The existing US-led hub-and-spoke alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally different than the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the 1950s the US investigated the possibility of establishing a regional multilateral alliance, but this soon proved infeasible. Unable to forge a Northeast Asian equivalent to NATO at the onset of the Cold War, the US opted instead for the “hub-and-spoke” architecture, where the spokes radiate out from Washington in a network of asymmetrical ties reinforcing American regional dominance. Why?

First, compared to Europe, the Asia-Pacific has very little history of multilateral institutions and alliance formation. Modern European states have a history of doing so dating back well before the Treaty of Westphalia was established in 1648. European sovereign political systems emerged out of Westphalia; Europe came to develop different notions of international community and international order, based, in part, on the concept of international law. Asia did not have such a tradition of legalistic international agreements.

Second, geography also plays a significant role in the nature of warfare, and therefore the ability of countries to come to one another’s aid. European nations border each other, but they do so in a land context. As such, not only is it easier to move around troops and military equipment, but it is faster.

The nature of geography and distance also inform countries’ threat perceptions. NATO continues to endure because of a shared common adversary—Russia. Countries neighbor each other, making for an easily delineated bloc. The distances between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are formidable compared to Europe. Moreover, the sheer size of China, and the formidable military power of Japan, made it harder for smaller competitors to balance against them.

There were some attempts at bridging East and West. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was established because of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty. It included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the US and was designed to curb the spread of communism in Asia. A major reason SEATO failed and was disbanded in 1977 was because there was a lack of a common threat perception.

What did survive was the U.S. hub-and-spoke system: the US-Japan alliance as a means of curbing any potential regional Japanese aggression after World War II, the US- South Korea alliance to protect South Korea from a North Korean invasion, and the US alliance with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) to protect both nations from perceived threats of communist invasion by China and Indonesia.

Central and critical to the credibility of any alliance system is how it deters conflict. This is arguably much harder to achieve in a multilateral alliance than in the current hub-and-spoke system. Conventional deterrence in the Asian maritime theater is difficult. The most significant work on conventional deterrence was done by John Mearsheimer. However, Mearsheimer’s analysis may be persuasive for eras preceding the development of nuclear weapons, but the pre-nuclear era did not involve missiles. His analysis was based on a European land context, not an Asian maritime context. As such, thinking on conventional deterrence is incomplete.

There are significant logistical challenges that come with trying to establish a multilateral alliance system in Asia. Tasks include the need to ensure the prompt replenishment of destroyed combat ships, establish defensive perimeters for fleet support, and ensure the safety of fleet replenishment oilers and dry cargo/ammunition supply ships, just to name a few.

Budget constraints brought on by sequestration (2013), coupled with longer-term financial uncertainty, was raising questions about the US Navy’s Military Sealift Command and its combat logistics force more than a decade ago. Europe was, and remains, one single geostrategic entity connected by an excellent road network. In the Asia-Pacific, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are more dispersed, with neutral and non-aligned states between them, not to mention a growing Chinese submarine fleet.

American forces need to move around large numbers of ships, aircraft, troops, and munitions. Unless the US establishes more permanent bases on allied territory, it is not clear that the US is able to adequately deploy replacement capabilities on very short notice, especially once conflict breaks out. Whilst American declaratory policy that requires a defense of allies in Asia is sound, it needs to be backed up by raw capability, the two components of deterrence.

For more than a decade, analysts have encouraged the US to improve readiness and sustainment of the US Navy. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments warned of many more similar issues, including how quickly cruisers and destroyers exhaust their missiles and how adversaries will attempt to use “cheap” missiles (such as the BrahMos cruise missile) to attack US warships to get them to use their most effective defenses first,  such as the long-range SM-6 missile, and then strike with more effective weapons to destroy carriers and their escorts.

The foundation of power projection was and remains sea control. As Hugh White argues, what has contributed to making the US such a decisive power in the region is a robust sea-control capacity with low risk, and therefore little cost. The modern concept of sea control has its origins in the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Sea control was about naval superiority, the concentration of forces, and decisive battles.

Sea control is the condition in which one has freedom of action in specified areas and for specified periods of time and, where necessary, to deny or limit its use to the enemy. Sea control is different from sea denial. The latter refers to attempts to deny an adversary’s ability to use the sea without necessarily seeking to control the sea. When it comes to Asia, China and the United States are gradually trading places when it comes to sea control.

Discussions about a multilateral alliance would arguably have to address the unavoidable question of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence (END). Discussions within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group during the Cold War about targeting and basing helped calm nervous allies, helped hold NATO together, and, in some cases, helped stem the tide of proliferation.

