltz originally wrote. The IRGC spends time on the battlefield, outside Iran, fighting American and Israeli forces.

Thus, they can carry with them the culture of war where “war exercises a powerful fascination in its own right” serving no political objectives. Deterring these ideological military forces poses a great challenge to exercising deterrence.

Additionally, a nuclear Iran could usher in the proliferation of nuclear weapons in an already destabilized region. As Muhammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, has vehemently asserted, “If they [the IRI] get one [nuclear bomb], we have to.” The threat is not in the bomb, but in who possesses the bomb. In the turbulent region where there are various religious Islamic ideologies, and a Jewish state, deterrence is not an easy task.

Recommendations

The focus of recent American administrations on preventing the IRI from achieving nuclear weapons by pursuing economic sanctions is a failure. The Islamic Republic is closer than ever to building nuclear weapons. Negotiation, demand for concessions, periodical hold out, and changing tactics are the methods that paid off for North Korea, allowing them to build a robust nuclear arsenal. The Islamic Republic is following suit.

To prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, there is only one option the United States can pursue—military action. There are costs to the use of force, but it is the only option that prevents the mullahs from possessing nuclear weapons. Force is feasible.

However, with the use of force, there are second and third order effects that are certain to follow. Most importantly, the Islamic Republic will launch missile strikes and use proxies against American forces in the Middle East and Israel and will attempt to close the Hormuz Strait. Here, the United States should send a clear message to the IRI that should the Islamic Republic decide to escalate, the United States will opt for the IRI’s centers of gravity—the political leadership, IRGC elites and forces, and IRGC bases in Iran. This threat focuses on Iran’s centers of gravity and works.

The reason threats against the centers of gravity are effective is not because the IRI is in and of itself afraid of losing its leadership or its forces, but because the Iranian government faces a legitimacy crisis and popular uprisings within the country. The attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria and the limited responses by Iran and Israel may prove the catalyst to change the current state of play.

The ayatollahs and the IRGC worry about being overthrown by the Iranian people once they are at war with the United States. Carl von Clausewitz’s point about the need for support from government, the army, and the people during war is relevant in the case of Iran. The ayatollahs and the IRGC know that support from the people is lacking. Their total war efforts against America and Israel are difficult without the people.

This leaves the United States in a good position to pressure the regime through military strikes and support for dissident groups. In short, the regime is more brittle than many in the West may think. The time to test the regime is now.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nuclear Iran: A Strategic Culture Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, there is concern that rogue states and terrorist groups with nuclear weapons would seek to bring on the very Armageddon deterrence is designed to prevent. Ensuring this concern is never materialized is a clear objective of the United States.

Second, adding new countries to the nuclear club increases the risks of accidents and theft as safely deploying and testing nuclear weapons is not something learned at a few evening seminars. It took the United States several decades to perfect nuclear safety measures.

Third, further proliferation by any signatories would violate the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and might begin its unravelling. Although the NPT does allow a ratifying state to withdraw on three months’ notice for reasons of supreme national interests, it does not make legal any prior acts in violation of the treaty or mitigate the consequences of withdrawal.

Fourth, adding to the nuclear club would dangerously complicate maintaining stability during an international crisis in that any use of nuclear force might very well trigger multiple conflicts that could easily get out of hand. In short, additional nuclear states could create greater uncertainty.

Fifth, with added nuclear states in the world, there is a potential for greater risks of horizontal and vertical escalation in the event nuclear deterrence fails. Such risks are hard to predict because states may act in unexpected ways to overcome a threat.

Although the United States is a reliable nonproliferation partner, there are growing doubts about the reliability of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. America’s allies are increasingly contemplating whether to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. This includes the creation of an independent European nuclear capability, as recently proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. A key ingredient to the increasing doubt is the growing nuclear arsenals of Russia and China, both designed to coerce the United States into standing down in a crisis or conflict.

Complicating matters is the fact that many allies still seek enhanced trade and investment ties with both Russia and China, which leads them to take different positions on issues like the war in Ukraine and Taiwan’s sovereignty. These challenges should not lead the United States to give up its long-established opposition to the spread of nuclear arms. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Asian allies are, despite economic interests, grappling with the consequences of growing nuclear arsenals and connected nuclear threats from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Germany, Japan, and South Korea are beneficiaries of American extended deterrence, but they are also nations with domestic publics increasingly discussing the pursuit of independent nuclear arsenals. The thinking goes: independent arsenals in these states would serve as checks on Russian or Chinese coercion and aggression. Arguing in favor of such proliferation, analysts suggest that if Ukraine kept those Russian nuclear weapons on its territory after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia would not have invaded. This argument has many flaws, but the overriding point is valid.

Unlike the United States, which never had expansionist desires in Afghanistan or Iraq, Russia and China have territorial ambitions in the states that fear them the most. This makes the security environment more troubling for our allies. Having nuclear weapons to defend one’s territorial integrity is one thing; possessing nuclear weapons as a security shield behind which one can undertake military adventures is another.

Some 174 nations do not have nuclear weapons and are not repeat victims of invasion by nuclear-armed states or their non-nuclear neighbors. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and South Africa all voluntarily gave up their nuclear weapons. South Africa did not want a communist-oriented African National Congress to have nuclear weapons should it come into power. The three Soviet Republics were guaranteed independence in return for giving up the Soviet nuclear forces they inherited. This was all to prevent an additional three nuclear powers from emerging on Russia’s borders.

Despite nuclear disarmament efforts, national leaders around the world clearly understand that nuclear weapons are effective at deterring adversary attack and invasion. The United States’ nuclear umbrella has, for six decades, protected European and Asian allies from existential harm. The confidence of past decades is now wavering and may lead to the very nuclear proliferation the United States has spent seven decades attempting to prevent. Should it occur, it may not only be friends who proliferate but additional foes.

In fact, the weakness of American extended deterrence may set off a proliferation cascade that dramatically increases the probability of nuclear use. When Donald Rumsfeld once said, “Weakness is provocative,” he was right. A strong extended deterrent is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with more than three decades in the analysis of risk. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own

America’s Vital Nonproliferation Interests was originally published on Global Security Review.

US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton, labels this issue the three body problem. As nuclear strategy experts suggest, American deterrence capabilities and overall numbers both matter.

Patrick McKenna and Dylan Land’s “Don’t Get Lost in the Numbers: An Analytic Framework for Nuclear Force Requirements Debates,” details four essential variables for right-sizing the arsenal: risk management, deterrence and assurance goals, force use guidelines, and operational constraints. This article will unpack the matter of risk management.

Risk management issues permeate virtually every decision about nuclear posture and arsenal right-sizing. The perspectives of tolerable nuclear risks held by America, this country’s adversaries, and this country’s allies all matter to effective global nuclear peacekeeping.

Deterrence theorists rightly argue that the US should start by understanding exactly what each adversary values most and their goals. This information is useful in determining what to hold at risk—the high value assets to target. The total number of those targets is an essential input to arsenal right-sizing.

Political and fiscal compromises have a major impact on arsenal size as well. For the United States, the finite capacity of the defense industrial base is a major current constraint. The less money available to sustain America’s triad, the greater the risk that the force structure is not adequate to deter adversaries and assure allies. The weaker the political will to resist coercion, and to retaliate in kind to any nuclear attacks, large or small, the less successful is deterrence and assurance.

Similarly, the less the production capacity of the defense industrial base, the less the US is able to implement on a timely basis whatever types and numbers of delivery vehicles and warheads are the chosen arsenal size and force structure.

Since nuclear deterrence has never failed, analysis is necessarily prospective and does not rely on large quantities of data or past experience. Instead, there is a reliance on inferences from military and political history, combined with playing out, on paper, the aftermath of a nuclear war.

The United States is now dealing with the unpleasant reality that any significant expansion in the nuclear arsenal is accomplished much less rapidly than adversaries can grow and strengthen their own arsenals. Actuarial science suggests that guarding against catastrophic failures calls for worst-case planning. Given the catastrophic results of nuclear warfare, right-sizing the nuclear triad must deter all adversaries simultaneously. This includes accounting for the instance in which China, North Korea, and Russia collaborate to coerce or attack the United States. Should they ever take the gamble to launch a nuclear attack, American deterrence has utterly failed.

An upper bound on American deployed warheads is the sum of what is needed to deter each adversary in isolation. This is because should US Strategic Command deploy enough nuclear weapons to simultaneously hold Chinese, North Korean, and Russian targets at risk, deterrence is likely to hold. Keep in mind, there is no historical example to suggest that all weapons will strike designated targets.

Thus, the fewer weapons there are to strike targets, the greater the risk of deterrence failure. This leaves the old pejorative, “We will make the rubble bounce,” important when considering that probability of target destruction is certainly much lower than many believe.

As with other inputs to triad right-sizing, wherein less of an important resource increases the risk of deterrence failure, the more the total number of deployed nuclear warheads falls short of the upper bound mentioned above, and the greater the risk becomes that one or another scenario of adversary coercion or attack will occur and possibly succeed.

But assuming the US fields a large enough and modernized arsenal, there is a disincentive for any single attacker to strike the United States and for a second adversary to wait, assess the damage, and perhaps complete what the initial attacker did not. There is also a disincentive for all adversaries to collaborate in a unified attack. Absent a large American arsenal, such considerations become more viable.

Risk is relative. There is seldom one right answer when many limited resources are being competed for, while the nation must also address other priorities besides the all-important national defense. But to go very far below the upper bound of the total number of high-value targets risks deterrence failure. Any resource savings are short-term and illusory. The costs of deterrence failure vastly eclipse any imagined benefits to a too-small arsenal.

Only further research and development, strategic planning, intelligence analysis, and open debate can lead to a sound consensus on exactly how big the nuclear arsenal needs to be during the risk-laden years that lie ahead. There is no time to waste.

Joe Buff is an experienced actuary with four decades of experience. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Nuclear Right-sizing was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) tested its first nuclear device on October 9, 2006. This action exacerbated an already significant threat perception by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. Because of the United States’ treaty agreement concerning the defense of South Korea and Japan, both nations, while uneasy, were confident in American security guarantees. In the subsequent two decades, the North Korean threat has grown considerably as has the China threat.

On December 18, 2023, the Associated Press reported that “North Korea on Monday conducted its first intercontinental ballistic missile test in five months, likely launching a developmental, more agile weapon, as it vows strong responses against US and South Korean moves to boost their nuclear deterrence plans.” The DPRK tested the Hwasong-18 ICBM. Theodore Postol argues that the Hwasong-18 is “identical” to the Russian Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 2). Jacob Gleason describes the Topol-M as having a range of 10,500–12,000 kilometers. The ranges of the Topol-M and DPRK’s Hwasong-18 are similar. According to Ridzwan Rahmat, the “Hwasong-18 is deployed onboard a nine-axled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).”

Rahmat suggests that the Hwasong-18 is possibly equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which enhances its strategic military posture by enabling a singular missile launch to engage multiple targets concurrently. Drawing on the framework posited by Postol, which draws a parallel between the SS-27 and the Hwasong-18, it is plausible, to infer that the Hwasong-18 missile may have the capacity to carry up to four nuclear warheads.

In the context of North Korea’s growing missile capabilities, it is imperative to formulate a strategic response that effectively deters Kim Jong Un from engaging in provocations that might threaten the United States, South Korea, or Japan. Within this intricate security landscape, the United States is responsible for reinforcing and validating the trust of regional allies, specifically the ROK and Japan.

Regarding the American commitment to South Korea, the Department of Defense provides insights that emphasize the necessity of a robust and unwavering alliance framework to ensure regional stability and counter the threats posed by the DPRK’s military advancements. This necessitates a nuanced approach that balances deterrence with diplomatic engagement, thereby maintaining regional peace and security while upholding the integrity of international alliances.

As the Department of Defense recently reminded Americans, “In 1953 the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) signed the Mutual Defense Treaty pledging to promote peace, defend against external threats, and strengthen collective defense in the Pacific region. Seventy years later, the U.S.-ROK Alliance now stands as one of the world’s premier alliances.” This is a clear statement of commitment to the alliance with South Korea. To comply with the “defend against external threats” directive, the United States needs to change its nuclear policy toward North Korea.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, Article III states, “The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.” These agreements codify an American commitment to the ROK and Japan.

If either South Korea or Japan lost faith in American commitment to their security, both countries have the technical capacity to pursue their own nuclear arsenals to deter the DPRK. To prevent such an eventuality, the United States, under the auspices of the Washington Declaration, is actively expanding its assurance efforts. The success of American efforts is evinced in the South Korea announcement: “The United States and South Korea plan to draw up joint guidelines on nuclear defense strategy by the middle of next year and establish an integrated system to deter North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Yonhap news agency said on Saturday.”

For American assurance efforts to work long term, the United States must explore multiple options to mitigate the potential security threats posed by North Korea. First, the US must continue support for joint exercises, like Ulchi Freedom Shield, but also consider including greater employment of nuclear weapons. The message conveyed through exercises is simple—the US and ROK alliance is prepared, through practice, for conflict.

Second, the United States should rotationally deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. This will signal North Korea that the United States is deeply committed to South Korean security. However, this strategy requires cautious execution to avoid provoking China, which could lead to unintended consequences.

Third, the United States could also undertake a continuous deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. They were in South Korea for decades and widely accepted by South Koreans. Nuclear weapons would be more welcome today given North Korean nuclear pursuits.

China is certain to respond negatively to any of these options, as would North Korea. However, the consequence of doing nothing may produce a situation that allows the DPRK to push the escalation rhetoric and provocations to the point of conflict.

North Korea’s growing nuclear arsenal and China’s nuclear breakout are increasingly concerning for South Korea and Japan as both nations see these efforts as a clear threat to their own security. American commitment to the ROK and Japan remains on shaky ground, despite the positive steps taken since the Washington Declaration. Countering those threats with a very clear commitment of American nuclear weapons may prove just the right demonstration of commitment to friend and foe alike.

James M. Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The North Korean Missile Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bad actors, for example, would likely cheat on such a ban. Russia, for example, has a long track record of cheating on international agreements. As with all law, it is only the honest who follow the rules. The dishonest are incentivized to cheat in order to employ nuclear coercion, or even nuclear attack, in a time of crisis.

Scenario analysis of possible results from denuclearization suggest there is significant risk to such a move. Removing the constraints on conventional war, which mutual nuclear deterrence has provided since 1945, could serve as the catalyst for expanded conventional conflict. Disarmament would not eliminate nuclear arms design knowledge. Instead, the world would rely on a shaky monitoring regime to ensure no misuse of such knowledge.

Without the impediment of a nuclear-armed adversary, great-power war would return with gusto. Some simple actuarial calculations are revealing. First, about 80 million soldiers and civilians were killed in World War II. An equivalent war today, accounting for population growth, gives an approximate death toll of 325 million. This estimate could be too low, given modern military capabilities.

There is a myth that modern war produces less collateral damage and fewer civilian casualties due to precision-guided munitions, prevailing humanitarian restraint, and improved medicine. Actual conditions in Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine illustrate that this is a myth. Modern conventional warfare tends to equal the destructive capacity of that in the twentieth century.

Similarly, the idea that ethnic cleansing (genocide) is a thing of the past is also false. The Balkans, Ukraine, and Xinjiang are all examples.

Other likely side effects of conventional great-power war deserve consideration. War creates refugees, expanding troop requirements, violence, stress, deprivation, and overtaxed medical systems.

