<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:Military Doctrine &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/military-doctrine/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/military-doctrine/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2026 11:59:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>India’s Push for Long Range Air-to-Surface Missiles</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-push-for-long-range-air-to-surface-missiles/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-push-for-long-range-air-to-surface-missiles/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdul Wassay]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2026 13:09:59 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air-LORA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BrahMos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional-nuclear threshold]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deep strikes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation dominance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation ladder]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[full-spectrum deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indian Air Force (IAF)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[J-10C]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-range air-to-surface missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LR-ASM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[May 2025 war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mirage-2000]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistani air defence zones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PL-15]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[quid-pro-quo-plus (QPQP)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rafale]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rampage missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SCALP/Storm Shadow]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stand-off capability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32212</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>India’s accelerating induction and expansion of long-range air-to-surface missiles (LR-ASM) into its conventional stockpile marks a shift in its military doctrine after the May 2025 war with Pakistan. While Indian officials frame this build-up to strengthen deterrence, the pattern raises deeper concerns. By favouring LR-ASMs, India is preparing for deep strikes without risking aircrew. This [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-push-for-long-range-air-to-surface-missiles/">India’s Push for Long Range Air-to-Surface Missiles</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>India’s accelerating induction and expansion of long-range air-to-surface missiles (LR-ASM) into its conventional stockpile <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/indian-air-force/">marks</a> a shift in its military doctrine after the May 2025 <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/2/pahalgam-attack-a-simple-guide-to-the-kashmir-conflict">war</a> with Pakistan. While Indian officials <a href="https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2088180&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=2">frame</a> this build-up to strengthen deterrence, the pattern raises deeper concerns. By favouring LR-ASMs, India is preparing for deep strikes without risking aircrew. This doctrinal shift may disrupt the already fragile escalation ladder in South Asia and dangerously blur the lines between conventional and nuclear thresholds. LR-ASM missiles could reshape crisis dynamics and deterrence stability between India and Pakistan.</p>
<p>In May 2025, Pakistan shot down seven Indian warplanes, a claim backed by later credible <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/07/16/how-did-pakistan-shoot-down-indias-fighter-jets">reports</a>. U.S. sources <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1956030">confirmed</a> Chinese-built J-10C fighters shot down Indian Rafales, and Pakistan’s Air Chief Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu <a href="https://dailytimes.com.pk/1411320/air-chief-says-paf-humbled-enemy-rafales-proved-ineffective/">publicly</a> tallied the Indian fighters destroyed in combat. Multiple <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/07/16/how-did-pakistan-shoot-down-indias-fighter-jets">reports</a> also identified wreckage of an Indian Rafale and Mirage-2000 at Pakistani strike sites, reinforcing Pakistan’s account. India provided <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-shot-down-six-pakistani-military-aircraft-may-air-force-chief-says-2025-08-09/">no evidence</a> to dispute these claims.</p>
<p>India’s response to those losses has been to extensively enlarge its LR-ASM arsenal. In the May war, the Indian Air Force (IAF) used its BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, French SCALP/Storm Shadow, and <a href="https://tribune.com.pk/story/2553857/military-notes-on-indo-pak-conflict-the-conduct-of-war#:~:text=IAF%20also%20fired%20the%20supersonic%20air%2Dto%2Dsurface%20Rampage%20missiles%2C%20co%2Ddeveloped%20with%20Israel%20Aerospace%20Industries%20(IAI)%2C%20from%20Su%2D30%20MKI%2C%20Jaguar%20and%20MiG%2D29K%20(Indian%20Navy%2DIN)%20fighter%20jets.">Rampage missiles</a> to strike targets from its own territory. Now India openly seeks even longer reach. Reports say India is in talks to procure the Air-LORA long-range missiles from Israel and is also field-testing an 800 kilometer (km) range <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/india-to-induct-800-km-brahmos-missiles-to-upgrade-strike-capability/articleshow/124701435.cms">BrahMos</a>. Almost two years ago, India contractually <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/39k-crore-deals-to-buy-missiles-air-defence-guns-inked/articleshow/108148791.cms">signed</a> its largest-ever BrahMos procurement (220 missiles, approximately $2 billion) and approved 110 more air-launched BrahMos.</p>
<p>Longer-range missiles enable Indian jets strike “from safe distances,” beyond Pakistan’s air defence zones, including advanced Pakistani air-to-air weapons like PL-15. Each new LR-ASM thus allows India to <a href="https://casslhr.com/op-ed/a-shift-in-iaf-strategy-against-pakistan/">hit targets deep</a> from its own soil. After the May war, India is changing its <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/indian-air-force/">tactics</a>: attack Pakistan without risking aircraft losses. Thus, in the next conflict, Pakistan will also retaliate equally, and this might take the crisis up the rungs of the escalation ladder. Every extra kilometer of range brings Pakistan’s “red lines” closer. For Islamabad, even a strike from hundreds of kilometers away could look indistinguishable from a major attack. <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/every-inch-of-pak-territory-is-within-brahmos-range-rajnath/articleshow/124675141.cms">Analysts</a> note that with 800 km range missiles, all Pakistani cities, from Islamabad to Karachi, lie within reach of Indian jets flying entirely from Indian territory. Some analysts <a href="https://dailymare.com/news/pakistan-warns-of-possible-indian-preemptive-strike-on-key-naval-bases,1756">warn</a> there is now almost no conventional buffer: any use of these missiles could be conflated with a strategic attack.</p>
