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		<title>Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 12:13:22 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Yildirimhan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32714</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 26, 2026 At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 26, 2026</em></p>
<p>At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/05/08/turkey-touts-propellant-breakthrough-for-yildirimhan-long-range-ballistic-missile/">unveiled</a> a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2026/tuerkiye-unveils-yildirimhan-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-challenging-china-df-26-range">released</a> details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/culture/yildirim-bayezid-sultan-who-struck-like-lightning-3214325?s=3">known for</a> acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.</p>
<p>Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.</p>
<p>A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and <a href="https://www.anixneuseis.gr/turkeys-defence-industrial-ambition-from-dependence-to-strategic-autonomy/">strategic autonomy</a>. Within this context, Turkey’s declared <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">goal to develop long-range ballistic</a> capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.</p>
<p>We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.</p>
<p>Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrict access to advanced weapons</a> capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R44000/R44000.97.pdf">arms embargoes, sanctions</a>, and <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2023/07/turkeys-defense-industry-suffers-from-undeclared-embargoes/">restrictions</a> imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey&#8217;s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.</p>
<p>Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.</p>
<p>Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its <a href="https://www.invest.gov.tr/en/news/news-from-turkey/pages/president-erdogan-unveils-turkiye-2030-industry-technology-strategy.aspx">National Technology Initiative</a>, is part of a larger investment in <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/we-want-to-maximize-our-technological-independence">civilian space and satellite launch</a> initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in <a href="https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/turkiye-begins-construction-of-space-launch-facility-in-somalia-3211221">Somalia</a>, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.</p>
<p>Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by <a href="https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/07/turkeys-fm-criticizes-nuclear-weapons-treaty-as-unjust-questions-turkish-endorsement/">Turkish officials criticizing</a> the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2026/05/turkey-rolls-out-intercontinental-missile-with-purported-6000km-range/">capable of carrying</a> a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.</p>
<p>The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-05/features/europe-moving-independent-nuclear-deterrent">develop its own nuclear capabilities</a>—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its <a href="https://warontherocks.com/disperse-to-survive-the-logic-of-french-forward-deterrence/">new doctrine of “forward deterrence,”</a> which <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-macrons-changes-to-french-nuclear-policy-mean-for-european-security/">advocates</a> for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both <a href="https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/nuclear-bombs-poland-germany-weapons-3pwvwdwhz?msockid=3393505b86306ec71fdc452087506f0e">Poland and Germany</a> have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.</p>
<p>At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.</p>
<p>Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.</p>
<p>Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.</p>
<p>Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly <em>The NIDS View</em> podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and <em>MCG Horizons LLC</em>, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Turkeys-ICBM-Ambition-for-Autonomy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/turkeys-icbm-ambition-for-autonomy/">Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-deep-strategic-culture-beyond-the-skies/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Areesha Manzoor]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 12:45:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32304</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>From the 1957 Sputnik-1 satellite to more contemporary explorations such as NASA’s Artemis III program, space has become the high ground for state competition due to its multifaceted military and civilian applications. The behavior of states within the space domain mirrors the earthly quest for dominance to plant flags on the uncharted territories. Orbits have [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-deep-strategic-culture-beyond-the-skies/">India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From the 1957 <a href="https://www.spacecentre.co.uk/news/space-now-blog/how-sputnik-changed-the-world/">Sputnik-1</a> satellite to more contemporary explorations such as <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/mission/artemis-iii/">NASA’s Artemis III program</a><strong>, </strong>space has become the high ground for state competition due to its multifaceted military and civilian applications. The behavior of states within the space domain mirrors the earthly quest for dominance to plant flags on the uncharted territories. Orbits have become the new playground for spacefaring nations. Now, states are developing a strategic culture beyond the skies and harnessing scientific curiosity to enhance sovereignty, power, and status.</p>
<p>In South Asia, India’s expanding space program—featuring anti-satellite weapons (<a href="https://www.space.com/india-anti-satellite-test-significance.html">ASAT</a>) to <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/indias-new-space-based-spy-network/">spy and surveillance satellites</a>—is not motivated by technological ambitions but is instead a function of its deep strategic culture. Indian scholar Rajesh Basrur’s <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003246626-8/indian-strategic-culture-rajesh-basrur">concept</a> of deep Indian strategic culture is an apt lens to study India’s space politics. India’s space odyssey reflects its quest for autonomy and prestige, the two essential components of its deep strategic culture.</p>
