Far from being a mere slip of the tongue, the episode revealed the extent to which BRICS have established themselves as increasingly influential players in international politics and economics. The fear aroused by those words was no accident; it reflected the growing perception that this bloc represents a direct challenge to the established international order.

The informal BRICS alliance was formed in 2009, when several emerging economies decided to coordinate their efforts to strengthen their financial, economic, and political cooperation. Brazil, Russia, India, and China formed the group, which was joined by South Africa in 2010. Since then, the bloc has steadily increased its influence, becoming a central player in the international system. It currently represents about 50% of the world’s population and approximately 40% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity.

Today, BRICS is once again at the center of global debate. For those who failed to understand the significance of Trump’s words, or the reasons for the nervousness they provoked, it is essential to pause and analyze exactly what this organization is and why its rise is generating growing concerns about the international balance of power. The question, in this context, is inevitable: why is this institution attracting so much attention today?

After the end of World War II, the United States and the major Western democracies promoted a framework of rules, institutions, and relationships that is now known as the “liberal international order.” This system was based on liberal principles—both political and economic—and cooperation among states through multilateral organizations designed to ensure stability, growth, and collective security.

However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system, the international scene underwent a profound transformation. Washington emerged as the sole global superpower, a situation that led Francis Fukuyama to formulate his thesis of the “end of history.”

Over the last few decades, Uncle Sam has maintained its hegemony through the liberal international order, relying on political and military alliances, shared norms, and universalist values, with institutions such as NATO and the IMF serving as fundamental pillars. This framework has guaranteed the hegemony of the dollar and its so-called “exorbitant privilege,” which has allowed the United States to borrow on more favorable terms than any other country, finance its deficits without immediate risk, and consolidate its debt as the safest asset in the global financial system.

To fully understand this analysis, it is essential to add another key element of the Western system’s success: the SWIFT network. This global payment infrastructure connects most of the world’s banks and acts as an intermediary in international transfers, the vast majority of which are conducted in dollars. In this way, the dollar has become the dominant currency worldwide. However, despite its power and influence, the liberal international order is beginning to show increasingly evident cracks.

Over time, a series of events have contributed to weakening this system. The financial crises of recent decades have undermined confidence in Western elites’ ability to manage the global economic order, while the U.S. strategy of shaping the world according to its own interests has fostered a coalition of states that reject its hegemony. Similarly, specific episodes such as Brexit in 2016, President Obama’s blockade of the WTO Appellate Body—considered the guardian of free trade—and Donald Trump’s return to the White House have intensified doubts about the soundness and legitimacy of this system.

Added to this context is the use of the dollar as a tool of political pressure, particularly visible in the sanctions imposed on Russia, a move that has reinforced the perception that the U.S. currency also functions as a geopolitical instrument.

This set of factors has led many powers to seek alternatives that reduce their dependence on the system dominated by the U.S. In this scenario of a weakening liberal international order, recent moves by BRICS are perceived as a direct threat to Washington, once again placing the bloc at the center of global debate.

As already noted, the BRICS is an informal intergovernmental organization whose main objective is to increase its global influence and offer alternatives to Western-dominated institutions. Since its creation, the bloc has progressively expanded its reach and sought to reduce its dependence on the U.S.-led international financial system.

A key step in this strategy was the 2014 creation of the New Development Bank, aimed at financing development projects in emerging economies, as well as the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a $100 billion fund designed to protect member countries from financial crises. These initiatives are perceived as direct challenges to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, essential pillars of the liberal international order.

Added to this institutional progress is the growing economic weight of the bloc. BRICS countries have established themselves as one of the main drivers of global growth, accounting for a significant share of industrial production and strategic resources.

It is in this context that BRICS found an historic opportunity to challenge the rules of the international economic game. In addition to developing their own institutions, in 2018 BRICS introduced a new international payment mechanism called “NIPS,” later known as BRICS Pay. Although the project progressed slowly for several years, it regained prominence in October 2024 during the 16th BRICS Summit, held that same year. On this occasion, the member countries formally presented and endorsed what was now called BRICS Pay.

BRICS Pay aims to facilitate international transactions in local currencies and reduce the centrality of the dollar. The system would rely on DCMS, a decentralized messaging network developed in Russia and distributed among member countries, allowing each state to control its own financial infrastructure and trade without using the dollar, thereby weakening its dominance. At the same time, the absence of a hegemonic actor within the system aims to foster more balanced cooperation and potentially reduce geopolitical tensions.

This project represents a direct challenge to both the United States and the SWIFT system and, by extension, to the liberal international order. If BRICS countries succeed in consolidating the success of BRICS Pay in the future, we could be witnessing a notable change in the world order as we know it today.

However, significant obstacles remain between ambition and reality. Although an initial prototype of BRICS Pay has been presented in Moscow, and it has been suggested that it could be operational by 2026, the path to a fully functional system is complex. The experience of the European Union shows that financial integration requires time, coordination, and a high degree of economic convergence.

Furthermore, BRICS countries have profound differences in their levels of development, monetary policies, and strategic priorities, which makes it difficult to build a stable and cohesive framework. Similarly, despite their growing economic weight, their global political influence remains limited and, for the time being, it is insufficient to displace Western primacy.

Even so, the bloc’s rapid rise in a brief time has altered the international balance and raised fundamental questions about the future of the global system. The central question is whether BRICS countries will succeed in consolidating themselves as a real alternative to the liberal order led by the United States or whether their challenge will remain, at least for now, a symptom of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world.

Ana Lorenzo López is a geopolitical analyst currently collaborating with The Political Room, where she writes in-depth political and strategic analysis on international affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

BRICS: The Emerging Bloc That Threatens the Liberal International Order was originally published on Global Security Review.

That contradiction has come into sharp relief during the presidency of Donald Trump, whose blunt interest in Greenland exposed what European diplomacy had long obscured. The controversy was framed as eccentricity or provocation, but the underlying grievance was familiar. For decades, the United States has underwritten European security while European governments reduced their defense investments in favor of generous welfare systems and subsidized industry, confident that the American half of the alliance would absorb the risk. The Greenland crisis has simply made that imbalance visible.

Greenland’s Strategic Reality

Greenland occupies a unique strategic position. It sits in the western hemisphere astride the Arctic approaches to the “GIUK Gap,” hosting critical space and missile-warning infrastructure essential to NATO’s early-warning architecture. The 2004 Defense Greenland Agreement between the United States and Denmark, Amending and Supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951, explicitly limits the US defense area in Greenland to Thule (Pituffik) Air (Space) Base only.

With Arctic sea lanes opening and undersea infrastructure becoming a focal point of competition, Greenland’s strategic importance is no longer peripheral but central. The question now confronting Europe is whether the small Kingdom of Denmark and, by extension, Europe, can demonstrate even minimal sovereignty over a territory it insists is non-negotiable but has left undefended for some 250 years.

Article 3 of the NATO Treaty states: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Put plainly, Denmark is obligated to maintain—on its own and on a continuous basis—the capacity to defend all its territory. By that standard, Denmark has failed to meet its Article 3 responsibilities for a very long time, if it ever has.

Despite its strategic importance, Greenland remains vulnerable and economically neglected. This is not an accident or a bureaucratic oversight. It is the result of a long-standing assumption—that the United States would indefinitely guarantee European sovereignty and sustain its social-economic model. That assumption no longer holds. Strategic competition is shifting away from open confrontation toward constant pressure, probing actions, and fait accompli. In this world, sovereignty is not something you can merely declare. It is something you must demonstrate.

Trump, Europe, and the Sovereignty Question

Trump’s narrative about Greenland was widely dismissed as transactional or unserious. Stripped of tone, however, the message was structural: As the Arctic presents opportunity, Greenland is even more strategically vital to North American security than ever before, and someone must take responsibility for securing and developing it.

This tension among NATO allies reflects a broader post–Cold War pattern. Europe expanded its regulatory, economic, and political influence while allowing NATO military funding and capability to atrophy. The resulting system elevated process, norms, and legalism over hard power security, sovereignty, and deterrence.

The renewed United States demand for Greenland exposes the limits of that model. If Denmark cannot even mount a minimal defense of its own territory, the problem is not American overreach, but European credibility.

The UK Corollary

In a striking act of geopolitical idealism, the United Kingdom has agreed to cede sovereignty over Diego Garcia to Mauritius—an “own goal” that harms US interests. Long regarded as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” Diego Garcia has been a cornerstone of US and UK power projection across the Middle East, East Africa, South Asia, and beyond for decades.

After years of legal and diplomatic pressure—culminating in adverse rulings from international courts and the United Nations—the UK concluded that continued unilateral control of the Chagos Archipelago was politically unsustainable in this rules-based international order. In 2024, London agreed to transfer sovereignty to Mauritius, a state increasingly influenced by Beijing, while attempting to preserve military access through a long-term, UK-funded lease.

On paper, operations continue. Leverage shifts from occupant to owner. Sovereignty matters: once surrendered, access rests on political permission rather than power. A future Beijing-aligned Mauritius could abrogate agreements or revoke leases, leaving the US and UK strategically stranded, “out of runway” and out of business in the Indian Ocean.

Like Diego Garcia, Greenland’s strategic value lies in assured access. Trusting that allies will always act in America’s best interest is folly. Access without ownership is always conditional; sovereignty without power is fragile. Both cases reveal the same risk—vital territory left exposed at a moment when great-power competition demands clarity, presence, and resolve.