If Americans thought the loss of life during the COVID-19 pandemic was terrible, and the global death toll was about seven million, how many more will the next world war kill? Lest we forget, the American medical system was overtaxed by a flu virus that left only a small percentage of the population needing medical care. If the next world war brings the fight to the United States and the American people, the medical crisis will prove far greater.

Furthermore, during the next world war, the current focus on manufacturing consumer goods will shift to a focus on producing war materials as nations exhaust their financial resources to wage war. Environmental regulations, child labor laws, and the other luxuries of peace will certainly be cast aside as victory becomes the primary concern.

Nuclear disarmament also has another consequence that should enter the equation. The nation(s) losing the war or those fearful of being pulled into war may very well turn to the covert development of nuclear weapons to either win or prevent attack. In short, the genie will likely escape the bottle once again, but without the benefit of providing pre-war deterrence. The scientific knowledge and engineering know-how to build nuclear weapons will never go away. Neither will ample supplies of special nuclear material.

A race among combatants to be the first to build new nuclear weapons would likely result. With trust at zero, an incentive to go nuclear is certain. As a conventional World War III wore on, anger, panic, grief, and revenge would likely feed the collapse of restraint. A rebirth of the most powerful nuclear weapons possible is likely. International law would prove meaningless as the fear of defeat loomed. Events far more terrible than Hiroshima and Nagasaki may follow.

Advocates of nuclear abolition argue that without global denuclearization, the accidental launch of a nuclear weapon or use by miscalculation is very likely, even if deterrence never fails. The disarmament community wants it both ways, while ignoring basic human nature.

Focusing on solid risk-mitigation decisions is a better option than the risky course of nuclear abolition. Assertions that general nuclear war is inevitable and will kill millions before bringing about nuclear winter is bad science and worse strategy. It attributes high probabilities where none exist.

Effective nuclear deterrence can sustain peace as it has for seven decades. Efforts to abolish nuclear weapons are based on emotion rather than a well-founded understanding of human nature. It is time we fully consider the consequences of a world without nuclear weapons. They are certainly not attractive. We know what that world looks like because we have seen it before.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

The Consequences of Nuclear Disarmament was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States now confronts graver threats to its security than it has in decades, perhaps ever. Never has it faced four allied antagonists at the same time—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—whose collective nuclear arsenal could within a few years be nearly double the size of its own. Not since the Korean War has the United States had to contend with powerful military rivals in both Europe and Asia. And no one alive can remember a time when an adversary had as much economic, scientific, technological, and military power as China does today.

These ominous developments did not happen overnight but are made worse by bad American security policy decisions just as China and Russia were simultaneously deciding to confront the United States leadership role in the world. Critical to a growing China and Russia threat is bad American nuclear policy choices.

Key to this decline were ten bad American policy decisions. These policies began in the wake of the Soviet Union’s decline and continue to the present. Let me explain.

First, America began by buying Francis Fukuyama’s flawed “end of history” thesis and believed that the “liberal international order” of the early post–Cold War period would remain in perpetuity, with authoritarian regimes collapsing as democracy and capitalism triumphed. This, as we know, proved untrue.

Second, the United States unilaterally eliminated almost its entire theater nuclear weapons arsenal, the very type of nuclear forces where there is now a serious and growing imbalance between the United States and China and Russia.

Third, after terrorism took the place of the Soviet Union as America’s top threat, the United States identified the solution to terrorism as democratization through force. The attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), Khobar Towers (1996), US embassies in Africa (1998), and USS Cole (DDG-67) were the kindling that served, in part, to justify the later invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, despite the extraordinary take down of Saddam’s Iraqi forces in Gulf War I (1991), the deterrent value of liberating Kuwait disappeared by the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks, which were then followed by two more decades of futile efforts in nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fifth, the United States long assumed a cooperative arrangement with China and Russia would prevent nuclear proliferation. American leaders failed to recognize that both nations played an important role in enabling North Korea’s successful nuclear program. The proliferation of nuclear weapons began with a 1982 decision by Deng Xiaoping and Yuri Andropov to transfer nuclear technology to client states.

Sixth, for three decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the US took a holiday from modernizing the nuclear deterrent. Now, as the US attempts to reverse course, the entire nuclear establishment requires refurbishment to make modernization possible.

Seventh, the US ignored Russian incursions into Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine during 2008–2014. Then, just prior to the 2022 invasion, the US compounded these mistakes by both declaring that the US response would depend upon how much Ukraine territory was taken or, later during the war, Ukraine could negotiate an end to the war by ceding additional territory to Russia—a country responsible for the deaths of many millions of Ukrainians during the Soviet Union’s existence. This only encourages Russian aggression.

Eighth, the US abandoned Afghanistan and left significant military equipment behind for the Taliban to use. A billion-dollar embassy and $14 billion worth of military equipment was quickly incorporated into the new Taliban-led government’s arsenal or sold to terrorist organizations around the world. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan was a humiliating action that undermined respect for the United States.

Ninth, the Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the Iranian regime allowed Tehran to continue its ballistic missile and nuclear program with increased funding from a return of assets previously seized by the United States. The Trump administration brought Iran under some semblance of control by cutting its foreign exchange reserves by over $100 billion. The killing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ General Qasem Soleimani was a clear signal that then-President Donald Trump would not tolerate Iranian-backed terrorism.

The Biden administration backtracked on efforts to deter Iran. Since October 2023, Iran has conducted 170 attacks, primarily against US and assets in the region. Iran combined forces with Houthi rebels to largely shut down commercial freight and crude oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran also rebuilt its foreign exchange reserves, while becoming more closely allied with Russia and China. This all took place as Iran moved closer to a nuclear weapon.

Tenth, the United States long dismissed warnings about the rise of Chinese military power and the threat it posed to the United States. President Xi Jinping’s massive investment in cyber, space, conventional, and nuclear weaponry will soon make China a peer of the United States. Asian allies of the United States are increasingly worried by China’s actions.

The United States must act to alter its course before it is too late. A return to a strong military, capable of fighting two peer competitors is necessary. It may also be time for a second Manhattan Project to implement the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission’s  recommendations. With nuclear modernization facing regular delays, there may be no other option. Whatever the solutions are, the time to act is now.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

America’s Downward Slide was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s coercive but indiscriminate “Sputnuke” concept lies at one end of a spectrum of potential space-based nuclear weapons. The remainder of the spectrum also offers significant offensive capabilities that could make space a very difficult place for the United States.

Prepositioning nuclear weapons in space would violate the Outer Space Treaty (1967). However, Moscow or Beijing gain significant coercive capability against the United States should they move forward with such a capability.

At least three classes of nuclear weapons could, potentially, be based in orbit. Any such weapon is likely to be disguised as some non-military type of spacecraft.

The first class of nuclear weapons in space are those in low Earth orbit. They are detonated from a position where they can disable adversary satellites. One or a small number of devices could create a wide-ranging electromagnetic pulse, which, by disabling satellites, could also cause an immense zone of debris along with a longer-lasting cloud of high-energy charged particles.

The combined effects would likely degrade this region of space for an extended duration. Spacecraft transiting low Earth orbit would also face the risk of a collision with orbiting debris.

Moscow or Beijing, if at a serious disadvantage to the United States during a conflict, may “escalate to win,” setting off nuclear weapons to wreak as much havoc in space as possible. This “scorched space” tactic would seek to level the playing field and slow American efforts to both mobilize force and command and control those forces.

The second class of nuclear weapons in space are those used for ground attacks. If, for example, intercontinental ballistic missile reentry vehicle-like weapons were covertly stationed on-orbit, their launch would be difficult to track. Such a weapon placed in low Earth orbit would strike a ground target in a matter of minutes.

Third are fission reactors based in orbit to power directed-energy weapons firing microwave, infrared, or optical laser beams. These travel at the speed of light, simplifying fire control. Out in the vacuum of space, a directed-energy beam would not suffer blocking or bending due to smoke, clouds, or atmospheric refraction.

With their reactors generating power, they do not need conspicuous and vulnerable solar panels. Firing energy pulses, they do not use chemical propellants or kinetic projectiles, and so do not run out of ammunition. Their fissionable fuel can last decades.

Their pinpoint, medium-power beams could at least temporarily blind or cripple soft or semi-hardened satellites over tremendous engagement ranges, and with much less collateral damage than a nuclear blast or conventional anti-satellite weapon. A small constellation of these systems could give Russia or China offensive and defensive coverage. Fortunately, there is no evidence either adversary is developing such a weapon at present.

Current and future American presidents are unwise to dismiss the dangers posed by these different classes of space-based nuclear weapons. To deter adversaries, in some cases, rough parity via on-orbit basing may be required.

For spaced-based nuclear weapons targeting American and allied satellites, the United States’ dominance in space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications make space-attack attractive. Should the United States perfect ballistic missile defenses and integrated air and missile, launching nuclear weapons from space toward ground targets may also prove an attractive option.

In many respects, the above discussion is prospective in contemplating how Russia and/or China might use nuclear weapons in space, but it is far from science fiction. For Western defense analysts, playing the part of futurist is a proactive approach to protecting American vital interests. Congressman Mike Turner’s open concern over intelligence suggesting that Russia may place nuclear weapons in space is only one example of Russian interest in weaponizing the domain.

The United States understands Chinese capabilities less well than those of Russia and their plans are even more difficult to predict. This leaves President Biden and his successors in a difficult position in the years ahead. Space is certainly a domain that will see weaponization sooner rather than later. For Americans, the question remains, who will dominate space?

 Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The view expressed in this article are the author’s own

To Deter in Space, the US Needs On-Orbit Parity was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet empire, subsequent defense cuts and the failure to sustain and enhance the American nuclear deterrent left the United States facing the prospect of two nuclear-armed peers in Russia and China, with combined nuclear arsenals approaching some 10,000 nuclear weapons—well beyond the size and capability of the American arsenal.

Behind this reversal in nuclear arms reductions lies a set of assumptions reflected in recent American nuclear posture reviews and nuclear policy that assumed nuclear reductions and restraint would be permanent and positive. For example, the recent Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States’ straightforward America’s Strategic Posture highlights differences in “understandings of the threats” with the Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

The 2022 NPR assumed greater cooperation between Russia, China, and the United States in addressing nuclear matters, especially preventing terror organizations and sponsoring states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moscow, however, regularly violates arms treaties. China has never signed a bilateral nuclear arms agreement with the US.

With analysts projecting Russia and China will field approximately 10,000 theater and strategic nuclear weapons by 2035–2045, a significant reversal of events is taking place that is unavoidable. A chronological look at arms treaties from 1967–2010 reveals whether American assumptions about arms control stood the test of time, particularly with respect to the lasting import of such deals and effects on American security requirements. In that context, examining the implications of American arms control agreements is instructive.

First, the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives assumed that American restraint in nuclear forces and deployments would lead to the restrain of other nuclear powers. This assumption was incorrect.

Second, the critics of START I and II and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) assumed that the Reagan nuclear build-up would trigger a similar Soviet effort and limit any deal on nuclear weapons reductions. While Gorbachev initially increased SS-20 missile deployments, increased troops in Afghanistan, walked out of the arms talks over opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and increased assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua, Reagan eventually prevailed. Peace through strength worked, contrary to the opinion of disarmament advocates.

Third, opponents of proliferation see the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a guarantor of sharply limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, when in fact NPT members China and Russia hid their rogue behavior and facilitated the spread of nuclear programs to Pakistan and North Korea and thus consequently to Iran, Libya, Syria, and possibly Iraq.

Fourth, arms control advocates blame the United States for North Korean, Syrian, and Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons. This blame is neither supported by facts nor a firm understanding of the security dynamics at play for each of these countries.

Fifth, because nuclear modernization often requires concomitant nuclear arms control efforts (New START ratification for nuclear modernization) to maintain support from Congress and the White House, an adversary can refuse to enter arms control agreements as a means of compromising American nuclear modernization. Constant efforts to stall modernization would leave the United States in an increasingly weak position.

Sixth, the START II process underscored Soviet efforts to kill any American ballistic missile defenses. Such efforts were supported by the arms control community. Russian President Vladimir Putin also continues to push for termination of missile defenses, which are now a central component of integrated deterrence.

Seventh, while New START achieved modest reductions from the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), the pursuit of still lower numbers as part of seeking abolition or “global zero” is likely to reach a point where strategic stability fails. A world without nuclear weapons is a world once again safe for great-power conventional wars.

Eighth, the 1999 Russian Duma’s rejection of the START II arms control treaty and the ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) is consistent with the findings of the Strategic Posture Commission, which clearly laid out Russia’s willingness to use nuclear coercion. For the arms control community, this potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia was dismissed—again proving how wrong disarmament advocates were.

For American deterrence to reflect the lessons above, it is also necessary for the United States to jettison bad thinking that still undermines deterrence effectiveness. Many arms control advocates believe conventional arms are sufficient to retaliate against an enemy’s nuclear strike, which would allow the United States to adopt a minimum deterrent of just a few hundred nuclear weapons.

A corollary to this thinking is the view that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence, rather than warfighting. This view undermines the credibility of deterrence by undermining American seriousness in the eyes of an adversary. Absent a willingness to fight, deterrence is not credible.

Similarly detrimental to credibility is the idea that on-alert nuclear forces are destabilizing. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the fact that nuclear forces are on-alert that makes them a less attractive target—improving deterrence credibility.

As the Strategic Posture Commission explained, China and Russia see nuclear weapons not just as a deterrent to prevent aggression, but as weapons for theater blackmail and coercion to allow aggression to succeed and keep the United States from supporting Ukraine and Taiwan.

Americans must understand that arms control efforts between the United States and adversaries is no solution for strategic stability. Arms control just for its own sake is foolish. Its utility is only in advancing American interests.

Given the current breathtaking modernization and expansion of Russia and China’s nuclear arsenals, in conjunction with their near-alliance, Americans must carefully weigh whether any arms control proposal advances American interests.

Deterrence at the strategic level remains robust since no power has the ability to launch a disarming strike. Theater-level deterrence is much weaker, with the United States at a distinct disadvantage.

For the foreseeable future, arms control has no realistic prospects. It is even difficult to argue that nonproliferation efforts are worthwhile since the United States may need the assistance of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan to stabilize tension in East Asia and prevent North Korean or Chinese aggression.

Instead, the United States should press forward with modernization of the strategic nuclear triad, while also looking at ways to expand theater nuclear capabilities. Rightsizing the arsenal and developing effective ballistic missile defenses are a must. Rejecting wrong-headed ideas that impede these initiatives is also necessary.

Finally, Congress must pass a defense budget on time. Over the past four decades, defense appropriations passed on time only four times. Bipartisan budget reform measures sought by the House Budget Committee will hopefully address the issue and none too soon. There is too much riding on it.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, CEO of Geostrategic Analysis, and host of a forty-plus year series of seminars and symposiums on nuclear matters.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary and former submarine technothriller author now researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. Views expressed by the authors in this article are their own. 

The Problem with Arms Control Assumptions was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider the following scenario: a nuclear-armed state faces a significant threat to its security but refrains from resorting to nuclear weapons use out of concern for reputational damage and the global perception that the country is no longer a responsible nuclear stakeholder. While this decision may seem prudent from a moral and ethical standpoint, it inadvertently undermines the credibility of the state’s nuclear force. Its adversaries may perceive this reluctance to employ nuclear weapons as a sign of weakness, emboldening them to act with impunity—disregarding the state’s nuclear deterrent.

The Crucial Role of Narrative Control

The crux of the matter lies in narrative control. In a world where perception is often more potent than reality, the ability to shape public opinion and control the narrative surrounding nuclear capabilities is of paramount importance. Leaders must project strength, resolve, and a willingness to employ nuclear weapons. This is necessary for instilling fear and uncertainty in the minds of adversaries.

