The Iran War may eventually end through a ceasefire, an interim agreement, or a broader diplomatic settlement. Regardless of how the fighting stops, one thing has become impossible to ignore. The Middle East’s existing security architecture has failed. For decades, the region operated under a series of overlapping assumptions. Gulf states relied heavily on American military protection. Israel maintained its own formidable deterrent capabilities. Arab governments pursued bilateral relationships with Washington while attempting to manage tensions with Tehran through diplomacy, economic engagement, or strategic hedging. The war exposed the limitations of that model. 

Despite decades of military investment, Gulf states found themselves vulnerable to missile and drone attacks. Critical energy infrastructure, shipping routes, and economic hubs became targets. Even where air and missile defenses performed effectively, the conflict demonstrated that no country can indefinitely defend itself against sustained missile salvos without deeper regional cooperation. 

The lesson from the war is not simply that Iran remains a challenge. The deeper lesson is that the region lacks a credible collective defense structure capable of deterring aggression before it escalates into major conflict. If the objective is to prevent future missile attacks, deter nuclear coercion, reassure regional partners, and avoid a destabilizing nuclear arms race, then the Middle East requires a new collective defense arrangement, not a direct replica of NATO, but instead an alliance inspired by some of its most successful features. 

The Collapse of the Old Model 

For many years, the Gulf security order rested on a simple bargain. The United States would provide military protection and extended deterrence while regional states focused on economic development and internal stability. The Iran War exposed the weaknesses of that approach. Even with a significant American military presence, missile and drone attacks reached the Gulf territory. Air defense systems intercepted many threats, but the sheer volume of attacks highlighted the vulnerability of individual states acting largely on their own. At the same time, regional governments discovered that they often had limited influence over strategic decisions that could profoundly affect their security. They faced the consequences of escalation without necessarily controlling it. The result is a growing recognition that future security arrangements cannot return to the status quo. 

Why Collective Security Is No Longer Enough 

For decades, regional cooperation has largely focused on collective security rather than collective defense. Collective security emphasizes diplomacy, dialogue, intelligence sharing, and crisis management. It helps states coordinate responses to threats but does not necessarily guarantee military support if a member is attacked. The Iran War demonstrated the limitations of that model. Missile attacks, drone strikes, maritime threats, and the possibility of nuclear coercion require more than consultation mechanisms. It requires credible defense that deters. 

Deterrence depends on an adversary believing that aggression against one state will trigger a broader regional response from others that is not worth the aggressive action. This is the essence of collective defense. The challenge facing the Middle East is therefore not simply to cooperate more effectively. It is how to build a framework capable of convincing potential adversaries that aggression against one participant risks confrontation with all. 

What a New Collective Defense Framework Would Look Like 

Rather than each country operating independently, a common air and missile defense network would provide a shared operational framework and faster response times. This is arguably the easiest and most practical first step because many of the required systems already exist. 

A successful post-war defense architecture would likely rest on five pillars. Each pillar supports the others in creating a collection of capabilities that can be brought to bear on an aggressor. 

Pillar 1, Integrated Missile Defense: The Iran war demonstrates that missile defense is no longer a national challenge; it is a regional one. A future framework should connect the radar, sensor, and interceptor networks of, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan, and the United States. 

Pillar 2, Integrated Intelligence: No missile defense system can function effectively without intelligence. A regional integrated intelligence network would combine missile warning systems, satellite surveillance, maritime monitoring, counter-terrorism intelligence, and track proxy groups. Israel’s intelligence capabilities would be particularly valuable, while Gulf states could contribute geographic reach, local networks, and regional expertise. 

Pillar 3, Conventional Military Integration: Deterrence works best when adversaries believe aggression will trigger an unacceptable coordinated response. Regional militaries should develop joint planning mechanisms, common operating procedures, maritime security coordination, air force interoperability, and shared exercises. The goal would not be to create a supranational military force but rather to ensure that any attack on one member triggers a coordinated defensive response. 

Pillar 4, A Credible Nuclear Umbrella: This concept is likely to be the most controversial component, yet it may also be the most important. Extended deterrence has historically been one of the most successful tools available for limiting nuclear proliferation among allies while maintaining strategic stability. However, the greatest long-term danger following the Iran War may not be Iran itself. It may be the possibility that multiple regional powers conclude they require their own nuclear weapons. If Saudi Arabia were to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal, others could eventually follow. The result could be a highly unstable multipolar nuclear Middle East. 

A more sustainable alternative would be a regional extended-deterrence framework similar in principle to NATO’s nuclear umbrella. Under such an arrangement, American nuclear weapons would remain under exclusive United States control but would be integrated into a broader deterrence architecture protecting key regional partners. Potential participants could include Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan. The purpose would not be to spread nuclear weapons across the Middle East. Instead, it would be to prevent their spread. 

Pillar 5, Strategic Consultation: Military capability alone is insufficient to deter. One of NATO’s greatest strengths is not its military hardware but its institutionalized political consultation. This model reveals that regional leaders require standing mechanisms to discuss emerging threats, nuclear developments, crisis management, escalation risks, and collective responses. Security cannot be improvised during a crisis. It must be built before one occurs. 

Israel’s Role in Defense 

A future collective defense framework will be impossible without Israel. 

That reality may remain politically uncomfortable in parts of the region, but the war reinforced Israel’s position as one of the Middle East’s most capable military and intelligence powers. Israel could serve many roles ton include strategic intelligence partner, A missile-defense leader, advanced defense technology provider, and a contributor to regional deterrence. Rather than replacing American leadership, Israel would complement it. 

Not a Middle Eastern NATO 

Critics will inevitably describe this collective defense as a Middle Eastern NATO. That comparison is understandable, but incomplete. NATO emerged as a formal treaty alliance among largely like-minded democratic states facing a common Soviet threat. The Middle East presents a far more complex environment. Any future defense arrangement would likely involve monarchies, democracies, and other political systems with differing strategic priorities. Participation would almost certainly occur at distinct levels, with some states becoming core members while others cooperate selectively. Turkey and Pakistan, for example, could contribute through intelligence cooperation, military exercises, defense-industrial partnerships, and strategic dialogue without necessarily becoming full members.  

