Advances in space technology are making the extraction of lunar and asteroid materials increasingly feasible. These capabilities promise the potential for significant economic gains, greater energy security, and new avenues of geopolitical influence for any spacefaring nation capable of developing and sustaining resource-extraction operations. As competition accelerates, the question is no longer whether space mining will occur, but who will shape the rules, norms, and capabilities that govern it.

To preserve American power in space, the United States must take formative policy action and protective research and development (R&D) measures to define the future of space mining before rival nations do. Building on the strategic momentum established in the space domain during the first Trump Administration, namely the creation of the U.S. Space Force, securing an early foothold in space mining will help counter adversarial efforts to undermine American leadership and preserve space as a key frontier for American power.

Formative Policy Action in Space Mining

In emerging domains, the first actors often leave a legacy that serves as a reference point for subsequent laws and behavior, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed outer space beyond its initial symbolic and scientific uses. Concerns over nuclear escalation prompted the creation of a legal framework that addressed non-weaponization and restrictions on national sovereignty. Despite approaching its 60th anniversary, the OST remains a foundational pillar of outer space governance, demonstrating how proactive U.S. leadership defined the rules of engagement and established operational precedents in an emerging domain. Sustaining this proactive approach is critical if the U.S. is to seize the strategic opportunities in outer space.

Space mining is among the more recent technical opportunities to emerge, alongside satellite constellations, orbital maneuvering, and AI-enabled platforms. Yet space mining is unique in that it offers potential energy security and trillions of dollars in economic value to those possessing return-to-Earth capabilities (currently limited, forcing a focus on in-situ resource utilization (ISR) for propulsion and life support). According to NASA’s Asterank database, extracting resources from the ten most cost-effective asteroids could yield profits exceeding $1.5 trillion. The promise of energy resilience and economic gain has captured the attention of global powers and middle-state actors alike, leading to a growing number of spacefaring nations and sparking geopolitical friction.

The U.S. and Luxembourg were among the first to formalize space mining in their legal frameworks, recognizing outer space resources as property subject to ownership and commercial trade. Conversely, Russia cites the Outer Space Treaty’s designation of space as the “province of all mankind” as a basis for prohibiting resource extraction and ownership. In response to the Trump Administration’s proposed lunar mining initiatives, Russian officials went so far as to accuse the U.S. of orchestrating an “invasion” of the Moon, likening it to “another Afghanistan or Iraq.” Russia’s actions, however, contrast sharply with its public stance, given its willingness to explore an agreement on space mining with Luxembourg in 2019.

Yet American space mining laws have been relatively insulated from further international criticism because they align with formative international frameworks. For example, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 reflects Article II of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies. Additionally, the 2020 National Space Policy aligns with the Artemis Accords by emphasizing transparency in national space policies and space exploration plans, as well as the sharing of scientific information. The legitimacy of U.S. legal principles has been strengthened by demonstrating its commitment to sharing the space domain as a collaborative partner while advancing its own interests and strategic advantages.

Critical questions about access to mining sites, extraction limits, and fair participation remain unanswered because frameworks such as the OST predate the concept of space mining. Addressing these questions and providing certainty before capabilities mature or competing nations establish their own frameworks is essential to preserving a U.S. strategic advantage in space.

Protective R&D Measures for Space Mining Capabilities

As the future of space mining and its economic potential threaten to catalyze geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for the U.S. not only to be among the first to establish governance frameworks but also to develop tangible space mining capabilities. Yet space is no longer a domain of uncontested U.S. dominance, as China has evolved from a near-peer to a peer competitor. Initiatives such as the Tiangong Space Station and the International Lunar Research Station underscore China’s growing space capabilities and its ambitions to assume a leadership role.

China’s rapid rise may be attributed in part to its exposure to U.S. space technologies, as bilateral cooperation agreements have provided avenues for interaction with U.S. research and development efforts. Despite the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits bilateral cooperation with China without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI, numerous violations of the provision have likely conferred strategic benefits on China, eroding the competitive edge the U.S. seeks to maintain. In 2024, the Office of the Inspector General investigated a state University for violations of the Wolf Amendment and announced in December that the University agreed to pay $715,580 to resolve civil allegations. When applying for and receiving NASA research grants, the University failed to disclose a professor’s affiliations with and support from the Chinese government. Similarly, according to a report published by the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), hundreds of articles crediting NASA funding were identified that were jointly published by U.S. researchers (including public universities and federal research entities) and CCP institutions. In early February 2026, the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to pay nearly $130,000 in penalties after federal investigators alleged that the lead principal investigator for a NASA-funded Center for Advanced Measurements in Extreme Environments failed to disclose affiliations with researchers in China.

China’s sustained intellectual property theft is eroding U.S. dominance in space and diminishing the impact of formative U.S. space mining policy measures. Prioritizing R&D for space mining, particularly return-to-Earth capabilities, is a central focus for spacefaring nations and must be a priority for the United States. However, R&D initiatives must be paired with enforceable oversight structures that protect intellectual property from adversarial appropriation. Enforcement entities should also demonstrate a clear commitment to implementing protective measures and punishing violators. Without such protections, any research investments risk benefiting adversarial states as much as the U.S., as evidenced by instances in which China has capitalized on U.S.-funded advancements.

Conclusion

Although the U.S. is facing increasing demands across emerging warfighting domains, with numerous competing national security concerns, space resource governance and capability development can no longer be sidelined. The U.S. must act decisively and with strategic clarity to build the legal and behavioral foundations for space mining, and to enact protections for space mining R&D, as competitors advance their own initiatives. Space mining has become a strategic imperative, one that this Administration must seize to ensure that American values, interests, and leadership define this emerging domain, resource governance and capability development resource governance and capability development.

Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Western Hemisphere is the de facto core position for undisputed U.S. power, integrity, and uncompromising sovereignty. While the U.S. commitment to Europe remains, European nation-states must step up to the plate and take charge of funding and leadership of their own defense. The segment on “civilisational erasure” is directly aligned with the position already made explicit by Vice President JD Vance in early 2025 at the Paris artificial intelligence conference in France and the Munich Security Conference in Germany.

One of the most meaningful merits of the NSS is its call to reposition economic security, industrial renaissance, and technological leadership at the heart of the U.S. strategy to deter and prevail in the event of military conflict. The NSS refrains from mentioning “major power competition,” opting instead for an acknowledgement of spheres of influence.  The NSS does not antagonizes China, instead framing it as an economic and technological competitor, rather than an ideological one. Sustaining American reshoring, reindustrialization, industrial base funding, technological edge, manufacturing supply chains, and access to critical materials, is what underwrites how the U.S. deals with China, deterrence postures notwithstanding. A clear focus on economic competition allows the NSS to remain as vague as possible on the potential for military confrontations in the Indo-Pacific.

Economy, Industry, Technology

In the 2025 NSS, the terms “economy/economic” are used 66 times and “industry/industrial” 19 times, including under “industrial base,” “industrial production,” and “industrial supply chains.” As for “technology/technological,” they appear 17 times. The core meaning of a dozen such mentions is captured as follows:

U.S. military power and diplomatic influence rest on a strong, resilient domestic economy. National security depends on rebuilding America’s industrial base, restoring economic self-reliance, and securing critical supply chains. Economic and technological competitiveness over the long term is essential to preventing conflict and sustaining global leadership. Further, the United States will actively protect its workers and firms from unfair economic practices.

American power requires an industrial sector able to meet both civilian and wartime production needs. Reindustrialization is a top national economic priority, aimed at strengthening the middle class and regaining control over production and supply chains. The U.S. will reshore manufacturing, attract investment, and expand domestic capacity, particularly in critical and emerging technologies. Hence a credible military depends on a robust and resilient defense industrial base.

Preserving merit, innovation, and technological leadership is essential to maintaining America’s historic advantages. Strengthening the resilience of the U.S. technology ecosystem, especially in areas such as AI, is a national priority and a foundation of global leadership. Thus, long-term success in technological competition is central to deterrence and conflict prevention.

Economic Security First

The 2025 NSS references industries primarily through a national-security lens, rather than civilian market categorization, including defense (industrial base, munitions production, weapons systems manufacturing, military supply chains), manufacturing (re-shored industrial production, domestic manufacturing capacity, wartime and peacetime production), energy (oil, gas, coal, nuclear) and its infrastructure and exports, strategic supply chains (critical materials, components and parts manufacturing, logistics and production networks), infrastructure, both physical and digital to be built at industrial-scale, and strategic technologies.

The 2025 NSS strategic technologies are artificial intelligence, explicitly cited as a comparative U.S. advantage; other critical and emerging technologies such as dual-use and strategic technologies tied to national power; defense and military technologie integrated with industrial and innovation advantages; intelligence and surveillance technologies such as monitoring supply chains, vulnerabilities, and threats; cyber technology including espionage, theft, and protection of intellectual property; industrial and manufacturing technologies aiming at re-shoring, reindustrialization, and advanced manufacturing; energy technologies directly linked to economic and national security; and sensitive technologies protected via aligned export controls.

The 2025 NSS treats economic power, industrial superiority, and technological edge as inseparable pillars of national security. Technology is framed less as a civilian growth driver and more as a strategic asset, a competitive weapon, and a deterrence multiplier. Civilian industry is subordinated to national resilience, mobilization capacity, and deterrence, reinforcing the 2025 NSS’s broader fusion of economic security, industrial policy, and military strategy. This constitutes an optimal response to the Chinese “civilian-military fusion” and “unrestricted warfare” model.

Space

While a mention of “space” appears only once on page 21 of the NSS, the second Trump administration published on December 18th an Executive Order “Ensuring American Space Superiority“ prioritizing lunar basing and economic development by 2030 with a clear focus on Artemis, cislunar security as a theatre, and space nuclear power on a schedule. To secure U.S. assets and interests from Earth orbit through cislunar space to the Moon, integrating commercial capabilities into the defense complex, reforming acquisition, and modernizing the nation’s military space architecture become paramount. Space traffic management and space situational awareness services are no longer solely provided by the U.S. government for free.

Repositioning the U.S. as an unrivalled economic-industrial-technological leader provides valuable opportunities to the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific and Europe-Middle-East-Africa regions: “The goal is for our partner nations to build up their domestic economies, while an economically stronger and more sophisticated Western Hemisphere becomes an increasingly attractive market for American commerce and investment.” After 35 years of the West divorcing itself from Reality, we now face a technology-savvy tripolar world. The NSS, complemented by the Executive Order on Ensuring American Space Superiority, merely reflects a long overdue readjustment to 21st-century geopolitics. These are fundamentally the space, nuclear, and disruptive industries, focused in ways that achieve techno-strategic power.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Techno-Economic power at the heart of the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

This 1 billion euros will be part of the ESA’s overall budget request of 22 billion euros for the next three years. Member states are expected to approve the funding at the ministerial meeting in Bremen, Germany, on November 26, 2025. ESA Director General Joseph Aschbacher (ESA DG) made these announcements on the sidelines of the annual conference of the European Space Policy Institute in Vienna.

Consider it a down payment on the real deal, which is the increased weight of security in the future distribution of the ESA’s space expenditures in the seven-year budget for 2028–2034. Because that budget will not be approved until 2028, the ESA’s stop-gap solution is critical to securing the program’s timely deployment. The deployment of such defense and security capabilities under the ESA program would be handled by an operational entity that has yet to be established.

The Times, They-Are-A-Changin’

During the half century since the creation of the ESA, hard power security was a “forbidden” topic with defense projects rejected as off-limits. This is no longer the case; the ESA DG confirmed that the agency’s 22 countries now agree that defense projects should be included to strengthen security. The DG said, “This does not require changes to our convention, as we discussed this in detail last year; the wording ‘peaceful purposes’ is actually interpreted for defense. The best proof that member states agree with this interpretation is that they asked me to submit the program.”

Bureaucratically speaking, the European Commission (EC) calls the new military satellite system the Earth Observation Governmental Service (EOGS). The ESA calls it the European Resilience from Space (ERS)—neither are military names.

Existing European Union (EU) space programs like Galileo, an alternative to the American Global Positionning System (GPS) and Copernicus, which monitors the effects of climate change, are used for civilian purposes. However, the ERS program is meant to pool national space assets and develop new capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, communications, and navigation to strengthen Europe’s resilience and autonomy in the face of emerging security threats. The 1 billion euro split is 75/25. Seven hundred fifty million euros go to an Earth observation component (ERS-EO), feeding the EC’s planned Earth Observation Government Services, expected to begin in 2028. The remaining 250 million euros support navigation (ERS-Nav). In addition, ERS-Com, the communications element, will encompass additional work for the IRIS2 program—the EU’s secure satellite communications network in low Earth orbit expected to serve as an alternative to Starlink by the 2030s. 