<p>Pakistan’s doctrine of <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2022/nuclear-south-asia-three-years-after-the-february-2019-kashmir-crisis/">“full-spectrum deterrence”</a> is designed to deter threats “at all rungs” of that ladder. In practice, using LR-ASM will make any deep Indian conventional counterforce strike against Pakistan more feasible, and this will be treated in Pakistan as an existential threat. These novel weapons will also cause an illusion of security in India since they will feel that they can launch attacks with no major reprisal by the Pakistani side, or if there is any, then it will be countered. Due to this expansion, India has made <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2022/nuclear-south-asia-three-years-after-the-february-2019-kashmir-crisis/">limited strikes</a> a more attractive coercive instrument and bargaining an increasingly risky game of brinkmanship. LR-ASM <a href="https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_859_3.pdf">enables</a> an attacker to impose rapid, precision costs on an adversary (targeting runways, command-nodes, air-defences, logistics) without risking pilots, so political leaders can credibly threaten or carry out deep strikes short of general war. This kind of weapon also compresses the decision-making time windows through which India can compel Pakistan’s actions and shift the onus of responsibility of escalation onto Pakistan.</p>
<p>The consequences for deterrence are also stark: a <a href="https://www.factsasia.org/blog/the-nuclear-bluff-or-reality">limited conflict</a> in future may have a much higher probability of escalation. Modernization and high-alert postures already leave “little margin for error” in South Asia. When India can hit sensitive targets from 800 km away, and Pakistan retaliate back via its quid-pro-quo-plus (QPQP) strategy, multiple rungs can be skipped, potentially leading to a full-scale war. In such a scenario, Pakistan’s Army Rocket Force Command and the Pakistan Air Force’s long-range unmanned systems would form part of Islamabad’s broader retaliatory and signalling toolkit. Indian strategists may view a layered mix of BrahMos, Rampage, and Air-LORA as a route to <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09636412.2024.2311106#abstract">“escalation dominance”</a> by pressuring Pakistan while minimising their own vulnerabilities. Yet the May 2025 losses only deepen this appetite for so-called risk-reducing stand-off capabilities, even though classic Kahn and Schelling deterrence theories <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/false-allure-escalation-dominance/">warn</a> that such confidence in <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR900/RR974/RAND_RR974.pdf">controllable escalation</a> is often an illusion.</p>
<p>LR-ASM expansion after the May 2025 war will generate an illusion of dominating the escalation ladder in the Indian psyche. This increases the possibility of a conventional strike, which would compel both states to skip multiple rungs of the escalation ladder and risk a more dangerous crisis. The May 2025 war demonstrated exactly how LR-ASM capabilities increased the dangers of escalation. In the absence of force posture transparency, plausible restraint signalling, and a solid mechanism of crisis handling, the deterrence equilibrium will be more fragile in the region with major consequences of potential nuclear involvement.</p>
<p><em>Abdul Wassay is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies, Lahore. He can be reached at </em><a href="mailto:info@casslhr.com"><em>info@casslhr.com</em></a>.<em> The views expressed are those of the author.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Indian-Push-for-Long-Range-Air-to-Surface-Missiles.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="224" height="62" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 224px) 100vw, 224px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-push-for-long-range-air-to-surface-missiles/">India’s Push for Long Range Air-to-Surface Missiles</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-push-for-long-range-air-to-surface-missiles/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sher Ali Kakar&nbsp;&&nbsp;Atta Ullah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2025 12:44:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Agni-Prime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[air defense systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Balochistan Think Tank Network]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BUITEMS Quetta]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bunker-buster missile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cold Start doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[confidence-building measures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional superiority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counterforce capability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crisis management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation dominance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[full-spectrum deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Pakistan conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international diplomacy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[limited war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear posture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear-capable missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Sindoor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rail-based launcher]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[retaliatory capability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security dilemma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Asia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic affairs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic signaling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technological development]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31745</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP Singh and Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recent, statements by <a href="https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/world-should-learn-from-india-air-chief-marshal-ap-singh-on-russia-ukraine-conflict-israel-war-494869-2025-09-19">Indian Air Force Chief Marshal AP</a> Singh and <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1947463">Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi</a> reflect how India’s military doctrine is transforming, which, in recent years, has undergone a significant shift and is marked by a more offensive and assertive approach. India continues to expand its military modernization program beyond its defense needs, as evidenced by its ranking as the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf">second-largest</a> importer of military equipment, alongside its huge <a href="https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/IB_Maheen_Sept_24_2024.pdf">investment</a> in indigenization.</p>
<p>India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.</p>
<p>These capabilities are considered key to a state’s <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/">escalation dominance strategy</a>. However, India’s <a href="https://sci-hub.se/https:/link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-15-6961-6">escalation dominance</a> in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.</p>
<p>In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.</p>
<p>Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1944192">Cold Start</a>, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.</p>
<p>On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-significance-north-koreas-rail-mobile-ballistic-missile-launcher">operational capability and survivability</a>, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.</p>
<p>The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.</p>