Instead of NATO, a collective defense would be more like the Triple Alliance, but more complex. These arrangements would provide a flexible and regionally tailored framework with multiple state interests. Yet it would share one crucial characteristic with NATO. It would be a collective defense. Its central message would be simple. Aggression against one participant risks a coordinated response from all. That principle, backed by integrated conventional and nuclear deterrence, would form the foundation of regional stability. 

Not a Perfect Solution, But the Alternative Is Worse 

Critics will argue that such a framework risks provoking Iran. This may do just this. However, the alternative may be far more dangerous. Without a credible collective defense architecture, the region could otherwise face, persistent missile wars, Iranian coercion, expansion of nuclear weapons programs, strategic fragmentation, and increased great-power competition involving the United States, China, and Russia. 

The purpose of a collective defense arrangement is not to prepare for another war. 

It is to make another war less likely. The Iran War exposed the weaknesses of the Middle East’s existing security order. The challenge now is whether regional leaders can transform that painful lesson into a durable defense framework that deters aggression, reassures partners, prevents proliferation, and creates the foundations for a more stable peace. 

History shows that major wars often reshape regional security systems. The question facing Middle Eastern leaders today is whether they will build a new order after this conflict or wait for the next crisis to force one upon them. 

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the authors’ own. 

Why the Middle East Needs a New Collective Defense Arrangement After the Iran War  was originally published on Global Security Review.

The previously concluded and now cancelled US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) revealed a paradox at the heart of the Middle East security landscape. Both sides have been negotiating back and forth on de-escalation, a compromise on enriched uranium, and freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. However, beneath these ongoing diplomatic efforts is a reality that is becoming increasingly clear. For the Iranian regime, a regional environment of managed conflict is more strategically valuable than a sustained peace agreement. This explains why, even after signing the 60-day ceasefire memo, Iran still attacked ships in the Strait of Hormuz, prompting the U.S. to respond to discourage future Iranian violence.

Iran will likely avoid a full-scale war that risks its destruction, instead preferring a continued proxy-driven, tension-filled regional environment to maintain deterrence and project power without escalation. Recent talks on uranium and safe passage through the Hormuz Strait will fuel Iran’s resistance to normalization with the U.S. and GCC.

Instability As a Strategic Infrastructure

For Iran, pushing for regional instability or proxy confrontations is not merely a temporary policy dispute. It has become embedded in the state’s architecture itself. Iran has built and framed its domestic popularity and regional legitimacy around the concept of resistance against Western pressure, particularly from the U.S. and Israel. This narrative was deeply institutionalized within Iran’s regional strategy, military doctrine, and its main controlling security establishments, the IRGC and Basij forces. In this regard, a comprehensive peace deal with the U.S. would create profound structural questions inside Iran, including the rationale of the “resistance” doctrine in place for decades, the logic of maintaining extensive regional proxy networks, and preserving a missile- and drone-heavy militarized regional posture.

In different ways, a controlled conflict has become part of the regime’s survival and operating environment. Therefore, achieving a sustainable peace agreement can entirely destabilize internal balances of power more than maintaining them. This explains why, even during periods of increased international diplomatic efforts, Iran often preserves parallel escalation mechanisms in addition to never conceding any of its nuclear program development to date. Thus, pursuing negotiations alongside adding pressure on multiple fronts is not a contradiction within Iranian strategic thinking. Instead, they are complementary tools.

The Asymmetric Leverage

Iran’s ability to threaten and demonstrate control over maritime access to the Strait of Hormuz negatively impacted global oil markets and exposed the vulnerability of international energy flows to customer states. In this respect, around one-fifth of global oil flows transit through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the most globally strategic water passages. Accordingly, the ongoing Hormuz crisis reinforces Tehran’s preference for controlled instability.

Iran uses the Hormuz situation to benefit itself domestically and internationally, framing it to show that strategic, asymmetric disruptions give diplomatic leverage. Even after military pressure, the U.S. remains focused on negotiations to reopen Hormuz and restore shipping stability. This is Iran’s leverage that it does not want to cede. Tehran, specifically the IRGC, which appears to be the decision-making authority, believes that maintaining control of Hormuz but avoiding escalation preserves its bargaining power, especially since hardliners see concessions to the U.S. as losses. Iran wants full control of the Strait, knowing it cannot fight the U.S. directly, and employs asymmetric leverage to influence the strategic balance.

Iran’s air force and navy remain significantly limited compared to those of the U.S. and regional GCC states. Additionally, Iran’s economy suffers under sanctions and American quarantines. As a result, Tehran has spent decades developing a different form of deterrence, including ballistic missiles, drones, proxy warfare networks, and regional escalation networks across Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Among Iran’s regional proxy groups, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen remain one of the most critical factors in Iran’s current asymmetric model of confrontation. Since the start of the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran, the Houthis have so far chosen not to fully participate in ground fighting. This is particularly concerning because the Houthis are currently Iran’s most strategically positioned proxy group in the Middle East, armed with a wide range of missiles and drones, capable of inflicting strategic damage across the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb and potentially causing another global maritime shock like Hormuz. This allows Iran to effectively deploy a multi-chokepoint strategy at any time. Alongside their threat to maritime security, the proximity of the Houthis to GCC states and the group’s history of fighting Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2022 give Iran additional leverage to pressure the region.

This asymmetric model works best for Iran when geopolitical friction persists. Even without fully going into a conventional war with the U.S., Iran can complicate Western military planning and generate political costs for its opponents. Therefore, a stable regional order with normalized relations would significantly reduce the strategic utility of all these tools.

Deterrence and The Regime Survival Dimension

Iran’s broader regional strategy relies heavily on maintaining a “forward proxy defense” doctrine beyond its borders to project influence. This approach has served several purposes simultaneously, including creating multiple escalation fronts and increasing the political cost of directly attacking Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, a low-level regional friction prevents the emergence of a fully consolidated anti-Iranian security order.

