Judicial reform for many post-socialist countries is an ongoing process. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw several Eastern European states embark on a journey to integrate into the EU, facing extensive pressure to conform to more stringent standards of judicial independence and rule of law. Anti-corruption campaigns have become central to this effort, particularly across the Balkans. Yet the question remains, “How can governments pursue aggressive anti-corruption prosecutions while still safeguarding democratic justice systems?”

Pressure increased significantly in February of 2018 when the EU–Western Balkans Strategy was adopted. This ramped up pressures through the introduction of comprehensive rule-of-law initiatives. Regional judicial overhauls commenced, with efforts to create specialized anti-corruption bodies taking center stage, whereas structural judicial changes in each country have often been paired with anti-corruption efforts encouraged by the EU. The aim of these efforts has been the eradication of entrenched exploitative networks. As a cursory review of these processes reveal, reform can often create new imbalances.

The case of Albania is one example. There was a time when Tirana was depicted as a leader for EU accession. Indeed, the country commenced one of the region’s most ambitious justice reforms, with extensive international support from the U.S. and the EU, with the centerpiece of this new anti-corruption architecture being the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK), established in 2019.

Highlighting the extent of the involvement of actors from outside the EU, this institution was created with assistance from USAID and the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), including the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), also played supporting roles, creating a structure that would resemble that of the FBI.

SPAK was intended to strengthen investigative capacity, supporting broader rule-of-law reforms and civil society oversight. SPAK was depicted as a landmark achievement capable of accelerating the country’s path toward EU membership, however SPAK has increasingly become the subject of debate. Possessing the mechanism and budgets to combat corruption the challenge facing Albania today is how to ensure the methods used remain consistent with rule-of-law principles.

Fighting corruption does not produce immediate results. Institutional restraint and procedural fairness are required. Concerns have grown that the sweeping powers granted to anti-corruption prosecutors risk undermining these very safeguards. Congressman Keith Self  noted that Albania’s judicial reforms have created delays of 8 to 15 years, a backlog that “undermines the rule of law, public trust, and due process.” Systemic delays illustrate how institutional reforms are not a catchall solution.

An area of particular concern is the expanded use of pretrial detention, which usually serves as an exceptional measure when courts determine there to be a genuine flight risk, threat of interference with an investigation, or threat to public safety. In Albania this has increasingly become a routine prosecutorial tool.

The case of Tirana mayor Erion Veliaj illustrates the controversy. Veliaj was detained by SPAK over a year ago, while to date, no formal charges have been levied. He continues to be held without bail, with another postponement in March 2026, and prevented from being able to perform his municipal duties. Veliaj’s detention, and that of other elected officials, presents a governance dilemma.

When elected officials are held for extended periods without conviction, public service becomes inhibited and voters disenfranchised. Tirana’s Council of Ministers attempted to remove Veliaj from office after three months of detention but the Constitutional Court later reinstated him as mayor, ruling that elected officials cannot be removed from office solely due to being detained.

Similar controversies have emerged in Turkey, where the detention, and trial of Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, has been criticized as politically motivated. In Bulgaria, the detention of Varna mayor Blagomir Kotsev sparked nationwide protests. Although each case must be seen within its own political context, together they illustrate a broader tension between anti-corruption enforcement and democratic governance.

A November 20, 2025, Washington Post article described Albania’s approach as an example of “muscular prosecution,” as part of which Albania seems to emphasize that no one should be above the law. Yet framing anti-corruption in these terms risks conflating aggressive enforcement with lawful enforcement. Effective justice systems depend not only on the vigor of prosecutions but also on strict adherence to procedural safeguards, without which the legitimacy of such prosecutions should be brought into question.

In Veliaj’s case, for example, SPAK has barred him from communication with the public. Criticisms have also been levied against the prosecution for violating the principle of equality of arms, a core judicial standard according to which all parties must have equal procedural opportunities, including access to evidence. The balance of power between prosecutors, judges, and defendants within Albania’s evolving justice system is thus brought into question.

Albania’s reliance on pretrial detention has drawn criticism from the U.S. State Department, the European Court of Human Rights, and United Nations torture prevention experts. NGOs have similarly warned about structural imbalances that leave judges reluctant to challenge anti-corruption prosecutors.