<p>India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1925251">bunker-buster</a>. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.</p>
<p>These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.</p>
<p>It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/india/modis-address-to-nation-key-statements-made-by-pm-on-pakistan-3536977">military capabilities</a> and technological strides.</p>
<p>On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">Trump</a>’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1937611">tariffs</a> was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.</p>
<p>India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.</p>
<p><em><strong>Sher Ali Kakar </strong></em><em>is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. </em><strong><em>Atta Ullah</em></strong><em> is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Indias-Strategy-of-Escalation-Dominance.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/">India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-strategy-of-escalation-dominance/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Showcases the Limits of Nuclear Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-showcases-the-limits-of-nuclear-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-showcases-the-limits-of-nuclear-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Anshu Kumar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 11:55:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional balance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crisis stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense preparedness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence adaptation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence credibility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence credibility gap]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence erosion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence escalation management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence failure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence theory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation ladder]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[forceful versus non-forceful deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germany military aid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[incremental warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[limits of deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mutual destruction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[non-nuclear forces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear red lines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear signaling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear threshold]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operation Spyder Web]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia-Ukraine war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russian nuclear doctrine 2024]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stability-instability paradox]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic culture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tactical nuclear weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine counteroffensive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war thresholds]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31685</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons early in the Ukraine conflict presents an interesting dilemma. For many analysts, this conflict exemplifies the limits of nuclear deterrence, an issue worth exploring. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany was one of Russia’s closest economic partners. At the outset of the war, Germany was criticized for its [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-showcases-the-limits-of-nuclear-deterrence/">The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Showcases the Limits of Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons early in the Ukraine conflict presents an interesting dilemma. For many analysts, this conflict exemplifies the limits of nuclear deterrence, an issue worth exploring.</p>
<p>Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany was one of Russia’s closest economic partners. At the outset of the war, Germany was <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-offers-ukraine-helmets-draws-kyiv-mayors-ire-2022-01-26/">criticized</a> for its hesitant offer to Ukraine of 5,000 military helmets, at a time when other European states, especially the Baltic nations, were offering weapons and heavy military equipment to defend against the Russian invasion.</p>
<p>This hesitancy had two facets. First, the belief that military aid would escalate the war to unmanageable levels. Second, the fear that Russia could easily achieve its military objectives. In such a case, it was unwise for Germany to risk its economic interests, particularly its heavy reliance on Russian natural gas.</p>
<p>However, Germany, later, began supplying <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-which-weapons-is-germany-supplying/a-66723828">weapons</a> and other military aid to Ukraine under domestic and international pressures. <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-war-russia-germany-still-blocking-arms-supplies/">Later</a>, Germany even supplied heavy <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64391272">military equipment</a> to Ukraine. As of August 2025, Germany <a href="https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/ukraine-node/ukraine-solidarity-2513994">is</a> one of the largest suppliers of military aid, amounting to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/germany-nato-ukraine-support-military-equipment-ecf467b892843343863727651e2982ca">$47 billion</a> worth. This includes air-defense systems, advanced drones, and heavy artillery. German action illustrates how incremental support erodes Russia’s nuclear red lines.</p>
<p><strong>Incremental Steps Eroding the Threshold</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>In the Russian conceptualization of deterrence, strategic deterrence (<a href="https://www.sup.org/books/politics/russian-way-deterrence">strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye</a>), both nuclear and conventional deterrence merge into one holistically integrated framework. The threat of or actual use of nuclear weapons would deter a conventional attack on Russia, help achieve military objectives, prevent third parties from entering a war, and help de-escalate a war. <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/politics/russian-way-deterrence">In the 1990s</a>, when Russia fielded a conventionally inferior armed force, it relied primarily on nuclear deterrence for its security.</p>
<p>However, a nuclear-deterrence-focused security strategy does not consider the erosion of thresholds owing to incremental changes during war (i.e., incremental changes test interwar and intrawar deterrence). After Pakistan became a nuclear power, Pakistan employed sub-threshold tactics (terrorism) against India, assuming that the fear of mutual nuclear vulnerability would prevent India from using kinetic means in retaliation. However, this approach failed when India employed conventional force against Pakistan in 2016, 2019, and, more prominently, in <em>Operation Sindoor</em> (2025). Similarly, Ukraine challenged Russia with its aggressive attacks in response to Russian invasion.</p>
<p>Russia’s <a href="http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/">updated nuclear doctrine</a> (2024) brought the threshold of nuclear employment to an even lower level than earlier doctrine. This <a href="http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/">includes</a> “actions by an adversary affecting elements of critically important state or military infrastructure” and “the massive launch […] of air and space attacks means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned, hypersonic and other aerial vehicles).”</p>