There is also an internal political dimension that Western analyses often overlook. For example, external confrontations in the hybrid warfare narrative, which often bolster regime unity as periods of increased confrontational pressure enable the Iranian leadership to suppress dissent and rally nationalist sentiment. They frame this to their local population as the West’s war on Islam, aligning it with the state’s ideological identity, deeply rooted in anti-Western and resistance narratives. An internationally accepted peace agreement with the U.S. could lead to unwanted domestic effects for Iran, such as reduced ideological cohesion and increased demands for broader political reforms. Ironically, a limited confrontation might seem safer for regime stability than reaching a peace agreement.

Regional Peace, Security, and Iran

During the recent confrontation, which culminated in April’s ceasefire, more than 80 percent of Iran’s missiles and drones were directed at GCC states. This suggests Iran was willing to strike neighboring countries outside the immediate conflict even though they were not directly fighting with Iran. Such actions undermine regional trust and raise questions about Iran’s willingness to function as a responsible contributor to regional security.

The central paradox of any U.S.-Iran negotiations is that peace itself will threaten some of the strategic foundations upon which Iran has operated for decades. Regional instabilities and relatively managed conflicts provide Tehran with bargaining leverage, geopolitical relevance, and a degree of deterrence it seeks to demonstrate. A sustained peace deal, by contrast, risks reducing Iran’s asymmetric advantages that it has been trying to capitalize upon while also exposing its internal political and strategic vulnerabilities. The U.S. must recognize this reality or risk negotiating without a clear understanding of Iran’s strategic intentions.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

Iran’s Strategic Logic of Instability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Persistent geopolitical instability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has renewed the debate about Indo-Pacific energy security and the need to diversify supply sources. However, diversification alone may not eliminate strategic vulnerability, even with alternative suppliers beyond the Gulf for the Indo-Pacific region, because the challenge lies not only in where energy is sourced but also in the maritime networks through which it travels. 

Recent warnings from the Australian Food and Grocery Council highlight how geopolitical instability in the Middle East is already contributing to broader cost pressures across Australia’s supply chains, especially through increasing fuel and logistics costs, as an example of a region at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. 

The Indo-Pacific’s capacity to decrease its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz is limited not by geography but by a broader network of contested maritime chokepoints influenced by proxy conflicts, especially the Bab el-Mandeb corridor connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In the event of a disruption in Hormuz, states such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand could theoretically turn to alternative suppliers in the Americas, Africa, or the Atlantic basin. 

However, diversifying suppliers does not necessarily reduce risk. Many of these alternative supply chains still rely on the same vulnerable maritime routes, exposing them to similar transportation and security dangers. For example, Bab Al-Mandeb (Red Sea gateway) continues to face significant disruptions from Yemen-based Houthi attacks. Meanwhile, Somali pirates have become more active due to the current regional crisis involving Iran, which raises risk premiums and causes delays in the Gulf of Aden. 

As a result, proxy warfare, rather than a formal state blockade, may also limit Indo-Pacific states’ ability to rely on alternative supplies. For example, non-state actors and proxy forces (especially in Yemen), along with regional instability, can disrupt the straits without owning them. Under these conditions, proxies can exert strategic influence over maritime corridors without officially controlling them. 

This indicates a shift in the international order where effective control of maritime corridors no longer requires sovereign ownership; disruption capability alone can achieve similar strategic results. Meanwhile, strategic geography links Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb together; disruption in one can increase pressure on the other. 

Proxy maritime actors like Yemen-based Houthis disrupt the Red Sea, while Somali piracy networks remain a persistent risk that could increase costs and uncertainty for shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden. As a result, energy security diversification in the Indo-Pacific region is limited not by a lack of alternative suppliers but by the concentration of global maritime energy flows at politically contested chokepoints. Therefore, these contested chokepoints are truly a security dilemma for the Indo-Pacific’s states. 

The growing capacity of proxy actors and non-state groups to disrupt these corridors transforms maritime geography into a web of vulnerabilities, undermining the effectiveness of traditional diversification strategies. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific’s energy security strategy must consider proxy-driven disruptions within maritime chokepoint networks, rather than relying solely on supplier diversification as a resilience measure. 

To address this risk, the Australian Defense Force has participated in coalition-based maritime security operations in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. However, its role has remained limited to multilateral frameworks rather than unilateral action. The escalating instability linked to Iran-related regional tensions and the widening insecurity from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa may increasingly pressure Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand to reassess their strategic posture toward key maritime chokepoints, including the scope, depth, capacity, and autonomy of their future engagement. 

This is especially significant as Iran continues to violate the current ceasefire with the U.S. and is eyeing Bab el-Mandeb, the only chokepoint after Hormuz that connects Asia, the Middle East, and Europe with the purpose of inflicting damage on the global economy and achieve a more robust position in its negotiations with Washington. 

Unlike Australia and Thailand, countries like Japan and South Korea are highly vulnerable to these threats because they are consistently among the top liquid natural gas and crude oil importers worldwide. This has led Seoul and Tokyo to sign a strategic agreement to strengthen energy cooperation despite longstanding historical disputes. 

A collective security action may be necessary if Indo-Pacific countries are to ensure energy security and strengthen domestic resilience amid rising geopolitical instability and the growing prevalence of regionally based asymmetric warfare. State and non-state actors increasingly employ coercion, sabotage, proxy forces, and physical attacks against critical supply lines to undermine political stability and disrupt economic activity. Because global and regional energy markets, maritime trade routes, and supply chains are highly interconnected, disruptions in or around a single country can cascade across the broader region. Consequently, Indo-Pacific nations have a shared interest in strengthening collective maritime security. By working together to deter threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and secure access to vital energy resources, regional states can enhance their ability to withstand external shocks and preserve the economic and social stability upon which long-term resilience depends. 

Shad Sherko is an independent journalist and security analyst specializing in Middle Eastern defense policy, regional proxy dynamics, and cross-border insurgencies. His work focuses on contemporary security threats across the Middle East and beyond. The views of the author are his own. 