Achieving narrative control is no easy feat. In the age of social media and instantaneous communication, information warfare is the new battleground for shaping public opinion. States contend with an onslaught of propaganda, misinformation, and alternative narratives, making it increasingly challenging to maintain a coherent and convincing message. 

Israel’s Narrative Struggles 

The case of Israel’s war with Hamas serves as a poignant example of the perils posed by losing the narrative war. Israel is being painted as the oppressor by large swaths of the international community, even though Hamas initiated the war with their October 7, 2023, attack. Despite possessing a formidable nuclear arsenal and clear escalation dominance in the region, Israel was utterly incapable of deterring conflict with Hamas. In fact, Hamas never believed Israel will use [its?] nuclear arsenal in a Gaza conflict. The Israelis have also failed to deter further escalation of aggression from Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.

Admittedly, nuclear weapons were never intended to deter all forms of aggression. It is possible that past Israeli strikes on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities are serving as a deterrent to Iran going nuclear because they fear an actual Israeli nuclear strike. This is speculation but serves to highlight the challenge of deterrence.

Israel has struggled to gain international acceptance and legitimacy for its action in Gaza with the United Nations condemning Israel, calling for a cease-fire, and even lending legitimacy to claims of genocide. This is a claim that prominent political scientists John Mearsheimer and Norman Finkelstein supported in the past weeks. The prominent commentator and former judge, Andrew Napolitano, also asserts that Israel has lost the public relations war.

Ultimately, the psychological impact of narrative victory empowers non-nuclear entities to resist traditional deterrence strategies. Adversaries, fueled by a sense of righteousness and global support, become more resilient to the deterrent effect of escalation dominance and nuclear superiority.

This resilience poses a significant challenge to the US and Israel, who find themselves contending with adversaries undeterred by their joint military superiority in the region. Even irrational decisions, in a quantitative sense, do not strike fear in adversaries that believe they dominate public support and will obtain divine vindication and retribution in their cause.

Reclaiming the Narrative Initiative

As a result, Israel finds itself caught in a precarious position, where its nuclear deterrent is weakened by perceptions of ambiguity, mistrust, and self-deterrence. Its adversaries are emboldened by this perceived weakness coupled with global support for their struggles. They may be more inclined to continue challenging Israel’s security interests, knowing that the costs of nuclear escalation are mitigated by doubts surrounding Israel’s willingness to employ nuclear weapons in conflict. This is a challenge with maintaining a nuclear posture of opacity.

To regain the narrative initiative, Israel must invest in strategic narrative crafting. Emphasizing shared values with allies, just causes, and a commitment to peace can reshape perceptions and counteract the narrative of oppression. Israel wants to be seen as a liberator and defender, not as the oppressor or the extension of an American empire. Israel has much work to do to change their current international reputation and reclaim the moral high ground. Strengthening international alliances and engaging in diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are essential and a good place to start. This is not to say Israel is not engaging in such efforts. They certainly are, but to little effect.

By influencing global narratives, Israel can garner support for their actions and create a more balanced perception of the current conflict. Launching targeted public diplomacy campaigns can bridge the gap between military actions and public understanding. Providing transparent and compelling narratives about strategic objectives can counter misinformation and build domestic and international support. Additionally, recognizing the power of cultural and ideological narratives is crucial. Israel should continue to tap into historical narratives that showcase their commitment to democracy, freedom, and human rights, countering portrayals that paint them as aggressors and oppressors.

Conclusion

The nexus of self-deterrence, narrative control, and nuclear deterrence is of utmost importance in the contemporary strategic environment. As states grapple with the complexities of nuclear strategy, the ability to shape public perception and maintain credibility is essential for maintaining peace and stability. Failure to do so risks undermining the very foundations of global security, with potentially catastrophic consequences for all nations involved. Only by mastering the art of narrative control can states hope to navigate the treacherous waters of nuclear politics and ensure the continued survival of the international order.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Self-Deterrence, Narrative Control, and Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Israel was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a security climate where problems must be tackled in weeks, months, or a year rather than decades or centuries, decision-makers need to prioritize and focus on end-states that are delivered in a finite time horizon with a limited budget and achievable outcomes. A Sum Greater Than Its Parts: Integrated Deterrence and Strategic Competition, a recent report by MITRE and the Aspen Strategy Group, addresses this issue.

The abstract is promising, claiming that integrated deterrence offers a strategy for “managing strategic competition, maintaining peace, and, if necessary, prevailing in conflict” during competition with China. The report also promises “actionable recommendations for policymakers, military leaders and private sector stakeholders” and delivers a laundry list of 31 major initiatives to enhance deterrence.

While a few of the recommended initiatives are sensible and would be useful for deterring China, like modernizing military capabilities to provide assurance and demonstrate resolve, several others are unproven and their implementation could distract from a laser-focused deterrence strategy needed for China. Indo-Pacific nations are acutely affected on a regular basis, either by economic coercion or the looming possibility of conflict over Taiwan or other contested territory. As a result, effective deterrence of China’s increasingly aggressive and coercive behavior must initially rely upon regional solutions to limit China’s most dangerous ambitions.

For a document proposing a China strategy, there is a strange obsession with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European issues. The term NATO appears nine times in the report, including a recommendation to consider internal dynamics in the alliance, while front-line allies in the Indo-Pacific that are key to deterrence (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) are mentioned as mere afterthoughts.

While there are good reasons to consider NATO, as part of any global strategy that includes deterring Russia, the emphasis on NATO seems misplaced given likely targets of Chinese aggression. The report also focused a large set of recommendations on developing public-private partnerships for deterrence, going as far as to “encourage all companies from allied nations to actively participate in strategic initiatives.” While portions of the private sector play a critical role in national security initiatives, it is unclear how a restaurant owner in Latvia could actively contribute to deterring Chinese aggression, for example.

Another group of recommendations suggests the broader use of economic levers including the use of “economic warfare” to undermine an adversary’s willingness to wage war. This ignores the fact that a broad range of economic measures aimed at isolating Russia had a limited impact on the Russian economy and proved to be an abject failure in deterring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The utility of economic sanctions in deterring adversaries has historically proven to be questionable. One study shows the use of sanctions leads to a higher probability of future conflict for democracies, as sanctions tend to signal weakness rather than strength. The utility of economic sanctions and other types of economic warfare to deter remains unproven.

The final grouping of recommendations in the report proved the most useful, suggesting that we must understand the adversary, define clear objectives, and build a grand strategy to win a strategic competition with China. MITRE needed to lead with clear objectives and an understanding of China’s goals and decision calculus. Instead, a long list of potential actions that might deter China is presented without sufficient links to China’s objectives. Rather than utilizing a strategy-to-task framework that links ways and means to the ends in a logical fashion, the report presents a broad range of ways and means primarily focused on integration.

Allies and diplomatic measures should play a crucial role in the realization of integrated deterrence, but policymakers must have clear and pragmatic options available. Prioritization of resources and initiatives to maximize deterrence requires a strong appreciation for the Indo-Pacific region, its unique dynamics, and China’s role in the region. Allies and partners must work bi-laterally and multi-laterally to operationalize deterrence in the region.

China is a significant and well-resourced adversary. To compete with and deter China effectively, the United States and its allies must be thoughtful about what initiatives are pursued and what resources are expended. Integration can improve outcomes, but only when it improves outcomes as part of a unified deterrence strategy. In a world where deterrence of China is urgently required, proven and effective measures that deliver deterrence must be brought together under a unifying strategy. This is the type of integration which should be implemented.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

 Leigh Ramsay is a graduate of the National Security College at the Australian National University.

The views of the authors are their own.

Integrated Deterrence: Which of These Two Words Is More Important? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent defense bill passed by Congress fully supports the Sentinel program. The Strategic Posture Commission report also supports the replacement of the Minuteman III ICBM, although the commission also recommends the US examine making some portion of the ICBM force mobile. The ACA rejects efforts to make ICBMs more survivable and recommends the elimination of all American ICBMs, a switch from their previous view that the US should keep the 54-year-old Minuteman III as an alternative to Sentinel.

ICBM mobility was reviewed by previous administrations in detail, but due to opposition from environmental groups and disarmament advocates, mobile ICBMs never received the political support needed. In 1977, just after President Jimmy Carter proposed the fielding of 200 mobile MX missiles, two senators, Howard Cannon (D-NV) and Frank Moss (D-UT), cleverly proposed to the Senate Armed Services Committee that Utah and Nevada would deploy one hundred mobile MX missiles but required another state accept the other half of the force. As they anticipated, there were no takers. Thus, the nation never fielded a mobile MX missile.

In 1983, a combined mobile and fixed ICBM force that included the multi-warhead Peacekeeper and the single warhead Small ICBM, were both recommended by the congressionally mandated Scowcroft Commission. The dual system approach, noted Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), was made because “[y]ou cannot make an elephant a rabbit and you can’t make a rabbit an elephant!”

In 1986, the Air Force fielded 50 Peacekeeper missiles in silos, as part of President Ronald Reagan’s nuclear modernization. However, with the end of the Cold War and a 50 percent cut to warheads under START I, plans for road-mobile Small ICBM and rail-mobile Peacekeeper missiles were both terminated.

Now, four decades later, with a nuclear arsenal 90 percent smaller than during the Cold War, the ACA rejects ICBMs altogether, whether fixed or mobile. In reality, their idea makes nuclear war more likely and does not address new strategic developments.

The most likely use of nuclear weapons is no longer a massive bolt-out-of-the blue strike, which arms control advocates cite as part of their rationale for eliminating the ICBM. The recent Strategic Posture Commission report unanimously concluded, as Mark Schneider explains, the most likely use of nuclear weapons against the United States is a coercive, but limited, nuclear strike as part of a regional conflict by Russia or China.

Within Russian strategy, limited strikes are part of an escalate to win approach that does not include strikes on American ICBMs. In fact, the very point of employing lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons is to keep strategic nuclear weapons out of the fight.

Most at risk are American military targets in Europe, the Western Pacific, and the Middle East. Here the US is already at risk with no theater nuclear forces in Asia and fewer than 200 fighter-delivered gravity bombs in Europe.

Unilaterally retiring American ICBMs from the nuclear triad would do nothing to prevent the use of nuclear weapons at either the strategic or theater level. In fact, a Russian or Chinese nuclear attack might prove more likely. For example, without ICBMs, American nuclear force structure would be reduced to five bomber and submarine bases and a handful of submarines at sea. More specifically, killing ICBMs reduces the number of targets an adversary must strike from over five hundred to about dozen—with none requiring a nuclear strike. The American deterrent is now survivable and allows for a robust second strike.

Eliminating the ICBM force invites a disarming attack by Russia or China. For example, although a majority of American ballistic missile submarines are at sea at any given time and are highly survivable, submarines are highly susceptible to conventional attack in port or when entering or leaving port. An underseas technology breakthrough would allow even our submarines at sea to be targeted.

Destroying the bomber force’s two Weapons Storage Areas before weapons are onloaded could take the bomber force out of any fight. ICBMs alone force Russia and China to expend at least 1,000 warheads in hope of destroying the force, while also knowing hundreds of American ICBMs could retaliate even after a confirmed warhead strike on the US.

An American deterrent without ICBMs invites rather than prevents aggression because it reduces the uncertainty and risk of an attack. Reducing the US nuclear force to less than a dozen aim points invites cooperative nuclear-armed adversaries to hide their intentions, promise a “peaceful rise,” and at a time of their choosing aim a possible surprise disarming strike at the United States. It also eliminates a significant hedge option for the United States.

Like the nuclear freeze, which Americans rejected half a century ago, once again the disarmament community proposes a dangerous unilateral measure that would make the very nuclear war they seek to avoid more likely. The American people must once again reject a bad idea.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The view’s expressed are the authors own. 

Killing ICBMs was originally published on Global Security Review.

With the Minuteman III ICBM fleet now 50 years old and 35 years beyond its planned service life, there is no option but to build a new ICBM. Although Northrup Grumman, the prime contractor on the Sentinel program, made a good faith effort to estimate the cost of building a new missile and retrofitting Minuteman III launch control centers and launch facilities with the new hardware required for the new missile, no company has engaged in this kind of activity in five decades.

Thus, in many respects, any estimate of costs can be no more than a ballpark estimate at best. Think about it. Have you ever tried to do a home improvement project for the very first time and it went exactly as you planned—without a hitch? Of course not. What about those home improvement shows where the contractor always finds something hidden behind the drywall that sends the remodel cost way up? Doing something once every 50 years with a workforce that has zero experience with such a project is a recipe for cost overruns.

This is the choice the nation made and must live with. It is hypocritical of arms control advocates to charge that Sentinel’s cost overruns mean the program should be cancelled. If they applied that same logic to all government programs, we would also kill Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and student loans. In fact, we would kill just about every federal program ever funded. Almost all estimates of government programs are wrong—and wildly wrong.

Instead, we must deal with a reality that leaves the United States little choice but to move forward because the strategic environment is rapidly deteriorating, and no amount of optimism and idealism will change that fact. It is time reality overrides aspirations.

The facts are simple. Russia already has a superior arsenal to the United States and maintains a capacity to produce about 1,000 new nuclear weapons every year. And with Russia no longer bound by the New START treaty, Vladimir Putin can double or triple the size of his nuclear arsenal before the end of the decade. He already maintains at least a 10-to-1 advantage in theater nuclear weapons.

China’s nuclear breakout also caught the United States on its heals. The DF-41 ICBM, for example, carries multiple reentry vehicles and is expected to fill the 300 new ICBM silos discovered in 2021. DF-41s filling those new silos could alone exceed the size of the entire American nuclear arsenal.

That says nothing of the new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons China is deploying. To deter such capabilities America requires a secure and reliable nuclear deterrent, which must include the Sentinel.

Why Does America Still Need ICBMs?

The fact that the basics of the ICBM mission have not changed much since they were first fielded may explain why some believe they are outdated. Before we commit to killing Sentinel and retiring the Minuteman, it is important to consider some of their benefits.

First, ICBMs provide an excellent deterrent to nuclear attack on the homeland. The 400 Minuteman III silos spread across the American West are invulnerable to all but a massive nuclear missile attack. Thus, their existence sets a high threshold for attacking the United States, either conventionally or with nuclear weapons. Without ICBMs, our strategic nuclear targets shrink from over 500 to about a dozen, which could all be destroyed with conventional strikes. Only ICBM silos require a nuclear strike.

Second, ICBMs cost less than the other two legs of the nuclear triad—even with cost overruns. While Sentinel will cost an estimated $130–150 billion over the next two to three decades, it is likely to prove operationally cost-effective over the long term. Remember, ICBMs are used every single day to deter the Russians and the Chinese. Our adversaries understand the power of an ICBM, which is why their nuclear forces are primarily composed of ICBMs.

Third, building a Sentinel provides the US an opportunity to consider deploying ICBMs in new and creative ways. With the United States government depending on the private sector for its space launch capability, the Sentinel also has some non-traditional missions that a common launch vehicle might provide. These include:

1. The ability to deploy time critical space assets like sensors, navigation, or communications satellites in response to a contingency; and
2. Closer to traditional missions are ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite kill vehicles, and conventional prompt global strike.

The benefit of such a system would be the ability to replace the top of a missile with a different payload to carry out a niche mission. At the same time, nuclear deterrence is preserved by those ICBMs still on alert.

