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		<title>Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 12:16:30 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 22, 2026  Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/">Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> June 22, 2026</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Some eighty years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the global community still struggles with the strategic, political, and ethical implications of nuclear arms races. The Cold War’s bipolar competition once defined the global nuclear dynamics, but today’s landscape is more complex, involving multiple nuclear-armed states, emerging technologies, and shifting geopolitical alliances.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">From Bipolar to Multipolar Competition and Arms Racing</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Evolution_of_Nuclear_Strategy.html?id=cq3WvwEACAAJ"><span data-contrast="none">engaged in</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> a massive arms buildup driven by deterrence theory, ideological rivalry, and fears of vulnerability. The end of the Cold War lowered tensions and decreased the number of nuclear weapons, but it did not eliminate them completely. Instead, the </span><a href="https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2024"><span data-contrast="none">global system has evolved</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> into a multipolar environment with nine nuclear-armed states, each with distinct strategic cultures and security concerns. Although most states in the United Nations have endorsed the principle of nuclear disarmament, no current nuclear weapons state has embraced the concept or taken even small steps in that direction.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">New Drivers of Competition</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The current nuclear environment is shaped by a mix of technological advances, growing regional rivalries, diminishing arms control agreements, and renewed great-power competition. Unlike the organized bipolar order of the Cold War, today’s strategic landscape is becoming more multipolar, faster-paced, and less predictable based on emerging factors.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-contrast="auto">Technological innovation:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Hypersonic weapons, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and missile defense systems introduce </span><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/26777846"><span data-contrast="none">new uncertainties</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> about the survivability of nuclear arsenals. Another source of potential instability is the growing effectiveness of conventional weapons for long</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">range precision strike, with destructive capabilities that might provoke a responsive nuclear first use or first strike. In addition, modern information and manufacturing systems, compared to earlier generations, shorten the timelines between concept and prototype, and between prototype and mass production.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Regional rivalries:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Regional military competition </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Nuclear_Strategy_in_the_Modern_Era.html?id=1GmYDwAAQBAJ"><span data-contrast="none">between India and Pakistan</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, North Korea and South Korea, China and India, and among China, North Korea, Japan, and the United States, threatens to escalate conventional war into nuclear first use, and even short of crossing the nuclear threshold, exacerbate regional and global nuclear tensions.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Erosion of arms control:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The termination of nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the New START Treaty, has created a situation of arms control anomie that invites competitive distrust among nuclear powers and increases uncertainty about their nuclear</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">strategic thinking.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Great</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">power competition:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The almost </span><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/FP_20190930_china_nuclear_weapons_talmadge-2.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">inevitable arrival of China</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> as a third nuclear superpower creates an additional axis of uncertainty compared to the two</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">sided Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. China&#8217;s involvement in a tripartite format for exchanging strategic thinking on nuclear weapons and arms control is an important, albeit challenging, imperative for all three states and their military leaders.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Risks and Consequences of Renewed Arms Races</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The modern nuclear landscape is increasingly defined not only by military competition but also by growing concerns over strategic stability, economic sustainability, and ethical responsibility.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Strategic Instability:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> As states pursue more sophisticated and diversified arsenals, the risk of miscalculation grows. Technologies that compress decision</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">making time—such as hypersonic glide vehicles or AI</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">enabled early</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">warning systems—</span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Second_Nuclear_Age.html?id=zkhRjTumZTkC"><span data-contrast="none">could increase the likelihood</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of accidental or preemptive nuclear use. AI</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">enhanced technology for intelligence, warning, and estimation of others’ options and intentions will become standardized among great powers, raising the issue of shared guardrails in military applications of AI technology for crisis management.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Economic and Opportunity Costs:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Nuclear modernization programs require enormous financial investments. For many states, the pursuit of nuclear capabilities reflects a tradeoff between perceived security benefits and long</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">term societal needs. Even within the umbrella of defense needs per se, there are important tradeoffs among preferred weapons systems and supporting infrastructure. For example, in the case of the United States, the </span><a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-05/62379-golden-dome.pdf."><span data-contrast="none">costs</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of developing and deploying the proposed Golden Dome antimissile defense system may compete with the demands of military services for new generations of offensive strategic nuclear weapons.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Normative and Ethical Concerns:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> The continued reliance on nuclear weapons raises profound ethical questions. The humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange—intentional or accidental—</span><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nuclear-weapons-averting-global-catastrophe"><span data-contrast="none">would be catastrophic</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. The potential erosion of norms against nuclear testing and against cavalier threats of nuclear first use threatens decades of progress toward the avoidance and management of nuclear crises.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Future Pathways: Escalation or Restraint?</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">As nuclear and non-nuclear systems become increasingly entangled, states, international institutions, and civil society organizations will play an important role in developing risk-reduction measures, strengthening strategic dialogue, and preserving norms to prevent nuclear escalation and maintain global stability.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Technological Governance:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Technological “black swans” have the potential to upend previously understood mechanisms for reassuring nuclear-weapon states against fears of preemptive nuclear attack. As AI, </span><a href="https://books.google.com/books/about/Hacking_the_Bomb.html?id=hshQDwAAQBAJ"><span data-contrast="none">cyber operations</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and autonomous systems become intertwined with nuclear command and control, states may need new norms or agreements to prevent destabilizing uses. Establishing shared understandings of “red lines” in cyber</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">nuclear interactions could be a starting point.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Regional Security Architectures:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> In regions with acute nuclear tensions, tailored diplomatic frameworks may help reduce risks. Confidence</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">building measures in South Asia, renewed dialogue on the Korean Peninsula, and discussions on European security could all contribute to stability. The containment of growth in the numbers and lethality of non</span>‑<span data-contrast="auto">strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, in the context of preserving regional deterrence and security, is of immediate importance.