Old Dogs, New Tricks

As Russian President Vladimir Putin employs his nuclear swagger, with no endgame in Ukraine and no deal with Iran, Europe further faces a reality check in its security relationship with the United States—at a time when realism is resurgent. The EU developed a space strategy for security and defense with the European Commission taking charge.

While France doubles down on space defense tech and Nordic countries supercharge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) deterrence, political uncertainties in the European defensive build-up went from bad to worse, because NATO’s defense math often does not add up. The involvement of the ESA would bring a significant political, budgetary, and industry contribution to European space defense capacity building.

As emphasized by the ESA DG, “Strategically, this is very important because the project is aimed at a new group of users, namely users in the security and defense sector. In this moment of rapid change, there is a critical need to synchronise European initiatives by aligning space for defence competencies, avoiding duplication, and pooling resources for scale. We still remain too fragmented to guarantee Europe genuine, comprehensive, and autonomous space resilience. We have an opportunity to change that, and we must.”

In practice, participating European nations would retain control over their own assets but could make excess capacity available to others on an in-kind basis. This pooled capacity will be complemented by data from the EU’s existing Copernicus Earth observation constellation and by new satellites developed under the program—the first of which could be launched as early as 2028—using a European launcher rather than using SpaceX.

Costly Regulatory Constraints      

The European space and defense policy is proposed by the EC, reviewed by the European Parliament, and implemented by member states. In June 2025, the EC added the EU Space Act draft to its legislative amendment and adoption process for implementation no earlier than 2030.

The act’s long lead time could reduce its immediate impact, as the EU’s own constellations risks being outpaced by SpaceX’s Starlink and its new direct-to-device (D2D) constellation. Amazon’s Kuiper and by China’s Guowang and Qianfan also threaten its relevance. The intention is laudable when it comes to harmonizing a fragmented legal environment that provides legal certainty and creates a competitive, resilient, and sustainable single space market across the EU. But it is also clear that American space companies dominating the global space market stand to lose the most from the EU Space Act, since compliance with the new rules would require rather costly adjustments. Even though the United Kingdom (UK) is a major contributor to the ESA budget, the UK is no longer part of the EU. As such, British space companies would need to establish themselves as European entities residing on the continent, including by merger and acquisition, to retain unfettered access to the market.

The ESA’s $1 billion request is a long overdue move in the right direction. Europe, however, talks a great deal of “strategic autonomy” but has yet to unhitch itself from its over-reliance on the US in space and defense capabilities. Whether the European bureaucracy can pull it off and walk the walk remains to be seen in the current climate of political dissent and financial quandary.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are the author’s own.

European Space Agency Goes Boldly was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary Meink’s wake-up call deserves restating,

One area of particular focus for the US Space Force is “space control,” the ability to ensure that US satellites can operate without interference while denying adversaries the same freedom. Unfortunately, 10 to 15 years ago, some of our adversaries started to weaponize space, and weaponized space aggressively. We stood on the sideline, probably too long. We didn’t want to go down that path, but now we are pushing hard. We didn’t start the race to weaponize space, but we have to make sure we can continue to operate in that domain. Going forward, we can’t lose that high ground.

This long overdue improvement in strategic communication marks a turning point toward rebuilding a credible American space deterrent. China seized the high ground through a rapid build-up of space deterrence and warfighting forces, while Australia, Japan, and South Korea observed warily this tipping of the strategic balance. The US and Europe pretended it was not a problem at all.

This was part of a broader trend for the West to bury its head in the sand for most of the past 35 years, from nuclear deterrence to space warfare. As adversaries weaponized space, the US Space Force (USSF) acknowledges at long last it must focus on fielding credible and effective deterrence and warfighting forces in space.

The USSF published an International Partnership Strategy, where “strength through partnerships” aligns allies with US space efforts. There are challenges, however, for an effective USSF international strategy. These include divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues surrounding space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy. If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies.

It turns out allies make similar moves. The US and UK Space Commands conducted their first-ever coordinated satellite maneuver in early September 2025. Among Quad members, Japan’s new space domain defense guidelines spearhead rapid battlespace awareness and real-time detection and tracking of threats. This further reinforces the importance of disrupting adversary command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I) and other expanding threats. India will develop “bodyguard satellites” after an orbital near-miss. France’s National Strategic Review 2025 makes space central to sovereignty and defense, to acquire rapidly deployable ground and space capabilities to deny, disable, or disrupt adversaries. Last, but certainly not least, Germany is ramping up its military space posture.

When Boris Pistorius, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, announced a $41 billion investment to counter the “fundamental threat” posed by Russia and China, he mentioned their targeting and tracking of Western satellites. While flying over Germany on reconnaissance missions, two Russian Luch-Olymp spy satellites tracked two Intelsat satellites used by the German Bundeswehr.

Pistorius suggested the Bundeswehr could centralize Germany’s military space functions to quickly respond in conflict. That requires investment in hardened systems less prone to Russian and Chinese jamming, spoofing, and manipulation. Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required.

Insufficient yet required functionalities need fixing. This includes resilience of satellite constellations and ground stations, secured launch functions, improved space domain awareness capabilities, and space surveillance satellites.

This does not happen in a capability vacuum and leaves some questions unanswered on how to square that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite Ariane 6 and rocket ventures, Europe does not have the required launching capability and still depends on SpaceX. IRIS², the European security-oriented constellation, will not be operational until the 2030s. Until then, dependency on Starlink remains.

Industry partners, such as Eutelsat, SES Satellites, Airbus Defense and Space, Thales, and OHB SE, will get the contracts for the German and European military space systems, but are they financially fit-for-purpose and able to deliver quickly? It depends. Airbus and Thales have heavy defense order backlogs. Eutelsat must recover from its acquisition of OneWeb, and SES just acquired Intelsat.

The question of military space capacity building for non-US NATO allies further resonates outside NATO. Japan does everything to strengthen its military space industrial base, while India puts in a serious effort from space situational awareness to launchers to warfighting satellites. Allies will get there eventually, but it may not be fast enough vis-à-vis Russia and China.

One thing is clear, the center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs. With NATO officially calling space a warfighting domain, it is no longer a support area. Non-US NATO leaders need to build military space capacity. They should not wait another decade to adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0.

Indo-Pacific allies should endeavor for a similar effort, all while leveraging NATO’s military space experience. That might include some degree of coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, especially for areas of concern to all, such as the Arctic. Without delegated authorities, codified protect-and-defend protocols, attribution thresholds, tactically responsive launch (less than 96 hours), and common allied space rules of engagement, the good guys’ response times will miss the fight as adversaries dominate orbit.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bottom line: The center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs, and our adversaries are acting as if they know it. NATO voices now openly frame space as a war-fighting domain, while Europe moves from point defense to deep strike, Washington debates force-design trades (B-52J vs. more B-21s), and Iran/Russia press for coercive advantage amid sanctions friction. The strategic task is to turn language and spending into tested, resilient, allied operational architectures, and fast.

Unifying Trends

1. Space goes operational, not “supporting.”
   NATO leaders’ tone shift (Germany, France, Spain, Canada) treats space as a domain for defense and offense (“shield and sword”), demanding common doctrine, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch (<96 hours) to restore/augment constellations under attack.
2. From point defense to deep strike.
   Denmark’s decision to field long-range precision fires (Tomahawk/JASSM-ER class and European options) reflects a continental realization: you can’t intercept your way out of massed salvos—you must hold launchers, C2, and magazines at risk.
3. U.S. force-design inflection.
   Cost/schedule breaches on B-52J upgrades collide with contested-airspace realities, strengthening arguments to expand and accelerate B-21. This is a survivability vs. standoff trade with industrial-base and budget consequences.
4. Great-Power coercion is coordinated.
   ISW’s readout on Moscow’s aims, Iran’s missile signaling and suspected tests, and Beijing’s pressure campaigns (incl. Taiwan wargaming counters) form a convergent pressure track seeking to outlast Western cohesion and exploit cost-asymmetry (cheap counter-space/EW vs. exquisite satellites).
5. Homeland defense as a system-of-systems problem.
   “Golden Dome” can work only if rigorous end-to-end (E2E) testing—across space sensors, comms, C2, effectors, cyber—starts now and leverages commercial testbeds/digital twins. Otherwise, the architecture risks beautiful fragility.
6. Forward posture debates return.
   Talk of re-entering Bagram underscores a broader theme: geography for deterrence matters again, but must be weighed against access, legitimacy, and escalation dynamics with the Taliban and China.

What This Means Operationally

• Speed is deterrence. Time to detect-decide-deliver (and to replace space capacity) is now a primary measure of merit.
• Proliferation beats pedigree. Multi-orbit, proliferated constellations with rapid reconstitution are more survivable than few exquisite assets.
• Kill webs over platforms. Advantage will come from tested integration of sensors, AI-enabled C2, and multi-domain effectors, not any single “silver bullet.”
• Allies are moving—synchronize them. Europe’s deep-strike pivot and NATO’s space posture create a window to standardize doctrine, data, and munitions.

Risks to Watch

• Doctrine lag in space. Without common allied space ROE/authorities, response times will miss the fight.
• Testing shortfalls. If E2E campaigns are under-funded or staged too late, integration debt will surface in crisis.
• Budget whiplash. Raiding legacy accounts for survivable capacity is necessary—but undisciplined shifts can hollow critical standoff magazines and training.
• Cost asymmetry. Adversaries’ cheap EW/dazzling/cyber vs. our pricey satellites remains a structural vulnerability.

Priority Actions (next 6–12 months)

1. Adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0
   Codify protect/defend, attribution thresholds, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch across NATO.
2. Stand up a Joint Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) pipeline
   Contract now for rideshare, hot-spare payloads, and 96-hour launch/checkout drills; exercise quarterly.
3. Golden Dome: lock an Integrated Master Test Plan
   Fund E2E test events that include on-orbit sensing + ground C2 + live/interoperable interceptors + cyber red-teaming. Mandate industry-in-the-loop from day one.
4. Rebalance the bomber portfolio toward survivability
   Protect B-21 ramp; scrutinize B-52J scope/schedule to preserve standoff munitions buys and mission-planning AI.
5. European deep-strike integration
   Fast-track common mission planning, targeting data standards, and logistics for JASSM-ER/Tomahawk/European LR strike across F-35 and surface fleets.
6. Harden the space kill web
   Deploy optical crosslinks, jam-resilient waveforms, PNT alternatives, and autonomous battle management aids to ride through EW/cyber.
7. Tighten economic levers against Russia/Iran
   Enforce oil price caps/leakage, expand sanctions on dual-use microelectronics, and close maritime re-flag loopholes that fund attritional strategies.
8. Wargame access/logistics for any Afghanistan posture
   If Bagram re-entry is pursued, pre-plan overflight, basing, sustainment, and escalation controls; build non-permissive extraction branches.

Concrete Measures of Effectiveness

• Time-to-Replace-On-Orbit (TTRO): target ≤ 96 hours from loss to restored coverage.
• Find-Fix-Finish latency: median time from first detection to effect in minutes, not hours.
• E2E test cadence: quarterly cross-domain integrated events; zero critical interoperability defects carried forward.
• Allied deep-strike coverage: % of NATO targets held at risk at >500 km with validated comms/targeting.
• Resilience index: % of space services with disaggregated backups (multi-orbit/multi-vendor).

Longer Perspective

Deterrence now hinges on resilient connections more than singular platforms: space that can fight and recover, kill webs that integrate fast, and alliances that can reach deep. If we test as we will fight, standardize with allies, and bias for speed and survivability, we deny adversaries the slow-motion coercion they seek—and keep escalation ladders short, clear, and in our control.

This Week in Deterrence (September 15-19, 2025) was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, SDI was not an actual defense initiative as much as it was a response to the Soviet Union’s rapidly growing strategic nuclear offensive forces and their own anti-satellite space forces. As William Van Cleave wrote in his 1986 report,

The Soviet Union has long been developing a multifaceted ballistic missile defense and, in fact, has already begun deploying such a defense. The Soviets have also began exploiting space for military purposes nearly two decades ago. They have already deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) space weapons. The overriding threat to American security today—that is, a rapid growth in offensive nuclear and conventional weapons systems—has come about precisely because the Soviet Union has been racing to build a weapons system, while the United States has not.

The same can be said of China today and is true of Golden Dome.

While there are plenty of Chinese, Russian, and Western arms control advocates criticizing Golden Dome as weaponization of space and an imbalance of forces, they all fail to note that Golden Dome is a response to the current imbalance of nuclear and space forces that advantages China and Russia. The utility of nuclear weapons, coupled with the advancement of hypersonic and space-to-ground attack options in the hands of the nation’s enemies grew in recent years.

