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		<title>The Politics of Global AI Governance</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-politics-of-global-ai-governance/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shaza Arif]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 12:14:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: October 13, 2026  The growing gap between rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and inadequate verification mechanisms has created several challenges for the technology. In this context, global AI governance has become a central topic of discussion in the tech world. However, the discourse around AI focuses primarily on how the technology will be [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-politics-of-global-ai-governance/">The Politics of Global AI Governance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> October 13, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-contrast="auto">The growing gap between rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and inadequate verification mechanisms has created several challenges for the technology. In this context, global AI governance has become a central topic of discussion in the tech world. However, the discourse around AI focuses primarily on how the technology will be regulated. The central problem of global AI governance is no longer whether AI should be regulated, but whether states possess the power to regulate the actors and infrastructures on which they increasingly depend.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The international system has begun responding swiftly to evolving AI dynamics. Notably, the </span><a href="https://www.un.org/digital-emerging-technologies/global-digital-compact"><span data-contrast="none">UN Global Digital Compact</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> has established a framework for digital cooperation. The General Assembly has created the </span><a href="https://www.un.org/independent-international-scientific-panel-ai/en"><span data-contrast="none">Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, along with a </span><a href="https://www.un.org/global-dialogue-ai-governance/en"><span data-contrast="none">Dialogue on AI Governance</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. In parallel, the European Union (EU) has moved towards an enforceable risk-based regulation through the </span><a href="https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/"><span data-contrast="none">AI Act</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. Likewise, the Council of Europe has also launched the first internationally </span><a href="https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/council-of-europe-adopts-first-international-treaty-on-artificial-intelligence"><span data-contrast="none">binding treaty on AI</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. These initiatives are a step in the right direction. However, they lack a coherent global regime or direction, which impacts their effectiveness.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">As the latest initiatives show, the U.S. relies on targeted export controls on advanced chips, voluntary frameworks, and a pro-innovation approach that preserves U.S. dominance. China, on the other hand, favors a state-driven approach, built around controls on generative AI. The EU, by contrast, prioritizes enforceable rules for high-risk and general-purpose AI, along with strong fundamental rights protection. The emerging AI order is therefore not one model, but several operating simultaneously. This fragmentation is not accidental. It reflects competing power struggles among national interests. In such an environment, the search for a global AI governance appears misguided.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Future AI governance is likely to mirror a hybrid model of international finance or trade regimes. Against this backdrop, private companies remain incredibly powerful, given their monopoly over data, models, computing power, and expertise, which are concentrated in a handful of private companies. This trend creates a governance paradox. Governments aim to regulate the private sector while remaining excessively dependent on it, creating a capacity challenge.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">These trends point to three prominent developments for the future. Regulatory fragmentation is likely to intensify as rival technological blocs establish incompatible standards. Ultimately, technologically backward states opt accordingly. Second is procedural multilateralism, where states agree on universal principles, but actual power remains concentrated among a few powerful entities. The third option is that states retain their distinct regulatory systems but agree on some conditions. These scenarios and trends are not mutually exclusive and can coexist, with different approaches emerging across sectors. As a result, the landscape is expected to remain complex. Whichever the scenario, the technological ecosystems are likely to become tools of influence </span><i><span data-contrast="auto">vis-à-vis</span></i><span data-contrast="auto"> cloud access, advanced semiconductors, data centers, export policies, global supply chains, digital infrastructure, and divergent AI standards.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">For the Global South, the ongoing trend poses multifaceted challenges. The foremost is structural dependence. While these states may draft their own AI policies, they will remain dependent on foreign technology. Likewise, consensus among states remains elusive. This becomes increasingly complex in a future environment where AI governance may become more infrastructural. This might involve the development of measurable controls. The key challenge for the Global South is not mere exclusion; it is participation without agenda-setting influence. In addition, AI innovation moves much faster than regulation, creating a governance lag and adding to the challenges. The main priority is to define a meaningful role for itself in this environment. Its main priority should be to integrate into regional frameworks, shared datasets, and coordinated diplomatic moves.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The international organizations have a limited but important part in global governance. They can expand their role by laying the ground for common scientific assessments, incident-sharing mechanisms, and capacity building. The approach should complement existing frameworks while acknowledging divergent national systems. Fostering coordination where political consensus allows remains central for relevant international organizations.