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	<title>Topic:nuclear stability &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/making-nuclear-blackmail-great-again/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/making-nuclear-blackmail-great-again/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2025 12:09:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31702</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>After World War I, the United States and its allies sought arms control solutions to what were political problems. Proposals such as a ban on war and restrictions on the size of naval vessels and army divisions were adopted. These efforts came to naught by 1936, when Germany began its aggressive march across Europe. After [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/making-nuclear-blackmail-great-again/">Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After World War I, the United States and its allies sought arms control solutions to what were political problems. Proposals such as a ban on war and restrictions on the size of naval vessels and army divisions were adopted. These efforts came to naught by 1936, when Germany began its aggressive march across Europe.</p>
<p>After World War II, both Japan and Germany became allies of the United States while the Soviet Union became a serious enemy. Most importantly, the Soviet Union established in Eastern Europe an alliance of nations under the Warsaw Pact. Thus, a decades-long Cold War began.</p>
<p>It was widely assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded an era of global cooperation and the end of great power competition and conflict. Arms control brought about the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and II) and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) agreements.</p>
<p>Today, however, as many military and diplomatic experts conclude, the dangers facing the United States and its allies are more complex and more serious than perhaps at any time since the end of WWII. Now, more than ever, arms control remains elusive.</p>
<p>Nuclear conflicts are now among the most serious potential dangers, including proliferation of nuclear weapons, the pending end to formal strategic arms limits, and the actual use of theater nuclear force arising out of existing conventional conflicts.</p>
<p>To lessen such dangers, nuclear abolitionists proffer numerous arms control proposals. Six ideas are most common: (1) a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons; (2) adoption of a “minimum deterrent” nuclear strategy; (3) the elimination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); (4) a unilateral freeze of US nuclear force development; (5) an extension of New START nuclear arms limits; and (6) abandonment of any new theater nuclear forces such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) or the sea-launched cruise missile. All of these strategies harm American and allied security and make worse the strategic nuclear balance.</p>
<p>The US extended deterrent has, for 70 years, rested on the option of using nuclear force to stop massive conventional attacks on US forces and allies overseas. Depending on the regional military balance, such nuclear extended deterrent options were, and remain, viewed by our allies as central to keeping their nation safe from Soviet/Russian and Chinese aggression.</p>
<p>Minimum deterrence strategies assume the only retaliatory targets the US needs to hold at risk are adversary cities where a few hundred nuclear warheads are all that is needed to deter. This doctrine assumes Russia and China will be completely deterred by the fear of losing large numbers of their civilian population. But this ignores the fact that these regimes murdered millions of their own people to gain power—showing little value for human life. Even worse, a minimum deterrence strategy would also leave alive the leaders of such nations as well as their nuclear and conventional forces with which they will commit aggression.</p>
<p>Cutting out the land-based ICBM force and a third of the ballistic missile submarine force would unilaterally reduce the US strategic nuclear force to around 500 at-sea on-alert warheads. This would be only a third of the allowed New START treaty force and give an 8 to 1 to 18 to 1 Russian and Chinese advantage in nuclear weapons, respectively. This would ensure that both nations frequently use nuclear weapons for coercion and blackmail.</p>
<p>A freeze on American nuclear force development would be a deterrence disaster. The US has not yet fielded any portion of the modernized triad, which is not rusting into obsolescence. Russia has completed over 90 percent of its own modernization and China is well on its way to tripling the size of its nuclear force over the next decade. Neither would participate in a unilateral freeze. Again, the United States would face a far superior adversary.</p>
<p>An extension of New START sounds attractive but would be harmful to American interests. It would delay any needed uploading of American warheads. It would not affect or make transparent China’s breathtaking nuclear build-up. And without a sea change in Russian behavior, verifying current arms limits would still be impossible, given the past five years of treaty violations by Moscow.</p>
<p>The Congressional Strategic Posture Commission report of October 2023 emphasized the urgency of rebalancing the current gap in US regional nuclear forces. The SLCM-N and better theater air deterrence were key recommended upgrades, both of which would be eliminated by a number of these proposals. It is precisely this deterrence gap which Moscow has leveraged to limit US and allied assistance to Ukraine.</p>
<p>The restraint these arms control ideas wish upon the US military assumes that Russia and China will reciprocate. But in the multiple decades after the end of the Soviet Union, massive US restraint was eventually met with what Admiral Richard has described as a “breathtaking” Chinese build-up and a near matching Russian modernization. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once warned, “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”</p>
<p>Now is the time to reject nuclear abolition for what it is, a purposeful effort to weaken the United States. American lives and freedom depend on it.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Making-Nuclear-Coercion-and-Blackmail-Great-Again.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="263" height="73" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 263px) 100vw, 263px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/making-nuclear-blackmail-great-again/">Making Nuclear Blackmail Great Again</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 13:23:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30161</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats. Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats. The House and Senate have [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
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<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdown___oYf6O">
<p>This report, prepared by Peter Huessy for the week of February 22, 2025, covers various aspects of nuclear deterrence, defense budget developments, and geopolitical threats.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Key topics include the Biden administration&#8217;s approach to nuclear escalation, Senator McConnell&#8217;s retirement and his views on restoring deterrence, and Russian official Medvedev&#8217;s nuclear threats.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The House and Senate have added $100-150 billion over ten years to defense, focusing on expanding the Navy, strengthening the defense industrial base, and modernizing strategic nuclear forces.</div>
<p>​<br />
SecDef Hegseth seeks an additional $50 billion for top priorities, excluding nuclear deterrence from budget cuts.</p>