The Chinese are in the midst of a breakout in the size and capability of their nuclear forces. Both China and Russia are engaging in a similar effort with their space attack forces. Both deployed ASAT and other space weapons systems that not only threaten American critical space infrastructure, but the homeland itself. As such, Golden Dome is a response to the already de-stabilizing activities of the Chinese and Russians. They, not the United States, are actively building weapons systems, especially in space.

Second, the narrative that SDI was a weapons development program is false. President Reagan’s speech directing SDI called it a research or “study” program. The 1985 Report to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative said that “it should be stressed that SDI is a research program that seeks to provide the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. It is not a program to deploy those weapons.”

President Trump understands this by his comments that while Reagan pursued SDI, “[he] didn’t have the technology.” However, Golden Dome is, in fact, a weapons deployment program. As his directive in the executive order states, “The United States will provide for the common defense of its citizens and the nation by deploying and maintaining a next-generation missile defense shield…[including] the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept,” among other sensors, trackers, and other weapons capable of defeating various threats from hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missiles. While SDI was a study for a future decision to deploy space-based missile defenses, Golden Dome is the decision to deploy before Trump leaves office.

Finally, another false narrative in the anti–Golden Dome commentaries is that the system will be full of “untested technology.” This is not the case. If anyone looks at the systems listed in the executive order from January 2025, one will see that several of the sensors and layers are already in the current programs of record, many of which have already started deployment in orbit.

While some of the systems, such as the space-based interceptor, are not deployed yet, the technology for intercepting such missiles is in various forms of testing and/or use—for decades. Just because SDI had grand visions of lasers bouncing off mirrors or large chemical lasers in space, does not mean that Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors must be based on those concepts. Current anti-ballistic missile tech gained considerable ground over the past four decades and is ready for deployment sooner than later.

Vulnerability is not an option. Protecting Americans and the homeland from space and missile attack is a strategic imperative that must not fail. Congress must ignore the false narratives of the late 20th century. The threat is real, the technology is real. It is time to field Golden Dome for America.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views and positions are those of the author and do not reflect the positions and opinions of the Department of Defense or the author’s employer.

A Second Look at the Critiques and Narratives Against Golden Dome for America was originally published on Global Security Review.

Topics include:

• China’s military space doctrine
• Counterspace threats from kinetic to cyber
• The limits of traditional deterrence theory
• Strategic recommendations for U.S. space policy

Real Space Strategy Live with Christopher Stone: Deterring Chinese Aggression in Space was originally published on Global Security Review.

As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.

Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated 2,000 warheads. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.

With nearly 95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.

China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding 50 nuclear weapons and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.

Meanwhile, Iran edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.

Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has apparently ended that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.

Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.

Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.

Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.

Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.

Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of theater-range assets can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.

Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, nonproliferation efforts, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.

Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.

In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.

To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World was originally published on Global Security Review.

First, the president’s executive order directing the deployment of an active defense against missile and space-borne attacks is not the starting point for an arms race. The fact of the matter is, the Chinese and Russians started an arms race over a decade ago and recently accelerated it with their “breakout” in nuclear missiles deployments as well as the expansion and modernization of long-range strike platforms (to include fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and nuclear anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

These expansions in offensive nuclear/space forces were not because America’s space and nuclear forces are too strong, but because they are too weak. The American nuclear enterprise is acknowledged to be “atrophied,” and the Space Force is not prepared to address such threats and incapable of addressing the threats posed by adversary space forces.

American vulnerability to homeland attack and, by extension, the nation’s critical space infrastructure, invites these threats. The US is delinquent in its duty to protect citizens by accepting a passive, hostage-style approach and labeling it “strategic stability.”

Second, detractors of homeland missile defense suggest that America is to blame for provoking China and Russia’s build-up. They are more concerned about space-based interceptors creating space debris than the impact of limited or mass attack upon the American homeland.

The US is the leader in advocating for the mitigation of debris generation, while China and Russia are the two biggest offenders. To think that these two adversary nations with kinetic ASAT capabilities and the political will to use them, despite debris generation, are only responding to US activity, shows a lack of understanding of these adversaries and their strategy. Lest Americans forget, both China and Russia see the United States as having more to lose from conflict in space than they do.

Third, opponents of Iron Dome for America believe that “real security” does not come from a credible hard power, but from “arms control, diplomacy and shared risk reduction.” While these are noble ideas, the historical record shows that arms control is often one-sided, with Russia cheating on every single arms control agreement it has ever signed and China showing no interest in anything other than American disarmament. UN votes on norms of behavior have not changed the situation one bit. China and Russia regularly exploit weakness. Iron Dome America seeks to remove this vulnerability from the equation. As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently stated correctly, “Diplomacy is important, talk is important, [and] negotiations are important,” Hegseth said. “But, ultimately, beans and bullets and tanks and helicopters and hard power still [matter].”

Finally, they argue that the system being pursued “won’t work.” This argument fails to understand that the reason American ballistic missile defenses are so limited is mainly due to policy restraints and less about technology. Missile defense technologies, such as those proposed in the Strategic Defense Initiative, were not mature in the 1980s, but four decades later, numerous technologies are more advanced.

Also, The high cost of launch, for example, is drastically lower today than it was four decades ago because of efforts of companies like SpaceX. This single company demonstrated the capacity to launch hundreds of satellites a year, if not thousands in the same number of launches it took thirty years for the Space Shuttle to fly.

Today, the idea of having “space-based interceptors” does not mean the United States must place missiles or laser cannons in space. There are many ways to pursue this effort in ways that were not conceivable when Ronald Reagan envisioned a space-based missile defense. Agencies like the Missile Defense Agency and Space Development Agency are pursuing numerous defensive layers as mentioned in the President’s Executive Order. All will collectively aid the system in protecting the homeland from boost to terminal phases of flight.

Iron Dome for America may not stop every missile launched at the United States, but fielding some measure of defense is better than simply ignoring the problem and hoping that good will prevail. History shows that idealism is all too often a key factor in the onset of war. Nuclear war is one Americans cannot afford to lose and should never be satisfied with leaving to chance.

Iron Dome for America is not just an idea, it is a requirement. The nation must get it right in order to ensure a more safe and secure home for Americans and the world.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, DC. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Pentagon. The views expressed by the author are his own and do not reflect those of his employer or the United States government.

Iron Dome America Is Not a Threat to Peace was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge is clear; adversaries are developing ASAT weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber threats that can disable American satellites—disrupting military operations, global communications, and economic stability. Without a robust deterrence framework, adversaries are emboldened to target space infrastructure. To counter these threats, the US must enhance resilient space architectures, strengthen policy frameworks, and refine operational doctrine to deter and, if necessary, defeat adversarial actions in space.

Resilient Space Architectures: Hardening the Backbone of American Space Operations

One of the most effective deterrence measures is making space assets more difficult to target and replaceable, if attacked. The United States is shifting from large, centralized satellite systems to disaggregated and proliferated constellations, reducing the risk posed by any single point of failure. The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), led by the Space Development Agency, aims to deploy a network of small, low-cost satellites that provide redundancy, making it harder for adversaries to cripple American space capabilities with a single strike.

Additionally, on-orbit servicing, maneuverable satellites, and rapid launch capabilities enhance resilience. SpaceX’s Starlink and the Rapid Agile Launch Initiative ensure that the US can quickly replenish space assets, denying adversaries the ability to achieve lasting effects through space attacks. By maintaining a dynamic, self-healing space architecture, the US strengthens deterrence by signaling that any attempted disruption will be ineffective.

Counterspace Capabilities: Strengthening Active and Passive Defenses

While resilience is key, deterrence also requires credible counterspace capabilities to impose costs on adversaries. The US Space Force and other defense agencies are investing in defensive counterspace measures, such as jamming-resistant communications, maneuverable satellites, and cyber-hardened space systems to protect critical assets.

At the same time, the US must maintain offensive counterspace capabilities as part of a deterrence posture. This includes electronic warfare tools to disrupt enemy satellite operations, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) for on-orbit inspection and intervention, and ground-based kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to neutralize hostile space threats. By demonstrating both defensive resilience and credible response options, the US reinforces deterrence by denial and punishment.

Policy and Alliances: Strengthening Space Norms and Collective Security

A strong policy framework and allied cooperation bolster deterrence by shaping adversary behavior and reinforcing international stability. The Artemis Accords, a multinational agreement on responsible space conduct, establish norms that promote transparency and discourage hostile activities. The US must continue leading diplomatic efforts to build consensus on space security standards, making aggressive actions politically and strategically costly for adversaries.

Additionally, alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), partnership with the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), and Five Eyes intelligence network provide collective security in space. The Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, which includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, enhances shared situational awareness and rapid coordination in space crisis scenarios. By integrating allied capabilities, the US deters adversaries by presenting a unified, multinational response to any hostile space activity.

Space Domain Awareness: Gaining the Tactical Advantage

Deterrence depends on knowing when and where threats emerge. The US Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) are advancing Space Domain Awareness (SDA) through advanced radar systems, AI-powered surveillance, and persistent monitoring of space objects. Programs like the Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept (DARC) and the Space Surveillance Telescope provide real-time tracking of adversary satellite maneuvers, ensuring that hostile actions do not go undetected.

By integrating AI and machine learning, the US can predict and respond to potential threats before they escalate. Improved SDA capabilities deny adversaries the element of surprise, reinforcing deterrence by ensuring that any aggressive move is immediately identified and countered.

Military Space Operations: Defining Rules of Engagement

To deter and defeat adversary actions, the US must develop clear space warfighting doctrine and operational concepts. The Space Force’s “competitive endurance” strategy emphasizes continuous engagement with adversaries to counter gray zone tactics, such as cyber intrusions, satellite blinding, and electromagnetic interference. Establishing clear rules of engagement for responding to hostile actions in space strengthens deterrence by ensuring decisive and proportional responses when necessary.

Additionally, the integration of space with multi-domain operations ensures that any adversary attack on space assets is met with cross-domain retaliation, whether in cyber, air, land, or sea. This raises the stakes for adversaries, reinforcing deterrence by making space conflict an unattractive option.

Conclusion: A Comprehensive Approach to Space Deterrence

The US must pursue a multi-layered strategy to deter and defeat adversary actions in space. Resilient architectures, credible counterspace capabilities, strong alliances, superior space domain awareness, and well-defined military operations are essential to ensuring freedom of action in space and securing national security interests. As space becomes increasingly contested, the ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats will determine whether the US maintains its strategic advantage beyond the atmosphere.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, is an engineer and career civil servant with the Department of the Air Force. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US Air Force. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond the Atmosphere: Strengthening US Space Deterrence in a Contested Domain was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

The perception of adversaries that western democracies are increasingly dependent on space for joint and integrated military operations gives them an incentive to threaten access to the assets that enable this capability prior to beginning of a conflict. The United States and its allies, including Australia, are now responding to this changing strategic dynamic, with a much greater focus on the challenges of undertaking space control as an important new task, along with the potential opportunities of establishing dedicated space forces.

The Policy Path to Space Control

In 2020, the then Morrison-led Coalition government sought for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to play a more ambitious role in space. The release of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the accompanying Force Structure Plan represented the first significant formal policy recognition of the importance of space control and the importance of space as an operational domain. The 2020 Force Structure Plan stated that:

Defence will need capabilities that directly contribute to war fighting outcomes in the space domain using terrestrial and/or space-based systems. The Government’s plans include the development of options to enhance ADF space control through capabilities to counter emerging space threats to Australia’s free use of the space domain and that assure our continued access to space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

It also aligned with the establishment of the Australian Space Agency in 2018 and the rapid growth of an Australian commercial space sector. This marked a truly fundamental shift from Australia’s previous approach of passive dependency on foreign states and commercial providers for space capabilities. Australia sought to become an active participant in a rapidly growing global space market, but also recognized that space access must be assured and protected in a contested and congested space domain.

The establishment of Australia’s Space Command (known initially as Defence Space Command) on January 18, 2022, also saw the release of the Defence Space Strategy which lists space control capabilities as a key objective towards “enhancing Defence’s space capability to assure joint force access in a congested, contested and competitive space environment.” The Space Command document states that “Defence will continue to identify space control gaps and opportunities to develop a credible Space Control capability, and space capability developers will actively seek to improve resilience of the space capabilities.” That would align with the decision by the following Albanese Labor government.

The Albanese government, which came to power in May 2022, largely sustained the previous coalition government’s approach to the ADF’s role in space. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) sought to highlight the importance of the space domain, “re-posturing” Space Command into Joint Capabilities Group. The subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Integrated Investment Program (IIP) lifted planned government investment for the ADF in the space domain from about $7 billion (Australian dollars) under the previous Morrison-led coalition government to between $9 billion and $12 billion, though the vast bulk of this extra funding would not appear until late in the current decade. On space control, the Albanese government largely followed the lead of the previous Morrison liberal-national coalition, with the 2024 IIP stating planned spending will include “measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations.”

