The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word diplōma, meaning “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is defined as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is defined as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.

In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.

China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China’s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.

The United States’ current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.

Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, argue that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”

Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. sanctions intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.

For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is deterrence by denial, as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in Thucydides’ Trap, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.

Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia’s posture. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as described by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”

It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.

While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.

Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft was originally published on Global Security Review.

Deterrence does not rest solely on possessing nuclear weapons. It also depends on the assurance that those weapons cannot be neutralized, constrained, or rendered ineffective by an adversary’s ability to maneuver, surveil, or strike first. Geography, therefore, matters. In the emerging strategic environment, Greenland occupies one of the most consequential geographic positions in the world.

Denial as the Foundation of Nuclear Survivability

The survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, particularly the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, is the cornerstone of strategic stability. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) provide the most secure retaliatory capability precisely because they operate undetected at sea. But stealth is not automatic. Submarines must transit known maritime corridors to reach patrol areas, and those corridors create opportunities for adversary interference.

For U.S. and allied forces operating in the Atlantic and Arctic, two choke points are decisive: the GIUK Gap (Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom) and the Bear Gap between Greenland and Svalbard. These routes connect the Arctic Ocean to the North Atlantic and serve as the primary pathways for submarines moving between bastion areas and open-ocean operating zones.

If Russian or Chinese submarines could transit these gaps freely, they would be able to threaten NATO SSBNs, target transatlantic sea lines of communication, and position themselves for nuclear or conventional strikes against NATO territory and U.S. nuclear forces. Denying that access—rather than reacting after the fact—is what preserves nuclear survivability. Greenland makes such denial far more feasible.

Greenland as a Strategic Gatekeeper

Greenland’s location enables persistent surveillance, early warning, and anti-submarine warfare operations across the Arctic–Atlantic interface. Sensors, airfields, space and radar infrastructure, and command-and-control nodes associated with Greenland enable the United States and NATO to monitor adversary movements and constrain their ability to maneuver undetected.

This is not about tactical confrontation; it is about strategic denial. Greenland’s geography makes it exceedingly difficult for Russian or Chinese forces to move quietly from the Arctic into the Atlantic, increasing the likelihood that such efforts would be detected, tracked, and, if necessary, intercepted. When combined with American technology, Greenland adds uncertainty, constrains their options, complicates operational planning, and reduces incentives for escalation.

Russia’s Arctic Strategy and the Olenya Complex

Russia’s own posture reinforces Greenland’s importance. Moscow has invested heavily in the Arctic, operating 32 bases, expanding air and missile defenses, and increasing submarine activity across the High North. The Kola Peninsula hosts a substantial portion of Russia’s nuclear forces, supported by infrastructure such as the Olenya nuclear weapons storage facility, which underpins long-range aviation and missile operations.

Russia’s objective is twofold: to shield its own nuclear forces within a protected Arctic bastion, and to enable submarines and aircraft to push outward into the Atlantic when required. Those outward movements would be designed to threaten NATO’s reinforcement routes, hold allied territory at risk, and directly threaten U.S. strategic forces and American cities.

By enabling the U.S. and NATO to better monitor and deny access through the Arctic gaps, Greenland limits Russia’s ability to mobilize and deploy 40 percent of its submarine force. This denial mission directly strengthens Euro-Atlantic security by reducing the coercive value of Russian nuclear signalling or capacity for destruction.

China, the Arctic, and Global Deterrence

Although China is not an Arctic power by geography, it increasingly behaves like one strategically. Beijing’s naval expansion and interest in Arctic routes reflect its ambition to operate on a global scale. Chinese submarines operating in cooperation with Russia, or benefiting from shared intelligence and surveillance, could complicate the maritime balance in the North Atlantic.

Preventing Chinese submarines from accessing these waters is therefore as important as containing Russian forces. Even a limited Chinese presence would require diverting allied assets and introducing new strategic risks. Greenland helps pre-empt that outcome by reinforcing allied control over Arctic approaches and denying adversaries the ability to open a northern axis of competition.

This denial function links Greenland directly to Indo-Pacific security. The same U.S. nuclear forces that deter conflict in Asia depend on freedom of manoeuvre and survivability in the Atlantic and Arctic. If those forces are threatened in one theatre, credibility erodes in all others.

Air, Missile, and Early Warning Dimensions

The Arctic is also a critical domain for air and missile operations—America’s planned “Golden Dome.” Long-range bombers and ballistic missiles generally follow polar trajectories to maximize range and payload and minimize warning time. Greenland’s position enables early detection, tracking, and integration into broader air and missile defense architectures.

By denying adversaries access to Arctic airspace, Greenland reinforces strategic stability by reducing incentives for first-strike calculations over the North Pole. This capability is essential in an era of increasingly compressed decision timelines.

Conclusion

Greenland matters because it enables strategic denial by denying Russian and Chinese submarines, aircraft, and missiles access through the Arctic and North Atlantic gaps that connect global theatres. That denial preserves the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces, protects allied homelands, and sustains the credibility of extended deterrence across both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions.

In an age defined by competition over access and geography, Greenland is not peripheral but essential to maintaining the balance of power and preventing great-power conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Greenland, Strategic Denial, and the Survivability of U.S. Nuclear Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia declared itself compliant with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.

In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration emphasized that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already been paused since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already completed over 70 percent of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. “inequality” in support of Ukraine.

New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.

Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its 10-16 multiple warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.

Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.

The U.S. nuclear triad modernization program is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.

Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a physical inspection method in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s final compliance report concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.

Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement” in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, some experts estimate the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at 1,000 to 5,000, a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.

Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including parity approaches, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START was originally published on Global Security Review.

The NIDS View Podcast: Regional Security Under Pressure: Japan, Taiwan, and the Future of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Chris McInnes is Executive Director at the Air Power Institute. He is an air power and national security expert with 25 years of experience in the military, government, and industry and is also a frequent commentator and speaker at defence seminars here in Australia.

Deterrence Down Under Podcast: Australian Air Power and Deterrence with Chris McInnes was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

These unmanned and precision attacks targeted strategic locations, ranging from early warning radar sites to critical military installations. They did not provoke the feared nuclear response. Instead, these operations exposed a new threat calculus where persistence, precision, and the power of perception are paramount.

Recent analyses suggest that such drone operations contributed to shifting risk assessments within adversary states, where even a 10 percent to 15 percent error in perception could lead to miscalculation. American nuclear strategists now contend with an urgent need to rethink deterrence as the boundary between conventional and nuclear erodes.

Spectral Shifts: Rethinking Strategic Assumptions

For decades, American nuclear strategy hinged on the assumption that any conventional attack on nuclear command and control assets would inevitably trigger a nuclear counter-response. Data from Cold War–era exercises and subsequent real-world incidents reinforced this mindset among defense planners. Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes on sensitive Russian assets, including radar installations integral to Russia’s early warning systems, force a reconsideration of long-held assumptions.

The Kremlin’s response is notably restrained, treating these incursions as manageable costs rather than triggers for nuclear escalation. This strategic restraint, observed in multiple public and classified communications from Moscow, signals that deterrence may now rely less on the brute force of nuclear capability and more on the sophistication of targeting and intent. The takeaway for modern policymakers is that deterrence must now incorporate a broader array of factors, including technology-driven precision and the adversary’s threshold for escalation.

Phantom Impact: Redefining Strategy Beyond Nuclear Might

The era when the primary measure of strategic impact was synonymous with nuclear firepower is ending. Ukraine’s innovative use of low-cost, high-precision drones demonstrates that small platforms can disrupt traditional security calculations. Recent reports from defense think tanks estimate that the unit cost of drone operations is less than 1 percent of what a conventional fighter aircraft mission might cost, yet their operational impact in terms of intelligence and tactical disruption is comparable in key areas.

These drones infiltrate deep into adversary territory and strike high-value military and economic assets once presumed invulnerable. Such operational dynamics challenge the long-standing monopoly of nuclear-armed states over credible homeland threats. American planners must now recalibrate their threat models to integrate non-nuclear options, recognizing that the future of strategic impact is both more economical and more technologically complex than ever before.

Haunted Homelands: The Crumbling Illusion of Sanctuary

During the Cold War, vast distances, natural barriers, and the geographic isolation provided by oceans created the comforting illusion that major powers could enjoy an impenetrable sanctuary. Today, that illusion is crumbling. Ukraine’s drone operations are a vivid demonstration that even regions thought to be well-protected can be penetrated. Attacks targeting Russia’s early warning networks, critical oil infrastructure, and military bases reveal that no area can rest on its laurels.

American infrastructure, ranging from energy grids to communication systems and early warning radars, face elevated risks in an age of highly agile autonomous systems. Consider that the global market for unmanned aerial vehicles is projected to reach nearly $50 billion by 2030. Considering this, there is an immediate imperative to overhaul homeland defense strategies. Rapid response protocols, increased situational awareness, and investment in counter-drone technologies are no longer optional. They are emerging as essential components of modern deterrence.

Phantom Signals: How Optics and Intent Drive Escalation

One of the most remarkable aspects of Ukraine’s campaign is its ability to secure tactical advantages without spiraling into uncontrolled escalation. The success of these drone strikes lies in their careful timing, precision, and measured execution. Ukrainian forces consistently space out operations and meticulously choose targets that convey national resolve without risking mass casualties. This dual messaging, delivering a tangible operational effect while sending a clear political signal, underscores a critical evolution in deterrence thinking.

Today, the optics and perceived intent behind an action can be as decisive as the physical impact. One analysis points out that misinterpretations of strategic intent now pose as much risk of inadvertent escalation as traditional force-on-force scenarios. For the United States, this means that developing clear, well-articulated signaling frameworks is crucial. Such frameworks must enable policymakers and military leaders to assert credible force while avoiding actions that might be misread as provocative by adversaries. In a world where every action is scrutinized and the margins for error are thinning, clarity in communication becomes a cornerstone of modern deterrence.

Ghosts in the Arsenal: Integrating Drones into Deterrence

Drones are transcending their traditional role on the battlefield and are emerging as indispensable strategic assets. Modern unmanned systems serve multiple roles, from surveillance and intelligence gathering to direct precision strikes against key targets. Their integration is revolutionizing how military operations are conducted without risking human life. Moreover, these systems have the added benefit of being less politically charged than manned strike platforms. However, their growing prominence also introduces the potential for miscalculation.