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The Role of Civil Society and International Institutions:</span><span data-contrast="auto"> Nongovernmental organizations, academic institutions, and international bodies continue to play a vital role in shaping public discourse, conducting research, and advocating for risk-reduction measures. Their influence may be especially crucial as formal diplomatic channels encounter political obstacles. One challenge is the relative shortage of nuclear deterrence and arms control studies in research university departments nowadays, compared to the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War periods.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Conclusion</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">In the twenty-first century, nuclear arms racing is no longer defined by the relatively stable bipolar logic of the Cold War, but by a far more complex and uncertain multipolar environment shaped by emerging technologies, regional rivalries, weakened arms control structures, and renewed great-power competition. The combination of emerging technology and increasingly sophisticated strike systems has </span><a href="https://warontherocks.com/america-needs-a-dead-hand/"><span data-contrast="none">compressed decision-making timelines</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> and introduced new risks of miscalculation, escalation, and strategic instability among nuclear-armed states. At the same time, the financial costs of nuclear arsenals and the potential catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear exchange continue to raise profound ethical and political questions about unchecked nuclear capacities.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Preventing future nuclear crises will require renewed commitments to arms control, technological governance, regional confidence-building measures, and sustained dialogue among both states and nonstate actors. In an era when formal diplomatic channels are increasingly strained, international institutions, academic communities, and civil society organizations may help preserve norms of restraint and advance practical risk-reduction measures. Ultimately, the challenge facing the international community is not only how to manage nuclear competition, but how to prevent technological change, geopolitical rivalry, and strategic mistrust from producing a new era of nuclear instability with potentially irreversible consequences.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Arms-Control-is-No-Panacea-But-It-Helps.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-is-no-panacea-but-it-helps/">Arms Control is No Panacea, But It Helps</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Trumping NATO</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 12:17:33 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 28, 2026 Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumping-nato/">Trumping NATO</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 28, 2026</em></p>
<p>Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised concern among European defense experts and government officials. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently noted that “It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” And French President Macron <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2026/04/02/trump-undermining-nato-by-creating-doubt-about-us-commitment-macron-says">indicated on April 2nd</a> that, in his view, U.S. President Trump was undermining NATO through his repeated threats to withdraw from the alliance. Raising new fears of American abandonment on the part of European leaders, Trump, in various interviews and social media posts within a few days, said that the United States “will remember” France’s refusal to assist in the war against Iran; that <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/01/trump-says-hes-considering-pulling-us-out-of-paper-tiger-nato.html?msockid=1510934c8249606b0f658525835f61ab">NATO was a “paper tiger”</a>; and that “Putin knows that, too, by the way.”</p>
<p>The most recent Presidential broadsides against NATO reflected Trump’s frustration with European allies who chose not to involve themselves in the war against Iran and/or denied their political and military support for the actions taken under Operation EPIC FURY—an effort that Secretary of War, Hegseth <a href="https://www.war.gov/Spotlights/Operation-Epic-Fury/">describes as</a> “laser-focused [to] destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure – and they will never have nuclear weapons.&#8221; But this hesitancy among European allies should not have surprised U.S. leadership. Neither NATO as an alliance nor individual European governments were consulted before the decision to go to war, nor were they fully informed until the operation was already in progress. Further to the issue of NATO support, Trump’s address to the nation on April 1st simply assumed that the United States would wind up its military operations within several weeks and would turn the problem of unblocking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over to European countries and others. In addition, Western European governments have strong public support for putting distance between themselves and the war in Iran. Popular majorities in every country oppose the U.S. and Israeli campaign, and European opposition to the war is enhanced by Trump’s personal unpopularity on that side of the Atlantic.</p>
<p>An additional element in the split between Trump and NATO was the Russian interpretation of its implications for the war in Ukraine, and more broadly, for Russia’s national security strategy writ large. Prolonged U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East could deplete the availability of military assets that would otherwise be available to sustain Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. The global spike in gas and oil prices was an obvious boon to the Russian economy and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, an unwelcome distraction for European leaders from the priority of supporting Ukraine. Russia also took advantage of Epic Fury to reinforce its support for Iran by providing targeting information for Iranian missile attacks against Israel and other regional states. Russia and Iran had already been sharing technology and knowledge with respect to drone warfare even prior to the launch of military operations against Tehran.</p>
<p>To some extent, the volatility in the Trump administration’s approach to NATO reflected the President’s frustration at his inability to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s war as existential and refused to acknowledge that there was any distinction between Ukrainian and Russian civilizations, let alone sovereignties. The Ukrainians responded in kind, resisting Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory with creative use of drone technology and edgy defensive strategizing that put at risk a variety of targets in Russian territory, including bomber bases and critical infrastructure. Worse for Putin, his invasion in 2022, preceded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, refocused NATO on its primary mission of deterrence and defense in Europe as opposed to “out of the area” operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the formerly Cold War neutral states, Sweden and Finland, were added to NATO’s membership because of Russia’s attempted coup de main against Kiev that turned into the longest and most destructive war in Europe since World War II. Caught in a trap of his own making, Putin continued to pour troops and material into the battlefields of Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine to support a more favorable negotiating position, should productive negotiations ever materialize.</p>
<p>Given Trump’s propensity for rearranging the deck chairs on foreign policy via Truth Social memoranda, it is conceivable that he will tone down the anti–NATO rhetoric once he has decided on a strategy for winding down the U.S. military campaign in Iran. The process of deconflicting the Strait of Hormuz will likely involve participation from European nations and other countries. Almost nobody benefits from continued bottlenecks in global shipping of oil and other vital commodities. Regardless of the outcome in Iran, the United States needs NATO, and NATO needs the United States. Without the U.S. as the indispensable leading partner, NATO Europe has insufficient nuclear or conventional deterrence against further Russian aggression. This assertion implies no disregard for the steps that the U.S. European allies have already taken since 2022 to improve the quality of their armed forces and military–industrial complexes. It is instead a recognition that the unique American nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capabilities, supported by European determination to resist further Russian aggression, create a global as well as a regional deterrent for Russia and its partners (The CRINKs – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that benefits not only NATO but also world peace. On the other hand, a divided and internally fractious NATO invites further aggression within and beyond Europe.</p>
<p><em>Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trumping-nato/">Trumping NATO</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/exposing-willful-blindness-american-strength-is-nonnegotiable/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Jul 2025 12:16:50 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Katerina Canyon’s op-ed, “From Deterrence to Diplomacy: Why Nuclear Dominance Is a Dangerous Illusion,” calls for restraint and diplomacy rather than a robust nuclear arsenal. While her concerns over escalation risks and humanitarian impacts have merit, her critique mischaracterizes the robust, empirical arguments in “From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/exposing-willful-blindness-american-strength-is-nonnegotiable/">Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Katerina Canyon’s op-ed, “From Deterrence to Diplomacy: Why Nuclear Dominance Is a Dangerous Illusion,” calls for restraint and diplomacy rather than a robust nuclear arsenal. While her concerns over escalation risks and humanitarian impacts have merit, her critique mischaracterizes the robust, empirical arguments in “<a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-deterrence-to-dominance-strengthening-us-nuclear-posture-in-a-shifting-world/">From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</a>.”</p>