<p>Basrur identifies <a href="https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003246626-8/indian-strategic-culture-rajesh-basrur">two levels</a> of strategic culture: ‘mutable strategic culture’ that can shift over time and ‘deep strategic culture’ that is a set of core strategic preferences derived from historical experiences. According to Basrur’s statement in his book chapter on Indian Strategic Culture, defining a deep strategic culture is “tricky, perhaps tautological since it is a recognition that is post facto (a long-term attribute is deep until it is not!).”  Still, he defines deep strategic culture as “patterns that are sustained unchanged over a long period of time (in the present context, since independence), irrespective of changing circumstance.” He further underscores the two most enduring pillars of Indian strategic culture as a persistent preference for strategic autonomy and a long-standing quest for status on the global stage.</p>
<p>India’s space politics is thus a reflection of its deep-rooted desire to achieve strategic autonomy. India has heavily invested in dual-use technologies, such as <a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/SatelliteNavigationServices.html#:~:text=NavIC%20was%20erstwhile%20known%20as,%2Dway%20ranging%20stations%2C%20etc.&amp;text=A%20new%20civilian%20signal%20is,Safety%2Dof%2Dlife%20alert%20dissemination">navigation satellites</a> (NavlC) and <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20140211041254/http:/isro.org/satellites/geostationary.aspx">communication satellites (GSAT).</a> India leverages these dual-use technologies as a strategic enabler that allows real-time monitoring and surveillance of the South Asian region and beyond. Moreover, the indigenous <a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/Launchers.html">development</a> of launch vehicles like the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) is adaptable for military purposes.</p>
<p>The Mission Shakti ASAT <a href="https://www.space.com/india-anti-satellite-test-significance.html">Test</a> is evidence of using an indigenous launch vehicle for the delivery of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. It underscores the operational autonomy in space without reliance on external partners or even against them. The pattern of international space cooperation of India is also driven by its deep strategic culture. India engages with both <a href="https://space.commerce.gov/u-s-india-joint-statement-highlights-space-cooperation/">the US</a> and <a href="https://india.mid.ru/en/history/articles_and_documents/cooperation_in_space/">Russia</a> as per its strategic needs. This <a href="https://www.spykmancenter.org/india-multi-alignment-dilemma">multi-alignment strategy</a> aims to get access to modern technology, expertise, and partnerships without committing to any one side.</p>
<p>Another deeply interwoven element of Indian strategic culture in its space politics is the pursuit of status. India leverages space as a key domain to achieve recognition as a technologically advanced and influential major power. India demonstrates its status through high-profile space missions, such as <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/mission/chandrayaan-1/">Chandrayaan</a>, <a href="https://www.planetary.org/space-missions/mangalyaan">Mangalyaan</a>, and the upcoming <a href="https://www.isro.gov.in/Gaganyaan.html">Gaganyaan</a> mission. These missions garner international attention and enhance India&#8217;s prestige, signaling to the international community that the country has ambitious space aims.</p>
<p>Furthermore, to enhance prestige and status, India participates in international space forums of exploration and governance like the <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-welcomes-india-as-27th-artemis-accords-signatory/">Artemis Accords,</a> the TRUST initiative, and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). India harnesses these platforms to advance its national interests by gaining greater visibility, access to dual-use technologies, and opportunities for space exploration. India also leverages these forums for high-accuracy real-time <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1587232">data</a> that allows it to do regional surveillance and monitoring.</p>
<p>Indian space politics is not only about capability but also about demonstrating it in ways that enhance its international standing. All this is not occurring in isolation but in a region with a fragile balance of power maintained by nuclear deterrence. This translation of Indian strategic culture into astropolitics has regional and global implications. At the regional level, India’s increasingly <a href="https://icfs.org.uk/from-surveillance-to-strike-operation-sindoor-and-the-role-of-space-in-himalayan-regional-security/">offensive space uses</a>, such as surveillance, missile guidance, and precision strikes, are creating a security dilemma for its neighbors. This disrupts the regional balance of power and will motivate Pakistan to enter an arms race or to equip itself with non-military means to compete with India.</p>
<p>At the international level, India is actively involved in cooperation with both the U.S. and Russia; however, India’s multi-alignment strategy is not working as per its expectations. There are structural constraints at the heart of the implementation of Indian astropolitics. India is dependent upon the U.S. for advanced space technologies, intelligence, and commercial space opportunities. It erodes the very basic tenet of Indian astropolitics, strategic autonomy. Moreover, India and Russia have a joint historical space and defense ecosystem, which has become politically sensitive amidst international sanctions on Russia. The dual-track or multi-alignment strategy of India increases strategic ambiguity.</p>
<p>In a nutshell, strategic autonomy sounds sophisticated, but it is practically unlikely since alliances and power blocs are the pivot of international relations. The contemporary <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/india/shocking-rift-between-india-and-united-states">strategic rift</a> between the United States and India is evidence of the backfiring of multi-alignment as the U.S. criticizes India on its strategy and close ties with Russia. If this strategic split expands, it reduces India’s technological options, putting serious constraints on its space program that is dependent upon both the U.S. and Russia. India’s strategic ambiguity exposes it to structural pressures and regional security dilemmas by reinforcing perceptions of India as a destabilizing actor in an already fragile strategic environment.</p>