Sovereignty Requires Adequate Organic Defense

Defending Greenland does not require national militarization on Cold War terms. It does not require large permanent formations or aggressive posturing. But it does require capability, presence, and integration of real forces tied to real geography. The fantasy of the [European] Liberal [global] Rules-based order is no longer sufficient alone.

A credible defense posture requires permanent ground, air, and naval forces. Presence must be sufficient to assert territorial control, secure the Arctic approaches, and protect key infrastructure. Additionally, it requires fifth-generation airpower, supported by NATO enablers sufficient to project air sovereignty and assert control over the airspace of the GIUK, along with integrated maritime and subsurface awareness to control approaches, advanced air and missile defense for critical nodes, and the logistics infrastructure required to sustain operations in an Arctic environment.

This is not an escalation; it is the minimum viable defense posture for the territory Denmark claims sovereignty over, NATO depends upon, and the Western Hemisphere demands. Anything less than that is not restraint; it is abdication.

What Denmark Can Do

For Denmark to retain its kingdom, it must fervently acknowledge that China and Russia are expanding their Arctic ambitions and that continuing to ignore or neglect this threat risks losing Greenland to another great power’s orbit. Denmark does not need to defend Greenland alone, but it must lead and meet its Article 3 responsibilities. Sovereignty cannot be subcontracted. First, Denmark must accept that a visible, persistent presence is non-negotiable. A battalion-sized force and a fighter squadron on Greenlandic soil are not a burden; they are a declaration of responsibility.

Second, Denmark must align force posture with geography. Arctic defense is not a side mission; it is central to Denmark’s strategic responsibilities and credibility. That requires prioritizing basing, sustainment, and readiness over symbolic deployments there or elsewhere.

Third, Denmark must integrate defense with economic development. Resource extraction, energy production, and infrastructure are not separate from security; they are its foundation. Without an economic base, defense remains episodic and less affordable. For the collective West, energy and critical element security is national security. If Denmark cannot execute these steps—even with allied support—then sovereignty is no longer exercised; it is merely asserted.

How Europe Can Contribute Without Posturing

Greenland offers Europe an opportunity to demonstrate what regional shared deterrence looks like. Contributions need not be equal in scale, but they must be meaningful in effect. Rotational air defense units, maritime patrol aircraft, icebreaking capacity, logistics support, and infrastructure investment tied directly to defense requirements would materially strengthen deterrence without grandstanding.

This is where Europe’s economic power must finally align with its strategic claims. Shared deterrence is not about symbolism or declarations. It is about complementary capability and sustained commitment.

Can Europe Move Fast Enough?

The decisive variable is time. Ten-year roadmaps and aspirational targets are irrelevant. Greenland’s exposure is immediate. The longer Europe delays, the more it reinforces the perception that sovereignty exists only on paper. Delay only serves to validate President Trump’s strategic demand.

Credible deterrence must begin within weeks, not months or years. Initial deployments need not be perfect, but they cannot be symbolic political statements devoid of the credible military capacity required for the mission. They need to be visible, permanent, and expandable.

The Consequences of Failure

Failure in Greenland would reverberate far beyond the Arctic. If Denmark cannot defend Greenland with allied assistance, then European claims of strategic autonomy collapse and NATO’s credibility fractures geographically. The United States will either act unilaterally or disengage selectively. Resource development will proceed without European leverage. Most damaging of all, failure would confirm a lesson Europe can no longer afford: that idealism and process cannot substitute for balance-of-power realism, and that international norms cannot enforce themselves. Where previous US presidential administrations relied on alliances, basing agreements, and quiet influence, President Trump has framed the issue in transactional terms: if Greenland was strategically vital, someone had to take responsibility for securing and developing it.

Conclusion

Greenland is not a crisis invented in Washington. It is the result of allied neglect and free riding. Persistent underinvestment in defense, miscalculation of threats, and a readiness among many allies to subordinate their sovereignty to international norms have produced a growing crisis of confidence in the United States. This can only be reversed with real power projection and a NATO commitment to peace through strength.

Denmark does not need to match American power. It needs to demonstrate agency, urgency, and empathy. Denmark and greater NATO must listen to its most powerful ally and address its security concerns with great alacrity. Rather than escalating the rhetoric, Denmark should admit its negligence and mitigate the shortfall now. Europe does not need to replace the United States or drive it out of the alliance. It needs to stop pretending that sovereignty is cost-free or that it can be reliably substituted with treaties in perpetuity.

This President demands more of the alliance to defend America’s northern approaches. If Denmark and the rest of NATO cannot meet that demand, the United States will. What is being asked is reasonable. The Arctic is now NATO’s second front. If Europe cannot meet that demand here, it has become sovereignty insolvent and should stop speaking of autonomy elsewhere. Because in the end, reality does not respond to intention, only to real and persistent power.

Col (Ret.) Kirk Fansher is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed by the authors are their own.

Can Denmark Defend Greenland from Trump? was originally published on Global Security Review.

By mid-June 2025, after years of preparation, the Israelis, in one fell swoop, destroyed half of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, destroyed some nuclear facilities, and assassinated Iran’s leading nuclear scientists and the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Then on June 23, 2025, a pre-dawn bombing raid ordered by US President Donald Trump took out of commission the hard-to-crack nuclear facilities of Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan.

Beyond adding to Israel’s capabilities with American B2 bombers loaded with GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrators, bunkers busters, the bombing cemented American leadership in dealing with the Iran problem. A review of joint Israel-US capabilities helps explain how deterrence in the region is returning and what to expect next.

Since the October 7, 2023, massacre of Israelis by Hamas, an Iranian proxy, Israeli intelligence and military units, all backed by superior defense technology, methodically destroyed Iranian capabilities and supporters. Iran’s “Ring of Fire” utterly failed to achieve Iran’s strategic aims.

Israeli and American space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance enabled early warning, target verification, and battle damage assessment. Israel relied on a precision-strike doctrine that is supported by systems like the Ofek, AMOS, and Eros-B space assets. Israel maintained surveillance for dominance above Iranian military and nuclear infrastructures. Iran merely linked its space program to the IRGC.

With multi-layer sensor fusion, Israel integrates Eitan unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), ELW-2090 airborne warning and control systems, and ground-based radars like the EL/M-2080 Green Pine with satellite data into a national and regional situational awareness (SA) web, shaping strikes and missile defense prioritization. Space-derived situational awareness enables real-time assessment of missile launches, UAV swarm attacks, or asymmetric maritime threats by Iran and proxies operating from the Red Sea or Persian Gulf.

Cyber intelligence, signal intelligence (SIGINT), and electronic warfare form another layer. In the conflict, Israel command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems pit Unit 8200 against IRGC affiliated cyber units.

Israel’s missile shield includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-2/Arrow-3. They combine to create a web of coverage. Arrow’s high-altitude, long-range interceptors tackle Iranian ballistic missiles such as Fattah, Shahab, and Sejil. Iron Beam laser defense, under development, aims to address low-cost, high-volume threats like UAVs and small rockets.

Israeli capabilities for missile defense, early warning, C4, and interoperability are integrated with US Central Command and the systems of the Gulf States. The US supports Arrow and David’s Sling. Aegis ballistic missile defense and terminal high altitude area defense (THAAD) systems in the region share radar feeds. American space-based infra-red system satellites provide missile-launch detection.

Bahrain hosts the US Navy and supports regional C4ISR, and has growing maritime security ties with Israel. The US expanded its Saudi Arabian basing in Tabuk to feed into the regional missile defense picture. The United Arab Emirates enables THAAD, Patriot (PAC-3), radar integration, and air picture sharing with the US and Israel. Jordan, the United Kingdom, and France also contribute to defensive actions during missile and drone attacks.

Iranian targets and their proxies have nowhere to hide. The US Space Force’s Space Operations Command Mission Delta 4 identifies and tracks threats. It did so during the April 2024 and October 2024 Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel. Operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to share intelligence, Mission Delta 4 ensures no missile launch ever catches America or her allies and partners by surprise.

A space-enabled Israel, integrated with Gulf State operations, eliminated Iranian air defenses, triggered covert operations inside Iran, and launched targeted bombings and assassinations. The American bombing topped these other efforts. Israel, as the military strong horse, irreversibly altered the regional balance of power, possibly ushering in the demise of a threatening Iranian Shia hegemony—an objective shared by Sunni Arab Gulf States.

Regime change was never a stated war aim but was an anticipated consequence if it occurred. It did not. The surviving Shia Islamist leadership and IRGC are now engaged in repression and remain capable of inflicting much suffering on both the region and Iranians.

It is unclear to which extent proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias can still attack Israel and American assets in the region. Military outcomes, though, are not the sole factors defining the Iranian endgame. The Iranian taqiyya-driven regime and its Shia hegemony ideology are down, but not out. Their nefarious ideological influence can persist around the Gulf, as far as Yemen and Africa, and beyond.

Considering the cost of inaction and a failure to reinstate deterrence, eradicating a threat to the homeland, Middle East bases, and Gulf allies means the effort was worth it. If the conflict drags on, the costs will rise. Disruption of maritime traffic and oil markets could bring its predictable cohort of economic disruptions. Terrorism around the globe is déjà vu.

In the words of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, “Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us.” Depending on the roles the new Syrian leadership and a resurgent Türkiye play, the Iranian endgame may take different forms.