<p>The report highlights the importance of concurrent modernization work at the three ICBM bases, which could save billions.</p>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>It also discusses the U.S. Air Force missileers&#8217; critical role in nuclear deterrence, the ethical and psychological aspects of their job, and the challenges of retaining diverse personnel.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The Christian Science Monitor provides an in-depth look at the missileers&#8217; responsibilities and the evolving nuclear landscape.</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>Regarding North Korea, USAF General Jason Armagost emphasized that the U.S. can respond overwhelmingly to a North Korean ICBM attack, underscoring the strength of the U.S. nuclear deterrence system.</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>The report also touches on the potential for arms control negotiations with Russia and China, with President Trump expressing a desire for &#8220;denuclearization.&#8221;</p>
</div>
<div class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">
<p>However, the feasibility of such agreements remains uncertain, given the geopolitical complexities and the need for the U.S. to maintain a competitive edge in military capabilities.</p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p><strong>MUST READ: </strong> The most awe-inspiring piece of the report is about  &#8220;RESPONSIBILITY&#8221; from the Christian Science Monitor, dated February 14, 2025, which provides an in-depth look at the lives and duties of U.S. Air Force missileers stationed at F.E. Warren Air Force Base.</p>
</div>
</div>
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<p><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-30165" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png" alt="" width="341" height="228" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel.png 470w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-300x200.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-Launch-Panel-360x240.png 360w" sizes="(max-width: 341px) 100vw, 341px" /></p>
<ul>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It highlights their critical role in nuclear deterrence, the gravity of their mission, and the personal and ethical complexities they face.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article follows missileers during their 24-hour shifts, emphasizing their readiness and strict operational protocols.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">It also explores the mental burden and moral dilemmas they encounter, particularly in the context of faith.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The piece touches on the historical context of missileers, their continued relevance, and the growing nuclear threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">Additionally, it discusses the challenges of attracting and retaining personnel, especially women and minorities, within this demanding career field.</li>
<li class="QnABodyStyle__markdownText___b9_I4">The article underscores the human element of nuclear deterrence, the operational challenges of aging systems, and the evolving nuclear landscape.</li>
</ul>
<p>Overall, the report underscores the need for robust defense investments, the challenges of modernizing nuclear forces, and the geopolitical threats posed by adversaries like Russia, China, and North Korea.</p>
</div>
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<div><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-of-Week-of-2-17^^.Prepared-by-Peter-Huessy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png" alt="" width="346" height="96" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 346px) 100vw, 346px" /></a></div>
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<p>​</p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-for-22-feb-2025/">ICBM EAR Report for 22 Feb 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2025 13:16:27 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM EAR Report Executive Summary Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025. Quotes of the Week Xi Jinping (China): &#8220;No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.&#8221; U.S. Ambassador [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/">ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM EAR Report</strong> <strong><br />
Executive Summary</strong></p>
<p>Based on the latest EAR Report, these are the critical points on global security, upcoming events, and the ongoing discourse on nuclear deterrence, modernization, and geopolitical strategy for 2025.</p>
<p><strong>Quotes of the Week</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Xi Jinping (China):</strong> &#8220;No one can stop the historical trend” of China’s “reunification” with Taiwan.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg (South Korea):</strong> Reaffirmed the U.S.-South Korean alliance amidst geopolitical tensions.</li>
<li><strong>DPRK Kim Jong Un:</strong> Committed to implementing the &#8220;toughest&#8221; anti-American policy while criticizing the U.S.-South Korea-Japan security partnership.</li>
<li><strong>Antony Blinken (U.S. Secretary of State):</strong> Highlighted Russia&#8217;s intentions to share advanced space technology with North Korea.</li>
<li><strong>NATO Official:</strong> Warned of unconventional Russian attacks causing substantial casualties.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Upcoming 2025 Seminar Events</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>January 10, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Robert Soofer &amp; Mark Massa on &#8220;The Case for Homeland Missile Defense.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>January 31, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Shoshana Bryen &amp; Ilan Berman on &#8220;Middle East Update and the Iranian Nuclear Threat.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>February 14, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Stephen Blank &amp; Mark Schneider on &#8220;Russian Intentions with Its Growing Nuclear Forces.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>February 28, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Hon. Madelyn Creedon &amp; Hon. Frank Miller on &#8220;Assessment and Update of the Posture Commission.&#8221;</li>
<li><strong>March 14, 2025, 10:00 AM:</strong> Gordon Chang &amp; Rick Fisher on &#8220;The Chinese Nuclear Threat &amp; Implications for US Security.&#8221;</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Nuclear Derangement Syndrome</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Criticism of nuclear deterrence is gaining momentum, focusing on framing nuclear weapons as both unnecessary and dangerous.</li>
<li>The Union of Concerned Scientists highlights essays opposing nuclear modernization, which are countered with arguments emphasizing deterrence as essential for stability.</li>
<li>The critique overlooks the strategic necessity of nuclear weapons in preventing large-scale conflicts and ensuring global security.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>The Biden-Trump Arms Race</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Criticism:</strong> The Biden and Trump administrations&#8217; claims of an arms race are exaggerated. They focus on necessary modernization within New START limits.</li>
<li><strong>Reality:</strong> Modernization efforts (Columbia submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, B21 bombers) align with treaty commitments, aiming for readiness by 2042.</li>
<li><strong>Key Concern:</strong> Rising nuclear capabilities of Russia and China surpass New START limits, demanding U.S. responses to maintain strategic balance.</li>
<li><strong>Counterarguments:</strong> Opponents argue modernization fuels an arms race, while proponents emphasize deterrence and technological edge against adversaries.</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="color: #000080;"><strong>Download the full report.</strong></span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-week-of-January-3.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-report-jan-3-2025/">ICBM EAR Report Jan, 3 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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