<p><em>Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Indias-Deep-Strategic-Culture-Beyond-the-Skies.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/indias-deep-strategic-culture-beyond-the-skies/">India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/proliferation-of-small-arms-impact-on-conflict-resolution/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kumail Mehdi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jul 2025 12:56:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Trade Treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arms traffickers. ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[artificial intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict resolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dinka]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethnic conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union Programme of Action]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Firearms Protocol]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[identity-based disputes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[light weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[needs-based approach]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychology of guns]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regionalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[safety]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Small arms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[smuggling routes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[structural reforms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[survival]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31087</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Religious, ethnic, and tribal affiliations often fuel identity-based disputes. The current conflict in South Sudan is a prime example. These hostilities are deadly and challenge the ability to live in peace. What makes them nearly impossible to resolve is an unchecked arms supply. The availability of arms exacerbates the length and severity of identity-based strife. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/proliferation-of-small-arms-impact-on-conflict-resolution/">Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Religious, ethnic, and tribal affiliations often fuel identity-based disputes. The current conflict in South Sudan is a prime example. These hostilities are deadly and challenge <a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-33890-000">the ability to live in peace</a>. What makes them nearly impossible to resolve is an unchecked arms supply.</p>
<p>The availability of arms exacerbates the length and severity of identity-based strife. <a href="https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14656.doc.htm">The United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs</a> pointed out that the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons undermine peace and security at the national, regional, and global levels.</p>
<p>Conflict often revolves around identity politics, where one group views another group with hatred, resulting in conflict. Violence often stems from perceptions of who is inside or outside the group, especially when survival is at stake. When a group of people attaches meaning to political and economic forces and considers compromise and disagreement unbearable, it erupts into violence, making conflict resolution a formidable challenge.</p>
<p>In this volatile situation, the presence of light arms and small weapons only worsens the situation. One of the main reasons for having guns is that they bring safety. The existing relationship between safety, survival, and weapons, especially in developing states, makes the differences deadly. <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0373-z">According to “The Psychology of Guns</a>,” the availability of weapons can drive aggressive behavior, leading to violence. In this regard, the proliferation of small arms and light weaponry needs to be checked.</p>
<p>Armed conflicts are ubiquitous, and those based on ethnic and tribal lines are often the most brutal. One estimate suggests <a href="https://ourworldindata.org/conflict-deaths-breakdown">that around 3.8 million people</a> died in such conflicts between 1989 and 2023.</p>
<p>For instance, in South Sudan, two groups, Dinka and Nuer, felt threatened by each other and launched into a violent war. It is important to understand the identity-borne roots of this dispute. Land and cattle hold significant prestige in South Sudanese society. With limited resources, achieving political power becomes a top priority.</p>
<p>In a bid to maintain political power and control over resources for one ethnic group, a <a href=".%20https:/www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan">political conflict between two leaders</a> turned into an ethnic war, which resulted in the killing of nearly 400,000 people. It is important to note the destructive impacts of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the civil war in South Sudan.</p>
<p>Likewise, the ethnic unrest of the Kurds in the Middle East illustrates how the combination of small arms proliferation and ethnic grievances can burst into conflict. <a href="https://uow.edu.pk/ORIC/MDSRIC/Publications/8th%20MDSRIC-147.pdf">The struggle for autonomy</a>, a free Kurdistan, is driving a war against Türkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.</p>
<p>The region has witnessed chaos, with over <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czel3ry9x1do">40,000 deaths</a> in an insurgency against Türkiye. The presence of <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2017/8/29/a-dangerous-smuggling-route-across-iraq-iran-border">smuggling routes </a>across the Iran-Iraq and Türkiye -Iraq borders aids in weapon proliferation. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czel3ry9x1do">The recent decision</a> to lay down arms by the Kurdish insurgents in Türkiye is a welcome step towards conflict resolution. The warring parties realised the economic and human cost of the conflict.</p>
<p>Hiruni Alwishewa notes that <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/29/3/331/7909057">the international regime to control the proliferation of small arms exhibits serious dichotomies</a>. For example, the Firearms Protocol and the European Union’s Programme of Action lack regulatory distinction between legal arms exports and illegal transfer of arms, so even legal transfers end up as illicit ones.</p>
<p>Likewise, the <a href="https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/">Wassenaar Arrangement</a> and the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of the West African States failed to address the proliferation of small arms. It is because both agreements do not scrutinise military aid, which flows undetected, causing arms proliferation. Similarly, the Arms Trade Treaty and United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) lack definitional clarity between small arms and firearms, thus hampering any substantial effort to curb the proliferation of small arms.</p>