<p>Ukraine’s <em>Operation Spyder Web</em> crossed these “nuclear thresholds” set in the 2024 doctrine. Russia’s numerous threats of tactical nuclear weapons use are not taken seriously by Europe any longer. This creates a stability-instability paradox where “conventional balances <a href="https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99913/RP%20No%2004.pdf">also reduce the credibility</a> of nuclear threats precisely because there is a conventional alternative to resorting to nuclear weapons.”</p>
<p>One of the implications of the stability-instability paradox in international relations is that while nuclear weapons create stability at the strategic level by deterring large-scale war between nuclear-armed states, they increase the likelihood of smaller, limited, or conventional conflicts. This is reinforced in the Ukraine conflict, where Russia simply cannot use nuclear weapons to deter third-party military help to Ukraine and Ukraine’s counteroffensives.</p>
<p>Nuclear deterrence has limitations and does not deter incremental or conventional actions of lower yields. The costs associated with utilizing nuclear weapons for deterring incremental erosion of thresholds is unimaginable. It is difficult for parties in a war to agree upon thresholds. Thus, resorting to conventional attacks rather than escalating to nuclear use becomes more likely, even after crossing stated red lines.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>States Should Build on That</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>For that matter, those states looking to augment their defence preparedness should invest in conventional deterrence capabilities that can guarantee security. This goes beyond just building missile and air-defense systems of a high calibre. Conventional deterrence is not merely about weapons to deter an adversary.</p>
<p>Military thinking needs to go beyond just inventing new weapons and focus on military strategy. States need to go beyond a one-size-fits-all understanding of deterrence, where all states subscribe to the same benchmarks, variables, and conceptualization of deterrence, and have a shared sense of it. Situating deterrence within the fold of strategic culture, how a state’s strategic culture shapes deterrence, is more helpful. For instance, in contrast to the denial versus punishment typology, Russia uses the <a href="https://www.sup.org/books/politics/russian-way-deterrence">forceful versus non-forceful</a> scheme for deterrence.</p>
<p>States may need to invest in the re-invention of military doctrines, strategy, and thinking to suit current challenges. It is worth studying how adversaries see the concept of deterrence. It confers two advantages. First, it helps one remain prepared for any incremental utilization of force under the fear of mutual destruction. Second, it allows the defender to assess the opponent’s risk-taking appetite and nuclear threshold in a war. This would confer advantages associated with effectively using conventional means.</p>
<p>At the same time, both parties need to be aware of over-extension, where a misguided action can cause a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Since agreeing on the same trigger point is subjective and difficult, states must study the pace, timing, and intensity of the use of non-nuclear forces to effectively achieve objectives without jumping to the nuclear step on an escalatory ladder.</p>
<p>In the end, preventing nuclear war is critical. Thus, understanding thresholds is important. If war is unlikely to end, ensuring it does not escalate to nuclear use should be a top priority.</p>
<p><em>Anshu Kumar is a Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian &amp; Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/The-Russia-Ukraine-War-shows-the-limits-of-Nuclear-Deterrence.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="256" height="71" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 256px) 100vw, 256px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-showcases-the-limits-of-nuclear-deterrence/">The Russia-Ukraine Conflict Showcases the Limits of Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-showcases-the-limits-of-nuclear-deterrence/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 12:09:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic destabilization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy sector]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[force protection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intelligence failures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[internal dissent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international standing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logistical shortcomings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[national interests. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[natural gas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Oil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychological impact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sabotage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security strategies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain disruptions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tactical miscalculations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vulnerabilities]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30811</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s military doctrine, honed through decades of sparse experience and adapted in the post-Soviet era, emphasizes the projection of power and the defense of its vast territory. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed a critical weakness: a systemic inability to implement effective force protection measures, resulting in significant vulnerabilities for Russia’s critical infrastructure, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/">Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Russia’s military doctrine, honed through decades of sparse experience and adapted in the post-Soviet era, emphasizes the projection of power and the defense of its vast territory. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed a critical weakness: a systemic inability to implement effective force protection measures, resulting in significant vulnerabilities for Russia’s critical infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. This failure stems from a complex interplay of factors, ranging from tactical miscalculations and logistical shortcomings to a potential underestimation of the adversary’s capabilities and a possible overconfidence in Russia’s own defensive capabilities.</p>
<p>Force protection, in its broadest sense, encompasses all measures taken to safeguard personnel, equipment, and facilities from hostile actions. For the military, this includes battlefield tactics, intelligence gathering, logistics security, and the establishment of robust defensive perimeters. For critical infrastructure, it involves physical security, cybersecurity, and contingency planning to mitigate the impact of attacks. Russia’s struggles in both areas are glaringly apparent.</p>
