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		<title>The United States Did Not Lose the War Against Iran: The Harder Part is Postwar Peacemaking</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-united-states-did-not-lose-the-war-against-iran-the-harder-part-is-postwar-peacemaking/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-united-states-did-not-lose-the-war-against-iran-the-harder-part-is-postwar-peacemaking/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 12:08:53 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32911</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: July 21, 2026 Recently, it has become fashionable in news commentary and in political pronouncements by members of Congress, among others, to claim that the United States’ conflict with Iran is a defeat and a debacle. Ironically, sources that criticized the Trump administration for Operation Epic Fury starting on February 28, 2026, are now [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-united-states-did-not-lose-the-war-against-iran-the-harder-part-is-postwar-peacemaking/">The United States Did Not Lose the War Against Iran: The Harder Part is Postwar Peacemaking</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: July 21, 2026</em></p>
<p>Recently, it has become fashionable in <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/07/iran-was-the-most-successful-failure-in-us-airpower-history/">news commentary</a> and in <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2026-06-21/congress-wonders-as-iran-war-draws-to-close-was-it-worth-it">political pronouncements</a> by members of Congress, among others, to claim that the United States’ conflict with Iran is a defeat and a debacle. Ironically, sources that criticized the Trump administration for Operation Epic Fury starting on February 28, 2026, are now criticizing the President and his advisors for capitulating to Iran on issues like Iran’s nuclear program, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and funds for Iranian reconstruction. Other critics argue that the regime in Tehran <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/iranian-regime-shows-power-defiant-tehran-turns-khameneis-funeral-rcna353158">remains in power</a> and that Iranian proxies, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, keep attacking Israel, America’s key ally in the Middle East.</p>
<p>There is no question that this war was started without many of the diplomatic and military precursors seen in past conflicts, such as consulting with major allies, the United Nations (UN), and briefing Congressional leaders beyond those required by the War Powers Act. There was also an ambitious list of political and military goals announced from the start, including hopes that Iran’s internal politics could be stirred into rebellion against the Ayatollahs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other parts of the ruling theocracy. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/operation-epic-fury-decisive-american-power-to-crush-irans-terror-regime/">Official objectives</a> included destroying Iran’s missile capabilities and its capacity to produce brand new ones; annihilating its navy; ensuring that the world’s number one sponsor of terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon; and ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside of its borders. Additionally, Israel sought to weaken or remove Hezbollah in Lebanon, and both the U.S. and Israel intend to further contain other Iranian proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863027/us-iran-trump-memorandum-of-understanding-full-text">The Memorandum of Understanding</a> reached between the United States and Iran in mid-June expedited shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to provide immediate relief for global trade and, inevitably, generated significant revenue for Iran from its oil sales to China and other buyers. U.S. officials pointed to declining domestic gas prices as a positive sign, which also fostered a more optimistic economic outlook ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. President Trump continued to reassure Americans and others that the upcoming sixty-day negotiation period between Washington and Tehran would prevent Iran from developing or obtaining nuclear weapons. The U.S. claimed that Iranian negotiators had agreed to future inspections of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities by UN atomic inspection experts, though Washington also emphasized the need to include American inspectors. Some Iranian officials denied agreeing to this inspection requirement, but these denials might have been aimed at appeasing hardliners within Tehran’s postwar regime.</p>
<p>Now comes the harder part. Negotiating the end of a war involves more complexity than most observers may realize. This is true even when the stronger power, in military terms, has the capacity to inflict greater damage on the relatively weaker power. Losing powers, not fully defeated, may still retain bargaining chips. The weaker side can influence the transition from midgame to endgame, making it more or less costly for the stronger power, depending on how willing the stronger power is to negotiate and trade concessions rather than simply enforce a diktat.</p>
<p>Regarding Iran, the first aspect of its ongoing ability to stir trouble lies in its close influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen. Israel continues to respond strongly to attacks by Hezbollah, and this back-and-forth creates a distracting layer for the ongoing U.S. negotiations with Iran. A second aspect of Iran’s postwar influence is its capacity to strike regional neighbors that support U.S. military bases or wish to maintain friendly relations with the U.S., including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Third, Iran is already suspected of supporting assassination plots against President Trump or planning other anti-American terrorist activities. Fourth, Iran has used its own narratives about the war with the U.S. to portray its regime as a victim of a bullying superpower, a storyline that appeals to many observers who were already critical of U.S. support for Israel’s war against Hamas following the October 7, 2023, massacre by the latter. Fifth, Iran’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz presents potential opportunities for disruptive actions against merchant ships and U.S. or other naval forces. Lastly, Iran’s ongoing close ties with Russia and China will gradually enhance its postwar military capabilities and economic rebuilding, while also reinforcing the stability of its political regime.</p>
<p>Notwithstanding the preceding cautionary notes against premature American irrational exuberance over Operation Epic Fury, a pessimistic assessment of U.S. military effectiveness, and talk of postwar U.S. political defeat, is unwarranted. Iran’s military capability has been seriously degraded, and major components of its nuclear program are buried under rubble, pushing back the estimated time for weaponization. Several rounds of anti-leadership targeting have scrambled the decision-making process within an already complexified regime structure. It is likely the regime will continue to maintain its powerful grip over the population unless, or until, home-grown opposition becomes much more motivated, better organized, and widespread. Meanwhile, we can assume that U.S. Central Command will maintain vigilant regional overwatch to keep Iran’s mischief within acceptable bounds.</p>
<p>Going forward, the endgame in Iran will test the ability of the United States and Israel to exercise both statesmanship and military power. Politics in the Middle East is as challenging as any. War in the Middle East, from ancient times to today, has been the graveyard of imperial ambitions and the source of frustration for efforts to spread democracy. Reshaping Middle Eastern political alliances for international peace and security requires high-stakes diplomacy, cultural understanding, and a strong dose of diplomatic and strategic realism. In the post–Epic Fury world, we stand on the brink of potentially historic breakthroughs that could lead to lasting regional peace, free from nuclear coercion, or, if they fail, sustain the cycle of theocratically motivated conventional or unconventional warfare.</p>