Yes, President Trump decisively played the hand he was dealt. But there are many more moves left in this game. The best moves may be still to come.

Christophe Bosquillon is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Deterring Iran: The Art of No Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.

The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.

Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.

The follow-on ceasefire agreement stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.

China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.

Bolstering Alliances

 On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.

Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.

Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.

The Dealmaker

 Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.

First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the underlying causes of the conflict and pathways for reconciliation.

Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.

In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the next few weeks. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.

Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to expand the Abraham Accords so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.

Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.

The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.

Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.

Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of the United States Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

For eighty years the United States pursued a policy of globalism with worldwide military commands to implement this policy. It is prohibitively expensive and is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Observers point out that the US defense budget was $849 billion in 2024, but this is only part of the overall annual expenditure on defense. Most countries include veterans benefits in their defense budgets. The United States treats these costs differently. Today the Veterans Administration (VA) budget stands at $369.3 billion and is rising rapidly because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which drove healthcare and retirement costs higher.

As Table 1 shows, the VA budget rose about 10 percent per annum, resulting in the VA budget rising to the second largest amount of discretionary funding in the federal budget.  Further, as the breakdown of annual expenditure shows, medical costs are growing as the soldiers who went to war as young people are now in their forties and their health issues are becoming chronic while the injuries they suffered are becoming more difficult to treat due to age-related complications.

Table 1

Veterans Administration Budget 2018–2025

Source: US Veterans Administration (2024)

Combined expenditures for fiscal year 2025 will surpass $1 trillion. Given America’s growing debt such expenditure is difficult to sustain, especially if Washington’s global military footprint continues to expand at a rapid pace. Finding the manpower to wage war is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States.

The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts saw the United States suffer 8,492 combat fatalities.  Compared to the 58,000 deaths in Vietnam and 53,000 in Korea this number was significantly smaller. A critical reason was excellent triage care and swift evacuation of wounded soldiers from the battlefield. To get soldiers to serve in an all-volunteer force, the United States was offering $20,000 to $40,000 enlistment bonuses. Today, those numbers are even higher.

Further, in his autobiography, Hillbilly Elegy, Vice President J. D. Vance discussed how the American working class, which his family belonged to, blamed George W. Bush and Barack Obama for making them cannon fodder in Afghanistan and Iraq. This feeling, combined with the high number of walking wounded (over 50,000) who came back from the wars with physical and psychological trauma, led to a growing reluctance amongst America’s combat-age population to go to war. In such circumstances, reducing military expenditures and the nation’s global military footprint makes sense.

In this context, Trump’s plan for hemispheric defense is a return to the Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century, where the United States maintained its military supremacy over the Western hemisphere and kept out foreign powers. Defending the Western hemisphere is easy. As Otto von Bismark once said, “The Americans are a very lucky people. They’re bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors, and to the east and west by fish.”

In the 21st century, the United States remains the predominant naval power in the Atlantic Ocean as well as in the Eastern and South Pacific, making it difficult for any aggressor to penetrate America’s defensive walls. Fielding an American military force that is based around a blue-water Navy and a globally deployable Air Force is a cost-effective strategy because it takes away the expense of overseas bases. In fact, recognizing that in a conflict with China there could be political unwillingness in Asia to host F-35s, the first Trump administration decided to build a new generation of lower yield nuclear weapons that could be launched from cruise missile–carrying submarines.

The Quest for Territory

Since coming to power, Donald Trump suggested Canada become the 51st state and the purchase of Greenland. Denmark has stated that Greenland is not for sale while in Canada Trump’s statements led to a revival of Canadian nationalism and a boost in the fortunes of a very unpopular liberal party. President Trump’s motivation for such efforts is clear.

In terms of minerals, a United States that has full access to minerals in Canada and Greenland is on par with the mineral wealth of Russia. Acquiring Canada and Greenland would also make the United States and Russia the two most prominent Arctic states and would freeze out attempts by China to acquire influence in the region.

Trump’s demands caused global leaders to wonder about the rationality of such pronouncements but what he said is based in political and historical facts. The United States purchased the Virgin Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John from Copenhagen in 1917 and, subsequently, bought Water Island from a private Danish company in 1944. If the citizens of Greenland choose, via referenda, to join the United States, such a purchase has historical precedent.

In the case of Canada, the Quebecois have periodically asked for independence and Ottawa conducted referendums to see if the population of Quebec wants to secede. So far, secessionists suffer defeat each time. It is interesting to note that the Atlantic provinces of Canada—New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—previously said that Quebec’s secession would lead to their joining the United States. British Columbia, which is divided from Canada by the Rockies and whose economy is tied to the West coast of the United States, would potentially follow suit. Canada would then consist of Ontario and the northern part of Quebec where the native population has made it clear that they have no interest in joining the Francophone nationalists.

The fact is that Canada has a fragile economy that could breed long-term discontent.  Further, in Quebec, the Parti Quebecois’ charismatic leader Paul St. Pierre Plamondon, who is likely to win the provincial election in April, wants a third independence referendum by 2030. If that happens, Trump’s territorial realignment may come to pass. In a world where all or part of Canada is part of the United States and Greenland is an American territory, the United States is in far less need of Europe or Asia. With only 11 percent of the American economy derived from exports, an internally focused United States is not a nation in a bad position.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow in the National Institute of Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal. He may be contacted at amit.gupta1856@gmail.com.

Hemispheric Defense: An Idea Whose Time Has Come was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement brokered by President Barack Obama in 2015, as it “failed to protect America’s national security interests.” Trump justified his withdrawal by arguing that the agreement, as “a windfall of cash”, did not curbed Iran’s malign activities. Instead, he contended, it provided financial resources that “enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior.”

For Iran’s non-Persian national and ethnic groups, the failure of the JCPOA was also due to its disregard for human rights and domestic oppression. Western negotiators prioritized nuclear and missiles restrictions and regional security while sidelining the people’s suffering under an authoritarian regime. The economic relief from the deal landed in the hands of regime elites, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and their affiliates. Ordinary peoples saw little benefit. Instead, the regime doubled down on its crackdown against marginalized groups, including Kurds, Baloch, and Arabs. With reduced external pressure, Tehran felt emboldened to impose its Persian-Shia ideological hegemony even more aggressively.

Now, with talks of a renewed deal resurfacing, one must ask: will this agreement, like its predecessor, serve only the regime’s interests? Trump’s letter outlined conditions for sanctions relief, including an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, cessation of uranium enrichment, ceasing financial support to Hezbollah and halting arms transfers to the Houthis, and dismantling its militias in Iraq. However, these terms, like before, fail to address the human rights abuses within Iran. If a future deal ignores these realities, it will once again be the oppressed groups who pay the price.

The absence of human rights considerations in Western negotiations with Iran is not incidental—it is a consistent pattern. Historically, the West has often prioritized short-term strategic gains over the long-term aspirations of the people in Iran. The result has been a cycle of diplomatic engagements that empower the ruling elite while leaving everyday people in a deepening state of economic hardship and political repression. Sanctions relief, while theoretically aimed at improving the people’s economy, has instead served as a financial injection for the regime’s military-industrial complex, allowing it to tighten its grip on power.

For Iran’s diverse population—comprising Baluchis, Kurds, Armenians, Qashqais, Azeris, Arabs, Turkmens, Gilakis, Tabaris, Talyshis, and religious groups including Jews and Bahais—a nuclear deal that fails to address their plight could be devastating. The regime’s persecution of non-Persian groups has been marked by disproportionate executions of Kurds and Baluchis, arbitrary detentions, and systematic cultural suppression. Economic marginalization has left these groups disproportionately affected by unemployment, poverty, and lack of access to basic services. A deal that does not explicitly condition sanctions relief on improvements in human rights will serve as yet another tool for the government to sustain its policies of repression and forced assimilation. Moreover, the suppression of dissent extends to students, journalists, and activists who have faced severe crackdowns for expressing opposition to the regime’s policies.

This regime operates outside conventional norms, yet Western commentators in mainstream media, instead of acknowledging the ideological and religious motives of Iran’s Shi’ite rulers, continue to search for rational justifications that overlook the regime’s true nature. If the past is any indication, a nuclear deal without guarantees for the people of Iran will reinforce the status quo: economic benefits funneled to regime elites, intensified repression of national and ethnic minorities, and continued expansion of Iran’s regional influence at the expense of its citizens. A more “comprehensive” approach to diplomacy with Iran must incorporate human rights as a core negotiating principle. Strict oversight and accountability measures must be implemented to prevent state-controlled entities, such as the judiciary, from imposing verdicts on the people, and the IRGC from monopolizing financial resources and oppressing dissidents. Furthermore, human rights organizations and genuine opposition figures should have a voice in shaping the terms of any agreement.

Ultimately, the goal of any nuclear deal should also aim to create conditions that empower its people to pursue democratic aspirations. A policy that prioritizes human rights alongside the security of Israel and the US would be strategically effective in fostering long-term stability in the region.

Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal was originally published on Global Security Review.

Given these doubts, European political leaders have expressed a determination to increase their defense budgets and upgrade their armed forces and defense industrial bases. For example, European Community leaders met in early March to discuss the urgency of rearmament and the possible shift in American commitment to the defense of Ukraine and/or Europe altogether. The president of the European Commission noted that Europe faces a “clear and present danger” from the possibility of an asymmetrical peace agreement favorable to Russia followed by a more ambiguous American commitment to the defense of Europe.

