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		<title>Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/applying-the-olympus-mons-problem-solving-model-to-defeat-iran-in-the-gray-zone/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/applying-the-olympus-mons-problem-solving-model-to-defeat-iran-in-the-gray-zone/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Oshawn Jefferson]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:11:29 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Here is a comma separated list of keywords from the article: Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32732</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 3, 2026 In an age of persistent great power competition, the fight for influence is the decisive precursor to any potential conflict. Adversaries like Iran, who cannot compete symmetrically with the U.S., have poured resources into the information domain, recognizing it as the critical battlespace. As detailed in “In an Asymmetrical War, Iran Seeks [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/applying-the-olympus-mons-problem-solving-model-to-defeat-iran-in-the-gray-zone/">Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="none">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> June 3, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">In an age of persistent great power competition, the fight for influence is the decisive precursor to any potential conflict. Adversaries like Iran, who cannot compete symmetrically with the U.S., have poured resources into the information domain, recognizing it as the critical battlespace. As detailed in “</span><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/28/business/iran-propaganda-war-ai.html"><span data-contrast="none">In an Asymmetrical War, Iran Seeks an Edge With Its Information War</span></a><span data-contrast="none">,” Iran is waging a sophisticated offensive to win the war of perception first, shaping the cognitive battlefield to paralyze U.S. decision-making. This poses a direct challenge to the U.S. Department of War’s core focus on &#8220;maximum lethality,&#8221; as outlined in the </span><a href="https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docN9BBD0C110897018cbdf4d6b9bf38037372495e6dcd443e16720c8ecbb7dd8fd3c88164b72dc7"><span data-contrast="none">2026 National Defense Strategy</span></a><span data-contrast="none">. That goal, however, is unachievable if the information battlespace is lost. Cognitive dominance in the operational information environment is not a distraction from lethality; it is the fundamental prerequisite for it. To win, the joint forces must complement their pursuit of kinetic overmatch with a mastery of the cognitive domain.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNA89DA7A0986A2f79201a87db1e5553493b961b3f1a127407a63d481d09d7bdc677d3a0661752"><span data-contrast="none">Iran’s gray zone strategy</span></a><span data-contrast="none">, a mix of proxy warfare and calibrated escalation detailed in analyses by CSIS and Michael Eisenstadt, is designed to create dilemmas and exploit the seams in Western military thought. The U.S. response was to elevate &#8220;</span><a href="https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1490517/introducing-information-as-a-joint-function/"><span data-contrast="none">Information</span></a><span data-contrast="none">&#8221; to a joint function, a critical doctrinal step. But as then-Brigadier General Grynkewich noted when introducing the concept, doctrine-on-a-shelf changes nothing without a corresponding shift in the force’s &#8220;cultural mindsets.&#8221; The real work is building cognitive architecture to apply it.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">This is where a &#8220;Global Mindset,&#8221; defined by scholars in “</span><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/288959604_A_whole_new_global_mindset_for_leadership"><span data-contrast="none">A Whole New Global Mindset for Leadership</span></a><span data-contrast="none">” as &#8220;the capability to influence others unlike yourself,&#8221; becomes a warfighting imperative. This mindset is not an abstract virtue, but a tangible capability built on three pillars: (1) Intellectual Capital: The cognitive horsepower to understand the complex web of political, cultural, and social factors in a contested environment. (2) Psychological Capital: The resilience and fortitude to operate effectively in ambiguous, long-term struggles, countering an adversary’s &#8220;long game.&#8221; (3) Social Capital: The behavioral skill to build trust and show intercultural empathy, allowing for the creation of authentic partnerships and resonant counter-narratives.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">Yet, how do you build this mindset at scale? The answer lies in a structured, teachable framework. The </span><a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315641720-11/enhancing-global-mindset-military-public-affairs-karen-naumann-oshawn-jefferson"><span data-contrast="none">Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model,</span></a><span data-contrast="none"> a methodology developed at The Air University and Defense Information School. It was designed specifically to make the abstract actionable. It provides a repeatable process for planners to solve &#8220;wicked problems&#8221; in the information domain. Its five core elements are:</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(1) Complex Adaptive Systems Thinking: This foundational mindset shifts planners from linear predictable models to seeing the information environment as a dynamic ecosystem. It allows them to anticipate ripple effects and identify high-leverage nodes in an adversary’s network.