The Indo-Pacific is entering a far more dangerous strategic era. Military modernization, grey-zone coercion, and rapid nuclear expansion are reshaping the regional balance of power. Most notably, China is undertaking a historic expansion of its nuclear arsenal, investing in silo fields, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and dual-capable systems. Simultaneously, Russia’s willingness to use nuclear threats in Europe demonstrates that nuclear coercion is once again central to great-power competition.

In Washington, proposals such as Ely Ratner’s Pacific Defense Pact reflect recognition that the current security architecture is insufficient. A more formalized collective defense structure in the Indo-Pacific is necessary.

However, this is not sufficient. A conventional Pacific Defense Pact does not fully address the most dangerous level of escalation to large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack. What the region now requires is a narrowly defined Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance.

A Narrow, Explicit Purpose

This would not be a sweeping defense pact covering every maritime incident, border clash, cyber intrusion, or grey-zone coercive act. It would have a clear and carefully delimited purpose. That is to deter large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack against member states.

Its clarity would be its strength. That clarity performs a second vital function. It minimizes the risk of entrapment by ensuring member states are not dragged into escalation over actions below the threshold of war. By explicitly excluding grey-zone coercion and limited crises from its nuclear remit, the alliance would reassure leaders that only truly existential threats trigger its highest-level commitments.

Participation becomes politically sustainable and strategically credible because it avoids automatic escalation over incremental provocations. The alliance would draw a line at catastrophic strategic aggression.

The Historical Record: Why Nuclear Deterrence Matters

The case for a nuclear alliance is not theoretical. It is grounded in historical experience. During the Cold War, nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented direct large-scale war and nuclear attack in Europe. Despite ideological confrontation and proxy conflicts, neither side attempted a conventional war or nuclear attack on the other’s core territories. Nuclear weapons imposed restraint. They deterred not just nuclear use, but overwhelming conventional assault.

Similarly, within NATO, the presence of U.S. nuclear guarantees has prevented full-scale Russian conventional attack on Alliance territory. Moscow has tested boundaries through

hybrid tactics and coercive signaling, but it has not launched a large-scale attack on NATO soil. Nuclear deterrence at the alliance level raised the costs to an unacceptable threshold.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict further illustrates how nuclear capability constrains escalation. The Soviet Union’s nuclear superiority allowed it to signal credible threats, while China’s emerging nuclear capability and mobilization signaled resolve. Mutual fear of escalation compelled negotiation, including intervention through U.S. triangular diplomacy. Nuclear weapons shaped behaviors without being used.

The India–Pakistan experience is equally instructive. Prior to overt nuclearization, the two states fought multiple full-scale wars. Since their nuclear tests in 1998, crises have erupted, but they have remained limited. Missile strikes, cross-border skirmishes, and periods of great tension have not escalated into all-out conventional war or nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence imposed a ceiling on the conflicts.

Contrast this with the Russia–Ukraine war. Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in the 1990s and now confronts a nuclear-armed Russia without possessing its own nuclear deterrent. The result has been a prolonged and costly conventional war of attrition. The absence of mutual nuclear deterrence has made sustained large-scale conventional war possible. By comparison, Russia has not launched a direct assault on NATO territory precisely because nuclear deterrence underwrites NATO’s collective defense.

The pattern is clear. Where credible nuclear deterrence exists between adversaries, large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack is sharply constrained or avoided. Where it does not, prolonged and devastating large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack becomes more likely.

The Indo-Pacific Strategic Gap

The Indo-Pacific currently relies on a patchwork of bilateral extended deterrence arrangements centered primarily on Washington. These remain essential, but they are increasingly strained or at risk of being fractured by China.

China’s expanding nuclear arsenal complicates escalation management. A larger and more survivable force reduces the credibility of assumptions that escalation will remain controlled or asymmetrical. Meanwhile, the region contains multiple flashpoints, including Taiwan, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and the India–China border where conventional conflict could rapidly climb the escalation ladder.

Frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad strengthen capabilities and coordination, while the proposed Pacific Defense Pact aims to guarantee that the U.S. and its allies can act in concert during crises or conflicts. But they are not structured as nuclear deterrence mechanisms. They do not institutionalize shared nuclear declaratory policy, crisis consultation at the strategic level, or joint planning for high-end escalation management. A nuclear alliance would fill that gap.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact

A Pacific Defense Pact, as envisioned in conventional terms, strengthens interoperability and signals unity. But without an explicit nuclear dimension, it leaves ambiguity at the highest rung of escalation. That ambiguity can invite miscalculation.

A nuclear alliance would not broaden commitments; it would sharpen them. It would: (1) establish shared declaratory policy on deterrence of large-scale war and nuclear attack, (2) institutionalize strategic consultation mechanisms during crises, (3) coordinate planning to ensure credible escalation management, and (4) reinforce extended deterrence while discouraging independent nuclear proliferation.

Importantly, such an alliance need not require additional states to acquire nuclear weapons. Like NATO, it could rely on extended deterrence commitments and nuclear-sharing with structured burden-sharing and planning arrangements. Nuclear forces may remain nationally controlled, but alliance cohesion amplifies deterrent credibility. 

Clarity as Stability

The objective is not confrontation. It is clarity. By defining a narrow and explicit threshold—large-scale conventional war or nuclear attack—the alliance reduces the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. It signals to potential aggressors that existential aggression will trigger unified strategic consequences.

Simultaneously, it reassures members that lower-level competition will not automatically escalate to nuclear commitments. This dual clarity strengthens deterrence at the top end and stabilizes politics at the lower end.

A Necessary Evolution

The Indo-Pacific is now the central arena of 21st-century strategic competition. Nuclear modernization is accelerating. Multi-nuclear dynamics are emerging. Escalation timelines are compressing.

History shows that nuclear weapons, and when embedded within credible alliance structures, deter catastrophic war. They prevent large-scale conventional war and nuclear attacks not because they are desirable tools of war, but because they impose unacceptable costs on those who contemplate it.

A Pacific Defense Pact is a step forward, but in the current strategic environment, it is not enough. To deter large-scale conventional war and nuclear attack in the Indo-Pacific, the region must move beyond a Pacific Defense Pact. It must build a nuclear alliance.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact: Why the Indo-Pacific Requires a Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

One of the cornerstones of this modernization is the development of the B-21 Raider, the nation’s first sixth-generation aircraft and second stealth bomber. Poised to replace the B-1 and B-2 bomber fleets, the B-21 embodies the pinnacle of airpower, offering dual-use capabilities and unparalleled lethality. Currently, the B-21 is in its flight test phase, and with multiple aircraft progressing through the assembly line, the B-21 program is largely on schedule and within budget, a testament to its efficient development. Once deployed, this capability will present a significant challenge to potential adversaries and strengthen America’s capacity to project power and effectively threaten vital enemy targets. Low observable stealth and other on-board technologies can ensure successful penetration and retaliation, placing high-value targets at risk in any cost-imposing deterrence strategy, even against the strongest defenses. This threat, along with the fear instilled by the B-21, will certainly cause any aggressor to reconsider attacking the United States or its allies. While the Air Force is currently funded to buy 100 B-21 bombers, the US Strategic Command commander recently testified that 145 units are needed “to cope with the increased threats to U.S. security.”

Complementing the B-21 and B-52 is the nuclear-tipped Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile. Designed to replace the 40-year-old nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) currently deployed on the B-52, the LRSO is a crucial component of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Impressively, the LRSO program is presently on track regarding schedule and budget, which is a welcome anomaly in major defense acquisitions. Its success is further highlighted by three successful flight tests in 2025 alone, demonstrating its maturity and readiness. The critical question, however, remains: how many LRSO missiles does the nation truly need to maintain a robust deterrent? This calculus involves intricate geopolitical considerations, technological advancements, and the evolving threat landscape. As of 2023, the Air Force plans to procure 1,087 missiles, with some 67 to be expended during the development phase.