With investments in drone technology doubling over the past decade in many leading militaries, the United States must swiftly incorporate these assets into its overarching deterrence framework. This requires the formulation of robust policies that define the operational limits and acceptable contexts for drone employment, comprehensive training programs for commanders in escalation management, and public messaging that reinforces strategic resolve without escalating tensions. The rapid pace of technological adoption means that the window for effective integration is short, and strategic agility is paramount.

Phantoms of the Future: Recasting Deterrence in the Drone Age

Retaining U.S. strategic credibility in the coming decades will demand an evolution beyond a deterrence model solely anchored in nuclear might. Although nuclear forces remain critical, they are no longer the exclusive instruments that shape adversary behavior in today’s multidomain conflicts. The future of deterrence depends on a seamless strategy where nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities are coherently integrated. This entails developing a comprehensive national doctrine for drone utilization that explicitly defines clear thresholds for action, acceptable target sets, and robust escalation-management protocols. In parallel, efforts must focus on modernizing homeland defenses to counter the threat of long-range, autonomous drone attacks, especially in sectors such as space-based assets, energy, and telecommunications. Data from defense budget analyses show that if every NATO member met the 2 percent gross domestic product defense spending target, the alliance’s budget would increase by over $100 billion annually. Such investments, along with analogous U.S. initiatives to enhance technological resilience, are crucial if deterrence is to remain credible and effective in this new operational environment.

Final Haunting: Embracing the Ghostly Evolution of Deterrence

“Ghosts in the Skies” is not just a metaphor; it encapsulates the profound transformation underway in modern deterrence. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone technology is forcefully redefining the conventional wisdom that has long informed global security policy. This paradigm shift challenges entrenched assumptions and demands a rapid evolution of U.S. military strategy. In an era of hybrid threats and rapid technological change, our global security environment is more complex and interdependent than ever before. The future of deterrence will rely on the capacity to adapt swiftly, integrate non-linear threat responses, and build flexible defense systems that are as agile as the adversaries they are designed to deter. The message for policymakers is clear: embrace this ghostly evolution now, for in the emerging multidomain battlefield every misstep carries the risk of destabilizing not only regional security but also global order.

The transformation in deterrence prompted by Ukraine’s drone operations is a stark reminder that innovation in warfare can render old paradigms obsolete. As nations invest in cost-effective, high-precision autonomous systems, the calculus of deterrence will continue to shift, compelling the United States and its allies to rethink both doctrine and defense spending. In this new era, where even the faintest ghost can upend strategic balance, the ability to adapt and respond with agility will be the true measure of national security.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

Ghosts in the Skies: How Ukraine’s Drone Tactics Recast Modern Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Extended deterrence, commonly known as the “nuclear umbrella,” represents America’s commitment to defend its allies against strategic threats, including the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1940s, this policy provides security guarantees to NATO members and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea.

Rising threats from adversaries like North Korea and Iran, coupled with the modernization of arsenals by Russia and China, underscore its continued necessity. Without this safeguard, allies may feel compelled to pursue independent nuclear programs, triggering preventable proliferation that can destabilize entire regions and weaken American influence.

Consider a scenario where the United States’ failure to build a peer theater nuclear capability and public statements are viewed by allies as a reduction in American nuclear commitments in East Asia. Japan, confronted by an assertive China and threatening North Korea, initiates a covert nuclear program, leveraging its advanced civilian nuclear technology and plutonium reserves. Constitutional constraints notwithstanding, mounting public anxiety could drive Tokyo toward its first nuclear test.

South Korea, facing similar security vulnerabilities, revives its previously dormant nuclear ambitions. Taiwan, under existential threat from China, sees nuclear capability as essential for survival. Alarmed by these developments, President Xi Jinping orders an accelerated attack on Taiwan and, potentially, attacks targets in South Korea and Japan to preempt support of Taiwan.

This ripple effect would yield devastating global repercussions. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone of nonproliferation, ceases in relevance. Nations such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany, and Poland might explore nuclear options. With more nuclear actors in play, risks increase as a statistical probability. Diplomatic and economic instability would likely surge, potentially fracturing alliances, crippling foreign investment, and destabilizing global markets.

Extended deterrence is not merely about preventing proliferation; it provides substantial military and economic benefits as well. American allies contribute robust defense capabilities, hosting critical strategic bases essential for American operations. South Korea’s military fought alongside American forces in every conflict since Vietnam, while Japan’s formidable naval and air capabilities enhance American strategic flexibility. European NATO allies provide indispensable missile defense and air operations infrastructure, reinforcing American global power projection.

Economically, the nuclear umbrella fosters stability, encouraging foreign direct investment from treaty allies like Japan, Germany, and South Korea—three of the top investors in the US. This security framework ensures mutual prosperity and deepens economic interdependence, strengthening not just trade partnerships but long-term strategic relationships. South Korea, the world’s 14th-largest economy, thrives under this arrangement, further reinforcing cross-border trade and investment.

Upholding extended deterrence demands a long-term investment of American resources, ensuring stability across NATO. Allied nations pledged to meet defense spending commitments, emphasizing the principle that collective security thrives on shared responsibility. Given that the US allocates just under three percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, committing at least two percent is a reasonable expectation.

Eleven nations met the two percent target in 2023, up from just four in 2017. President Trump’s pressure campaign on NATO defense spending is working. If every NATO nation adhered to the two percent minimum, the alliance’s total defense budget would rise by over $100 billion annually, reinforcing military capabilities, strengthening infrastructure, and fortifying global stability.

More than just a financial obligation, honoring these agreements is fundamental to sustaining NATO’s unity and trust. Increased investment not only bolsters collective security but also eases the strain on the US, which continues to shoulder the responsibility of protecting Western civilization from instability.

Extended deterrence long served as the backbone of global stability, shaping a world where security, military cooperation, economic prosperity, and nuclear nonproliferation are upheld. Stability is not self-sustaining; it demands vigilance, action, and unwavering commitment. NATO’s legacy proves this repeatedly. From coalition forces uniting in Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing, to NATO-led air campaigns in Libya that dismantled an oppressive regime, alliance members stood together in moments of crisis. Joint operations in Afghanistan, where NATO countries fought side by side for nearly two decades, showcased the strength of shared commitment. Even today, as NATO fortifies defenses in Eastern Europe, the principle remains unchanged. Security is only as strong as the unity behind it.

NATO’s Article 5 is more than a pledge; it is a promise that must be upheld through action. Security is not theoretical; it is built on resources, strategy, and cooperation. The deterrence piggy bank needs deposits, not just withdrawals. If allies fail to uphold their commitments, the burden on the US becomes untenable.

The stakes could not be higher. Geopolitical tensions are rising, nuclear threats are evolving, and adversaries are watching for cracks in the foundation. The American nuclear umbrella remains a pillar of international security, but it is only as strong as the resolve behind it. Allies must step up because if they do not, the rain will come, and they will find themselves unprotected in the storm.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

The Nuclear Umbrella: Reassurance or Relic in a Shifting World? was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Podcast – Future-Proofing National Security: We Can’t Just Wish for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

India and the Philippines are set to sign a $200 million missile deal in 2025, that will include Akash missiles, which is a short-range surface-to-air ballistic missile and has a range of 25 kilometers (km). This is the second defense venture between Manila and New Delhi, the first being the acquisition of missile systems in 2022 worth $375 million from India. This new development shows India’s rise in the international defense market.

To enhance its defense capabilities, India robustly tests missile systems. In March 2024, India successfully tested the nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Agni-5 missile, which has a range of 5,000 km. This missile is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and has elevated India’s status as it enters the group of states that can fire multiple warheads from a single ICBM. In November 2024, India tested a long-range hypersonic missile successfully that can mark targets 1,500 km away. This missile is indigenously developed and puts India in the league of just a few countries that have developed this advanced technology.

In its Defence Day parade in January 2025, India publicized the mass production of quasi-ballistic Pralay missiles, which have a range of 150 to 500 km, can carry a payload of 500 to 1,000 kilograms (kg), and can maneuver while keeping a low trajectory. This is a short-range surface-to-surface tactical missile and is expected to be deployed near the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Moreover, there are media reports that Armenia is interested in buying these missiles from India.

According to media reports, India issued a notice to airmen (NATOM) in early 2025 for potential missile tests in the Bay of Bengal. It is anticipated that this NATOM was  conducting tests of the Agni-5MII. If tested successfully the Agni-5MII will modernize the Indian military, advance the Indian missile program, give India an edge over regional competitors, and will enhance India’s status in shaping the global security dynamics.

Along with the modernization of its missile program, the MTCR’s membership grants India greater boosted defense ties with various states, as previously mentioned. The MTCR focuses on missiles alone, but Indian defense exports are beyond just missiles. They include a broader range of equipment and services. Indian defense exports are estimated to increase to over $4 billion by 2025.

Moreover, India is actively pursuing partnerships with France, Israel, Russia, and the US. All of these partnerships focus on joint development and production of defense equipment, joint productions, transfer of technology, and military exercises.

Growing Indian missile capabilities pose a challenge to regional competition, putting Pakistan in a position where it needs to maintain the balance of power in the region via upgrading its defense capabilities. Indo-Philippine defense ties can be translated as a shift in the alliance in the Pak-Philippines equation. This was a traditionally warm relationship. It can force Pakistan to look out for developing closer ties with other states to counter this emerging alliance.

The technological advancement India achieved via the Akash missile can push Pakistan to invest in developing the same capabilities to counter any future Indian threat. The selling of Akash missile technology to the Philippines can be viewed in the light of India’s attempt to expand its strategic footprint at the regional and global level.

Pakistan then needs to reassess its own strategic alliances and defense posture. Growing Indian missile and defense ambitions will have repercussions on peace and stability both at the regional and global level. India’s growing missile ranges, in the case of ICBMs, will be perceived by China as an emerging threat, which can escalate tensions between these two states. The mutual perception of threat by China and Pakistan has the possibility of driving these two nations closer together. This is certainly not something the United States desires.

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director of Research for the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

India’s Missile Program: A Threat to Regional and Global Peace and Stability was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1966, he directed the establishment of the military-controlled Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and made nuclear weapons research a primary focus. Over the next two decades, Taiwan aggressively pursued a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Its remarkable advancement came to an abrupt halt in 1988 because of one Taiwanese scientist who was also a Central Intelligence Agency informant. What if that had not happened?