European concerns are understandable, but the possibility that free Europe can establish a self-sufficient deterrent against further Russian political coercion or military aggression, apart from US security guarantees, is remote. An effort to bisect American national security from that of Europe would be politically unwise, weaken deterrence, and open the door to piecemeal disintegration of the transatlantic partnership that served leaders during the Cold War and thereafter. Four aspects of this issue merit specific consideration.

First, NATO is the strategic and military embodiment of shared security commitment and risk among member-states. NATO’s totality of conventional and nuclear military strength, supported by its political unity, is the linchpin for credible deterrence against Russian revanchism. Collectively, NATO members have the resources, including conventional forces for modern combined arms battle and the defense industrial base for protracted conflict, to deter any repetition of Russia’s invasion against Ukraine or any Russian attack on the alliance. American commitment to European defense ensures that its strategic nuclear forces support deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict, including possible Russian nuclear political coercion or first use.

Second, President Trump, on his best and worst days, tends to see international relations as entirely transactional. This may work when dealing with trade or tariff matters but not matters of war and peace. American entanglement with the security of Europe is not only transactional; it is also existential. European and American defense and deterrence requirements are joined at the hip, notwithstanding occasional spats and acrimony over the details of military planning and defense economic priorities. American politicians complain that the United States should try to avoid getting stuck in another “forever war” in Ukraine but Ukraine is not Iraq or Afghanistan.

A victory for Putin in Ukraine opens the door to European vulnerability that Russia will later exploit at a higher cost in blood and treasure for the United States and its European partners.

Therefore, it follows that the US decision in early March to suddenly suspend American military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine was ill advised and poorly timed. Although holding back equipment deliveries might take some months to impact events at the front, failure to share timely intelligence could impact immediately on Ukraine’s ability to strike key Russian targets, including logistics hubs, command centers, and troop concentrations. Thus, the suspension sent the wrong message to Ukraine and to Russia about allied steadfastness as preliminary ceasefire and peace negotiations were taking place in Saudi Arabia.

Third, messaging of American commitment to peace and security in Europe also involves the decisions about modernization of the American nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure. This has a number of components. First, the US is replacing all three legs of its strategic nuclear triad. The Trump administration also wants to deploy the sea-launched cruise missile, to replace some existing nuclear warheads with upgrades, and to provide additional limited nuclear options for contingencies short of general nuclear war.

Fourth, American defense planning for each potential theater of war will continue to emphasize a spectrum of options including both conventional and nuclear weapons. The US must maintain credible deterrence against the combined forces of China and Russi, not only with respect to the possible outbreak of conventional war in Asia or Europe, but also with regard to the threat of nuclear first use or first strike against American allies or the American homeland.

In this respect, another challenge to deterrence lies in the increasing capability of conventional weapons for use against targets previously assigned to nuclear weapons, and, conversely, the attractiveness for some parties of low-yield nuclear weapons for use against targets previously assigned only to conventional weapons.

The challenges in meeting the preceding standards for deterrence in Europe and beyond are enormous. First, they include the evolving international security environment in which an emerging multipolar realignment places a coalition of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia at cross-purposes with US and allied visions for world order in Europe and Asia. Second, the challenges involve the significance of emerging technologies for long-range precision strike, missile and air defenses, cyber deterrence and war, space conflict, and continuing developments in autonomous warfare. Third, the costs for maintaining deterrence in Asia and Europe are enormous and Europe cannot expect the United States to foot the bill.

Some American allies in Asia and Europe expressed a willingness to increase their defense budgets and their degrees of readiness for local or regional conflict. More demanding times are ahead. In short, there is no “Eurodeterrent” without the United States and vice versa.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a distinguished professor at Penn State-Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Euro-deterrence and the Quest for Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

In fact, months ago, the president asked North Atlantic Treaty Council Organization (NATO) countries for a proposal by each state for putting peacekeeping troops in Ukraine. The Europeans dithered and then expressed consternation that Trump was keeping them out of the negotiations with Putin.

More pertinently, the president suggested that NATO countries increase their defense expenditure to five percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This is a far more realistic assessment of the decline in European capabilities than that which calls for a growth of defense expenditure to three percent of GDP.

The British, French, and Germans all expressed varying degrees of outrage at Trump’s actions including the suggestion by some that he is creating a “Munich”-like outcome in his negotiations with Putin by conceding too much even before the discussions began. The fact is that Trump is playing his cards knowing full well that the Europeans have no plan.

Why Five Percent Is Impossible

When one looks at NATO’s defense expenditure, countries like Canada, Italy, and Spain are below the two percent threshold while France, Germany, and the Netherlands barely cross it.  Yes, countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are above the two percent threshold, but they are small nations with populations less than that of Chicago. Estonia has a mere 1.6 million people.

To get to three percent, let alone five, would require NATO countries to add tens of billions to their defense budgets and require cutting the social services that their citizens expect and value. As Politico pointed out, for France, which is one of the voluble proponents of European rearmament, to go from two to three percent of GDP would require Paris to add about 30 billion euros to its defense budget.

Given the country’s budgetary problems that is unlikely to happen. Five percent is a bridge too far. Britain, which is also facing economic headwinds, cannot afford such an increase. In Germany, despite the 100 billion euros committed to modernization, which largely went to refurbish existing equipment that was mothballed, Berlin made it clear it is a long way from substantially increasing its defense budget. Countries like Italy and Spain, given their own economic compulsions, will also find five percent impossible.

The Europeans raise the issue that even if they went to five percent their defense industries are not able to crank up production to meet the demand for new weaponry. That is not the primary problem for these countries. Instead, it is an issue of manpower. Europe is aging and lacks the population for expanded militaries. Worse, as part of the peace dividend, conscription was removed in most countries in the 1990s. This left Gen X, the millennials, and now Gen Z, without any memory of military service.

Reinstating conscription, as seen from the figures below, would be the way to give teeth to European militaries. Compulsory military service, however, is hugely unpopular among the younger generation and a push to draft people would lead to an electoral backlash that few politicians in Europe want to face.

As Table I shows, the major European militaries drastically downsized after the Cold War:

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, 2023, 2024 editions.

The above figures clearly show that remilitarization would require a major intake of manpower that the European countries would be unable to achieve because of the factors discussed above. Yet, this does not stop them from making bold pronouncements about future militarization efforts. Reality is something else.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy states the German case of weakness quite bluntly:

The decline in German numbers over the past 20 years is particularly striking: in 2004 Germany had thousands of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and even almost one thousand howitzers. By 2021, these numbers had come down to the hundreds, as Germany only had 339 tanks and 121 howitzers. The German numbers for 1992 must be interpreted carefully, as they include weapons and equipment from the newly incorporated East German army. Still, when considering the available Leopard tanks, i.e., the West German tanks, Germany had around 4200. The German decline in military stock is thus massive.

Despite all the optimistic talk emanating from Berlin, German rearmament is a myth.  The country’s industrial capability, which is in the doldrums, will not allow it to rapidly militarize. And young people will not join the military in droves as Olaf Scholz and Ursula van der Lyon fondly believe. There is a reason Ukraine has not dipped into its pool of 18–21-year-olds for the current war. It would probably lead to mass flight from the country by younger Ukrainians.

If Europe cannot remilitarize easily and lacks the manpower to build Cold War–level forces, what can it do? The answer is simple. Write checks.

Ukraine requires reconstruction. The World Bank estimated that it would cost around $486 billion, while Zelensky put the number closer to $700 billion. It is a year since the World Bank made its estimate so one can safely assume that in the intense conflict of 2024 the damage to infrastructure may have added another $50 billion to $100 billion to the bill. The Europeans can make a $25 billion a year commitment to Ukraine for the next twenty years to aid reconstruction. This would lead to the rapid build-up of Ukraine’s economy and stop the population from fleeing the war-torn nation.

As things stand, Ukraine’s population is set to decline to around 30 million by 2050 and it will largely be a country of old people thanks to a decline in fertility. If Kyiv stands a chance, it needs a sustained dose of financial aid with no strings attached. A side benefit would be that China would not be the major post-war economic player in Ukraine.

From the European perspective, Brussels can go to Trump and say that yes, we engaged in burden sharing and it would be a lot less expensive than five percent of GDP and far less socially divisive than the imposition of conscription.

Xi Jin Ping suggested Chinese and Indian peacekeepers be inserted in Ukraine. This would change the future security architecture of the region. Russia will be far more comfortable with such a peacekeeping force rather than a crypto-NATO force posing as peacekeepers. It will be interesting to watch how this plays out.

Perhaps most interesting is the fact that Trump called Europe’s bluff. If London, Paris, and Berlin want to be relevant, it is time to write a big check. At least for now, Americans are no longer willing to subsidize Europe’s welfare states.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal.

The European Dilemma: Five Percent and Manpower was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the signing event, President Trump remarked, “On trade, I have decided, for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff, meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them no more, no less. In other words, they charge the US a tax or tariff, and we will charge them the exact same tax or tariff, very simple.”

A strong economy is vital to national security. In addition to reliable access to energy, minerals, and capital, any great power fundamentally requires a resilient, production-oriented, economic infrastructure that ensures a comprehensive and adequate industrial base capable of producing most of the nation’s necessities.