Both the US–Republic of Korea Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the US–Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue were established after the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review for a similar purpose. There were growing concerns around the ability of the US to overcome China’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities and American support in the event of specific contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Could these bilateral dialogues become multilateral fora? This applies just as much to conventional weapons, but where the members of the alliance are far apart from each other, the potential red lines of escalation and conflict are much less identifiable than they would be in a land context.

But the technical challenges in the credibility of American extended deterrence to Australia, Japan, and South Korea matter less than the reasons why the US would want to do nuclear strategy again, this time in East Asia, a vastly more complicated theater. What matters is interest.

Hugh White raised the uncomfortable but critical issue when he suggested that Tokyo’s desire for a closer defense relationship with Australia is all about lining Australia up to support Japan against China, and that is the way Washington and Beijing will see it, too. Tokyo and Washington believe that Australia should defend the US-led international order and refuse concessions to China’s ambitions. Australians have not decided whether they agree with the US and Japan and are predisposed to seek a compromise with China—all while retaining a strong American role.

As White argued, no possible US nuclear posture, even the best possible, would eliminate the risk that a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China might lead to direct nuclear attacks on US territory. This leaves America’s East Asian allies to ponder whether American interests in the Western Pacific are strong enough for Washington to justify running the risk of conflict going nuclear.

Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University expressed concerns about American alliances in Asia. He found it nearly inconceivable that the US would actually use nuclear weapons to defend Australia, Japan, or Taiwan. Bracken noted that he played out countless scenarios, and that when it came down to it, American leaders were unwilling to use nuclear weapons. Bracken went so far as to suggest that the United States may not engage in a conventional hi-tech war with China, either.

Ely Ratner’s article is thought-provoking, valuable, and timely. But there are significant challenges in alliance credibility in Asia, because interests do not align as easily as they do in Europe. As former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles remarked in 1952, “The North Atlantic Treaty reflected a sense of common destiny as between the peoples of the west, which grew out of a community of race, religion, and political institutions, before it was finalised. But that element does not clearly exist as yet anywhere in the Pacific area.” The same is true today, seven decades later.

Christine Leah, PhD, is a fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  

American Alliances in East Asia: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

People the world over are in quarantine or isolation as the international order demands American leadership. However, the United States finds itself overstretched, having too many interests to defend with no allocation of priorities. At the same time, the population grumbles about climate change and economic inequality, with many calling for socialism and aggressive government intervention.

This article argues not for isolation but for prioritization: identifying critical areas in need of attention. The United States cannot be everywhere and solve everyone’s problems. What if the United States pulls back from the international system? Can the United States pursue self-sufficiency and maintain existing standards of living for citizens? These are essential questions that this short essay cannot answer. This article intends to identify core areas of American interest.

Let us first define the term interests. Interests are anything that makes a state more secure. If the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, then it is in the interest of the United States to get them out. If the United States is dependent on other states for oil, then it would be in its interests to manage supply chains as well as the oil price. Thus, if any state is planning on attacking the United States, or inflicting economic damage upon it, then it is in the interest of the United States to act to neutralize the source of that vulnerability.

The United States is currently balancing against Russia, China, and Iran, providing counter-terrorism support to African, Middle Eastern and Latin American states, funding NATO while most members free-ride, providing aid to developing states (U.S. Build Act), all the while trying to improve the lives of over 325 million citizens. The United States also contributes to the bulk of the funding for major international institutions like the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the International Monetary Fund.

Why did the United States take on this much responsibility when it was founded on principles of non-intervention? This can be boiled down to a straightforward argument: the wealthier the state, the more it needs to expand outward to secure its wealth. Like any business, a state must expand to survive. Unlike a business, a state cannot reach out to a governmental authority if it is attacked or a partner refuses to honor its end of the deal. This is called anarchy. Hence, throughout its process of economic expansion, the United States had to increase its presence overseas, thereby creating international interests. These interests need defending to sustain development and prosperity at home.

The point of no return with regards to isolationism came in 1945 with the end of World War II. From the American perspective, the Soviet Union and its expansionary ambition had to be stopped. This author is of the view that the United States was threatened by the power of the Soviet Union, not by its economic system. Power is the ability of one state to make other states behave in a way that benefits the interests of the former. The United States (and the Soviet Union) wanted to avoid being dominated. Regardless, the Cold War was over in 1991.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States began doing business with China, a socialist state without the power of the Soviet Union (at the time). Neoliberals believed that the wealthier and more market-oriented China became, the less authoritarian the state would be as the rising middle class would demand increased representation. This didn’t happen. Instead, much like the United States: the wealthier the state, the more it needs to expand to secure its growing wealth. Today, China is most definitely not a democratic state, and thus the logic of neoliberalism failed.