Concerns have also been raised by regional leaders. The mayors of the B40 Balkan Cities Network, representing 76 municipalities across the region, recently issued a joint letter warning of a “dangerous trend” threatening local democracy. Citing both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Venice Commission’s October 2025 report, the mayors emphasized that pretrial detention of sitting elected officials must remain a measure of last resort.

Under Albanian law, consistent with prevailing standards across the EU and the U.S., detention before trial is intended to remain exceptional. The EU, considering Albania’s accession ambitions, has a clear interest in this. At the same time, the U.S. cannot simply distance itself from an institution it helped create. Successful judicial reforms must be judged through the way institutions can uphold accountability while preserving democratic liberties. For Albania, it must reconcile the need to fight longstanding corruption while maintaining an open and fair judicial system that is acceptable to the global community.

Luka Petrović is a political analyst of Balkan descent based in Germany, with a focus on the Western Balkans, international relations, and human rights. Luka has contributed research and analysis for major international NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with a focus on human rights monitoring, minority protection, and conflict-affected communities in the Balkans. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Can the Balkans Fight Corruption Without Weakening Due Process? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Worryingly, not all seem to realize this. On April 15, Ljubljana-based outlet Necenzurirano published a written proposal for wide-ranging border changes in the Western Balkans that had been delivered to Charles Michel, the President of the European Council. While no country has claimed authorship of this unofficial diplomatic document, or ‘non-paper’ in Brussels-speak, many suspect that it came from Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša or a high-level official in his government. The non-paper suggests that the European Union throw its support behind a variety of measures designed to create ethnically homogeneous states in the region, including the unification of Albania and Kosovo as well as the cession of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s primarily Serb and Croat areas to Serbia and Croatia proper.

This is far from the first proposal to redraw Western Balkan borders along ethnic lines.

While the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia during the 1990s sprang from ethnonationalist impulses, the geopolitical patchwork that emerged in its wake does not correspond entirely with the distribution of the region’s various ethnic groups. Western Balkan politicians have therefore periodically advocated for further territorial changes in attempts to realize misguided dreams of ethnically pure nation-states.

The European Union’s persistent opposition to border changes and leveraging of the carrot of EU membership have been key to preventing them thus far. In 2011, for instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded that Serbia give up its claims to northern Kosovo if it wished to join the bloc. This ultimately led to an EU-brokered deal in 2013, whereby Belgrade agreed to recognize Pristina’s sovereignty over the territory in exchange for the opening of accession negotiations. So long as countries in the region believe that their eventual path to the European Union hinges on respect for the territorial status quo, Brussels maintains the final say on this crucial issue.

Unfortunately, however, it is unclear how committed the European Union remains to this former red line. After the non-paper first surfaced, Michel’s office failed to immediately condemn its contents. In fact, there was no official EU response to the proposals until the Commission finally came out in opposition more than ten days later. This delay, as well as the proposal’s likely origin from a member state government, suggests significant internal EU disagreement about how to approach Western Balkan territorial issues.

It is not just the European Council that has demonstrated the Union’s softening stance on border changes. When the idea of a Serbia-Kosovo land swap resurfaced again in early 2020, top EU diplomat Josep Borrell refused to publicly state his opposition. Overall, Brussels seems increasingly hesitant to reject the toxic goal of ethnically homogeneous states in the Western Balkans. This trend likely stems from frustration with a perceived lack of progress in the region’s reform agenda in recent years, which has prompted a greater willingness to consider bold, alternative ‘solutions’ (as the non-paper states).

Yet opposition to this ideology should be a no-brainer for a bloc that ostensibly champions liberal values such as diversity and respect for minorities. Indeed, the foundational logic of the European Union as a political project rests on a repudiation of ethnic nationalism and its associated perils. Allowing territorial changes motivated by this outlook in future member states, therefore, represents a betrayal of the European Union’s very raison d’être. Furthermore, changes such as those proposed in the non-paper would lead to a host of dangerous consequences, including the legitimation of Russia’s claims to various territories in its near abroad as well as increased risks for the hundreds of thousands of people who would end up on the “wrong” side of these new ethnically determined borders.