Proxy Wars Threaten Energy Security in the Indo-Pacific Amid Regional Turmoil in The Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced at just a few thousand dollars. This inversion has established a new guiding principle of defense: countering low-cost threats with low-cost means. This shift extends beyond state-on-state conflict. Affordable drone technology is expanding the military potential of small and medium-sized nations. At the same time, it multiplies the operational capacity of non-state actors, terrorist organizations, extremist groups, insurgent movements, and criminal networks that are turning what was once an expensive domain into an accessible tool of asymmetric warfare.

The Economic Inversion of Warfare

Traditional defense procurement has long relied on high unit costs and limited production runs. A single main battle tank or advanced air-defense missile can cost tens of millions of dollars. Yet, inexpensive drones costing as little as $500 have repeatedly destroyed or disabled assets worth millions. A commercially modified quadcopter or loitering munition can achieve effects once reserved for precision-guided munitions costing orders of magnitude more. The result is a dramatically altered cost-exchange ratio that favors the attacker. This forces even well-funded militaries to reconsider force structures and procurement chains. For smaller nations with constrained budgets, affordable and scalable drone systems offer a way to build credible denial capabilities without disproportionate spending.

Ukrainian Technology Transfer

A recent example of technology diffusion is the strategic investment announced on March 31, 2026, by Japan’s Terra Drone Corporation in Ukraine’s Amazing Drones LLC through its subsidiary Terra Inspectioneering. The partnership includes the launch of the Terra A1 interceptor drone: an electrically propelled system with a 32 km range, maximum speed of 300 km/h, 15-minute flight time, low noise and heat signature, and the ability to perform airspace surveillance, target detection, and neutralization in a single sortie.

Empowering Non-State Actors and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region

The most destabilizing aspect is the accessibility of these systems to non-state actors. Terrorist and extremist organizations no longer require state sponsors or complex supply chains. Commercial components, open-source software, and simple assembly have lowered the barrier to entry, allowing insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, and ideological extremists to field effective aerial capabilities.In the Asia-Pacific, where vast maritime spaces, porous borders, and multiple gray-zone disputes already exist, the proliferation of cheap drones carries specific risks. Small terrorist cells or insurgent movements could use first-person view (FPV) drones or loitering munitions to disrupt shipping lanes, attack critical infrastructure, or conduct targeted operations with minimal logistical needs. The same technology that enables smaller states to deter larger neighbors also equips criminal networks and extremist groups to challenge law-enforcement or rival factions in remote areas. The combination of low cost, commercial availability, and rapid adaptability means that non-state actors in the region can now sustain prolonged asymmetric campaigns. Reports from other conflict zones show terrorist and insurgent groups already employing commercial UAVs for resupply and precision strikes, and similar patterns are emerging in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.

In Southeast Asia, the risks are particularly acute. The Philippines’ ongoing insurgencies in Mindanao and the porous maritime borders of the Sulu Sea already see small extremist cells experimenting with commercial drones for reconnaissance and occasional strikes. Similar patterns are visible in Myanmar’s borderlands, where insurgent groups have modified off-the-shelf UAVs for logistics and targeted operations. In the Malacca Strait and South China Sea gray zones, low-cost drone swarms could disrupt vital shipping lanes or harass naval patrols with minimal investment. These developments lower the threshold for violence: a terrorist or criminal network with a few thousand dollars can now field persistent aerial surveillance or precision munitions that once required state-level resources. The combination of vast ungoverned maritime spaces and readily available commercial technology creates ideal conditions for prolonged asymmetric campaigns by non-state actors across the region.

Conclusion

The convergence of economic inversion, widespread accessibility, and rapid technology transfer has created a more volatile global security environment. In the Asia-Pacific—a region defined by strategic chokepoints, unresolved territorial disputes, and active non-state threats, the democratization of lethal drone capabilities lowers the threshold for conflict and expands the operational reach of terrorist, extremist, insurgent, and criminal organizations. Policymakers can no longer rely solely on high-end systems. The principle of “countering cheap threats with cheap means” has become the new baseline for credible defense. Without scalable, affordable countermeasures and domestic production ecosystems, states risk ceding initiatives not only to peer competitors but also to far smaller and resource‑constrained actors operating in the region’s gray zones. The economics of war have changed, and the Asia-Pacific region is one where the consequences of the new economics will play out.

Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction was originally published on Global Security Review.

(Editor’s Note: This article was submitted before the U.S.-Iran conflict began. We intentionally left the article as “forward looking” to signify the value of the analysis.)

The Red Sea theater sits in a fragile equilibrium. Commercial shipping lines have cautiously begun returning to the Suez corridor after months of rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. Insurance premiums remain elevated but are no longer crisis-level. Western naval task forces maintain a visible deterrent presence. Meanwhile, the Houthis continue to signal both restraint and readiness. The question is no longer whether the Red Sea crisis of 2024-2025 can return. The question is what specific trigger conditions will lead to its return. Accordingly, the escalating U.S.-Israeli-Iranian confrontation will make the Houthis resume maritime attacks, if not also targeting different spots of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The earlier claims about trench networks around Hodeidah, Yemen and coastal missile positioning, whether fully verified or partly exaggerated, fit within a broader pattern: the institutionalization of a long-term defensive and deterrent posture by the Houthis along Yemen’s western coastline. When combined with February 2026 reporting that maritime traffic is resuming but threats persist, a clearer strategic picture emerges. This is not a de-escalation. It is a structured pause under tension.

The Current Operational Baseline

This month, several dynamics defined the Red Sea environment. This included the cautious resuming of shipping traffic via the Suez route; major new Houthi missile or drone strikes on international vessels were not confirmed in this window, and Western naval forces remained deployed. However, Houthi rhetoric tied potential future maritime action to broader regional developments, particularly U.S.-Iran and Israel-related escalation scenarios. In this respect, the Houthis have announced that they will resume attacks on ships in the Red Sea.

The absence of active strikes should not be misread as capacity degradation. Instead, it reflects a conditional deterrence posture.

The Houthis have demonstrated in prior cycles that they calibrate attacks based on political timing rather than purely military opportunity. That suggests that the past few months’ relative quiet has been strategic, not structural. The Houthis were only preparing more for a bigger scale of maritime attacks.