Continuing tensions in the Taiwan Strait along with conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have renewed conversations about the validity of the extended deterrence provided by the United States. Understandably, states may doubt the veracity of these current security guarantees.

We offer a counterfactual historical analysis to assess the traditional tradeoffs between a state’s right to nuclear weapons for security versus the established US foreign policy commitment of extended deterrence, which costs the United States significant human and material resources. If Taiwan was permitted to build a successful nuclear weapons program, what would the security environment in the Taiwan Strait look like today? Could the United States have prevented its own security dilemma with China, or would it have become more precarious? Can a what if scenario help inform a what’s next scenario for American foreign and nuclear policy?

To begin the analysis, a baseline understanding of nuclear postures is needed. Vipin Narang offers a simple construct for nuclear posture. It is the combination of a state’s capabilities, employment doctrine, and its command-and-control structure.

In his book, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, Narang introduces a framework that systematically explains the nuclear posture choices made by regional powers based on two variables: whether there is a third-party patron able to defend them and the proximity of a conventionally-superior threat. It then applies several unit-level variables when the security environment is indeterminate.

Moving through his decision tree (below), regional nuclear powers fall into three potential postures: catalytic, asymmetric escalation, or assured retaliation.

A catalytic posture depends on a third-party patron to intervene and de-escalate the situation before nuclear exchange happens.

An assured retaliation posture is assumed when a nation can keep its nuclear forces secure from a potential disarming first strike and assure a costly retaliation on the aggressor. An asymmetric escalation posture is designed to deter conventional attacks by credibly showing the ability and willingness to escalate to nuclear first use options at first sign of conventional attack.

With the groundwork laid, it is possible to examine the PRC’s nuclear posture and posit a hypothetical Taiwan posture. Historically, China maintained an assured retaliation posture. According to the Federation of American Scientists, by 1970, China had approximately 50 nuclear weapons and by 1980 that number was 200. It maintained a small arsenal for over 30 years while maintaining its assured retaliation posture. It was an arsenal that Taiwan could counter, if allowed to continue to build its own weapons.

There are some assumptions required to run through this historical counterfactual. First, Taiwan would have been able to start developing nuclear weapons by 1990. When program shutdown began in January of 1988, Taiwan was assessed to be “at least a year or two away from having a three to six-month breakout capability.” Second, Taiwan would have been able to match a similar pace of production that China achieved from 1964-1979.

Third, China would not have intervened militarily to dismantle Taiwan’s nuclear program. This assumption is based on protections by the United States remaining intact, creating enough deterrence at a time when the People’s Liberation Army, though nuclear capable, was relatively weak.

Fourth, the great powers would not have engaged in counterproliferation efforts against Taiwan. In reality, this was not the case.

Fifth, American concerns over political instability in Taiwan were more muted, which reality would later vindicate.  Again, there were always real concerns with Taiwanese autocracy.

Accepting these assumptions and following the above framework, we suggest Taiwan could have fielded approximately 50 nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990’s. This nuclear arsenal would have been sufficient to achieve an asymmetric escalation posture, which is best suited and specifically designed to counter conventional attacks from a conventionally superior neighbor.

To be credible, Taiwan would need to declare that any attempt to unify Taiwan and China by force will lead to a nuclear response. With this posture Taiwan would improve its ability to use asymmetric escalation to deter by denial—using nuclear weapons to deny the aggressors military objectives—and deterrence by punishment.

Had Taiwan been able to reveal an asymmetric escalation posture in the mid-1990s, would it have improved the balance of military power, sustained the status quo, and created a more stable security environment? There is no doubt Taiwan could inflict damage and deter a rational actor. Would it have been enough to deter China, who equated its national destiny with unification, including by force? Alternatively, would the revelation of Taiwan’s nuclear program intensify the cross-strait security dilemma by accelerating China’s own potential nuclear expansion? The unknowns of China’s decision calculus perplex even the modern analyst.

If the United States afforded Taiwan the space to develop a nuclear arsenal, would that have absolved America from any security commitments? One might argue the United States may have become more entangled in containing proliferation and a potential cross-strait nuclear war.

Certainly, the Republic of Korea (ROK) would not have appreciated another neighbor obtaining nuclear weapons while it faced its own nuclear-armed adversary. And Japan, given its tenuous history in the region, would likely have been unhappy to see the ROK field nuclear weapons without achieving its own equitable defense.

The discussion of alternative history matters in 2025 because middle states have witnessed what happened with Ukraine—a country without indigenous nuclear capability nor under the umbrella of protection from a third-party patron. Middle states across the world are recognizing that the security guarantees of a nuclear power extend only as far as its national interests.

It is no wonder that Ukraine now seeks a stronger security guarantee in the form of either “nukes or NATO.” And by extension, it’s not surprising that other middle states in comparable situations, like Taiwan, would re-evaluate their trust and confidence in the United States’ security promises. They see the writing on the wall with waning political interest and resources to combat adversaries in a multi-polar world.

Graham Allison observed that the United Kingdom learned, in the late nineteenth-century, rising German, Russian, French, and American navies meant its “two power standard” for naval supremacy was no longer a viable security formula without over-extending its resources. A century later, the United States finds itself in the position of Britain, compelled to re-evaluate its policies as a multipolar world challenges American dominance.

Chief among these policies must be exploring an international security strategy that defines and is faithful to American national security priorities, within available resources, unambiguous, and exploits the broad array of instruments of power. The nation must avoid the mistake of treating everything as a national security priority, rendering nothing a priority. This results in under-resourced and under-supported engagements, which erodes trust and confidence in the United States.

There will be winners and losers if the United States strikes a truly prioritized strategy.  But Thucydides argues that this is the nature of international politics, however unfortunate; the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. However, as the alternative history above suggests, left to their own devices, vulnerable middle states may lean towards obtaining their own nuclear weapons.  Thus, creative new security solutions must replace resource-intensive extended deterrence in those cases, if nuclear non-proliferation remains a top national security priority. 

Kira Coffey is a 2024 Air Force National Defense Fellow and International Security Program Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. She is a graduated squadron commander, combat pilot, and China Foreign Area Officer. Her research focuses on Great Power Competition with the People’s Republic of China. 

Ryan Fitzgerald is a 2024 National Defense Fellow and Security Studies Program Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a graduated squadron commander and combat pilot. His research focuses on International Relations and Nuclear Deterrence.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Taiwan’s Nuclear What-If: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Global Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

This important agreement, which places limits on strategic nuclear arsenals and provides verification mechanisms, may face an uncertain future under Trump’s leadership. During his first term, President Trump demonstrated a dislike of arms control, a trend that could seriously undermine multilateral efforts in maintaining global strategic stability.

 Trump’s Arms Control Record

 During Trump’s first term, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a landmark agreement with Russia that had eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons. While the US cited Russian violations of the treaty as the reason for American withdrawal, the move is concerning for European security and removes a crucial safeguard against nuclear escalation.

Trump also expressed skepticism toward extending New START, instead demanding the inclusion of China in future agreements. While China is increasing its nuclear capabilities, its nuclear arsenal remains smaller than the American and Russian arsenals. Trump’s insistence on China’s inclusion delayed negotiations, nearly causing the treaty to lapse even before the Biden administration secured its five-year extension.

These actions reflect a broader pattern of undermining multilateral arms control frameworks. Trump’s transactional approach prioritizes American advantage over long-term global stability, raising concerns about the future of arms control agreements under his leadership. Given his resounding victory in the recent election, the American people support his “America first” agenda, which will embolden Trump’s efforts to pursue his approach further.

 The Risks of Unilateralism

 Arms control agreements like New START, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the now-defunct INF Treaty historically relied on multilateral cooperation to reduce the risks of nuclear conflict. These agreements were/are built on principles of mutual trust, verification, and a shared commitment to minimizing the threat of nuclear escalation. Russia’s suspension of New START and increasing US-China and US-North Korea tensions further empower Trump’s unilateralism. Taken together, the already fragile architecture of global arms control is likely to fracture.

If Trump allows New START to expire or pursues a renegotiation on his terms, the consequences could be severe, with both openly increasing their strategic nuclear forces.

A Fragmented Global Landscape

 The dissolution of New START would not only impact Russo-American relations but also have negative implications for global security. European NATO member states are, however, more concerned about the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. The bigger threat is Trump’s withdrawal from NATO, which could spur NATO member-states to expand their own arsenals in nuclear-sharing arrangements, while others might consider developing independent nuclear capabilities. This fragmentation could destabilize the transatlantic alliance and further weaken the global arms control regime.

Beyond Europe, arms control agreements are importantly observed by all states. In the Middle East, where tensions are already high, countries like Iran countries might accelerate its nuclear program. Similarly, North Korea may interpret American instability in arms control as an opportunity to modernize its arsenal.

Emerging Technologies and Strategic Instability

The erosion of multilateralism in arms control is compounded by the rise of emerging technologies such as hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, and cyber warfare. These advancements could transform the nature of modern conflict, introducing new challenges that traditional arms control frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Under Trump’s leadership, the US is likely to prioritize investments in these technologies, potentially at the expense of traditional arms control efforts. For example, Trump’s first term emphasized missile defense systems, which Russia perceives as destabilizing. In response, Moscow invested heavily in countermeasures like hypersonic weapons. The potential weaponization of space and advancements in cyber capabilities further complicates the strategic landscape, creating new risks of miscalculation and escalation.

Lessons from History and the Importance of Multilateralism in Arms Control

The history of arms control offers valuable lessons about the importance of cooperation. Agreements like the INF Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were not merely symbolic but played critical roles in reducing nuclear risks during the Cold War. These treaties demonstrated that even adversaries could find common ground in the pursuit of mutual stability.

To mitigate risks, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to multilateral arms control. Organizations like the United Nations and NATO have a critical role to play in facilitating dialogue and promoting transparency. Only through a renewed commitment to multilateralism can the world hope to navigate the complex challenges of the 21st century and maintain global stability in the face of evolving threats.

Syed Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Trump 2.0: Unilateralism and the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

Too few Americans contemplate the role of digital currency volatility in acting as a barrier or an enabler to nuclear deterrence. The reality is that there are opportunities and risks that volatile cryptocurrency plays in the strategic calculus of nuclear states.

