China’s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial inputs for products used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over the supply chains of these critical minerals is becoming a key aspect of geopolitical rivalry. 

Much of this competition is focused on Africa, which holds about 30 percent of the world’s mineral reserves. China has already secured dominant positions in essential parts of these supply chains, recognizing the strategic importance of controlling access to these critical resources. 

China produces nearly 70 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals, and has reinforced this position through deliberate efforts to control every stage of the critical mineral supply chain. This process begins long before extraction, with Chinese banks and engineering firms securing involvement. Beijing then extends that control to the project’s end, pairing ownership of mines with ownership of the railways, roads, and ports through which these materials move. The result is a supply system in which China extracts, refines, and exports minerals from Africa which ensures that, in many cases, raw materials move on Chinese terms. 

China’s dominance in the rare earth mineral trade stems from its strategic approach to mineral supply chains, not just profit. This allows Beijing to maintain long-term control of mines during economic downturns. This is a luxury that profit-driven Western competitors do not have. Chinese firms enter the market fully prepared and offers financing, workforce, equipment, and logistics that often gain significant control over project execution from the start. This strategy has helped Beijing achieve “processing dominance,” meaning control over the refining system to the point that winning a mining contract in Africa does not ensure independence from Chinese supply chains. Although China produces only about 10 percent of the world’s lithium, cobalt, and copper, it controls roughly 40-90 percent of the refining capacity for these materials. Therefore, a Western company extracting ore in sub-Saharan Africa has not truly succeeded if the ore must be processed through a Chinese refinery. For the United States, this distinction has far-reaching consequences beyond market competition. 

The U.S. is highly exposed to supply chain disruption risks because critical minerals have uses that extend far beyond consumer products. They are key components of systems essential to national defense, including F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles, and more. The U.S. maintains only one domestic rare earth mine, possesses minimal refining infrastructure, and relies on China for 70% of rare earth imports. Expanding domestic mining and refining capacity requires significant capital investment and highly specialized expertise, limiting the speed at which domestic production can realistically offset exposure risks. The result is a situation in which the U.S. defense industrial base is significantly dependent on a strategic adversary for materials it cannot easily replace, and which are essential to the production and sustainment of advanced military capabilities. 

The risks of relying on a strategic adversary like China for materials vital to American national security are clearly shown by the China–Japan Rare Earths dispute of 2010. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships in the East China Sea, leading to the arrest and detention of the boat’s captain. In reaction, the Chinese government stopped exporting critical minerals to Japan. Tokyo, which depended on Beijing for nearly 90 percent of its rare earth mineral imports, saw prices for these goods rise nearly 10-fold in the year after the incident. Although the United States and Japan are in different positions within global supply chains, Japan’s experience demonstrates the broader strategic dangers that arise when a country becomes heavily dependent on a geopolitical rival for key resources. 

The coercive value of rare earth dominance lies not only in China’s ability to deny access but also in the threat of disruption. Even the possibility of export restrictions can drive price volatility, delay industrial production, complicate defense procurement, and undermine long-term investment planning. Japan’s response to the 2010 dispute reveals that dependency on rare earth elements is not unavoidable. Japan’s proactive approach included investing in recycling technologies, developing alternative materials, diversifying supply chains through overseas mining projects in Australia and other countries, and building stockpiles to secure reserves. As a result, Tokyo reduced its reliance on Chinese rare earths by about 30 percent, demonstrating that policy actions can yield tangible results. More broadly, Japan’s experience underscores a key truth of modern strategic competition: dependence on an adversary for vital materials can create vulnerabilities that go beyond economics. Washington and its partners should take notice. 

Holden Johansen is an independent researcher focused on geopolitical security risks. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Miami University and completed coursework in European Politics and Security at the Danish Institute for Study Abroad in Copenhagen. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

China’s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

The national security strategy outlines the president’s strategic vision and serves as the closest approximation to a U.S. grand strategy. It orients the POTUS’ goals and associated efforts in foreign and defense policy within the executive branch and informs Congress of the POTUS’ priorities and direction. The NSS declares what is important to America—its national interests, goals, and priorities—and emphasizes how the President envisions the use of America’s diplomatic, informational, economic, military, and technological instruments of power to achieve or service those interests. The 2025 National Security Strategy is not the most comprehensive ever produced; that distinction belongs to the President’s first NSS in 2017.