Furthermore, America’s national debt exceeds $36 trillion, with a debt-to-GDP ratio surpassing 133 percent. In fiscal year 2024, the cost of servicing the debt’s interest surpassed America’s defense budget.

Americans place great importance on fairness and balance. The Declaration of Independence famously states that “all men are created equal” and advocates for equal treatment for all individuals, regardless of status or position. The Constitution establishes a framework that balances power among various branches of government, as outlined in James Madison’s Federalist 51.

Socrates once remarked, “If measure and symmetry are absent from any composition in any degree, ruin awaits both the ingredients and the composition…. Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.” He was right.

President Trump seeks to implement tariff reciprocity towards America’s competitors in a fair, just, and balanced manner. Can this same principle be applied to his peace through strength deterrence approach? Yes, it can.

Dynamic parity is a nuclear deterrence strategy that deliberately achieves and maintains a contextually symmetrical balance of nuclear force capabilities, capacities, and composition in relation to the combined nuclear strength of China, North Korea, Russia, and possibly Iran. This strategy seeks to balance America’s nuclear deterrent force against the potentially collaborative arsenals of these adversaries, thereby enhancing deterrence, reassuring allies, and preserving strategic stability in a world lacking binding arms control agreements.

America is about 15 years into a 30-year effort to recapitalize its nuclear arsenal, which has a program of record that offers a one-for-one intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) swap, two fewer ballistic missile submarines, and a reduced bomb load capacity. The current program of record was designed for a world that no longer exists.

Even the Biden administration’s acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy acknowledged the need to explore “options for increasing future launcher capacity or adding more deployed warheads in land, sea, and air capabilities” to address the significant growth and variety of China’s nuclear arsenal. The 2023 Congressional Commission report on U.S. Strategic Posture stated that the current nuclear modernization program is “necessary, but not sufficient” for facing two nuclear peers: China and Russia.

Americans often assess the fairness of financial rewards and the distribution of costs, commonly reacting to perceived unfairness with feelings of hostility and responding with protest. Regarding economic, political, or national security issues, we are “wired to resist unfair treatment.” This sense of fairness and balance also extends to America’s defensive posture. A recent Reagan National Defense Forum Survey noted that 77 percent of voters were concerned that the national debt might force defense cuts, with 79 percent supporting increased defense spending, and 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about “Russia launching a thermonuclear attack against the US.”

In this context, geopolitical fairness refers to the perceived evenhandedness among nations in a manner that mutually impacts interests. Meanwhile, geopolitical balance pertains to the distribution of perceived power between states in the international system. The 2024 Annual Threat Assessment noted that Russia possesses the largest, most diverse, and most modern nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. This infers that America remains inferior in aggregate nuclear weapon numbers and is trailing in modernization, which creates an imbalance.

Correcting long-standing imbalances in trade policy and military shortfalls is vital to the American conscience. Allowing trade deficits with economic competitors to persist without challenge is akin to unilateral disarmament. The US trade deficit for goods reached a record $1.2 trillion in 2024, while the treasury borrowed $2 trillion that same year. Ongoing deficits of this magnitude threaten domestic companies and jobs, putting negative pressure on GDP and the prosperity of individual Americans. Ensuring that America’s nuclear deterrent can counter the threats posed by its adversaries will safeguard citizens’ security and sovereignty, enabling prosperity.

President Trump’s new Trade and Tariff Reciprocity Policy, like the nuclear deterrence strategy of Dynamic Parity, places the burden of acceptable behavior on America’s competitors. They both empower America to act in the interest of fairness, aiming to achieve balance in both process and product. Geopolitical stability is not born of an America exploited economically or constrained militarily. This kind of weakness is not only provocative but also insulting.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.

Trump’s Trade and Tariff Policy Benefits America’s Nuclear Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2020, President Donald Trump led a campaign to ban TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership and compromise of private data by the Chinese government. Four years later, Trump delayed the removal of TikTok from the American market as he looks to find an American buyer for the popular app. This apparent reversal raises the question, is this change motivated by legitimate considerations or political advantage?

The 2020 Ban: National Security or Politics?

During his first term, President Trump pushed to ban TikTok. This effort was framed as a national security measure. Concerns were raised that the app’s parent company, ByteDance, was sharing user data with the Chinese government, posing a threat to American citizens and government operations.

While these concerns were legitimate, critics argued the move was also a political maneuver. It allowed Trump to position himself as tough on China, appealing to his base and broader nationalistic sentiments during an election year. Few analysts considered that both can be true. Politics, particularly those surrounding a beloved video app, were too divisive.

2024: The Return of TikTok?

Fast forward to 2024, and the reported pivot to support TikTok’s return appears incongruous. The core issues cited in 2020—national security and data privacy—have not fundamentally changed. In fact, Americans better understand what it means to have sensitive personal data captured and potentially used for nefarious purposes by an adversary state. Highly contentious congressional testimony by the leaders of social media companies in 2024 only shined a further spotlight on how such firms do not work for the good of users.

Why then would President Trump seek to save the platform? One possible explanation is the platform’s immense popularity, particularly among younger demographics—a voting bloc Trump struggled to capture. Saving TikTok from the US Supreme Court’s ruling and ensuring its sale to an American firm could signal an attempt to appeal to these voters, making the move less about the app’s merits and more about electoral politics.

Is It about the Public Good?

President Trump’s changing perspective on TikTok may reveal a broader trend in modern politics—the prioritization of optics over substance. Leaders often take contradictory stances to align with prevailing public opinion or to cater to specific constituencies. In the case of TikTok, the narrative seems less about resolving genuine concerns and more about capitalizing on its cultural ubiquity. If national security was a pressing concern in 2020, the question remains why it would be any less urgent today.

Ironically, users fleeing from TikTok prior to its designated cutoff date did not flock to American social media platforms as some might expect, but other Chinese platforms similar to TikTok. It seems Americans are angrier and more concerned that Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat are manipulating them than anything the Chinese Communist Party may do. Whether this is the wisest choice is yet to be determined.

Political Rhetoric or Pragmatism?

Ultimately, the fluctuating stance on TikTok underscores the blurred line between political rhetoric and pragmatic governance. Decisions on complex issues like technology and national security require consistency and transparency, yet they are often reduced to tools for political gain. This is a bipartisan issue that was not invented by President Trump. It has a long tradition dating back to the early days of the Republic. In fact, it is endemic to democratic systems.

Whether Trump’s recent position reflects a genuine change of heart or strategic posturing, it highlights the broader issue of political inconsistency. Leaders across the political spectrum often adjust their positions based on electoral strategy rather than principle, yet accountability for these shifts is rare. For example, former Vice President Kamala Harris initially endorsed “Medicare for All” during the 2020 Democrat primary, only to later soften her stance to appeal to moderate voters. These shifts demonstrate how political beliefs are easily adjusted to maximize votes. Whether on healthcare, national security, or technology policy, such reversals can erode public trust if not clearly explained to the electorate.

The ultimate resolution of TikTok’s future will depend on whether the app is sold to an American firm, as President Trump has stipulated, or whether it continues operating without a sale. Given the heightened concerns over data security and foreign influence, a lack of clarity on this issue could further weaken public confidence. While political reversals are common, abrupt shifts without clear explanations can make leadership appear inconsistent or opportunistic. Greater transparency from President Trump regarding his rationale would not only provide insight into the decision-making process but could also help mitigate skepticism about his motivations. At a time when trust in government is already fragile, reinforcing accountability and open communication is critical to maintaining public confidence.

The TikTok saga serves as a reminder that political decisions, especially those framed as national security concerns, are often entangled with strategic interests. In an era where public trust in government is fragile, transparency and consistency are essential. Without them, shifting narratives risk further eroding confidence in leadership—not just on TikTok, but on the larger issues that shape democracy itself.

Offering further explanation into President Trump’s plan and thinking would give the American people a better understanding of the variables under consideration and could potentially assuage some of the speculation into his motivation. Democracies require open communication between the citizenry and their representatives. TikTok is an example of just that.

Justin Miller is Associate Professor of Practice in the School of Cyber Studies at the University of Tulsa.

TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.

America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.

There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.

President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.

An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.

This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.

American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.

Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.

Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.

These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Future of US-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.

The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains uncertain, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.

In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel launched Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.

This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.

Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos raided an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also captured Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.

Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran continues to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency stated that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.

However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.

Degraded Proxy Capabilities

In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.

Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.

Israeli operations significantly degraded Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian S-300s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.

Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire economic situation of the country as well as the increasing repression by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.

Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, energy shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.

That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.

Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the installation of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.

Iran’s foreign minister recently stated that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.

The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.

Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in minimal progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.

Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing options in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.

Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.

While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.

Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.

Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.

Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example of this malfeasance was the repeated use of the term fascism/fascist or Nazism/Nazi to refer to Donald J. Trump and his supporters. Among those raising this concern were disaffected officials from the first Trump presidency. For example, retired four-star general John F. Kelly, who served as Trump’s White House chief of staff, caught media attention by going public with warnings that Trump would try to govern as a dictator.

In addition, thirteen republicans who served in the first Trump administration released an open letter on October 25 charging that Trump’s disdain for the professional military and his admiration for autocrats would be dangerous for America. They contended, “The American people deserve a leader who won’t threaten to turn armed troops against them, won’t put his quest for power above their needs, and doesn’t idealize the likes of Adolf Hitler.”