Cryptocurrency and Geopolitical Shifts

Cryptocurrencies are decentralized and borderless, challenging traditional financial systems and reshaping how states interact economically. Their volatility stems from market immaturity, speculative trading, regulatory uncertainties, and evolution of these ever-changing technologies. Essentially created to prevent intermediaries, like banks and financial institutions, cryptocurrencies lay the foundation for trustless transactions for illicit activities.

This volatile mix of person-to-person transactions and zero oversight introduces both unpredictability and opportunity, raising questions about their implications for nuclear deterrence, which now must deal with a domain that includes ungoverned access to financial streams that can be used by state and non-state actors to engage in elicit behavior that undermines deterrence stability.

Nuclear deterrence relies on a delicate balance of power, with states maintaining assured second-strike capabilities to dissuade adversaries from initiating conflict. This balance hinges on credibility and capability. Cryptocurrencies, with their volatile swings in value, could serve to undermine stability within a country or enable elicit actors to engage in a range of nonnuclear actions that undermine strategic stability.

The Risks of Cryptocurrency Volatility as a Barrier

Cryptocurrency volatility can act as a barrier to nuclear deterrence by creating financial instability and undermining a state’s ability to project economic power. Traditional nuclear powers depend on stable economies to maintain robust defense capabilities, fund deterrence strategies, and support diplomatic efforts. Sharp and unpredictable fluctuations in digital assets can undermine financial stability, weakening a state’s capacity to fund critical defense initiatives.

For the United States, crypto is not a major issue currently. But, for North Korea, who funds its nuclear program through elicit activities, crypto is important. Proliferators also use crypto to conduct activity. Instability in crypto makes illicit activity even more high stakes and unpredictable.

Instability creates advantages for state and non-state actors to exploit cryptocurrency markets for nefarious purposes, such as evading sanctions, financing proliferation, and bypassing traditional financial controls. The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies complicates efforts to monitor, track, and regulate illicit activities, potentially undermining efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or restrict financing for state and non-state actors pursuing destabilizing weapons programs.

Cryptocurrency instability also presents a challenge to strategic stability through cyber threats. If critical financial systems or exchanges are disrupted, or if adversaries manipulate markets to harm a nation’s economy, it could create economic shocks severe enough to destabilize deterrence relationships, increase miscalculation risks, or fuel insecurity-driven arms build-ups.

The Darknet and Conflict Escalation

Darknet cryptocurrency markets empower bad actors by offering anonymity and decentralized financial tools, enabling a wide range of conflict-escalating activities. These markets facilitate the purchase of illegal arms, military-grade technology, and hacking tools, often used to destabilize regions and target critical infrastructure (command-and-control systems) through cyberattacks.

Terror organizations leverage cryptocurrencies for anonymous funding, allowing them to finance operations, recruit globally, and expand their influence. Sanctioned entities exploit these markets to bypass international restrictions and acquire resources that fuel aggressive actions.

The ability to transact anonymously with cryptocurrencies also shields organized crime, including narcotics and human trafficking, whose revenues often fund conflict zones and insurgent groups. Covert exchanges on the darknet can increase espionage, destabilize international relations, and provoke hostilities to serve a radically motivated agenda.

In parallel, extremist groups utilize these platforms to spread propaganda, incite violence, and radicalize populations, further destabilizing fragile regions. The combination of anonymity, decentralized systems, and hidden economies presents a formidable challenge for global security efforts aimed at conflict prevention and stability.

Cryptocurrency as an Enabler of Nuclear Deterrence

On the other hand, cryptocurrency volatility also opens new avenues for strengthening nuclear deterrence through financial resilience and innovation. The decentralized nature of digital assets can enable states to diversify their financial resources and reduce dependency on traditional systems that might be vulnerable to adversarial influence or geopolitical tensions. In times of economic crisis or sanctions, cryptocurrencies can provide states with alternative means to maintain fiscal stability, thus supporting their deterrent capabilities. Countering bad activities with good can be as challenging as the reliance on traditional financial stability for positive security assurance.

Furthermore, blockchain technology, which underpins cryptocurrencies, offers potential for transparency, accountability, and verification mechanisms in arms control agreements. By leveraging blockchain, states can create tamper-proof records for tracking nuclear materials, enhancing verification regimes, and building trust between adversaries. The volatility of digital assets may fuel innovation and drive investment into these applications, ultimately strengthening nuclear stability and deterrence structures.

Balancing the Risks and Opportunities

While the volatility of cryptocurrencies poses undeniable risks, it is essential to approach them with a nuanced perspective to find the right balance between risk and reward. Policymakers must strike a balance between leveraging the opportunities that digital assets present and mitigating their risks to global security. Collaborative efforts to regulate and stabilize cryptocurrency markets can reduce the likelihood of financial instability while harnessing the potential of decentralized systems.

In addition, enhanced cybersecurity measures must accompany any state or multilateral effort to integrate cryptocurrency into the financial systems that underpin deterrence capabilities. Protecting digital infrastructure against malicious actors will ensure that the advantages of decentralized assets are not overshadowed by their exploitation for destabilizing purposes.

A New Strategic Frontier

The volatility of cryptocurrency markets is both a challenge and a frontier for instability of nuclear deterrence. While it poses risks through financial instability, illicit use, and cyber threats, it also offers opportunities for financial resilience, innovation, and transparency. In today’s evolving digital environment, nations must adapt to this dual-edged sword, developing strategies that incorporate the volatility of digital assets into a comprehensive approach to deterrence.

Ultimately, whether cryptocurrencies become a barrier or enabler of nuclear deterrence depends on how nations, regions, and regulators in the broader international community respond to this evolving challenge. By advocating cooperation, innovation, and regulation, cryptocurrencies can strengthen global security architectures and contribute to a stable nuclear order—turning volatility into a force for strategic stability and peace.

Greg Sharpe is the Marketing and Communications Director at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are his own.

The Volatility of Cryptocurrency: Barrier or Enabler of Nuclear Escalation? was originally published on Global Security Review.

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The Weekend Gouge- Dec 6 was originally published on Global Security Review.

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The Weekend Gouge was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hypersonic technology encompasses both aircraft and missiles that travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. These vehicles leverage advanced propulsion systems, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets), to achieve and sustain such high velocities. The potential applications of hypersonic technology are vast, ranging from rapid global strike capabilities to enhanced missile defense systems.

However, interest in hypersonic technology is not new. Scientific research began during the Cold War, but only in recent years have significant breakthroughs been made towards advancing hypersonic technology from theory to practicality. The primary drivers of this renewed focus include advancements in materials science, computational fluid dynamics, and propulsion technology. Nations such as the United States, China, and Russia are at the forefront of hypersonic research, each vying for technological supremacy, with China and Russia attempting to challenge the status quo.

The strategic advantages of hypersonic technology are multifaceted. One of the most significant benefits is the ability to deliver payloads at unprecedented speeds, drastically reducing the time available for adversaries to detect, track, and intercept these threats. This capability enhances both offensive and defensive operations.

Hypersonic vehicles can reach their targets much faster than conventional missiles or aircraft. This rapid response capability is crucial in scenarios requiring immediate action, such as neutralizing high-value targets or responding to emerging threats. The ability to strike quickly and precisely could deter adversaries from initiating conflict, knowing that retaliation would be swift and devastating.

The high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles make them difficult to detect and intercept. Traditional air defense systems, designed to counter slower, more predictable threats, may struggle to adapt to the dynamic flight paths of hypersonic weapons. This enhanced survivability increases the likelihood of mission success, particularly in contested environments.

Hypersonic vehicles can cover vast distances in a short amount of time, providing global reach without the need for forward-deployed bases.

This capability is especially valuable for nations looking to project power and influence across the globe. It also reduces the logistical burden associated with maintaining overseas bases and allows for more flexible deployment strategies.

Despite their potential, hypersonic technologies face significant technological challenges. Overcoming these obstacles is essential for the successful development and deployment of hypersonic systems.

One of the primary challenges is managing the extreme heat generated during hypersonic flight. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air friction can cause the surface temperature of a vehicle to reach several thousand degrees Celsius. Developing materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding and dissipating this heat is crucial to maintaining the structural integrity and performance of hypersonic vehicles.

The materials used in hypersonic vehicles must endure not only high temperatures but also extreme pressures and aerodynamic forces. Advanced composites, ceramics, and metal alloys are being developed to meet these demanding requirements. Researchers are also exploring innovative manufacturing techniques, such as additive manufacturing, to create components with enhanced durability and performance.

Maintaining control and accuracy at hypersonic speeds is another significant challenge. Hypersonic vehicles must navigate through rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, requiring sophisticated guidance and control systems. These systems must be able to make real-time adjustments to the vehicle’s trajectory, ensuring that it stays on course and reaches its intended target.

Developing reliable propulsion systems capable of sustained hypersonic flight is a major technological hurdle. Scramjets, which operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds, are still in the experimental stage. Achieving a balance between thrust, fuel efficiency, and structural integrity is critical for the success of these systems.

The deployment of hypersonic technology has profound strategic implications for global security. As nations race to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, the balance of power could shift, necessitating new defense strategies and international regulations.

The development of hypersonic technology has the potential to trigger an arms race among major powers. Nations may feel compelled to develop their own hypersonic capabilities or invest in advanced defense systems to counter these threats. This escalation could lead to increased military spending and heightened tensions on the global stage.

Hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence by providing a credible and rapid response option. However, their deployment also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons could shorten decision-making windows, increasing the likelihood of accidental or preemptive strikes. That said, the opportunity to discuss potential gains and losses for both development and implementation of hypersonic weapons is an opportunity to help drive future strategy development.

Developing effective countermeasures against hypersonic threats is a priority for many nations. Advanced radar systems, directed-energy weapons, and missile defense systems are being explored as potential solutions. Integrating these technologies into existing defense frameworks is essential for maintaining a robust defense posture.

The proliferation of hypersonic technology underscores the need for international regulations and agreements. Establishing norms and guidelines for the development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons could help mitigate the risks associated with their use. Diplomatic efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures are crucial for maintaining global stability.