<p>Peace in international affairs is not a natural state; it is actively maintained through strength. As <a href="https://daily.jstor.org/reconsidering-appeasement/">Winston Churchill</a> famously noted, true peace is achieved not by retreating from power, but by wielding it wisely.</p>
<p>Today, with China rapidly modernizing its conventional and nuclear forces and Russia pursuing territorial ambitions backed by nuclear threats, a kinder and gentler approach risks inviting greater aggression. Only a credible deterrence posture—grounded in empirical evidence and historical lessons—can secure strategic stability.</p>
<p>Reinforcing American nuclear dominance is not about favoring conflict over diplomacy; it is about ensuring that American deterrence is strong enough to compel respect and maintain global order in an increasingly volatile world.</p>
<p><strong>First Things First</strong></p>
<p>American nuclear weapons serve as a cornerstone of deterrence, preventing strategic attack and reassuring allies. This element of deterrence is under pressure as China and Russia rapidly expand their arsenals, and North Korea advances its capabilities, creating a complex, multipolar threat environment.</p>
<p>The primary point in the original article was the need to reestablish American nuclear dominance—not as a provocation but as a stabilizing force. In an era of rising threats and eroding deterrence, a more robust and flexible nuclear posture is essential to prevent conflict, assure allies, and preserve global security.</p>
<p><strong>Misreading the Nature of Nuclear Dominance</strong></p>
<p>A primary claim presented by Canyon is that advocating for nuclear dominance is tantamount to seeking advantage through expansion, thereby increasing the risk of catastrophe. This is a misrepresentation of evidence. The call for dominance is not about reckless arms racing or seeking victory in nuclear war. Rather, it is about ensuring that the United States’ nuclear posture is credible, flexible, and resilient enough to deter adversaries in a world where the old rules no longer apply.</p>
<p>The Cold War’s doctrine of <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/348671812.pdf">mutually assured destruction (MAD)</a> worked because both sides fielded survivable second-strike capabilities and clearly communicated those capabilities to the other. Today, China and Russia are modernizing and diversifying their arsenals at a pace not seen since the 1980s. <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-looms-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now">China’s warhead stockpile</a> surpassed 600 in 2025 and is projected to double by 2030. Russia, meanwhile, maintains the world’s largest <a href="https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/">inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons</a>—estimated at 2,000 warheads—many of which are integrated into conventional military operations, as seen in Ukraine.</p>
<p>Dominance in this context means closing critical gaps—like the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—and ensuring that American extended deterrence is not just theoretical, but practical and adaptable to new threats.</p>
<p><strong>Historical Lessons: Arms Races and Escalation</strong></p>
<p>Invocation of the Cold War arms race is erroneously used as a cautionary tale, suggesting that any move toward dominance will inevitably provoke adversaries and increase the risk of miscalculation. History is more nuanced.</p>
<p>The most dangerous moments of the Cold War—Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—were not the result of American dominance but of <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315633039-22/power-weakness-robert-kagan">perceived weakness, ambiguity, and miscommunication</a>. The 1980s nuclear buildup, while expensive, ultimately contributed to the Soviet Union’s willingness to negotiate arms reductions (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) from a position of mutual strength. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted, “<a href="https://www.bing.com/ck/a?!&amp;&amp;p=a3fac9e88c000058ee85484ecbc89fdcf1fa74b76d9705f6e87846a5dbba38cfJmltdHM9MTc1MDcyMzIwMA&amp;ptn=3&amp;ver=2&amp;hsh=4&amp;fclid=0a79bb16-1a35-60c1-3402-af001b7a6139&amp;psq=Deterrence+is+not+about+parity%3b+it%e2%80%99s+about+credibility+and+resolve.&amp;u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly9wcmVzcy51bWljaC5lZHUvcGRmLzA0NzIxMTI4NzItY2g4LnBkZg&amp;ntb=1">Deterrence is not about parity; it’s about credibility and resolve.</a>”</p>
<p>Moreover, the post–Cold War era of American nuclear restraint did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea, China’s militarization of the South China Sea, or North Korea’s nuclear breakout. A senior research professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, asserting that “<a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mahnken_10-22-15.pdf">adversaries exploit perceived gaps</a> in US resolve and capability, not its strength.”</p>
<p><strong>The Risks of a Passive Posture</strong></p>
<p>Canyon argues that modernizing or expanding American nuclear capabilities—such as the SLCM-N or space-based interceptors—will only accelerate a global arms race. Yet, the data show that adversaries are already racing ahead, regardless of American action.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiR7dbzlYqOAxXKEVkFHVzDEh8QFnoECBkQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fcarnegieendowment.org%2Frussia-eurasia%2Fpolitika%2F2024%2F01%2Frussias-nuclear-modernization-drive-is-only-a-success-on-paper%3Flang%3Den&amp;usg=AOvVaw0xSFTrjP2MUHZL-LkRW0WX&amp;opi=89978449">Nearly 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad is modernized,</a> with new hypersonic and dual-capable systems. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjIxbmRloqOAxXdEFkFHbZ0OpIQFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fchinapower.csis.org%2Fchina-nuclear-weapons%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw146oe4HqpAgeuNTp3UL7Zx&amp;opi=89978449">China</a> is rapidly fielding road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiCoN2nloqOAxXtFFkFHf1LC24QFnoECCMQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.armscontrol.org%2Fact%2F2025-04%2Fnews%2Fnorth-korea-justifies-nuclear-weapons-expansion&amp;usg=AOvVaw2bN4ozw670jepNgZx88RAk&amp;opi=89978449">North Korea bolsters over 50 nuclear weapons</a> with growing missile survivability and regional reach.</p>
<p>Iran was advancing toward a nuclear threshold, with uranium-enrichment activities previously nearing weapons-grade levels. In response, the United States launched a preemptive strike targeting Iran’s key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. American officials framed the operation as a limited, precision action designed to neutralize an imminent threat and prevent a larger, more destructive regional war.</p>
<p>By acting before Iran could cross the nuclear threshold, the US aimed to avoid a future scenario in which multiple states—particularly Israel—might engage in broader, uncoordinated military campaigns. The strike also sent a calibrated message intended to deter further escalation while leaving diplomatic channels open.</p>
<p>Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal remains one of the largest in the region, and its proxy network, coordinated through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, continues to operate across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.</p>
<p>The US, by contrast, faces delays and budget overruns in its own modernization efforts and lacks credible theater-range nuclear options in both Europe and Asia. This is not dominance; it is vulnerability.</p>
<p><strong>Diplomacy and Arms Control: Not Mutually Exclusive</strong></p>
<p>Canyon calls for a return to arms control and diplomacy, citing the expiration of New START in 2026. Diplomacy is essential, but history shows that arms control only works when backed by <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjv18uwl4qOAxW4JUQIHSBEAW0QFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftnsr.org%2F2018%2F11%2Fthe-purposes-of-arms-control%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw394GwgBWUdQqNos61KdXAC&amp;opi=89978449">credible deterrence</a>.</p>
<p>The most successful arms control agreements (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), INF, START) were negotiated when the US held a position of strength. The collapse of the INF Treaty and the uncertain future of New START are not the result of American intransigence but of Russian violations and China’s refusal to join trilateral talks. As the Congressional Research Service notes, “Arms control is not a substitute for deterrence; it is a complement to it.”</p>
<p><strong>Alliance Cohesion and Forward Deployment</strong></p>
<p>The suggestion that forward-deploying nuclear assets makes allies “targets, not safer” is textbook pacifist propaganda. This ignores decades of alliance management and empirical research. Extended deterrence—backed by visible, credible, American capabilities—has prevented proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and NATO for generations.</p>