<p><em>Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies, edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-united-states-did-not-lose-the-war-against-iran-the-harder-part-is-postwar-peacemaking/">The United States Did Not Lose the War Against Iran: The Harder Part is Postwar Peacemaking</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>Strategic Corruption and the Future of Hybrid Warfare</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/strategic-corruption-and-the-future-of-hybrid-warfare/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/strategic-corruption-and-the-future-of-hybrid-warfare/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeffery A. Tobin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jun 2026 12:09:21 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32815</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 23, 2026 During the Cold War, deterrence centered on missiles, troop deployments, and nuclear escalation. Military power still matters enormously, but modern strategic competition increasingly unfolds far from conventional battlefields. Rival states now seek influence through weaker institutions, compromised elites, illicit financial systems, infrastructure dependence, and strategic corruption. In many cases, adversaries no longer need to defeat a country militarily to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/strategic-corruption-and-the-future-of-hybrid-warfare/">Strategic Corruption and the Future of Hybrid Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> June 23, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">During the Cold War, deterrence </span><a href="https://kissinger.sais.jhu.edu/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/american-deterrence-unpacked/"><span data-contrast="none">centered</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> on missiles, troop deployments, and nuclear escalation. Military power still matters enormously, but modern strategic competition increasingly </span><a href="https://gjia.georgetown.edu/conflict-security/part-i-rethinking-deterrence/"><span data-contrast="none">unfolds</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> far from conventional battlefields. Rival states now seek </span><a href="https://knowledgehub.transparencycdn.org/helpdesk/ForPublishing_Illicit-finance-financial-secrecy-and-state-threats.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">influence</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> through weaker institutions, compromised elites, illicit financial systems, infrastructure dependence, and strategic corruption. In many cases, adversaries no longer need to defeat a country militarily to weaken its strategic position.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">This shift has blurred the line between governance problems and national security threats. Corruption no longer acts solely as a domestic political issue tied to ethics or economic inefficiency. Increasingly, it </span><a href="https://knowledgehub.transparencycdn.org/helpdesk/ForPublishing_Illicit-finance-financial-secrecy-and-state-threats.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">functions</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> as strategic infrastructure that hostile states and aligned networks can exploit to gain influence, undermine institutions, and weaken deterrence from within. The result is a form of hybrid warfare that </span><a href="https://www.corruptionjusticeandlegitimacy.org/post/strategic-corruption-as-a-threat-to-security-and-the-new-agenda-for-anti-corruption"><span data-contrast="none">operates</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> quietly below the threshold of conventional military conflict.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Traditional military deterrence assumes that states seek to avoid direct escalation because the costs remain too high. Yet modern rivals increasingly </span><a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA700/RRA720-1/RAND_RRA720-1.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">prefer</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> indirect approaches that create long-term political leverage without triggering military confrontation. Strategic corruption fits this model well because it </span><a href="https://ti-defence.org/corruption-statecraft-urgent-steps-taken-guard-against-hybrid-warfare/"><span data-contrast="none">weakens</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> institutional resilience gradually and often without attracting immediate international attention.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Infrastructure financing offers one example of this evolving landscape. Major infrastructure projects can generate economic growth, but opaque financing arrangements, weak procurement oversight, and political favoritism can also </span><a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative"><span data-contrast="none">create</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> long-term dependency and strategic leverage. Ports, telecommunications systems, energy infrastructure, and logistics hubs increasingly carry geopolitical significance alongside their economic value. Foreign influence over critical infrastructure may </span><a href="https://features.csis.org/no-safe-harbor-china-ports/"><span data-contrast="none">shape</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> political decisions long before any military crises emerge.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Illicit financial networks create additional vulnerabilities. Sanction evasion systems, offshore financial structures, and corruption-linked patronage networks </span><a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/what-kleptocracy-and-how-does-it-work"><span data-contrast="none">allow</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> authoritarian governments and criminal actors to preserve influence even under significant economic pressure. These systems often </span><a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/illicit-finance-financial-secrecy-and-state-threats"><span data-contrast="none">connect</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> political elites, business interests, criminal organizations, and external state actors in ways that complicate accountability and obscure responsibility.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The challenge becomes even more serious when state and non-state actors begin to overlap. Modern hybrid competition increasingly </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-competition-us-adversaries-and-growth-irregular-warfare"><span data-contrast="none">operates</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> through networks rather than formal battle lines. Organized crime groups, private intermediaries, corrupt officials, and geopolitical rivals often </span><a href="https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023-06-13-Perspectives_No_8_TransnationalUPDATED.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">interact</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> inside the same gray zones. Those overlapping relationships make it harder to identify where criminal activity ends and strategic competition begins.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The Western Hemisphere illustrates this problem clearly. Across parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, organized criminal groups now </span><a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1943475/only-connect-the-survival-and-spread-of-organized-crime-in-latin-america/"><span data-contrast="none">exert</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> considerable influence over trafficking routes, local economies, migration systems, illicit mining operations, and even municipal governance. Criminal organizations often </span><a href="https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20Memo%205283"><span data-contrast="none">provide</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> dispute resolution, employment, or social services that weak governments struggle to deliver. This creates fragmented sovereignty in which state authority exists unevenly across territories and institutions.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">These unstable environments create opportunities for external rivals </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-strategy-political-warfare"><span data-contrast="none">seeking</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> geopolitical access or influence. Weak oversight systems, corruption within procurement processes, and institutional distrust make states more </span><a href="https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/20230217-elite-capture-corruption-security-sectors.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">vulnerable</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> to strategic penetration. In these circumstances, foreign influence does not always arrive through military alliances or ideological movements. Instead , it emerges through infrastructure contracts, illicit finance, commercial dependency, or relationships with politically connected elites.