A much more productive course of action would be for the European Union to get serious about promoting reform in the Western Balkan states. The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the already precarious condition of democracy and rule of law across the region, casting serious doubt on its countries’ ability to fulfill the political criteria for EU accession in the foreseeable future. Despite its clear geopolitical interest in integrating the Western Balkans as soon as possible, EU engagement in the region has been lacking.

To support societal resilience, Brussels should provide aid to selected independent media outlets and civil society organizations in Western Balkan countries. It should also enthusiastically support the extension of the existing ‘mini-Shengen’ area between Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo, to include Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well – this would provide an ideal avenue for enhanced regional cooperation and trust. Finally, the European Union should offer single market access to any country in the region that desires it, providing an achievable interim goal that will encourage Western Balkan governments to continue making the necessary reforms for full EU membership down the line.

Ultimately, the Western Balkans must move beyond the ethnonationalist tensions that have brought the region so much pain in recent decades. While changing borders may seem like an easy fix, it legitimizes the existence of a pernicious ideology while failing to address the root of the problem. A better way forward is to do the hard work of building better societal relations within the region’s states as currently constructed. This is true not only for the Western Balkan countries themselves but for the European Union as well – indeed, if it ever wishes to welcome the region into the fold without losing itself in the process, there is no other option.

Western Balkan Border Changes Must Remain an EU Red Line was originally published on Global Security Review.

There is a lesson to be learned from recent events in Macedonia—and it must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identity and foreign policy in the Balkans. Any foreign policy decision that is seen as a threat to the continuity of the national identity is perceived as a security threat, and therefore, it is rejected as ontologically unacceptable. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans (still recovering from the traumatic experience of ethnic conflicts) require a different approach than what is advocated by the European Union.

President George Ivanov of the Republic of Macedonia, during his second inaugural speech in 2014, stated that he “will not accept ideas or proposals that would threaten the Macedonian identity, distinctiveness of the Macedonian nation, the Macedonian language and the Macedonian model of coexistence.” Ivanov added that “the Republic of Macedonia and the Macedonian citizens are a benefit for the Union only if we enter as equal in the mosaic of diversity of the European Union, with our own identity and dignity.” 

In his speech, Ivanov makes a clear distinction between Macedonia’s pursuit of its foreign policy interests and the need to ensure the continuity of the country’s national identity and explicitly states his reluctance to endorse any policy that would pose a threat to Macedonian’s self-image in the international arena. Taking this into consideration, one could legitimately expect that the recent political developments in Macedonia can shed new light into the complex relationship between a state’s national identity and its foreign policy. 

The Referendum in Macedonia

The referendum held at the end of September 2018 in Macedonia—in contrast to Ivanov’s 2014 speech—conflates of the concept of national identity with foreign policy into a single question: “Are you in favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?” 

The “Prespa” agreement between Macedonia and Greece includes specific clauses about changes to Macedonia’s official name, in addition to modifications to an already-established historical narrative of its national identity. The text of the Agreement arguably indicates a degree of political control over the planned reconstruction of the historical elements of the Macedonian national identity: “The Parties shall establish […] a Joint Inter-Disciplinary Committee of Experts on historic, archeological and educational matters, to consider the objective, scientific interpretation of historical events based on authentic, evidence-based and scientifically sound historical sources and archeological findings. The Committee’s work shall be supervised by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Parties […].” As such, established historical narratives that contribute to the Macedonian national identity would be revised based on a politically supervised “objective, scientific interpretation of historical events.”

Also, the wording of the referendum question implicitly points out the conditional relationship between the national identity and foreign policy objectives. In other words, the Macedonian voters were reminded that the full implementation of the “Prespa” agreement (and the subsequent amendments to historical elements of the national identity) is a crucial precondition for the realization of the country’s foreign policy goal—joining the E.U. and NATO. 

However, a majority of Macedonians decided to boycott the referendum, illustrating a reluctance to answer a question in which they were asked to affirm the mutually exclusive nature of the relationship between Macedonia’s national identity and its foreign policy priorities. Voter turnout was low at 37 percent, thus failing to secure the 50 percent threshold required to make the vote legitimate. The concept of ontological security must be taken into account to understand why the Macedonian government was unsuccessful in legitimizing the referendum.