<p>In resolving identity-based conflicts, a needs-based approach is an important tool because it works to build trust. It focuses on accepting needs, based on ethnic, religious, and resource-related issues that parties in conflict believe essential to their survival. Repression and tyranny only worsen a conflict.</p>
<p>Unlike other disputes, conflicts sparked by ethnic and religious differences cannot be settled by contractual arrangements. <a href="https://erlanbakiev.weebly.com/uploads/1/0/8/3/10833829/ho-won_jeong-conflict_management_and_resolution___an_introduction-routledge_2010.pdf">They rest on bringing structural reforms that involve</a> either power redistribution or changing the political and economic systems to benefit all parties. Such efforts ensure that understanding and accepting diverse cultures run in tandem with each other.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/new-regionalism">After the fall of the Soviet Union</a>, regionalism received significant attention in the form of trade agreements, economic integration, and increasing interdependence. Regional initiatives such as coordinating between border states to curb illicit arms transfer, strengthening national laws, and promoting transparency were useful in controlling the proliferation of small and light weapons.</p>
<p>Understandably, effectively controlling small arms is a challenging task. In this regard, significant attention must be given to improving the international structure of arms control. Theoretically, arms control agreements cover all weapons, but, practically, nuclear weapons are the primary focus. In this regard, these agreements must be revisited to fill the existing gaps. This includes removing definitional gaps and bringing military aid under scrutiny.</p>
<p>Similarly, artificial intelligence (AI) can be utilized to effectively trace and detect light weapons. AI’s utility in data analysis, detection, and surveillance makes it useful in controlling arms proliferation.</p>
<p>For example, AI-based weapon detection software combines video analysis, learning, and object recognition. This software can be used to identify and track weapons, which will be useful in controlling the proliferation of small arms.</p>
<p>In the end, the goal is to reduce needless casualties in needless conflicts. It is possible to undertake intelligent measures that deter arms traffickers from providing the weapons sowing so much death in the world today.</p>
<p><em>Kumail Mehdi is a researcher at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad</em>.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Proliferation-of-Small-Arms-Its-Impact-on-Conflict-Resolution.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="187" height="52" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 187px) 100vw, 187px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/proliferation-of-small-arms-impact-on-conflict-resolution/">Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extending-the-golden-dome-aukus-pillar-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Natalie Treloar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Jun 2025 10:39:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[advanced technologies]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[AUKUS pillar two]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31074</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the United States attempts to better understand the requirements of President Trump’s Golden Dome program, pillar two of the AUKUS agreement has the potential to help solve the “integration problem at massive scale” and provide the needed architecture for collective defense. This initiative would also prevent AUKUS pillar two from “failing in its mission” [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extending-the-golden-dome-aukus-pillar-2/">Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the United States attempts to better understand the requirements of President Trump’s Golden Dome program, pillar two of the AUKUS agreement has the potential to help solve the “<a href="https://www.csis.org/events/americas-golden-dome-explained">integration problem at massive scale</a>” and provide the needed architecture for collective defense. This initiative would also prevent AUKUS pillar two from “<a href="https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/aukus-pillar-ii-is-failing-in-its-mission-it-needs-its-own-optimal-pathway/">failing in its mission</a>” by enabling the prioritization of advanced technologies at the <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/why-america-shouldnt-underestimate-chinese-power">scale</a> required to achieve Golden Dome missile defense.</p>
<p>Golden Dome is focused on specific <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/golden_dome.pdf">missile threats to the American homeland</a>. AUKUS pillar two is designed to reduce the <a href="https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2023-06/PB69-CriticalTechTracker-AUKUS%20relevant%20technologies%20top%2010%20country%20snapshot.pdf">significant lead</a> China has in dual-use emerging technologies. An “extended” Golden Dome approach that produces strong and resilient allies may provide greater strategic deterrence than an America alone approach.</p>
<p>As stronger allies contribute more to collective defense through <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/shared-threats-indo-pacific-alliances-and-burden-sharing-todays-geopolitical-environment">burden sharing</a>, this can reduce the financial and military burden on the United States. Capable allies can deter aggression and manage local conflicts, promoting <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/burden-sharing-responsibility-sharing">regional stability</a> without constant American intervention.</p>
<p>If allies are seen as weak and easily overrun, it may undermine the <a href="https://researchportalplus.anu.edu.au/en/publications/alliances-and-nuclear-risk-strengthening-us-extended-deterrence">credibility of alliances and security guarantees</a>, thereby emboldening adversaries. Strong allies often bring <a href="https://carnegieindia.org/research/2024/09/innovative-alliance-us-australian-defense-science-and-technology-cooperation-for-a-dangerous-decade?lang=en">advanced technologies</a> and capabilities that enhance joint operations through interoperability and innovation.</p>