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Traditional deterrence frameworks </span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-the-us-needs-a-total-defense-strategy-based-on-resilience/"><span data-contrast="none">struggle</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> to address these dynamics because they still focus heavily on conventional military indicators. Defense planners understandably prioritize readiness, force posture, weapons modernization, logistics, and operational capability. These areas remain essential. However, military strength alone cannot fully </span><a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2023/Financial-Access/"><span data-contrast="none">protect</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> states whose institutions face </span><a href="https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The_Fifth_Column_Web.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">sustained</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> internal erosion.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">States often </span><a href="https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The_Fifth_Column_Web.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">weaken</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> politically before they weaken militarily. Public distrust, elite fragmentation, corruption scandals, feeble judicial systems, and declining institutional legitimacy can reduce a government’s ability to respond effectively during periods of strategic pressure. Adversaries increasingly </span><a href="https://www.corruptionjusticeandlegitimacy.org/post/strategic-corruption-as-a-threat-to-security-and-the-new-agenda-for-anti-corruption"><span data-contrast="none">recognize</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> this and exploit those vulnerabilities patiently over time.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">This problem extends beyond developing countries or fragile democracies. Advanced democracies also </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/return-political-warfare"><span data-contrast="none">face</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> growing concerns involving foreign influence operations, cyber-enabled corruption, disinformation campaigns, opaque lobbying networks, and strategic investments tied to geopolitical objectives. Hybrid competition increasingly </span><a href="https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/resilience-civil-preparedness-and-article-3"><span data-contrast="none">targets</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> the political and institutional foundations that support deterrence itself. As a result, national security discussions must </span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-anti-corruption-efforts-strengthen-global-democracy-and-security/"><span data-contrast="none">broaden</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> beyond military hardware and battlefield concepts alone. Deterrence </span><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/resilience-first/"><span data-contrast="none">depends</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> not only on weapons systems, but also on institutional credibility, public trust, transparency, and political resilience. Governments that cannot maintain confidence in procurement systems, electoral institutions, judicial independence, or regulatory oversight may struggle to sustain strategic cohesion during periods of crisis.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">This reality does not mean every corruption scandal represents foreign subversion or hybrid warfare. Domestic political dysfunction often </span><a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/4167178/political-warfare-against-intervention-forces/"><span data-contrast="none">emerges</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> from local conditions and internal failures. However, strategic rivals increasingly </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/foreign-malign-influence-targeting-us-and-allied-corporations"><span data-contrast="none">exploit</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> those weaknesses opportunistically once they appear. Corruption </span><a href="https://millercenter.org/rise-strategic-corruption"><span data-contrast="none">creates</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> openings that adversaries can leverage quietly and incrementally.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The United States and its allies therefore need a broader understanding of deterrence in the twenty-first century. Military modernization remains necessary, particularly as rival powers continue expanding nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities. Yet strategic competition increasingly </span><a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA290-1.html"><span data-contrast="none">unfolds</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> inside institutions as much as along borders or within contested seas.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Institutional resilience should now be a centerpiece of national security planning. Strong oversight systems, transparent procurement practices, anti-corruption enforcement, independent courts, investigative journalism, and trusted public institutions all </span><a href="https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/TI-DS-Submission-for-2025-PBAR.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">contribute</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> to long-term strategic stability. These systems </span><a href="https://www.ifes.org/pub/paths-democratic-resilience-era-backsliding/understanding-and-designing-resilience-interventions"><span data-contrast="none">strengthen</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> national resilience against both domestic corruption and external exploitation.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">In the emerging era of hybrid competition, states may not lose strategic position through invasion alone. They may lose it gradually through institutional erosion that weakens deterrence long before conventional conflict formally begins.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Jeffery A. Tobin is a senior advisor and partner with Pan-American Strategic Advisors, conducting research on democracy, corruption, and institutional health. His work has appeared in outlets including Lawfare, Just Security, Foreign Policy in Focus, the Modern War Institute, and Small Wars Journal. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Strategic-Corruption-and-the-Future-of-Hybrid-Warfare.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="223" height="62" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 223px) 100vw, 223px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/strategic-corruption-and-the-future-of-hybrid-warfare/">Strategic Corruption and the Future of Hybrid Warfare</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 12:13:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32714</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 26, 2026 At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 26, 2026</em></p>
<p>At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/05/08/turkey-touts-propellant-breakthrough-for-yildirimhan-long-range-ballistic-missile/">unveiled</a> a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/tuerkiye-unveils-yildirimhan-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-challenging-china-df-26-range">released</a> details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/culture/yildirim-bayezid-sultan-who-struck-like-lightning-3214325?s=3">known for</a> acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.</p>
<p>Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.</p>
<p>A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and <a href="https://www.anixneuseis.gr/turkeys-defence-industrial-ambition-from-dependence-to-strategic-autonomy/">strategic autonomy</a>. Within this context, Turkey’s declared <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">goal to develop long-range ballistic</a> capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.</p>
<p>We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.</p>
<p>Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrict access to advanced weapons</a> capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44000/R44000.97.pdf">arms embargoes, sanctions</a>, and <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrictions</a> imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey&#8217;s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.</p>
<p>Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its <a href="https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/news/news-from-turkey/pages/president-erdogan-unveils-turkiye-2030-industry-technology-strategy.aspx">National Technology Initiative</a>, is part of a larger investment in <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/we-want-to-maximize-our-technological-independence">civilian space and satellite launch</a> initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/turkiye-begins-construction-of-space-launch-facility-in-somalia-3211221">Somalia</a>, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.</p>