Capability Options for ADF Space Control

If Australia is to acquire a space control capability, it is certain to be a
“soft kill” system that disables or denies rather than physically destroys a target. The Albanese government signed a ban on destructive testing of direct-ascent ASAT systems on October 27, 2022, and any acquisition of a “kinetic kill direct-ascent ASAT would violate such a ban.” A kinetic kill ASAT capability is not consistent with Australia’s policy of sustainable use of space.

In 2021 the Morrison government announced a new defence project (DEF-9358) that would explore options for a ground-based space electronic warfare capability. Such an approach would be consistent with a preference for reversible or scalable effects that disable or deny rather than destroy.

Space-based “co-orbital” space control could conceivably include space electronic warfare technologies such as on-orbit jamming or even high-power microwave weapons for electronic attack in orbit. It is also conceivable that a ground-based electro-optical laser dazzling capability could be considered, with Australian commercial space companies demonstrating capability expertise in such a system. Finally, ground-based cyber capabilities could be exploited in space control operations against both satellites in orbit and ground facilities undertaking satellite telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C).

Such soft-kill defensive, and potentially offensive, space control capabilities would contribute to assuring ADF space access by denying an adversary the ability to attack critical space support capabilities, such as ADF satellites for communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This is consistent with the military strategy of deterrence by denial as laid out in the 2024 NDS. Other measures could be taken that include hardening key space support capabilities and potentially “silent spares” deployed in orbit.

To significantly strengthen ADF space resilience, the opportunity for the ADF to exploit emerging Australian commercial space launch capabilities is important. Embracing space lift as a means to assure sovereign space access makes eminent sense, given Australia’s geographic advantages for launch. By developing a responsive sovereign launch capability that can deliver small satellites into orbit, Australia can augment space support for the ADF and its allies in a crisis, or, if necessary, reconstitute lost capability in the aftermath of a counterspace attack.

Next Steps

Looking forward, the 2024 NDS established a biennial defence policy process, and the 2026 NDS and IIP represent the next best opportunity for Defence to more clearly conceptualize its approach to space control. Doctrinal documents within Space Command already suggest a role for space control, but greater detail is needed. Most importantly, there needs to be a public and unclassified policy explaining how the ADF will undertake this important task alongside allies and partners. Space control, like space domain awareness, represents an opportunity for the ADF to undertake a next step in its use of the space domain, beyond simply capability assurance and satellite communications, which was the perceived role of space in the 2023 DSR. In a contested space domain, Australia must burden share to a much greater degree in orbit and in acquiring the means to undertake space control tasks. This represents an important next step towards that outcome.

Malcolm Davis is a Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy and Capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

The Case for Space Control: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.

Recent scientific research at Sandia National Laboratories proves that carefully aimed nuclear detonations in space, early enough in an object’s approach to Earth, can deflect a threatening comet or asteroid by enough to put it on a safe trajectory. The idea is not to try to pulverize the object by a direct hit, which might still shower Earth with debris. Rather, by detonating the warhead at a modest distance from the object, the forceful ablation (evaporation) of one side of its surface, induced by the intense X-ray of a nuclear detonation, would cause the entire object to move away from the detonation.

This would be an example of what has been called a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). Back in the early Cold War, the US Atomic Energy Commission looked into potential applications of nuclear detonations for peaceful civil engineering purposes. These included digging canals, creating harbors, and moving mountains. And yes, fallout was expected, which is why these terrestrial applications were abandoned. An underground nuclear blast was also tested as a way to extract natural gas, by creating in some geologically promising area a subterranean cavity that could then be tapped. The test was not a success because the natural gas was radioactive.

Later, India’s first successful nuclear test (1974) was announced as a peaceful nuclear explosion, for oil extraction and mining purposes, not a weapon test. Then, in 1976, the U.S. and the USSR signed the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which permitted such blasts anywhere on Earth if the host country gave permission. Thus, there is some precedent for the use of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.

Certainly, non-nuclear methods for diverting menacing space objects are possible. For instance, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) test-demonstration DART high-velocity inert impactor mission was successful. But the object whose orbit was changed slightly was a very small moonlet of a slightly less-small asteroid. Other techniques being studied include attaching rocket motors to a threatening object or moving it aside via space tugs deploying giant nets. Such motors or tugs could be driven by chemical engines, or non-explosive nuclear propulsion, or solar power (either solar panels, or light sails).

These latter techniques are years or decades away from meaningful deployment. Due to their lower specific energy compared to a PNE, they would need for the inbound object to be detected very early and to be comparatively small.

For the largest potential Earth-bound objects, especially those coming from sunward, which can make them hard to detect very early, peaceful nuclear explosions might be an essential diversion method.

Obviously, such use of nuclear devices, well away from any people living on Earth or in space, would be for the benefit of mankind. However, nuclear devices can also be deadly weapons of war. They are indeed being looked at by America’s adversaries for purposes of space-based coercion and blackmail and even warfighting in space. Examples include Russia’s “Sputnuke” and China’s fractional orbital bombardment system. Effective strategic deterrence thus continues to require American preparedness and vigilance, throughout the cislunar and beyond the Moon.

However, nuclear explosives in space are truly a dual-use technology. There are already copious amounts of natural hard radiation throughout the solar system. An asteroid- or comet-moving PNE blast’s fallout would dissipate relatively harmlessly.

PNEs in space raise troubling but pressing questions about the need to rethink and update the Outer Space Treaty, since it prohibits placing any nuclear devices anywhere in space. On the one hand, all nuclear weapons based on-orbit should continue to be forbidden. But on the other hand, the same warheads used to defend Earth against space rocks simply must be allowed.

This might be achieved in one of two ways. One is to create a “Planetary Defense Guard” under the auspices of the UN, with the necessary nuclear devices put under UN Security Council control. However, the UN does not have a record of success regarding cooperative use of nuclear devices. A proposed plan in the early Cold War called for all nuclear arms to be pooled under central UN control. It went nowhere. The modern UN attempt at a treaty banning all nuclear devices everywhere (including PNEs) is also going nowhere, for the same reason. States owning nuclear warheads have no desire to give them up.

The other way to get the protection Earth requires is to recognize that planetary defense is a necessary and unavoidable aspect of the “Scramble for the Skies” now emerging. In this alternate scheme, rival powers compete using nuclear devices in a peaceful way for space-based civil engineering purposes. They vie to develop the best suite of proprietary systems, procedures, and technologies for deflecting Earth impactors via peaceful nuclear explosions. They could then also “race” to launch them whenever actually needed. Such healthy competition might significantly increase the odds of at least one contender making a successful diversion, while letting all contenders participate in this ultimate “space Olympic decathlon.”

Changing the OST out of sheer necessity, to allow PNEs for planetary defense, would have several very significant societal benefits. It would more rapidly and effectively advance humanity’s space defenses. It would urgently accelerate everything needed for the successful commercialization, industrialization, and colonization of space, which advocates say could take pressure off Earth’s endangered environment, too.

Allowing PNEs in space would also give spacefaring nuclear powers a way to stay within Cold War–style safety guardrails against nuclear crises and nuclear war. It would allow them to instead compete to show their culture’s and their government’s superiority through the peaceful, beneficial harnessing of both spaceflight and nuclear energy. Such a grand competitive program would help address three existential threats to the human race at once, three possible extermination events: a large asteroid strike, a climate catastrophe, and a nuclear holocaust.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Devices in Space was originally published on Global Security Review.

In planning to strengthen space defense capabilities, the French military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA) focuses on surveillance, security, and cooperation. France aims to have a full space defense capability by 2030, built on military space capabilities such as Earth observation, communications, positioning, and navigation. The country is also expanding its space situational awareness capability to monitor, classify, and better understand space activities and threats.

France unveiled Toutatis, a new space surveillance program to protect low-Earth orbit assets, focusing on satellite detection, characterization, and targeting. Toutatis works with two satellites. A “spotter” cubesat detects targets and a smaller target satellite—developed by French start-up U-space in partnership with defense industry major MBDA.

France also works on geosynchronous orbit surveillance through the Yoda program of small satellites with cameras to monitor space threats. The annual military space exercise, AsterX, highlights the need for enhanced situational awareness in low-Earth orbit. Within two years, the Toutatis program will test capabilities with planned launches of maneuverable satellites.

Rather than kinetic weapons against weaponized space assets, France deploys non-destructive measures like dazzling adversaries with lasers to neutralize threats—without creating debris. The country also seeks to balance autonomy with international cooperation. For example, an envoy from Ukraine recently discussed space defense in Paris. Pawan Kumar, Director of the Indian Defense Space Agency, recently provided the French space command with an update on military space cooperation between the two countries.

The French view is that enhanced situational awareness in space, through programs like Toutatis, is a cornerstone of its space defense strategies. Nations should prioritize investments in monitoring technology to observe potential threats and signal their deterrence capabilities.

France’s focus on space start-ups indicates a shift towards commercial and civilian involvement in space security. A timely joint-announcement made by two rising space ventures, Cailabs and Unseenlabs, revealed they successfully tested space laser transmission for satellite downlink in a world first. While Cailabs supplied the optical ground station, Unseenlabs deployed a low-Earth orbit nano-satellite with a laser payload. The pair established a stable link for several minutes. France’s Ministry of Armed Forces called the successful test a world first. It was a first for the commercial sector, but a few other experiments remain confined to American government attempts.

The French Defense Innovation Agency funded the test with €5.5 million ($6.1 million). The Cailabs/Unseenlabs system will be integrated on France’s future military satellites. Laser technology is hard to intercept or hack, compared with radio antennas.

Such a capability would be useful for expanding battlefield data transmissions. France’s optical communications satellite project, dubbed Keraunos (thunderbolt in Greek), helps mitigate the effects of atmospheric turbulence, making space-Earth liaisons handy on mobile, land-based, naval, and airborne platforms.

The European Space Agency Director, General Josef Aschbacher, rightly noted that a gap in space spending between Europe and the United States (a ratio of 1 to 6) is complicated further by spending in Europe that is spread among a wider range of national space agencies. Streamlining European defense and space governance is thornier than in the US since it involves structural reforms on technological gaps, fragmented capital markets, and strategic spending.

A rather disappointing report on European competitiveness by Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and president of the European Central Bank, generated immediate push-back from Ludwig Moeller, director of the European Space Policy Institute (ESPI). ESPI methodically reviewed the Draghi Report’s shortcomings when it came to European Defense and Space. ESPI suggested the report lacked an impulse for the needed market reforms.

As stated by Eva Portier, space deputy in France’s military procurement agency, Directorate General of the Armament (DGA), “Access to space is an essential element of our national sovereignty, our capacity to use space to launch our satellites and conduct operations.” While greater Europe is struggling to fundamentally unite in its efforts to counter future malicious space efforts by China and Russia, France is stepping forward in a more limited way. It is not lost on observers that French satellite names harken to a past where France needed protection. For example, Toutatis, discussed above, was a divinity once worshipped in ancient Gaul and Britain, and was considered a protector of Gallic and Celtic tribes. The annual military space exercise, AsterX, led by the French Air and Space Force and involving 15 partners countries, is a wink to Asterix and Obelix, leading characters of a comic book series describing the adventures of a small village resisting the Roman invaders. Legend has it the Gauls feared only “that the sky would fall on their head.”

French efforts are moving in the right direction, but unless Europe reforms and consolidates space defense efforts across the continent, Europe will be unprepared when a crisis occurs. Major space reforms take time. Thus, it is important those reforms begin now. France simply cannot accomplish what is needed on its own.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

France Doubles Down on Space Defense Tech was originally published on Global Security Review.

While this is a welcome comment from the former president, it is not a new argument to have a Space National Guard. This argument, however, was much maligned, mocked, and ignored for years. Lately, much reporting on the topic is misinformation that confuses both the American people and Congress.

Many who oppose the Space National Guard wrongly believe that space defense is a strictly federal mission. They believe the Guard’s deployable space operations, a function since the 1990s, and the nearly 300 years of the Guard’s legal and constitutional role does not justify a Guard element for Space Force. They argue that bypassing the constitutional framework and the law of the land, which requires a governor’s consent on decisions regarding their state guard forces, is a “one off.”

If the federal government is allowed to eliminate the role of governors, this would set a dangerous precedent. During congressional testimony, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendell discussed a legislative proposal that would do just that and suggested that going around the law “is not a big deal” and that National Guard is “an artifact of history.” Legislation requiring the support and inclusion of governors is not supported by Kendell.