Nuclear deterrence works by creating the fear of a massive retaliatory response. It achieves a psychological effect in the mind of an adversary. Non-traditional missions can support deterrence by taking away an adversary’s belief in his potential success in achieving some advantage.

A prompt global strike capability, for example, would also fill a niche role, if needed, allowing the US to strike targets quickly without escalating to nuclear use. Sentinel makes that possible. Given its cost, only a small number of such weapons would be feasible, and all while complicating adversary strategy.

These are just some additional uses for Sentinel, but they do not change the fundamental reason for building a new ICBM—Minuteman III is 50 years old and well past its service life. Yes, there are cost overruns, but can we really expect any less when we build something once every half-century?

Conclusion

In short, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping would love for the United States to cancel the Sentinel program. We should not give them what they want.

Adam Lowther, PhD, is the Vice President of research and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The view’s expressed are the authors own. 

Why America Needs ICBMs was originally published on Global Security Review.

China’s notion of the “Middle Kingdom” is not just a historical concept; it is a guiding force shaping the nation’s foreign policy. Seen in initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and military expansion, it portrays China as the cultural, political, and economic epicenter of the world. This intentional effort to shape the global system involves territorial disputes, diplomatic pressures, and information warfare, projecting China’s influence far beyond its borders.

However, beneath the peaceful platitudes lies a shadow. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China’s human rights landscape has taken a dark turn. From the oppression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the challenges faced by Tibetans and Hong Kongers, China’s stance on basic freedoms is increasingly disconcerting. Moreover, China’s influence extends globally, touching on economic coercion, cyberattacks, and support for authoritarian regimes, challenging international human rights institutions and norms.

China’s challenge to the US and the post-1945 international system manifests in various forms, presenting a multifaceted threat. The ambition to displace, rather than replace, the US raises concerns about potential conflicts and instability. At its core is an ideological clash—China’s authoritarian capitalism versus the liberal democratic order that is the cornerstone of the international system. The corridors of power in the West are replete with recommendations: fortify alliances, champion human rights, and competently engage with the rising power.

As the world stands on the brink of a new global order, there is a sense of urgency to understand Chinese aspirations and prevent them from turning into conflict with the United States. The intertwining of power and principles calls for careful navigation of uncharted waters. The profound impact on human rights and freedoms demands a collective response—a strategic dance between nations, not merely in policy but in the very fabric of conscience.

To delve deeper into the implications of China’s global power projection, it is crucial to explore the ripple effects across various spheres. Economically, China’s rise has reshaped the global economic landscape. Its Belt and Road Initiative, spanning continents, creates a web of economic dependencies, presenting both opportunities and challenges for those nations involved. While some benefit from infrastructure development and economic partnerships, others find themselves vulnerable to China’s economic leverage. Ultimately, the terms of receiving Chinese aid often leave the recipient turning over ownership of ports, airports, railways, and other key infrastructure to the Chinese.

In the realm of technology, China is a formidable player. With advanced capabilities in artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and quantum computing, the country is positioning itself as a leader in the fourth industrial revolution. This technological prowess not only impacts the global market but also raises concerns about surveillance, privacy, and the potential

weaponization of technology for authoritarian control—something the Chinese Communist Party is already doing at home.

Moreover, China’s increasing military capabilities and assertiveness in territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea, have geopolitical implications. The potential for conflicts or tensions in these areas pose a challenge to regional stability and global peace. The international community grapples with how to address and manage these challenges while avoiding the escalation of conflicts.

China’s global power projection also extends to the realm of soft power. Through cultural initiatives, media influence, and educational exchanges, China seeks to shape international narratives and perceptions. This cultural diplomacy aims to foster a positive image of China globally, further enhancing its influence and challenging the dominance of Western narratives.

In the economic and diplomatic arenas, China’s growing influence in international organizations and forums cannot be ignored. As the country becomes a key player in shaping global policies, there is a need for a recalibration of international governance structures to accommodate a multipolar world.

The implications of China’s global power projection are vast and multifaceted. From economic shifts to technological advancements, geopolitical tensions, and soft power strategies, China’s ascent reverberates across the globe. Navigating this complex landscape requires a nuanced understanding and proactive engagement from the international community to ensure a balance between cooperative partnerships and safeguard universal principles of human rights and freedom. The ongoing dialogue and strategic decisions made today will undoubtedly shape the course of international relations in the years to come.

Shane McNeil is an American intelligence professional with over 20 years of experience in the military, as a contractor, and as a government civilian.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

China’s Rise: Unraveling Power and Principle was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Americans, there must be a greater sense of urgency and realization of critical vulnerabilities that can include one or both potential realities. First, consider that a 2024 Chinese attack on Taiwan is feasible. Second, plan for the defense of Taiwan without the benefit of assets in Okinawa and Guam. There is a significant possibility both may prove true.

China has the confidence and believes it can control both conventional and nuclear escalation. China’s “no first-use” policy only exists in name only. China made it very clear, in state-run television, that it would use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Japan. That is, if Japan became involved in the domestic affairs of China during a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (which the Chinese Communist Party sees as a domestic affair), then China may strike Japan with nuclear weapons. This would include Okinawa.

China has the capability and will to gain the advantage in the Asia-Pacific and Taiwan relatively quickly. It is said that amateurs think strategy and generals think logistics. If this is true, understanding China’s perspective is instructive.

First, China will not let Taiwan become the operational center of attention because that is where American attention is focused in wargaming and tabletop exercises (TTX) played in the United States. China, if it acts as expected, will not strike Taiwan, but elsewhere—only later taking Taiwan.

Imagine Taiwan as held between the thumb and finger of the US. Struggle to pry it loose and fail. Cut off the thumb and finger and Taiwan is released. The thumb is American forces on Okinawa and the finger is the US presence on Guam.

Okinawa is home to Kadena Air Base which hosts the 18th Wing, the Air Force’s largest combat air wing. The Kadena’s strategic importance is underscored by its array of advanced fighter aircraft, aerial refueling capabilities, and reconnaissance aircraft. It serves as a critical hub for air operations in the Pacific, offering rapid response capabilities for various regional contingencies. Okinawa is also home to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). The US Navy has several facilities in Okinawa, including White Beach Naval Facility, which supports naval operations in the region.

Guam hosts significant American military assets, including Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base. With Guam and Okinawa out, the US still has assets in Tokyo, the Philippines, Australia, and, further out, is Diego Garcia, and even further away is Hawaii.

To operationally execute a surprise attack on Okinawa and Guam, China could employ a stratagem beginning with a deliberate maritime provocation: a scenario where a less costly Chinese asset, such as a $20 million LY-132 warship, engages provocatively with a more valuable US asset, akin to a $2 billion Aegis destroyer. This mirrors past incidents in the South China Sea involving near-collisions, notably between a Chinese LY132 and the USS Chung-Hoon on June 4, 2023. In such a scenario, the Chinese vessel could aggressively maneuver across the bow of the US destroyer in internationally disputed waters, compelling the US ship to decelerate.

In the event of an actual collision, China could construe this as a hostile action by the US in what it claims as its sovereign territory. Leveraging this pretext for a counterstrike, China’s arsenal includes advanced military capabilities for rapid engagement against Okinawa and Guam. In September 2015, the DF-26 nicknamed the “Guam Killer,” which can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, was publicly revealed. Eight years later, China has added the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, the DF-27 missile, and 094-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), capable of delivering a nuclear strike.

The DF-27, a medium-range ballistic missile, augments China’s offensive reach, particularly in regional conflicts. Its range, speed, and accuracy render it a formidable threat to critical American positions in the Indo-Pacific, including military bases and naval forces. The DF-27 is designed to enhance China’s ability to hold targets at risk beyond the second island chain and possesses a high probability of penetrating American ballistic missile defenses. The newest weapon in the Chinese hypersonic inventory, the DF-27, with its range, speed, and ability to maneuver in flight, is a potent “carrier killer.” Additionally, it can hit targets as far as Hawaii.

Using these capabilities China has the option to hit American forces in the first two island chains fast and furiously.

Some may argue that Japan tried something similar in 1941—only to fail. Then, the United States had industrial capacity to quickly build and overpower Japan. Today, the industrial and labor capacity exists in China, not the US. Most importantly, after years of neglecting American nuclear capabilities while China worked toward perfecting their own, the Chinese now have greater regional nuclear capability than the United States. Retaliating for nuclear strikes on Okinawa and/or Guam would prove pyric because the only option is to strike the Chinese mainland. That would put American cities and populations at risk of annihilation.

Returning to the point of this article, 2024 is a good year to attack American forces in the Indo-Pacific for five reasons. First, the US is distracted by the upcoming presidential election. Second, the US is stretched thin with contingencies in Europe and the Middle East. Third, experts and leaders are myopically looking for a cross-strait conflict, rather than the conflict discussed above. Fourth, the US is busy trying to play catch up and strengthen its integrated deterrence with allies. China has the advantage and would prove unwise to give the United States time to prepare. Fifth, the US has more to lose than China in a nuclear conflict. The risk/reward calculation looks better for China than the US in 2024 and beyond.

Thus, 2024 is a good year for a Chinese attack on American military forces in the Indo-Pacific. It is time Americans wake up to the fact that the threat is already here and not somewhere in the future.

Alexis Littlefield, PhD, is Chief of Staff at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a Fellow of the Institute. He lived two decades in Taiwan and China.

Why 2024 Is a Good Year for China to Attack American Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

It is straightforward to see that beyond the deterrent or “last defense” aspect of possessing a nuclear arsenal these weapons are one tool among other strategic options. It is the duty of a military planner to plan for outcomes with the instruments that adversaries possess, however distasteful those weapons (nuclear weapons). It does not require reams of classified intelligence nor deep policy experience to recognize the appeal of a nuclear weapon to achieve winning outcomes. Even the technical specifications of specific weapons, their delivery method, and the effects achieved by their use can take a second seat to the appealing utility of their use in the mind of a foe.

A brief look at two kinds of adversary is instructive. First, there is the ideologically driven actor who seeks to remake the international state system and its associated norms, behaviors, and morals. Second, there is a leader or state-party that seeks to climb politically, economically, and cultural-informationally within the extant Western-built international system.

For the antagonist motivated by an ideology whose primary ambition is the destruction of contemporary norms or who desires to trigger a millenarian kind of resorting, whether secular or religious, a nuclear weapon heralds to fellow adherents the breaking of the status quo by the offer of a new, radicalized future. To achieve such an outcome a nuclear weapon targeted at a populated area, especially a political capital or major religious center, would offer the radical damage and chaos sought.

The size of the nuclear device need not be large. The purpose is to tear down a targeted society by inflicting as many casualties as possible and to wreck the symbols and sinews that symbolized the victims’ way of life and station in the international order. There is no doubt many terrorist organizations that would leap at the chance to exploit a nuclear weapon in this fashion. And there are state challengers who no doubt see the same appeal. The only risk to such leaders is the repercussions they may face. But to the radicalized actor, the repercussions are just another aspect of martyrdom—religious or ideological. One imagines that such a scenario has not occurred more due to lack of opportunity than to a lack of desire.

A nuclear weapon fired by a state’s armed forces is even more likely to occur if for no other reason than governments possess the world’s nuclear arms. State arsenals and their delivery systems continue to proliferate in both number and capability, thus expanding the scenarios for weapons use. The danger of the “mutually assured destruction” problem that occupied many deterrence thinkers during the Cold War is still a threat, but the logic of employment success points towards battlefield use.

A nuclear weapon that struck a key military target could decisively alter the course of a battle and a campaign by inflicting damage at a scale that conventional weapons can only achieve over much longer periods of time. The historical record informs us that winning quickly is a tremendous advantage for an adversary.

The one sure way to suffer a military defeat by the US and any American-led coalition is to wait for American joint and combined forces to deploy, assemble, and wage a maneuver campaign. If the Normandy landings of World War II are too distant, then the overwhelming success of the United States in the Gulf War (1991) is a more recent reminder of the fate of any adversary that simply waits for the United States to come to them. The war in Ukraine is an ongoing example of the grinding, almost interminable, result of fighting when early wins do not occur. Despite the many technological advances that modern armed forces possess, speed in multi-domain operations is still decisive, and elusive.

America’s adversaries are certainly aware that speed matters. Alongside the imperatives of increasing range and the convergence of lethal effects, the rapid way a nuclear weapon can alter battlefield geometries and the correlation of forces gives so called “battlefield nukes” tremendous appeal. There are many creative ways to benefit from a nuclear weapon, not just on land, but also in the maritime and air domains. Sealing an area off from maneuver; denying communications, targeting, and surveillance systems; destroying logistical nodes and stockpiles; damaging vehicles and equipment; and inflicting casualties on the adversary are all additional ways nuclear weapons are useful. This is not to mention the escalatory advantage of skipping rungs on the escalation ladder, thereby intimidating America’s partners and neutral states—foreclosing incremental steps from American policymakers.

Simply put, nuclear weapons present an urgent operational challenge to the joint force of the United States and its military partners. Whether the scenario is in Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or globally, the United States must imagine that adversaries are thinking about, and at least gaming if not planning, nuclear weapons use to achieve their objectives.

Americans must admit that there is a problem and stop hiding behind sincere wishes that nuclear weapons are never used again. The logic of their employment demands that the nation act on the facts as they are. Nuclear weapons are present. They are plentiful. It is also almost certainly only a matter of time before an adversary exploits American reticence to prepare for their use. It is time to prepare for that day.

Major General (Ret.) Bradley T. Gericke, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Operational Logic of Nuclear Weapons Use by an Adversary was originally published on Global Security Review.

Some commentators believe the submarine launched nuclear cruise missile (SLCM-N) is a better approach. Others believe the existing low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile (W76-2) and the new air launched cruise missile are all that is needed to assure allies well into the future.

One issue with the W76-2 is the fact that an adversary cannot tell the difference between a low- or high-yield weapon until after it detonates. The low-yield cruise missile element avoids that problem but only offers a unilateral American solution to potential NATO inability to quickly responding with observably non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The former Polish prime minister’s recent comments about his desire to host nuclear weapons in Poland, was based on his concern that conventional forces may fail to convince Russia that Poland has the will or capability to retaliate to Russian aggression. When then-prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, said he wants to “act quickly”  to begin hosting US nuclear weapons, it was this concern that drove his thinking, which leads back to the opening proposition; build the needed facilities.

Alternatively, the Biden administration made a non-weapon based assurance move with South Korea by involving them more in nuclear planning. The development of military facilities for nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles is, however, a way for allies to draw attention to their willingness to respond to existential or nuclear attack, which can be done almost entirely on their own.

If Poland, South Korea, or other US nuclear umbrella beneficiaries are serious about sending a stronger message to their adversaries (and the United States) they can demonstrate resolve through the suggested defense spending. Constructing weapons storage and security system (WS3)sites with the same, or greater, security and survivability as those built across Central Europe in the 1980s eliminates at least one argument against direct participation in nuclear sharing.

Specific design criteria necessary to calculate just how survivable WS3 sites are or how much the cost to build is of course classified. A feel for cost from publicly available congressional testimony is possible. Government accountability office products and a blue ribbon panel report. Congressional testimony puts nuclear weapon storage improvements at about $50 million per base, each with several individual nuclear storage units. This is in line with the cost of building new F-35 hardened shelters. At least a thousand hardened shelters already exist across Europe and the Pacific, so the actual cost for adding just the WS3 element might actually be lower.