Regardless of the naysayers, hypersonic technology represents the next frontier in military airpower, offering unparalleled speed, agility, and reach. While the strategic advantages are significant, the technological challenges and strategic implications cannot be overlooked. As nations continue to invest in hypersonic research and development, the race for air superiority will intensify, shaping the future of global security. Balancing the benefits and risks of hypersonic technology will be essential for ensuring a stable and secure international environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.

Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority was originally published on Global Security Review.

Instability and American Aid

Pakistan is not a stable country. There are concerns that the state may disintegrate. Its military and ISI are infiltrated by individuals linked to terrorist groups. Without focused American engagement, Pakistan’s instability could lead to either the theft of a nuclear weapon by terrorists or the sabotage of a nuclear facility. Moreover, a long-running territorial dispute over Kashmir and cross-border terrorism could easily escalate into a conflict or nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan gets a free ride. Between 1948 and 2016, it received over $78.3 billion in US military and economic support. In return, it is duplicitous. Over half of this aid was allocated to counterterrorism efforts, yet Pakistan’s military and the ISI continue supporting the Taliban and other extremists. The US annually provides Pakistan $2 billion in military and economic aid without proper oversight. Of this amount, $100 million is allocated to the Strategic Plans Division to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal. Despite this assistance, Pakistan provides safe haven to dozens of terrorist organizations and their leadership. Its military’s continued support for them increases the risk of a catastrophic nuclear attack by a proxy.

The Case for a Joint US-Pakistan Task Force

A joint US-Pakistan task force is necessary to enforce oversight, strengthen strategic ties, and provide a direct US role in securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A formal framework will mitigate the risks of mismanagement or unauthorized access and maintain control over critical aspects of nuclear security. It will enhance collaboration between military and intelligence agencies, enabling both sides to identify and respond to emerging threats while leveraging their combined expertise in human intelligence and counterterrorism.

A joint task force will also enhance nuclear security through specialized training. American experts in nuclear security and cyber defense can provide essential training to Pakistani forces, strengthening their operational readiness and capability to protect nuclear sites. Both nations conduct regular nuclear security drills—often referred to as “Armageddon tests” to assess vulnerabilities at nuclear sites. These drills help identify personnel weaknesses and prevent potential security breaches.

Deterrence, Sovereignty, and Regional Tensions

The presence of US military personnel in Pakistan will also serve as a powerful deterrent to terrorist organizations. US support in securing nuclear facilities reduces the probability of terrorist attempts to infiltrate and breach nuclear facilities or execute large-scale attacks. This cooperation also signals the seriousness of nuclear security in the region to potential adversaries.

Establishing an American military presence in Pakistan could be perceived as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. However, US involvement would be limited to advisory, intelligence, and technical support roles. This role would enable Pakistan to retain full control over its nuclear assets and security operations.

A US military presence in Pakistan could also escalate regional tensions—particularly with India. The two states have irreconcilable differences when it comes to Kashmir, and both sides believe they should control all of Kashmir, not just one part of it. An attack on civilians or military forces on either side of the line of control in Kashmir could easily escalate into a major conflict. However, the US can use diplomatic channels to ensure regional actors, including India, are aware of the task force’s defensive nature. The task force aims to secure nuclear sites and combat terrorism, not alter the region’s strategic balance.

Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe

The world cannot afford nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. By establishing a Joint US-Pakistan task force, the US both protects global security and reaffirms its leadership in the fight against nuclear terrorism. This partnership strengthens nuclear safeguard, prevents nuclear theft, and stabilizes the region. The US must act now to ensure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are protected. Together, we can turn a potential crisis into a collaborative success. The time to act is now for a safer and more stable world.

Timor Nawabi is currently pursuing a master’s degree in security policy studies with a concentration in Science and Technology, focusing mainly on cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Why a Joint US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Task Force Is Necessary was originally published on Global Security Review.

These efforts at nuclear compellence, using the threat of escalation to coerce NATO to limit its support for Ukraine, introduce dangerous loopholes that can be exploited by non-state jihadi actors such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, who possess no stake in global stability and are religiously motivated to see the downfall of a global order they view as sinful. These loopholes can be exploited via a false flag attack by imitating what appears to be (but is not) a NATO-backed conventional weapons attack on Moscow with the deliberate intent of triggering a nuclear war.

Jihadi terrorists, unlike state actors, do not seek to maintain a status quo. They are apocalyptically motivated, seeking to bring about the conditions for their version of an Islamic caliphate.

ISIS, al-Qaeda, and aligned groups are motivated by a destructive, apocalyptic worldview. In a 2007 video, Osama bin Laden had promised to use massive weapons to upend the global status quo, destroy the capitalist hegemony, and help create an Islamic caliphate, while Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd said, “If Muslims cannot defeat the kafir in a different way, it is permissible to use weapons of mass destruction, even if it kills all of them and wipes them and their descendants off the face of the Earth.”

ISIS aims to weaken and ultimately destroy state actors, including Russia, which they view as an enemy for its role in propping up the Assad regime in Syria. Furthermore, ISIS has a history of calling for attacks on Russia, specifically in retaliation for Russia’s military involvement in Syria and its broader fight against Islamist movements in the North Caucasus. If their leaders or the leaders of al-Qaeda can exploit a loophole to trigger a large-scale conflict between Russia and NATO, they might see this as a means to cripple both powers, creating a vacuum wherein they can establish their Caliphate.

One of the most disturbing scenarios arises from the possibility of ISIS orchestrating a false flag conventional weapons attack that manages to trigger a nuclear response and thus leads to all-out nuclear war. In today’s interconnected global landscape, terrorist groups can exploit modern technologies, cyber capabilities, and regional instability to mislead major powers. A well-executed false flag attack could deceive both NATO and Russia into believing they are under attack from the other, prompting a rapid escalation into a nuclear conflagration.

Imagine a scenario where ISIS or an affiliated group, through bribery or threats, gains control of a missile system from a third-party state or rogue military element and manages to smuggle this system into a NATO nation with porous border security, such as Romania. From this site, they launch a salvo of conventional missiles at Moscow, which the Russian government might interpret as either a NATO-supported attack or at least an action by rogue members of the NATO chain of command. Russia would be unlikely to consider the possibility that the launch was in fact performed by an uninvolved third party such as ISIS.

Within Putin’s revised nuclear doctrine, a sufficiently embarrassing non-nuclear strike on Russian territory could provoke a nuclear retaliation. This scenario becomes even more plausible if Russia believes the attack was coordinated by a NATO member or supported with NATO-provided weaponry. Thus, a false flag operation can exploit the lowered red lines Putin has established, triggering a nuclear launch by Russia, which would in turn be met with massive nuclear relation by NATO and America—leading to wider nuclear conflict.

ISIS’s leaders are not known for long-term survival planning, especially in the event of a global catastrophe like nuclear war. Their ideology prioritizes martyrdom and the apocalyptic fulfillment of their religious vision over practical concerns about survival in a post-nuclear world. If a NATO-Russia nuclear conflict were to lead to a nuclear winter—an environmental catastrophe that would devastate agriculture and global ecosystems—ISIS may believe that their movement, or at least their ideological successors, would survive through divine intervention or sheer resilience.

ISIS’s apocalyptic vision and willingness to exploit global chaos makes them a serious threat to global security, especially in the context of Russia’s current nuclear posture. Russian and NATO forces must work to enhance intelligence-sharing and establish clearer lines of communication to avoid falling victim to such a false flag operation. Furthermore, global powers must consider the broader implications of lowering nuclear thresholds in an age where non-state actors can exploit such vulnerabilities. Robust systems for verifying the origins of attacks, improved missile defense technologies, and clear diplomatic channels are essential to prevent any false flag attempt from succeeding.

For Russian military strategists, in particular, understanding the apocalyptic motivations of groups like ISIS is crucial. Putin’s strategy of nuclear compellence might seem effective in deterring NATO’s involvement in Ukraine, but it also opens dangerous new avenues for manipulation by non-state actors. By setting conditions where even a conventional attack could provoke a nuclear response, Russia risks falling into a trap set by terrorist groups that wish to bring about the universal Caliphate and wipe the global slate clean. This cannot happen.

Jonathan Rodriguez Cefalu is a researcher of security vulnerabilities in artificial intelligence systems and was the first discoverer of a critical vulnerability called “prompt injection,” which enables hijacking the actions and instructions of numerous AI systems. Jonathan discovered prompt injection as part of his work as co-founder of an AI safety & security firm called Preamble. Oksana Bairachna is an associate professor of management at the Odesa National University of Technology (ONTU) and a contributor to Preamble’s research on global strategic stability.

Why and How ISIS Leaders Might Exploit Putin’s Nuclear Compellence to Destroy Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Nuanced Continuity

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will likely continue the multilateral strategy that characterizes the Biden administration. As vice president, she demonstrated a deep commitment to international alliances and a keen understanding of national security. This suggests that a Harris administration will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national defense, while also advocating for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Additionally, a Harris administration will benefit from a seasoned foreign policy team. Her national security advisor, Phil Gordon, and his deputy, Rebecca Lissner, are experienced Washington hands who advocate for a balanced approach to American leadership. Their influence will likely steer Harris towards policies that emphasize deterrence without escalation and maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal while pursuing arms reductions.

Modernization with a Purpose

The Biden-Harris administration supports nuclear modernization as a component of national security. This includes updating existing systems and ensuring that the nuclear triad’s land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers remain effective and secure. Modernization efforts are aimed at addressing the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia, who are investing in advanced nuclear capabilities.

Additionally, during her tenure as a senator, Harris endorsed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived weaknesses. Her support for modernization reflects a recognition that technological advancements and evolving geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reliable and secure nuclear arsenal. This perspective aligns with her broader commitment to national defense and security.

Generational Shift in Perspective

Kamala Harris represents a generational shift. Unlike her predecessors, she brings a globalized outlook shaped by her immigrant heritage and diverse experiences. This worldview is likely to influence her approach to nuclear policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of global security. Harris has frequently spoken about the importance of addressing modern threats such as climate change and human rights, which she sees as intertwined with traditional security concerns. This broader perspective could lead to a more integrated approach to deterrence, considering a wider array of factors influencing global stability.