The opponents of the Space National Guard repeat questionable arguments to confuse and distract the American people and Congress. The false arguments are many.

First, they claim a Space National Guard will result in increased and unsustainable costs and bureaucracy that are not supported by the Space Force and Air Force. This is false as documented by no less than six studies by the Department of the Air Force that supported a Space National Guard.

Five of these studies were deliberately withheld from Congress by actors external to the Pentagon. Importantly, these studies proved that the costs of establishing a space guard are insignificant because the existing budget will transfer from one line of accounting to another. They also dispute the findings of a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study (2020) that did not use actual Air Force and National Guard budget data points to project the cost of establishing a Space National Guard.

Shockingly, the CBO did not interview anyone from the National Guard Bureau, the individual state guard components, or the Department of the Air Force’s working groups when it conducted the study. In truth, no additional bureaucracy is needed to establish the Space Guard because the staff support and operational squadrons already exist in the Air National Guard and would transfer into the Space National Guard.

Second, detractors argue that states do not need a Space Guard for the limited protection of individual states. This is a mistaken perspective because the National Guard is the nation’s primary combat-reserve force—regardless of operating domain—and has been since 1636. It delivers strategic and operational depth to the nation. It is a lower cost alternative to the larger and more expensive federal force. For example, most of the nation’s air sovereignty mission is owned by the Air National Guard because the threat to American air space is not constant.

It is also important to remember that the states are dependent upon space systems for their domestic emergency operations and the capabilities of the National Guard are leveraged for events like wildfires, earthquakes, floods, and others. Space systems are linked to critical infrastructure and therefore fall into the state roles and missions for homeland security. Those who want to use the opportunity to consolidate military space power at the federal level ignore these realities.

Third, the military must have the support of the American people when it is time to go to war. The National Guard, by design, provides a clear and deep connection with the American citizenry. Support for a robust Space National Guard is vital if the nation is to field the force required to win in a time of war. Connecting main streets across the nation with space defense cannot occur through a single component service and the absorption of what is rightfully National Guard capability into the federal military.

The talking points used by Space National Guard opponents are fundamentally misleading and fail to acknowledge the immediate readiness costs associated with taking Air National Guard space units away from their respective states and governors. Keep in mind, about 80 percent of Guard personnel surveyed suggested that they will not transfer to the US Space Force unless there is a Space National Guard. All 50 governors oppose the removal of the space missions from the National Guard.

If opponents of a Space National Guard succeed, units and capabilities will become ineffective. Enormous experience will be lost from the loss of personnel. The Department of Defense will then have to fund recruiting and training efforts for the Space Force to rebuild that capability. Those who oppose the Space National Guard leave out that this would cost taxpayers at least $1 billion. Former President Trump, NGAUS, and all 50 state governors are correct; the Space National Guard should exist as the “primary combat reserve of the US Space Force.”

National Defense Authorization Act language should not ignore the states and their governors. It is time to establish a Space National Guard.

Christopher Stone is senior fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The thoughts, opinions, and statements are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Department of Defense.

Correcting the Record on the Space National Guard was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test, held on March 27, 2019, highlights its growing space capabilities and intent to weaponize space. India’s test, known as “Mission Shakti,” demonstrated its ability to intercept and destroy a satellite in low Earth orbit, positioning India as one of only four countries with such capabilities. While Indian officials maintain that the test was aimed at strengthening national security and not directed toward any particular country, such a capability would pose a significant threat to Pakistan’s space assets, which would undermine Pakistan’s situational awareness, communication, and command-and-control capabilities during a conflict.

The implications of India’s recent MIRV test to its intent in the space domain have received little scrutiny, with one Indian analyst suggesting that the country’s MIRV efforts complement its space ambitions. However, analysts did not address the potential implications on regional stability. India’s development and testing of advanced missile technologies suggest that New Delhi could use these capabilities for counter-space missions, including the targeting of satellites, and their expansion of counter-space weapons may disrupt the strategic equilibrium in South Asia.

Bringing MIRVs to Space

While the primary use of MIRV ballistic missiles is not in counter-space missions, there are scenarios and technologies related to MIRVs that could potentially be adapted for anti-satellite (ASAT) roles. Instead of carrying nuclear warheads, the MIRV could be equipped with kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) or other payloads designed to disable or destroy satellites through collision or other means. A missile equipped with MIRV technology could launch multiple payloads into space, each with its own propulsion and guidance systems, allowing them to maneuver into specific orbits close to target satellites. Moreover, the independent targeting capability of MIRVs means each payload could be directed to a different satellite, potentially allowing for simultaneous attacks on multiple targets in different orbits.

In addition, co-orbital systems can loiter in space and potentially engage targets when needed, providing a persistent threat compared to direct-ascent ASAT systems. MIRVs could be adapted for co-orbital ASAT missions by modifying their payloads and utilizing their independent targeting capabilities. Russia and China have demonstrated co-orbital ASAT systems, while the United States maintains advanced space technologies that could potentially be used in similar roles. The adaptation of MIRVs for such purposes would be complex and carry significant strategic and legal implications.

Implications for Regional Stability

Outer space is considered a global common, a concept established by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which ensures that space is free for exploration and use by all countries, cannot be claimed by any nation, must be used for peaceful purposes, and should be preserved for future generations. It is crucial that this principle should be consistently applied to preserve space for the benefit of all states for communication, navigation, weather monitoring, and scientific research. However, the growing overlap between military and space technologies is blurring the lines between these fields and raises apprehensions about the militarization and potential weaponization of the domain.

The advancements made by India in military technology and satellite capabilities, which integrate military and space capabilities, have raised significant concerns about the weaponization of space in Pakistani policy circles. Pakistan also tested a MIRV capability on its Ababeel missile. However, it never demonstrated its intent to develop counter-space weapons through policy or capability development. Pakistan’s space policy and activities are focused on peaceful uses of outer space, such as satellite communications, remote sensing, and scientific research. Islamabad has participated in international initiatives aimed at promoting the responsible and peaceful use of outer space, including discussions on space security and arms control within forums such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Considering India’s development and modernization of its military beyond traditional security needs, such as its ASAT capability and advanced missile ranges, there is a possibility that New Delhi may use MIRVs for counter-space missions in the future. In a scenario of escalating tensions with Pakistan, India could conduct counter-space missions by either placing co-orbital ASAT systems during a brewing crisis or launch KKVs during a conflict by using MIRV capability. This would enable India to destroy Pakistani satellites, severely impairing Pakistan’s situational awareness, disrupting secure military communications, and degrading command-and-control functions.

As New Delhi strengthens its counter-space capabilities, its potential development of counter-space capabilities can upset the balance maintained by Pakistan’s effective deterrence posture in South Asia. The complex interplay between nuclear and conventional forces maintains this balance. However, there is a growing asymmetry between India and Pakistan in space capabilities.

New Delhi’s substantial advancements and investments in space technology and infrastructure outmatch Pakistan’s space capabilities, creating a significant power disparity where India has a much greater capacity to deploy and utilize space-based assets for various purposes, including military and intelligence gathering. India’s disproportionate expansion of space capabilities not only poses a threat to Pakistan but also China. Their reliance on satellites for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) functions is growing to address genuine security needs. Pakistan recognizes the strategic importance of information superiority in modern warfare.

With evolving security challenges, including border surveillance and counter-terrorism operations, Islamabad is enhancing its C4ISR capabilities through significant technological upgrades such as satellite programs and advanced communication systems, along with the integration of centralized command centers and secure communication networks. The expansion includes increased use of drones for surveillance and reconnaissance, development of electronic warfare capabilities, and robust cybersecurity measures.

Human resources are being developed through specialized training and international collaboration, particularly with China and Turkey, to facilitate technology transfer and interoperability. These efforts aim to improve situational awareness, decisionmaking, and operational effectiveness, strengthening Pakistan’s overall national security.

During a crisis, Pakistan may face the risk of its satellite assets being targeted which could have significant impact on its military and strategic capabilities. Pakistan could face severe constraints in its C4ISR capability. Moreover, the integration of satellite communication into Pakistan’s drone operations and C4ISR framework highlights the dependence on these assets for maintaining robust communication. Hence, the loss of satellite communication could disrupt command-and-control functions, impairing coordination and timely decisionmaking across the armed forces.

In view of these reasons, it is possible to conclude that India’s MIRV test represents a dangerous shift in the domain of space weaponization. The integration of MIRV technology with India’s missile systems not only enhances its nuclear deterrence but also signals its potential use for counter-space capability. Therefore, while India’s achievements in missile technology and space capabilities are notable, they carry significant risks for regional stability.

Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the authors own.

India’s MIRV Development – A Latent Counter-space Capability was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, one area the report does not cover is how the United States can ensure the advantages created by an expanding critical space infrastructure will remain “enduring” under direct threat of space attack without the weapons systems capable of deterring or defeating such aggression. Without a US Space Force capable of achieving measurable space superiority against a continual growth in Chinese and Russian space attack forces, new technologies and capabilities for terrestrial advantage will create more targets and vulnerabilities.

At present, there is much to do in space to continue to maintain what advantages and leadership the United States has managed to keep in the past twenty years of passivity and talk. At present the Space Force and its combatant command cousin US Space Command, while capable organizations for enabling terrestrial actions and providing situational awareness of space activities, are fully incapable of addressing the threat of armed aggression in and from space. Having an ability to take a hit and not proactively retaliate in and from space creates more, rather than less, vulnerability for exploitation and weakness in times of conflict. Would the nation take this type of approach with other services? Take the Air Force as an example.

Suppose the US was seeking to maintain its airpower advantage through the improvement of fuel efficiency, navigation routes, wing design, air traffic control modernization, and speed and distance characteristics of aircraft. Meanwhile, the enemy is building vast integrated air defense systems of missiles and fighter-interceptors, and long-range bombers, to take out the industrial and operational infrastructure of American civil and military aviation.

While the US has the advantage of outstanding technology in the air, the adversary fielded an ability to deny, degrade, and destroy that advantage in rapid fashion. Instead of building a US Air Force that fights, the nation responds by building an Air Force that can conduct limited electromagnetic jamming, overhead reconnaissance, and movement of equipment.

The Air Force’s position is that the service can take the hits and replace the airplanes in a reasonable time frame. All the while, in a great-power war, airports, air bases, and aircraft that provide an enduring advantage in economic and military support are now smoking debris. Regardless of the advantage airpower provides in this scenario, the United States possesses no means for strategic attack or air superiority.

This is exactly where the nation is with the Space Force. The urgency of the times is having little effect in shaping the actions of planners or political leaders.

At the low end, the Space Force has a very small number of electromagnetic jammers and geolocation systems. While such a small number was good for rotating them over time into a largely uncontested Middle East operating environment in the Global War on Terror, such numbers are wholly inadequate for requirements in the Indo-Pacific theater, much less the entirety of combatant command requirements worldwide.

The United States lacks options that are known to friends, neutrals and enemies alike with a clear declaratory policy highlighting American willingness and ability to project force in and from space to deter or win a conflict in space. Knowing what is happening in space is important, but there is no such thing as deterrence by attribution. Americans knew the Russians were amassing troops outside Ukraine and communicated that publicly, but Putin still invaded. The United States is pushing for norms of behavior and bans on destructive ASAT testing—to mitigate long-lived debris fields—but Russia and China oppose these efforts and continue to test, deploy, and use their space forces on a near daily basis, as former Vice Chief of Space Operations, General David Thompson, noted before his retirement.

The time has come to fix this and to do so publicly and aggressively. Passivity and resiliency alone will not defend America’s critical space infrastructure and the advantage that it provides. Only with a force projection capability that can achieve space superiority in and from space, as the Chinese and Russians both believe is key to deterrence, can the nation achieve credible deterrence in the minds of our adversaries.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the former special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

There Can be No “Enduring Advantage in Space” without Space Superiority was originally published on Global Security Review.

The FY 2025 budget focuses on simpler satellite networks. Notable decreases occur in launch and classified activities, while increases are found in position, navigation, and timing. The Space Force continues moving towards more distributed, resilient, and cost-effective space capabilities, including GPS satellites and narrowband communications. The intention signaled for space operations is to enhance the Space Force’s ability to adapt and respond to emerging threats. By prioritizing the development of distributed and proliferated satellite networks to ensure resilient space operations, the Space Force places a continued focus on low Earth orbit (LEO). This aligns with defense goals of redundancy and rapid deployment, enhancing space “competitive endurance,” a strategy announced in early 2023 by Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman.”