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(2) PESTLE and Ecosystem Analysis: Using a structured analysis of the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, and Environmental domains, this step builds the deep situational awareness required to uncover the root grievances an adversary like Iran exploits.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(3) </span><a href="https://www.consuunt.com/cynefin-framework/"><span data-contrast="none">Cynefin </span></a><span data-contrast="none">Sensemaking Framework: This framework helps leaders correctly categorize the environment. The gray zone is a &#8220;Complex&#8221; domain, where the only effective approach is to &#8220;Probe-Sense-Respond,&#8221; in essence to conduct small-scale, reversible actions, see how the system reacts, and adapt accordingly. This neutralizes an adversary&#8217;s probing tactics and reduces the risk of miscalculation.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(4) Wicked Solutions for Complex Problems: This approach is the engine for building social capital. It forces planners to see the problem from the diverse perspectives of all stakeholders, enabling the creation of sustainable, locally resonant strategies that can &#8220;flip the script&#8221; on an adversary&#8217;s propaganda.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">(5) Strategic Foresight: This element breaks Iran&#8217;s “long game” advantage by shifting the U.S. focus from short-term reactions to long-term competition, allowing planners to anticipate future conflict domains and build strategic patience.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">Defeating our adversaries in the gray zone is a cognitive, not purely a kinetic, challenge. To achieve the Department of War&#8217;s goal of decisive lethality, we must first win the war of ideas. The time has come for U.S. military leaders to stop treating information as a supporting effort and recognize it as the central battlefield in modern competition. This requires a deliberate, sustained investment in the intellectual and cultural readiness of our warfighters. We must integrate cognitive frameworks like the Olympus Mons model into professional military education and operational planning. This is not just about improving human decision-making today; it is about future-proofing our force. The structured, logic-based nature of this model is the most compatible framework for integration with the Information Advantage large language models that will define the next generation of warfare, allowing our warfighters to serve as the critical &#8216;human-in-the-loop&#8217; for AI-enabled operations in the information environment.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="none">The character of conflict is evolving, but the core of American strength, the ingenuity and adaptability of its warfighters, remains unchanged. The next generation of warfare will not be won by military might and technology alone, but by those who can master the cognitive battlefield of the Operational Information Environment which includes the complex human terrain where influence is wielded and will is broken. Frameworks like the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model do not replace the warrior&#8217;s ethos; they sharpen it, forging leaders who can out-think, out-maneuver, and out-compete our adversaries in the war of ideas. Seizing this cognitive high ground is the ultimate expression of &#8216;peace through strength.&#8217; The tools to build this future are within our grasp; what is required now is the vision and the will to forge the victory of tomorrow.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="none">Oshawn Jefferson is a national security professional and strategic communication expert with over two decades of experience in the U.S. military and academic sectors. He is the creator of the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model and a leading voice on developing cognitive readiness and a global mindset within the Joint Force. The views of the author are his own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233117&quot;:true,&quot;134233118&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Applying-the-Olympus-Mons-Problem-Solving-Model-to-Defeat-Iran-in-the-Gray-Zone.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/applying-the-olympus-mons-problem-solving-model-to-defeat-iran-in-the-gray-zone/">Applying the Olympus Mons Problem-Solving Model to Defeat Iran in the Gray Zone</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>China’s AI-Driven Information Operations Are Here: The US Needs an AI RMA</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-ai-driven-information-operations-are-here-the-us-needs-an-ai-rma/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-ai-driven-information-operations-are-here-the-us-needs-an-ai-rma/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew J. Fecteau]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 May 2025 12:11:01 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30686</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The DoD must incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities to counter the influence of China. Artificial intelligence will inevitably determine who shapes future conflicts. China is actively using these capabilities to gain decision dominance. Focusing on information operations is critical. Drones, for example, use artificial intelligence capabilities, as do defensive systems. However, conflict between near-peer adversaries [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-ai-driven-information-operations-are-here-the-us-needs-an-ai-rma/">China’s AI-Driven Information Operations Are Here: The US Needs an AI RMA</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The DoD must incorporate artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities to counter the influence of China. Artificial intelligence will inevitably determine who shapes future conflicts. China is actively using these capabilities to gain decision dominance.</p>