<p>On the battlefield, Russian forces repeatedly demonstrated a lack of effective force protection. From the initial botched attempts to seize Kyiv to the protracted and costly battles in eastern Ukraine, Russian units suffered heavy casualties. This was often due to a combination of poor tactical decisions, inadequate reconnaissance, and a failure to adapt to the evolving battlefield. Ambushes, artillery strikes, and drone attacks took a heavy toll, revealing vulnerabilities in their supply lines and a lack of situational awareness. This inability to protect its forces has not only hampered Russia’s military objectives but also had a cascading effect on the security of its critical infrastructure.</p>
<p>The vulnerability of Russia’s infrastructure, particularly its energy sector, is a direct consequence of these force protection failures. Oil and natural gas fields, pipelines, and processing facilities, often located in remote areas, require robust security to prevent sabotage or attack. However, the demands of the war in Ukraine stretched Russia’s military resources thin, leaving critical infrastructure exposed.</p>
<p>Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep within Russian territory, including energy facilities, demonstrates this vulnerability. These attacks not only disrupt energy production and supply but also have a significant psychological impact, undermining public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and vital assets.</p>
<p>Several factors contribute to Russia’s struggles with force protection and the resulting infrastructure vulnerabilities. Firstly, the sheer size of Russia and the length of its borders make it incredibly challenging to secure all potential targets. This geographical challenge is compounded by the fact that many critical infrastructure sites are dispersed and remote, making them difficult to defend effectively. Secondly, there are indications of potential intelligence failures. Russia may have underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and its ability to conduct effective counter-offensives, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of preparedness for attacks on its own territory. Thirdly, logistical issues plague the Russian military. Supply-chain disruptions, shortages of essential equipment, and a lack of well-trained personnel have all contributed to the erosion of force protection capabilities.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the potential for internal dissent and sabotage cannot be discounted. The war in Ukraine fuels anti-government sentiment in Russia, and there is a risk that individuals or groups opposed to the regime may seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to express their discontent. Such internal threats further complicate the task of ensuring the security of these facilities.</p>
<p>The implications of Russia’s failure to implement effective force protection are far-reaching. The disruption of energy supplies can have a devastating impact on the Russian economy, leading to shortages, price increases, and social unrest. Moreover, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure can undermine Russia’s international standing and its ability to project power. The perception of weakness can embolden adversaries and erode alliances, further isolating Russia on the world stage.</p>
<p>Russia’s ongoing struggles with force protection in the context of the Ukraine conflict have exposed critical vulnerabilities in its infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. These vulnerabilities stem from a combination of tactical miscalculations, logistical shortcomings, intelligence failures, and the inherent challenges of securing a vast and geographically dispersed territory. The consequences of these failures are significant, with the potential to destabilize the Russian economy, undermine public confidence, and weaken Russia’s international standing. As the conflict continues, Russia will need to address these shortcomings if it hopes to protect its critical infrastructure and safeguard its national interests. The ability to learn from these failures and adapt its security strategies will be crucial for Russia’s long-term stability and its ability to project power in the region and beyond.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the </em><a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a><em> and doctoral student at Missouri State University. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Joshua currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Russias-Vulnerable-Underbelly_-The-Failure-of-Force-Protection-and-its-Impact-on-Critical-Infrastructure.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="187" height="52" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 187px) 100vw, 187px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/">Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/russias-vulnerable-underbelly-the-failure-of-force-protection-on-critical-infrastructure/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Why Military Presses Matter</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-military-presses-matter/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-military-presses-matter/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam Lowther&nbsp;&&nbsp;Laura M. Thurston Goodroe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Sep 2024 11:59:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air & Space Power Journal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Air University Press]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Budget Cuts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civil-Military Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Debate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense budget]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Discussion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Historical Record]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intellectual Development]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joint Operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Leadership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Allies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Archives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Books]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Challenges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Community]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Contributions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Criticism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Editors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Education]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Engagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Ethics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Funding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Institutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Journals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Leaders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Monographs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Officers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Partners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Benefits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Debate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Discussion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Influence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Journals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Monographs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Profession of Arms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Record]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Press Thought]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Presses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Professionalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Readership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Reforms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Scholarship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Solutions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Thought]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Training]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Universities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military