Washington’s Return to Central Asia

 For the past two decades, Central Asia—comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—has largely remained on the margins of U.S. foreign policy. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed the region not as a battlefield, but as a quiet buffer zone separating Russia, China, and Iran. That perception, however, is changing. The war in Ukraine, the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, and the reemergence of ‘bloc politics’ have convinced U.S. strategists that the stability of this region will shape not only Eurasia’s future, but also the architecture of the emerging world order.

This renewed engagement can be seen as a redefinition of the C5+1 initiative that began under the Biden administration but is now being pursued under Trump with a distinctly economic and commercial tone. The difference lies in emphasis: rather than promoting liberal values, Washington’s new approach prioritizes industrial cooperation, transit corridors, and competition over critical mineral resources.

Washington no longer relies on hard containment. Instead, it is adopting what American policy circles call ‘smart containment’: a strategy of weaving economic, technological, and logistical interdependence that constrains Russian and Chinese influence without a military presence. Central Asia can become a strategic lever for Washington by positioning itself against Russia through reducing export routes dependent on Moscow and reshaping energy transport networks. For China, Central Asia can compete in the extraction and processing of vital minerals, which are the backbone of batteries, clean energy, and advanced technologies.

 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Washington’s two Strategic Anchors

The United States engages Central Asia through two key partners: Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and the world’s main uranium producer, has become increasingly attractive to the Trump administration, and Uzbekistan, with its central location and sizable population. Investments by major U.S. companies like GE, Wabtec, and Microsoft represent more than industrial partnerships. They are part of Washington’s broader efforts to build non-Chinese supply chains, integrating the region into networks that bypass Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Central Asian republics are now seeking to act independently. Kazakhstan, for instance, blocked the deployment of Wagner Group forces near its borders in 2023 and declined to deepen its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan, for its part, has introduced new foreign investment reforms designed to limit its dependence on China. The region’s leaders have now learned that diversification, not dependence, is the true safeguard of sovereignty and survival in an increasingly competitive Eurasian landscape.

Trump’s recent summit with Central Asian leaders carried significant political weight.  Kazakhstan’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords marks the first formal linkage between the Middle East and the Eurasian security architectures. Further, Kazakhstan recently signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. Company Wabtec Corporation to supply 300 locomotives over the next decade. Central Asia holds vast reserves of strategic minerals such as lithium, copper, and uranium that the U.S. can capitalize on.

Washington at a Crossroads: Containment or Partnership

Central Asia’s renewed importance for the United States stems from its position at the intersection of three major global trends: competition for vital resources, the restructuring of supply chains, and the emergence of a multipolar world order. This realization has prompted Washington to return to the heart of Eurasia after two decades of relative disengagement. Still, Washington will have to decide on a long-term strategy for diplomacy in Central Asia.

Today, Washington faces a choice between two approaches in Central Asia. The first is a containment-oriented strategy, viewing Central Asia primarily as a tool to counter China and Russia. The second is a partnership-oriented approach, focusing on infrastructure, technology, and sustainable development, which could help transform Central Asia into a genuine partner in the emerging global order.

Kazakhstan’s multi-alignment strategy, Turkmenistan’s neutrality, and Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach signal efforts to navigate between competing powers. If these dynamics are guided by a cooperative mindset, Central Asia could transform from a backyard of disparate states to a bridge between major powers. However, if the competition continues under a zero-sum logic, the history of Cold War competition risks repeating itself in a new guise.

By embracing a cooperative strategy that recognizes the region’s strategic autonomy and prioritizes economic diversification and technological cooperation, Washington could move beyond the traditional containment mindset. In doing so, it could play a constructive role in shaping a new Eurasian order grounded in soft power, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.

The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.

Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.

The follow-on ceasefire agreement stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.

China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.

Bolstering Alliances

 On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.

Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.

Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.

The Dealmaker

 Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.

First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the underlying causes of the conflict and pathways for reconciliation.

Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.

In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the next few weeks. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.

Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to expand the Abraham Accords so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.

Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.

The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.

Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.

Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of the United States Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

As discussions of retaliation by Israel continue, the media discuss Iranian oil refineries as possible targets that might be hit. Israeli Defence minister, Yoav Gallant, stated that retaliation against Iran’s missile attacks will be “lethal and surprising.” Meanwhile, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked social media accounts are already spreading reports that Tehran warned the United States that actions against Iranian oil refineries will lead the Islamic Republic to target oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait. According to a Reuters report, Iran also warned the Gulf Arab states that any use of their airspace or military bases to target Iran will be unacceptable and threatened a military response.

Iran’s Strategy

Iran’s reference to Azerbaijan as a potential target, should Israel attack Iranian oil refineries, is an indication of the Islamic Republic’s growing threat to critical energy infrastructure not only in the Middle East, but also in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea basin region. Azerbaijan supplies 40 percent of Israel’s energy needs and Azerbaijan’s oil and gas infrastructure is the backbone of its independence in the geopolitically tense region.

Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR, alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed, was awarded a licence to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan are a primary concern for Iran.

In anticipation of Israeli retaliation against the Iranian ballistic missile attacks, the Iranian media continues to make unsubstantiated claims about supposed secret Israeli military bases in Azerbaijan with a ridiculous accusation that Azerbaijan is one of the origins of sabotage against the Islamic Republic. Talking about possible Israeli retaliation against Iranian oil facilities, Iranian diplomat Abbas Mousavi falsely claimed in an interview to Tejarat News that Israel deployed many planes to Azerbaijan.

In fact, since Hamas launched the brutal terrorist attacks against Israel in October 2023, Iran’s main goal is the consolidation of the members of the Organisation of Islamic States to achieve an economic blockade and diplomatic isolation from Israel. Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei repeatedly called on Arab and Muslim countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel. Iranian officials frequently repeat similar calls showing Tehran’s agenda behind the Hamas attacks, which aimed to disrupt economic, political, and diplomatic relations between the State of Israel and Muslim-majority nations.

Iran’s multidimensional strategy behind the Hamas attacks was based on several ambitious goals, including preventing possible normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states; derailing the Abraham Accords; preventing efforts to improve strained Turkish-Israeli ties; and trying to inflict economic and diplomatic damage on Israel-Azerbaijan strategic ties. Iran’s strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian media outlets launched coordinated propaganda attacks against Turkey and Azerbaijan for supplying crude oil to Israel via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline since the Hamas terrorist attacks and start of the subsequent war in Gaza. Iran-inspired, pro-Hamas Islamist, and leftist circles in Turkey staged several demonstrations where they vandalised Azerbaijani oil company, SOCAR, offices in Istanbul in an attempt to halt oil exports.

Considering the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, the country is a comfortable space for Iranian propaganda and hybrid activities covered by so-called Islamic narratives. Ironically, the fact that Iran is a major energy supplier to Armenia and supplied the formerly Armenian-occupied Karabakh region received no similar response from Islamists or leftists in Turkey.

Coercive Actions

Iran’s military threats against Azerbaijan increased from the end of the Second Karabakh War, when the balance of power in the South Caucasus shifted in Baku’s favor. Iran conducted several military drills near Azerbaijan’s border, putting on a show of force against the geopolitical changes in the region. In late September and early October 2021 Iran suddenly conducted military drills near Azerbaijan’s borders.

An Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman described the exercises as a “sovereign right,” saying, “Iran will not tolerate the presence of the Zionist regime” near its borders. Iran undertook another military provocation a year later when Tehran laid pontoon bridges across the Araz River near the Azerbaijani border and crossed the river as part of war games. In March 2023, an Iranian air force fighter jet violated Azerbaijan’s airspace. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry summoned Iran’s ambassador, and the Azerbaijani Defence and Foreign Ministries issued a joint statement condemning the incursion.