The presence of American nuclear weapons on NATO territory is what sets it apart from other bilateral extended deterrence promises. Although German officials publicly talk about removing nuclear weapons from their territory to reduce the chances of becoming a nuclear target, the idea is always rejected. However, just voicing this opinion begs the questions, would Germany allow allies to sortie nuclear weapons from their airbases and, more importantly, is that friction exploitable? The Morawiecki  seemed to think so. The most credible threat of nuclear retaliation is of course for the Poles to have their own nuke, but that is neither plausible nor desirable for all involved.

The next most credible threat would be Polish pilots flying Polish F-35s out of Polish airfields to deliver NATO assigned weapons requiring the United States do nothing but provide the codes. The same logic would apply in Asia, improving deterrence for South Korea, Japan, or even Singapore. Because the F-35 was born nuclear capable, each country with a squadron of them and WS3 sites is just one US policy decision and a nuclear code box away from being able to deliver a nuclear strike.

Training all NATO F-35 pilots to deliver nuclear weapons was recently recommended as a low-cost means of improving deterrence. Even if NATO stores no greater number of weapons nor are any re-introduced to the Pacific, the simple fact that capability improved sends a “clear and visible signal” of partner resolve. Partners who build WS3 sites and already have F-35s take virtually all the cost, time, and training issues out of hosting American nuclear weapons.

Building a WS3 site is not only about sharing the financial burden, but it also shows backbone by making one’s airfields an even more important target for the adversary trying to take even one inch of territory. Bringing (almost) all the necessary elements of a nuclear retaliatory capability within one’s border virtually eliminates the age-old worry of whether the US is willing to trade New York for Paris. It is true that extended deterrence partners may have to do without one or even two F-35s to afford the several WS3 sites necessary to preclude their easy targeting. But spending that money and accepting the risk shows that America’s partners see credible nuclear retaliation as valuable.

Even without weapons in hand, simply having nuclear certified storage capacity turns F-35 partner nations into nascent nuclear self-defense capable states. This approach costs the US nothing, discourages nuclear technology proliferation, and does not necessitate expanding American stockpiles.

Partner nations building WS3 sites go a long way toward showing their belief in the value of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing. Increasing the number of targets an aggressor must destroy to deny nuclear retaliation decreases the likelihood of the aggressor going nuclear in the first place.

Perhaps fielding a slew of secure and hardened nuclear weapons storage sites is a deterrence dream, but if they build them, perhaps the weapons will come. At worst this investment creates a classical deterrence threat by leaving something to chance with the future “upload” possibility for a more amenable American presidential administration.

If You Build It, They Might Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

These challenges suggest two questions. First, does the announcement that the United States will field a new B61-13 nuclear gravity bomb address the perceived weakening of extended deterrence credibility? Second, does the B61-13’s development also effectively signal deterrence credibility to adversaries like Russia and China?

Will the B61-13 Repair US Nuclear Deterrence and Assurances?

The Department of Defense is embarking on a significant endeavor: the development of the B61-13, a modern variant of the B61 nuclear gravity bomb. The project awaits approval from Congress, driven by the imperative to bolster deterrence against potential adversaries while equipping the president with a versatile set of options to address targets formerly assigned to the B83 megaton class nuclear gravity bomb, but at less than half the expected yield.

The foundation of this ambitious project lies in the insights gleaned from the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. The document sheds light on the expansion and modernization of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, prompting a recalibration of US nuclear strategy. The cornerstone of this recalibration is a balanced approach that includes investments in deterrence capabilities while concurrently emphasizing a commitment to pursuing arms control measures.

The B61-13’s ability to enhance deterrence across several crucial dimensions is central to its development. Foremost among these is the bomb’s ability to broaden the spectrum of potential targets the United States can strike with the weapon. Its ability to address harder and larger-area military targets poses a formidable challenge to potential adversaries, pushing them to consider an extended array of possible objectives.

This expansion of target sets introduces an element of unpredictability into the calculations of would-be aggressors, thus, aspirationally at least, reinforcing deterrence. The B61-13’s development appears a small step in the return to a nuclear policy based on “calculated ambiguity.” Such a policy may have played an important role in explaining why the Cold War never turned hot.

Moreover, the B61-13 assumes the role of safeguarding the credibility of the United States’ nuclear deterrent by demonstrating American ability to design and field new weapons. Effective deterrence hinges on the perception that a nation possesses the determination and the means to respond effectively to various threats. By elevating its nuclear capabilities, including the development of the B61-13, the United States reinforces the credibility of its response options. Such enhancements discourage potential adversaries from testing the resolve of a nation armed with a potent and adaptable nuclear arsenal.

The B61-13’s provision of tailored response options is critical to note, and a testament to its flexibility. This empowers the president to select a response that is appropriate and proportionate to specific threats, serving as a deterrent by signaling to potential aggressors that the United States can deliver a precise and calibrated response, discouraging reckless actions.

Additionally, the B61-13 improves assurance with allies and partners, underscoring the United States’ unwavering commitment to collective defense. Its inclusion among the array of nuclear capabilities reinforces the assurance that the United States will stand by its allies. Keith Payne of the National Institute for Public Policy wrote, “It is imperative for US and allied security, and for the assurance of US allies, that the United States be capable of deterring and defending against this eccentric rogue power.” This assurance factor discourages potential adversaries from targeting U.S. allies, as they acknowledge the presence of a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent designed to support collective defense efforts. Will the B61-13 announcement alleviate concerns from our allies in the Pacific?

Finally, the B61-13 plays a crucial role in advancing strategic stability. By upholding a credible and adaptable nuclear deterrent, the United States contributes to an environment characterized by predictability and reduced risk of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation in times of crisis. The assurance of a stable and predictable American response fosters strategic stability, discouraging actions that could precipitate conflict or escalation.

The B61-13 should strengthen deterrence by broadening target coverage, preserving deterrence credibility, offering tailored response options, assuring allies, and promoting strategic stability. These interconnected elements collectively enhance the United States’ capacity to deter potential threats and promote international security in an ever-evolving geopolitical landscape.

Will the B61-13 Repair US Nuclear Deterrence and Assurances? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Even before Russia’s war on Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, the Russo–American nuclear arms control dialogue was icy. Both states withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that previously precluded any deployment of nuclear or conventional missiles with ranges from 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Russian President Vladimir Putin showcased several advanced nuclear delivery systems in development or ready for deployment in his address to the Russian Federal Assembly in 2018. Putin continued to object to American missile defenses deployed in European NATO member-states as part of the alliance’s modernization plans, describing these ship-based and shore-located antimissile systems as potential threats to Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

As the Biden administration took office, the last nuclear arms control agreement remaining was the New START Treaty of 2010, which was scheduled to expire in February 2021 unless the United States and Russia agreed to a five-year extension. Fortunately, the Biden administration moved rapidly to negotiate an extension with Russia, leaving New START in place for another five years. However, New START’s value lies less in its symbolism or historical status than in its potential for revitalizing the Russo–American nuclear arms control process. If New START cannot be the cornerstone for a rebooted nuclear arms control regime, it will be a historical footnote but not a favorable augury for future progress.

Progress in nuclear arms control between Russia and the United States is a necessary condition for other steps to reduce the risks of future nuclear war. Together, both countries control about 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. Any hope of restraining vertical proliferation (larger arsenals among existing nuclear weapons states) or horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to additional state or non-state actors) depends upon leadership from Washington and Moscow.  Regional rivalries in the Middle East and Asia could increase the number of nuclear weapons states outside of Europe or create new incentives for non-nuclear powers to acquire nuclear arsenals.  New nuclear weapons states often lack the technologies, tactics, techniques, and procedures to field nuclear weapons that are secure from a first strike or possess the warhead security employed by the United States and Russia.

If New START is the basic building block for resuming a cooperative security relationship with Russia, what does it entail? New START restricts the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads for each state to 1,550 weapons on a maximum number of 700 deployed launchers (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); and heavy bombers). Current Russian and American strategic nuclear forces comply with these New START limits. Counting rules treat each bomber as a single weapon, although bombers actually carry variable numbers of weapons. Thus, the official New START figures understate the total numbers of weapons actually deployed by each side.

Within a common ceiling on the numbers of weapons and launchers deployed under New START limits, the US and Russia have strategic nuclear forces that are structured very differently. Russia’s forces emphasize land based strategic missiles (ICBMs) while the United States is more reliant upon submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This difference in emphasis is likely to continue in future planning and deployments. Both Washington and Moscow have committed themselves to future nuclear modernization plans that will replace or refurbish each arm of the venerable nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based, and airborne launchers. This situation results partly from bureaucratic inertia, but also from the conviction that a three-legged deterrent force provides more flexibility for military planners and a more complicated attack surface for hostile forces.

During and after the Cold War, efforts to rationalize American nuclear war plans ran up against competing priorities among policymakers, military planners, and expert analysts inside and outside government. American declaratory policy for deterrence was not always consistent with employment policy for the use of nuclear weapons, should deterrence fail. Broadly speaking, alternative models for nuclear employment policy included: (1) a force sufficient to inflict unacceptable retaliatory destruction on the society of the attacker; (2) option one plus forces and command systems for flexible targeting and escalation control, including some options for lower-yield weapons; (3) options one and two plus counterforce superiority relative to any prospective attacker; and (4) options one and three, plus antimissile defenses capable of damage limitation even against major attacks.

There were variations around these themes, but the evolving American nuclear targeting plan—the single integrated operations plan (SIOP)—was put into effect by target planning staff matching available weapons to prospective targets. After all was said and done, no credible plan for anything resembling “victory” at an acceptable cost was available to American or Russian nuclear planners.

Strategic analysis sometimes fails to recognize that deterrence depends for its success, not only on the cleverness of the deterrer, but on the psychology and strategic thinking of the object of deterrence threats. States are not billiard balls, and leaders’ estimates of what will deter their competitors are often wide of the mark. Intelligence estimates may err in their assessments of enemy intentions, capabilities, or both. History, before and after the beginning of the nuclear age, is littered with deterrence failures based on faulty intelligence, biased images of other states and their leaders, and many varieties of motivational bias and wishful thinking. States’ perceptions of one another’s military-strategic doctrines are subjected to mirror imaging or other sources of distortion.

In the case of Russia, for example, some contend that Russian military thinking treated nuclear weapons as just another point on a linear continuum of violence, and not as a nonlinear departure from military rationality. However, at their historic meeting at Reykjavik in 1987 Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and should never be fought. This long road to nuclear deterrence sobriety for both the US and Russia was not achieved without some dangerous detours like the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and Able Archer (1983). Future nuclear powers, without the benefit of Cold War experience, may behave less prudently.

This familiar Russo-American strategic nuclear choreography is going to be shaken up by twenty-first century political and technological realities. The rise of China as a major nuclear power is no longer in doubt. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is modernizing its land and sea-based nuclear-missile forces and bombers, developing the potential for a regionally dominant and globally competitive nuclear arsenal. This decade, the United States may face two nuclear peers in Moscow and Beijing. Such a development raises important questions about American nuclear force sizing and modernization. Both the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, of various ranges and yields, will be up for discussion among American defense planners. The United States and its allies will also have to consider how China’s rise affects American and allied conventional force modernization and the United States’ ability to counter China’s regional anti-access/area denial capabilities.

A regional conventional war involving Chinese and American forces also raises the possibility of nuclear escalation. Another issue is the maturing alliance between Russia and China. Although not necessarily in agreement on all strategic issues, Moscow and Beijing concur in their desire to push back against the rules-based international order favored by the United States. On the other hand, China’s nuclear rise may encourage existing Asian powers like Korea and Japan to augment their conventional forces with nuclear weapons.

New technologies are certain to stress prior assumptions about the stability of nuclear deterrence based on assured retaliation. Three examples are instructive. First, because hypersonic weapons do not fly a ballistic path that allows for reliable detection and tracking, the time and ability required to determine a target does not, at present, exist. Second, drone swarms are also a threat as adversaries develop innovative ways to employ them for offensive or defensive purposes. Drone attacks against command-and-control systems or mobile launch systems like transporter erector launched intercontinental ballistic missiles and ballistic missile submarines. Third, nuclear coercion could be preceded or accompanied by cyberattacks against military communications and command and control systems or other military and civil infrastructure. Cyber-attacks could also serve as advanced tools for disinformation, propaganda, and other deceptive “like-war” tools.

If the rise of China and the uncertain implications of new technologies do not offer enough concern for Russo-American arms control regimes, there is the additional challenge of deciding “how much is enough” for American defense preparedness and for nuclear weapons specifically. The American defense budget dwarfs all others at a time of considerable stress in the US economy.  For a country with global commitments, military preparedness does not come cheap. The nuclear arsenal is also expected to provide extended deterrence for allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Without the American nuclear “umbrella,” some allies might consider more seriously the option of developing their own nuclear arsenals.

In Asia, this risk is especially salient in view of China’s expanding capabilities and assertive behavior. Regardless of the perceived strategic necessity for various forces or weapons systems, competing demands from domestic priorities will place limits on future defense budgets. Difficult trade-offs within future budgets is certain as the United States is expected to face a prolonged recession over the next few years. With regard to nuclear forces, expenditures for deployed and reserve weapons and launchers are only part of the equation. Also demanding of resources are the components of the nation’s nuclear infrastructure, including weapons laboratories, and defense contractors who support the Pentagon’s research and development.

Too much complacency exists about the pace of nuclear proliferation. Admittedly, some of the most pessimistic predictions made during the Cold War about the eventual spread of nuclear weapons were wide of the mark. Far fewer nations became nuclear powers than expected. It would be wrong to infer from the relative slow growth in the number of nuclear powers that we have reached a condition of stasis with respect to the entry of new countries into the ranks of nuclear weapons states. A nuclear Iran, for example, would almost certainly lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons states across the region.

Another case is the already crowded nuclear competition in Asia, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. A more expansive China or a more nuclear-assertive North Korea could increase popular support in South Korea and/or Japan for their own national nuclear force, despite the historic nuclear allergy of Japan and the defense guarantees to both countries provided by the United States. In addition to the challenge of new nuclear weapons states, there is also the lesser, but still dangerous, possibility of non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.  The United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons shows widespread recognition by governments of a continuing nuclear danger. But none of the current nuclear weapons states shows any interest in dismantling their nuclear arsenals. A number of existing nuclear powers are increasing their arsenals in size and quality (Russia, China, North Korea).  Therefore, arms control, both “old style” and “new age,” remains relevant and necessary.

With all of the challenges described above, we return to the question offered in the title of this article; is a new start for New START possible? The number of variables than may shape the answer to this question are numerous and unpredictable, leaving these two analysts uncertain of the New START Treaty’s future and the role of nuclear arms control in a world of increasing insecurity. Our greatest fear is that China’s growing nuclear arsenal may make New START and any other nuclear arms control efforts untenable as nuclear parity between Russia, China, and the United States leads to uncertainty and the desire to begin growing strategic nuclear arsenals. With no easy solutions, the United States is certain to see troubled days ahead.

A New START for New START? The Future Russo-American Nuclear Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

“Nuclear weapons seem to be in almost everybody’s bad book, but the fact is that they are a powerful force for peace. Deterrence is most likely to hold when the costs and risks of going to war are unambiguously stark. The more horrible the prospect of war, the less likely war is. Deterrence is also more robust when conquest is more difficult. Potential aggressor states are given pause by the patent futility of attempts at expansion.”

John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic, August 1990

Since the detonation of Little Boy and Fat Man ended the war in the Pacific, nuclear weapons have occupied an increasingly critical place in international politics. The weapons captured both awe and terror across the globe, sending policymakers and scholars scrambling to discover how to properly manage and exploit this new power. Through no small effort, the world has not only seen an era without the further use of these weapons in war but one without great power conflict—a precarious period of relative peace through deterrence.