The 2025 NSS identifies three core national interests that collectively shape U.S. strategy. First, it is the “balance of power,” which focuses on U.S. security and emphasizes preventing any rival from gaining regional or global dominance that could threaten U.S. sovereignty or freedom of action. Second, a predisposition to non-interventionism, which reflects a desire to limit U.S. involvement in long-lasting or discretionary foreign wars, emphasizing restraint, burden-sharing, and deterrence over “fruitless ‘nation-building’ wars.” Third, economic security, a key strategic goal, which requires the United States to maintain its position as the world’s leading economy through balanced trade, secure access to essential resources, reindustrialization, energy security, and mutually beneficial economic ties with other countries. Collectively, these interests reveal a strategy that prioritizes American strength and strategic stability over “forever wars,” while recognizing that economic vitality and security are inseparable from national power.

Only a strong nuclear deterrent will ensure these core national interests are both protected and advanced. The core idea of 2025 NSS is “peace through strength,” asserting credible military power and the fear it projects as the best safeguard against conflict amid geopolitical turbulence and great-power competition. This NSS espouses a more realist disposition, unapologetically relying on deterrence to project strength in a world fraught with nuclear weapon expansion. President Reagan reminded us in 1986 that “Nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other.”

The 2025 NSS clearly states on page three, “We want the world’s most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent.” This is the engine of a U.S. balance of power policy—acting to prevent other states or coalitions of states from achieving dominant power over the U.S., thereby maintaining a balance between stability and security. Moreover, the NSS emphasizes that deterrence depends on maintaining U.S. military “overmatch.” An abundant, modern, and resilient nuclear arsenal not only provides the military advantage sought but also does so at a lower cost than a conventionally armed force with equivalent destructive capability.

Next, instead of open-ended overseas wars or nation-building, the 2025 NSS frames military engagement as justified only when U.S. core interests are directly threatened. This predisposition to non-interventionism requires maximum deterrence strategies to prevent regional conflicts from escalating into large-scale wars that could “come to our shores, [which] is bad for American interests.”

Moreover, empowering and enabling allies and partners—removing imperial perceptions of American behavior—by letting them lead, investing in their capabilities, and treating them as co-architects rather than subcontractors signals that America is not trying to dominate outcomes but to share responsibility. This creates economic value through burden sharing and arms sales, while fostering an equally shared commitment to security goals and deterrence. Capacity building is not short-sighted; it is a long-term investment in partnerships that advance the balance of power without relying solely on American taxpayers.

The 2025 NSS further stresses that economic security and vitality—one of President Trump’s central goals—requires a sustained focus on deterrence to prevent war in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. By creating the strategic space for economic expansion, successful deterrence enables reinvestment in the very capabilities that preserve it. This dynamic not only offers a long-term sustainment pathway for America’s nuclear deterrent force but also reinforces deterrence as the essential buffer between competition and conflict.

Finally, the NSS contends that durable deterrence rests as much on economic and technological dominance as on military power. By preserving America’s lead in high-tech innovation, increasing its industrial capacity, ensuring energy dominance, and securing reliable access to critical minerals, the United States reduces adversaries’ incentives to challenge it militarily while incentivizing a realignment of countries toward U.S. interests. At the same time, the strategy underscores that economic strength alone is insufficient; it must be coupled with a military that is rigorously recruited, trained, equipped, and modernized to remain the world’s most lethal and technologically advanced deterrent force, protecting U.S. interests and preventing conflict.

The 2025 NSS is far from “business as usual.” It embraces sovereignty, fairness, and balance of power, asserting that peace rests on strength—not wishful thinking, unchecked interventionism, or self-imposed restraint. The strategy states that “in the long term, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict,” thereby framing deterrence not simply as a matter of nuclear or conventional force posture, but as the cumulative product of industrial capacity, innovation, and sustained national investment. Within this logic lies a clear call to expand and emplace a robust, modern, flexible, and resilient nuclear arsenal capable of deterring nuclear attack, averting major war, and safeguarding America’s national interests.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Views expressed in this article are his own.