When Israel liquidated Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, in Damascus in April 2024, Iranian member of parliament, Jalal Rashidi Kochi, called for strikes on an Israeli embassy in the region, preferably in Azerbaijan. Iranian attempts to target the Israeli embassy and ambassadors in Baku were also foiled on many occasions over the years; the most recent reported attempt involved the arrest of an Afghan national in July 2023. Recently Iran has enhanced its naval capabilities in the Caspian Sea and increased naval drills, including joint drills with Russia.

Iran’s Missile and Cyber Capabilities

Iran possesses numerous capabilities to threaten critical infrastructure including energy and power in the region. Among them Tehran’s ballistic missiles and cyber tools are key. Iran maintains the largest ballistic and cruise missile force in the Middle East, capable of reaching 2,500 kilometres from its borders. Moreover, these capabilities combined with Iran’s drone arsenal can overwhelm missile defence systems. Iran’s missile attacks against Saudi oil facilities in 2019 were conducted by a combination of drones and cruise missiles.

Iran has improved its offensive cyber capabilities, too, and is capable of causing localised and temporary disruption to corporate networks for days or weeks. Drilling oil wells, pumping crude oil, and loading fuel are processes where cyberattacks can cause significant disruptions. According to an FBI report released in August 2024, Iran exploited computer network vulnerabilities to infiltrate and steal sensitive technical data from organisations in Israel and Azerbaijan. In July, cybersecurity firm Check Point reported that an Iranian hacker group named Muddy Water, affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, increased its cyber activities against targets in Azerbaijan, Israel, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Securing Critical Infrastructure

Overall, considering Azerbaijan’s key role in the energy security of vital American allies, such as Europe, Israel, and Turkey, and its significant help in supplying energy to US-friendly states Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the next administration needs to reverse shortsighted Biden State Department policy. The decision not to waive Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, banning US aid to the Azerbaijani government, damages American interests in the South Caucasus. It is in the interest of the US and Azerbaijan to expand their military and technical partnership to secure critical infrastructure in the region.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Threat to Azerbaijan’s Critical Energy Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.

In March 2023 Azerbaijan finally opened its embassy in Israel, despite establishing bilateral relations in 1992. Baku opted to open its embassy in Tel Aviv after restoring its territorial integrity. The next month, in April 2023, Israel inaugurated its embassy in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, making it the closest Israeli embassy to Iran, just 17 km from the Iranian border. Iran followed all these diplomatic moves with annoyance and concern.

Normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations was also widely discussed as an extension of the Abraham Accords. Momentum similarly grew in 2022 for Israel and Turkey to normalize their strained relations. At the next meeting between Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, they agreed to continue developing bilateral relations and to pay official visits to each other.

Azerbaijan’s initiative to set a new trilateral format for cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey was advancing rapidly in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty for Tehran. The October 7, 2023, attack on Israel gave Iran the chance to derail possible Saudi-Israeli and Turkish-Israeli ties and stop the Azerbaijani initiative for trilateral cooperation in its tracks.

Tehran seized the opportunity of the war in Gaza to pursue its grand, multidimensional strategy. It is using economic means, via a set of coercive actions, to achieve foreign policy objectives, something widely overlooked. Iran’s multidimensional strategy seeks to achieve multiple goals simultaneously, in both the Middle East and South Caucasus.

Iranian strategy prioritizes using economic means to isolate Israel by derailing its relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the Gulf Arab states. Iran’s subtle, calculated, approach also intends to inflict an economic blow on Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey, which makes substantial revenue from the export of oil via Turkey to Israel.