<p>A <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiO4aX6l4qOAxUR_skDHWiXHy8QFnoECCcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.heritage.org%2Fmilitary-strength%2Fassessment-us-military-power%2Fus-nuclear-weapons&amp;usg=AOvVaw15LGIyBLHmyufWRZz5DxVZ&amp;opi=89978449">2023 RAND study</a> found that allies are more likely to pursue their own nuclear options if they doubt American commitments. Forward deployment, joint planning, and regular consultations are essential to alliance cohesion and nonproliferation. The United States’ nuclear umbrella extends to over 30 allied and partner nations, primarily within <a href="https://www.google.com/search?sca_esv=ccb8066356fd07b7&amp;cs=0&amp;q=NATO&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiDhfnsmIqOAxWr6skDHYqJL1wQxccNegQIAhAB&amp;mstk=AUtExfAceYhAF-0mtB58rM7SNIoAYPP3OmhRwOD6NFvxAiatNzIFKqvv-w96a1UlLSy6D538GPoivqrkNQQNRFZ3ForFQFIRNCLXH-0QrW9WE9j_e0_J4TKLFgdNAwPWlSE-JyM&amp;csui=3">NATO</a>, but also including countries like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These nations are assured of American protection, including potential nuclear response, in case of attack.</p>
<p><strong>Economic Trade-offs: Security and Prosperity</strong></p>
<p>Context is key. Canyon points to the $1 trillion cost of nuclear modernization over 30 years, suggesting these funds would be better spent elsewhere. This figure represents less than 5 percent of projected defense spending over that period, and less than 0.1 percent of gross domestic product annually. The cost of deterrence is dwarfed by the potential costs of conventional war should deterrence fail. Small conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq cost over $7 trillion. The cost of a war against China would be far higher.</p>
<p>National strength is not a zero-sum game between security and social spending. The credibility of US leadership—and the stability it underwrites—enables the very prosperity and global order that supports education, healthcare, and infrastructure.</p>
<p><strong>Public Opinion and Global Norms: A Reality Check</strong></p>
<p>Canyon’s claim that “most Americans and the global community favor arms reduction” lacks empirical rigor. Sweeping generalizations like this demand robust, replicated data across diverse populations. Without that, such assertions are more rhetorical than factual.</p>
<p>In contrast, multiple credible surveys reveal consistent public support for deterrence and defense. For example, a November 2022 poll found that 60 percent of Americans believe the military’s primary role is to deter attacks on the US. A national survey showed that a vast majority of voters view nuclear deterrence as critical to national security, with nearly three-quarters supporting modernization efforts.</p>
<p>The 2023 NATO Annual Tracking Survey found that 61 percent of allied respondents believe NATO membership reduces the likelihood of foreign attack, and 58 percent see it as a deterrent. In Germany, 64 percent support a European nuclear deterrent independent of the US, reflecting growing concern over strategic autonomy.</p>
<p>Another poll reported that 69 percent of Americans feel defense spending increases their sense of security. These data points underscore a clear trend; public opinion, in the US and Europe, favors credible deterrence over disarmament, especially amid rising threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. This is the factual foundation that reinforces the case for maintaining and strengthening American nuclear capabilities, not as a provocation, but as a stabilizing force in an increasingly volatile world.</p>
<p><strong>The Real Existential Threats</strong></p>
<p>Extreme weather events, natural disasters, pandemics, and mass displacement are among today’s gravest challenges. Yet, using these non-nuclear crises to justify a softened stance on nuclear deterrence is like comparing apples and oranges. Even the most intelligent and well-informed individuals sometimes fall into the trap of an “either-or” debate, mistakenly assuming it is only possible to address one threat or the other.</p>
<p>Multiple risks demand simultaneous attention. Credible nuclear deterrence is not an overreaction; it is a precise, vital response to a threat that, if unleashed, would compound other crises and shatter global stability.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion: Dominance as Responsible Leadership</strong></p>
<p>Canyon’s critique is a masterclass in wishful thinking, a dangerously naive philosophy that would lead the free world to ruin if ever implemented. It stems from a misplaced comfort with notions of restraint and diplomacy, ignoring the hard reality that security is founded on military strength. History, from the catastrophic failures of appeasement in the 1930s to the isolationism preceding Pearl Harbor, teaches that weakness only emboldens tyrants. Each concession, whether to Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland or to modern-day aggressors, proves that diplomacy without credible force is nothing more than indulgence.</p>
<p>The current global landscape is dominated by adversaries who respect only strength. Russia, under its neo-imperialist regime, wields its vast nuclear arsenal to bolster conventional aggression. China’s unprecedented military modernization is reshaping the balance of power in Asia, and Iran continues its relentless march toward nuclear capability while sponsoring proxy terror. To imagine that these regimes would respond to soft words or empty promises is akin to believing that a repeatedly misbehaving child will learn simply by being put in timeout. Real change is forced change.</p>
<p>American strength, particularly through a robust nuclear deterrent, is not a provocation; it is the only language these adversaries understand. It ensures that any aggressive action exacts a price too steep to consider. In an increasingly perilous world, where the stakes are nothing less than the survival of global stability, a commitment to maintaining unparalleled military dominance is both pragmatic and essential. Ignoring this reality is not idealism, it is willful blindness that invites disaster.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/A-Rebuke-to-Willful-Blindness.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/exposing-willful-blindness-american-strength-is-nonnegotiable/">Exposing Willful Blindness: American Strength Is Nonnegotiable</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2025 11:54:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30909</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The global nuclear landscape in 2025 is not just unstable—it is accelerating toward unprecedented volatility, testing the very limits of American strategic dominance. New technologies, evolving doctrines, and intensifying rivalries among nuclear-armed states are creating the most unpredictable security environment since the Cold War. The era of passive deterrence is over. As adversaries like China, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-deterrence-to-dominance-strengthening-us-nuclear-posture-in-a-shifting-world/">From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The global nuclear landscape in 2025 is not just unstable—it is accelerating toward unprecedented volatility, testing the very limits of American strategic dominance. New technologies, evolving doctrines, and intensifying rivalries among nuclear-armed states are creating the most unpredictable security environment since the Cold War. The era of passive deterrence is over.</p>
<p>As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.</p>
<p>Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated <a href="https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/russia/">2,000 warheads</a>. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.</p>
<p>With nearly <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/NPR-2022.PDF">95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized</a>, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.</p>
<p>China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003322360/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLE'S-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">stockpile surpassed 600</a> and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and <a href="https://www.csis.org/programs/asia-program/asia-program-projects/chinas-military-modernization">hypersonic glide vehicles</a> signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.</p>
<p>North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding <a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/north-korea/nuclear/">50 nuclear weapons</a> and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-ties-with-russia-2023-09-13/">Russia</a>, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p>Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/latest-iaea-report-on-irans-nuclear-programme-available-to-members">Iran</a> edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.</p>
<p>Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2025/05/07/us-houthi-ceasefire-deal-israel/83489986007/">apparently ended</a> that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.</p>
<p>Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.</p>
<p>Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11917">sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)</a>—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.</p>
<p>Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.</p>
<p>Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-210">nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems</a> is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.</p>
<p>Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of <a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50068.htm">theater-range assets</a> can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.</p>
<p>Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/subject/9/date">nonproliferation efforts</a>, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.</p>
<p>Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.</p>
<p>In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.</p>