<p>Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/07/turkeys-fm-criticizes-nuclear-weapons-treaty-as-unjust-questions-turkish-endorsement/">Turkish officials criticizing</a> the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">capable of carrying</a> a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.</p>
<p>The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-05/features/europe-moving-independent-nuclear-deterrent">develop its own nuclear capabilities</a>—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its <a href="https://warontherocks.com/disperse-to-survive-the-logic-of-french-forward-deterrence/">new doctrine of “forward deterrence,”</a> which <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-macrons-changes-to-french-nuclear-policy-mean-for-european-security/">advocates</a> for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nuclear-bombs-poland-germany-weapons-3pwvwdwhz?msockid=3393505b86306ec71fdc452087506f0e">Poland and Germany</a> have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.</p>
<p>At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.</p>
<p>Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.</p>
<p>Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.</p>
<p>Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly <em>The NIDS View</em> podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Turkeys-ICBM-Ambition-for-Autonomy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/assessing-the-credibility-of-manned-platforms-in-contemporary-drone-rich-combat-environment/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahmad Ibrahim]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 12:14:19 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[and concepts discussed throughout the paper. The keywords below capture the core topics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[and evolving strategies highlighted in the document.manned platforms]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32615</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 23, 2026 Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete. This argument gains credibility [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/assessing-the-credibility-of-manned-platforms-in-contemporary-drone-rich-combat-environment/">Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 23, 2026</em></p>
<p>Proliferation of unmanned systems in modern warfare has popularized the notion that traditional platforms have reached the end of their operational relevance. Particularly, the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened the perception that small, agile, and inexpensive drones have rendered manned platforms in land, air, and sea domain obsolete.</p>
<p>This argument gains credibility while assessing drones’ performance against <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/20/world/europe/tanks-ukraine-drones-abrams.html#:~:text=So%20are%20tanks%20obsolete?,lethal%20weapon%20in%20ground%20warfare.&amp;text=But%20he%20added%20that%20the,Thomas%20Gibbons%2DNeff%20contributed%20reporting.">manned armored vehicles</a> which are now <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2022/02/watch-boris-johnson-claimed-the-days-of-big-tank-battles-in-europe-were-over">routinely labelled</a> as outdated systems against drone-enabled precision strikes. Yet, what is often depicted in the media is only one side of the coin. Drones often fail to find targets, are intercepted, or manage to hit their target, thus not achieving intended results. Despite proliferation of first-person view (FPV) drones, armored vehicles continue to play a vital role in maneuver warfare and protected mobility. Modern armor strategies have evolved to include combined arms and dispersion rather than mass for increasing survivability and combat efficiency. In the Russia-Ukraine war, several <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/are-tanks-obsolete-on-modern-battlefield-not-exactly-sa-021226">rudimentary measures</a> like installation of cope cages atop turrets, have been implemented by both militaries to enhance the survivability rate of tanks against kamikaze drones. Vehicle mounted <a href="https://cepa.org/article/the-era-of-the-cautious-tank/">jammers</a> have also shown promising results. Defensive technologies, like active protection systems (APS) and electronic countermeasures (ECM), have proven their efficiency against FPV drones. Thus, it can be argued that drones have not turned armored vehicles obsolete; they have forced them to evolve into more refined systems.</p>
<p>Similarly, in the aerial domain, many analysts perceive unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as <a href="https://insidefpv.com/blogs/blogs/drones-vs-traditional-air-power-a-cost-effective-alternative?srsltid=AfmBOooNnjAILgfsJl-1ToeY9xoM5SzrM8nUFh76C5ocJlV2k1adUv-P">cost effective alternative</a> vis-à-vis manned aircraft. Yes, UASs have shown impressive evolution. From dropping laser-guided bombs (LGBs) to firing <a href="https://baykartech.com/en/press/turkiye-successfully-test-fires-mini-intelligent-cruise-missile/">cruise missiles</a>, <a href="https://www.twz.com/air/turkeys-fighter-like-kizilelma-drone-shot-down-aerial-target-with-radar-guided-missile">air-to-air missiles</a>, <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/sea-air-space-2025/2025/04/anduril-unveils-copperhead-m-a-torpedo-designed-specifically-for-drones/">torpedo</a>, and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/09/17/russian-dolls-fpv-drone-carrying-drones-are-now-in-action-in-ukraine/">even smaller drones</a>, drones have come a long way in changing warfare. Increasingly, drones have pushed manned aircraft aside as a more efficient option for operational engagement. In Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan <a href="https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/drones-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-analyzing-the-data/">innovatively employed</a> aerial drones to expose Armenian air-defenses’ positions making them vulnerable to subsequent Azerbaijan’s targeted strikes. This unique use of drones as a crucial component of SEAD/DEAD (Suppression &amp; Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses) kill chain marked a watershed moment in modern warfare.</p>
<p>However, the <a href="https://insidefpv.com/blogs/blogs/drones-vs-traditional-air-power-a-cost-effective-alternative?srsltid=AfmBOooNnjAILgfsJl-1ToeY9xoM5SzrM8nUFh76C5ocJlV2k1adUv-P">inherent limitations</a> of drones are obvious too. UASs are more susceptibility to electronic warfare (EW) disruption <strong>and</strong> have unproven records in complex battlespace with dynamics rules of engagement (ROEs). Claims that unmanned systems will soon replace fighter jets overlook the enduring advantages of human decision-making in contested and escalation-sensitive environments. Manned aircraft provide operational flexibility and command judgment that are yet to be replicated through automation alone. The developmental trajectory suggests that instead of perceiving UAVs as one-one-one substitute for piloted aircraft, the future lies in Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) where manned aircraft will serve as command nodes while accompanied unmanned systems will provide mass, persistence, and attainability.</p>
<p>In the naval domain, the successfully employment of kamikaze surface and aerial drones by Ukraine in the Black Sea conflict is now frequently cited as an indicator that large surface combatants will soon turn into relics of past. Besides <a href="https://kyivindependent.com/these-are-most-important-russian-ships-destroyed-by-ukraine/">sinking multiple Russian warships</a> in the Black Sea, Ukraine has even damaged a Russian Kilo class submarine stationed at Novorossiysk harbor using an <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/12/15/europe/ukraine-underwater-drone-submarine-novorossiysk-russia-intl">underwater suicide drone</a>. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, despite having overwhelming superiority over Ukrainian counterpart, has failed to establish sea-control in the Black Sea primarily due to remarkable performance of Ukrainian naval drones.</p>