The widespread use of the fascist moniker by Trump opponents, as well as the identification of Trump as an admirer of Hitler, substitutes emotional frustration for a nuanced appreciation of history and policy. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, the Nazi and fascist ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s cannot be replicated in 21st- century America. There are too many checks and balances in the American system of government to permit a fascist dictatorship or a similarly authoritarian system from taking root in the United States.

The geniuses who designed the American system of government dispersed power among three branches of the federal government and divided powers between the federal government and the states for a reason. The priority of values in the American political system favors liberty over efficiency. Admittedly the apparent inefficiency of government compared, say, to private business, is sometimes frustrating. But Americans instinctively mistrust centralized power as inimical to freedom, and history validates the prudence of that judgment.

Second, the character and training of the US professional officer corps would preclude the collaboration of the highest-ranking generals and admirals in subverting democracy. The graduates of American war colleges are steeped in the constitutional legitimacy that surrounds civil-military relations. An anti-democratic usurper demanding that the armed forces become partisan subordinates, as opposed to apolitical guardians of democracy, would meet with Pentagon resistance and, if necessary, refusal to carry out illegal orders.

Of course, complacency on the character of civil-military relations is never desirable; democracy must always be safeguarded against imminent dangers. But overstatement of American vulnerability to any single president or administration is distracting from more probable and immediate dangers and challenges.

First among these dangers is the relentless march of technology and its tendency to produce an elite of technocrats who exert indirect or direct control over public choice. When technocrats are in the private sector, they can influence public policy indirectly by leading successful corporations that make desirable consumer goods or other commodities.

On the other hand, when technocrats reside in government bureaucracies, their influence and power are not determined by market forces, but by law and government regulation. For most of the 20th century, the United States successfully balanced the creativity of the private business sector with the regulatory regimes of government bureaucracy. In the twenty-first century, this balance is at risk by bureaucracy in hyperdrive.

Aided by the explosion in new information technology, the federal bureaucracy now resembles Cheops’ pyramid and intrudes into every corner of American life. In turn, a more activist government is demanded by disgruntled interest groups or litigious citizens who take every grievance, real or imagined, into the local, state, or federal judicial system.

The result is a logjam of jurisprudential clutter and a never-ending cascade of regulations that dictate how Americans work, eat, sleep, drive, watch television, cook, and educate their children. A list of things that the government does not regulate would be harder to draw up than a list of things that the government controls directly or indirectly.

In short, mastery of advanced technology is a necessary condition for American national security and defense. On the other hand, technological micro-management of the American body politic can only depress innovation, discourage original thinking, and empower dysfunctional government controls over social and political life.

A second concern that both political parties need to address is the restructuring of the international political and economic system to the detriment of American leadership and security.  Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted a conclave of member states of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) plus some thirty other countries interested in joining or otherwise supporting the group. BRICS is explicitly designed to push back against the rules-based international order led by the US and its Western allies.

On the international security front, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the CRINKs) are acting in concert as system disrupters in support of aggression in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Iran and North Korea are providing explicit military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine, including ballistic missiles and drones.

North Korea has also begun sending troops to fight under Russian command in Ukraine.  China has moved into a more open military alliance with Russia, that includes joint war games and training exercises, including scenarios with forces that are potentially nuclear-capable.  Russia is confident that it can outlast Ukraine in manpower and war-related resources despite NATO support for Kiev. At the level of high diplomacy and statecraft, no recipe for a negotiated settlement of this war is on offer.

China continues to press forward its Belt and Road Initiative and other measures to dominate global trade and infrastructure development. As well, China apparently aspires to become a third global nuclear superpower, with forces essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia by 2035 or sooner.

A third concern that should occupy the attention of the next administration is the matrix of challenges to American and allied conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s gathering storm for a future strike against Taiwan, and Iran’s wars against Israel via proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, all point to a decline in respect for American power and a willingness to test American resolve by direct or indirect action.

In addition, Iran is already a threshold nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian bomb could set off a reaction among Middle Eastern countries that would make a serious dent in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen have diverted maritime commerce throughout the world and have evolved from a fledgling insurgency into a well-armed terrorist strike force capable of ballistic missile and drone attacks throughout the region.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the fate of the American strategic nuclear modernization program that was supported by the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations is now uncertain as to its timing and continuing support from Congress. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) component (Sentinel) of the nuclear triad faces scrutiny over its rising costs and delayed schedules. The possible collapse of the New START regime in 2026 could presage an open-ended nuclear arms race among China, Russia, and the US.

Other challenges to nuclear deterrence stability include developments in hypersonic offensive weapons, in advanced missile and air defenses, and in space and cyber weapons for deterrence or defense. Kinetic attacks on US space-based assets and cyberattacks against both military and civilian targets can be acts of aggression in themselves; or, on the other hand, they can be precursors for nuclear first strikes or for large-scale conventional offensives against American and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and infrastructure.

In short, (1) managing the balance between governmental and private-sector technology innovation; (2) steering the pivotal role of the United States in a more competitive international system; and (3) supporting credible conventional and nuclear deterrence against more ambitious regional actors and nuclear competitors provides a partial menu of priorities that should receive more attention from policymakers. Demagoguery’s day has passed. It is now time to govern for the betterment of the nation.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine.

The Wrong Agenda for Political Debates was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or win a possible war against a conventional NATO force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.

What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.

A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.

As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a conventional force sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.

Given Russia’s economic and strategic limitations, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the New Look Policy of the Eisenhower administration.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.

This year, outbreaks of antisemitism across American college campuses, including at the most elite private colleges and universities, remind commentators of the turbulent year 1968. That year was marked by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy, together with antiwar demonstrations at many colleges and riots at the Democrat National Convention in Chicago.

Some saw, in the upsurge of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations a possible prelude to a similar upheaval at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 2024. The Biden administration was under attack from its progressive wing and for its support of Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza.

Democrat doubters about the administration’s foreign policy were already worried about the polls showing Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump competitive against Vice President Kamala Harris in the seven key swing states of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And irony of ironies, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., was running as a third-party candidate who might conceivably take away votes from either Biden or Trump—eventually withdrawing and throwing his support to Trump.

In 1968, Democrat dissidents and message malaise opened the door for Richard Nixon to come back from the graveyard of politics and win the White House. Would the Democrat Party recreate that debacle in 2024 and usher Donald Trump into the presidency for a second term?

Unfortunately for political prognosticators, 2024 is only superficially reminiscent of 1968. Pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses are not catching fire with the public as did antiwar protests in 1968. To the contrary, college presidents are under siege from various quarters for not doing enough to resist outbreaks of antisemitism and pro-Hamas demonstrations.

Jewish students feel unsafe on many college campuses, and parents of college students began to file lawsuits against schools that refuse to enact policies that protect Jewish students against harassment. In addition, a majority of American voters support Biden’s policy of favoring Israel’s right to defend itself against attack, while sharing some reservations about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the war in Gaza. Not every criticism of Israel’s policy is antisemitism. As Israel moves toward the final stages of its campaign against Hamas, controversy will almost certainly surround its choice of military tactics and the costs of war for civilian noncombatants.

Given current events, the foreign policy center of gravity for the 2024 presidential campaign is not only the war in the Middle East, but also the war in Ukraine. The most recent tranche of American military assistance to Ukraine was held up in Congress by endless delays based on a variety of complaints from conservatives in the House. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, ended this deadlock by agreeing with a majority of Democrats to pass legislation providing aid to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine in separate bills.

For his anti-isolationist temerity, Johnson was threatened by his House Republican colleagues with a vote to vacate the speakership as soon as practicable. Some House Republicans gave as their reason for opposing Johnson the absence of a companion bill providing additional funding for controlling the southern border. However, the problem at the border is not a lack of funding, but a fundamental policy disagreement between the Biden administration and its critics about whether to enforce existing immigration law and or allow the near-free flow of illegal aliens to enter the country.

The war in Ukraine, on the other hand, is a fundamental test of American resolve to defend the international order based on rules and expectations that preserved security and freedom in Europe from the end of World War II until well into the twenty-first century. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is an overt attempt to overthrow a legitimate government in Europe, based on reading history through a glass darkly and on ambition to restore Russian greatness as seen by its clique of siloviki, oligarchs, and propagandists.

Apologists for Russia attribute its belligerence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post–Cold War expansion, the United States’ drive for unipolar dominance, and Ukraine’s illegitimacy as a unique culture and civilization. None of this may be true or original on the part of Russia. It is Aleksandr Dugin marinated in twenty-first century Moscow-centric geopolitics.

The tragedy is that Russia is a great civilization, with a history and culture that provided some of the world’s great literature, music, art, higher education, and excellence in professional military studies. Russia’s history is the story of an advanced civilization ruined by a succession of retro autocratic governments.

NATO has admirably rallied in the face of Russian military aggression by providing Ukraine with necessary military assistance, including weapons, intelligence, and training. But NATO has dragged this out to an extent that jeopardizes Ukraine’s ability to fight successfully even on the defensive, let alone on offense, for anything more ambitious than a military stalemate. Russia still hopes that an offensive before winter might turn the tide decisively against Ukraine—to the extent that the latter would have an insubstantial position for any post-conflict peace agreement.

Disparities between Russian and Ukrainian personnel- and military-related resources favor Russia as the war becomes more extended in time and space. Ukraine can only be saved by American and NATO firmness in the face of repeated threats of horizontal (extending military operations into NATO territory) or vertical (nuclear weapons) escalation. NATO’s combined gross domestic product is about thirty times that of Russia, but Russia has a far larger nuclear arsenal. Such problems all await the next president.