Hodeidah and Coastal Entrenchment: Defensive Depth as Strategic Signaling

Whether or not the claims of the Houthis’ trench dimensions are independently verified, the logic behind coastal fortification is consistent with Houthi behavior. Hodeidah serves multiple functions for the Houthis. It serves as a coordination hub, a political stronghold, and a strategic maritime access point as well as a symbolic center of resistance. If significant defensive works are underway or expanded, they serve three interlocking objectives.

Firstly, for the purpose of anti-assault preparation, large-scale trenches are classic anti-armor and anti-vehicle barriers. They complicate any amphibious or ground-based incursion supported by regional actors. Secondly, for the purpose of airstrike mitigation, defensive depth complicates targeting and disperses assets such as mobile launchers. When it comes to psychological signaling, massive projects communicate permanence. They project the message: “We are not a temporary militia. We are entrenched.” The current environment, characterized by paused attacks but intact infrastructure for renewed confrontation, aligns with this.

Iran-U.S. Tensions as Activation Factor

The strategic linkage between the Houthis and Iran remains central to forecasting. While the Houthis maintain operational autonomy, their Red Sea campaign historically synchronized with broader regional escalation cycles involving the U.S. and Israel. The emerging rhetoric linking maritime threats to wider geopolitical friction suggests a conditional doctrine: The Red Sea is a pressure valve for the Houthis as directed by Iran.

If the U.S.-Iran tensions spike, whether via direct strikes on Iranian assets or Israeli escalation involving Iran-backed actors, then the Red Sea becomes a low-cost, high-visibility response domain. This makes the Red Sea maritime security in 2026 structurally fragile.

Maritime Deterrence Architecture in 2026

Western naval presence in the Red Sea has shifted from reactive escort to semi-permanent deterrence architecture. The key characteristics of such a strategy included layered missile defense at sea, preemptive ISR monitoring of launch sites, rapid retaliatory strike frameworks, and European naval coordination alongside U.S. military assets.

However, this architecture carries its escalation risk. A single successful Houthi strike on a high-value commercial vessel could trigger renewed U.S. or allied airstrikes inside Yemen, re-divert global shipping flows, and force insurers to re-rate the corridor. Thus, deterrence holds, but it is deterrence under tension, not deterrence under resolution.

Forecast: Strategic Scenarios for 2026

There are multiple scenarios that one could anticipate. However, the most likely scenario would be a triggered escalation where the current regional military action involving Israeli-Iranian confrontation or direct U.S.-Iran confrontation activates Houthi maritime operations. Critical indicators from the Houthis to watch for would include repositioning of coastal missile batteries, increased drone launch activity, and explicit linkage in Houthi statements between Yemen and external theaters.

Another scenario would be the Houthis’ internal consolidation and strategic freeze. Here, the Houthis prioritize internal governance and economic stabilization over external projection. In such a scenario, regardless of any U.S.-Iran military confrontation, the Houthis’ maritime attacks remain suspended, and Red Sea threats become rhetorical rather than operational. However, structural drivers, including ideology, alignment, and leverage utility, make such a scenario highly unlikely.

Structural Realities and Final Strategic Assessment

Three enduring factors ensure persistent volatility. Firstly, the geographic leverage is critical where the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, a narrow passage that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is irreplaceable in global trade. Disruption has a disproportionate economic impact. Secondly, the asymmetric cost structure of the Red Sea maritime attacks grants the Houthis leverage, where their drones and missiles are low cost, the Western defensive interception and naval deployment that are much higher cost. Thirdly, attacks in the Red Sea generate global headlines, thus providing the Houthis with a political signaling value. That makes the theater attractive for indirect signaling. Thus, even if the current situation is relatively calm in the Red Sea, the underlying incentive structure for renewed maritime disruption persists, and threats continue to increase.

The current situation does not reflect the active Red Sea crisis levels of 2024-2025. However, it reflects something equally important: institutionalized readiness. The Houthis appear neither demobilized nor strategically exhausted. Defensive consolidation around Hodeidah, if confirmed, suggests the Houthis’ preparation for future confrontation, not abandonment of maritime leverage. The Red Sea will remain quiet only so long as broader regional dynamics remain contained. The moment those dynamics fracture, most notably with the U.S.-Iranian confrontation, the maritime corridor becomes the fastest and most globally visible arena for escalation. Accordingly, the conclusion is clear: the Red Sea is not stabilizing. It is waiting.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Red Sea Uncertainty: A 2026 Forecast for the Houthis Actions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The partnership is a result of a long-standing history of defense partnerships but does not represent a paradigm shift in defense collaborations. However, the nature of this defense collaboration continues to evolve concerning the relationship of Pakistan to the United States and India. Examining the India-US defense partnership with an eye to the history, agreement details, and overall implications is worth the effort. Chanakya’s philosophical concepts, which are discussed below, are also instructive.

History

The United States and India are not new defense partners. The current agreement is an extension of those older agreements. This series of partnerships began in 2002 under the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA).

The most recent agreement expands the areas of cooperative defense to cyber and maritime security issues. This agreement will help bring the American and Indian militaries into alignment and make their defense capabilities and strategies align more effectively.

This US-India defense partnership is one of the ways that India can move toward greater defense independence and create “self-reliant” defense industries. The goal of this effort is to encourage the development of defense systems produced domestically or developed through technology transfers from other countries and to allow India to produce and export these products globally.

The US-India partnership also anticipates India having an upgraded military, being able to project maritime power more effectively, and enhancing its ability to deter aggression. The improvements in India’s military capabilities and its nuclear posture align with India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy; however, India’s evolving security environment is beginning to mirror the American security environment.

The partnership between the US and India will also help to reinforce the Quad framework (US, Japan, Australia, and India) as a key element of American Indo-Pacific Strategy, creating a free, open, and rules-based regional order. It is also anticipated that increased defense cooperation between the US and India will provide an enhanced collective deterrent against Chinese assertiveness and will enable the US and India to conduct more frequent and extensive joint naval and air exercises, such as the Malabar exercise.