The Case for Deterrence: What the 2025 NSS Gets Right was originally published on Global Security Review.

Washington’s Return to Central Asia

 For the past two decades, Central Asia—comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—has largely remained on the margins of U.S. foreign policy. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed the region not as a battlefield, but as a quiet buffer zone separating Russia, China, and Iran. That perception, however, is changing. The war in Ukraine, the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, and the reemergence of ‘bloc politics’ have convinced U.S. strategists that the stability of this region will shape not only Eurasia’s future, but also the architecture of the emerging world order.

This renewed engagement can be seen as a redefinition of the C5+1 initiative that began under the Biden administration but is now being pursued under Trump with a distinctly economic and commercial tone. The difference lies in emphasis: rather than promoting liberal values, Washington’s new approach prioritizes industrial cooperation, transit corridors, and competition over critical mineral resources.

Washington no longer relies on hard containment. Instead, it is adopting what American policy circles call ‘smart containment’: a strategy of weaving economic, technological, and logistical interdependence that constrains Russian and Chinese influence without a military presence. Central Asia can become a strategic lever for Washington by positioning itself against Russia through reducing export routes dependent on Moscow and reshaping energy transport networks. For China, Central Asia can compete in the extraction and processing of vital minerals, which are the backbone of batteries, clean energy, and advanced technologies.

 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Washington’s two Strategic Anchors

The United States engages Central Asia through two key partners: Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and the world’s main uranium producer, has become increasingly attractive to the Trump administration, and Uzbekistan, with its central location and sizable population. Investments by major U.S. companies like GE, Wabtec, and Microsoft represent more than industrial partnerships. They are part of Washington’s broader efforts to build non-Chinese supply chains, integrating the region into networks that bypass Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Central Asian republics are now seeking to act independently. Kazakhstan, for instance, blocked the deployment of Wagner Group forces near its borders in 2023 and declined to deepen its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan, for its part, has introduced new foreign investment reforms designed to limit its dependence on China. The region’s leaders have now learned that diversification, not dependence, is the true safeguard of sovereignty and survival in an increasingly competitive Eurasian landscape.

Trump’s recent summit with Central Asian leaders carried significant political weight.  Kazakhstan’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords marks the first formal linkage between the Middle East and the Eurasian security architectures. Further, Kazakhstan recently signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. Company Wabtec Corporation to supply 300 locomotives over the next decade. Central Asia holds vast reserves of strategic minerals such as lithium, copper, and uranium that the U.S. can capitalize on.

Washington at a Crossroads: Containment or Partnership

Central Asia’s renewed importance for the United States stems from its position at the intersection of three major global trends: competition for vital resources, the restructuring of supply chains, and the emergence of a multipolar world order. This realization has prompted Washington to return to the heart of Eurasia after two decades of relative disengagement. Still, Washington will have to decide on a long-term strategy for diplomacy in Central Asia.

Today, Washington faces a choice between two approaches in Central Asia. The first is a containment-oriented strategy, viewing Central Asia primarily as a tool to counter China and Russia. The second is a partnership-oriented approach, focusing on infrastructure, technology, and sustainable development, which could help transform Central Asia into a genuine partner in the emerging global order.

Kazakhstan’s multi-alignment strategy, Turkmenistan’s neutrality, and Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach signal efforts to navigate between competing powers. If these dynamics are guided by a cooperative mindset, Central Asia could transform from a backyard of disparate states to a bridge between major powers. However, if the competition continues under a zero-sum logic, the history of Cold War competition risks repeating itself in a new guise.

