Drone warfare is expanding from the skies to the seas, and the United States must be ready. The Russia-Ukraine war, which has become synonymous with aerial drone warfare, has now featured the “first naval battle in history between unmanned boats,” according to the Ukrainian Navy. On September 14, 2026, a Ukrainian Sargan 300 drone boat fired at and sank a Russian unmanned surface vessel (USV) in the Black Se. This is a significant milestone in warfare’s rapid evolution. 

Unmanned naval platforms are also starting to see combat beyond the battlefield laboratory of Eastern Europe. During the Iran conflict, in July 2026, three American one-way attack USVs struck an Iranian submarine and naval facility, the first-ever American use of USVs to strike enemy targets. Just weeks prior, a USV rescued two U.S. Army pilots from nearby waters after an Iranian drone struck their helicopter. 

Nor are recent U.S. unmanned successes confined to the Middle East. They have occurred right in America’s backyard. Reporting from August 5, 2026, indicated that an American USV recently detected, tracked, and helped intercept a U.S. bound narcotics shipment worth $81 million in the Caribbean Sea. 

Now, building on these recent tactical successes requires accelerated U.S. efforts, not complacency. Greater strategic imagination is the first step. The Pentagon needs to think both bigger and smaller about unmanned military platforms. Bigger thinking means integrating them into a single network with manned assets and human warfighters. Smaller thinking means complementing high-end platforms with inexpensive, expendable ones. Today, the U.S. military does neither at scale. 

The American military’s recent success with autonomous platforms, along with the unmanned advances of partners like Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan, offers three main lessons for the Pentagon’s next unmanned leap forward. 

First, expendability has its own currency. Ukraine has achieved outsized battlefield effects with lower-end, expendable unmanned platforms, as well as Iran and Russia. This is true for sea-based autonomous systems too. However, one-way attack USVs, like those American forces used against Iran, remain in short supply. That shortfall stems from bureaucratic, not technological, reasons. The Pentagon applies the same rigid standards to unmanned, expendable platforms as to high-end, manned surface combatants. Yet overly rigorous testing and evaluation inhibit production at the pace the battlefield demands. 

Second, as the recent USV rescue of U.S. aviators from the Arabian Gulf demonstrates, unmanned platforms offer more than strike or surveillance functions. In fact, those lower-tech functions may have a greater upside, involving less rigorous testing and faster deployment timetables. Take, for example, the since-axed UCLASS program to build carrier-based surveillance-and-strike drones. Due to a lengthy requirements list, the project became unsustainable. That is subtraction by addition. Now, the Navy is developing the MQ-25 Stingray, an unmanned aerial refueler and a simpler platform meeting a fundamental need. 

Unmanned platforms offer additional unconventional utility, such as logistics resupply and forward basing. For example, an Israeli firm is exploring turning commercial ships into camouflaged floating drone bases. Another has developed heavy-lift drones to move materiel to the battlefield. These concepts address a primary challenge America would face in a future Pacific war: contested logistics across a broad geographic area far from the homeland and near the enemy’s surf and turf. Fortunately, unmanned systems could ease those logistical headaches by offering greater concealment, dispersal, and flexibility, while preserving manpower. 

Another potential evolution is now on the horizon: unmanned amphibious landings. A Ukrainian startup has a prototype autonomous amphibious vehicle that resembles a small truck. It can carry drones, travel underwater with a low radar profile, and drive onto enemy shores. The United States, by acquiring that capability, could facilitate a naval version of Operation Spiderweb, where Ukrainian drones hidden inside cargo trucks infiltrated Russia and neutralized strategic Russian bombers across the country. 

Third, and finally, the Pentagon’s unmanned advances must be complementary. However, they are not presently. This is the “think bigger” half of the equation, and what makes the first two lessons pay off. Expendable autonomous mass, low-cost single-purpose platforms, and distributed unmanned hubs reach their potential only when they work as a team. Recognizing this, Taiwan is seeking over 200,000 one-way attack drones and over 1,200 USVs, including the systems architecture to link them together. 

To prevail in a hypothetical Pacific war, American forces must maintain persistent surveillance of the adversary. That interconnectivity is currently lacking, which impedes readiness. Surveillance drones cannot directly communicate with nearby submarines or USVs, nor fuse data into a common operating picture. 

