Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming warfare, but whether it is changing it for the better remains unsettled. AI-enabled systems can improve surveillance, targeting, defensive response, and force protection. Yet technological improvement alone does not constitute a revolution. The more critical issue is whether AI-enabled robotics, which include semi-autonomous and fully autonomous machines, will change what Carl Von Clausewitz called the “grammar of war,” which includes the practical methods through which political violence is organized, controlled, and conducted. 

The conflict with Iran, known as Operation EPIC FURY, has made a broader view of war more compelling. The operation is characterized by drones, missiles, long-range strikes, electronic warfare, persistent surveillance, and layered air defenses, like the war in Ukraine. The absence of a significant ground campaign does not mean U.S. troops are out of harm’s way. These courageous service members reassure allies, support operations, deter escalation, and influence an adversary’s decisions. Even if they are not directly fighting on the ground, these brave men and women remain targets. 

This operation highlights the lack of distinction between combat troops involved in direct operations and support troops, which may signify the future of warfare. The U.S. has pivoted toward multi-domain operations with a focus on geopolitical actors and challenges, at times marginalizing insurgency and criminality as a secondary issue. In this new (or perhaps revamped) dynamic, a service member does not have to be maneuvering against an enemy force to be a target. Ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones can hit well beyond a conventional front line. The front line has not disappeared. Instead, it has expanded across the theater. 

Robotics may further alter this situation, but only if our military leaders and planners look beyond supplanting troops with machines. Unmanned aircraft, robotic logistics platforms, automated ships, underwater systems, and loitering munitions could reduce the number of personnel exposed to kinetic attacks. But these systems would still need operators, maintainers, analysts, communications specialists, and logisticians. If those people remain concentrated on vulnerable bases, robotics may simply shift risk rather than eliminate it. 

A genuine technical revolution would therefore require robotics to transform both offensive and defensive capabilities. Robotic systems would need to fill roles in the most dangerous missions in place of humans while also protecting the human force that remains as a shaping element in the region. The first recorded rescue operation involving downed pilots involved an unmanned surface vessel (USV) during Operation EPIC FURY. This rescue proved that robotics or drones could reduce the potential for loss of life. 

Advanced AI plays a role in the revolution especially in counter-missile and anti-drone capabilities. A prime example of AI successfully countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and missile attacks is Israel’s use of its Iron Dome. With future advancements, those networks could fuse multiple sensor feeds, distinguish real threats from decoys, predict trajectories, and deploy the most cost-effective defense. This is important because current attacks are meant to swamp defenders with volume, speed, and complexity. 

Clausewitz explains what can change the nature of conflict. War has its logic in political aims, the why, and its own grammar, the how. Geopolitical entities will engage in combat operations, but the question is, with what tools? The debate regarding active conflict will not dissipate, even if humans are not involved in the more active parts of combat. Emerging technologies can rewrite this framework to a degree but only if they compel militaries to completely overhaul established doctrine, logistics, and command structures to accommodate novel paradigms. 

Historical precedent cautions against calling a revolution at the first use of every new weapon system. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, numerous analysts cited precision munitions and satellites as definitive evidence that combat had undergone a permanent transformation. The less glamorous realities of the Gulf War are very telling as well and commonly forgotten. These include strong supply chains, highly specific political boundaries, ineffectiveness and ineptitude of the opposing force, and overwhelming air superiority, which are frequently disregarded by that narrative. Hardware offers promise; institutional competence is still the filter through which that promise is translated into actual combat effectiveness.  

The same will be true of robotics. Militaries will not achieve a revolution merely by purchasing or producing thousands of drones or unmanned vehicles in place of humans. Those systems must be integrated in a coherent way of fighting through doctrinal and organizational changes. They must share information, divide tasks, adapt to losses, function in disrupted communications environments, and operate under clear rules of authority and accountability. 

Integrating robotic systems into combat operations and the operational environment may fundamentally alter the domestic politics surrounding armed conflict. While sparing troops is an undeniable humanitarian gain, removing the visceral human cost could significantly lower the political barrier for states to initiate or drag out military campaigns. The political price of fighting, therefore, does not vanish but merely takes a new form. Public debate and legislative scrutiny will most likely shift from the casualty metrics to severe hardware attrition, market dynamics, and debt or deficit levels. Domestic debates will center around the depletion of advanced interceptors, sudden semiconductor supply chain crises, and the hard reality that a nation’s industrial base may not even be able to produce replacements at the rate that the conflict justifies. 