The Referendum in the Context of Ontological Security

The concept of ontological security, when applied to international relations, is defined as the unconscious and conscious possession of a fundamental national identity that justifies a country’s existence. It is argued that states pursue ontological security to ensure the continuity of the state’s identity. States must provide for their ontological security in addition to pursuing physical security objectives, such as ensuring the territorial integrity of the state. 

Ontological security of the state is especially important when the national ‘self’ interacts with the significant ‘other’ in the international arena. The harmony between the already established narratives and discourses that comprise the state’s identity of the state and foreign policy objectives is something governments take into consideration when conducting international relations.

In some cases, however, foreign policy is not conducted by the established narratives of the national identity. Thus, these foreign policy decisions are arguably ontologically unacceptable. To overcome this obstacle, policymakers selectively use specific narratives and discourses to emphasize certain parts of the national identity that could justify the new foreign policy. This strategic manipulation of narratives is done to bridge the cognitive gap between national identity and a foreign policy that is perceived as controversial or disruptive.

The referendum in Macedonia and the events preceding present an ideal case study for analyzing the importance of ontological security in foreign policymaking. Consistent reminders from both E.U. and NATO officials that an agreement on the name issue between Macedonia and Greece is a crucial precondition for Macedonia’s integration both entities made both of these foreign policy objectives ontologically unacceptable for many voters in Macedonia.

After years of difficult negotiations between Greece and Macedonia, an agreement was reached. Voters were faced with a referendum where they were asked whether they would accept the “Prespa” name-change agreement for the sake of Macedonia’s integration into the E.U. and NATO. Undoubtedly aware of the substantial cognitive dissonance between the already established ontological narratives and the requirements set by foreign policy objectives, the government initiated a strategic and selective reshaping of narratives to improve the controversial perception of these conflated policies—thus reducing the perceived threat to Macedonia’s ontological security.

The Macedonian Government’s Failed Strategy

A major theme of the government’s pre-referendum strategy was portraying the referendum as an opportunity to affirm the ‘European’ nature of Macedonia. The media and political elites in Macedonia told voters that they had the historic chance to vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia. The Prime Minister of Macedonia Zoran Zaev said that “September 30 is a day to write history, for European Macedonia.” For months before the vote, the European dimension of the Macedonian national identity was emphasized through political rhetoric. In contrast, the country’s new name—the Republic of North Macedonia—decided in the agreement between Macedonia and Greece, was hardly mentioned. 

This selective application of specific narratives and withdrawal of others to formulate a revised national identity represents a discursive manipulation aimed at bridging the cognitive gap between the national identity and the foreign policy goal. In other words, the Macedonian national identity was repeatedly ‘europeanized’ in political statements to portray the pro-European foreign policy as ontologically acceptable and compatible with the national identity—thus posing no threat to the continuity of the identity of the state. 

However, low voter turnout for the referendum indicates the government’s pre-referendum campaign was not sufficient. Voters were not convinced of two crucial things: that if they vote ‘yes’ they vote for a ‘European’ Macedonia, and that the continuity of the national identity – the ontological security of the state – will be maintained if the referendum was successful. Put in other words, the government’s strategy of selective usage and strategic manipulation with different narratives did not succeed in its aim to bridge the gap between national identity and foreign policy priorities. 

The events in Macedonia must be taken seriously to better understand the interplay between national identities and foreign policymaking, especially in the Balkans. A volatile security context such as that of Balkan states leaves relatively less space for political differentiation between the physical and ontological security of the state. The region’s historical and geopolitical context gives the historical element of the national identity a central place in the politics of the Balkan countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the continuity of the national identity has been considered as a crucial component of the security and sovereignty of the states in the Balkans. 

Unfortunately, a crucial, yet oft-neglected, issue is that the E.U. conditional framework for states in the Balkans doesn’t entirely account for the importance of national identity in the region. On the contrary, E.U. conditionality criteria include clauses requiring that aspiring members enter into negotiations over their national identities. The specific historical conditions in the Balkans, which continue to recover from the trauma of multiple ethnic conflicts—mandate a different approach on the part of European institutions. The 2018 referendum in Macedonia should serve as a reminder that the geopolitical interests are not always the first choice in the Balkans, especially if they come at the cost of losing the ontological security of the state. 

Ontological Security in the Balkans: Lessons from Macedonia was originally published on Global Security Review.