<p>Focusing on information operations is critical. Drones, for example, <a href="https://medium.com/@adelstein/ai-powered-defense-how-cutting-edge-technology-is-revolutionizing-national-security-against-drones-1934a13123fa">use artificial intelligence capabilities</a>, as do defensive systems. However, conflict between near-peer adversaries and competitors is still unlikely <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/todays-wars-are-fought-in-the-gray-zone-heres-everything-you-need-to-know-about-it/">as gray zone and hybrid conflict are the dominant avenues for competition</a>. With the information environment transcending all domains of warfare, artificial intelligence capabilities become the go-to capability to ensure and maintain information advantage.</p>
<p>China’s AI-enhanced information operations are becoming increasingly sophisticated. For example, the Chinese advanced persistent threat actor <a href="https://cyberscoop.com/tag/spamouflage-dragon/">Spamouflage Dragon</a> uses generative AI to create online personas to influence public opinion. China and its proxy companies seek to develop or compete for AI supremacy within the information environment.</p>
<p>Of course, China will use anything within its arsenal to shape strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war to its advantage, expand its influence, and create an ecosystem that is dependent on its technologies. For example, <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/01/baidu--the-google-of-china--eyes-expansion-to-us-europe-ceo.html">Baidu, known as the “Google of China,</a>” invested billions into AI capabilities, creating the <a href="https://medium.com/ai-frontiers/baidu-goes-open-source-ernie-ai-model-to-be-released-by-june-2025-72a918897da4">proprietary ERNIE model</a>, which has been trained on billions of parameters, increasing the output’s quality and complexity.</p>
<p>However, China is also leveraging open-source AI models to shape the information environment. With the recent release of open-source <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/markets/2025/03/06/what-is-qwen-the-open-source-genai-model-from-alibaba-challenging-deepseek/">large language models such as DeepSeek and Qwen</a>, Chinese-linked subsidiaries, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-17/alibaba-tencent-join-funding-for-chinese-ai-high-flyer-baichuan">High-Flyer and Alibaba Group</a> created a way to expand their influence, revise history, and likely create a dependent ecosystem for target countries. Unlike the much more expensive ChatGPT, for which the more basic model is free, China’s investment in <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/artificial-intelligence/alibaba-releases-ai-model-it-claims-surpasses-deepseek-v3/articleshow/117670287.cms?from=mdr">generative AI models is free</a> for the public and even surpasses <a href="https://www.sparkouttech.com/deepseek-vs-chatgpt/">ChatGPT’s in some respects</a>.</p>
<p>There is a debate about how China’s proxy state companies were able to create these advanced models without US-based critical components. China allegedly <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/deepseek-huawei-export-controls-and-future-us-china-ai-race">did not have access to the advanced critical Nvidia chips</a> for which most AI models are dependent. China seems to have created generative models just as suitable or even better than that of ChatGPT, but allegedly at a <a href="https://www.techpolicy.press/closing-the-loopholes-options-for-the-trump-administration-to-strengthen-ai-chip-export-controls/">fraction of the cost and free of charge to the public</a>. The US limited Nvidia chip exports to China, a market predicted to top <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/martineparis/2024/07/26/ai-to-drive-1-trillion-in-global-chip-sales-by-2030-as-nvidia-leads/">$1 trillion in revenue within a decade</a>. Still, the accusation is that the Chinese subsidiary leased or bought the more advanced <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/technology/tech-news/us-trade-rules-breached-singapore-detains-three-in-nvidia-gpu-crackdown-125030400651_1.html">Nvidia chips from Singapore, circumventing restrictions</a>, and used <a href="https://www.theverge.com/news/601195/openai-evidence-deepseek-distillation-ai-data">ChatGPT to train its model</a>.</p>
<p>Regardless of how China secured these critical technologies, the cat is indeed out of the bag. China has shown that it has the capability to develop new and emerging AI technologies. From the capabilities already built, it now has a baseline to create even more capabilities to develop its own AI chip ecosystem. With such capabilities, China will become more active within the information environment with the help of AI capabilities, and its motives are far from benevolent.</p>
<p>Why is the Chinese model free? China has several motives, but it is likely in hopes that data and information across the globe are the price tag for using the model while lessening a dependency on Western technologies and <a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/01/transforming-industries-with-ai-lessons-from-china/#:~:text=China's%20trajectory%20in%20AI%20is,for%20AI%20innovation%20by%202030.">becoming a global leader in AI by 2030</a>. Whatever data is obtained by the United States is icing on the cake. The West is not the primary target audience. Both models have servers in Singapore and China, where information is likely subject to Chinese laws, and terms and conditions are meaningless.</p>