War Colleges]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Writers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Operational Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Professional Journals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Service Presses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tactical Issues]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=28982</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On a 2015 official visit to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) National University of Defense Technology in Changsha, China, I (Adam) was talking with a senior PLA colonel about Chinese and American views on nuclear deterrence. The colonel, who knew I specialized in China’s nuclear weapons program, also knew that I was in charge of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-military-presses-matter/">Why Military Presses Matter</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On a 2015 official visit to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) National University of Defense Technology in Changsha, China, I (Adam) was talking with a senior PLA colonel about Chinese and American views on nuclear deterrence. The colonel, who knew I specialized in China’s nuclear weapons program, also knew that I was in charge of the United States Air Force’s professional journals <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/SSQ/"><em>Strategic Studies Quarterly</em></a> and <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ASPJ/Archived-Editions/"><em>Air &amp; Space Power Journal</em></a> (Arabic, English, French, Mandarin, Portuguese, and Spanish). At one point in our conversation, the colonel looked at me and said, “I read your journal. We can match your technology, but we cannot match the quality of your officers. They are much better thinkers than our own.”</p>
<p>I was taken aback by his comment. It also convinced me of the role <em>Air &amp; Space Power Journal </em>played, albeit small, in deterring the Chinese from choosing conflict with the United States. In the decade since that encounter, <em>Air &amp; Space Power Journal—Mandarin</em>, which published Mandarin language (often translated from English) articles written specifically for a Chinese audience, ceased publication. Arabic and French editions are also no longer published. Air University Press, which publishes books by military and civilian authors and the Air Force’s professional journals, also lost several of its staff positions.</p>
<p>If Air Education and Training Command’s proposed 2025 budget remains unchanged, <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/">Air University Press’s</a> operating budget will shrink to a point that operations will become virtually untenable. The circumstances are similar for <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/">National Defense University Press</a>, which publishes <a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/"><em>Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)</em></a><em>,</em> and a number of books and research monographs on topics related to joint operations. <a href="https://usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press">Naval War College Press</a>, <a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/">Army War College Press</a>, <a href="https://www.usmcu.edu/MCUPress/">Marine Corps University Press</a> and <a href="https://jsou.edu/Press">Joint Special Operations University Press</a> also saw their budgets decline over the past decade. It is only <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/">Army University Press</a> at Fort Leavenworth that still seems to maintain significant support—despite being smaller than at past points in time.</p>
<p>The decision to further reduce military press budgets in fiscal year 2025 to the point that even operating is a challenge, is short sighted in the extreme. For example, the 2025 NDU Press budget, proposed as an unfunded requirement (UFR), is 54 percent less than the 2012 budget. NDU eliminated funding for NDU Press, including <em>Prism</em> and <em>JFQ</em>, as of FY21. Temporary funds were identified, but those will likely expire in 2025. Without the UFR, NDU Press, now down to a staff of 5, will cease production of <em>JFQ</em> for the first time in 32 years.</p>
<p>Military presses play a vital role in the life of the services and the joint community. They are unique tools that allow each service to discuss and debate tactical, operational, and strategic issues internally and share and debate the perspectives of service members with the academic community, other services, allies, and partners, and, as our experiences illustrates, America’s adversaries.</p>
<p>For less than 0.000025 percent of the <a href="https://www.govexec.com/defense/2023/03/bidens-842b-pentagon-budget-proposal-would-boost-new-weapons/383825/">defense budget</a> (roughly $20-25 million), the services can fully fund all seven presses. Such a sum does not even constitute noticeable waste in the federal government. Service presses play an important role that goes well beyond the few points offered above. Let us explain.</p>
<p><strong>The Service Press</strong></p>
<p>Just over 40 years ago, noted civil-military scholar Sam Sarkesian <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1601063">observed</a>, “All militaries must be socialized into reinforcing their commitment to the political system and in their understanding of the political-social dimensions of their role as soldiers. How well this is accomplished is primarily a function of military professionalism.” The US military, as a group of individuals with specialized knowledge, “<a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3036&amp;context=parameters">are granted autonomy</a> contingent on maintaining the trust of the society they serve,” and in which members become experts on this knowledge and “share a commitment to common values and ethical principles.”</p>
<p>Debate and discussion about these issues often take place in the pages of service journals. For example, in the Spring 2024 issue of the US Air Force’s, <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AetherJournal/"><em>Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower &amp; Spacepower</em></a>, three Air Force officers discuss the challenge of “moral injury” as a result of waging war. Service presses also frequently publish articles or books on <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/nco-journal/archives/2024/january/breaking-the-cycle/">professional ethics</a>, <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0146_SAWTELLE_REAL.pdf">leadership</a>, and related topics. They serve as a vital outlet for members of the military and civil service to identify and discuss the very challenges that undermine the character of a free nation’s military.</p>
<p>The importance of thinking about larger ideas and crafting thoughtful arguments is nothing new. In an October 1946 speech to the US Air Force’s <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/">Air University</a>, Army Air Forces Major General F. L. Anderson <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/1947_Vol01_No1-4/1947_Vol1_No1.pdf">noted</a>, “It is not enough for airmen to be technicians. They must be versed in human affairs; they must understand the political, social, and economic aspects of international relations. They must be educated to the standard required by the history-changing role of Air Power.” Service presses serve as leading indicators of the intellectual health of the military as they affirm, explore, and expand the “specialized knowledge” of the profession as well as the all-volunteer force’s shared “commitment” to broader societal values and principles.</p>