Across the Atlantic, the NATO nuclear deterrent is undergoing its own transformation, centered on the F-35 fighter jet and the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb. All planned units of the B61-12 have been produced, and the F-35 has achieved certification for nuclear operations. While several European allies have already certified their F-35 jets for this crucial mission, others are still awaiting delivery of their aircraft or are in the process of certification. This phased integration underscores the collaborative nature of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements and the ongoing commitment to collective security. The F-35 is a nimble, adaptable, high-performance multirole fighter combining stealth, sensor fusion, and extraordinary situational awareness, enhancing the lethality of NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability.

The venerable senior citizen B-52H Stratofortress, a workhorse of the bomber fleet, is also receiving a suite of vital upgrades. These enhancements include new engines, radar systems, and upgraded nuclear communications systems.  While progress is being made on these upgrades, they are encountering higher costs and longer timelines than initially projected. Nevertheless, the program is not “off the rails” and remains a critical effort to extend this enduring platform’s operational life and capabilities. When complete, the B-52J will be a more fuel-efficient, reliable, modern, and better-integrated platform going into the second half of the 21^st century. Should the B-52J modernization effort be overly delayed or cancelled, it will likely be replaced with additional B-21 bombers.

Finally, the Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program represents a monumental undertaking. Beyond merely replacing the now 50-year-old Minuteman III missile, Sentinel involves a complete overhaul of the vast infrastructure spanning five missile fields. Following a Nunn-McCurdy recertification last year, all three stages of the missile, including the post-boost section, have undergone successful testing. The next crucial steps include laying some 7,000 miles of fiber optic cables across five states to establish robust command and control capabilities for the deployed weapons. A significant cost driver that contributed to the Nunn-McCurdy breach was the escalating cost of rebuilding the individual launch facilities. General Gebara reminded the audience that with 450 launch facilities (LF), any growth or cost increases in one LF can be multiplied by 450. Therefore, a $1 million increase in the design, construction, or reconditioning of one LF equates to adding half a billion dollars to the program, highlighting the scale and complexity of this vital modernization effort. General Bussiere, commander of the Air Force’s Global Strike Command, describes the Sentinel ICBM project as “the largest works project ever taken in fifty years [likely] since Eisenhower’s interstate program.”

The birth of the United States Air Force coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age and the rapid escalation of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence quickly became a central and defining mission, profoundly shaping USAF structure, development, and doctrine throughout the Cold War and beyond. In today’s complex era of great power competition, the USAF is, as it should be, deeply committed to modernizing and revitalizing its nuclear deterrent. While programs like the LRSO and B-21 demonstrate impressive progress, others, such as the B-52 upgrades and Sentinel ICBM, face inherent challenges. These efforts, though costly and complex, are essential to maintaining a credible and effective deterrent in a dynamic global environment, ensuring national security for decades to come. This must be America’s number one priority!

As the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley once affirmed, as a believer in humanity, he deplored the use of the atomic bomb; however, as a soldier, he respected it. The United States should be prepared to utilize the full psychological and military impact of the bomb to prevent a war and, if attacked, to win the war. He was right in October 1949, and his sentiment remains valid today; the Air Force must ensure that its segment of the strategic nuclear triad is prepared to deter war well into the century.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

The Air Force’s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress was originally published on Global Security Review.

The international system is now firmly bipolar, with China’s global power rapidly increasing at a time when Russia regularly threatens to use nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), influencing the administration of President Donald Trump. The combined Chinese and Russian threats are leading President Trump to warn of a possible World War III.

American power is increasingly contested, bringing new operational challenges to extended deterrence. A fundamental question is now in play—should the US abandon the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it created in 1960s and instead push its allies to field nuclear weapons?