<p>Similarly, in the Red Sea crisis, the Houthis’ rudimentary drones have challenged the operational persistence of Western naval powers. Kamikaze drones have compelled <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/23/us-warship-cruising-red-sea-shoots-down-attack-drones-fired-from-yemen">American</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68122944">British</a>, <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231210-french-frigate-downs-drones-over-red-sea-military">French</a>, and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/german-warship-part-eu-red-sea-mission-shoots-down-two-drones-2024-02-28/">German</a> warships to deplete expensive air-defense missiles, which in some cases resulted in <a href="https://www.twz.com/news-features/navy-warships-have-to-leave-the-red-sea-fight-for-weeks-to-reload-their-missiles-navy-secretary-says">pre-mature withdrawal</a>. Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) is usually considered a potent point of defense against all types of aerial threats in the maritime domain. However, both gun-based and missile-based CIWS have limited magazine capacity and engagement range. This suggests that against a more capable adversary, drone swarms can saturate warships’ defenses and can cause mission-kill by damaging critical instruments onboard, rendering them inoperable for extended time duration.</p>
<p>Although naval drones have added an additional layer of threat for warships, they do not, in themselves, render them obsolete. Novel defensive capabilities for countering drone threats are already in the developmental phase. Few systems have been deployed and evaluated in real combat. For example, on 03 March 2024, an Italian <em>Andrea Doria</em> class destroyer <a href="https://www.twz.com/sea/italian-destroyer-guns-down-houthi-drone-with-76mm-super-rapid-cannon">shot down</a> an incoming kamikaze drone threat in Red Sea using <a href="https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/the-strales-76mm-system-with-dart-guided-ammunition">DART projectiles</a> fired from 76mm deck gun, a move far more economically feasible than air-to-surface missile. Similarly, <a href="https://www.twz.com/sea/uss-preble-used-helios-laser-to-zap-four-drones-in-expanding-testing">high-energy lasers (HELs)</a> onboard warships are being tested for countering drones. Besides kinetic defensive application, <a href="https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/12/french-navy-counters-uav-for-the-first-time-thanks-to-jamming-solution/">soft-kill measures</a> such as jammers and decoy systems are also emerging as critical components of warships defensive suite.</p>
<p>In addition, the Black Sea and the Red Sea are enclosed bodies of water, offering limited operational space for naval forces and providing tactical advantage to drone-based asymmetric tactics. In blue waters, however, the effectiveness of such drones would diminish considerably. In open seas, it is unlikely that even mass formations of drones would be able to penetrate modern naval armadas. Although suicide drones can be used in formation with cruise and ballistic missiles to <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/at-least-50-iranian-missiles-hit-israel-during-12-day-conflict/3613692">outclass adversary air-defenses</a>, but repeating such a feat against time-sensitive and well protected high-value naval ships would be a very challenging undertaking. Thus, it can be argued that sea drones can be employed as enablers or force-multipliers in conjunction with other systems, but not as decisive instruments of naval warfare.</p>
<p>The future of warfare will not be defined by the triumph of drones over manned platforms. Today, drones have turned into a potent tool of warfare and are also an integral part of the kill-chain of modern militaries around the globe. However, limitations cannot be ignored. In practice, drones work less as independent war-winning weapons but are enablers and force-multipliers. In the age of viral narratives and simplified conclusions, misperceptions regarding military technologies are bound to persist. No single military system determines the outcome of war, and no single innovation renders all others irrelevant. Military power is cumulative and contextual.</p>
<p><em>Ahmad Ibrahim is a Research Associate at Maritime Centre of Excellence (MCE), Pakistan Navy War College (PNWC), Lahore. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Assessing-the-Credibility-of-Manned-Platforms-in-Contemporary-Drone-Rich-Combat-Environment.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/assessing-the-credibility-of-manned-platforms-in-contemporary-drone-rich-combat-environment/">Assessing the Credibility of Manned Platforms in Contemporary Drone-Rich Combat Environment</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Return of the United States Primacy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-the-united-states-primacy/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-the-united-states-primacy/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Todd Clawson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 11:56:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31239</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The death of the United States’ unipolar moment is exaggerated. Foreign policy experts claiming the United States is on the decline and international relations are headed to multipolarity are less than accurate. Pundits insist that China’s economic and military rise will allow the country to eclipse the United States and lead to the creation of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-the-united-states-primacy/">The Return of the United States Primacy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The death of the United States’ unipolar moment is exaggerated. Foreign policy experts claiming the United States is on the decline and international relations are headed to multipolarity are less than accurate. Pundits insist that China’s economic and military rise will allow the country to eclipse the United States and lead to the creation of new international institutions led by Beijing.</p>
<p>The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.</p>
<p><a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/operation-midnight-hammer-how-the-us-conducted-surprise-strikes-on-iran/">Operation Midnight Hammer</a> demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.</p>
<p>The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.</p>
<p>Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.</p>
<p>The follow-on <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/23/world/iran-israel-ceasefire-trump">ceasefire agreement</a> stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.</p>
<p>China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “<a href="https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/why-iran-faced-israel-and-the-us-alone-as-its-friends-stood-by">Axis of Resistance</a>” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.</p>
<p><strong>Bolstering Alliances</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/06/president-trumps-leadership-vision-drives-nato-breakthrough/">NATO</a>) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.</p>
<p>Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.</p>
<p>Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.</p>
<p><strong>The Dealmaker</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.</p>
<p>First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/rwanda-congo-sign-us-brokered-peace-deal-to-end-fighting-that-killed-thousands/ar-AA1HAP8e?ocid=BingNewsVerp">Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda</a> to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-heralds-us-brokered-peace-deal-drc-rwanda/story?id=123277316">underlying causes of the conflict</a> and pathways for reconciliation.</p>
<p>Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.</p>
<p>In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-xl/politics/government/trump-netanyahu-agree-to-end-gaza-war-in-two-weeks/ar-AA1Hvc9Y?ocid=BingNewsSerp">next few weeks</a>. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.</p>
<p>Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/trump-s-crown-jewel-abraham-accords-may-expand-to-normalize-ties-between-israel-and-other-nations/ar-AA1HtI4v?ocid=BingNewsVerp">expand the Abraham Accords</a> so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.</p>
<p>Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.</p>
<p>The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.</p>
<p>Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.</p>