Linking autonomous platforms, manned assets, and human warfighters in a shared data mesh and command-and-control system would close those gaps. The U.S. military’s Combined Joint All-Domain Command-and-Control (CJADC2) aims to forge that very integration. Yet CJADC2 remains limited to “fragmented deployments,” according to the Pentagon. Fixing this is a critical next step. 

Innovating in the unmanned domain will require the Pentagon to be more imaginative in how it acquires, tests, and links its manned and unmanned platforms. That requires thinking smaller, by acquiring more expendable unmanned systems, and thinking bigger, by operationalizing a joint-domain network. It should also involve Washington acquiring Israeli, Taiwanese, and Ukrainian unmanned technology and expanding co-production with those U.S. partners at the cutting edge of warfare. 

Successful adaptation also requires the Pentagon to re-examine how it allocates resources. Currently, cost overruns on large, manned surface combatants poorly calibrated to today’s threat landscape constrain the development and acquisition of future unmanned capabilities. Studies indicate that guided-missile destroyers would be highly vulnerable in a Pacific war, and that reliably fixing and returning them to battle would be nearly impossible. Spending on these platforms, while important, takes up a disproportionate share of the Navy’s budget, crowding out unmanned innovation and acquisition. 

The Pentagon’s recent unmanned successes show it is not completely outpaced by warfare’s rapid evolution. Yet this is a marathon, not a sprint. The U.S. will suffer if it does not keep up—particularly in the unmanned domain. 

Vice Admiral Michael Connor, USN (ret.), is a former Commander, U.S. Submarine Forces, and a Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Generals and Admirals Program participant. He is the former director of the Pentagon’s Naval Warfare Integration Group. Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA. 

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily represent those of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Next Chapter of Unmanned Warfare Has Arrived was originally published on Global Security Review.

When the Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, Nikolai Partushev, claimed in mid-January that the continuation of policies “by the Kiev authorities can contribute to the loss of Ukraine’s statehood,” members of the international security community expressed outrage at what appeared to be a blatant threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty. Nevertheless, impulsive proclamations have overshadowed subtle diplomacy and enabled largely-unnoticed progress between Germany, Ukraine, and Russia to decrease tensions and facilitate a degree of quasi-cooperation.

In light of the November 2018 naval confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian vessels, maritime activities on the Sea of Azov, particularly in the vicinity of the Kerch Strait Bridge, have exhibited the potential to escalate tensions between the two countries. Recently, however, the Russian government has accepted a German proposal for joint monitoring missions with France to ensure freedom of navigation for shipping on the Azov Sea—a proposal that is very much welcomed by Ukrainian officials. Joint Franco-German monitoring would help to prevent further confrontations between Ukrainian and Russian vessels and counter Russia’s claims to the right to regulate passage of the Kerch Strait.

In December, the Russian government rejected Germany’s initial proposal for monitoring missions by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Russian officials were disinterested in an expansion of OSCE missions beyond the current observations in the Donetsk-Luhansk region. However, with the removal of this stipulation, Russian President Vladimir Putin “immediately agreed” to allow German and French observers to evaluate Russian compliance with international law in the Sea of Azov and at the Kerch Strait, the site of the controversial bridge connecting the Russian mainland with Russian-annexed Crimea. The revised proposal, submitted to the Kremlin by Heiko Maas, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on January 18th, is intended to ensure Russian activities do not impede shipping through the Kerch Strait and comply with international maritime law.

Given Ukraine’s deep-seated interests in maintaining its freedom of navigation within the Sea of Azov, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has welcomed the German initiative as assurance against the potential for Russian forces to accuse Ukraine of noncompliance and induce penalties on Ukrainian maritime operations. Germany’s proposal arrives at a critical moment for Ukraine as twenty-four of its sailors involved in the November Kerch Strait incident remain in Russian custody  having been charged with illegal border crossing, which carries a sentence of up to six years in prison.

At a recent press conference, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin eagerly welcomed prospects of an international monitoring mission led by Germany with the caveat that he hopes Russian authorities “don’t manipulate it.” Klimkin further urged that the mission refrain from inadvertently legitimizing Russian activities on Azov and that it explicitly denounce the border between Ukraine and Crimea under international law while also refusing to acknowledge the Kerch Strait Authority.