<p>The Chinese will use AI technologies to gain an advantage in the information environment and seek to expand influence by creating an ecosystem for which other countries are dependent on their models. The incentive is to give countries this technology to foster dependency. The idea is similar to China’s debt-trap diplomacy—<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative">the Belt and Road Initiative</a>. While ChatGPT’s basic model is free, China seeks to develop better models at a cheaper price to serve as leverage over countries that cannot afford the higher-end US-based models.</p>
<p>The United States is taking the right approach to maintaining its information advantage through AI development and investment. The <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/behind-500-billion-ai-data-center-plan-us-startups-jockey-with-tech-giants-2025-01-23/">billions pouring into creating AI data centers</a> will play an important role in ensuring the United States has the edge in AI.</p>
<p>These data centers remain critical for identifying and countering any malign information operations against the United States, its partners, and its allies. When Iran attempted to influence the 2024 presidential election using the generative model GPT, <a href="https://openai.com/index/disrupting-deceptive-uses-of-AI-by-covert-influence-operations/">OpenAI detected and shut it down</a>. Without this expansive investment in AI data centers that keep information within the letter of US law and oversight, these interventions would be out of reach, and information operations may be even more challenging to detect.</p>
<p>However, this approach is insufficient without incorporating artificial Intelligence into all aspects of military operations. The DoD uses artificial intelligence within some branches, but given the expansive nature of AI, this is not enough. AI is expected to touch nearly all aspects of military operations, especially information operations, and may not have time to wait for its major AI initiative, <a href="https://interestingengineering.com/military/project-maven-the-epicenter-of-us-ai-military-efforts">Project Maven</a>, to fully develop.</p>
<p>Some military scholars have called something like this a <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/real-revolution-military-affairs">revolution in military affairs</a>, but perhaps, given the impact of war, it could be classified as such. <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nothing-new-why-revolution-military-affairs-same-old-one-77266">The concept is somewhat antiquated and outdated without some context</a>, but it remains the best way to describe what should take place within the DoD. The foundation is already in place through the conceptual framework of multidomain operations.</p>
<p>Artificial capabilities are widely available through graphical user interfaces in deployable, ready-to-use form, such as ChatGPT or even internal <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/283601/enhancing_military_operational_effectiveness_through_the_integration_of_camo_and_nipr_gpt">large language models</a>. The joint force should use these capabilities to the broadest extent possible. If anything, artificial intelligence, including large language models, will make joint and combined forces more lethal and accurate as they counter Chinese efforts within the information environment.</p>
<p>The DoD must adopt incentives for service members to understand the capabilities of AI and incorporate them in all training environments. These incentives can include bonuses for taking AI-driven courses. The DoD can also increase awareness and accessibility of AI courses on its education platforms which now have a paucity of artificial intelligence courses.</p>
<p>The DoD must also improve the training environment. With proprietary or off-the-shelf software, the DoD can incorporate AI offensive and defensive platforms within all training and mission-critical tasks. Even simply assisting with identifying generative outputs, e.g., deepfakes, will counter Chinese influence within the information environment, especially during hybrid conflict. Furthermore, military doctrine should recognize the importance of AI, especially information operations, with an emphasis on psychological operations.</p>
<p>While AI investment is critical to countering Chinese influence within the information environment, the only way to truly embrace multidomain operations is to ensure service members have the AI technical competency necessary to maneuver within the information environment deterring Chinese aggression.</p>
<p><em>US Army Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau is a PhD researcher at King’s College London studying how artificial Intelligence will impact conflict. He can be reached at matthew.fecteau.alumni@armywarcollege.edu.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Chinas-AI-Driven-Information-Operations-are-Here.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="288" height="80" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 288px) 100vw, 288px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-ai-driven-information-operations-are-here-the-us-needs-an-ai-rma/">China’s AI-Driven Information Operations Are Here: The US Needs an AI RMA</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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