<p>Defeating fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), hypersonic glide weapons, and land-attack cruise missile threats is the <a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/golden_dome.pdf">focus</a> of Golden Dome, which “<a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/golden-dome-strategic-impacts-of-an-untouchable-united-states/">proposes</a> a multilayered defense network capable of intercepting threats during the boost, <a href="https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessment-us-military-power/missile-defense">midcourse, and terminal stages</a> of missile flight.” Some analysts argue that it is easiest to target these threats in the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOVMSRxbyl4">boost/ascent phase</a>.</p>
<p>Targeting the <a href="https://www.inss.org.il/publication/interception/#:~:text=A%20COIL%20system%20(Chemical%20Oxygen,benefits%20of%20using%20a%20Zeppelin.">boost</a> phase can either occur from allied territory, targeting North Korean missiles from South Korea, or the homeland. The boost phase can also be <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOVMSRxbyl4">targeted from space</a>. However, targeting from space is not without its own unique set of challenges. Either way, it will not be solved by America without its allies.</p>
<p>Arguably, five-eyes countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) are already entangled in American <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF11697/IF11697.6.pdf">nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)</a>. Furthermore, the US operates in coordination with other military forces as part of broader coalition operations. Hence, extending Golden Dome to allies is not only possible, but can further leverage the AUKUS pillar two effort. Moreover, a missile defense system consists of <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/sensors-command-control/">sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control systems</a> that work together to detect, track, and intercept incoming missiles.</p>
<p>These necessary components exist in AUKUS pillar two working groups like the cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities, innovation and information sharing, and the deep-space advanced radar capability program (DARC).</p>
<p>AUKUS pillar two leadership should prioritize the development of technologies and supporting systems for an effective extended Golden Dome architecture. America is unlikely to solve the problem in isolation by building a “<a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/golden-dome-strategic-impacts-of-an-untouchable-united-states/">tightly integrated system of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial radar stations, directed-energy platforms, and kinetic interceptors</a>” that senses, decides, and neutralizes incoming missiles. The linkages and opportunities for the prioritization of advanced technology development for missile defense can be found in the following summaries.</p>
<p>Cyber capabilities encompass both offensive and defensive operations for missile defense. Offensive cyber tools are used to deter adversaries and disrupt their operations through tactics such as cyber-reconnaissance, communication isolation, targeted strikes, and network intrusions. Defensively, military forces can prioritize robust network protection, active threat disruption, and seamless coordination across units to safeguard critical systems. Cyber operations can enhance intelligence gathering, command and control, and information warfare to shape public perception and the broader information environment. As conflict evolves, training personnel in cyber tactics and integrating machine learning for threat detection and analysis can maintain strategic advantage.</p>
<p>AI and autonomy can transform missile defense and military operations by enhancing efficiency, precision, and decision-making. Autonomous weapon systems are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat missions. AI-driven wargaming platforms simulate real-world combat scenarios to help strategists test tactics and improve readiness. In command and control, AI supports real-time data processing and analysis. AI optimizes logistics by improving resource allocation, supply-chain management, and transportation.</p>
<p>In intelligence and surveillance, AI analyzes vast datasets to detect patterns and identify threats. Additionally, AI monitors threats and predicts future events. Human-machine teaming allows AI systems to collaborate with human operators, combining strengths and minimizing errors.</p>
<p>Quantum technologies transform missile defenses through enhanced security, operational efficiency, and advanced training. In cybersecurity, quantum-resistant cryptography is being developed to protect against the threat quantum computers pose to traditional encryption. Quantum key distribution offers highly secure communication by transmitting encryption keys through quantum channels, making interception nearly impossible.</p>
<p>In military operations, quantum algorithms can optimize logistics, supply chains, and battlefield strategies by analyzing complex data in real time. Quantum computing could process data in real time, enabling missile defense systems to rapidly analyze incoming threats, allowing for quicker decision-making and more effective interception. Additionally, quantum computing could enable highly accurate simulations of complex systems like nuclear reactions and weapon designs.</p>
<p>Undersea capabilities encompass a wide range of offensive and defensive functions that contribute to missile defense. Offensively, submarines and other undersea platforms can strike surface vessels, submarines, and land-based targets. They are also instrumental in inserting special forces into hostile territory for reconnaissance or sabotage missions. Undersea vehicles play a key role in mine warfare, either by laying mines or clearing minefields. On the defensive side, these platforms are vital for anti-submarine warfare, enabling the detection and neutralization of enemy submarines. They also support surveillance and reconnaissance efforts, gathering intelligence on enemy naval movements. Undersea systems help protect vital infrastructure such as pipelines and communication cables and help ensure safe navigation.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic systems are vital to missile defense operations. Hypersonic glide weapons and hypersonic cruise missiles are designed to strike targets with exceptional speed, maneuverability, and precision while evading traditional defenses. Counter-hypersonic capabilities include advanced sensors and tracking systems like radar and satellite imaging to detect and monitor hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic interceptors aim to neutralize threats mid-flight, while high-power lasers and microwave weapons can disrupt their guidance systems. Effective command-and-control systems are essential for coordinating these defenses, and soft-kill measures such as cyberattacks offer additional means to interfere with hypersonic weapons.</p>