However, to pretend that such peace was born automatically is folly. Such logic runs counter to humanity’s history of conflict and warfare. The current international landscape is changing greatly; as the world slides towards a multipolar world and return to great power politics, it must re-address the notion of nuclear conflict and deterrence in the modern world if peace is to be maintained. The use of nuclear weapons has become increasingly likely in the modern-era due to two primary reasons:

1. Nuclear multipolarity and state competition, resulting in an increasing number of competing, nuclear-armed states with historical tensions, leading to instances of escalation and the security dilemma between multiple actors.
2. Nuclear modernization and proliferation, including the development of low-yield, counterforce nuclear weapons that can be utilized without threatening a state’s survival in a limited nuclear conflict, particularly when parity is not present at all levels of nuclear escalation.

The possibility of escalation to a limited nuclear conflict at the tactical level, utilizing low-yield, counterforce nuclear weaponry is a plausible reality. Low-yield, counterforce nuclear weapons can be utilized in a limited fashion against an adversary’s military forces without threatening the survival of either state—particularly when there is a significant disparity between the nuclear capabilities of the states involved.

Mearsheimer states that within the social sciences, “those who venture to predict… should, therefore, proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes.”^[1] Within political sciences, the sheer number of unpredictable variables makes any prediction anything but certain. It is, therefore, more prudent to analyze the changing landscape of the international nuclear system and identify the challenges and risks that threaten to upend the relative peace that has been maintained for the last 70 years. To preserve and enhance peace within the international system, it is critical to evaluate these potential risks in an unbiased manner while exploring all plausible possibilities. The scope of this piece is primarily limited to intentional inter-state nuclear conflict, and will not address threats such as accidental war, nuclear terrorism, or other related matters.

Competition Between Nuclear States

The structure of the international system has been one of conflict and anarchy for the entirety of human history. The world has never known an era without warfare; states compete to maximize their security and ensure their survival against one another. But in the modern era, this competition may have far more dire consequences. States now yield weapons with unimaginable destructive capabilities and are capable of delivering them at unprecedented speeds. While these weapons almost certainly cause states to act more cautiously, it does not undermine the competitive nature of international relations; states will still compete and seek primacy over one another, securing their own interests and security. While possessing nuclear weapons may raise the risk of failure and serve as a strong deterrent to other states, the weapons by themselves are not enough to prevent this competition between states. In some cases, they may go as far as to instigate it as states seek to ensure their security against another’s nuclear capabilities.

To properly evaluate this concept, a baseline in neorealist theory should be established. Neorealism holds five relevant truths. First, the international system is one of anarchy, with states as the primary actors, competing against each other without a higher ruling authority. Of these states, great power states are the most critical and relevant actors. Second, states will inherently possess some military capability to secure their power and security, a capability that can be both defensive and offensive. Third, a state can never be truly certain about another’s intentions; if a rival state is building troops or weaponry, one can never be certain whether it is intended to be offensive or defensive, despite what they may claim. Fourth, a state’s basic drive is for survival and sovereignty. Fifth, states are rational actors who seek to survive and ensure their security within this anarchic system.^[2]

The primary difference between nuclear weapons and other weapons of war is not their destructive power, but the ability to inflict this damage at unprecedented speeds, and to inflict it against an adversaries’ homeland without having to first engage their military and defensive forces.^[3] If a state utilizes its nuclear arsenal against an opponent’s cities, the opposing side’s conventional forces and defenses are irrelevant. A state can be losing a conflict and decide to destroy the opposition with a speed unprecedented in history by escalating to nuclear conflict, completely bypassing the military and defenses of the opposing state.^[4] Hence, the basis of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is one of mutual vulnerability, with both states accepting that the other could cause immense damage to their own at any time if they utilize nuclear weapons, and thus deciding to avoid it. This has been the backbone of nuclear weapons policy since World War II. The idea is that nuclear weapons ultimately mitigate conflict and escalate the cost of nuclear war to one that is far too high to pay, “war becomes less likely as the cost of war rises in relation to possible gains.” The fear of a retaliatory response deters the aggressor from initiating nuclear conflict in the first place. Wars occurring between nuclear states are likely to be limited in scale for fear of pushing one past the nuclear brink—if they occur at all. The cost of a miscalculation that leads to nuclear conflict is a far greater risk than the same miscalculation with a conventional army.^[5]

However, the idea that actors would accept this vulnerability runs contrary to previous assertions made within the theory of neorealism. If it is accepted that states seek to preserve their sovereignty and security, parity seems to be an unlikely position for a state to find acceptable. The security dilemma highlights some of these challenges; when a rival state rises to the point where it can threaten another’s security, this state will bolster its own military strength and try to prevent any threat to its own security and sovereignty. Sometimes this may escalate into an arms race and ultimately into conflict.^[6] In this instance, accepting that another state can eliminate your own with the press of a button fails to be acceptable. The very existence of these weapons is incredibly threatening to other states, and a state will act in whatever way necessary to mitigate that threat and ensure their own security. This concept has led to cases of nuclear proliferation in the past. For example, Pakistan built nuclear weapons in response to India’s nuclear test, and North Korea built nuclear weapons to ensure their regime’s survival and security against powers like the United States.^[7]

Policymakers attempted to fix this problem during the Cold War with a secure second-strike capability. It was argued that if a state could still retaliate after suffering a fatal nuclear blow and deal the same fate to the aggressor, it would deter against preemptive strikes and force states to accept this mutual vulnerability and forego competition. As such, states sought to ensure their retaliatory capabilities through a combination of “hardening, concealment, and redundancy.”^[8] Stationary weapons silos and shelters were hardened to improve survivability, submarine-based systems stayed concealed and mobile, and a massive number of nuclear weapons were produced and globally dispersed.^[9]

However, this system was never truly accepted. If states had accepted this mutual vulnerability, the massive spending on modernization would fail to make sense. Even when these states claimed to accept MAD, their actions said otherwise. While the second-strike theory may have enhanced deterrence, it certainly did not stop states from competing to gain the nuclear edge over each other. Gavin asserts that even when quantitative parity was accepted between the two states, they still sought a qualitative edge over the other to secure nuclear primacy.^[10]

The United States still pursued the ability to win a nuclear war with the USSR instead of accepting the status quo as expected and sought to be able to defeat the USSR’s second-strike capability. The U.S. engaged in programs to modernize its nuclear weapons, invest in missile defense technologies, nuclear submarine tracking, command and control technologies, as well as sought geopolitical advantage. Both states actively pursued the ability to outperform and outgun the other, to gain the edge and retain the capability to win a nuclear war.^[11] The basic competition of realism did not change with the introduction of nuclear weapons. While states acted more cautiously, they still competed to secure their advantage and their security within the international system.

As time moves forward, the security imposed by this has become increasingly fragile. Even during the Cold War, the U.S.  possessed a remarkable intelligence capability that would have been able to effectively find and target both stationary and mobile Soviet nuclear weapons. Long and Green authored an exquisite piece discussing now-declassified information that demonstrated our intelligence capabilities to track down enemy missiles with efficiency and precision via improvements in acoustics, ocean surveillance, and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) technologies, capabilities that have significantly improved to this day.^[12] Improvements in the targeting, accuracy, and reprogramming of weapons have further improved U.S. capabilities to destroy hardened targets. Elimination of fratricide from multiple strikes via these improvements has also allowed the U.S. to target and strike a hardened silo multiple times within a few seconds of each other. Lieber and Press claim that a strike against 200 Soviet silos utilizing two weapons per target in 1985 would have left approximately 42 silos still standing, while a similar strike today would destroy all 200.^[13] Second-strike capabilities have become increasingly vulnerable in the modern age.

This isn’t to say that nuclear weapons have no deterrent effect—the lack of nuclear conflict during the Cold War certainly can stand testament to that. Instead, the point is that this deterrent is not as simple of a system as was thought, or perhaps wished; states will still compete, go to war, and may even engage in a nuclear conflict. The security dilemma was never truly mitigated and is still alive and well within the international system. But nuclear weapons can raise the cost associated with conflict and cause states to act more cautiously. Attempting to destroy a state’s entire second-strike capability is a major act and not one to be taken lightly. While a state may decide to attempt this if it was prudent to ensure its own security, it would certainly be an extreme situation in which few would likely be willing to bear. While states still engage in this strategic competition and attempt to gain the upper edge in a nuclear exchange, escalation to this level still seems incredibly unlikely due to the costs of failure.

Further, it is worth considering that the defending state may panic and retaliate upon the signal of the enemy launch, fearing for the security of its own second-strike capability. During the Cold War, policymakers steered away from these reactions, relying on the survivability of their second-strike systems to dissuade the benefits of preemption and secure deterrence. If faced with this situation in the modern era, knowing these systems may not be as secure as they once were, it would be difficult to judge what an actual reaction would be. This uncertainty may actually improve the traditional deterrence model, as states are fearful that their adversary will be pushed into a “use it or lose it” mentality. But this traditional view is primarily applied to a preemptive, large-scale strike against another state. Limited nuclear warfare may be a far more realistic scenario to consider. Limited nuclear warfare could be conducted in a manner that does not threaten a state’s immediate survival, and hence would not warrant an all-out nuclear response in retaliation. The concern of these attacks escalating to this level of large-scale nuclear conflict is a real one, but the initial use of a nuclear weapon at this limited level is a far more palatable option for governments to utilize.

Nuclear Proliferation and Multipolarity

Nuclear weapon use in a limited manner may be a serious threat, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the changing state of the world into a multipolar nuclear order may encourage this. Despite tensions between the U.S. and USSR, they were ultimately able to manage this competition in a bipolar nuclear world; this competition for advantage and security ended with the eventual collapse of the USSR. The security dilemma ran its course without the use of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. rose to become the hegemon of a unipolar world. However, in a multipolar nuclear world, the challenges faced previously are significantly exacerbated. Currently, the nine known nuclear-weapon states are the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea.^[14] Strategies that worked in a bipolar world may not be as effective in the modern landscape, thus preventing the failure of deterrence—and the subsequent use of a nuclear weapon—may be more challenging than before.

The most recent nuclear state, North Korea, is one of the most troubling in the current group of nuclear states. North Korea is one of the world’s poorest states, facing harsh sanctions and isolation from much of the international community. Yet, despite the hardships, poverty, and poor economy of this autocratic state, it managed to defy the nonproliferation regime and create a fully operational nuclear arsenal.^[15] Pyongyang is not bashful about its willingness to use its weaponry either, stating that it will use its weapons to “reduce the U.S. mainland to ashes and darkness.”^[16] Such a clear security threat may increase proliferation elsewhere in response. Allison calls this the “nuclear cascade,” and suggests that if a state as weak and isolated as North Korea can defy the non-proliferation regime, other states are likely to follow suit.^[17] If the United States is incapable of preventing such a clear security threat, why would Tokyo and Seoul rely on Washington to defend them in the face of a nuclear threat? Japan already has the capability to build nuclear weapons, possessing well-developed uranium enrichment and missile programs that could allow Japan to rapidly create a credible nuclear weapons program to defend itself and its national interests without the United States. According to The Council on Foreign Relations, there are thirty states that have the technological ability to quickly build nuclear weapons.^[18]

While Pyongyang claims offensive intentions, it is incredibly unlikely to attempt to use its nuclear forces offensively against the United States. Doing so would be an act of suicide, the disparity between U.S. and North Korean forces is far too great. Instead, these weapons were more than likely obtained for defensive purposes. Pyongyang may not be able to destroy the United States, but it can ensure its own sovereignty. Forcibly trying to topple the Kim regime could escalate into the use of nuclear force if Pyongyang got desperate, and a strike designed to eradicate their nuclear weapons would again invoke this “use it or lose it” mentality. While Pyongyang may not be able to destroy the U.S. with its capabilities, it can undeniably cause immense harm to the US. It could cause even greater harm to smaller, closer countries such as U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. Knowledge of this is a strong deterrent against U.S. intervention, allowing Pyongyang to carry on less cautiously without fearing foreign intervention. The creation of this deterrent may have effectively ensured the sovereignty of the Kim regime for the time being, and they are unlikely to relinquish this guarantee. The establishment of this deterrent highlights some of the challenges in the modern nuclear era. North Korea’s outright defiance of the nonproliferation regime sends a signal that other states can build a nuclear capability as well and that such a force may be an effective way to guarantee their sovereignty against the Western world.^[19]

Proliferation to autocratic states is a cause for concern, primarily because they are considerably less stable than democratic states and may be more willing to utilize a nuclear weapon. The inherently volatile nature of these regimes poses a significant challenge. North Korea has a very poor and impoverished populace, held under authoritarian rule. Regimes such as these are not known for their longevity and stability. The threat of regime change and revolt from within is a realistic consideration with autocratic states. If this occurred, it could result in the loss of a nuclear weapon, or their domestic use to quell a rebellion.^[20] It could also escalate into conflict as Chinese and U.S. forces both seek to secure their nuclear assets and end up in conflict with each other. China would certainly not accept U.S. forces along the Yalu river, and both would want to immediately seek to ensure the stability of Pyongyang’s nuclear assets.

Autocratic states could also safely assume that Western powers would prefer it if they were a democratic government friendly to the West. With the international liberal orders push for global democracy, autocratic rulers are likely to fear Western interference. After Pyongyang’s recent success, a nuclear weapons capability may appear to be an effective way to prevent Western interference and ensure its sovereignty.

With smaller autocratic states, the constant external and internal threats to the stability of their regimes breed paranoia and volatility. Leading government officials tend to be promoted based on loyalty rather than competence, and disagreement or discontent with the dictator may be punished harshly, stifling progress and ingenuity. These regimes also tend to have strong military leadership directing the country. Pakistan is notable in this regard, where the military maintains significant control over the government and has a history of instigating a military coup when they dislike civilian leadership. Pakistan has had four separate military coups since its creation, with military dictators constantly consolidating their power into the executive branch.^[21] Military leadership is far more likely to see nuclear weapons use as a viable option, which increases the instability of nuclear autocratic regimes even further. Civilian leadership has arguably been a key factor in preventing nuclear use thus far. Military officers often possess a different mindset and attitude on the subject than civilian leadership due to their career path. During the Cold War, there were numerous instances where the Joint Chiefs of Staff were far more willing to utilize nuclear weapons in a preventive war and were reined in by U.S. civilian leadership.^[22]

Throughout the Cold War, there were numerous false alarms; equipment detected missile launches that did not exist, drills were confused for real launches, and communication cut-offs and the “fog of war” nearly led to nuclear use.^[23] If faced with similar threats, it is less likely that an autocratic state will respond in such a level-headed manner. With shorter-range nuclear weapons, this could be exacerbated. These states are less likely to have a robust, survivable nuclear arsenal. If a state’s nuclear arsenal is threatened, it is likely to take action to ensure its survival or use. Without having the same geographic separation that the U.S. and USSR did, several states today rely on shorter-range weapons, like short-range missiles and multi-role fighter/bomber aircraft. Whether these weapons systems carry nuclear or conventional payloads may be unknown; being forced to make a rapid decision to respond to a potential threat may push a state over the edge to ensure its security.^[24]

Particularly concerning, at least in regard to stability, is the smaller size and the heightened vulnerability of many arsenals compared to other states. The multipolar nuclear order lacks the same levels of parity both quantitatively and qualitatively that were present in the Cold War. The number of weapons between states varies significantly. While exact numbers are typically classified, experts have estimated a range varying from approximately 20 warheads in North Korea, to around 6,000 for both the U.S. and Russia.^[25]  Destroying all the nuclear weapons in North Korea is significantly easier to do than performing the same action against the U.S. or Russia, and this may be especially true with an even newer autocratic state that develops a brand-new nuclear capability. The parity dilemma further extends to conventional capabilities. A state with inferior conventional capabilities such as North Korea compared to the U.S. or Pakistan compared to India, may feel pressured into utilizing, or at least threatening, to use its nuclear capabilities to make up for its inferiority. If a nuclear-armed state lacks an effective conventional response option and is faced with a crisis that threatens its security, it may decide to escalate with a limited nuclear strike to preserve its integrity and security.