Engagement with Allies

Harris’s extensive engagement with international partners signals a strong commitment to collective security. Her active participation in high-profile international summits, such as the Munich Security Conference, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, and the Conference of Paris (COP) climate summit in Dubai, underscores her belief in the power of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Harris has also demonstrated unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, reflecting her dedication to upholding international norms and supporting allies under threat.

Under her leadership, the US is likely to continue strengthening NATO and other strategic partnerships—presenting a unified front against nuclear threats. Harris’ approach would emphasize the importance of solidarity among allies to ensure that deterrence strategies are robust and effective. Her support for multilateralism suggests she will work closely with allies to enhance deterrence capabilities, sharing intelligence and coordinating military strategies to address potential nuclear challenges.

Moreover, Harris’ experience on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, combined with her background as a prosecutor, equips her with the skills to navigate complex security issues and engage in rigorous policy discussions. This expertise is instrumental in developing nuanced and comprehensive approaches to nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the US and its allies are well-prepared to counter any threats.

Strategic Restraint and Humanitarian Concerns

Harris’ stance on Israel and Gaza underscores her readiness to challenge established policies when humanitarian concerns are prominent. This approach reflects a broader principle that could significantly impact her handling of American nuclear deterrence. Harris’ sensitivity to the human costs of conflict suggests a preference for strategies that go beyond military force. Harris’ focus on humanitarian issues and her critical stance on the conduct of international conflicts indicate that she will prioritize the development of policies that not only ensure national security but also reflect ethical considerations.

Policy Evolution and Public Sentiment

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will also reflect evolving public sentiment, particularly among younger Americans who prioritize issues like climate change and human rights. This demographic shift indicates a growing preference for a security strategy that integrates traditional defense measures with contemporary global challenges.

Her administration could leverage this support to advance comprehensive security policies that address both traditional and emerging threats. This means not only maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to deter adversaries but also incorporating measures to combat climate change, promote human rights, and address cyber threats. By doing so, Harris can appeal to a new generation of Americans who demand a more holistic and forward-thinking approach to national and global security.

Conclusion

A Kamala Harris presidency may be positioned well to navigate the complexities of nuclear deterrence with a blend of strategic continuity and innovative evolution. Harris’ experience and commitment to multilateralism suggests a firm dedication to maintaining a credible and secure nuclear arsenal while actively pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Her support for nuclear modernization underscores the necessity of a reliable deterrent in the face of evolving global threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach to national security.

At the same time, Harris offers a generational shift in perspective and emphasis on global interconnectedness. Her focus on integrating humanitarian concerns, strategic restraint, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a more balanced and ethical approach to deterrence. This perspective aligns with her commitment to addressing contemporary global challenges, such as climate change and human rights.

Harris’ extensive international engagement and support for multilateral cooperation highlight her belief in the power of alliances to bolster deterrence and manage nuclear risks. Her administration will likely continue to strengthen NATO and other strategic partners—ensuring that American nuclear policy is both robust and cooperative.

As public sentiment evolves, particularly among younger generations who prioritize a holistic security strategy, Harris’ approach may resonate strongly with voters. By integrating traditional defense measures with contemporary priorities, her presidency may offer a nuanced and forward-thinking approach to nuclear deterrence, addressing both immediate security needs and long-term global stability.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

What a Kamala Harris Presidency Means for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Indeed, as of this writing such probes are already occurring. Sino-Russian aerial probes against Alaska recently occurred in the Arctic. While American officials claim this is the first time this happened, Chinese officials stated that this is the eighth such joint aerial probe. Moreover, the probe took place immediately following Sino-Russian bilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.

In a similar fashion, there is evidence that China is providing missile technology to North Korea. This follows the new mutual security pact signed by North Korea and Russia, which came after North Korea made itself a supplier of missiles to Russia in its war against Ukraine. Russian assistance to North Korea’s satellite program is also reportedly taking place.

In the Middle East, China’s negotiation of an agreement on Hamas-Palestinian Authority unity not only conforms to long-standing Russian objectives, but it also facilitates further Sino-Russo-Iranian influence among Palestinians—making a durable Middle East peace even less likely. Pyongyang’s willingness to proliferate nuclear and missile technology to Iran and a de facto Russo-Iranian alliance, only further destabilizes the region and makes a larger scale war more likely.

The same is true in Europe where China emerged as the primary source of Russian revenues, defense technologies, and diplomatic support for its war on Ukraine. Without Chinese support, Russia would be hard-pressed to continue the war. At the same time, numerous accounts show that Russia is engaged in cyber war against Europe, attacking infrastructure and cyber networks. Russia is also planning assassinations of key figures and other mayhem within the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia is not alone in engaging in these behaviors. While the attacks on France’s national railway system on the eve of the Olympics was very likely a Russian plot, Iran is concurrently threatening Israeli athletes at the Olympic games through cyberattacks.

The number of global attacks and coordination among these four actors, all of whom use nuclear weapons to deter the West from responding to their gray zone attacks, is increasing. Once Iran fields its own nuclear arsenal, which seems increasingly likely, more terror campaigns against Israel, other Middle East states, and international shipping (by Iranian proxies) is likely.  Indeed, the Houthis granted safe passage to Chinese and Russian ships in the Red Sea while Moscow is considering giving them anti-ship missiles. These facts also raise the issue of their use of cyber and hacking devices, if not GPS, to direct and track ships in the Red Sea.

Accordingly, the West faces a multi-domain threat linking all the domains of warfare, including nuclear escalation. These autocracies already incorporated nuclear deterrence, if not escalation, into their strategies against the US and its allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.  North Korea, as well as China and Russia, is building a larger and more diversified arsenal. Soon, North Korea will field a nuclear triad of fighter-bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles.

As a result of their policies, there is virtually no hope of arms control in the near future. China’s recent walkout from nuclear talks exemplifies the utter impossibility of arranging arms control with either Beijing or Moscow. By the same token nonproliferation and the nonproliferation treaty are evidently on their last legs. Beijing’s announcement of its commitment to that treaty’s renewed credibility is thus a grim joke given its ongoing record of support for proliferation. For the next administration, which must deal with facts rather than wish-fulfillment in its defense policy, it is clear that a sustained program of conventional and nuclear modernization, if not an actual increase, is necessary. Moreover, nuclear proliferation appears increasingly likely.

If Iran goes nuclear, the pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit increases exponentially. Egypt and Turkey may also follow suit, leading to a Middle East that is equally unstable, but with more nuclear powers.

South Korean public opinion is apparently increasingly supportive of an independent nuclear arsenal, which would lead Japan to follow suit. In short, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all making the world a less safe place as they challenge world order.

While Americans already live in interesting times, the times are likely to become even more interesting as they become more threatening. The United States will face a nuclear-armed autocratic quartet that is focused on supplanting American power. That quartet is also likely to be more dangerous than ever before because the threat, if not the actual use of nuclear weapons, offsets their conventional inferiority and increases their war-making power.

The fevered rhetoric of the current presidential campaign will soon end. The intractable realities will neither end nor give the next administration any respite. They will challenge the nation and force Americans to turn their inward gaze outward.

Steve Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The New Nuclear Alliance Against the West was originally published on Global Security Review.

NATO is now in its third decade of the post–Cold War era—a period during which all member-states ought to have fulfilled their GDP defense obligation. However, this was never done by the vast majority of NATO members. Most countries maneuvered to avoid this obligation.

European countries comprise 30 of the 32 NATO members, together with the US and Canada. Of the 30 European members, only 10 fulfilled their 2023 2 percent of GDP goal. This leaves a sobering 20 European NATO countries that do not expend the minimum on defense. The “honorable 10 European NATO countries” that do pay their dues are: Poland (3.9 percent), Greece (3.01 percent), Estonia (2.73 percent), Lithuania (2.54 Percent), Finland (2.45 percent), Romania (2.44 percent), Hungary (2.43 percent), Latvia (2.27 percent), the United Kingdom (2.07 percent), and the Slovak Republic (2.03 percent). Outside Europe, the US spent 3.49 percent of its GDP on defense in 2023, while Canada spent 1.38 percent. Overall, it is the 10 honorable European countries and the US that carry Europe’s defense burden.

A decade ago, the Obama administration made it clear to NATO countries in their failure to meet funding obligations, “Everyone has to step up.” The Trump administration called for “burden sharing.” Yet no improvement was made.

The states failing to meet their obligation failed to grasp that today’s global security threat is not just limited to Europe. Their assumption that the US will always be available in an emergency to protect them is no longer viable.

The United States is overextended militarily and economically due to its worldwide security obligations. By necessity, America’s security focus has shifted away from Europe to two other strategic regions: the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. These increased global threats necessarily draw upon US defense resources—away from Europe. European countries failed to recognize this long ago. It is now time for Europe to have a reality check and to initiate new corrective actions to remedy the ongoing malaise—and the sooner the better.

Non-compliant NATO member-states justifiably deserve a nudge out of their self-imposed “NATO welfare cocoon.” While Russia is rated as the world’s third or fourth military power, it would pale in comparison to a fully funded European NATO superpower. Economically, it would become a European titan versus a Russian pauper. Demographically, it is NATO Europe’s billion inhabitants versus Russia’s 144 million inhabitants. The European component of NATO alone would have deterrence supremacy that casts a protective veil over European countries. As such, Russia would cease to be a bona fide threat to Europe.

To correct the present European security deficiency, the alliance end the manipulation by under-spending NATO member-states. NATO’s Secretary General has long failed to encourage, cajole, or coerce member-states into meeting their obligations. As such it is important that a new Secretary General be appointed from one of the obligation-meeting countries, who can more effectively influence those states that do not contribute adequately. Among those countries who meet their defense spending obligations, there are qualified statesmen ready to lead NATO. A fully funded NATO that can far more effectively deter Russian aggression is the objective.

A new-era Secretary General, to reshape NATO and redirect it toward Europe’s real-world milieu, could redefine the alliance’s perception of the threat it faces and reshape its principles. These principles may well include: (1) accepting that Europe is primarily Europe’s responsibility; (2) realizing America’s global defense commitments extend beyond Europe; (3) acknowledging that America’s army is no longer Europe’s defensive army; (4) insisting that all NATO member-states must meet their minimum 2 percent defense expenditure; and (5)  Acknowledging that Europe can no longer fear Russian aggression.