<p>Electronic warfare is fundamental for gaining military advantages in cross-domain missile defense. Electronic attack includes jamming enemy communications, radar, and navigation systems. It also includes spoofing—sending false signals to enemy forces. Electromagnetic or directed-energy weapons disable or destroy enemy assets. Electronic protection ensures secure communication through encryption and satellite links and employs electronic countermeasures (ECM) to defend against attack. Electronic counter-countermeasures are used to overcome enemy ECM and maintain operational effectiveness. Electronic support can be focused on gathering intelligence through signals interception, using sensors for surveillance and target acquisition, and detecting threats in the electromagnetic spectrum.</p>
<p><em>            In short, under the auspices of AUKUS pillar two, Australia and the United Kingdom can contribute to Golden Dome in ways that many may not be thinking about. As longtime allies with a shared culture, history, and values, working together on Golden Dome just makes sense. </em></p>
<p><em>Natalie Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), a Non-Resident Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, and a cohost of the NIDS Deterrence Down Under Podcast.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Extending-the-Golden-Dome-AUKUS-Pillar-2-and-the-Architecture-of-Collective-Defense.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="173" height="48" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 173px) 100vw, 173px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extending-the-golden-dome-aukus-pillar-2/">Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Haseeb Riaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Feb 2025 13:12:27 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30179</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The unceremonious ouster of Syrian President Bashar al Assad marks the demise of the last Ba’athist regime in the Middle East. The end of the 54-year-long Assad dynasty can herald a new era in the fragile body politic of Syria. The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/">The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The unceremonious ouster of Syrian President Bashar al Assad marks the demise of the last Ba’athist regime in the Middle East. The end of the 54-year-long Assad dynasty can herald a new era in the fragile body politic of Syria.</p>
<p>The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/10/middleeast/israel-syria-assad-strikes-intl/index.html">numerous air strikes</a> to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.</p>
<p>The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the <a href="https://pakobserver.net/alarming-power-struggle-in-syria/">US to support rebel factions</a>. The loss of the regime is a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-11/assad-fall-syria-axis-of-resistance-future-iran-hezbollah-hamas/104706528?utm_source=abc_news_web&amp;utm_medium=content_shared&amp;utm_campaign=abc_news_web">major setback</a> to Iran’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-10-03/what-is-irans-axis-of-resistance-who-is-part-of-it/104423298?utm_source=abc_news_web&amp;utm_medium=content_shared&amp;utm_campaign=abc_news_web">axis of resistance</a> and also puts <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-assads-fall-russia-pulling-some-but-not-all-of-its-forces-out-of-syria/">Russian strategic interests in jeopardy</a>. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.</p>
<p>Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.</p>
<p>Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">Iranian support and Russin aerial cover</a> seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.</p>
<p>Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. <a href="https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/warfare-irregular-threats-and-terrorism-program-archives/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir">Hayat Tahrir al-Sham</a> (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.</p>
<p>Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations <a href="https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267?_gl=1*1a1xrgu*_ga*MzEwODExNDYyLjE3MzUyOTY5MzI.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*MTczNTI5NjkzMS4xLjEuMTczNTI5NzA4OS4wLjAuMA..*_ga_S5EKZKSB78*MTczNTI5NjkzMi4xLjEuMTczNTI5Njk4MS4xMS4wLjA.#sanction_measures">designated terrorist organization</a> and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others <a href="https://pakobserver.net/author/dr-zafar-nawaz-jaspal/">covertly supported</a> HTS regime change in Syria.</p>
<p>Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/dem-party-and-turkeys-kurdish-issue">Kurdish</a> desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-17/trump-sees-turkey-as-key-player-shaping-syria-s-future-after-assad-s-fall?embedded-checkout=true">most important player</a> on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.</p>
<p>Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/50464561">oil-rich area</a>, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/15/opinion/al-assad-syria-isis.html">ISIS threat</a>, and it was <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/kurdistan-and-united-states-isis-defeated-what-happens-now">supported by the US</a> in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.</p>
<p>Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/fall-assad-has-exposed-extent-damage-irans-axis-resistance">deprived of deterrence capabilities</a>, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.</p>
<p>Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “<a href="https://youtu.be/eDb_BsKGV6I?si=J9HI6OqFZCrB54je">We don’t want Russia to leave</a>.”</p>
<p>This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.</p>
<p>China has emerged as a <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/saudi-iran-reconciliation-chinas-mediator-role-in-middle-east">credible mediator</a> on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/02/28/chinas-vetoes-during-the-syrian-conflict/">eight times</a>,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.</p>
<p>Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.</p>
<p>Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.</p>
<p>The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.</p>