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">AI Governance in the contemporary era is complex. As the ongoing developments suggest, the future of AI governance will not be manifested as a single regulator or a universal AI rulebook. Instead, it will emerge as a highly contested polycentric order, characterized by an environment where laws, norms, technical standards, and UN/international organization-led coordination overlap. In this context, the U.S., China, and the EU will continue to assert their dominance and institutionalize their edge into rules and norms. In parallel, countries in the Global South are likely to resist and consolidate their own influence. The pivotal challenge in such an environment will not be whether AI is governed. Instead, it will be whose security interests and priorities prevail in the technological age. Hence, the tussle will be to convert technological capability into institutional influence.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:276}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Shaza Arif is a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, </span></i><a href="mailto:casss.thinkers@casstt.com"><i><span data-contrast="none">casss.thinkers@casstt.com</span></i></a><i><span data-contrast="auto">. The views in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of NIDS.</span></i></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/The-Politics-of-Global-AI-Governance.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32906 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/@-Download-Button-2026.png" alt="" width="250" height="80" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-politics-of-global-ai-governance/">The Politics of Global AI Governance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Techno-Economic power at the heart of the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/techno-economic-power-at-the-heart-of-the-2025-u-s-national-security-strategy/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/techno-economic-power-at-the-heart-of-the-2025-u-s-national-security-strategy/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christophe Bosquillon]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2026 13:16:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31959</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) dropped on December 4th. The Secretary of War said: “Out with utopian idealism, in with hard-nosed realism.” The NSS could even further be translated as “Out with neoconservative/neoliberal ideological mythologies, in with fiscally responsible, economy-driven geostrategic deterrence.” The NSS bottom line is that America should remain an 800-pound gorilla [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/techno-economic-power-at-the-heart-of-the-2025-u-s-national-security-strategy/">Techno-Economic power at the heart of the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (<a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf">NSS</a>) dropped on December 4th. The Secretary of War said<em>: </em>“Out with utopian idealism, in with hard-nosed realism.” The NSS could even further be translated as “Out with neoconservative/neoliberal ideological <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/12/10/facing_facts_and_rolling_back_mythologies_the_new_national_security_strategy_1152378.html">mythologies</a>, in with fiscally responsible, economy-driven geostrategic deterrence.” The NSS bottom line is that America should remain an 800-pound gorilla but share global influence with the only other two major powers it recognizes, Russia and China.</p>
<p>The Western Hemisphere is the de facto core position for undisputed U.S. power, integrity, and uncompromising sovereignty. While the U.S. commitment to Europe remains, European nation-states must step up to the plate and take charge of funding and leadership of their own defense. The segment on &#8220;civilisational erasure&#8221; is directly aligned with the position already made explicit by Vice President JD Vance in early 2025 at the Paris artificial intelligence conference in France and the Munich Security Conference in Germany.</p>
<p>One of the most meaningful merits of the NSS is its call to reposition economic security, industrial renaissance, and technological leadership at the heart of the U.S. strategy to deter and prevail in the event of military conflict. The NSS refrains from mentioning &#8220;major power competition,&#8221; opting instead for an acknowledgement of <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/breaking-down-trumps-2025-national-security-strategy/">spheres of influence</a>.  The NSS does not antagonizes China, instead framing it as an economic and technological competitor, rather than an ideological one. Sustaining American reshoring, reindustrialization, industrial base funding, technological edge, manufacturing supply chains, and access to critical materials, is what underwrites how the U.S. deals with China, deterrence postures notwithstanding. A clear focus on economic competition allows the NSS to remain as vague as possible on the potential for military confrontations in the Indo-Pacific.</p>
<p><strong>Economy, Industry, Technology</strong></p>
<p>In the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf">2025 NSS</a>, the terms “economy/economic” are used 66 times and “industry/industrial” 19 times, including under “industrial base,” “industrial production,” and “industrial supply chains.” As for “technology/technological,” they appear 17 times. The core meaning of a dozen such mentions is captured as follows:</p>
<p>U.S. military power and diplomatic influence rest on a strong, resilient domestic economy. National security depends on rebuilding America’s industrial base, restoring economic self-reliance, and securing critical supply chains. Economic and technological competitiveness over the long term is essential to preventing conflict and sustaining global leadership. Further, the United States will actively protect its workers and firms from unfair economic practices.</p>
<p>American power requires an industrial sector able to meet both civilian and wartime production needs. Reindustrialization is a top national economic priority, aimed at strengthening the middle class and regaining control over production and supply chains. The U.S. will reshore manufacturing, attract investment, and expand domestic capacity, particularly in critical and emerging technologies. Hence a credible military depends on a robust and resilient defense industrial base.</p>
<p>Preserving merit, innovation, and technological leadership is essential to maintaining America’s historic advantages. Strengthening the resilience of the U.S. technology ecosystem, especially in areas such as AI, is a national priority and a foundation of global leadership. Thus, long-term success in technological competition is central to deterrence and conflict prevention.</p>
<p><strong>Economic Security First</strong></p>
<p>The 2025 NSS references industries primarily through a national-security lens, rather than civilian market categorization, including defense (industrial base, munitions production, weapons systems manufacturing, military supply chains), manufacturing (re-shored industrial production, domestic manufacturing capacity, wartime and peacetime production), energy (oil, gas, coal, nuclear) and its infrastructure and exports, strategic supply chains (critical materials, components and parts manufacturing, logistics and production networks), infrastructure, both physical and digital to be built at industrial-scale, and strategic technologies.</p>