The primary barriers to the use of nuclear weapons in the Cold War were the second-strike capability and the threat of mutual destruction. But as has been discussed, this second-strike may not have been as effective as previously thought and is particularly less effective in the modern age. Such disparity between arsenal sizes eliminates many other concerns with a nuclear first strike. The chances of eliminating a second-strike capability are significantly higher in many circumstances, and the abolition of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty has made the idea of intercepting any surviving nuclear weapons much more likely. While ballistic missile defense is a fickle and inconsistent technology, the prospect of defending against a few surviving second-strike weapons is much more realistic than trying to defend against a general nuclear war.^[26] The disparity between military strength has led to conflict through all history, and this has not changed with nuclear weapons. If a state thinks it can successfully engage and win in a conflict that would bring great benefit and little harm to itself, the threat of this occurring is great. As Thucydides cited the Athenians telling the Melians during the Peloponnesian War, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

Faced with this fact, the receiving state may very well utilize its weapons as discussed to prevent the loss of its second-strike. The knowledge of this possibility enhances deterrence, but with great disparity, it may not be enough. If the aggressor feels that it can effectively defend against such a limited strike, or that it would be able to conduct the strike prior to the launch of enemy weapons, it may decide to do so. The varying distances between states and shorter-range weapons that can be utilized in the modern era make a difference as well. Nuclear rivals like Pakistan and India can strike each other much quicker than the U.S. and USSR could strike each other in the Cold War. This gives even less reaction time to make such a large decision and increases the chance that a disabling first strike could be pulled off.

The security dilemma is notable to mention here as well; the U.S. and Russia currently enjoy a considerable nuclear advantage over all other states. But another state building their nuclear deterrent or conventional forces, and hence threatening another’s superiority as happenstance, is likely to escalate into an instance of the security dilemma. In a multipolar world, this is especially relevant. Competition between two states is much simpler to manage, but when reacting to one state, a state may create escalation between several states simultaneously.^[27] The recent abolition of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty serves as a useful example. The U.S. and Russia found this to be an acceptable state for several years; however, China’s rising conventional and nuclear power, including the development of intermediate-range weapons, may have threatened this. Russia, considering China’s proximity and fearing for its own security, hence develops intermediate-range weapons of its own to match this threat, pushing the U.S. to respond in kind as well.

Bracken expands on this concept, explaining how decisions targeted towards one state could affect several, and the challenges this brings to nuclear strategy.^[28] In his example, the U.S. deploys a precise conventional missile capability designed to penetrate and destroy North Korean and Iranian nuclear infrastructure on its submarines, a move being considered at the time Bracken wrote The Second Nuclear Age. However, this capability has been condemned by China, for fear that it will have the added effect of threatening their own nuclear deterrent. China responds to these deployments by remodeling its deterrent and deploys a more mobile nuclear force that is harder for the U.S. to track and destroy. In turn, this agitates India and threatens their security, so they decide to respond to the increased Chinese nuclear threat by improving their own nuclear forces.

Any development to India’s nuclear doctrine or weapons program will surely affect Pakistan, and will surely escalate the already strenuous tensions between the states. The result is a cascading, delicate dynamic that is significantly more complex than the comparatively simple bipolar relationship deterrence theory was founded under. The security dilemma and realist competition between states aren’t so easily managed in a multipolar world and may very well escalate out of control. When a proper second-strike capability is not always present or a nuclear strike is unlikely to threaten the survival of a state and will serve its interests, the threat of such acts occurring is heightened. The multipolar nature of the world and challenges presented by the fog of war may make nuclear escalation in a crisis significantly more likely.

Multipolar competition has become all too apparent in the modern-day. Both China and Russia have been increasing their military might and seeking to expand their influence, challenging U.S. hegemony. The return to great power politics makes the more precarious state of the multipolar nuclear order more dangerous. Some comfort can be taken in the notion that the ideas and strategies that deterred strategic nuclear warfare in the past are still in place. A strategic strike against a nuclear powers’ cities would be counterproductive and almost certainly result in likewise retaliation, an unacceptable consequence and a strong deterrent in the majority of situations. But this strategy does not prevent a state’s aggression and expansion elsewhere. While the U.S. may be committed to its strategy of extended deterrence, the bulk of its warfighting capability rests on its conventional power.

While it may claim otherwise, a nuclear strike against an ally under the U.S. nuclear umbrella by a great power state is unlikely to be met with nuclear force, lest this escalates into strategic nuclear warfare between the two nations. The United States is unlikely to engage in a strategic nuclear war with another state to defend an ally’s security unless U.S. national security and the U.S. homeland is directly threatened. What is more likely to prevent a state from using a strategic strike against non-nuclear adversaries’ cities is the lack of necessity. There are few situations in which this is useful, as most goals can be accomplished nearly as easily with conventional forces. They certainly exist, the nuclear use in Japan highlights this, but if a state has a conventional option that is nearly as effective it would likely take it. While a strategic strike against a nuclear-armed adversaries’ cities is still unlikely, there are two more realistic options that should be considered: a counterforce strike against an adversaries’ nuclear forces, or a counterforce strike against an adversaries’ conventional military forces.

Tactical Nuclear Conflict

Nuclear weapons cannot be lumped together in one class. The way they are used and the style of weapon are important distinctions. Reaching as far back as 1965, Kahn made these assertions in On Escalation, describing different levels of escalation in nuclear conflict instead of the presumed jump to all-out nuclear war. He asserted that nuclear conflict could be fought at a variety of different levels, escalating and de-escalating between them depending on the circumstances. One of the most important distinctions in the modern day is that of counterforce and countervalue weapons. Counterforce would be used at the tactical level, against a state’s conventional or nuclear military forces. Countervalue is what is thought of more traditionally in a nuclear conflict, a higher-yield attack used on the strategic level, against a state’s cities, industry, and personnel. The attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were of this sort, strategic attacks designed to coerce the state of Japan into surrendering, knowing they could not retaliate.

While the conditions and necessity for a state to conduct a strategic strike may still be unlikely, a more recent trend in nuclear weaponry may be a far more realistic and pressing threat. During the Cold War, states focused on creating the largest, most awe-inspiring and outright terrifying arsenals they could, and fielding the largest, deadliest weapons that they could create. The USSR went as far as to create and test the largest nuclear weapon ever to exist, the Tsar Bomba, a multi-stage hydrogen bomb with a yield of 50 megatons. For perspective, this weapon possessed approximately 1,570 times the explosive power of the nuclear weapons detonated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.^[29] Such a massive weapon is terrifying, but also altogether unnecessary, and was unlikely to be used. Much of what was produced in the Cold War was an unbelievable threat. Instead, the modern nuclear age may see more utility in moving the exact opposite direction, fielding low-yield, precision, tactical nuclear weapons.

One of the primary concerns with tactical nuclear weapons is they create a far more realistic threat, blurring the line between conventional and nuclear conflict.^[30] Strategic nuclear weapons used against an opponent’s cities are unlikely to be used. At the minimum, this would invite great harm against each other’s respective states, certainly enough pain that one would seek to avoid it. Few gains are worth the risk of losing one’s major cities and infrastructure. Tactical, low-yield nuclear weapons may avert this obstacle, however. If these weapons are utilized against an adversaries’ conventional forces, and outside of an adversaries’ homeland, it is unlikely to cause massive nuclear retaliation; neither the aggressing nor defending states’ survival is ever threatened in this scenario. These weapons may have the added capability to target and destroy enemy forces and defenses more efficiently, more accurately, and without the heavy number of civilian casualties that may be present in a traditional nuclear strike.  If a state can vastly improve its warfighting capability without the threat to its survival that higher-yield, strategic weapons created, it could be expected to take advantage of these weapons.^[31]

The most likely threat for nuclear weapons use would be a state escalating to tactical nuclear use against an adversaries’ conventional forces, attempting to coerce them into backing down, ensure victory, or deter foreign intervention.^[32] For example, if China decided to retake Taiwan, it may be able to do so conventionally, but such a crisis has the potential to incite an American military response in defense of Taipei and have considerable Chinese casualties. If U.S. forces responded, Beijing may believe tactical nuclear strikes against those forces would be an effective means of creating military superiority against a conventionally superior force and that low-yield weapons could be utilized without threatening China’s survival. Such a measure would be incredibly unlikely to incite a nuclear response against China’s homeland, for fear of a similar response.

In a different, albeit unlikely scenario, tactical nuclear strikes against Taiwanese defenses in an initial strike may have the added effect of deterring an American response in the first place, raising the threshold for American intervention. In this scenario, Beijing would be operating under the impression that the U.S. would be sent a message that coming to Taipei’s defense would not only mean great power war but nuclear conflict, as well. Without facing a threat to its own homeland, it would be far less likely to incur that risk. The use of a nuclear weapon against a non-nuclear weapons state will almost certainly not result in nuclear use against the aggressor.

Similar situations could be seen by attacking a military base outside of a state’s homeland. The idea of such a strike occurring outside of ones’ homeland, on forward-deployed forces is critical. Yield differences mean nothing if the attack is directed at a state’s homeland, directly threatening its security. Escalation to this point is almost certain to result in strategic level escalation. An adversary cannot accurately guess the yield level of an opposing weapon in flight. While lower yield weapons are more useful for tactical level warfare, the target is the more important distinction.

A state must be able to fight at both the tactical and strategic levels. If the aggressing state escalates to the tactical nuclear level, and the responding state is unable to respond at that level, it will be faced with two options: concede and yield or escalate to the strategic level. The latter of these creates a threat to their own security via reciprocation at the strategic level—and hence is an unlikely choice.^[33] The possible exception to this would be if the aggressing state is unable to retaliate at the strategic level themselves. As such, a significant disparity between great power states at the tactical level may be a cause for concern. Strategic capabilities do not need to be vast to create an unacceptable level of harm to a state, all that’s needed to deter at the strategic level is a small, survivable arsenal. Certainly, a single nuclear strike on an American city is an unacceptable consequence, and it would take a very extreme situation for a state to be willing to risk that. Defending a foreign state such as Taiwan that will not impact the survivability of the United States is not such a situation.

If a significant disparity at the tactical nuclear level exists, a state may be able to prevent foreign intervention when engaging in expansive conflict. If China maintained a far superior tactical nuclear capability than the U.S., and even a minimal strategic second-strike capability as described, it is very likely that it could escalate to the tactical nuclear level in an attempt to force the U.S. to de-escalate. With the initial use of tactical nuclear weapons against Taiwanese defenses, it is possible it could prevent U.S. intervention altogether if its capabilities were vastly superior at the tactical level of escalation. Taiwan is certainly not the only example; wherever a significant tactical nuclear disparity exists and state aggression against non-nuclear states cannot be deterred, the U.S. policy of extended deterrence will not hold any merit. The same could be seen with any state’s expansion, such as Russia reclaiming the Baltics, or China moving to use force seize territory claimed by both India and itself. If a state can utilize tactical nuclear weapons and would benefit more than it would risk, there is a possibility of it doing so.

Unfortunately, this is not a mere theoretical threat. The most recent Nuclear Posture Review identified significant expansion and modernization of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces, while the U.S. has expanded only incrementally. Since 2010, the F-35A multirole fighter jet is the only new nuclear delivery system produced by the U.S., whereas Russia has developed a combined total of 14 new delivery systems across the nuclear-triad and China has fielded nine new ground and sea-based delivery systems. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review further mentioned Russia’s vast expansion of tactical weapons systems that can hold either a conventional or nuclear payload.^[34] These types of weapons systems are not held accountable under the START treaty. As of 2016, the only weapon in the U.S. arsenal designed for non-strategic purposes was the B61 gravity bomb, an air-based tactical nuclear weapons system, of which the U.S. maintains an inventory of approximately 500. These weapons have a max payload of about 50 kilotons, which may still be far too high to effectively target conventional forces and provide an effective tactical-level deterrent.^[35] The U.S. does not have tactical nuclear weapons on any other level of the nuclear-triad, a gap which the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review addressed and called to fix.^[36] While the U.S. has slowed down its nuclear programs and the development of tactical nuclear weapons, other countries have not followed this lead, and instead have been exploiting it as a weakness. Retired Vice Admiral Robert Monroe claims that Russia is around 20 years ahead of the U.S. in terms of its low-yield nuclear weapons capabilities.^[37]

There may be an upside though. Tactical nuclear weaponry, a far more believable threat, may be used to enhance deterrence if used properly.^[38] Decisions to aggressively expand and enter into war are made by calculating that a state can win the encounter and the benefits outweighing the costs.^[39] If Russia is to invade the Baltics, it must find that it has a high chance of success. Either it has the capability to defeat NATO defenses and responding forces via tactical nuclear conflict or be confident NATO will not come to their defense, whether this is from initial tactical-nuclear escalation or for other reasons. Strategic weaponry may work to deter a threat from an attack on a state’s homeland, but it remains too unbelievable of a threat to deter another nuclear state from expansion elsewhere. The proxy wars and conflicts against non-nuclear states since the end of World War II provide a solid historical precedent for this. Tactical nuclear weapons may be a more believable threat and be able to deter where strategic weapons could not. If the U.S. announces its commitment to defend Taipei and has an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons at relative parity to China’s, then China is less likely to try to take Taiwan by force in the first place. The same goes for any other theoretical expansive military action taken by a nuclear state armed with a robust tactical nuclear capability.^[40]

While the aggressing state’s survival is no longer threatened, the cost of war is heavily escalated and chances of success much lower. Tactical nuclear weapons will cause immense and swift destruction to conventional forces on both sides, a risk that is unlikely to be taken. With relative parity, these weapons greatly raise the threshold of military action and may make the risk of conflict even less prevalent if this parity is maintained amongst great powers. This is still not absolute, as even with tactical nuclear parity, the willingness to commit to such an act must be believable. The defense of another state without a direct impact on one’s own homeland may not be believable, and the aggressor may call the bluff. However, not knowing for sure and having the commitment of extended deterrence will cast enough doubt in the majority of situations, as the cost of being wrong would be immense. The best way to prevent such a threat from materializing is to credibly be prepared to fight at all levels if it does.^[41] While this may not guarantee that these weapons will not be used and remain deterred, the lack of parity will almost certainly invite their use if it will give another state superiority over the United States. If a state can topple a stronger conventional force and achieve its goals with nuclear force, without threatening its survival, it will do so. With the competitive and fragile nature of a multipolar nuclear order, it will be of the utmost importance to be able to manage escalation at all levels of nuclear escalation.

Conclusion

In the modern nuclear age, the use of these weapons is increasingly likely, particularly if doing so will give a state a significant advantage over another. Deterrence has merit, but it undoubtedly lies in the presence of a realistic, credible threat, across all levels of the threat spectrum that mitigate this potential advantage.  Nuclear multipolarity and increased interstate competition are resulting in an increasing number of competing, nuclear-armed states with historical tensions, leading to instances of escalation and the development of the security dilemma between multiple actors. Nuclear modernization and proliferation are prompting states to develop low-yield, counterforce nuclear weapons which can be utilized without threatening a state’s survival in a limited nuclear conflict—particularly when parity is not present at all levels of nuclear escalation.