<p>HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/30/middleeast/syria-elections-four-years-intl/index.html">at least four years before Syria will have a general election</a>. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/The-Geo-Political-Implications-of-New-Syria-and-the-Future-Pathways.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="342" height="95" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 342px) 100vw, 342px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/">The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Navigating the New Frontier: Agentic AI’s Promise and Challenges</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-new-frontier-agentic-ais-promise-and-challenges/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Sharpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2025 13:05:37 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29971</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is entering a new era with the rise of agentic AI, a groundbreaking innovation redefining how machines interact with the world and perform tasks. Unlike traditional AI systems that operate within the bounds of human-defined algorithms and instructions, agentic AI stands apart because it can act autonomously, adapt to changing environments, and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-new-frontier-agentic-ais-promise-and-challenges/">Navigating the New Frontier: Agentic AI’s Promise and Challenges</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is entering a new era with the rise of <a href="https://www.investors.com/news/technology/servicenow-stock-now-stock-mcdermott-interview-artificial-intelligence/">agentic AI</a>, a groundbreaking innovation redefining how machines interact with the world and perform tasks. Unlike traditional AI systems that operate within the bounds of human-defined algorithms and instructions, agentic AI stands apart because it can act autonomously, adapt to changing environments, and make decisions independently to achieve specific objectives. This evolution marks a paradigm shift, moving AI from a tool to an active agent capable of strategic reasoning and complex problem-solving.</p>
<p>Agentic AI quickly became a buzzword in the technology industry, drawing the attention of innovators, corporations, and policymakers alike. By combining machine learning, natural language processing, and real-time analytics, agentic AI systems can interpret nuanced data and execute multi-step tasks previously thought to require human intervention. This capability unlocks immense potential across industries, from healthcare and finance to manufacturing and customer service.</p>
<p>However, the rise of this transformative technology is accompanied by profound challenges. The potential for significant job displacement is actual and imminent. Roles that involve repetitive or analytical tasks could be rendered obsolete, leaving swathes of the workforce vulnerable. This shift is sparking resistance from employees and unions concerned about job security and the ethical implications of AI in the workplace.</p>
<p>In the workplace, agentic AI is already making waves. Businesses leverage these systems to automate complex workflows, enhance productivity, and reduce operational costs. For instance, AI agents are being deployed to streamline supply chains, personalize customer interactions, and even assist in groundbreaking research, such as drug discovery and financial forecasting. As organizations increasingly adopt this technology, the workplace transforms, promising greater efficiency and innovation.</p>
<p>However, the rise of agentic AI is not without challenges. Concerns about job displacement, ethical considerations, and security risks have fueled resistance from employees, unions, and policymakers. Trust in AI decision-making and transparency in its operations remain critical issues that must be addressed for widespread acceptance. Moreover, questions about accountability and regulatory oversight are at the forefront of discussions as the line between human and machine decision-making becomes increasingly blurred.</p>
<p>As this trend continues to gain momentum, agentic AI promises to become a cornerstone of the future economy. Its ability to think, learn, and act autonomously offers unprecedented opportunities to reshape industries and redefine the relationship between humans and technology. With careful implementation and robust ethical guidelines, agentic AI could usher in a new era of collaboration between intelligent systems and human ingenuity, setting the stage for innovations yet to be imagined.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Basics of Agentic AI</strong></p>
<p>Agentic AI represents a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, characterized by its autonomy in decision-making and action execution without direct human intervention. Unlike traditional AI systems that rely on predefined rules, agentic AI adapts to dynamic environments, processes vast data, and formulates strategies to achieve specific objectives. This autonomy enables agentic AI to handle complex, multi-step problems across various <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-are-companies-using-ai-agents-heres-a-look-at-five-early-users-of-the-bots-26f87845">industries</a>.</p>
<p>Integrating agentic AI into the workplace transforms business operations by automating intricate tasks and enhancing efficiency. Companies like ServiceNow are embedding agentic AI into their enterprise software to act as control towers for AI-driven business transformations, facilitating seamless system cooperation. Additionally, organizations such as Johnson &amp; Johnson and Moody’s are deploying AI agents for tasks ranging from drug discovery to financial analysis, demonstrating the versatility and impact of Agentic AI in various sectors.</p>
<p><strong>Potential Benefits</strong></p>
<p>Autonomy and adaptability are critical as agentic AI systems operate independently, making decisions and adapting to changing inputs to achieve specific goals without human oversight. Enhanced productivity is vital because agentic AI automates complex tasks, allowing employees to focus on strategic initiatives, thereby increasing overall productivity.</p>
<p>Agentic AI aids industry applications when it is utilized across various industries, including healthcare, manufacturing, and retail, to optimize processes and improve efficiency.</p>
<p><strong>Emerging Concerns</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>While promising enhanced productivity and operational efficiency, the integration of agentic AI in the workplace faces significant resistance from various groups due to various concerns. These objections stem from ethical, economic, and cultural implications. Worker advocacy organizations and unions express concern about the potential for large-scale job displacement.</p>
<p>Agentic AI, with its capacity to perform complex, multi-step tasks autonomously, threatens roles that rely on repetitive or analytical tasks, such as data analysis, customer service, and logistics coordination. These groups argue that businesses may prioritize short-term cost savings over employee welfare, exacerbating unemployment and wage stagnation.</p>