<p>The 2025 NSS strategic technologies are artificial intelligence, explicitly cited as a comparative U.S. advantage; other critical and emerging technologies such as dual-use and strategic technologies tied to national power; defense and military technologie integrated with industrial and innovation advantages; intelligence and surveillance technologies such as monitoring supply chains, vulnerabilities, and threats; cyber technology including espionage, theft, and protection of intellectual property; industrial and manufacturing technologies aiming at re-shoring, reindustrialization, and advanced manufacturing; energy technologies directly linked to economic and national security; and sensitive technologies protected via aligned export controls.</p>
<p>The 2025 NSS treats economic power, industrial superiority, and technological edge as inseparable pillars of national security. Technology is framed less as a civilian growth driver and more as a strategic asset, a competitive weapon, and a deterrence multiplier. Civilian industry is subordinated to national resilience, mobilization capacity, and deterrence, reinforcing the 2025 NSS’s broader fusion of economic security, industrial policy, and military strategy. This constitutes an optimal response to the Chinese “civilian-military fusion” and “unrestricted warfare” model.</p>
<p><strong>Space</strong></p>
<p>While a mention of “space&#8221; appears only once on page 21 of the NSS, the second Trump administration published on December 18th an Executive Order <em>&#8220;</em><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/12/ensuring-american-space-superiority/"><em>Ensuring American Space Superiority</em></a><em>&#8220;</em> prioritizing lunar basing and economic development by 2030 with a clear focus on Artemis, cislunar security as a theatre, and space nuclear power on a schedule. To secure U.S. assets and interests from Earth orbit through cislunar space to the Moon, integrating commercial capabilities into the defense complex, reforming acquisition, and modernizing the nation’s military space architecture become paramount. Space traffic management and space situational awareness services are no longer solely provided by the U.S. government for free.</p>
<p>Repositioning the U.S. as an unrivalled economic-industrial-technological leader provides valuable opportunities to the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific and Europe-Middle-East-Africa regions: “The goal is for our partner nations to build up their domestic economies, while an economically stronger and more sophisticated Western Hemisphere becomes an increasingly attractive market for American commerce and investment.” After 35 years of the West divorcing itself from Reality, we now face a technology-savvy tripolar world. The NSS, complemented by the Executive Order on Ensuring American Space Superiority, merely reflects a long overdue readjustment to 21st-century geopolitics. These are fundamentally the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuTjHijUnQA">space, nuclear, and disruptive industries</a>, focused in ways that achieve <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/posts/nuclecastpodcast_nipp-nationalsecurity-deterrence-activity-7401344866145939458-O6R_/">techno-strategic power.</a></p>
<p><em>Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em> <em>The views expressed are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Techno-Economic-power-at-the-heart-of-the-2025-U.S.-National-Security-Strategy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/techno-economic-power-at-the-heart-of-the-2025-u-s-national-security-strategy/">Techno-Economic power at the heart of the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Chhimpa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31719</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, and non-aligned traditions.</p>
<p>That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.</p>
<p><strong>India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI</strong></p>
<p>India’s governance model integrates<a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2021-02/Responsible-AI-22022021.pdf"> civilian oversight</a> with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/national-strategy-for-ai"><em>National Strategy for AI</em></a> mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.</p>
<p>The<a href="https://visionias.in/current-affairs/"> Evaluating Trustworthy AI</a> (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.</p>
<p>India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10493592"> red-team exercises</a> involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.</p>
<p><strong>Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation</strong></p>
<p>US-India collaboration on <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/17/joint-fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continue-to-chart-an-ambitious-course-for-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology/">AI verification</a> can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/international-center-excellence-in-technology">iCET fact sheet</a> outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.</p>
<p>A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.</p>
<p>The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Lalwani%20-%20U.S.-India%20Divergence%20and%20Convergence%20.pdf">Quad framework,</a> pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.</p>
<p><strong>Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control</strong></p>
<p>A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The<a href="https://unidir.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-in-the-military-domain-and-its-implications-for-international-peace-and-security-an-evidence-based-road-map-for-future-policy-action/"> UNIDIR report</a> calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.</p>
<p>The UN General Assembly has established an <a href="https://dig.watch/updates/fourth-revision-of-draft-unga-resolution-for-scientific-panel-on-ai-and-dialogue-on-ai-governance">Independent AI Scientific Panel</a> and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Applications and Future Prospects</strong></p>
<p>India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/mapping-the-prospect-of-arms-control-in-south-asia/">joint research on AI safety</a>, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.</p>
<p>Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bSpONUdcms">Mach 8</a> and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p>
<p>Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.</p>
<p>By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.</p>
<p><em>Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science &amp; Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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