<p>By providing a platform for Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians to discuss and debate the profession of arms in a rigorous manner—a platform that includes inputs from the public at large including taxpayers, Allies, partners, diplomats, and civilian researchers—largely unavailable anywhere else, servicemembers are compelled to think deeply about war and its consequences. Consider the persistent debate over the role of retired senior military officers in US foreign policy in the pages of <em>Parameters </em>first in <a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2402&amp;context=parameters">2006</a> and revived again in <a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss1/1/">2020</a>, or the Gian Gentile-John Nagl debate over Afghanistan in pages of <em>JFQ</em>. These professional academic fora provide an opportunity for military professionals and civilian contributors to challenge the existing orthodoxy and offer new and better approaches for achieving American interests through military means. Publications of publicly funded professional military presses are often a place for self-examination and criticism of the system. As discussed below, they are the one place where authors are free to challenge the institution they serve.</p>
<p>These long-standing institutions are places where the military’s best and brightest can engage with and participate in the intellectual development of the military profession and its members. In fact, key service doctrinal innovations were developed and honed in military publications—consider Air Force Colonel John A. Warden’s Five Rings, Army General Don Starry’s AirLand Battle, and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John Boyd’s OODA Loop. Finally, professional military presses serve as a critical repository and history of the military’s intellectual development, providing Americans a window into the proclivities, trends, and concerns of a subordinate military, which, while representing a fraction of the population that the Constitution makes subordinate to civilian authority. Sadly, in an era focused on technological solutions to all military challenges, service presses and their role in encouraging innovative thought within the military is seen as expendable.</p>
<p><strong>Scholarly For a Reason</strong></p>
<p>Except for National Defense University Press and Joint Special Operations University Press, which work for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Special Operations Command, respectively, military presses are subordinate to each services’ education and training command and aligned under their professional military education institutions. These schools are civilian-accredited masters- and, in some cases, doctoral-degree granting institutions. These presses adhere strictly to civilian academic publishing standards but vary in one important way. They provide an unmatched level of support to the many military officers who seek to publish an article, book, or monograph related to their profession. Military press editors spend far more time helping their writers craft quality articles than traditional academic presses. After all, military presses serve the profession of arms, along with university academics who write for a living.</p>
<p>The founding of military presses and their publications date back seven decades or <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2022/">more</a>. Importantly, they offer military members a place to publish that maintains a strong tradition of discourse and academic freedom. In the inaugural issue of <em>Air University Quarterly Review</em> in March 1947, the <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/1947_Vol01_No1-4/1947_Vol1_No1.pdf">editorial board</a> noted the now-familiar disclaimer that accompanies all publications of military presses, that the content therein represents authors’ opinions and may not “coincide with” that of the military service or department.</p>
<p>The 1947 opening statement said, “The Editor and Editorial Board wish to encourage new thinking. Consequently, if the appearance here of articles which may not agree with accepted policy, or even with majority opinion, will stimulate discussion and provoke controversy, an important part of this journal’s mission will have been accomplished: to induce airmen to have original thoughts on these matters and to give these thoughts expression.” In the immediate post-World War II era, leaders of the Army Air Forces knew how important it was to encourage airmen to think, write, and develop ideas that challenge the status quo.</p>
<p>Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, established <em>Joint Forces Quarterly</em> in 1993, soon after the Gulf War, <a href="https://nam02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2Fportals%2F68%2FDocuments%2Fjfq%2Fjfq-1.pdf&amp;data=05%7C02%7Claura.thurston_goodroe%40au.af.edu%7Cbc9a7adeea1645d6023808dc639ba667%7C9f90e2a5baf54a3787bd48acea06e6e2%7C0%7C0%7C638494767912638036%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=qdyaeeJcVf6HMrENjqyN1ZhTDSLmByqoCqUupN73g6A%3D&amp;reserved=0">admonishing</a> readers not to “read the pages that follow if you are looking for the establishment point of view or the conventional wisdom. Pick up JFQ for controversy, debate, new ideas, and fresh insights—for the cool yet lively interplay among some of the finest minds committed to the professional of arms.”</p>
<p>Military presses are not part of a service’s public affairs office, nor should they be. Understandably, contributions to military presses must be cleared to ensure no classified information is released and that a service’s doctrine is not misrepresented. However, well-reasoned dissent and criticism are not only acceptable but highly desired. In fact, in many cases, that is the purview of a military press—loyal opposition. Starving military presses of funding or killing them outright shuts down the very discussion they were designed to facilitate.</p>
<p>Contributions to military presses are necessarily wide-ranging and include everything from the fine details of drone technology to satellite operations, international political economy, deterrence, and discussions of social issues affecting the military. Again, the military not only must execute America’s political will with lethal force but must continually replenish its all-volunteer ranks through enticing individuals and families to serve.</p>
<p><strong>Society-Wide Intellectual Engagement</strong></p>
<p>Military presses engage in a dialogue that is both internal to each service, where iron sharpens iron, and external, where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians attempt to shape perspectives nationally and abroad. The relatively few academic journals that cover “security studies” broadly speaking, rarely publish the type of scholarly yet professionally focused articles and books that are the purview of service presses. This means that without them, the debate ceases to occur.</p>
<p>Western militaries are bureaucratic and technocratic in nature and rigorously examine failures. Coming from open societies, they often freely discuss their challenges to find the best solutions. Cutting off that discussion by killing the venues where those discussions take place will inevitably lead to suboptimal outcomes. The civilian and military contributors to service press publications, together with readers, create a larger intellectual common where dialogue that is critical to stewarding the effective execution of politics by other means takes place.</p>