<p>To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/From-Deterrence-to-Dominance.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="245" height="68" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 245px) 100vw, 245px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/from-deterrence-to-dominance-strengthening-us-nuclear-posture-in-a-shifting-world/">From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Katerina Canyon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jan 2025 12:33:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29731</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The argument for “escalation dominance” as a cornerstone of US deterrence policy, presented in Joe Buff’s recent Global Security Review article, relies on outdated Cold War logic that fails to address the complexities and ethical considerations of today’s global security environment. While the premise of maintaining deterrence is essential, the emphasis on overwhelming military capability [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/">Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The argument for “<a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg614af.9?seq=10">escalation dominance</a>” as a cornerstone of US deterrence policy, presented in Joe Buff’s <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/modern-escalation-dominance-is-essential-to-effective-deterrence-and-assurance/">recent <em>Global Security Review </em>article</a>, relies on outdated <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/perspectives-nuclear-deterrence-21st-century-0/nuclear-deterrence-destabilized">Cold War logic</a> that fails to address the complexities and ethical considerations of today’s global security environment. While the premise of maintaining deterrence is essential, the emphasis on overwhelming military capability as a panacea for geopolitical challenges is both dangerous and counterproductive.</p>
<p>Buff asserts that the US must invest heavily in full-spectrum military capabilities to deter adversaries. However, history shows that militarization alone often escalates tensions rather than resolving them. For instance, the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</a>—a frequent example in escalation dominance arguments—was resolved through diplomacy, not military action.</p>
<p>President John F. Kennedy and Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to negotiate behind the scenes prevented catastrophe. This underscores the need for diplomacy as a primary tool of deterrence, rather than relying solely on military might.</p>
<p>The concept of escalation dominance inherently invites an arms race. If the Americans aim for superiority at every “rung” of the escalation ladder, adversaries will predictably respond by developing their own capabilities, leading to a dangerous spiral of militarization.</p>
<p>This is evident in the ongoing nuclear arms race with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control">Russia</a> and <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/the-china-dilemma/">China</a>, where both nations responded to American advancements with their own. Far from ensuring security, this creates an unstable environment where miscalculation or miscommunication can lead to catastrophic conflict.</p>
<p>Buff’s advocacy for relentless dominance neglects the immense human and ethical costs of prolonged conflict. The destruction in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/ukraine">Ukraine</a> serves as a stark warning of the devastation that unchecked militarization can bring. Escalation dominance does not account for the millions of civilians who suffer in war zones, the refugees who flee their homes, or the global economic and environmental impacts of sustained conflict. A more humane approach prioritizes conflict prevention through diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and economic development.</p>
<p>The article frames restraint as synonymous with appeasement, a reductive argument that misrepresents modern security strategies. Restraint does not mean inaction—it means carefully measured responses that avoid unnecessary escalation while maintaining credibility.</p>
<p>The assumption that adversaries only understand brute force disregards the nuanced motivations behind their actions. Engaging adversaries through dialogue and understanding, rather than confrontation, is often a more effective way to address their concerns and reduce hostilities.</p>
<p>The push for escalation dominance ignores the domestic consequences of prioritizing military spending over critical needs like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Buff argues that America’s survival depends on overwhelming military capability, yet the true strength of a nation lies in the well-being of its people. Allocating resources to address systemic inequalities and bolster resilience at home is a more sustainable approach to national security than pouring trillions into the Pentagon.</p>
<p>Rather than focusing solely on military dominance, the US should adopt a balanced approach to deterrence. It should incorporate four major objectives.</p>
<p>First, diplomacy should always be the first option. Prioritizing dialogue and international cooperation to resolve conflicts must always precede conflict and escalation.</p>
<p>Second, arms control is a necessary component of national strategy. Reinvigorating arms control agreements to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and rebuilding trust with adversaries is a must.</p>
<p>Third, humanitarian engagement is core to American foreign policy. Addressing root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, and climate change, through global partnerships, can prevent conflict.</p>
<p>Fourth, smart defense spending is critical to an affordable defense. Invest in modern, cost-effective defense strategies while reallocating excess military funds to domestic needs is important for the nation.</p>
<p>Buff’s call for escalation dominance reflects a worldview that prioritizes power over pragmatism and ignores the interconnected realities of the 21st century. True security comes not from the constant threat of overwhelming force, but from fostering global stability through cooperation, understanding, and sustainable policies. The US must resist the temptation to revert to Cold War thinking and instead embrace strategies that build a more peaceful and equitable world.</p>
<p><em>Katerina Canyon is the Executive Director of the Peace Economy Project. The views expressed are her own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Escalation-Dominance-A-Flawed-Framework-for-Modern-Security-Challenges.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/escalation-dominance-is-a-flawed-framework/">Escalation Dominance Is a Flawed Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-resilient-hegemon-why-americas-global-leadership-endures/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Nov 2024 14:51:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29326</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In an era where political pundits are quick to sound alarms about the impending decline of American global leadership, the reality paints a more optimistic picture. While the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the saber-rattling of North Korea and Iran led some to predict a seismic shift in world power, a closer [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-resilient-hegemon-why-americas-global-leadership-endures/">The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In an era where political pundits are quick to sound alarms about the impending decline of American global leadership, the reality paints a more optimistic picture. While the <a href="https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/how-a-rising-china-has-remade-global-politics/">rise of China</a>, the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/09/reckoning-with-a-resurgent-russia?lang=en">resurgence of Russia</a>, and the saber-rattling of <a href="https://www.hudson.org/arms-control-nonproliferation/north-koreas-dangerous-saber-rattling">North Korea</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-24/iran-s-nuclear-saber-rattling-raises-more-alarm-at-un-watchdog">Iran</a> led some to predict a <a href="https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-world-orders-biggest-seismic-shift-in-a-century">seismic shift in world power</a>, a closer examination reveals that the United States remains firmly entrenched as the world’s leading hegemon, with little reason to believe that will change anytime soon.</p>
<p><strong>A Network of Powerful Allies</strong></p>
<p>One of the strongest indicators of America’s continued leadership is its robust network of alliances. <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/02/mapped-americas-collective-defense-agreements/135114/">Over 50 nations are directly allied with the US</a>, forming a global coalition that includes some of the world’s most powerful economies. Countries like <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-alliance">Japan</a>, the <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-united-kingdom-a-historic-friendship-and-enduring-alliance/">United Kingdom</a>, <a href="https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-france-allies-partners-and-friends/">France</a>, and <a href="https://au.usembassy.gov/u-s-australia-relations/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%2DAustralia%20alliance%20is,in%20the%20South%20China%20Sea.">Australia</a> consistently align themselves with American leadership, not just in military terms but also economically and diplomatically. Even in regions like the Middle East, traditional allies such as <a href="https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-saudi-arabia/">Saudi Arabia</a> and <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/16/fact-sheet-the-united-states-strengthens-cooperation-with-middle-east-partners-to-address-21st-century-challenges/">emerging partnerships</a> are fortifying the US’s global standing.</p>