In General (Ret.) John Raymond’s often quoted words, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Space Force need to “exploit what we have, buy what we can, build what we must.” The DoD will increase the integration of commercial satellite services to reduce costs and accelerate deployment. The belief behind this policy is that to strengthen partnerships with commercial satellite providers is to capitalize on existing technologies and infrastructure, which is largely preferable to government doing it by itself. While it is a politically and operationally challenging process, the budget sequence necessitates more flexible and adaptive budget planning processes within the Space Force and other related agencies. By adopting these practices, the Space Force might better navigate budget constraints and funding adjustment, while advancing its strategic goals in space defense.

Regarding proliferation of smaller commercial assets for the sake of resilience in space, and within the currently prevalent DoD cognitive framework for the Space Force, the link between resilience and deterrence was further validated in April 2023 by John F. Plumb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. In remarks at the Space Foundation’s 38th Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Plumb said, “We will do that first and foremost by investing in resilience. We must expect to take punches in space in a near-peer conflict. A resilient architecture means we will be prepared to absorb those blows. With sufficient resilience, we hope to deter an adversary from attacking in the first place, because the value of any such attack will be greatly diminished.”

However, in space as in any other domains, resilience does not qualify as deterrence. Before events occur on the battlefield, deterrence is first and foremost built not merely based on actual capabilities, but on the ability to clearly communicate to the adversaries what such capabilities will do to them, if used. But deterrence requires a third factor, which is credibility. And the credibility of passive defensive posturing is where the real problems start.

To prevail over adversaries such as Russia and China, the West requires a genuine understanding of the adversary’s own decision-making process. If the West fails to understand that adversaries fundamentally value space as an offensive domain, the West will fail to protect its space assets—unless the Space Forces build a credible offensive counterforce capability. For active defense of critical Western space and terrestrial infrastructures to be sufficient to ensure credible deterrence, the Space Force must view space systems as a critical infrastructure and not merely a support desk for terrestrial operations.

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on June 14, 2024, cleared its version of the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The bill was then headed to the Senate floor. The legislation, which is yet to be released in full, includes compromise language on a long-standing dispute over the transfer of Air National Guard space units to the active-duty Space Force. That does not mean the political process ends there. In the meantime, the House passed its own version of the NDAA, which includes several social policy amendments, that eliminates paid leave for servicemembers to cross state lines for an abortion, eliminates controversial diversity initiatives, and eliminates taxpayer funding for “gender-affirming care,” which is likely to start another cycle of congressional haggling.

There are professionally constructive developments on the commercial side, though, as the Senate Armed Services Committee includes requirements for reviews of investment policy and performance evaluation. The bill also authorizes DoD to identify poor-performing contractors and require approval for additional contracts. The question remains, though, whether government should still retain an exclusive role in building certain specific space defense capabilities on its own and which ones these should be.

When and how the congressional process concludes, and the end game for the FY 2025 Space Force budget, remain to be seen. It should be extremely clear—no less is at stake than the US and its allies prevailing against common adversaries, for, in, and from space. In short, getting funding priorities right may affect who controls the high ground.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Congressional Haggling Jeopardizes the US Space Force FY 2025 Budget was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though data on the breakdown of aerospace engineers employed in space-related projects versus solely terrestrial-based aircraft is not readily available, the above statistic represents a worrying trend for a field (space) that is heavily reliant on aerospace engineers and at the center of American preeminence. More concerning, it is important to also ask if these known unemployment numbers are a deterrent for graduates entering into a dedicated space-focused workforce. Space is a critical part of national security and without a comprehensive understanding of how to entice applicants into priority positions, the new space race with China may not be so easily won.

On the surface, the situation does not appear dire. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated aerospace engineering jobs should grow by 6 percent between 2021 and 2031. However, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reported that the number of space private-sector jobs is down 12,000 from a decade prior. Additionally, an article from major consultant McKinsey & Company noted an 8 percent decline in aerospace, aeronautical, and astronautical engineering hires over the past five years within the broader aerospace and defense sector. It characterized the situation as an “intense competition for talent,” with younger graduates more interested in pursuing the highly lucrative computer and software engineering careers.

“Right now, we have a STEM crisis,” Mel Stricklan of the Space Workforce 2030 initiative spoke in an interview at the 39th Space Symposium. Further exacerbating the space employment challenge is how the overall number of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) graduates decreased despite the number of job openings increasing. As the purpose of her organization’s mission is to develop the next base of qualified professionals, Stricklan was passionate in suggesting, “The next generation needs to understand that they have a place in space.” In the same interview, Mike French, formerly Vice President of Space Systems for the Aerospace Industries Association, warns companies need to pay attention to their retention rates, the impact of retirements on workforce demographics, and security clearance requirements dissuading applicants.

According to Pew Research, a majority of Americans believe the US needs to be a leader in space, including from within the private sector. Though analysts predict a space market valuation of over $1 trillion in under a decade, it is not yet clear if the path to reach this estimate is through increasing the number of professionals and therefore varied projects in the industry or by simply increasing the price to fund space projects already in existence.

For a recent parallel example, the collapse of cryptocurrency bank FTX was in part due to customers discovering sister-company Alameda Research artificially propped up the value of FTX by inflating the value of FTX’s nascent exchange coin rather than providing liquidity backed by fiat or already proven cryptocurrencies. Looking at the current trends in the space market, the Space Launch System rocket produced by Boeing keeps increasing in cost for the Artemis lunar exploration mission despite NASA’s goal to switch contracting methods. Young graduates may be paying attention to these trends and hedging their bets elsewhere.

As Americans wait for the space tourism industry to flourish, traditional aerospace companies are generally limited to selling only to governments and major commercial companies. When a project cancellation hits the industry, such as the OSAM-1 satellite mission, the engineering specialists and mission support staff find themselves in a precarious position of not knowing if they will remain employed. Following this development came whispers of more contractor layoffs hitting the Goddard Space Flight Center after previous cuts in 2023, although NASA committed to funding the 450 personnel working on the program through fiscal year 2024. The recent news of cuts at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which saw 8 percent reductions of the workforce following budget cuts to the Mars Sample Return program, also adds to the uncertainty of job stability for the space industry. Without a new project to immediately switch to, the unemployment rate of aerospace engineers may be partially explained by this phenomenon.

A lack of understanding of why engineers are moving away from space-related careers displays an incongruity within a space strategy that calls for the integration of commercial and military space capabilities. Paid training and a guaranteed job after completion will be necessary to persuade the upcoming Generation Z to choose a space career. Regardless of the numerous factors contributing to a decreasing space workforce, companies and government agencies must first recognize the extent of the problem before an adequate solution can be developed. Whatever solution industry and government leaders may choose, it is important it comes soon.

Alexis Schlotterback is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Is the United States Losing Aerospace Engineers? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Then it was argued that spacepower is solely a federal mission and the states have no role or requirement for space forces. The federal system of checks and balances purposefully divides power between the active and reserve component controlled by the president and the national guard controlled by governors.

While many Americans may remember from high school civics or college government class the Constitution’s separation of powers between the three branches of the federal government and the states, the Constitution also deals with a separation of military power. It was not in the founding father’s plan for all military power to be vested in the hands of the capitol and the president. It was intended to be distributed between the states and in partnership with the federal government.

If the federal bureaucracy’s push for centralization of American military spacepower is successful, it will set a dangerous precedent that ultimately leads to the consolidation of all national guard forces of the states (Army and Air Force) into the single component service model with the rest of the service branches. This, according to sources, was discussed as part of the plan. If it works for the Space Force, it will work for the rest of the services. Therefore, the states who created the federal government are at risk of losing even more power of self-defense to the federal leviathan than intended by the founding fathers and current law.

The active component has long sought to exercise day-to-day control over National Guard units that are not under Title 10 federal orders. Day-to-day, National Guard units answer to their governors and the adjutant general, who is appointed by the governor. As such, a working relationship between state military departments and the federal department of defense is a required check upon federal overreach.

This is frustrating to federal commanders, but as the Federalist Papers denote, this was part of the plan. James Madison stated in Federalist 46 that “the federal and state governments, are…[to] resist and frustrate the measures of each other.” The military and militia (now National Guard) were intended to be a security for the rights of civilians and a check against a large federal force from the “oppression of the several states.”

In fact, it was thought that the federal force should be smaller than the aggregated strength of state military forces as a means of defense from an overreaching federal force. The border situation is one example of where state control of armed forces as a means to fill a void left open by the federal government is so important. Hamilton agreed but thought that the states could also be overpowering if not checked by a federal force answerable to the president. So, a compromise was decided that a federal force combined with the checks of the states would be the best option in the constitutional system.

If military space forces are denied the states, who, despite the messaging of some in Washington, DC, that are actively leveraging space systems for state roles and functions, will challenge the idea circulating in the Pentagon and Biden administration that it is necessary to convert all military services to a federal-only single component of part-time and full-time forces? This is a move that is contrary to the Constitution’s purposeful efforts to create a system of checks and balances.

If successful, the single component concept will neuter the states’ abilities to check and be engaged in their policy of state self-defense and the broader national security debates of our time. The single component service model must be opposed, and the Space National Guard should join the established components of the Army and Air Force to ensure that the separation of military power between the states and the federal governments continue to provide the security we need as a country in this ever-growing time of geopolitical and astropolitical strife.

Christopher Stone is a Senior Fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Stone is a former U.S. Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for space policy. The opinions expressed in this commentary are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of Core-CSI nor the Defense Department.

Space Guard Opponents Seek Unraveling of Constitution’s National Defense Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two years have passed since the United States announced a unilateral ban on the testing of destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The ban was announced on April 12, 2022, and hailed as a first step towards establishing a norms of responsible behavior to further the ideal of sustainability in outer space.

Several states, including many that do not possess nor intend to deploy such a capability, made similar proclamations. The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and India, however, refused to make the pledge. The US also sponsored a resolution, which was a lead-in to the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, led by the United Kingdom and supported by the US. With the blinding effect of celebration subsiding, a more reasoned look at the drawbacks and weaknesses of the ban is in order.

Unilateral Arms Control Concession

Lost in the euphoria of the ban is the reality that the ban is a unilateral arms control concession. The US ignored an important tenet of diplomacy and negotiation and frittered away destructive ASAT testing without exacting similar concessions from Russia and China. American idealists believed that by signing the ban, the US would show leadership as a responsible actor and encourage both Russia and China to abandon their threatening counterspace build up. However, the American precedent of unilaterally banning direct-ASAT testing on its own without seeking concessions from either Russia or China signals to both that the US may be convinced to make more concessions without either adversary surrendering any of their own capabilities.

Sacrificing Freedom of Action

The unilateral American concession is not about giving up something vital to national security, but rather forfeiting freedom of action with no tangible benefit—other than creating positive political optics and an illusory norm of behavior. Many of the states pledged to the ban and the resolution lacks the requisite technology, capabilities, or the political desire to develop or acquire such technology. In other words, these states pledged to give up a freedom of action and a capability they neither possess nor plan to acquire. Conversely, Russia, China, and India, who all possess the capability, are not willing to give up their freedom of action to the advantage of the United States.

Demonstration Versus Test

The premise of the destructive test ban is the kinetic actions involving destructive ASATs are tests to determine whether a capability works. What the ban ignores is that these events are demonstrations and not tests.

The distinction between “test” and “demonstration” is not a matter of semantics but rather it is the difference between a state ascertaining whether it has a capability as opposed to showing others that it has a capability and a capacity. Ground-launched ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense technology, and the know-how for that capability has existed for decades.

Any state that possesses a missile defense capability is presumed to have a rudimentary ASAT capability that can transition to a break-out capability. Thus, a test ban is nonsensical as the need to test a capability is unneeded and any event involving an ASAT is considered a demonstration, including India’s 2019 satellite intercept and Russia’s 2021 intercept. Thus, the US has unilaterally sacrificed freedom of action for “destructive testing” when the capability is already proven and no longer necessary.

Implications for Missile Defense

An outright ASAT ban implicates the testing and development of mid-course missile defense systems. Direct-ascent ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense and destructive mid-course missile defense testing against dummy warheads could open the opportunity for Russia and China to complain that the United States is going back on its commitment and testing ASAT technology. This would fall in line with their narrative of “space weapons” given the impetus for this talking point is to stunt the development of American missile defense technology and capabilities. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics focusing on sustainability would also foster this narrative and create public pressure for the US, both in and out of international organizations, to suspend missile defense testing.

Ceding Space Control

Space control is the unspoken chip on the table, especially since the US does not have an operational destructive counterspace capability and restricts its ability to develop offensive capabilities necessary to achieve deterrence through superiority with Russia and China. According to Dana Johnson, “Space control in geopolitical terms is the capability of a nation to maintain freedom of action in outer space and to deny the same to an adversary should national interests dictate.” The unilateral concession by the US bargains away kinetic space control for the ideal of sustainability and the anticipation it will create leverage and put international pressure on Russia and China to restrict their counterspace capabilities and thus ensure sustainability.