The United States, primarily due to its trade with China, underwrote China’s transformation into the economic powerhouse it is now. Today, China has genuinely global interests, and its presence can be felt around the world: in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is creating a system of economic dependency with China at the very center. As a result, the United States risks being sidelined. This leads us to today. Writing in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak, this author isn’t interested in writing about the pandemic’s origins; but rather its effects.

The Chinese Communist Party was never transparent about the spread of the COVID-19. COVID-19 would not have spread the way it did if the CCP had acted responsibly. Instead, it silenced and punished those like Dr. Li Wenliang, who tried to sound the alarm. However, because China is a global power with deep economic relations the world over, the disease rapidly spread.

The irony of ironies is that the economic policies of the United States enabled China—a totalitarian and self-described socialist state—to become the economic giant it is today. China is today is just as belligerent as the Soviet Union, but even more powerful. The COVID-19 pandemic brought the global power and influence of China to light. Can the United States withdraw from the system under these conditions? At this point, no. However, there needs to be some prioritization.

[bs-quote quote=”The people of China are not to blame. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is.” style=”default” align=”right”][/bs-quote]

To borrow from Cato the Elder, for the good of China and the good of the world, the CCP must be destroyed. The CCP gets its legitimacy partly from positive economic performance. Thus, the first priority for U.S. policymakers should be both economic and political; The U.S. government must designate specific national security priorities in these two areas, as it’s irrefutably clear that China does not have the best interests of the United States in mind. The United States must accelerate its efforts to decouple its critical supply chains from China and encourage domestic manufacturing of essential goods for the national interest (steel, pharmaceuticals, and other materials vital to state survival.

The second task is to address critical geopolitical questions: can Europe effectively defend itself? Should Japan remilitarize? Can other states become less dependent on the U.S. for their security? Finally, the United States must avoid becoming entangled in foreign conflicts where no core U.S. interests are at stake.

The people of China are not to blame. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is. It is those suffering as a result of the CCP’s hold on power who hurt the most: Uyghurs interned in concentration camps, pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong, victims of organ harvesting and trafficking (particularly members of religious groups like Falun Gong), victims of the corruption of the party elite, and the citizens of Taiwan who are denied recognition in the international arena as a result of CCP influence operations. The party claims to act in the interests of the Chinese people, but in reality, it exists only to further its power—often at the expense of those subjected to its rule. The CCP must face a global reckoning.

U.S. Isolationism in an Era of CCP Dependency was originally published on Global Security Review.

NPA tactics of dispersal, concentration, and shifting can be viewed from two perspectives: in line with their activities or ideological, political, and organizational (IPO) efforts as well as about that of the enemy, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). To conduct extortion and other malign activities, NPA territorial platoons break up into squads to cover the area of the platoon within the guerrilla zone (GZ) with each squad having an assigned number of 10 barrios at an average.

The SDG (Sentro de Grabidad, which serves as a “rallying point of all other NPA units engaged in military or mass works in the guerrilla front”) disperses with its squads only deployed in a shorter distance from a relative center conducting the same activities. Both platoons consolidate during conferences, training, and assessment exercises. Shifting is done when a platoon transfers to a different area within the same guerrilla front (GF) or to a different front to participate in a new mission or for a more specific reason, like augmenting the forces of the neighboring GF.

The NPA has also been externally linked with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) where financial aid is being used to entice both members of the Lumad ethnicity and others to dig in. Yunit Milisyang Bayan (MBs), a highly acclaimed foothold of NPA, has driven a lot of Lumads to take part in the revolution from the ground. As an organized group, they are being armed by NPA themselves to become rogue members of NPA units. For instance, Surigao’s ALCADEV (Alternative Learning Center for Agricultural Development) secures foreign funding from Europe for a hidden agenda—instilling the belief that the government cannot help them, the only groups that can are CPP cadres disguised as teachers, management committees, and even politicians. As usual, with the support of legal fronts, the issue of confronting this will die down in the process because of the protection and bias of various interest groups in favor with NPA. Legal fronts are composed of the following: the Makabayan bloc—Bayan, Anakbayan, Karapatan, Anakpawis, Act Teachers, Gabriela, and all other related groups.