<p>Contrast this with <a href="https://cftni.org/publications/cranks-may-2024/">the coalition of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran</a>. While this quartet may represent a serious challenge, it pales in comparison to the extensive alliances that the US leads. Most crucially, while <a href="https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/together-and-apart-conundrum-china-russia-partnership">Russia and China</a> may appear aligned in the short term, they are not close allies in any deep or historical sense. The two powers have a long and fraught history, marked by strategic rivalry and suspicion. Their partnership today is one of convenience rather than genuine alignment. In the end, history tells us that such partnerships are prone to fracture, especially when national interests clash.</p>
<p>The reality of America’s network of allies compared to the alliance of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran is stark. This balancing coalition does not even come close to the strength of the band wagoning coalition the US possesses. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (<a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm">NATO</a>), with its 31 member states, represents not only the most powerful military alliance in history but also an economic powerhouse, accounting for over <a href="https://www.worldeconomics.com/Regions/NATO/#:~:text=Data%20is%20combined%20for%20the,years%20(2013%2D2023).">30 percent of global gross domestic product</a> (GDP).</p>
<p>In contrast, China and Russia are economic competitors more than collaborators, and their combined GDP does not come close to rivaling the economic output of the US and its allies. Furthermore, China’s partnerships with nations like Iran and North Korea are limited by geography, sanctions, and divergent interests. North Korea is a heavily sanctioned and isolated state with little economic or strategic leverage beyond its nuclear capabilities, while Iran is mired in regional conflicts that prevent it from playing a major global role.</p>
<p>In essence, while China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran may occasionally coordinate to challenge the West, their relationships lack the cohesion, shared values, and the long-term strategic alignment of the American-led alliance system. This coalition cannot hope to rival the strength, stability, and global reach of America’s network of alliances. For all the talk of a multipolar world, the US remains at the center of the most powerful and united coalition of nations in modern history, a fact that ensures its continued dominance on the global stage.</p>
<p><strong>The Strategic Advantage of Geography</strong></p>
<p>Another underappreciated advantage is geography. The United States enjoys a position of unmatched security, largely thanks to what scholars like <a href="https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393349276">John Mearsheimer</a> call the “stopping power of water.” Unlike any other global power, the United States benefits from being bordered by two vast oceans. These natural barriers serve as formidable buffers against potential adversaries, significantly reducing the likelihood of direct invasion or immediate military threats to the mainland.</p>
<p>This geographic advantage has profound implications for national security and global influence. Unlike Russia, which shares extensive borders with Europe and Central Asia, and China, which borders several regional rivals including India, Japan, and Vietnam, the US is largely insulated from the chaos of regional disputes.</p>
<p>Moreover, this geographic separation means that the US can maintain a relatively smaller standing army compared to continental powers—focusing instead on advanced naval and air forces capable of projecting power far from its shores. American military bases, fleets, and alliances stretch across the world, but the mainland remains safely beyond the reach of conventional military threats.</p>
<p>This position gives the US a level of strategic flexibility that few nations can match. That is not to say the US Navy does not have issues facing its future, especially with <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/september/shipyard-shortage-people-problem#:~:text=In%20looking%20to%20expand%20U.S.,labor%20failures%20of%20Cramp%20Shipbuilding.&amp;text=The%20ongoing%20debate%20over%20how,as%20a%20sensible%20way%20forward.">shipyards</a> and <a href="https://federalnewsnetwork.com/navy/2024/08/navys-journey-to-new-procurement-system-remains-in-peril/">defense procurement</a>. However, it is still considered the <a href="https://www.wdmmw.org/ranking.php">greatest Navy in the world</a> as of 2024.</p>
<p><strong>The Monroe Doctrine</strong></p>
<p>Part of what makes the US so unique is its role as the uncontested regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. <a href="https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine">The Monroe Doctrine</a> has long established the principle that no foreign power should interfere in the affairs of the Americas, solidifying U.S. dominance in its own region. No other nation on Earth holds this level of regional control.</p>
<p>This unrivaled regional hegemony allows the US to focus on maintaining global stability and leading from a position of strength. As long as the Western Hemisphere remains secure, the US can project power abroad with confidence, knowing that its backyard is free from external threats.</p>
<p><strong>The Interconnected Economies of the U.S. and China</strong></p>
<p>Finally, the specter of the so-called <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/">Thucydides Trap</a>—the idea that a rising power (China) will inevitably clash with an established one (the US)—is not as likely as it may seem. While it is true that <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3562442/dod-report-details-chinese-efforts-to-build-military-power/">China’s economic and military rise is a concern</a>, the interconnectedness of the two economies makes a full-blown conflict far less probable. The US and China are not just rivals; they are <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/china-us-pandemic-economy-tensions-trump-coronavirus-covid-new-cold-war-economics-the-great-decoupling/">deeply intertwined economically</a>. From trade to investment to the global supply chain, the economic fates of both nations are linked in ways that make large-scale conflict costly for either side.</p>
<p>This <a href="https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&amp;context=gazette">economic entanglement</a> offers a powerful deterrent against conflict. Both nations have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability, knowing that any war would be mutually destructive. This interdependence, in many ways, acts as a stabilizing force, reducing the likelihood that the US and China will fall into the trap of inevitable conflict. However, it is worth noting that much of the same was said about the European powers just before World War I.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion: A Future of Optimism, Not Decline</strong></p>
<p>Despite the challenges posed by emerging powers and the uncertainties of the global political landscape, the US remains in a position of unparalleled strength. Its vast network of powerful allies, its strategic geographic advantage, the stability of the Monroe Doctrine, and the economic interdependence with China all suggest that the US’s role as the world’s leading hegemon is secure for the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>Rather than succumbing to the doom and gloom of some political pundits, it is time to recognize the many reasons for optimism. The US has the tools, alliances, and strategic advantages to maintain its leadership and continue shaping a peaceful, prosperous global order.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. All views expressed here are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/The-Resilient-Hegemon-Why-Americas-Global-Leadership-Endures.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-resilient-hegemon-why-americas-global-leadership-endures/">The Resilient Hegemon: Why America’s Global Leadership Endures</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Maintaining America’s First-Use Policy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/maintaining-americas-first-use-policy/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/maintaining-americas-first-use-policy/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Oct 2024 12:14:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29094</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the 2024 presidential election looms, the future of American national security policy, particularly its nuclear posture, is under scrutiny. Whether Donald Trump reclaims the White House or Vice President Kamala Harris steps into the Oval Office, one issue should remain constant: the United States must unambiguously reject a nuclear no-first-use policy. Regardless of the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/maintaining-americas-first-use-policy/">Maintaining America’s First-Use Policy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the 2024 presidential election looms, the future of American national security policy, particularly its nuclear posture, is under scrutiny. Whether Donald Trump reclaims the White House or Vice President Kamala Harris steps into the Oval Office, one issue should remain constant: the United States must unambiguously reject a nuclear no-first-use policy. Regardless of the moral or ethical debates surrounding the use of nuclear weapons, the strategic logic underpinning this is essential for maintaining American credibility, deterring adversaries, and ensuring global stability.</p>
<p><strong>The Role of First Use in Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>American <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/2022-nuclear-posture-review/">nuclear posture</a> has long relied on an ambiguous first-use policy to enhance deterrence. Unlike a <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/no-first-use/no-first-use-frequently-asked-questions/#:~:text=A%20%E2%80%9CNo%20First%20Use%E2%80%9D%20(,are%20for%20deterrence%E2%80%94not%20warfighting.">no-first-use policy</a>, which commits a country to only retaliate in response to a nuclear attack. Ambiguity forces adversaries to consider the possibility that any aggression could provoke a devastating nuclear response, even in a non-nuclear conflict.</p>