Similar to other forms of strategic wisdom that are based upon the doctrines of Chanakya, the US-India defense agreement appears to reflect the concepts of not engaging directly with an adversary, depleting an adversary’s resources, and winning when the circumstances are appropriate. As such, it appears that India is employing a similar approach (building partnerships, establishing a defense industrial base, attaining strategic independence, and then waiting until the opportunity presents itself to engage) with similar replenishment concepts (economic and diplomatic) that were outlined in Chanakya’s playbook to allow India to capitalize on a potential weakening of the enemy due to internal politics.

While this agreement does provide a framework for cooperation and addresses some of the regional security concerns, including India’s negative view of China as an aggressive actor in the Indo-Pacific, the agreement does not establish a legally binding security arrangement, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Rather, the agreement reflects an increasing level of strategic convergence and represents a cooperative structure for defense. Media coverage of the agreement frequently exaggerates the significance of the agreement, while downplaying the fact that defense relationships between the US and India are not new and have little impact on the strategic balance between India and Pakistan.

While some in Pakistan see this latest agreement as a threat, the best option for Pakistan is to employ diplomacy, act in good faith to prevent future terror attacks in Indian territory, and avoid escalating tensions due to a false perception of encirclement. Positive dialogue with India and other regional actors will decrease the chance of conflict and build trust.

The US can serve as a stabilizing force to create dialogue between India and Pakistan and enhance regional cooperative mechanisms. Regional actors, such as China, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, etc., need to develop new policies to maintain an equilibrium in South Asia and not take action that exacerbates existing regional tensions.

The latest US-India agreement serves as a foundation for increased cooperation and may benefit regional stability and the overall security of the Indo-Pacific region. The degree to which this defense agreement has the ability to positively contribute to the strategic stability of South Asia depends on successful implementation of its provisions and the degree to which the United States and India can work with other regional states to address emerging challenges.

Harsa Kakar is as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. The views expressed are personal. She can be reached at Kakarhsa01@gmail.com.

The Impact of the India-US Growing Strategic Partnership on South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s initiative to invest in critical telecommunications and emerging technology in foreign countries, is a vehicle to lower the barriers to cyber coercion and propagate the digital curtain. By embedding its “model of technology-enabled authoritarianism” in recipient nations, Beijing seeks to shape the digital ecosystems of other countries in ways that serve its strategic interests. Such attempts call for a proactive and coordinated response from the United States and its regional partners—one that builds a resilient, tech-driven organization capable of countering China’s digital expansion across the the Indo-Pacific.

The United States and China are engaged in a great power competition, one which has seeped into multiple theaters and domains. The Indo-Pacific region is generally understood to be the frontline of this contest.

However, China’s burgeoning technological capacity has led to cyberspace being a critical juncture in this competition; one where traditional borders fade, thereby allowing the proliferation of gray zone tactics. Such tactics are deployed in various ways—infiltrating critical infrastructure, cyber espionage, and disinformation campaigns—on key democracies in the region.

Considering the geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific, China’s attempts to use cyber coercion to cleave the region from the United States’ sphere of influence highlights a calculated strategy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The region is home to over 50 percent of the world’s population, and 80 percent of global trade volume transits through its channels. It houses “seven of the world’s largest militaries, and five American treaty allies.”

Moreover, digital connectivity and internet adoption rates are the fastest growing compared to any region in the word, making it rife with opportunities and threats. These vulnerabilities not only indicate further volatility for regional governments but could also undermine American national security.

The list of cyber incidents already attributed to Chinese state-sponsored entities is extensive, and its targets are equally expansive. Advanced persistent threat (APT)—long-term, sophisticated, and entrenched cyber intrusions designed to hack, steal, and/or neutralize systems—have been a weapon of choice for those entities. For instance, APT-30 and APT-40, which targeted Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members and New Zealand’s government, respectively, are reportedly linked to the Chinese government.

Furthermore, American intelligence and cybersecurity agencies recently confirmed that Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored entity, compromised American critical infrastructure ranging from telecommunications to water systems; its reach even included US territories such as Guam.

While the specter of ATPs and digital intrusions have entered the purview of several governments in the Indo-Pacific region, individual efforts to deter those threats are futile. This is often due to strategic inertia, a shortage of specialized workers, and asymmetric capabilities.

A consolidated effort by the United States and its regional partners is needed to build consensus, direct resources, and establish a digital enforcement body. This could address those issues while mitigating any potential upheaval from China’s tactics. Fortunately, the groundwork for such a partnership is already in place.

On July 1, 2025, the 10th Quad foreign ministers’ meeting was hosted by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where he was joined by his counterparts from Japan, India, and Australia. It was the second such meeting since January, signifying the importance placed on the vision of the group by the Trump administration.

The measures agreed upon as a result are further evidence to that fact—initiatives to bolster maritime and transnational security, economic security, critical and emerging technology, among others. Therefore, the vast security mandates of those initiatives provide a viable path to constructing a techno-centric partnership while addressing the region’s strategic, skills, and capabilities gaps when it comes to deterring China’s digital incursions.

The decision to expand the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)—a technology-focused initiative to augment the maritime security landscape—provides a practical foundation for a techno-centric partnership. Its stated goal of developing a “common operating picture” for the IPMDA could lead to the basis for a strategic consensus among potential members.

Furthermore, incorporating insights from the first Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) workshop could assist in closing the skills gap for a regional digital workforce, further adding to the partnership’s feasibility.

Additional features which could be utilized for the partnership and address the capabilities gap include the Quad Cyber Challenge and the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. The Cyber Challenge seeks to enhance the cyber ecosystem, digital awareness, and resourcing among member nations.

The Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience, on the other hand, bears a more tactical responsibility of strengthening telecommunications infrastructure, specifically, undersea cables—arguably the most critical component of the digital ecosystem. Although these initiatives are focused on Quad member-nations, they could be expanded in a larger forum to engage ASEAN and Pacific subregional organizations such as the Pacific Island Forum, providing more opportunities for resource allocation.