Undeniably, the use of another nuclear weapon, either tactically or strategically, is a travesty that all states must try to avert. At the same time, the destructive power of these weapons does not fundamentally alter the landscape of relations between states. If this power is to be kept in check, this idea must be acknowledged and understood. If a state can get away with using these weapons to advance its position, it almost certainly will do so. Large disparities at different levels of nuclear escalation should be avoided if possible, particularly amongst great powers. While developing more destructive and lethal weapons may seem counterproductive to ensuring peace, doing so may not only be in the interest of sustained U.S. hegemony but to prevent the potential use of nuclear weapons and improve international stability.

^[1] Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

^[2] Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter): 10.

^[3] Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press. 18-26.

^[4] Wallander, Celeste A. 2013. “Mutually Assured Stability: Establishing US-Russia Security Relations for a New Century.” Atlantic Council. July 29, 2013. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/mutually-assured-stability-establishing-us-russia-security-relations-for-a-new-century.

^[5] Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2013. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 3-40.

^[6] Dougherty, James E., and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. 2001. Contending Theories of International Relations. Boston: Addison Wesley Longman. 64.

^[7] Bracken, Paul J. 2013. The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin. 162-211.

^[8] Leiber, Keir A., and Press, Daryl G. 2018. “The New Era of Nuclear Arsenal Vulnerability.” Physics and Society 47, no. 1 (January): 2-6. https://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/201801/nuclear-arsenal.cfm.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Gavin, Francis J. 2019. “Rethinking the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy.” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (January). https://tnsr.org/2019/01/rethinking-the-bomb-nuclear-weapons-and-american-grand-strategy/.

^[11] Jervis, Robert. 2009. “The Dustbin of History: Mutual Assured Destruction.” Foreign Policy. November 9, 2009. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/the-dustbin-of-history-mutual-assured-destruction/.

^[12] Long, Austin, and Brendan R. Green. 2015. “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1-2: 38-73. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150.

^[13] Leiber, Keir A., and Press, Daryl G. 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce.” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring): 21-27.

^[14] Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2018. “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Federation of American Scientists. Accessed February 20, 2019. https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.

^[15] Sagan, Scott D. 2018. “Armed and Dangerous.” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December): 35-43. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-10-15/armed-and-dangerous.

^[16] U.S.  Department of Defense. 2018. Nuclear Posture Review. Washington DC. 32.  https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

^[17] Allison, Graham. 2010. “Nuclear Disorder.” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January/February): 74-85. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2010-01-01/nuclear-disorder.

^[18] The Council on Foreign Relations. 2012. “The Global Nonproliferation Regime.” May 21, 2012. https://www.cfr.org/report/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime.

^[19] Sagan, 2018.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Oberst, Robert C., Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, Ashok Kapur, Mahendra Lawoti, Syedur Rahman, and Ahrar Ahmad. 2014. Government and Politics in South Asia. Boulder: Westview Press.

^[22] Sagan and Waltz, 2013. 48-63.

^[23] Sagan, 2018.

^[24] Cimbala, Stephen J. 2015. “Deterrence in a Multipolar World.” Air and Space Power Journal 29, no. 4 (July/August): 54-60.

^[25] Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2018.

^[26] Colby, Elbridge. 2018. “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War.” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December): 25-32. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/if-you-want-peace-prepare-nuclear-war?fa_package=1123220.

^[27] Bracken, 2014. 93-126.

^[28] Ibid

^[29] Atomic Heritage Foundation. 2014. “Tsar Bomba.” Accessed February 20, 2019. https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/tsar-bomba.

^[30] Doyle, James E. 2017. “Mini-Nukes: Still a Bad Choice for the United States.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. April 17, 2017. https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/mini-nukes-still-a-bad-choice-for-the-united-states/.

^[31] Colby, 2018.

^[32] Carter, Ash. 2016. “Remarks by Secretary Carter to Troops at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota.” Department of Defense. September 26, 2016. https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/956079/remarks-by-secretary-carter-to-troops-at-minot-air-force-base-north-dakota/.

^[33] Kyl, Jon and Michael Morell. 2018. “Why America Needs Low-Yield Nuclear Warheads Now.” Washington Post, November 29, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-america-needs-low-yield-nuclear-warheads-now/2018/11/29/c83e0760-f354-11e8-bc79-68604ed88993_story.html.

^[34] U.S.  Department of Defense. 2018.

^[35] Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. 2018. “United States Nuclear Forces, 2017.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 1: 48-57. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1264213.

^[36] U.S.  Department of Defense. 2018.

^[37] Monroe, Robert. 2017. “Facing the Grave Nuclear Risk.” Washington Times, January 26, 2017. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/26/america-must-resume-underground-nuclear-testing/.

^[38] Kyl and Morell, 2018.

^[39] Waltz, 2013. 8.

^[40] Colby, 2018.

^[41] Ibid.

Conflict and Competition: Limited Nuclear Warfare and the New Face of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Then, as now, damage limitation could take many forms, including counterforce attacks on an opponent’s nuclear arsenal, ballistic missile defense, air defenses against enemy bombers, anti-submarine warfare, and civil defense.  Air defense was emphasized by U.S. planners during the 1950s and early 1960s, but it fell by the wayside once it became clear that Moscow intended to rely primarily on missiles to deliver its strategic nuclear weapons.  The U.S. Navy possessed (and likely still possesses) a potent ability to hunt and destroy enemy ballistic missile submarines, but the bulk of the USSR’s strategic forces resided in its fleet of land-based ICBMs.  Not long after taking office, the Kennedy administration launched a campaign to invigorate U.S. civil defense programs. However, the initiative fizzled due to a lack of public support.  As a result, most discussions of damage limitation during the Cold War focused on counterforce and missile defense.

Deterring a Soviet nuclear attack required the U.S. to have enough survivable weapons to inflict an “unacceptable” amount of damage on the USSR in a retaliatory strike.  It was presumed that Moscow, too, sought to ensure that it possessed such a capability. The possession of an assured destruction capability by each side helped ensure nuclear stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of war.  Each superpower was deterred from attacking the other by the knowledge that its opponent could launch a devastating counterattack.  Thus, U.S. policymakers viewed maintaining the nation’s nuclear deterrent as paramount.

At the same time, there was a widespread view in Washington that the U.S. should also possess some ability to limit damage to itself in case deterrence failed.  This was an understandable desire since relying solely on deterrence left the United States vulnerable to a Soviet attack.  No one could guarantee that deterrence would always prevail since it ultimately depended on a potential adversary’s state of mind.

The question of what role damage limitation should play in U.S. nuclear planning and the form it should take was—and still is—the subject of considerable debate within the national security community.  Some policymakers prioritized it more than others during the Cold War.  However, because the U.S. strategic arsenal always could strike an opponent’s nuclear forces, there has never been a time over the last seven decades when the United States has not had some damage limiting capability, even if public officials have not always referred to it as such.

Yet damage limitation turned out to be a very complicated concept.  One issue stemmed from the realization that no damage limitation system could be 100 percent effective.  If a strategic nuclear conflict with the USSR arose, a certain number of Soviet bombs would inevitably reach U.S. soil no matter what.  The resulting death toll would likely number in the tens of millions.

Such a scenario raised a difficult question for policymakers: How much damage limitation capability should the U.S. seek?  If a given U.S. damage limiting capability were sufficient to limit U.S. fatalities in an all-out war to, say, 80 million, would it make sense to pay the high costs associated with enhancing that capability further to reduce the expected death toll to 50 million?  For those who viewed nuclear war as a real possibility, and who therefore believed that the U.S. should possess the ability to win if one occurred, saving 30 million Americans seemed like a worthwhile goal no matter what the cost.

To those who viewed nuclear war as unthinkable, and who therefore rejected nuclear warfighting as a concept, enhancing U.S. damage limiting capabilities seemed pointless since it did little to strengthen the country’s nuclear credibility.  In a crisis in which critical U.S. interests were at stake, would a U.S. president really feel freer to act to protect those interests if he knew that “only” 50 million American lives were at risk rather than 80 million?  Would the Soviets actually be more deterred if that were the case?

The two primary forms of damage limitation available to the United States during the Cold War, counterforce and missile defense, each presented their own set of challenges.  The ability of the U.S. to use its strategic offensive forces to limit damage to the American homeland depended on its ability to destroy Soviet nuclear weapons before they could be launched.  If the Soviets were able to attack first, U.S. missiles and bombers would be unable to limit the initial damage.

A damage-limiting counterforce strike by the U.S. would, therefore, be vastly more effective if the U.S. struck first.  However, launching a first strike meant initiating strategic nuclear war, the very thing that U.S. nuclear forces were ostensibly intended to prevent.  Indeed, U.S. declaratory policy in the later years of the Cold War seemed to rule out this option.  The Pentagon’s 1983 annual report to Congress stated that U.S. strategy “excludes the possibility that the United States would initiate a war or launch a pre-emptive strike against the forces or territories of other nations.”

If the U.S. was attacked first, it could launch a retaliatory counterforce attack.  The conventional wisdom was that if the Soviets did launch a first strike, they would likely do so with only a part of their arsenal, keeping many of their strategic weapons in reserve.  If so, the U.S. could hit the residual Soviet nuclear forces in a second strike in an attempt to reduce any further damage that could be inflicted on the United States.  This option, however, would hardly be straightforward.

If the Soviet first strike were a counterforce attack, it would leave the U.S. with a diminished ability to retaliate against hardened targets (such as ICBM silos).  If it were a counter value strike against American cities, U.S. strategic forces would remain intact, but damage to the United States in terms of casualties and economic destruction would be enormous.  The U.S. president would then have to decide whether to retaliate against Soviet cities or the USSR’s remaining strategic arsenal.

The possibility of achieving damage limitation through anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense also received a great deal of attention during the Cold War, just as it does today.  Unlike counterforce, it offered a way to actively defend the U.S. homeland from a Soviet attack after it had been launched.  Nevertheless, missile defense had its downsides.  For one, many strategic planners had severe doubts as to how well such a system would work.  It was generally recognized that even an elaborate missile defense system could only be partially effective against a major Soviet attack.  Moreover, the tracking radars needed to guide ABM interceptors to their targets would themselves be vulnerable to a Soviet attack.  If the Soviets were able to destroy U.S. radar installations in advance of the main attack on the United States, the ABM system would be crippled.

Additionally, developing and deploying a missile defense system was a costly proposition.  A 1965 Pentagon study determined that a system capable of protecting 75 percent of the U.S. population in an all-out nuclear war would cost $35 billion, or more than two-thirds of the defense budget at the time.  Furthermore, even if such a system were able to protect three-quarters of the U.S. population in an all-out nuclear war, American fatalities would number close to 50 million.  Opponents of missile defense also pointed out that the USSR would almost certainly respond to a U.S. ABM deployment by expanding the size of its strategic arsenal or by implementing relatively inexpensive countermeasures such as equipping its existing ICBMs with decoy warheads or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

The most compelling argument against emphasizing damage limitation in nuclear planning was that it made war more likely. As noted, each side possessed enough survivable nuclear weapons that it would be able to inflict great devastation on its adversary in retaliation for a first strike.  Under normal peacetime conditions, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had the option of either starting a nuclear war by launching a “bolt-from-the-blue” surprise attack on its opponent or maintaining the status quo.  However, even if the attacking country believed that launching a sudden first strike would enable it to emerge from the conflict stronger than its adversary, the opposing state’s assured destruction capability would ensure that the attacking state suffered catastrophic damage, leaving it worse off than before the war.  Inaction would, therefore, be the wiser choice.

That calculus could easily change in a crisis, however.  During a period of acute tension in which both sides possessed a significant damage-limiting counterforce capability, each nation would have some incentive to strike preemptively to limit the amount of damage that could be inflicted on it.  The risk that one side would act preemptively under such circumstances would correspond to the perceived likelihood of war.  If nuclear war seemed inevitable—or even highly likely—the apparent choice for each side would then be between launching a preemptive attack that would destroy a large number of its opponent’s strategic forces, thereby limiting (but not eliminating) the adversary’s ability to inflict harm on the attacking state, or permitting the opponent to act first and do the same thing.

Furthermore, worst-case assumptions could lead to a negative feedback loop, further undermining crisis stability.  The U.S., for instance, would be aware that the Soviet leadership might believe that Soviet fatalities could be dramatically reduced by launching a first strike against the United States. Soviet leadership would know that the U.S. was aware of the Soviet leadership’s belief that a first strike would significantly reduce Soviet fatalities. The U.S, in turn, would then know that the Soviet Union knew that the United States was aware that the Soviets could launch a first strike to reduce its fatalities. In this way, decision making in a nuclear crisis would resemble a hall of mirrors.  A war could easily occur under such circumstances even if both sides preferred to avoid one.

In a hypothetical crisis, worst-case scenario thinking could lead one side or the other to believe that a first strike by the opposing side was imminent and launch a pre-emptive counter-force first strike, under the impression, correctly or not, that it was acting in self-defense to preempt action by a perceived aggressor. In this scenario, both sides could perceive themselves to be the defending state while casting the opposing state as the aggressor.

The possession of an ABM system by one side and not the other would further contribute to crisis instability.  Ballistic missile defenses are fundamentally defensive, but defensive weapons can be made to serve offensive purposes.  Then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan, arguably history’s most ardent proponent of missile defense, acknowledged as much during his March 1983 speech unveiling his Strategic Defense Initiative.  He noted that “if paired with offensive systems, [missile defenses] can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that.”

Had the U.S. deployed a missile defense system that was perceived by both sides as being partially effective, and had the Soviets lacked any comparable system of their own, each side would have been presented with an added incentive to strike first during a period of heightened tension.  The Soviets’ incentive would stem from their knowledge that if they launched a major counterforce first strike against the United States, they could likely overwhelm U.S. missile defenses and destroy some portion of the U.S. strategic arsenal, thereby limiting the amount of damage they would experience from an American attack.  The U.S. would be incentivized to launch a counterforce first strike by the knowledge that its ABM system could significantly reduce the effectiveness of a diminished Soviet retaliatory attack.  Again, each side would be aware of the incentive facing its opponent.

In the end, of course, the nuclear war that everyone feared during the Cold War never took place.  Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union maintained arsenals that featured significant counterforce capabilities, but neither superpower ever developed an ability to carry out a completely disarming first strike against the other.  Similarly, both the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in extensive research into missile defense technologies, but neither nation ever came close to deploying a major ABM system.

After the Soviet Union dissolved, the U.S. and Russia implemented dramatic reductions in their nuclear arsenals.  The two nations developed a relatively friendly relationship over the next two decades, the threat of nuclear conflict receded, and debates over nuclear deterrence and nuclear warfighting were supplanted by other topics such as international peacekeeping, ethnic cleansing, and counterterrorism that seemed more relevant to the post-Cold War world.  Now, almost thirty years later, the United States finds itself facing three potential adversaries—Russia, China, and North Korea—armed with nuclear weapons and a fourth, Iran, which many fear will develop a nuclear capability at some point in the future.

Editor’s note: This is the first piece in a two-part series examining the role of damage limitation strategy in U.S. nuclear war planning. Read part two here.

A History of Damage Limitation in U.S. Nuclear War Planning was originally published on Global Security Review.