<p><em>Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/The-Return-of-the-United-States-Primacy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="172" height="48" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 172px) 100vw, 172px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-return-of-the-united-states-primacy/">The Return of the United States Primacy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Weekend Gouge- Dec 6</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-weekend-gouge-dec-6/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Sharpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Dec 2024 12:34:59 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29476</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Learn what the Global Security Review provides its readers in China. Now is the time to create a knowledge base on this provocative adversary. In the aftermath of the U.S. Election fog, we must focus on the looming threat that marches toward us. Here is what you need to know: &#8220;China’s Growing Power and the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-weekend-gouge-dec-6/">The Weekend Gouge- Dec 6</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Learn what the Global Security Review provides its readers in China. Now is the time to create a knowledge base on this provocative adversary. In the aftermath of the U.S. Election fog, we must focus on the looming threat that marches toward us.</p>
<p>Here is what you need to know:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>&#8220;<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-growing-power-and-the-inevitable-end-of-no-first-use/">China’s Growing Power and the Inevitable End of &#8216;No First Use&#8217;</a>&#8220;</strong> (July 2024)
<ul>
<li>This article examines China&#8217;s expanding military capabilities and the potential shift in its nuclear policy, moving away from its longstanding &#8216;No First Use&#8217; stance.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-strategic-contest-in-ukraine-a-pivotal-war-foreshadowing-a-major-us-china-conflict/">&#8220;The Strategic Contest in Ukraine: A Pivotal War Foreshadowing a Major US-China Conflict&#8221;</a></strong> (June 2024)
<ul>
<li>An analysis of how the conflict in Ukraine serves as a precursor to potential major confrontations between the US and China, highlighting strategic lessons and future implications.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>&#8220;<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-2024-is-a-good-year-for-china-to-attack-american-forces/">Why 2024 Is a Good Year for China to Attack American Forces</a>&#8220;</strong> (January 2024)
<ul>
<li>A provocative piece discussing the strategic timing and reasoning behind potential Chinese military actions against US forces, emphasizing the significance of the year 2024.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>&#8220;<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-rise-unraveling-power-and-principle/">China’s Rise: Unraveling Power and Principle</a>&#8220;</strong> (January 2024)
<ul>
<li>This article delves into China&#8217;s ascent on the global stage, exploring the interplay between its growing power and underlying principles guiding its foreign policy.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>&#8220;<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/u-s-army-intelligence-analyst-arrested-and-charged-with-conspiracy-to-obtain-and-disclose-national-defense-information-export-control-violations-and-bribery/">China had &#8216;persistent&#8217; access to U.S. critical infrastructure</a>&#8220;</strong> (March 2024)
<ul>
<li>A report on China&#8217;s prolonged cyber infiltration into U.S. critical infrastructure, shedding light on the methods and implications of such cyber activities.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<h3><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Weekend-Gouge-6-Dec.pdf">Download</a></h3>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-weekend-gouge-dec-6/">The Weekend Gouge- Dec 6</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-resilient-hegemon-why-americas-global-leadership-endures/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Nov 2024 14:51:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29326</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In an era where political pundits are quick to sound alarms about the impending decline of American global leadership, the reality paints a more optimistic picture. While the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the saber-rattling of North Korea and Iran led some to predict a seismic shift in world power, a closer [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-resilient-hegemon-why-americas-global-leadership-endures/">The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In an era where political pundits are quick to sound alarms about the impending decline of American global leadership, the reality paints a more optimistic picture. While the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/how-a-rising-china-has-remade-global-politics/">rise of China</a>, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/09/reckoning-with-a-resurgent-russia?lang=en">resurgence of Russia</a>, and the saber-rattling of <a href="https://www.hudson.org/arms-control-nonproliferation/north-koreas-dangerous-saber-rattling">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-24/iran-s-nuclear-saber-rattling-raises-more-alarm-at-un-watchdog">Iran</a> led some to predict a <a href="https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-world-orders-biggest-seismic-shift-in-a-century">seismic shift in world power</a>, a closer examination reveals that the United States remains firmly entrenched as the world’s leading hegemon, with little reason to believe that will change anytime soon.</p>
<p><strong>A Network of Powerful Allies</strong></p>
<p>One of the strongest indicators of America’s continued leadership is its robust network of alliances. <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/02/mapped-americas-collective-defense-agreements/135114/">Over 50 nations are directly allied with the US</a>, forming a global coalition that includes some of the world’s most powerful economies. Countries like <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-alliance">Japan</a>, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-united-kingdom-a-historic-friendship-and-enduring-alliance/">United Kingdom</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-france-allies-partners-and-friends/">France</a>, and <a href="https://au.usembassy.gov/u-s-australia-relations/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%2DAustralia%20alliance%20is,in%20the%20South%20China%20Sea.">Australia</a> consistently align themselves with American leadership, not just in military terms but also economically and diplomatically. Even in regions like the Middle East, traditional allies such as <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-saudi-arabia/">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/16/fact-sheet-the-united-states-strengthens-cooperation-with-middle-east-partners-to-address-21st-century-challenges/">emerging partnerships</a> are fortifying the US’s global standing.</p>
<p>Contrast this with <a href="https://cftni.org/publications/cranks-may-2024/">the coalition of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran</a>. While this quartet may represent a serious challenge, it pales in comparison to the extensive alliances that the US leads. Most crucially, while <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/together-and-apart-conundrum-china-russia-partnership">Russia and China</a> may appear aligned in the short term, they are not close allies in any deep or historical sense. The two powers have a long and fraught history, marked by strategic rivalry and suspicion. Their partnership today is one of convenience rather than genuine alignment. In the end, history tells us that such partnerships are prone to fracture, especially when national interests clash.</p>
<p>The reality of America’s network of allies compared to the alliance of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is stark. This balancing coalition does not even come close to the strength of the band wagoning coalition the US possesses. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (<a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm">NATO</a>), with its 31 member states, represents not only the most powerful military alliance in history but also an economic powerhouse, accounting for over <a href="https://www.worldeconomics.com/Regions/NATO/#:~:text=Data%20is%20combined%20for%20the,years%20(2013%2D2023).">30 percent of global gross domestic product</a> (GDP).</p>
<p>In contrast, China and Russia are economic competitors more than collaborators, and their combined GDP does not come close to rivaling the economic output of the US and its allies. Furthermore, China’s partnerships with nations like Iran and North Korea are limited by geography, sanctions, and divergent interests. North Korea is a heavily sanctioned and isolated state with little economic or strategic leverage beyond its nuclear capabilities, while Iran is mired in regional conflicts that prevent it from playing a major global role.</p>
<p>In essence, while China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran may occasionally coordinate to challenge the West, their relationships lack the cohesion, shared values, and the long-term strategic alignment of the American-led alliance system. This coalition cannot hope to rival the strength, stability, and global reach of America’s network of alliances. For all the talk of a multipolar world, the US remains at the center of the most powerful and united coalition of nations in modern history, a fact that ensures its continued dominance on the global stage.</p>