There is institutional and strategic momentum behind the formation of a tech-centric partnership, not to mention the critical security imperative that exists. The broad consensus, coupled with the runway to take near-term action, makes this a prospective enterprise. Such concrete action is necessitated if the US and its regional allies expect to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and establish an active deterrent to China, which seeks to write the rules and draw the margins of the evolving digital age.

Abrar Rahman Namir is currently interning at Associated Universities and assisting in the Batteries and Energies to Advance Commercialization and National Security program as a supply chains and trade analyst.

Tech-centric Partnership in the Indo-Pacific to Deter Digital Curtain was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.

The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis announced that they would resume attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.

As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.

Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat

At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.

The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.

A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity

Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.

Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.

Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact

The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a cost-effective weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.

Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and reinforcing the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.

This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.

This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.

Intelligence and Great Power Enablers

What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily Russia and China. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.

This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.

This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.

The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations

Many military planners agree that land operations are required to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.

Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective land-sea-air doctrine integration.

Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations

The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.

The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.

Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea

The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.

To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.

A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Why the Houthi Threat Persists was originally published on Global Security Review.

By mid-June 2025, after years of preparation, the Israelis, in one fell swoop, destroyed half of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, destroyed some nuclear facilities, and assassinated Iran’s leading nuclear scientists and the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Then on June 23, 2025, a pre-dawn bombing raid ordered by US President Donald Trump took out of commission the hard-to-crack nuclear facilities of Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.

Beyond adding to Israel’s capabilities with American B2 bombers loaded with GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrators, bunkers busters, the bombing cemented American leadership in dealing with the Iran problem. A review of joint Israel-US capabilities helps explain how deterrence in the region is returning and what to expect next.

Since the October 7, 2023, massacre of Israelis by Hamas, an Iranian proxy, Israeli intelligence and military units, all backed by superior defense technology, methodically destroyed Iranian capabilities and supporters. Iran’s “Ring of Fire” utterly failed to achieve Iran’s strategic aims.

Israeli and American space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enabled early warning, target verification, and battle damage assessment. Israel relied on a precision-strike doctrine that is supported by systems like the Ofek, AMOS, and Eros-B space assets. Israel maintained surveillance for dominance above Iranian military and nuclear infrastructures. Iran merely linked its space program to the IRGC.

With multi-layer sensor fusion, Israel integrates Eitan unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), ELW-2090 airborne warning and control systems, and ground-based radars like the EL/M-2080 Green Pine with satellite data into a national and regional situational awareness (SA) web, shaping strikes and missile defense prioritization. Space-derived situational awareness enables real-time assessment of missile launches, UAV swarm attacks, or asymmetric maritime threats by Iran and proxies operating from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf.

Cyber intelligence, signal intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic warfare form another layer. In the conflict, Israel command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems pit Unit 8200 against IRGC affiliated cyber units.

Israel’s missile shield includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-2/Arrow-3. They combine to create a web of coverage. Arrow’s high-altitude, long-range interceptors tackle Iranian ballistic missiles such as Fattah, Shahab, and Sejil. Iron Beam laser defense, under development, aims to address low-cost, high-volume threats like UAVs and small rockets.

Israeli capabilities for missile defense, early warning, C4, and interoperability are integrated with US Central Command and the systems of the Gulf States. The US supports Arrow and David’s Sling. Aegis ballistic missile defense and terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) systems in the region share radar feeds. American space-based infra-red system satellites provide missile-launch detection.

Bahrain hosts the US Navy and supports regional C4ISR, and has growing maritime security ties with Israel. The US expanded its Saudi Arabian basing in Tabuk to feed into the regional missile defense picture. The United Arab Emirates enables THAAD, Patriot (PAC-3), radar integration, and air picture sharing with the US and Israel. Jordan, the United Kingdom, and France also contribute to defensive actions during missile and drone attacks.

Iranian targets and their proxies have nowhere to hide. The US Space Force’s Space Operations Command Mission Delta 4 identifies and tracks threats. It did so during the April 2024 and October 2024 Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel. Operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to share intelligence, Mission Delta 4 ensures no missile launch ever catches America or her allies and partners by surprise.

A space-enabled Israel, integrated with Gulf State operations, eliminated Iranian air defenses, triggered covert operations inside Iran, and launched targeted bombings and assassinations. The American bombing topped these other efforts. Israel, as the military strong horse, irreversibly altered the regional balance of power, possibly ushering in the demise of a threatening Iranian Shia hegemony—an objective shared by Sunni Arab Gulf States.

Regime change was never a stated war aim but was an anticipated consequence if it occurred. It did not. The surviving Shia Islamist leadership and IRGC are now engaged in repression and remain capable of inflicting much suffering on both the region and Iranians.

It is unclear to which extent proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias can still attack Israel and American assets in the region. Military outcomes, though, are not the sole factors defining the Iranian endgame. The Iranian taqiyya-driven regime and its Shia hegemony ideology are down, but not out. Their nefarious ideological influence can persist around the Gulf, as far as Yemen and Africa, and beyond.

Considering the cost of inaction and a failure to reinstate deterrence, eradicating a threat to the homeland, Middle East bases, and Gulf allies means the effort was worth it. If the conflict drags on, the costs will rise. Disruption of maritime traffic and oil markets could bring its predictable cohort of economic disruptions. Terrorism around the globe is déjà vu.

In the words of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, “Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us.” Depending on the roles the new Syrian leadership and a resurgent Türkiye play, the Iranian endgame may take different forms.

Yes, President Trump decisively played the hand he was dealt. But there are many more moves left in this game. The best moves may be still to come.

Christophe Bosquillon is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current responses, ranging from US, UK, and Israeli airstrikes to maritime task forces, aim to degrade the Houthis’ operational capabilities. Except for recent American bombing efforts, they have fallen short of effectively neutralizing the group’s capacity to pose a critical threat to maritime trade in the Red Sea as well as the wider threat of destabilizing the region.