Allies are already reconsidering their nuclear stance. In the Asia-Pacific, American ally Australia provides useful historical insights.

From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons in response to an unstable international order where it felt threatened by China. In 1967, Secretary of US Defense Robert McNamara said it would be “entirely natural” and “an obvious thing to happen” for Australia to acquire nuclear weapons in response to China developing them. He also expressed interest in establishing a collective nuclear organization for the Far East, “starting with Australia and the Philippines.”

Indeed, Secretary of State Dean Rusk earlier suggested a “US-supplied Far Eastern nuclear stockpile” open to Japan and India. In 1958, others proposed the US could base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in Australia, in the event the US decided to keep tight control of nuclear weapons in its own hands and actively worked to push its allies to agree to the NPT treaty.

There were similar debates around friendly nuclear proliferation in Europe around the same time. Aiming to regain leadership in Europe, the US proposed a multilateral nuclear force within NATO. While there were doubts over its military utility, the diplomatic discussions that started around sharing nuclear hardware and control did allow time to develop a European non-proliferation solution. In 1966, the NATO nuclear planning group was established, allowing some European allies to be involved in how and under which circumstances American weapons might be used.

The structural changes in the international system that prompted these earlier ideas are happening again. It is time to start thinking seriously about the next steps to take. The nuclear history noted suggests three broad approaches.

First, allies might build their own nuclear forces. The logic is that in a high-intensity conflict between the US and a nuclear power, the adversary may target American allies with nuclear weapons. Such an escalation demonstrates an adversary’s willingness to coerce allies into ceasing support for the United States.

This is the worst-case scenario that extended deterrence was created to prevent. If allies seriously doubt American credibility, fielding independent nuclear forces is a solution.  Indeed, economically challenged Pakistan and North Korea took this path already. For America’s allies, acquiring nuclear forces may be a lower cost option than growing their conventional forces.

Second, allies might work together to devise a modern multilateral nuclear force as considered in 1960s Europe. In the Pacific, Australia considered working with Britain on nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and 1950s; some still favor this effort. In that regard, Japan and Australia have recently acquired Tomahawk cruise missiles, which the US armed with nuclear warheads to deter Russia in the 1980s. Such weapons might be a starting point for an allied nuclear force in the eastern Pacific. As noted, the US considered deploying ICBMs in the Australian outback.

Third, another option, arguably better for American global leadership, is to address the allies’ deepening concerns over extended deterrence. This would involve the current administration actively reassuring allies that it still places importance on existing security treaties, increasing nuclear sharing and including more nations in nuclear planning, especially in the Pacific. Such steps would be at marginal cost to the US.

The most important might be nuclear sharing as this appears a tangible example of commitment. Of course, nuclear sharing is actually a misnomer since the US shares in the employment of certain nuclear weapons. It retains full control of the weapons prior to an authorization to strike a target.

The US could increase nuclear sharing with Pacific allies, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and broaden out to other NATO nations like Poland and the Scandinavian nations, which appear to be Russia’s next target after Ukraine. These nations could then reciprocate in hosting US nuclear weapons as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands do now.

This discussion hinges on American ambitions for global leadership. As the Trump administration pushes allies to bare a greater share of their own security while attempting to close a $2 trillion annual deficit, the US must necessarily cut costs everywhere. Thus, American allies must take a realistic look at what President Trump is seeking to accomplish with the federal budget and understand that they must step into the breach while the US sets its house in order.

Sometimes, a great power must admit that it may be in its interests to change direction and push its allies down a new, different path. In that case, the Trump administration might declare the NPT finished and instead encourage its allies to go nuclear.

Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament and Australia and the Bomb. Dr. Peter Layton is Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute and an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. He is author of Grand Strategy and coauthor of Warfare in the Robotic Age.

Time to Proliferate Nuclear Weapons (or Not?) was originally published on Global Security Review.