Conclusion

At its core, the unilateral ASAT test ban is a sacrifice of freedom of action made for political convenience and to check off a bucket list item for NGOs, academics, and civil servants. The US unilaterally forfeited something of major significance for something trivial and of questionable significance without taking into consideration it would not be reciprocated. The American attempt to use the ban to create momentum for its effort to create pseudo-norms and the drafting of a legally binding treaty to the same end is misplaced and is a detriment to American standing in outer space law, policy, national security, and deterrence.

Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert and practitioner in outer space law, policy, security, and lawfare/hybrid warfare strategy. He is the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis. Views expressed are the author’s opinion and not legal advice.

Two Years After the ASAT Test Ban: A Realistic Assessment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s coercive but indiscriminate “Sputnuke” concept lies at one end of a spectrum of potential space-based nuclear weapons. The remainder of the spectrum also offers significant offensive capabilities that could make space a very difficult place for the United States.

Prepositioning nuclear weapons in space would violate the Outer Space Treaty (1967). However, Moscow or Beijing gain significant coercive capability against the United States should they move forward with such a capability.

At least three classes of nuclear weapons could, potentially, be based in orbit. Any such weapon is likely to be disguised as some non-military type of spacecraft.

The first class of nuclear weapons in space are those in low Earth orbit. They are detonated from a position where they can disable adversary satellites. One or a small number of devices could create a wide-ranging electromagnetic pulse, which, by disabling satellites, could also cause an immense zone of debris along with a longer-lasting cloud of high-energy charged particles.

The combined effects would likely degrade this region of space for an extended duration. Spacecraft transiting low Earth orbit would also face the risk of a collision with orbiting debris.

Moscow or Beijing, if at a serious disadvantage to the United States during a conflict, may “escalate to win,” setting off nuclear weapons to wreak as much havoc in space as possible. This “scorched space” tactic would seek to level the playing field and slow American efforts to both mobilize force and command and control those forces.

The second class of nuclear weapons in space are those used for ground attacks. If, for example, intercontinental ballistic missile reentry vehicle-like weapons were covertly stationed on-orbit, their launch would be difficult to track. Such a weapon placed in low Earth orbit would strike a ground target in a matter of minutes.

Third are fission reactors based in orbit to power directed-energy weapons firing microwave, infrared, or optical laser beams. These travel at the speed of light, simplifying fire control. Out in the vacuum of space, a directed-energy beam would not suffer blocking or bending due to smoke, clouds, or atmospheric refraction.

With their reactors generating power, they do not need conspicuous and vulnerable solar panels. Firing energy pulses, they do not use chemical propellants or kinetic projectiles, and so do not run out of ammunition. Their fissionable fuel can last decades.

Their pinpoint, medium-power beams could at least temporarily blind or cripple soft or semi-hardened satellites over tremendous engagement ranges, and with much less collateral damage than a nuclear blast or conventional anti-satellite weapon. A small constellation of these systems could give Russia or China offensive and defensive coverage. Fortunately, there is no evidence either adversary is developing such a weapon at present.

Current and future American presidents are unwise to dismiss the dangers posed by these different classes of space-based nuclear weapons. To deter adversaries, in some cases, rough parity via on-orbit basing may be required.

For spaced-based nuclear weapons targeting American and allied satellites, the United States’ dominance in space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications make space-attack attractive. Should the United States perfect ballistic missile defenses and integrated air and missile, launching nuclear weapons from space toward ground targets may also prove an attractive option.

In many respects, the above discussion is prospective in contemplating how Russia and/or China might use nuclear weapons in space, but it is far from science fiction. For Western defense analysts, playing the part of futurist is a proactive approach to protecting American vital interests. Congressman Mike Turner’s open concern over intelligence suggesting that Russia may place nuclear weapons in space is only one example of Russian interest in weaponizing the domain.

The United States understands Chinese capabilities less well than those of Russia and their plans are even more difficult to predict. This leaves President Biden and his successors in a difficult position in the years ahead. Space is certainly a domain that will see weaponization sooner rather than later. For Americans, the question remains, who will dominate space?

 Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The view expressed in this article are the author’s own

To Deter in Space, the US Needs On-Orbit Parity was originally published on Global Security Review.

Rather than an aggressive push in space strategy, policy, and guidance for the DoD’s emergent roles and missions in such things as cislunar operations, in-space manufacturing, low earth orbit operations (LEO), space weather, science, technology, engineering, and math skills, planetary defense, and support for deep space exploration and development; the only substantive document produced by the office was an updated directive for the Department of Defense on space policy. While this usefully collects and repeats a number of high-level policies, it falls short as it fails to codify the most important policies and taskings material for strategic, great power competition, which were released by the two previous administrations.

Reading the updated directive gives the impression that the DoD is not subject to any of the space-specific national strategies and appears to indicate that the National Strategy for Space, as developed in 2018, is defunct. The DoD’s space policy completely ignores the nation’s legal and policy direction to economically develop space and continue to lead the free world in this vital domain.

Worse, the absence of forward-leaning enabling policy leads to hesitation on the part of key players in government and industry that increase uncertainty and reduce synergies within the interagency, and their allies and partners.

Some apologists for the lack of thought leadership from ASD Space Policy argue that the office is held hostage by an administration whose National Space Council is overly focused on a norms-based approach and is overly passive about developing the key material capabilities needed to address America’s ever-diminishing advantage in strategic competition in the space domain. While the Biden administration kept the Artemis program, and released a cislunar science and technology strategy, they were overly tolerant of NASA’s delays, budget overruns, and failure to meet the intent of SPD-1—to facilitate a permanent and industrial base on the moon. While the administration kept the Space Force, it allowed both ASD Space Policy and the Space Force to operate for nearly four years without a future operating concept or strategy for strategic competition in the space domain.

To address this flagging advantage in space, and the lackluster focus of ASD Space Policy and the administration, Congress must play a stronger role to ensure that the strategy, guidance and resources are committed to ensure American leadership in space through the following actions:

First, Congress needs to ensure the ASD Space Policy is not distracted from their intended duties. When Congress elevated the position, in concert with the establishment of the Space Force, Congress envisioned a dedicated shop which would enable concentrated and singularly space focused, civilian oversight and rapid yes/no decisions in support of the Space Force and overarching national security space requirements. This would enable more agile evolution and employment of the force—in some ways analogous to ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC).

Rather, the administration convoluted the new office with other strategic capabilities for integrated deterrence, including cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This should be reversed and should provide the dedicated strategy/policy focus space requires for the US to compete and win against adversaries in space.

Second, task ASD Space Policy, in partnership with OSD Net Assessment to provide Congress with a bigger-picture net assessment and strategy for great-power competition in space. In the 2021 NDAA Section 1614, Congress asked the National Space Council to do a comprehensive net assessment and to produce a comprehensive strategy to compete with China. The National Space Council proved uninterested in the task.

Congress should re-assign this primarily security-focused study to ASD Space Policy as lead. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who historically pushed for the creation of both the ASD Space Policy and the Space Force, should ensure that their fiscal needs reach Congress in a timely manner, and not compromise the long-term effectiveness of ASD Space Policy by exacerbating perceptions of the office’s tardiness and non-responsiveness.

Third, Congress should direct ASD Space Policy to update the Defense Space strategy. It was argued at the time of release that the 2020 Defense Space Strategy was already out of date. Since 2020 a diversity of higher-level policies has established major components of a broader national grand strategy in space. New joint doctrine better articulates the DoD’s role in strategic competition; the Defense Space Strategy has not aged well. Congress should therefore ask for a new Defense Space Strategy that acknowledges the nation’s grand strategy in the domain. In particular, the nation’s civil and commercial ambitions in cislunar space must be included, with provisions for enabling policy to US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and the Space Force—to support and protect those equities.

Fourth, accompanying this broad defense space strategy should be a specific DoD cislunar strategy. Just as the DoD has an Arctic strategy, which articulates the manifold ways in which the department supports primarily civil and commercial actors in the Arctic, A whole-of-nation strategy is needed for space. ASD Space Policy should be directed to author a DoD cislunar strategy which articulates how DoD postures, invests, and operates to support broader national goals.

Finally, Congress should also ask ASD Space Policy to update the DoD directive on space policy and the DoD directive on functions of the Department of Defense, with the specified tasks in Title 10, the Unified Command Plan, National Space Policy, national cislunar strategy, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy, LEO strategy, and planetary defense strategy. These White House documents detail US Space Command, US Air Force, and US Space Force responsibilities to protect and defend commerce, develop technologies of strategic interest, and develop capabilities for homeland defense against asteroids and comets. Just as NASA provides implementing guidance for the national planetary defense strategy, ASD Space Policy should provide implementing guidance for each of those mentioned above.

In short, Congress must ensure that ASD Space Policy is not a stumbling block to America’s grand strategic ambitions in space. Toward that end, Congress should give that office some much needed homework.

Peter Garretson is Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Commission is the European Union’s (EU) executive arm, responsible for drafting legislative proposals. It also implements the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. This means the EC calls the shots when it comes to the outline of policy. For EU member-states, they must balance national interest against the sovereignty relinquished to the EC.

Breton, the current Commissioner for the European Union Internal Market at the European Commission, leads, among many markets, the space sector. His political mandate is to ensure European access to space. Furthermore, Timo Personen, head of the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space at the EC, made it clear that Europe must take responsibility of its own defense in space.

While the European Commission’s key actions for 2024 start with the creation of a single market for space, regaining independent access to space begins with Ariane VI and Vega-C, which are set to become operational this year. Additional launch programs are also coming, protecting space systems and boosting space commercialization are also important.

Commissioner Breton put an emphasis on delivering new services for space defense needs. The EU’s efforts to address challenges, foster innovation, and deliver strategic autonomy in space appear to be serious efforts this time around. And while these remain forward-looking statements, the new European Strategy for Security and Defense and the above-mentioned EC decisions are triggering a renewed dynamic of bolder and better aligned European leadership and stronger political will in upgrading its defense. This is all while reckoning with the central role the space domain will play. Including proper capacity-building for the new European secure connectivity satellites constellation IRIS2—pending resolution of current issues—is also an important move.

While the EC is taking over European space policy, starting with independent launch and defense, there is still a role left to national space agencies and the European Space Agency (ESA) itself. ESA will remain in its various roles and funded by individual member states. These agencies, including ESA, have mandates in space science and exploration—cis/lunar space and beyond—and anything “space for Earth,” such as Earth observation supporting downstream data markets.

ESA is also deeply involved in space-based solar power studies, and its overall activity goes far beyond launch. However, the current programing, funding, and execution model for Western space agencies is a question. One may wonder whether that model remains relevant, also looking at the weight of the military among Indo-Pacific space powers. Should European nations relinquish the leadership and execution of land, maritime, and air economies and defense to agencies respectively in charge of agriculture and forestry, oceanography, and atmospheric studies? Of course not, but then why are they doing exactly that in the space domain?

For example, Europe has shipyards that are owned by the government, the private sector, or a combination of both, and they serve military and civilian markets. Some would argue that the current space agency model is simply broken. Many also believe that commercial and economic space development, together with defense, should eventually be tackled by organizations that are fit-for-purpose. The mindset for such purposes is not prevalent among space agencies, satisfied with basic science and exploration only. Setting up fit-for-purpose organizations would not exclude cooperation with space agencies, but it would streamline the policy budgeting and execution for each purpose.

The doubts expressed by Mike Griffin concerning the Artemis program is one example. Such concerns may eventually lead to considerations about what forms or organizations are fit-for-purpose to effectively run economic development and defense programs in space—on budget and on schedule. However, major institutional changes in the foreseeable future should not be the expectation.

As the Biden administration and Congress further address the defense of the United States, the space domain looms large. Defense of national interest needs to continue to involve deep engagement and multi-domain cooperation with Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and European allies—space included. It sounds strategically and fiscally reasonable to expect allies to provide a stronger contribution to their own defense and the joint-interest of collective defense. Should NATO require serious recalibration, that might start with aligning the actual weight of European contributions with the rhetoric. European states need to walk the walk of “strategic autonomy” by taking responsibility, starting with some fiscally irreversible defense and security engagement in the space domain.

Europeans must take charge of their own defense, focusing on space. Commissioner Breton decided, the EU will take substantially increased responsibility for its own defense as part of the alliance—an essential step to taking the alliance to the next level. It is crucial for a fiscally responsible EU to shoulder its fair share of the burden. Seen from an orbital space perspective, it becomes apparent that the security of the alliance goes beyond the North Atlantic. The Arctic, the Eurasian continental plate, and Indo-Pacific all matter. Europe is better off if it fosters alliances/partnerships and advocates for policymakers who support such policies.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views in this article are the authors own.  