<p>Today, the US faces a diverse array of threats from state and non-state actors, including revisionist powers like China and Russia, nuclear-armed rogue states like North Korea, and potential proliferators like Iran. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent is critical in this environment. A first-use option deters conventional aggression from adversaries who may believe that their superior non-nuclear forces could overwhelm the US or its allies without triggering a nuclear response. If the US were to adopt a no-first-use policy, adversaries could be emboldened, believing they can engage in limited conflicts or conventional escalations without risking catastrophic consequences.</p>
<p><strong>Credibility of Use</strong></p>
<p>Nuclear deterrence rests not only on the existence of weapons but also on the belief that they will be used, if necessary. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent, therefore, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/believe-it-or-not-u-s-nuclear-declaratory-policy-and-calculated-ambiguity/">depends on a consistent and robust posture that leaves room for ambiguity</a>. Even if morally troubling, this ambiguity serves to keep adversaries in check.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm">Credibility is essential in preventing both conventional and nuclear conflicts</a>. The US must signal that it is willing to escalate when necessary, ensuring that adversaries believe they have no safe avenues to challenge American power. Both Moscow and Beijing are expanding their military capacities, with the <a href="https://fas.org/publication/details-russia-modernization-expansion/">Russian nuclear arsenal</a> modernized and <a href="https://fas.org/publication/chinese-nuclear-forces-2024-a-significant-expansion/">China rapidly growing its arsenal</a>. Without the possibility of nuclear first use, these powers might test American resolve in regions like Eastern Europe, Taiwan, or the South China Sea, believing that Washington is reluctant to escalate.</p>
<p>This is where critics often misunderstand the moral and ethical dimensions of nuclear deterrence. A no-first-use policy may appear more humane, but by removing the strategic ambiguity that underpins deterrence, it risks emboldening adversaries to start conflicts that could spiral out of control. Paradoxically, maintaining a first-use option can be the best way to prevent nuclear war by ensuring adversaries never push the US into a corner where nuclear retaliation becomes necessary.</p>
<p><strong>Continuity across Administrations</strong></p>
<p>Regardless of who wins the November election, as Matthew Costlow noted, <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/believe-it-or-not-u-s-nuclear-declaratory-policy-and-calculated-ambiguity/">continuity in nuclear policy is essential for maintaining credibility</a>. The US has had a bipartisan consensus on maintaining nuclear deterrence since the dawn of the atomic age. Both Republican and Democrat administrations preserved the first-use option because they recognize the value of strategic ambiguity in deterring aggression.</p>
<p>A Trump administration might be inclined to preserve a muscular nuclear posture to project strength, while a Harris administration might come under pressure from progressives to move towards a no-first-use policy—aligning with global disarmament movements. However, any shift towards no first use would erode the credibility of US commitments to allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in particular, relies on the American nuclear umbrella, and a no-first-use policy could cause allies to question Washington’s willingness to respond to conventional or nuclear threats. Such a policy could cause a cascading effecting of nuclear proliferation amongst our allies and adversaries.</p>
<p>Moreover, a shift in policy during an administration change could create instability by signaling to adversaries that US nuclear posture is fluid and negotiable, making deterrence less effective. Credibility in nuclear deterrence is not just about weapons but also about long-term consistency and resolve, which are crucial in managing the expectations of allies and adversaries alike.</p>
<p><strong>Moral and Ethical Considerations</strong></p>
<p>The <a href="https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538164136/Nuclear-Ethics-in-the-Twenty-First-Century-Survival-Order-and-Justice">moral and ethical dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons</a> are undeniable. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear use make it tempting to adopt a policy that seeks to limit the circumstances under which such weapons might be employed. But the ethics of deterrence also hinge on preventing war in the first place. If the fear of nuclear first use keeps adversaries from initiating conflicts that could escalate into full-scale war, then the policy serves a larger ethical purpose: preserving peace.</p>
<p>In the real world of international politics, where states act for self-interest and survival, moral purity often clashes with pragmatic necessities. Nuclear deterrence, including the first-use option, is a grim but necessary strategy for ensuring peace and stability in a world still defined by competition among great powers.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>As the 2024 election approaches, the future of American nuclear policy should be beyond partisan politics. The US must maintain its nuclear first-use policy regardless of which administration takes office, whether led by Donald Trump or Kamala Harris. The strategic logic of deterrence, the credibility of use, and the need to prevent adversary aggression all argue for preserving this policy. While the moral and ethical concerns surrounding nuclear weapons are valid, the preservation of peace and the deterrence of large-scale conflicts depend on maintaining the ambiguity that has underpinned nuclear strategy for decades. A stable and secure world requires that the US continue to hold the line on its nuclear posture—now and in the future.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Maintaining-Americas-First-Use-Policy.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/maintaining-americas-first-use-policy/">Maintaining America’s First-Use Policy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Crucial Role of Escalation Dominance and Narrative Control in Nuclear Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:12:35 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dominance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[global stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-range attacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[media]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[narrative]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear powers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic messaging]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic weapons]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=26968</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear weapons have long been considered a double-edged sword in international relations—capable of both preventing conflicts through deterrence and posing existential threats if mismanaged. In this delicate balance, two key elements emerge as critical for nuclear deterrence credibility and effectiveness: escalation dominance and the control of international narratives. This article explores the interconnectedness of these [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/">The Crucial Role of Escalation Dominance and Narrative Control in Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear weapons have long been considered a double-edged sword in international relations—capable of both preventing conflicts through <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/21st-Century-Nuclear-Deterrence-and-Missile-Defense/">deterrence</a> and posing <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/EC726528F3A71ED5ED26307677960962/S2194588819000162a.pdf/nuclear_war_as_a_global_catastrophic_risk.pdf">existential threats</a> if mismanaged. In this delicate balance, two key elements emerge as critical for nuclear deterrence credibility and effectiveness: escalation dominance and the control of international narratives. This article explores the interconnectedness of these elements and their significance in maintaining peace and stability in the strategic environment.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Escalation Dominance</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong><a href="https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/escalation-dominance-in-americas-oldest-new-nuclear-strategy/">Escalation dominance</a> refers to a nation’s ability to control and dictate the pace and intensity of a conflict, particularly when nuclear weapons are involved. In the context of nuclear deterrence, it becomes essential for a nation possessing such capabilities to showcase a clear and overwhelming advantage in terms of the scale and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282155">This superiority</a> discourages potential adversaries from engaging in actions that might lead to a nuclear confrontation.</p>
<p>One aspect of escalation dominance is the possession of a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Americas-Nuclear-Triad/">diverse range of nuclear capabilities</a>, including strategic and tactical weapons. <a href="https://www.britannica.com/technology/strategic-weapons-system">Strategic weapons</a> are designed for long-range attacks on major targets, while <a href="https://www.ntanet.net/tactical-vs-strategic-nuclear-weapons-what-is-the-difference/">tactical weapons</a> are intended for use in more localized conflicts and are often of much lower yields. The combination of both types of weapons enhances a nation’s flexibility and adaptability in responding to different threat scenarios, reinforcing its position of escalation dominance.</p>