<p><strong>The Strategic Advantage of Geography</strong></p>
<p>Another underappreciated advantage is geography. The United States enjoys a position of unmatched security, largely thanks to what scholars like <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393349276">John Mearsheimer</a> call the “stopping power of water.” Unlike any other global power, the United States benefits from being bordered by two vast oceans. These natural barriers serve as formidable buffers against potential adversaries, significantly reducing the likelihood of direct invasion or immediate military threats to the mainland.</p>
<p>This geographic advantage has profound implications for national security and global influence. Unlike Russia, which shares extensive borders with Europe and Central Asia, and China, which borders several regional rivals including India, Japan, and Vietnam, the US is largely insulated from the chaos of regional disputes.</p>
<p>Moreover, this geographic separation means that the US can maintain a relatively smaller standing army compared to continental powers—focusing instead on advanced naval and air forces capable of projecting power far from its shores. American military bases, fleets, and alliances stretch across the world, but the mainland remains safely beyond the reach of conventional military threats.</p>
<p>This position gives the US a level of strategic flexibility that few nations can match. That is not to say the US Navy does not have issues facing its future, especially with <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/september/shipyard-shortage-people-problem#:~:text=In%20looking%20to%20expand%20U.S.,labor%20failures%20of%20Cramp%20Shipbuilding.&amp;text=The%20ongoing%20debate%20over%20how,as%20a%20sensible%20way%20forward.">shipyards</a> and <a href="https://federalnewsnetwork.com/navy/2024/08/navys-journey-to-new-procurement-system-remains-in-peril/">defense procurement</a>. However, it is still considered the <a href="https://www.wdmmw.org/ranking.php">greatest Navy in the world</a> as of 2024.</p>
<p><strong>The Monroe Doctrine</strong></p>
<p>Part of what makes the US so unique is its role as the uncontested regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine">The Monroe Doctrine</a> has long established the principle that no foreign power should interfere in the affairs of the Americas, solidifying U.S. dominance in its own region. No other nation on Earth holds this level of regional control.</p>
<p>This unrivaled regional hegemony allows the US to focus on maintaining global stability and leading from a position of strength. As long as the Western Hemisphere remains secure, the US can project power abroad with confidence, knowing that its backyard is free from external threats.</p>
<p><strong>The Interconnected Economies of the U.S. and China</strong></p>
<p>Finally, the specter of the so-called <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/">Thucydides Trap</a>—the idea that a rising power (China) will inevitably clash with an established one (the US)—is not as likely as it may seem. While it is true that <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3562442/dod-report-details-chinese-efforts-to-build-military-power/">China’s economic and military rise is a concern</a>, the interconnectedness of the two economies makes a full-blown conflict far less probable. The US and China are not just rivals; they are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/china-us-pandemic-economy-tensions-trump-coronavirus-covid-new-cold-war-economics-the-great-decoupling/">deeply intertwined economically</a>. From trade to investment to the global supply chain, the economic fates of both nations are linked in ways that make large-scale conflict costly for either side.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&amp;context=gazette">economic entanglement</a> offers a powerful deterrent against conflict. Both nations have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability, knowing that any war would be mutually destructive. This interdependence, in many ways, acts as a stabilizing force, reducing the likelihood that the US and China will fall into the trap of inevitable conflict. However, it is worth noting that much of the same was said about the European powers just before World War I.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion: A Future of Optimism, Not Decline</strong></p>
<p>Despite the challenges posed by emerging powers and the uncertainties of the global political landscape, the US remains in a position of unparalleled strength. Its vast network of powerful allies, its strategic geographic advantage, the stability of the Monroe Doctrine, and the economic interdependence with China all suggest that the US’s role as the world’s leading hegemon is secure for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>Rather than succumbing to the doom and gloom of some political pundits, it is time to recognize the many reasons for optimism. The US has the tools, alliances, and strategic advantages to maintain its leadership and continue shaping a peaceful, prosperous global order.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. All views expressed here are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/The-Resilient-Hegemon-Why-Americas-Global-Leadership-Endures.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-resilient-hegemon-why-americas-global-leadership-endures/">The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Political Economy of Security</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-political-economy-of-security/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 2024 19:19:51 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29252</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As Americans enter an era of unprecedented technological innovation and global instability, the question of how to secure the nation’s future looms large. While discussions around deterrence often focus on military strategies, weapons modernization, and the shifting balance of power, there is an economic dimension to national security that is largely overlooked. Without proper fiscal [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-political-economy-of-security/">The Political Economy of Security</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As Americans enter an era of unprecedented technological innovation and global instability, the question of how to secure the nation’s future looms large. While discussions around deterrence often focus on military strategies, weapons modernization, and the shifting balance of power, there is an economic dimension to national security that is largely overlooked. Without proper fiscal management, the United States risks losing its ability to maintain credible deterrence in the face of growing challenges.</p>
<p>Specifically, if the United States does not reduce government spending and reduce the national debt, the nation’s ability to modernize the nuclear arsenal and keep pace with rapid technological advancements is not possible. It is time for a “guns versus butter” debate that ultimately reigns in domestic spending.</p>
<p>The relationship between economic power and military strength is well-documented. As Paul Poast notes, “<a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070912">Money is power</a>.” <a href="https://cheirif.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/paul-kennedy-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-great-powers-19891.pdf">Paul Kennedy’s research</a> empirically shows, from the Roman Empire to the Cold War, that economic decline often precedes the erosion of military dominance. In today’s context, the United States faces a growing national debt, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/06/18/national-debt-budget-projections-cbo/">projected to surpass $50 trillion by 2033</a>, according to the <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58946">Congressional Budget Office</a>. While this staggering figure is often discussed in terms of domestic economic consequences, such as inflation and interest rates, its implications for national security are equally alarming. The costs of servicing this debt, combined with rising entitlement spending, will leave fewer resources available for defense.</p>
<p><strong>Deterrence and the Need for Modernization</strong></p>
<p>Deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, is the <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1801797/4-things-to-know-about-the-us-nuclear-deterrence-strategy/">bedrock of American security strategy</a> since the end of World War II. The ability to deter adversaries—whether through nuclear capabilities or advanced conventional forces—depends on maintaining a credible threat of retaliation. This requires not only a robust military infrastructure but also a commitment to modernization.</p>