<p>Employees in affected industries, such as manufacturing, finance, and retail, fear job insecurity and skill redundancy. Their resistance stems from the perception that companies are deploying AI solutions without clear plans for retraining or upskilling displaced workers. Furthermore, employees often express discomfort working alongside autonomous systems due to a lack of trust and transparency in AI decision-making.</p>
<p>Civil rights groups and ethics committees raise alarm bells over the potential misuse of Agentic AI in surveillance, decision-making, and predictive analytics. Concerns center on the lack of accountability for autonomous decisions, biases in AI algorithms, and the possibility of violating individual privacy rights. These groups argue that deploying AI without clear ethical guidelines undermines trust and could harm marginalized communities disproportionately.</p>
<p>Many managers view agentic AI as threatening their authority and decision-making roles. With AI systems taking on responsibilities like resource allocation and strategic planning, resistance arises from concerns about <a href="https://scet.berkeley.edu/the-next-next-big-thing-agentic-ais-opportunities-and-risks/">diminished relevance</a> and influence in organizational hierarchies.</p>
<p><strong>C-Suite Leadership and Industry Best Practices</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Executives, particularly C-suite leadership, often resist large-scale AI adoption due to high implementation costs, cybersecurity risks, and the challenges of integrating AI into legacy systems. They also face pressure to ensure ethical compliance, which slows decision-making processes and creates resistance to adopting agentic AI systems.</p>
<p>As agentic AI reshapes the corporate landscape, C-suite leaders face a dual imperative: embracing this <a href="https://www.exitcertified.com/blog/understanding-agentic-ai">transformative technology</a>, driving innovation, and remaining attractive to top talent while supporting existing employees. Forward-thinking executives recognize that successfully navigating this shift requires technical adoption and a strategic focus on building a resilient and inclusive workplace culture.</p>
<p>C-suite leaders emphasize reskilling and upskilling programs to keep <a href="https://venturebeat.com/programming-development/agentic-ai-can-help-you-to-get-a-new-software-engineering-job-in-2025/">talent coming</a>. By investing in continuous learning initiatives, leaders can empower employees to thrive alongside agentic AI, positioning their companies as industry leaders prioritizing professional growth. Additionally, fostering partnerships with academic institutions and specialized training providers enables businesses to cultivate a pipeline of skilled professionals eager to work with cutting-edge technologies.</p>
<p>Equally important is addressing employee concerns about job security and ethical AI deployment. Transparent communication about how agentic AI is integrated and its benefits to the organization and <a href="https://techbullion.com/copy-of-understanding-the-role-of-intentionality-in-agentic-ai/">workforce</a> helps build trust.</p>
<p>C-suite leaders should also protect their organizations by establishing best practices for ethical AI use, including governance frameworks, data privacy safeguards, and inclusive decision-making processes. These measures mitigate risks and position companies as responsible innovators, enhancing their reputation among employees, customers, and investors.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Ethics and Governance</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>In the broader policy perspective, regulatory authorities resist rapid adoption due to insufficient legislation governing AI ethics, accountability, and security. Policymakers advocate for stricter oversight and clearer governance frameworks to mitigate autonomy and data security risks.</p>
<p>While this innovation has much to be praised, consumer resistance stems from a lack of understanding and <a href="https://www.knime.com/blog/what-is-agentic-ai">trust in</a> agentic AI systems. Concerns about transparency in AI-driven decisions—such as pricing models, recommendations, or dispute resolutions—lead to skepticism about businesses that fully rely on such systems.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Tech Companies Eye Financial Windfall from Agentic AI</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong><a href="https://www.investors.com/news/technology/servicenow-stock-now-stock-mcdermott-interview-artificial-intelligence/">Tech giants</a> are racing to position themselves at the forefront of the agentic AI revolution, recognizing its immense potential to drive financial growth. Companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon invest heavily in research and development to create advanced AI agents capable of autonomous decision-making. These firms view agentic AI as a transformative technology that can enhance their existing platforms, open new revenue streams, and cement their dominance in the AI landscape. For instance, <a href="https://venturebeat.com/ai/nvidia-launches-agentic-ai-blueprints-to-automate-work-for-enterprises/">enterprise solutions powered</a> by agentic AI are being marketed as tools to revolutionize industries by automating complex tasks, optimizing workflows, and delivering unprecedented efficiency.</p>
<p>Start-ups and established firms compete to attract venture capital funding, focusing on niche applications such as healthcare diagnostics, financial analytics, and personalized customer experiences. These targeted deployments promise significant cost savings for businesses, making them attractive investments. Additionally, tech companies are integrating agentic AI into cloud computing services, offering businesses scalable, AI-powered solutions that can be tailored to diverse needs.</p>
<p>In short, Agentic AI is coming. It will shape industry, government, and the military, and preparing for that future is critical.</p>
<p>Mr. Greg Sharpe is a Fellow and the director of Communications and Marketing for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the Managing Design Editor for the Global Security Review. He has 25+ years in marketing and communications with a focus on digital communications, organizational and institutional change, and analysis.  Greg has over 35 years of military, federal civilian, and defense contractor experience in the fields of database development, digital marketing &amp; analytics, and organizational outreach and engagement, technology use case exploration and assessment.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/The-Rise-of-Agentic-AI.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-new-frontier-agentic-ais-promise-and-challenges/">Navigating the New Frontier: Agentic AI’s Promise and Challenges</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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