Therefore, the proper analogy is not between 2024 and 1968, but 2024 and 1938. Before the end of 1938, Germany had already crossed several red lines that anticipated an unlimited appetite for political coercion supported by the threat of military conquest. Then, as now, isolationists in the US and apologists for Hitler in Europe called for conciliation of Germany and appeasement of its demands. History never repeats itself exactly, as the saying goes, but it does rhyme.

The question for the United States and democratic Europe, now, as then, is not whether to resist aggression, but how and when. History suggests that tyrants’ appetite grows with the eating. The United States needs neither a return to its “unipolar moment” nor a willy-nilly reboot into forever wars among non-Western cultures. It does need to lead NATO’s resistance to Russia’s mistaken revanchism in Europe with smart strategy and politics until the climate improves for a viable peace settlement.

With regard to wars in the Middle East, the United States and its allies must also confront the foreboding reality of Iran’s wars against Israel, the United States, and the international order.

Iran’s instigation of Hamas’ attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, together with its support for proxy attacks on Israel and American troops elsewhere (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-supported terrorists in Iraq and Syria) has thus far met with less than intimidating responses. In addition to these failures in US and allied conventional deterrence, Iran is now a threshold nuclear weapons state potentially capable of threatening its immediate neighbors and targets outside the region.

An Iranian bomb could also stimulate Saudi Arabia and other Middle East powers to follow suit and destabilize the region. In addition, a nuclear Iran might pass nuclear materials and know-how to proxies for the construction of so-called dirty bombs or suitcase nukes. A nuclear Iran can destabilize the Middle East without firing a nuclear weapon.

Tehran can use the bomb for coercive diplomacy against Israel and other enemies, including threats of nuclear first use in response to any losses in a conventional war. In this respect, as well, 2024 may resemble 1938. Imagine Hitler with the bomb in 1938. A strategy of appeasement would have been far more appealing to political leaders in Britain and France, and a posture of isolationism to Americans—compared to what actually happened. Iran must be stopped by political negotiation or other means before it crosses this Rubicon.

Whether the world’s worst fears are recognized in the years ahead, as they were in and after 1938, or whether conflict is avoided will likely result, in large part, from the actions of the next president. This is a daunting future for either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD is a distinguished professor at Pennsylvania State University—Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the authors own.  

It’s 1938, not 1968 was originally published on Global Security Review.

While this is a welcome comment from the former president, it is not a new argument to have a Space National Guard. This argument, however, was much maligned, mocked, and ignored for years. Lately, much reporting on the topic is misinformation that confuses both the American people and Congress.

Many who oppose the Space National Guard wrongly believe that space defense is a strictly federal mission. They believe the Guard’s deployable space operations, a function since the 1990s, and the nearly 300 years of the Guard’s legal and constitutional role does not justify a Guard element for Space Force. They argue that bypassing the constitutional framework and the law of the land, which requires a governor’s consent on decisions regarding their state guard forces, is a “one off.”

If the federal government is allowed to eliminate the role of governors, this would set a dangerous precedent. During congressional testimony, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendell discussed a legislative proposal that would do just that and suggested that going around the law “is not a big deal” and that National Guard is “an artifact of history.” Legislation requiring the support and inclusion of governors is not supported by Kendell.

The opponents of the Space National Guard repeat questionable arguments to confuse and distract the American people and Congress. The false arguments are many.

First, they claim a Space National Guard will result in increased and unsustainable costs and bureaucracy that are not supported by the Space Force and Air Force. This is false as documented by no less than six studies by the Department of the Air Force that supported a Space National Guard.

Five of these studies were deliberately withheld from Congress by actors external to the Pentagon. Importantly, these studies proved that the costs of establishing a space guard are insignificant because the existing budget will transfer from one line of accounting to another. They also dispute the findings of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study (2020) that did not use actual Air Force and National Guard budget data points to project the cost of establishing a Space National Guard.

Shockingly, the CBO did not interview anyone from the National Guard Bureau, the individual state guard components, or the Department of the Air Force’s working groups when it conducted the study. In truth, no additional bureaucracy is needed to establish the Space Guard because the staff support and operational squadrons already exist in the Air National Guard and would transfer into the Space National Guard.

Second, detractors argue that states do not need a Space Guard for the limited protection of individual states. This is a mistaken perspective because the National Guard is the nation’s primary combat-reserve force—regardless of operating domain—and has been since 1636. It delivers strategic and operational depth to the nation. It is a lower cost alternative to the larger and more expensive federal force. For example, most of the nation’s air sovereignty mission is owned by the Air National Guard because the threat to American air space is not constant.

It is also important to remember that the states are dependent upon space systems for their domestic emergency operations and the capabilities of the National Guard are leveraged for events like wildfires, earthquakes, floods, and others. Space systems are linked to critical infrastructure and therefore fall into the state roles and missions for homeland security. Those who want to use the opportunity to consolidate military space power at the federal level ignore these realities.

Third, the military must have the support of the American people when it is time to go to war. The National Guard, by design, provides a clear and deep connection with the American citizenry. Support for a robust Space National Guard is vital if the nation is to field the force required to win in a time of war. Connecting main streets across the nation with space defense cannot occur through a single component service and the absorption of what is rightfully National Guard capability into the federal military.

The talking points used by Space National Guard opponents are fundamentally misleading and fail to acknowledge the immediate readiness costs associated with taking Air National Guard space units away from their respective states and governors. Keep in mind, about 80 percent of Guard personnel surveyed suggested that they will not transfer to the US Space Force unless there is a Space National Guard. All 50 governors oppose the removal of the space missions from the National Guard.

If opponents of a Space National Guard succeed, units and capabilities will become ineffective. Enormous experience will be lost from the loss of personnel. The Department of Defense will then have to fund recruiting and training efforts for the Space Force to rebuild that capability. Those who oppose the Space National Guard leave out that this would cost taxpayers at least $1 billion. Former President Trump, NGAUS, and all 50 state governors are correct; the Space National Guard should exist as the “primary combat reserve of the US Space Force.”

National Defense Authorization Act language should not ignore the states and their governors. It is time to establish a Space National Guard.

Christopher Stone is senior fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The thoughts, opinions, and statements are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Department of Defense.

Correcting the Record on the Space National Guard was originally published on Global Security Review.

Throughout his first term, Trump consistently emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons to national security. He viewed nuclear modernization as essential to maintaining military superiority, often stating that the United States must have the strongest nuclear arsenal in the world. In a 2017 interview, Trump said, “We have to be the top of the pack,” signaling his commitment to nuclear dominance.

Trump’s push for nuclear modernization culminated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which highlighted the need to revitalize the nuclear triad—comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers. The NPR called for developing low-yield nuclear warheads, modernizing aging delivery systems, and investing in new nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure. These initiatives reflected Trump’s belief that a robust and credible nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of national security.

Policies and Actions During Trump’s First Term

Trump’s nuclear policies were characterized by a blend of assertiveness and unpredictability. He withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing Russian violations, and signaled reluctance to renew the New START Treaty without significant changes such as adding China to the treaty. While these actions were criticized by some as undermining arms control efforts, they were consistent with Trump’s view that the United States should not be constrained by treaties that he perceived as one-sided or outdated.

Under Trump, the Pentagon pursued the development of new nuclear capabilities, including the W76-2 low-yield warhead, which was deployed on Ohio-class submarines. This move was intended to provide the US with more flexible and credible deterrence options, particularly against regional adversaries. Trump also supported the development of the Sentinel ICBM to replace the aging Minuteman III.

However, Trump’s approach to nuclear deterrence also included moments of brinkmanship and unpredictability. His “fire and fury” rhetoric toward North Korea and his famous twitter threat that “I too have a nuclear button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my button works!” underscored his willingness to use the threat of nuclear force as a means of coercion.

While these statements alarmed many, they also demonstrated Trump’s belief in the deterrent value of projecting strength and unpredictability. Ultimately, perceptions of Trump’s nuclear rhetoric varied—some saw it as inflammatory, others as necessary to exercise strength and resolve—but the fact remains that during his administration, the US avoided major conflicts.

 The Role of Trump’s National Security Advisors

Trump’s national security advisors played a crucial role in shaping his nuclear policy during his administration and are likely to continue to do so moving forward. Looking ahead, a potential Trump administration is already seeing a contest for top national security positions, with figures like Richard Grenell and Elbridge Colby emerging as frontrunners for the role of National Security Advisor. Grenell is known for his staunch “America First” stance and his confrontational style, which aligns closely with Trump’s preferences. Colby, a former senior Pentagon official, is a strong advocate for focusing military efforts on countering China, potentially signaling a shift in priorities away from Europe.

The selection of these advisors would likely shape Trump’s nuclear policy in significant ways, emphasizing a hardline stance on China, a push for further nuclear modernization, and a continuation of the “America First” doctrine that marked his first term. As Trump’s potential return to the White House looms, the advisors he chooses will play a pivotal role in determining how the US navigates the complex landscape of nuclear deterrence and global security.

What Could a Second Trump Term Mean for Nuclear Deterrence?

If Trump were to return to the White House, it is likely that his administration would continue to prioritize nuclear modernization. The Sentinel program, the development of the Columbia-class submarine, and the enhancement of NC3 infrastructure would likely remain top priorities. Additionally, Trump could seek to further expand the nuclear arsenal quantitatively and qualitatively, potentially fielding new nuclear weapons, such as sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or new low-yield options.