What it would truly take to dismantle the Houthi threat, in a sustainable and strategic manner, requires a multi-dimensional, coalition-led effort that combines kinetic force, strategic isolation, regional realignment, and political recalibration. Many of these key strategic components are still missing in the current response to the Houthis’ actions.

The Houthi Threat: Tactical Capabilities, Strategic Leverage

Beginning in 2023, the Houthis began escalating their attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and even the Gulf of Aden—utilizing Iranian-supplied drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned suicide boats. These attacks achieved several objectives for the group and its backers in Tehran. First, the attacks successfully disrupted global shipping, raising insurance rates and negatively impacting Egypt’s Suez Canal, which saw a decrease of almost 60 percent of its annual revenue from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Second, the Houthis’ attacks provided a clear projection of Iranian deterrence without a confrontation with the US. Third, the attacks repositioned the Houthis as a pan-regional “resistance” actor, not merely a Yemeni faction.

Despite Israel’s effective strike on Yemen’s sea port of Hudaydah followed by another set of strikes a day later, including ones on the main airport in Sanaa, which probably prompted the Houthis to inform the US that they “don’t want to fight anymore,” the Houthi leadership still exists and their armed capabilities are far from degraded.

If anything is beneficial out of such ceasefire, it is only for the Houthis as it would ultimately allow them to reorganize their resistance and offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Houthis’ obvious ballistic missile and drone capabilities pose a threat to Israel more than ever before.

The Inadequacy of Current Approaches

Western-led responses include airstrikes on Houthi launch sites, naval deployments like Operation Prosperity Guardian, and diplomatic pressure via the UN Security Council. Yet, these actions failed to produce long-term deterrence for four main reasons.

First, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, lack strategic unity regarding Yemen. Conflicting Arab views on how to engage the Houthi threat, along with differing opinions on the alignment of the US military response to the Houthis, are significantly limiting the effectiveness of the US efforts to degrade Houthi capabilities.

Second, Houthi adaptability and decentralized operations make targeting difficult. Houthi leadership, in several interviews, praised their unique structure and claimed it is different from that of Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of not relying on any communication technologies within the group and yet having a decentralized distribution in the mountains in Yemen.

Third, Iranian support continues uninterrupted through land and maritime smuggling. Reports from 2024 revealed that UN mechanisms failed to inspect most ships heading to Houthi-controlled ports.

Fourth, the proximity of civilian infrastructure to military targets limits the rules of engagement for Western forces. Furthermore, there is no insufficient political strategy to undercut Houthi legitimacy among Yemenis, and still, many of the Yemeni population appeal to the Houthi group. Based on the above, an effective strategy for neutralizing the Houthis’ capabilities requires escalation dominance across the military, economic, information, and political domains.

A Multi-Domain Campaign to Neutralize the Houthis

A shift to precision airstrikes by the United States was necessary, but more is needed. This includes high-value targeting of command-and-control (C2) nodes, drone operation sites, missile production sites, and technical assembly sites. Covert special operations strikes by Arab and American forces, to sabotage radar arrays, smuggling depots, and launchpads in areas like Al-Hudaydah and Sa’ada, is also needed.

Furthermore, border security cooperation from Oman is crucial in addition to placing an effective security cooperation framework with Eastern African states, where much of the Iranian weapons smuggling is taking place. Enforcement of naval dominance will occur through the establishment of exclusion zones in the Red Sea, supported by AEGIS destroyers and Gulf-based airpower.

Although the US Navy is taking the lead role in such functions, establishing a regional US-Arab naval cooperation is a key factor in eliminating the threats posed by the Houthis as well as further preventing the smuggling of weapons, missile components, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components to the Houthis via the sea. Cyber disruptions targeting the Houthis’ satellite navigation, drone-control networks, and internal communications is needed. This function is far more complex than it may appear, given that reports indicate that Russia supports the Houthis with targeting data.

Furthermore, it is also reported that the Houthi leadership coordinates directly with Chinese officials regarding safe passage for Chinese vessels. In addition to US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms, providing evidence that China’s technological support strengthens Houthi capabilities is needed.

Accordingly, effective US-Arab intelligence cooperation should be further enhanced to isolate Houthi access to foreign powers. This military approach must be continuous, not episodic, and paired with intelligence fusion centers involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egyptians.

Strategic Isolation of the Houthis from Iran

Without eliminating the Houthi connection to Tehran, no solution can succeed. This requires the interdiction of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime routes, especially between the Bandar Abbas–Socotra–Horn of Africa corridor. Hence, the situation ultimately requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including the use of satellites to ensure effective monitoring of vessels coming to Yemen, not to mention the essential need for regional security cooperation among all the nations surrounding these locations.

The financial isolation of the Houthis and associated members by pressuring banking entities and crypto exchanges that facilitate Iranian transfers to Houthis requires improvement. Continuously drying up the cash sources provided to the Houthis is a key factor in dismantling their operational capabilities. Additionally, increasing regional pressure on Oman to improve its border monitoring and security efforts is crucial for reducing overland routes used for arms and cash smuggling.

Overall, Iran’s support for the Houthis is part of its “ring of fire” doctrine. To dismantle this arc, the Houthis must be made a liability, not an asset, for Tehran.

Recalibrating the Regional Arab Response

Arab unity is a missing ingredient in the fight against the Houthis. A new Red Sea Defense Compact is required, comprising a joint command structure involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and, ultimately, Oman. Having a regional naval and airbase integration with a primary role for Egypt and Saudi Arabia would provide a forward-operating presence across the Red Sea. Given that Houthi disruption of Red Sea commerce and maritime passage directly threatens Egypt’s economic security, strategic re-engagement is particularly important. Such an arrangement would also create a strategic opportunity for a further deepening of US-Egypt defense cooperation and alignment of mutual regional interests.

The need for a Saudi-UAE reconciliation over Yemen’s future is essential, possibly via American mediation. Otherwise, even after neutralizing the Houthi threat, the region risks a politically unstable Yemen. If Arab states continue to act independently, they risk being played against each other, benefiting Iran and prolonging the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

What It Takes to Neutralize the Houthi Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

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The Weekend Gouge was originally published on Global Security Review.