<p>The American nuclear arsenal, a cornerstone of deterrence, is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/06/opinion/nuclear-power-us-invest.html">aging</a>. The <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">nuclear triad</a>—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and strategic bombers—was largely developed during the Cold War. Many of these systems are nearing the end of their operational lives, and without significant investment, they will soon become less effective. The <a href="https://www.afnwc.af.mil/Weapon-Systems/Sentinel-ICBM-LGM-35A/">Sentinel ICBM</a> program and the <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf"><em>Columbia</em>-class submarine</a> are critical components of this modernization effort, but they come with hefty price tags. The Department of Defense estimates that modernizing the nuclear triad will cost over <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/U.S.-Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-Costs-Constraints-Fact-Sheet-v-May-2023.pdf">$1.5 trillion</a> over the next 30 years.</p>
<p>This modernization is not optional. As adversaries like <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/16/china-nuclear-arsenal-weapons/">China</a> and <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12672">Russia</a> expand their nuclear capabilities, failure to update our arsenal would undermine the credibility of American deterrence. In addition, <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/IF10472.pdf">North Korea’s continued nuclear development</a> and <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2024/05/irans-nuclear-threshold-challenge/">Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons</a> only increase the need for a reliable deterrent. However, modernization is only possible with sustained investment. If the US continues its current fiscal trajectory, defense spending will only decline, as it already has, by the <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2024/08/what-is-the-national-debt-costing-us#:~:text=The%20Congressional%20Budget%20Office%20(CBO,trillion%20over%20the%20next%20decade.">growing demands of interest payments</a> on the national debt and mandatory spending on programs like Social Security and Medicare.</p>
<p><strong>Technological Advancements: The New Frontier of Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>Beyond nuclear modernization, the future of deterrence will be defined by emerging technologies. As Michael Horowitz notes in his <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032725">2020 article</a>, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, autonomous drone warfare, cyber warfare, and hypersonic weapons are reshaping the nature of conflict. These technologies have the potential to transform military operations by providing advanced capabilities for precision strikes, autonomous systems, and cyber operations that can incapacitate an adversary’s critical infrastructure without the need for traditional warfare.</p>
<p>However, the integration of these technologies into the American defense apparatus requires substantial investment in research, development, and deployment. <a href="https://itif.org/publications/2024/09/16/china-is-rapidly-becoming-a-leading-innovator-in-advanced-industries/#:~:text=In%20all%20these%20industries%2C%20China,over%20the%20last%2025%20years.">China is already making significant strides in AI and quantum technologies</a>, while <a href="https://fortune.com/2024/03/15/russia-china-hypersonic-innovation-holding-us-back-politics-tech/">Russia continues to prioritize hypersonic weapons development</a>. The US cannot afford to fall behind in this technology race, as the consequences for deterrence are dire. A nation that lacks cutting-edge capabilities risks becoming vulnerable to both traditional and non-traditional forms of warfare.</p>
<p>Yet, technological innovation is expensive. Maintaining a competitive edge in AI, cyber capabilities, and other advanced technologies requires not only a well-funded military but also a robust industrial and academic infrastructure. If government spending continues to spiral out of control, the funds necessary to develop and integrate these technologies will be diverted to service the national debt or shore up social welfare programs. This creates a vicious cycle in which the American military falls further behind while adversaries close the gap—or even surpass the United States—in critical areas.</p>
<p><strong>The Economic Roots of Military Power</strong></p>
<p>The decline in military readiness that results from unchecked government spending and rising debt is not hypothetical. Historical examples illustrate the dangers of economic mismanagement leading to military weakness. The Soviet Union, for instance, collapsed, in part, because it <a href="https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/simes-collapse.html?scp=169&amp;sq=george%20kennan&amp;st=Search">overextended itself militarily</a> while failing to <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021716/why-ussr-collapsed-economically.asp">manage its economic challenges</a>. While the US is far from Soviet-style economic collapse, the lesson is clear; no nation can maintain military dominance without a strong economic foundation.</p>
<p>Paul Poast, a leading scholar on the political economy of security, <a href="https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070912">highlights the importance of economic capacity in sustaining military power</a>. Military expenditures are only sustainable if the state has the economic resources to support them. Poast argues that focusing solely on military budgets without addressing the underlying economic conditions that make those budgets possible is a recipe for disaster.</p>
<p>In the American case, <a href="https://www.pgpf.org/the-fiscal-and-economic-challenge/fiscal-and-economic-impact">the growing national debt is directly threatening the economic foundation</a> necessary for sustained military investment. Interest payments on the debt already consume $900 billion each year, and that figure is expected to rise significantly in the coming decade. As interest rates increase, so will the cost of servicing the debt, leaving fewer funds available for national defense. Without a course correction, this fiscal irresponsibility will leave the US incapable of maintaining its military superiority, much less modernizing its forces for the future.</p>
<p><strong>The Path Forward: Fiscal Responsibility as a National Security Imperative</strong></p>
<p>To avoid this grim future, the US must prioritize fiscal responsibility as part of its broader national security strategy. There are no historical examples of any nation borrowing its way to prosperity. This begins with reining in government spending and reducing the national debt. While this may require difficult political choices—such as reforming entitlement programs or scaling back certain discretionary spending—the alternative is far worse. A nation that cannot afford to invest in its defense is a nation that cannot defend itself.</p>
<p>Moreover, reducing the national debt would free up resources for the investments necessary to modernize the nuclear arsenal and integrate emerging technologies into the military. By putting the nation’s fiscal house in order, it is possible to ensure that the US remains a global leader in both traditional and technological forms of deterrence. Failure to do so risks not only economic consequences but also the erosion of America’s ability to defend its interests and allies in an increasingly volatile world.</p>
<p>The political economy of security is not just about guns and bombs—it is about dollars and cents. If the nation fails to address the growing national debt, the US will prove unable to modernize its nuclear arsenal or keep pace with the technological change that is defining the future of warfare. Fiscal responsibility is not just a domestic issue; it is a national security imperative. Only by controlling spending and reducing debt can deterrence remain credible.</p>
<p>By taking the necessary steps now, the nation can secure a future where America’s deterrent capabilities remain strong and its security unassailable. Failing risks a future where deterrence fails, and with it, the ability to protect the nation and its allies. The stakes could not be higher.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/The-Political-Economy-of-Security_Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-political-economy-of-security/">The Political Economy of Security</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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