In the aftermath of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte‘s 2017 State of the Nation Address (SONA), the CPP-NPA exploited the President’s controversial statement that Lumad schools were being run and manipulated by CPP-NPA. According to Armed Forces of the Philippines ‘official website, the CPP-NPA employed an institutionalized self-imposed ‘Taktikang Bakwit’ as a well-versed orchestra of rhetoric directed at the President. Conversely, the Kalumbay Lumad Alliance in Northern Mindanao led by Datu Jomorito Goaynon involved itself the investigation of alleged abuses and violations allegedly committed by army troops under 4ID and the PNP as well in Bukidnon, Surigao, and Agusan Provinces August 15, 2017.

According to a 2017 report by Luke Lischin, sixty-four percent of recorded incidents were armed assaults involving the exchange of small arms fire (at a minimum) between the NPA and other actors, 19 percent were attacks on facilities or infrastructure such as mining sites, plantations, and vehicles, while the remaining incidents entailed abductions, arrests, and assassinations/executions.

Further, the CPP-NPA has also initiated a socio-politico strategy of linkage. The Save Our Schools Network (SOS Network) is essentially an extension of the communist party working to subversively influence target populations by using powerful institutions and personalities in their disinformation operations, masked by the appearance of charitable work. This influence campaign supports the efforts of militants, which routinely violate the CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement for the Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law).

In part, the rejection of activism as a concept stems from a belief that a sufficient amount of change has already been made. In connection therewith, many lives of promising students recruited into the organization ended too soon and too tragically because they crossed the path to armed struggle. We can see that rebel life was being romanticized by insurgents, adding that in truth, it was a portal to a life of suffering, violence, and crime. Thus, activism and membership in specific organizations could lead to a violent fate. This way of thinking emerges when people frame the righting of great historical wrongs as concessions that one group has personally made, in largesse bestowed in some ongoing negotiation (i.e., peace talks) for which there must be a quid pro quo.

In assessing prominent Communist politicians in government and their prospects for gaining power in a legislative manner, particularly now that national elections are nearing, one could arguably make the case that it would take years to accomplish such a goal. The CPP’s aim has always been to overthrow any individual in a leadership position. Such actions were initiated by during the administrations of three former Presidents—Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III.

The CPP-NPA successfully ousted former President Estrada in January 2001 through the Erap Resign Movement but failed to oust both Presidents Gloria Arroyo and Noynoy Aquino through their Oust Arroyo campaign in 2006, and Kilusang Talsik in 2013. The CPP-NPA is currently engaged in the Oust Duterte Movement under a “Grand Coalition,” and are also working on other anti-Duterte initiatives—the Coalition For Justice (CFJ) and the Tindig Pilipinas.

The Coalition For Justice (CFJ) is composed of a group of judges led by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, the Evangelical Church led by Pastor Caloy Dino, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) with Attorney Susan Villanueva as the lead personalities. Meanwhile, Tindig Pilipinas is composed of the rejectionist (RJ) group, Liberal Party and Magdalo Group with Senator Antonio Trillanes, Congressman Gary C Alejano (who campaigned for a Senate seat), Aleta Tolentino, and Ricky Garchitorena as the lead personalities.

Moreover, now that the national election will happen in the same month when Marawi Siege erupted despite its liberation from the hands of Maute-ISIS inspired terrorists, rumors, hearsays, and atrocious commentaries have been circulating to dissuade the people from believing Government’s efforts regarding Marawi rehabilitation. Recently, members of the House Makabayan bloc filed a Resolution 1973 seeking an investigation into the human rights situation and the status of reconstruction in the Islamic City of Marawi.

The resolution was spearheaded by ACT-Teachers  Reps. Antonio Tinio and Frances Castro, Gabriela Reps. Emmi de Jesus and Arlene Brosas, Bayan Muna Rep.  Carlos   Zarate,  Anakpawis  Rep.  Ariel  Casilao,   and   Kabataan Rep. Sarah Elago specifically asked the House committees on human rights and Muslim affairs to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on reports of human rights violations in Marawi and   other   grave   concerns   of   the   local   people   on   the   government’s   post-siege rehabilitation   plans   in   Marawi.   Meanwhile,   Amnesty   International,   in its report on November 2017 said that the Philippine security forces violated the prohibition on the use of torture and other ill-treatment of people in their custody, adding that most of the violations were carried out against civilians who were escaping from the besieged lakeside town and seeking military protection.