Considering the global nature of the modern economy, economic power plays a significant role in shaping geopolitical outcomes and foreign policy. In this case, Iran’s usage of political, diplomatic, and media instruments, as well as its regional proxies like the Houthis in Yemen, merits analysis. The use of economic means to shape geopolitical outcomes and achieve foreign policy goals is the cornerstone of Iran’s multidimensional strategy. Iran does not possess the necessary economic means, by itself. However, the Islamic Republic does possess significant geopolitical assets in the form of proxy groups and diplomatic and media resources, which it is using to hinder or shut down global navigation and prevent the flow of strategic commodities to Israel.

The late Iranian foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, called on Muslim-majority countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel and expel its envoys in October 2023. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called on Muslim countries to cease trade, particularly food and oil with Israel, the following month. Hasan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, followed Ayatollah Khamenei’s call and appealed to Arab and Islamic countries to impose an oil embargo on Israel.

The call for an economic boycott of Israel by Muslim-majority states gives an insight into Iran’s multidimensional strategy. The late Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, also reiterated Ayatollah Khamenei’s call for a boycott of Israel at the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh in November 2023. President Raisi argued that Islamic countries must cut diplomatic relations as well as refuse to buy Israeli goods, echoing Khamenei’s call. Weeks after his call for an economic boycott, Ayatollah Khamenei had urged Muslim countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel to halt diplomatic ties for a limited period. In January 2024 Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his call for a total blockade of Israel by Muslim countries.

The official rhetoric of Iran’s leaders clearly shows Tehran’s multidimensional strategy of using the war in Gaza to isolate Israel economically, impose an oil embargo, destroy economic and diplomatic ties between Israel and Muslim-majority countries, and position Iran as a major geopolitical force in the region. To implement this strategy Iran has employed coercive media propaganda against many countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. Iranian media has intensified criticism of Turkey for its trade and economic ties with Israel and Azerbaijan for oil exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which meet 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil.

Iranian media has also targeted Turkish president Erdoğan for not cutting trade relations with Israel, which was actively used within Turkey by Islamist circles including the leader of the Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP), Fatih Erbakan, in recent local elections. The New Welfare Party, which sympathizes with Iran, managed to get 6.1 percent of the nationwide vote—contributing to Erdoğan’s first election loss in decades. When Erdoğan’s ruling party suffered the election setback, he launched economic measures against Israel, halting trade. Iranian media propaganda and the active shaping of the narrative in the run-up to elections in Turkey yielded a significant result by creating strain in diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and Israel. The multidimensional Iranian strategy of achieving goals in multiple theatres has so far succeeded in two places: Turkey and Yemen. Using the Houthis to disrupt maritime shipping, Iran positioned itself as a key player that can shut down trade not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Bab al Mandab Strait.

Iran’s strategy of using economic means to achieve its goals also entails containing and weakening Azerbaijan by inflicting significant revenue losses. Not only does Azerbaijan meet nearly 40 percent of Israel’s demand for crude oil, Azerbaijan’s state energy giant SOCAR alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed were awarded a license to explore an area to the north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean. The strong bilateral and multifaceted relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have long been a primary concern for the Iranian establishment. The military-technical partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan helped Baku boost its national security and defense, as well as to retake control of its territory from occupying Armenian forces. Changes in the realities of South Caucasus politics since 2020 are a security concern for Tehran. Constant Iranian media attacks against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline are part of the multidimensional Iranian strategy.

Better understanding Iran’s strategy is important if the United States desires to counter those efforts. Iran’s use of hybrid warfare, proxies, media propaganda, and blackmail—to force neighboring countries to cut economic and diplomatic ties with Israel—is having some success but is not in the interest of the region. Iran’s primary goal is to derail the normalisation process under the Arab-Israeli Abraham Accords; to strain Turkish-Israeli diplomatic and economic ties; to damage Azerbaijan’s independence by targeting its primary source of revenue; to prevent the emergence of the Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey trilateral cooperation; and to prevent further diplomatic normalisation of relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states. It is only through understanding Iranian efforts that the United States, Israel, and the larger region can prevent Iran’s success.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City, University of London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Iran’s Multidimensional Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.