Soon to be joined by economic and cost-exchange paradigms, traditional measures of success, such as casualty-exchange ratios, will come to prominence. While tactical victories may be achieved in isolated engagements, a nation could suffer broader strategic failure if it continuously depletes multi-million-dollar defense infrastructure to counter cheap, mass-produced weapons. Future military power will be measured not only by troop numbers, but also by computing capacity, energy reserves, software agility, and manufacturing speed. 

Experiences from recent conflicts suggest that contemporary conflict is nearing this technological threshold but has not yet reached it. Advanced AI-enabled combat systems have transformed the battlefield, yet human vulnerability remains. Specifically, support personnel behind or beyond the front lines are now high-value targets because of how their operational and logistical footprint can shape the course of the conflict. 

The decisive test of a robotic revolution will not be whether autonomous machines can reach the enemy. Missiles and drones already do this. The test will be whether integrated networks of semi-autonomous and fully autonomous systems, supported by advanced AI, can prevent the enemy’s machines from reaching friendly safe havens. If robotics can simultaneously generate combat power, protect deployed forces, and reorganize how militaries distribute risk, then it may profoundly change the grammar of war. 

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew J. Fecteau is an information operations officer working with artificial intelligence, and a PhD researcher at King’s College London. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the US Government. 

Beyond the Body Count: Will Robotics Change the Grammar of War? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Force protection, in its broadest sense, encompasses all measures taken to safeguard personnel, equipment, and facilities from hostile actions. For the military, this includes battlefield tactics, intelligence gathering, logistics security, and the establishment of robust defensive perimeters. For critical infrastructure, it involves physical security, cybersecurity, and contingency planning to mitigate the impact of attacks. Russia’s struggles in both areas are glaringly apparent.

On the battlefield, Russian forces repeatedly demonstrated a lack of effective force protection. From the initial botched attempts to seize Kyiv to the protracted and costly battles in eastern Ukraine, Russian units suffered heavy casualties. This was often due to a combination of poor tactical decisions, inadequate reconnaissance, and a failure to adapt to the evolving battlefield. Ambushes, artillery strikes, and drone attacks took a heavy toll, revealing vulnerabilities in their supply lines and a lack of situational awareness. This inability to protect its forces has not only hampered Russia’s military objectives but also had a cascading effect on the security of its critical infrastructure.

The vulnerability of Russia’s infrastructure, particularly its energy sector, is a direct consequence of these force protection failures. Oil and natural gas fields, pipelines, and processing facilities, often located in remote areas, require robust security to prevent sabotage or attack. However, the demands of the war in Ukraine stretched Russia’s military resources thin, leaving critical infrastructure exposed.

Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep within Russian territory, including energy facilities, demonstrates this vulnerability. These attacks not only disrupt energy production and supply but also have a significant psychological impact, undermining public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and vital assets.

Several factors contribute to Russia’s struggles with force protection and the resulting infrastructure vulnerabilities. Firstly, the sheer size of Russia and the length of its borders make it incredibly challenging to secure all potential targets. This geographical challenge is compounded by the fact that many critical infrastructure sites are dispersed and remote, making them difficult to defend effectively. Secondly, there are indications of potential intelligence failures. Russia may have underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and its ability to conduct effective counter-offensives, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of preparedness for attacks on its own territory. Thirdly, logistical issues plague the Russian military. Supply-chain disruptions, shortages of essential equipment, and a lack of well-trained personnel have all contributed to the erosion of force protection capabilities.

Furthermore, the potential for internal dissent and sabotage cannot be discounted. The war in Ukraine fuels anti-government sentiment in Russia, and there is a risk that individuals or groups opposed to the regime may seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to express their discontent. Such internal threats further complicate the task of ensuring the security of these facilities.

The implications of Russia’s failure to implement effective force protection are far-reaching. The disruption of energy supplies can have a devastating impact on the Russian economy, leading to shortages, price increases, and social unrest. Moreover, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure can undermine Russia’s international standing and its ability to project power. The perception of weakness can embolden adversaries and erode alliances, further isolating Russia on the world stage.

Russia’s ongoing struggles with force protection in the context of the Ukraine conflict have exposed critical vulnerabilities in its infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. These vulnerabilities stem from a combination of tactical miscalculations, logistical shortcomings, intelligence failures, and the inherent challenges of securing a vast and geographically dispersed territory. The consequences of these failures are significant, with the potential to destabilize the Russian economy, undermine public confidence, and weaken Russia’s international standing. As the conflict continues, Russia will need to address these shortcomings if it hopes to protect its critical infrastructure and safeguard its national interests. The ability to learn from these failures and adapt its security strategies will be crucial for Russia’s long-term stability and its ability to project power in the region and beyond.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) and doctoral student at Missouri State University. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Joshua currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.

Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.