Peace for all of Europe is better assured through a stronger NATO. This must start with a change in leadership. Credible deterrence begins with the financial commitment of NATO’s member-states. Recent moves by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance demonstrate the real strategic threat Russia poses. It is a threat all alliance members must work collaboratively to deter. Russian threats to use nuclear weapons against NATO are only possible because there is a lack of commitment and capability across the alliance.

The underlying issue addressed here is that a fully funded NATO can become the dominant military power in Europe. The resulting nexus of such military supremacy is an interconnected Europe composed of NATO countries and those aligned with the alliance. Such a force is one that despite Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s bluster, he knows that war is a lose-lose proposition. Creating that perception in the mind of Russia’s president is the continued purpose of NATO.

Warren K. Christolon is an international geo-economics and security expert in London, UK Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Restructured NATO That Will Benefit All of Europe was originally published on Global Security Review.

By incorporating stealth, the KC-Z can operate discreetly in contested airspace, safeguarding both itself and the aircraft it refuels such as the F-22, F-35, B-2, and B-21. Additionally, the enhanced capabilities of the KC-Z significantly extend operational reach, allowing aircraft to operate farther from their bases and demonstrate a rapid response to global threats, thus serving as a powerful deterrent.

Technical specifications and design details for the KC-Z are still under development. However, Lockheed Martin’s proposed design emphasizes stealth as a core feature, incorporating low-observable materials, shaping, and potentially radar-absorbing coatings. The KC-Z is expected to be larger than existing tankers to accommodate a substantial fuel capacity and potentially integrate advanced mission systems, such as enhanced communication and electronic warfare capabilities. The design will likely include features to reduce its infrared and acoustic signatures, further enhancing its stealth capabilities. Details about the refueling mechanism, boom or drogue system, are yet to be finalized, but it is expected to be compatible with various aircraft types, including fighters, bombers, and, potentially, unmanned aerial vehicles.

The KC-Z’s presumed ability to loiter for extended periods enhances the US military’s persistent presence in critical regions, reinforcing extended deterrence commitments to allies and partners. Although the US Congress has halted plans to phase out the current fleet of KC-135s until the USAF can submit a formal acquisition strategy for the KC-Z, the acknowledgement of the KC-Z’s importance as a definitive force multiplier that amplifies air combat capabilities through the enablement of longer flight durations, expanded mission support, and overall greater flexibility, further deterring adversaries, highlights the pivotal role the KC-Z will have by integrating with other advanced platforms by enabling coordinated operations across multiple domains.

While the exact timeline and cost of the KC-Z project remain fluid, current projections estimate the first operational aircraft to be fielded by 2040. The USAF is currently in the initial phases of the acquisition process, with a request for information issued in early 2023. This will be followed by an analysis of alternatives to determine the specific requirements and design of the NGAS, which includes the KC-Z. The development of a stealth aircraft with aerial refueling capabilities is expected to be a complex and costly endeavor, with estimates reaching into the tens of billions of dollars. However, proponents argue that the long-term strategic advantages and enhanced operational capabilities justify the significant investment.

Despite the potential advantages, the development and deployment of the KC-Z faces significant challenges. The high cost associated with developing and maintaining stealth aircraft raises concerns about the project’s overall cost-effectiveness, especially considering the budgetary constraints in the defense budget. Additionally, questions remain about the long-term viability of maintaining the KC-Z’s stealth profile, given the wear and tear of regular operations and potential advancements in radar technology by adversaries. Some argue that investing in alternative refueling solutions, such as unmanned tankers or ground-based refueling systems, might be more practical and cost-efficient. Furthermore, integrating a new, complex platform like the KC-Z into existing air operations could pose logistical and operational challenges, requiring substantial adjustments to training, tactics, and maintenance procedures.

Though the Next-Generation Air-Refueling System (NGAS) includes the KC-Y or “bridge tanker” that will close capability gaps between the future KC-46 and KC-Z, recognizing the importance of stealth design in aerial refueling airframes to the deterrence mission will strengthen the United States deterrence strategy by expanding operational capabilities in contested environments, projecting power globally, maintaining a persistent presence, multiplying force effectiveness, and fostering integrated operations. The KC-Z represents a critical evolution in air refueling, aligning it with the demands of modern warfare.

The development of the KC-Z places the U.S. at the forefront of aerial refueling technology, potentially sparking a new arms race as other nations seek to maintain parity or develop their own stealth tanker capabilities. This could have significant implications for international relations and global security. While the KC-Z is primarily intended for defensive and deterrence purposes, its potential offensive applications could raise concerns among rival nations, further fueling geopolitical tensions. Conversely, the KC-Z could also act as a deterrent by showcasing American technological prowess and bolstering alliances with countries that benefit from extended airpower projection capabilities. The international community will undoubtedly be watching the development and deployment of the KC-Z closely, assessing its potential impact on the global balance of power and the future of aerial warfare.

The introduction of the KC-Z could significantly reshape the USAF’s strategic posture. By enabling stealth aircraft to operate deeper into contested airspace, the KC-Z would expand the reach and effectiveness of airpower, potentially altering the dynamics of air combat and deterrence. This could lead to new operational concepts and tactics, as commanders leverage the KC-Z’s unique capabilities to project power and maintain air superiority in challenging environments.

The ability to conduct extended missions with fewer refueling stops could also streamline logistics and reduce the vulnerability of support aircraft. Furthermore, the KC-Z could play a crucial role in enabling distributed operations, where aircraft disperse across a wider area to minimize the risk of detection and enhance survivability. This shift towards a more agile and resilient force structure could have far-reaching implications for the future of air warfare.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own. 

Lockheed Skunk Works KC-Z: Extending the Range of Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

North Korea, a relic of the Cold War, has evolved into a cult state centered around the Kim family. Despite its oppressive regime, the state’s endurance into the 21st century is perplexing. The regime maintains its grip on power through a combination of brainwashing, terror and strict social control. Public executions and pervasive surveillance cultivate an environment of fear, ensuring blind obedience from the population. However, beneath this veneer of control, North Korean society is sustained by bribery and corruption, which permeate every level of life.

Read the full article here.

Balloons and sleepwalking into conflicts was originally published on Global Security Review.

Central to the concept of inhibition is the idea that the US is willing to go to great lengths to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even at the expense of strained diplomatic relations or the imposition of sanctions. This commitment was evident in American interactions with both adversaries and allies, as seen in its efforts to dissuade countries like Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons. Inhibition failed in the latter case and may soon fail in the former, but the lack of proliferation by American allies are cases of success.

The Pragmatic Approach of Inhibition

Historically, the United States was always willing to engage with other nuclear powers, even adversaries such as the Soviet Union, to advance shared inhibition goals. The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty discussed by both the United States and Soviet Union before and after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was understood as an inhibition tool. As Marc Trachtenberg notes,

A test ban, the Soviets would be told, would mean that “there would be no additional nuclear powers in our camp.” The Russians, for their part, would prevent allies from building nuclear forces. And these commitments would be linked: the United States would “take responsibility in respect to non-dissemination with relation to those powers associated with it, if the Soviet Union is willing to take a corresponding obligation for the powers with which it is associated.”

This pragmatic approach, characterized by a mix of cooperation and competition, highlights the adaptability of the inhibition strategy in the face of evolving geopolitical dynamics. Ultimately, the US is willing to work with either friend or foe, to pressure, coerce, and threaten nascent nuclear states, to include both allies and adversaries, to keep them non-nuclear.

The Role of Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Extended nuclear deterrence, a key component of American grand strategy, refers to the United States’ commitment to defend its allies with nuclear weapons, if necessary. This commitment serves as a crucial aspect of the security assurances provided by the US to its allies under the nuclear umbrella, reinforcing the broader framework of alliances that underpin global security. However, the credibility of American extended nuclear deterrence is under scrutiny, particularly in light of doubts about the United States’ willingness to prioritize the defense of its allies over its own interests.

The United States’ willingness to trade Los Angeles for Seoul, for example, raises concerns about the reliability of American security assurances and the potential impact on its inhibition efforts. Such doubts not only affect the perception of American commitment to its allies but also raise concerns about the effectiveness of extended deterrence in supporting the broader strategy of inhibition. As such, ensuring the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence is crucial for maintaining global stability and preventing nuclear proliferation.

Reevaluating Kenneth Waltz’s Proposition

Kenneth Waltz’s proposition that more nuclear states can lead to a safer world raises profound questions about the nature of nuclear deterrence and international security. In a world where South Korea is concerned about American security commitments, they may consider proliferating nuclear weapons to ensure they have a credible deterrent against North Korea. They may come to the belief that more is better and develop their own nuclear arsenal in hopes of obtaining more security. However, the complexities of nuclear proliferation and the risks associated with additional nuclear-armed states suggests that Waltz’s argument may not hold true. The proliferation of nuclear weapons introduces uncertainties and escalatory risks that could destabilize regions and increase the risk of nuclear conflict rather than decrease the risk.

A scenario in which South Korea acquires nuclear weapons could potentially strengthen North Korea’s resolve to consider early nuclear weapons use in conflict, compensating for weaknesses in its conventional military capability. This is precisely the kind of hypothetical situation that prompted the United States to adopt a policy of extended deterrence alongside the grand strategy of inhibition. There is a concern that when the US (or any nuclear state) faces an adversary lacking parity in escalation capabilities, that adversary might resort to early nuclear weapons use to compensate for strategic shortcomings. However, testing an American response to nuclear attack is a risky endeavor fraught with the possibility of further escalation.

Sustaining the Strategy of Inhibition

Instead of advocating for a proliferation-friendly approach, it is imperative for the United States and the international community to continue their efforts to inhibit nuclear proliferation. This includes diplomatic engagement, economic incentives, and, when necessary, coercive measures to dissuade states from acquiring nuclear weapons. The risks of nuclear proliferation far outweigh any potential benefits, and concerted efforts to prevent it remain essential for global security and stability.

Despite these challenges, the sustainability of the inhibition strategy remains feasible. The key lies in reaffirming American commitment to its allies and maintaining a credible deterrence posture. This requires not only a clear and consistent articulation of American security guarantees but also investments in conventional military capabilities and diplomatic efforts to address the underlying security concerns of allies. The US must continue to craft convincing strategic narratives regarding its commitment to allied security via maintaining escalation dominance, nuclear superiority, and narrative control.