<p>The common created by this dialogue has significant worldwide reach and impact. For example, Air University Press’s four journals have an annual audience of well over one million readers globally. National Defense University’s <em>Joint Force Quarterly</em> had close to one million readers worldwide in 2023. The other military presses have similar annual readerships. Ally and partner militaries read American military publications and often adopt similar thinking and approaches. Adversary militaries read American military publications and are impressed by the level of creativity, intelligence, and thoughtfulness of the United States’ military establishment.</p>
<p><strong>Historical Record</strong></p>
<p>Finally, military presses are an unrivaled record of military thought and the change in thinking that follows the nation’s many conflicts. <a href="https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Military-Review/"><em>Military Review</em></a> is a case in point. It was first published in 1922 as a response to American involvement in World War I. In the century since the journal began, <em>Military Review </em>has played a vital role in the various reform movements that changed the Army after major conflicts like Vietnam, for example.</p>
<p>The flagship journal of the Air Force, currently represented by the journals <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AetherJournal/"><em>Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower &amp; Spacepower</em></a> and <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ASOR/"><em>Air &amp; Space Operations Review</em></a>, turned 77 in March 2024 and predate the establishment of the US Air Force. Airpower’s evolution and debates surrounding topics like the Air Force role in countering a rising China and nuclear modernization are found in their pages.</p>
<p><a href="https://usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review"><em>Naval War College Review</em></a> was founded in 1948 and serves as the central venue for the discussion of seapower. The journal’s archives are the central repository for discussion and debate concerning seapower’s role during the Cold War, for example.</p>
<p><a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/"><em>Parameters: A Journal of Strategic Landpowe</em>r</a> published its first issue in 1971 and was largely a response to the US Army’s performance in Vietnam. Many of the post-Vietnam reforms undertaken by the Army were first discussed in its pages.</p>
<p>Further, these publications are peppered with the articles of field grade officers who later became general and flag officers—a sign of the importance the military places on the intellectual development of its future leaders. Just to name a few, <a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol16/iss1/27/">then-Major David H. Petraeus</a>, <a href="https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol23/iss1/24/">then-Major Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr</a>., then-Captain James Stavridis, and <a href="https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-03_Issue-2/ForsythSaltzman.pdf?ver=l1oVFUVbmuX8OQTlxSMsgQ%3d%3d">then-Lieutenant Colonel B. Chance Saltzman</a> all wrote in their respective professional journals. Leading civilian scholars of the military also contribute to service professional journals. Barbara Tuchman, Richard Betts, John Mearshimer, Robert Pape, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, Tammi Biddle, Williamson Murray, Matthew Kroenig, and Hal Brands all contributed to the various professional publications of the military presses.</p>
<p><strong>Whether Civilian or Military Outlet</strong></p>
<p>Some ask why civilian-operated military-focused outlets cannot do the job of a military press. Indeed, fine civilian and association journals, such as <em>Air &amp; Space Forces Magazine</em>, <em>Texas National Security Review</em>, <em>Global Security Review</em>, <em>Marine Corps Gazette</em>, <em>Proceedings</em>, <em>Armed Forces &amp; Society</em>, <em>RUSI</em> <em>Journal</em>, and <em>War on the Rocks</em> are actively engaged in the various and important debates that arise from the military profession. However, service presses do not report to a board of directors, individual donors, or other private entities. They are publicly funded, open access, and are often staffed and led by active-duty, retired, or former servicemember with deep service-specific knowledge. This approach to publishing allows service presses to publish on topics that are important to their service, but not necessarily commercially viable.</p>
<p><strong>The End of Service Presses?</strong></p>
<p>For senior service leaders looking to pinch every last penny to fund new weapons or additional operations, this makes a support entity like a press an attractive target. This is a short-sighted effort to save very little money. In the case of the Air Force, eliminating Air University Press will save about $1 million in operations costs and $2 million in staff salaries and benefits. This, in an Air Force Budget of about <a href="https://www.afrc.af.mil/News/Article/3703300/daf-releases-2025-budget-proposal/#:~:text=The%20%24217.5%20billion%20proposal%20that%20Congress%20will%20now,percent%2C%20%242.4%20billion%2C%20from%20last%20fiscal%20year%E2%80%99s%20budget.">$217 billion</a>.</p>
<p>The services and the Department of Defense should reconsider the regular cuts to military press budgets. Rather than severely underfunding or effectively defunding their presses, the services and the Department of Defense should fund them to a level that allows each to perform the functions discussed above.</p>
<p>Service leaders must be fully cognizant of the role their presses play and the audience they serve. While most fall under the organization of each service’s military university or war college, service presses draw contributors and readers from across the service and beyond. Over 99 percent of the more than 1 million readers that learn from the Air Force’s professional journals are not students at Air University, for example.</p>
<p>It is also time to put to rest the incorrect belief that military presses exist solely to serve students at the various command and staff and war colleges. They do not. Instead, they belong to their respective services and provide information and research for audiences—military and civilian—at home and abroad. As such, it is perhaps time for service secretaries and chiefs of staff to take a role in ensuring that their presses continue to serve as the place where the service expresses its intellectual history, innovation, and thought.</p>
<p>Regardless of whether the United States wins or loses its wars, military presses and the professional books, monographs, and journals they publish will serve as the place where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Guardians, and members of the broader society think, discuss, and debate the profession of arms. The demise of service presses is not in the interest of any service, but it seems it will take a senior leader or Congress to step in and stop this from happening.</p>
<p><em><strong>Dr. Laura Thurston-Goodroe</strong> is the editor of Æther and Air &amp; Space Operations Review. <strong>Dr. Adam Lowther</strong> is the Vice President of Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are their own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Why-Military-Presses-Matter.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-military-presses-matter/">Why Military Presses Matter</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-military-presses-matter/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