By embracing a cooperative strategy that recognizes the region’s strategic autonomy and prioritizes economic diversification and technological cooperation, Washington could move beyond the traditional containment mindset. In doing so, it could play a constructive role in shaping a new Eurasian order grounded in soft power, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

The most significant avenue of cooperation between Pakistan and the US in recent years was counterterrorism. Despite diplomatic challenges, Pakistan facilitated American counterterrorism efforts time and again. The arrest and extradition of the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) terrorist, Sharifullah, the man behind the August 26, 2021, attack on the US Marines, highlights the significance of the US-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership. This cooperation, between CIA and Pakistan’s intelligence services over Sharifullah’s capture, who was accused of planning the Abbey Gate bombing at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, serves as a reminder for the Trump administration that Pakistan remains central to the US counterterrorism efforts.

The provision of security assistance to the Trump administration could be Pakistan’s strategic move, but its long-term cooperation with the US depends largely on shared interests and mutual trust. In this regard, past experience demonstrates that security cooperation alone does not ensure a viable long-term partnership. For a sustainable relationship, security collaboration must be complemented by economic partnership, technological exchanges, and diplomatic engagement. Otherwise, history might repeat itself as a sporadic pattern of bilateral interaction.

While formal alliance and strategic partnership may not be on the table, Pakistan and the US could tap into potential areas of cooperation. This is especially true in key areas of mutual benefit like critical minerals and information technology (IT).

Sharifullah’s arrest serves as a reminder that Pakistan and the United States will remain intertwined in a need-based relationship when it comes to counterterrorism. As terrorism surges regionally, and as the Islamic State (IS) and its regional factions continue to function as the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, Pakistan will remain crucial to global counterterrorism efforts. However, intelligence sharing with the US could become a double-edged sword, exposing Pakistan to retaliatory attacks. Therefore, a robust, well-fashioned, and coordinated counterterrorism strategy must be pursued by both states to mitigate the menace of terrorist attacks.

Besides cooperation in counterterrorism, both Pakistan and the US are collaborating to serve economic interests of each state. Pakistan is a large export destination for the US.  The US also invests in Pakistan’s key sectors like energy and technology. However, President Trump’s desire to balance trade could undermine Pakistan’s exports. Uncertainty regarding the US-Pakistan Green Alliance—the climate resilience initiative—highlight differences between the current administration and its predecessor.

To broaden the bandwidth of relations between Pakistan and the US beyond security issues, Pakistan needs to diversify its exports market away from textiles. Investment in Pakistan’s mining sector could provide the US with a chance to have access to critical minerals for its products, while reducing its dependency on China for supply of critical minerals. Given considerable untouched mineral resources, Pakistan could offer a stable supply of critical minerals.

Given Pakistan’s stable supply chain, investment in Pakistan’s mining sector could be cost effective for the US. However, the United States ignores such an opportunity, carrying out resource planning without considering Pakistan. As the US negotiates with Ukraine for critical mineral mining rights, it is wise to keep Pakistan in mind. The trade dispute with China makes such an approach a particularly good idea. Given the much lower labor cost in Pakistan than in Australia or Canada, Pakistan’s untapped mineral wealth could be a boon for the United States beyond rare.

Since World War II, Pakistan has enjoyed significant benefits from American educational opportunities like the Fulbright program. The US government, through its educational exchange programs, brings almost 800 Pakistanis to the United States every year in pursuit of knowledge and cultural exchange. This strengthens people-to-people ties and nurtures enduring Pakistan-US relations.

However, the suspension of US Agency for International Development (USAID) programs and the unilateral imposition of sanctions on Pakistan’s state-owned National Development Complex (NDC) undermine the stability of Pakistan-US relations. Policies that isolate key partners prove counterproductive, especially when global security challenges demand multilateral cooperation. To maintain stability in South Asia and beyond, the US must adopt policies that strengthen rather than weaken its relations with Pakistan.

Pakistan-US ties are shaped by a complex interplay of collaboration, alignment, and friction. To ensure stable relations, a comprehensive strategy that encompasses diplomatic, security, economic, and regional issues must be formulated. The future of Pakistan-US relations can be more fruitful if commercial and economic matters take precedence over security concerns.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

Pak-US relations: Areas of Engagement beyond Security Cooperation was originally published on Global Security Review.