A second Trump term could also see a continuation of his assertive approach to arms control. Trump may push for more stringent terms in any potential arms control agreements, or he could further distance the US from existing treaties if he perceives them as constraining American capabilities. This approach could lead to increased tensions with China and Russia, potentially sparking a new arms race, or it could be the exact prescription required for effective arms control.

At the same time, Trump’s willingness to engage in high-stakes diplomacy, exemplified by his dealings with North Korea, indicates he might pursue similar approaches with other nuclear-armed adversaries. However, the unpredictability that defined his first term could heighten the risk of miscalculation or escalation, especially in nuclear crises, or it could be that it just happens to induce a proper amount of fear that the adversary effectively backs down or ceases operations. Ultimately, Trump’s unpredictability serves as a tool to instill fear and uncertainty in adversaries, keeping them cautious and off-balance.

 Conclusion

 A second Trump presidency could bring renewed momentum to US nuclear deterrence and modernization efforts. Trump’s first term demonstrated a clear commitment to revitalizing America’s nuclear arsenal, recognizing its crucial role in maintaining national security. His administration prioritized the development of modern capabilities, ensuring the nuclear triad remains credible and effective.

Trump’s focus on nuclear superiority aligns with his “America First” doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of military strength in securing peace and stability. By continuing to push for advanced nuclear technologies and modernized infrastructure, a second Trump term could restore America’s position as the world’s foremost nuclear power. A second Trump presidency, therefore, could enhance American nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the arsenal remains a potent force for peace and stability in an increasingly complex global landscape for years to come.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

What Nuclear Deterrence Might Look Like Under a Second Trump Presidency was originally published on Global Security Review.

Vice President Kamala Harris certainly grasps the fact that voters respond to promise that their cost of living will come down, but they rarely understand the implication for the economy of government intervention. Harris’ calls for price controls on drugs and groceries and promises of tax cuts for the poor or benefits increases fails to explain how and who will pay for them.

At the same time, Donald Trump’s call for 10 percent tariffs on all imports and 60 percent tariffs on Chinese goods, plus his threat to deport many of the estimated 20 million illegal aliens currently in the United States, not only amounts to higher prices, but it will devastate the agricultural, restaurant, construction, and hospitality industries. It is certainly not a free trader perspective. Thus, neither party’s perspective offers a clear path to growth, offsetting tax hikes, like tariffs, or increased federal revenue with which to pay for all the benefits they are offering.

Since the US is both the principal and ultimate arbiter of international order, whose power rests on the sound management of its economy, both examples of this illiteracy endanger not just the American economy, but that of other states around the world. Worse yet, these examples of misconceived economic thinking come at a time when international challenges are rapidly multiplying. Indeed, bipartisan reports describe the American military as increasingly maladapted to contemporary and future threats.

These reports underscore the urgent need for comprehensive modernization, recapitalization, and increases of both conventional and nuclear arsenals due to mounting challenges from the axis of authoritarianism: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Indeed, even the Biden administration, which cannot be accused of partiality towards nuclear weapons, has stated the need for modernization and investment in newer and more nuclear weapons and, recently, went so far as to alter nuclear employment guidance.

At the same time, Americans have equally urgent domestic pressures that must be seriously addressed but are not discussed. These include the need to reduce deficits, ensure long-term non-inflationary growth, increase the labor participation rate, maintain technological leadership, reform and simplify the tax code, and apply existing immigration law while determining if new laws are needed. Yet nobody is seriously raising these domestic issues let alone addressing the fact that a strong economy is needed to address defense challenges—and build the military needed.

For example, neither campaign mentioned that servicing the national debt, for the first time in history, exceeded defense spending in 2024. This fact represents an unmistakable sign of decline and is a canary in the coal mine that the nation must reduce domestic redistribution programs while also carefully employing military force when absolutely necessary.

Neither should a response to these challenges lead the nation, as some Republicans argue, into a new unilateralism that would isolate the US from its allies and lead to further chaos. Nor can the nation afford a progressive policy of ever greater spending on redistribution programs—without paying for them.

Both sets of delusional thinking ultimately bring about the worst of all possible outcomes. Americans will find themselves with a greater probability of war and lower economic growth.

It is time both campaigns’ economic policies are subjected to tougher scrutiny by the media and voters. They must be persuaded, if not compelled, by the exigencies of politics, to explain how they will pay for future needs, balance the budget, and confront well-known challenges.

This requirement should apply to defense modernization as well. If history is any guide, only a serious threat to the nation motivates government and industry to mobilize capability for the required defense buildup. The bipartisan reports, mentioned above, clearly suggest the United States is facing a similar threat to that faced by imperial Japan and Nazi Germany before World War II began.

Vice President Harris and former President Trump must address questions going far beyond the partisan bickering that is endemic of this election. Perhaps the September 10 presidential debate will offer some clarity on important issues.

Commentators suggest that this election is about generational change. This, however, is no guarantee that change is for the better. Eastern Europe experienced great change after 1945, but it was decidedly for the worse.

Thinking strategically about medium- and long-term challenges and consequences is imperative. The abiding delusion that American prosperity, world leadership, and security is unending and self-sustaining deserves a much more rigorous evaluation. The nation may very well be standing on a precipice, and it will be the next president who either pulls the nation back or sends it over the edge. Let’s hope it is the former.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Our Delusional Presidential Campaigns was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cirincione begins his article, “President Joe Biden has a terrible nuclear policy. A re-elected President Donald Trump’s would be much worse.” President Trump, should he win, will likely follow the path of every new president since 1994 and conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, and, like the last three presidents, follow a path that reflects the threat facing the United States. Until something concrete takes place, Cirincione is merely speculating by attributing the plan of some conservative organizations, Project 2025, to Donald Trump.

Cirincione also willfully misrepresents the record of the Biden administration when he writes that Biden has “authorized the largest nuclear weapons budgets since the Cold War.” This suggests President Biden supports nuclear weapons. The Biden Nuclear Posture Review called for the retirement of the B-83, the nation’s only megaton class nuclear capability. Biden also proposed canceling the sea launched cruise missile-nuclear (SLCM-N) and eliminating the nuclear hedge. Neither of these efforts are the actions of a man who supports the nuclear arsenal. Biden, however, had the misfortune of dealing with a reality that was inconsistent with his ideology, something that is never a problem for disarmament groups because they have no responsibility to protect the country.

Cirincione claims that Trump’s nuclear policy is informed by the “new conservative manifesto Project 2025.” When Trump was recently asked about Project 2025 he said that he has never heard of it. He even went on Truth Social to write, “I know nothing about Project 2025.” This is certainly not something Trump would lie about. Trump is, in fact, relying on a small number of officials from his first administration for advice and guidance. He does not need the Heritage Foundation or any other think tanks to tell him what to think.

Understood for what it says, rather than the conspiratorial insinuations of many progressives, Project 2025’s nuclear arsenal related proposals are largely accurate and well-reasoned. An honest assessment of the coming decade clearly indicates a need to expand the American nuclear arsenal to counter a growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capability. When Cirincione writes, “These proposals [from Project 2025] would add unnecessary new weapons to an already expansive nuclear arsenal” he is merely denying the reality facing the United States.

This country is already well behind Russia in the size and capability of its nuclear arsenal and will fall behind China within a decade. The United States will soon face three autocratic regimes with a collective arsenal several times greater than the American arsenal.

Cirincione goes on to criticize every nuclear policy prescription in Project 2025, suggesting that none are necessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to his critique, prioritizing nuclear weapons programs over other defense programs is a wise move. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of American defense policy—ensuring that adversaries think twice before considering aggressive action against the United States.

Interestingly, Cirincione fails to acknowledge that former President Barack Obama made an agreement with the US Senate in 2010 in which the Senate agreed to ratify New START in return for modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden all honored this agreement in the main, even if they sought change on the margins.

Cirincione even goes so far as to criticize modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and production complex. This is not a radical move but a sensible effort that was needed decades ago. The desire of Joe Cirincione and other disarmament advocates to allow the nuclear weapons complex to atrophy into obsolescence is a dangerous path that only wealthy idealists with tall fences can contemplate. It is only because of three decades of neglect that Americans are now forced to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad.

In other words, Joe Cirincione and his fellow travelers in the disarmament community advocated for the actions that led the nation down the path it is now on. Today, both Republican and Democrat administrations recognize the trouble facing the nation, even as disarmament advocates complain about efforts to fix the problems they helped create. It is simply an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect at work.

Tying Donald Trump to Project 2025 and vilifying both is an effort to obfuscate and avoid having a substantive discussion about the nuclear breakout of China, Russia’s nuclear threats, and other meaningful issues that challenge the mantra of the disarmament community.

What is perhaps most disappointing is just how far the Bulletin has fallen. Rather than engaging in meaningful discussion on nuclear issues, the journal is increasingly publishing articles that read more like an excerpt from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks or Herbert Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” They, like Cirincione’s own article, seem more interested in advancing the radical ideology of modern-day Marxists than having a fact-based debate over the role of nuclear weapons in national security. This penchant for the absurd makes it hard to take a once-conscientious publication and its contributors seriously.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Joe Cirincione is Wrong about Donald Trump was originally published on Global Security Review.