Furthermore, the US can leverage its alliances and partnerships to reinforce norms against nuclear proliferation. By working closely with its allies and engaging with potential nuclear aspirants through dialogue and diplomacy, the US can continue to promote the goals of inhibition while ensuring the credibility of its extended nuclear deterrence.

Conclusion: Upholding the Principles of Inhibition

The United States’ grand strategy of inhibition is a linchpin of American foreign policy and is rooted in the belief that preventing nuclear proliferation is crucial for global security. While recent debates on the credibility of American extended deterrence raise valid concerns, the strategy of inhibition remains not only relevant but imperative in today’s world.

The risks posed by nuclear proliferation far outweigh any perceived benefits, making it essential for the US and the international community to continue their efforts to inhibit nuclear proliferation. By reaffirming its commitment to allies, maintaining credible deterrence, and engaging diplomatically with potential proliferators, the US can uphold the principles of inhibition and mitigate the risks associated with nuclear proliferation. In doing so, the US will not only safeguard its own security but also contribute to a safer and more stable world.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Nuclear Challenges: Inhibition and Extended Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

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Ties to Russian Military and Russian Intelligence Agencies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Efforts to conventionally deter Iran failed with Iran-inspired fighting spreading from Gaza to the Red Sea, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Recently, three American soldiers were killed and 34 wounded in a drone attack by Iran-backed militants in northeastern Jordan, according to US Central Command. The Pentagon has reported more than 160 attacks by Iranian-linked militia groups on American bases and forces in the Middle East since Israel was attacked on October 7, 2023. These actions place immense pressure upon President Joe Biden to strike the sovereign territory of Iran, which Iranian leaders may view as an act of war.

Moreover, recent political decisions render the threatened use of sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program impotent. In February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded President Trump’s United Nations (UN) sanctions restoration. This was followed by President Biden’s decision to release $6 billion “in exchange for the release of five Americans detained in Iran” and another $10 billion in a sanctions waiver that grants Iran access to money from Iraq in exchange for electricity purchases.

Recently, Maj Gen Hossein Salami, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards, said the country is not seeking war with America, but is not afraid of it either. Iran’s aggressive behavior certainly lends credence to the statement. Iran is emboldened by its allies and empowered by its proxies. This, of course, is backstopped by an eerie sense of confidence that Iran may soon become a nuclear power. In May of 2022, the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that “Iran has accumulated enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear bomb,” with a uranium stockpile enriched to 60 percent that had grown four times in just 90 days.

David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and founder of the US Institute for Science and International Security, said that if Iran continues producing enriched uranium at the same rate, the regime will have enough weapons grade material to make 12 nuclear bombs within five months. Meanwhile, Iran successfully launched three satellites into space using a two-stage, liquid-fueled rocket. This achievement undoubtedly accelerates Iran’s ability to perfect and field a future intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), likely the regime’s preferred nuclear weapon delivery system.

The United States is now experiencing coordinated aggression. The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review warns, “In a potential conflict with a competitor, the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor. We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk, recognizing that a near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states would constitute an extreme circumstance.”

Furthermore, the Department of State’s International Security Advisory Board recently warned in their Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity that the United States must be concerned that adversary states could engage in opportunistic acts if or when the United States is engaged in other conflicts.

The bipartisan America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States also advised that the possibility of opportunistic or simultaneous multi-state aggression should no longer be construed as improbable. According to the report, “The new partnership between Russian and Chinese leaders poses qualitatively new threats of potential opportunistic aggression and/or the risk of future cooperative two-theater aggression.” Opportunistic aggression can translate to other hostile states like Iran and North Korea in league with Russia and China if they perceive American limitations in capability, capacity, or the will to fight with enough ferocity as to induce the fear to attack in the first place.

It appears that Iran is taking advantage of an already beleaguered United States that continues to support Israel in its war with Iranian-backed Hamas; exports arms, munitions, and intelligence to Ukraine; deters a hostile North Korea; and must endeavor to discourage Iran’s top oil importer (China) from invading Taiwan. All of these “fronts” are collectively testing American diplomacy, burdening the American taxpayer, challenging the American defense industrial base, negatively impacting military readiness, and now producing American casualties.

Killing Americans is a clear escalation and yet another indication that Iran remains undeterred by the current threat of American power. These acts are timed to take advantage of an overburdened America and are designed to frustrate American efforts within the region and ultimately convince the United States to abandon its Middle East interests and allies. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s untimely proclamation on September 29, 2023, that “[t]he Middle East region is quieter today than it has been in two decades” was a complete misreading of the region.

Successful deterrence requires the consistent application of power. Deterrence messaging must not be muddled or muted. It must be clear, powerful, and credible. How is this done?

First, the Biden administration must immediately end sanctions relief of Iran. The United States can never fund its adversaries.

Second, the United States must take a systematic approach to eliminate the weapons, command and control, and supplies of Iranian proxies. They must not be allowed to threaten American and allied forces across the region.

Third, the United States must credibly communicate through strength by moving nuclear assets closer to the region. The United States seems content to use ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) to deter North Korea. An SSBN in the Arabian Sea would communicate a similar deterrence message.

Fourth, America must heed the warnings of opportunistic multi-state aggression and prepare a robust capability to address this very real and demonstrated threat. To do otherwise risks abandoning regional allies in conflict.

Fifth, America must not attack Iranian targets within sovereign Iranian territory unless President Biden and Congress are ready to declare war. What may be a regional conflict for the United States is a fight for survival for the Mullahs in Tehran.

Iran and its proxies are not deterred from attacking American forces, whether motivated by opportunistic aggression or existential circumstances. It is time to create a real sense of fear within the Iranian leadership. They must dread economic isolation, the destruction of proxies, and potential attack on what Iran holds most valuable—themselves and their nuclear facilities.

However, unless prepared to declare war, the United States must limit its retaliation to targets outside sovereign Iran. To attack Iranian soil would be a clear indication that deterrence has failed and could potentially lead to an all-out war. Restoring deterrence after such an event would come at a much higher cost.

Deterrence aims to make the adversary afraid to attack by creating a preferable condition of war avoidance. The goal is to convince the adversary that maintaining a peaceful status quo is the best option. Starting a war to prevent another war is a bad strategy, and it does not qualify as deterrence.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterrence Is Failing in the Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

 Escalation Dominance

 Escalation dominance refers to a nation’s ability to control and dictate the pace and intensity of a conflict, particularly when nuclear weapons are involved. In the context of nuclear deterrence, it becomes essential for a nation possessing such capabilities to showcase a clear and overwhelming advantage in terms of the scale and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal. This superiority discourages potential adversaries from engaging in actions that might lead to a nuclear confrontation.

One aspect of escalation dominance is the possession of a diverse range of nuclear capabilities, including strategic and tactical weapons. Strategic weapons are designed for long-range attacks on major targets, while tactical weapons are intended for use in more localized conflicts and are often of much lower yields. The combination of both types of weapons enhances a nation’s flexibility and adaptability in responding to different threat scenarios, reinforcing its position of escalation dominance.

Moreover, modernizing nuclear arsenals with advanced technologies, such as hypersonic delivery systems and precision-guided munitions, further solidifies a nation’s escalation dominance. The continuous development and enhancement of nuclear capabilities are intended to act as a powerful deterrent, dissuading potential adversaries from challenging the status quo.

Narrative Control

 In the contemporary era, where information flows rapidly across borders, the control of international narratives is equally crucial for effective nuclear deterrence. The narrative surrounding a nation’s nuclear capabilities, intentions, and strategic outlook can significantly influence global perceptions and responses. Therefore, shaping and managing this narrative becomes a vital component of maintaining a credible deterrent.

International narratives are shaped through diplomatic channels, public communications, and media engagement. Nations with nuclear capabilities must articulate a clear and consistent message about the responsible and restrained use of their nuclear arsenal. Emphasizing a commitment to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament initiatives (whether one follows through with them or not) helps build trust and reduces the likelihood of misunderstandings that could lead to conflict.

Strategic communication also plays a pivotal role in deterring potential adversaries. By effectively conveying the consequences of hostile actions and highlighting the unwavering commitment to national security, a nation can discourage aggressive behavior and maintain a stable international environment.

Interconnected Dynamics

The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence relies on the seamless integration of escalation dominance and narrative control. Escalation dominance alone may not be sufficient if a nation fails to communicate its intentions clearly and reassure the international community of its responsible behavior. Conversely, narrative control without credible escalation dominance may lead to perceptions of weakness, inviting potential aggressors to test boundaries.

The interconnected dynamics of escalation dominance and narrative control form a symbiotic relationship. A nation’s ability to demonstrate overwhelming military capabilities enhances the credibility of its strategic messaging, reinforcing the perception that any conflict would be unwinnable. Conversely, a well-crafted narrative that emphasizes responsible behavior and a commitment to peace complements the deterrent effect of military capabilities.

Conclusion

 In the complex realm of nuclear deterrence, the synergy between escalation dominance and narrative control stands as the linchpin in the delicate dance of maintaining global stability and preventing conflict. As nations navigate the intricate landscape of international relations, the imperative to invest in both military capabilities and strategic communications becomes increasingly apparent. The symbiotic relationship between escalation dominance and narrative control underscores the multidimensional nature of effective deterrence.

Advances in technology and a worsening security environment add another layer of complexity to the challenge. Nations must not only stay ahead in terms of military advancements but also adapt their communication strategies to resonate with the contemporary world. The rise of social media and instant global communication necessitates a nuanced approach in crafting and disseminating narratives. The global audience, armed with instant access to information, demands transparency and coherence in the messages conveyed by nuclear powers.

Looking forward, the ability to balance these elements becomes more than a strategic necessity; it becomes imperative for the survival of a peaceful international order. Nations that excel in both the formidable display of military capabilities and the art of narrative persuasion are better equipped to deter potential adversaries effectively. The delicate interplay between escalation dominance and narrative control remains not only relevant but increasingly vital in an ever-changing world, where the specter of nuclear conflict looms over the delicate equilibrium of global relations. As the international community grapples with emerging challenges, the mastery of this delicate dance remains an ongoing commitment to a safer and more secure world.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Crucial Role of Escalation Dominance and Narrative Control in Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

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Global Security Review 2023 Article Compendium was originally published on Global Security Review.