Official negotiations between German, Russian, and Ukrainian officials have yet to occur as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas have constrained discussions of the mission to separate and private talks with Ukrainian and Russian leaders. However, upcoming talks between Ukraine and Germany to negotiate a “joint vision… to work with the Russian side” appear promising since diplomatic relations between Russia and Ukraine are, by-and-large, nonexistent. “They are at an absolute minimum – only for protecting our citizens,” Klimkin explained at a Kiev press conference earlier this month. “But we are looking for a formula, as soon as we find it, we will definitely apply it.” Germany’s effort to ensure the stability of the Sea of Azov and monitor the Kerch Strait may very well prove to be the missing variable in this formula.

Germany: The Subtle Mediator Between Russia and Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia has substantially increased its presence in Black Sea since its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Under Russian administration, Crimea plays host to Bastion and Bal coastal defense systems that both employ anti-ship missiles. Conceivably, the Bastion system can reach the Black Sea straits as well as Ukrainian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Turkish ports.

Russia has also deployed S-400 air defense systems to the peninsula with the capability to target strategic bombers, ballistic, and cruise missiles as well as surface targets. The S-400 system is further enhanced by the Pantsyr S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun system which was provided to the Crimean air defense forces.

Through these measures, Russia has established an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone over the Black Sea. The establishment of this A2/AD zone means Russia has the capability to block NATO access to the Black Sea. Granted, NATO's presence in the Black Sea is limited, but the threat remains nevertheless.

Russia's moves in the Black Sea threaten Ukraine's national security.

While NATO's interests aren't directly threatened by Russian actions in the Black Sea, Ukraine's are. Russian military deployments in the Black Sea region act as a deterrent to other Western forces who might consider assisting Ukraine militarily. Moscow's control over the Black Sea and the Crimean Peninsula has also resulted in Russian control over the disputed Sea of Azov.

Prior to the Crimean annexation, Ukraine and Russia shared sovereignty over the sea. However, in the wake of the annexation, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that not only was Sevastopol perpetually a part of Russia, but Crimea as well as the Sea of Azov were inherently Russian, as well.

In the case of the Sea of Azov, Russia's actions speak louder than words. Earlier in 2018, Russia completed construction a bridge over the Kerch Strait, explicitly setting it at a height which prevented any Ukrainian commercial ships from transiting the Strait. In doing so, it has threatened the viability of Ukraine's ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk. Furthermore, Russian officials have illegally boarded Ukrainian ships, essentially preventing Ukrainian usage of the Sea of Azov.

These illegal actions act are parts of a psychological operation to convince the Ukrainian people that Russia has a right to act with impunity in its "near-abroad." In other words, Russia is attempting to persuade Ukraine that NATO and the greater West lack the will to intervene on Ukraine's behalf, despite political rhetoric to the contrary.

Russia finally gets what it wants.

In addition to impeding Ukraine's political shift to the West, Russian objectives in the region include obtaining and maintaining access to and control over a warm water port. The A2/AD zone means that Russia has open access to the Balkans and the Mediterranean Sea. Access to a warm water port has been an objective that has been a cornerstone of Russian foreign policy since the days of Gregory Potemkin, an advisor to Catherine the Great.

Potemkin advocated for Russian southward expansion through the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the northern Middle East. With control over the Black Sea, Russia has the capacity to embark on a significant naval buildup. This buildup would give a much-needed boost to Russia's stagnating economy.

Access and control over the Black Sea also gives Russia a springboard from which to project power into the Middle East, the Balkans, and the greater-Mediterranean. Given Russia’s involvement in the Syrian war, this ability to project power could have measurable implications for that conflict.

Russia has also been conducting a soft power offensive in countries like Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, and looks to be maintaining its partnership with Armenia. Russia is also taking steps to improve regional tensions, calling for an end to the Syrian war and agreeing to a resolution to the dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

The consequences of a delayed or minimal response to Russia's increasing control over the Black Sea could be substantial. The Black Sea is but one example of Russia's slow-but-steady consolidation of power and influence across the Eurasian landmass. If the United States and its fellow NATO allies fail to act, it may be too late to reverse shifting power dynamics in a region of major strategic value.

Russia is Consolidating its Control Over the Black Sea was originally published on Global Security Review.