In one case, Bayan Muna Rep. Carlos Isagani Zarate cited an alleged Armed Forces of the Philippine’s (AFP) anomaly wherein the P192.5  million Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA) program in Maguindanao is unconstitutional and promoted corruption. Zarate, as is his style, jumped on the bandwagon of Peace Adviser Jesus Dureza’s recent statement that he decided to return the extra amount in exchange for a newer version of the budget resolution to be used for allocating funds going forward. They argued that the Peace Talks are a worn-out psychological warfare tactic designed to project victory while concealing the continuing failure of the AFP to suppress the popular resistance and stem the steady growth of the NPA.

Meanwhile, last year, the CPP trade union campaign was developed by the National Organization Department (NOD)—specifically the National Trade Union Bureau (NTUB)—with former DOLE Undersecretary Joel Maglunsod serving as a critical player. When PRRD declared his intentions to stop the practice of ENDO—the so-called “labor contractualization,” Secretary Bebot Bello and Undersecretary Maglunsod collaborated in coming up with the Department Order 174, which imposed workers regulations. Maglunsod, an active member of the CPP operating inside DOLE, led the national audit and inspection of all labor force situation in big companies and industries, with the dubious participation of a known CPP legal organization, the KMU.

Currently, the CPP-NPA also co-opts the grievances of Marawi residents with grave concerns and frustrations over the lack of a clear and comprehensive rehabilitation plan for internally  displaced   persons, a lack of recognition and   accountability over intelligence failures on the part of the government, inability to stem the flow of terrorist groups into Marawi, an absence of any government statement or commitment to indemnify lost lives or provide compensation for damaged property, no assurance of assistance in rebuilding damaged or destroyed mosques and madrasahs, and the apparent absence of a clear government plan for lifting martial law in Mindanao.

The CPP’s rhetoric advances their interests to position the party at all levels of the political hierarchy—from the individual level to party-list representatives. This strategy is designed to counter the government’s initiatives on charter reform and federalism. Thus, the CPP-NPA are wary over the potential to reform the country’s system of government to a more federalist structure, as this will abolish the Party-list system, which would severely affect the entire organization. This was validated by José María Canlás Sison’s statement citing that “federalism is meant to concentrate executive, legislative, and judicial powers in the hands of Duterte.”

Externally, the European Union’s funding for Communist Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), along with UN Special Rapporteur for the Indigenous People (UNSRIP) and similar EU agencies, reveal that the CPP-NPA has successfully established international alliances through front organizations—purportedly to address social ills afflicting Filipino society.

Through its International Department, infiltrating the UN and engaging the EU through “Lakbay Lumad Europe,” to achieve the eventual revival of the People’s Permanent Tribunal, the CPP-NPA intends to humiliate the Duterte administration in international arena purposely to reinforce the initiative of delegitimizing the President on the international stage. According to CNN Philippines, the CPP-NPA is on EU’s list of terrorist organizations, yet the government’s motion to label communist rebels as terrorists is still pending before a local court.

Among the listed Philippine NGOs were the Alternative Learning Center for Agricultural and Livelihood Development (ALCADEV); IBON Foundation; Karapatan; Mindanao Interfaith Services Foundation, Inc.; the Rural Missionaries of the Philippines; the Salugpungan Ta’tanu Igkanugon Community Learning Center, Inc.; the Alliance of Health Workers; the Kilusang Mayo Uno; Gabriela; and ACT. Meanwhile, the ALCADEV and Salugpungan are identified as CPP-NPA alternative learning centers and schools.

In response, the National Security Adviser and Vice Chairman of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTFELCAC) Hermogenes Esperon formally wrote to the European Union (EU) to “immediately cease” funding to groups serving as legal fronts of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army. In a letter to Gilles De Kerchove, EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, dated March 26, Esperon said EU funds are being used to sustain terrorist activities of the longest-lasting existing communist terrorist organization in the world—the CPP-NPA—which is listed as a terrorist group by both the United States and the EU.

On March 28, 2019, the EU received a set of documents concerning the more specific allegations by the Government. As a result, the EU issued a Press Statement stating that “since 2005 the EU considers the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army as terrorist groups, which means, among other things, that no assets can be held in EU by these organizations.”

The European Union’s commitment investigate the government’s allegations that EU funds have been donated to groups acting as legal fronts of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing New People’s Army (NPA) is clear, as outlined in the statement. In April, it was announced that an external firm would be auditing EU grants to non-government organizations (NGOs) in the Philippines that were allegedly funneled to the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). The EU did not just commit to looking into the voluminous documents the NTF (National Task Force) has submitted; it also committed to enlisting a third-party firm to audit the funds they donated to NGOs reported having links with the CPP-NPA.

CPP-NPA and the Duterte Administration: Realpolitik in Insurgency and Terrorism was originally published on Global Security Review.