<p>Moreover, modernizing nuclear arsenals with advanced technologies, such as <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/programs/npp/hypersonic/">hypersonic delivery systems</a> and <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11353#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defense%20(DOD,launched%20rockets%2C%20and%20guided%20bombs.">precision-guided munitions</a>, further solidifies a nation’s escalation dominance. The continuous development and enhancement of nuclear capabilities are intended to act as a powerful deterrent, dissuading potential adversaries from challenging the status quo.</p>
<p><strong>Narrative Control</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>In the contemporary era, where information flows rapidly across borders, the control of <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/07/31/controlling_the_narrative_how_political_warfare_can_influence_policy_113669.html">international narratives</a> is equally crucial for effective nuclear deterrence. <a href="https://www.tvpaul.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Self-Deterrence-Article-PDF.pdf">The narrative surrounding a nation’s nuclear capabilities, intentions, and strategic outlook</a> can significantly influence global perceptions and responses. Therefore, shaping and managing this narrative becomes a vital component of maintaining a credible deterrent.</p>
<p>International narratives are shaped through diplomatic channels, public communications, and media engagement. Nations with nuclear capabilities must articulate a clear and consistent message about the responsible and restrained use of their nuclear arsenal. Emphasizing a commitment to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament initiatives (whether one follows through with them or not) helps build trust and reduces the likelihood of misunderstandings that could lead to conflict.</p>
<p><a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/58375.htm">Strategic communication</a> also plays a pivotal role in deterring potential adversaries. By effectively conveying the consequences of hostile actions and highlighting the unwavering commitment to national security, a nation can discourage aggressive behavior and maintain a stable international environment.</p>
<p><strong>Interconnected Dynamics</strong></p>
<p>The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence relies on the seamless integration of escalation dominance and narrative control. Escalation dominance alone may not be sufficient if a nation fails to communicate its intentions clearly and reassure the international community of its responsible behavior. Conversely, narrative control without credible escalation dominance may lead to perceptions of weakness, inviting potential aggressors to test boundaries.</p>
<p>The interconnected dynamics of escalation dominance and narrative control form a symbiotic relationship. A nation’s ability to demonstrate <a href="https://www.psqonline.org/viewContent.cfm?sk=21F4EBC9D6D50BF9C81DC9DF5FC967B21ACDE0A2A90FDBD3A087B2D1B09BE2CEEE">overwhelming military capabilities</a> enhances the credibility of its strategic messaging, reinforcing the perception that any conflict would be unwinnable. Conversely, a well-crafted narrative that emphasizes responsible behavior and a commitment to peace complements the deterrent effect of military capabilities.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>In the complex realm of nuclear deterrence, the synergy between escalation dominance and narrative control stands as the linchpin in the delicate dance of maintaining global stability and preventing conflict. As nations navigate the intricate landscape of international relations, the imperative to invest in both military capabilities and strategic communications becomes increasingly apparent. The symbiotic relationship between escalation dominance and narrative control underscores the multidimensional nature of effective deterrence.</p>
<p>Advances in technology and a worsening security environment add another layer of complexity to the challenge. Nations must not only stay ahead in terms of military advancements but also adapt their communication strategies to resonate with the contemporary world. The rise of social media and instant global communication necessitates a nuanced approach in crafting and disseminating narratives. The global audience, armed with instant access to information, demands transparency and coherence in the messages conveyed by nuclear powers.</p>
<p>Looking forward, the ability to balance these elements becomes more than a strategic necessity; it becomes imperative for the survival of a peaceful international order. Nations that excel in both the formidable display of military capabilities and the art of narrative persuasion are better equipped to deter potential adversaries effectively. The delicate interplay between escalation dominance and narrative control remains not only relevant but increasingly vital in an ever-changing world, where the specter of nuclear conflict looms over the delicate equilibrium of global relations. As the international community grapples with emerging challenges, the mastery of this delicate dance remains an ongoing commitment to a safer and more secure world.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/The-Crucial-Role-of-EscalationThe-Crucial-Role-of-Escalation-Dominance-and-Narrative-Control-in-Nuclear-Deterrence-Dominance-and-Narrative-Control-in-Nuclear-Deterrence.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-crucial-role-of-escalation-dominance-and-narrative-control-in-nuclear-deterrence/">The Crucial Role of Escalation Dominance and Narrative Control in Nuclear Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Has Been Renamed to Acknowledge the Value of Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-bureau-of-arms-control-verification-and-compliance-has-been-renamed-to-acknowledge-the-value-of-deterrence/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Nov 2023 22:39:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Emergency Action Message]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms agreements]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomatic]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[International Security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=26285</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>ALERT!  The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance has been renamed to the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS) as of November 13, 2023. The official announcement explains that ADS will lead “Department of State efforts on developing, negotiating, implementing, and verifying compliance with a range of arms [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-bureau-of-arms-control-verification-and-compliance-has-been-renamed-to-acknowledge-the-value-of-deterrence/">The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Has Been Renamed to Acknowledge the Value of Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>ALERT!  The U.S. Department of State’s <em>Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance</em> has been renamed to the <strong><em>Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (ADS)</em></strong> as of November 13, 2023. The <a href="https://www.state.gov/announcing-the-renaming-of-the-bureau-of-arms-control-verification-and-complianceto-the-bureau-of-arms-control-deterrence-and-stability/">official announcement</a> explains that ADS will lead “Department of State efforts on developing, negotiating, implementing, and verifying compliance with a range of arms control and disarmament agreements and arrangements; extended deterrence; missile defense; confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs); risk reduction; and crisis communications.” The newly renamed bureau will also assume key responsibilities to tackle national security challenges “relating to artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing” while playing a key role in establishing and promoting norms of responsible behavior in outer space, cyberspace, and with artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies.” As a result of the suspension, termination, or withdrawal of multiple arms control treaties, the level of &#8220;verification and compliance&#8221; has drastically decreased.</p>
<p>Diplomatic efforts toward addressing these modern national security challenges can “enhance integrated deterrence, global stability, and international security,” but only if these efforts result in favorable outcomes for America. Therefore, it is crucial that this renamed organization reorients its purpose and metrics accordingly. Pursuing many agreements, even if they are bad, is not a reliable way to measure success. The success of any agreement should only be measured by how effective it is. The three maxims to successful arms control agreements are:</p>
<ol>
<li>Any agreement that does not satisfy the national security needs of the parties will eventually be cheated on and thus fail</li>
<li>Any agreement that does not have rigorous and regular verification procedures will eventually be cheated on and thus fail</li>
<li>Any agreement that is not symmetrically desired by all parties will yield asymmetric results that benefit one party over another; the perception of any lopsided agreements will eventually be rejected and thus fail</li>
</ol>
<p>The Bureau’s name change not only addresses “emerging 21st-century national security challenges,” but acknowledges the important role deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence, plays in achieving and maintaining global stability. The National Institute for Deterrence Studies congratulates the ADS’s recognition that it “must modernize [its] approaches and expand [their] thinking to help build a more stable, peaceful world” and we stand ready to assist!</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-bureau-of-arms-control-verification-and-compliance-has-been-renamed-to-acknowledge-the-value-of-deterrence/">The Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Has Been Renamed to Acknowledge the Value of Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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