European Commission: Taking Charge of Space Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States’ current National Security Strategy states that an era of “strategic competition” exists, which the recent Joint Concept for Competing defines as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.” It notes how America’s “adversaries are employing cohesive combinations of military and civil power, below the level of armed conflict, to pursue objectives that threaten the strategic interests of the United States, its allies, and its strategic partners” and to “win without fighting.”

If NASA is a national security organization, then it may be a primary, even principal tool to protect America’s strategic interests and to achieve America’s strategic objectives and should act responsibly as a custodian of America’s security interests, rather than merely as a science and exploration agency. So, is NASA a national security organization?

Many will say no and argue that NASA has a science and exploration mission, and that “NASA doesn’t do security.” Some assert that NASA was specifically created by President Eisenhower, distinct from the military industrial complex to be a tool of diplomacy, with national security belonging elsewhere.

Of course, that might come as news to President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself, who partially created NASA as a cover for his top-secret National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO). It likely would also come as a surprise to President Kennedy and to the first generation of Cold Warriors at NASA, who heeded President John F. Kennedy’s call that “the eyes of the world now look into space, to the Moon, and to the planets beyond. And we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace.” They won the first great victory of the Cold War—America’s first strategic competition.

President Lyndon B. Johnson said, “control of space means control of the world.” In fact, declassified documents reveal that NASA’s Mercury, Saturn, and the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Programs were designated as the “highest national priority category” under the Defense Production Act.

It would surprise Congress, who authorized NASA, the most. NASA’s purposes are codified in Title 51–National and Commercial Space Programs of the United States Code. The law states,

Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States require that adequate provision be made for…space activities. Congress further declares that such activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control over…space activities sponsored by the United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States).

It also unambiguously states, “the making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of discoveries that have military value or significance,” and that “the administration and the Department of Defense, through the president, shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions related to…space activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.” In fact, NASA has a long history of direct cooperation, during the Cold War, with the Air Force,  DARPA, SDIO, and NRO to advance the nation’s security interests through peaceful means and applications.

NASA’s primary job during the first strategic competition was to showcase the vibrancy of democratic capitalism over the Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy. Landing a person on the Moon, a symbol for national strength, was a way to woo newly independent states to the West’s side of the Cold War.

When the Cold War ended, NASA still had a security mission, but without the broader context of strategic competition it was asked to enhance security through diplomacy. This also included employing Russian rocket scientists and engineers to prevent them from building intercontinental ballistic missiles for Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

According to the NASA Administrator, America is in a new space race as part of a broader strategic competition with China and Russia. This time it is not using space technology as a symbolic proxy of national power, but rather developing space technology to secure long-term national economic power. Thus, NASA was given a mission to lead the “return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization.”

The national vision begins with a “campaign to utilize…the surface and resources of the Moon, and cis-lunar space to develop the critical technologies, operational capabilities, and commercial space economy.” The National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy explains that the United States will “leverage collaborations with private entities to enable capabilities for large-scale ISRU and advanced manufacturing at the Moon.”

Despite such clear policy direction from two administrations, it is not uncommon to hear NASA personnel eschew any mandate for economic development or industrial development in space, preferring to concentrate only on what advances their own exploration. The mandate is crystal clear in law.

In Title 51, NASA’s purpose includes, “the preservation of the United States preeminent position in…space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes” and the “preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in…space science and technology.” Title 51 also calls for the “establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of…space activities.”

NASA is a national security organization whose duties include ensuring the pre-eminence of the United States. Its job is not to build weapons or engage in conflict—but to pursue American strategic objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. Now that the US is once again in strategic competition, it is time for NASA to return to its roots as a primary competitor in seeding and cultivating economic, industrial, and logistical expansion. Thus, NASA’s Artemis planning must not be only in the narrow context of a Moon-to-Mars exploration program, but also must be made in the broader context of securing long-term economic security for the United States and its partners.

Peter Garretson is a Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), co-director of AFPC’s Space Policy Initiative, and author of Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space and The Next Space Race: A Blueprint for American Primacy. The view’s expressed are the authors own.

Is NASA a National Security Organization? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today we see America’s allies supporting the fundamental rights of access to space and its derived services. The United Kingdom (UK) leads work in the United Nations to create a space norms of behavior mandate that will enable the UN to hold irresponsible nations accountable for their behavior. Holding nations accountable is vital. Russia and China are deploying anti-satellite (ASAT) and direct energy weapons (DEW) that can target commercial and military space infrastructure. The Combined Space Operations (CSPO) Vision’s role is to develop and share a common understanding of military space operations and policy. It is a critical framework that serves as a foundation for such allied enforcement mechanisms. It recently expanded to include Italy, Japan, and Norway.

These new initiatives are not just a good idea, they are threat driven and a reaction to adversarial space activity that threatens allied space infrastructure. ASAT deployments and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) by China and Russia are of concern and the aggressor nations must be held to account—through strong allied military and political efforts. Attempts to reduce the risk of misunderstandings on orbit are also of paramount importance, because the United States does not want a Cuban Missile Crisis in space.

UK Space Command was created in April 2021 to act as the single UK military voice in allied enforcement efforts, and rather than duplicating American capabilities UK Space Command seeks to supplement American systems by enhancing resilience. This can be multifaceted. It can include the addition of novel sensors as well as increasing satellite communication capacity. CSPO members also provide capabilities that increase resilience and operational effectiveness. A few examples are instructive.

First, the UK and US share Royal Air Force (RAF) Base Fylingdales in Yorkshire. This base combines missile warning and space surveillance at one place. In addition, RAF space operators and planners have been leveraged in numerous command-and-control facilities worldwide, including US Space Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The UK is a leader in providing satellite communications’ capabilities to NATO through the SKYNET constellation.

Second, Australia, like the UK, has a Defence Space Command and a civilian space agency working in unison. This civilian and military relationship ensures that if an adversary were to attack a commercial satellite the military could act to defend it. Australia has gone further to align itself to American space deterrence and warfighting capabilities by declaring possession of offensive space control capabilities. These capabilities are important to maintain credibility in the minds of adversaries. China maintains an “attack to deter” mindset, and without such capabilities the credibility of extended deterrence in space is lost.

Third, Canada contributes additional space situation awareness (SSA) capabilities, an example being their Sapphire satellite which feeds into several US and allied SSA systems. As is the case with the UK and Australia, Canada also contributes skilled space professionals to American and allied space commands, staffs, and space robotic systems to enhance resiliency in the face of threats in, from, and to space.

In addition to the “Five Eyes” partnership, NATO is a vital organization for deterrence in space and on earth. Article 5, and the commitment to collective defence, is one of the most potent forms of deterrence in place in any military alliance around the world and is applicable to elements of space infrastructure. To enhance NATO’s operational support to deterrence capabilities it established the NATO Space Centre of Excellence in France and the NATO Space Operations Centre in Germany. These initial steps enable NATO military commanders and political leaders to deter attacks on the critical space systems that enable successful terrestrial operations. For NATO to deter it must act upon the call for defensive capabilities and communicate coherently about rising threats. Failure to do so will erode the alliance’s unified front and therefore its credibility.

Deterrence in space is hard but by integrating the evolving capabilities of allies at a greater depth deterrence can be achieved not only in space but across all domains. The rise of allied space commands, capability integration, and enhancements of resiliency will only grow in importance as space expands its reach into the day to day lives of our peoples and societies.

Major Robert Atchison QRH is a British Army officer who serves as the Military Assistant to Commander of UK Space Command.

Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

“America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It” by Jonathan Trexel highlights the urgent need for the US to revise its strategic posture in response to escalating global threats. It emphasizes the changing international security environment, underscoring the necessity for the US to adapt its defense planning. The report suggests enhancing conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to address these threats, including those from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The recommendations also cover aspects like modernizing nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and developing offensive and defensive space assets. The author argues for the urgent adoption of these measures to maintain national and global security.

“Congressional Dysfunction Impacts American Defense in the Pacific” by Christophe Bosquillon highlights concerns about American defense strategy in the Pacific, specifically due to congressional delays in funding the Compacts of Free Association (COFA) with Pacific island-states. The article underscores the strategic importance of these island-states, such as Palau, for American defense, particularly against China. Bosquillon argues that congressional inaction undermines American commitments in the region, potentially inviting Chinese influence and jeopardizing American security interests in the Pacific.

“Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated” by Michael J. Listner examines the concept of space deterrence, arguing it’s a simple yet often over-complicated idea. He discusses the importance of understanding different perspectives on deterrence, especially from adversaries like Russia and China. Listner emphasizes the need for the US to have the capability and will to apply force in space. He critiques the reliance on resilience as a method of deterrence, stating it’s not a substitute for actual defensive and offensive capabilities in space. The article advocates for a straightforward approach to deterrence in space, stressing the importance of capability, will, and communication.

“Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent” by Christophe Bosquillon analyzes Japan’s evolving space strategy in the context of regional security challenges, particularly threats from North Korea and China. The article discusses Japan’s shift from pacifist policies to developing credible deterrence in space, including the use of anti-satellite capabilities and enhancing space situational awareness. It underscores the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the US for security in the Indo-Pacific region and highlights the challenges Japan faces in establishing a credible deterrent in space.

“Nano Aquabots and the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement” by Alexis Littlefield explores the dual-use nature of nano aquabots and other advanced technologies, emphasizing the risks and benefits of the US-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement. Littlefield discusses how these technologies, while beneficial for society, can also be weaponized. The article critically examines the implications of US government-funded research in collaboration with China, highlighting concerns about intellectual property transfer and national security. The author’s perspective sheds light on the complexities of international science and technology agreements and their impact on strategic interests.

“Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyber-Attacks” by Alexis Schlotterback highlights the increasing threat of Russian cyber operations targeting satellites. The article explores various satellite cyberattack methods such as data interception, data corruption, and seizure of control. It emphasizes Russia’s advanced capabilities in cyber warfare, including the use of GPS jammers and potential hacking of American satellite control systems. The discussion includes the need for enhanced security measures in satellite infrastructure to protect against these threats.

“The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad” by Christopher Stone critically evaluates the US Space Force’s strategy as outlined in a congressional report. Stone highlights the positives, such as acknowledging the Space Force’s role in supporting terrestrial forces. However, he points out significant gaps, arguing that the Space Force should focus more on warfighting capabilities to counter growing space threats from China and Russia, rather than merely supporting other forces. He emphasizes the need for combat-credible space forces capable of offensive and defensive operations, asserting that this should be the primary mission of the Space Force.

“The Danger of Minimum Deterrence” by Peter Huessy critiques the concept of minimal deterrence in nuclear strategy. Huessy argues that reducing the US nuclear arsenal to a minimal level undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, impacts the deterrence of conventional conflict, and ignores the need for strategic stability. He emphasizes that a robust nuclear arsenal is crucial for credible deterrence and argues against the reduction of nuclear forces as part of a path to disarmament.

“The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t” by Adam Lowther and Col (Ret) Curtis McGiffin challenges the notion of a new nuclear arms race, arguing that the current situation is not comparable to the Cold War era. They critique the assertion of an arms race, highlighting the significant reduction in nuclear weapons since the Cold War and the lack of expansion in US nuclear capabilities. The authors emphasize the importance of arms control agreements that align with US interests, and they critique the viewpoint that more nuclear weapons are inherently destabilizing, suggesting that strength, not weakness, deters conflict.

“The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed” by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther is a critical analysis of the Department of Defense’s 2023 report on China’s military developments. The authors highlight the significant increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and potential first-strike aspirations, which contradict its “No First Use” policy. They argue that the US needs a coherent strategy to counter this threat, emphasizing the urgency for more robust American deterrence measures in response to China’s rapid military expansion.

“The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout” by Peter Huessy discusses the rapid expansion of China’s nuclear capabilities and its implications for US strategic posture. Huessy highlights the significant growth of China’s nuclear arsenal and the development of advanced delivery systems. He emphasizes the need for the US to enhance its nuclear deterrence and missile defense capabilities in response to China’s expanding nuclear force. The article urges the US to consider strategic adjustments to maintain a credible deterrent against the evolving threat posed by China.

“The Value of Panda Diplomacy” by Alexis Littlefield explores the geopolitical symbolism of pandas in Sino-American relations. The article discusses how pandas leased to zoos, such as Tian Tian and Mei Xiang in Washington DC, represent diplomatic ties between China and the US. The return of these pandas to China signifies a shift in relations, especially in the context of China’s global influence and the Belt and Road Initiative. Littlefield examines the broader implications of these changes, suggesting pandas as indicators of China’s international relationships.

“Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report” by Peter Huessy addresses the Congressional Commission’s findings on the strategic challenges posed by China and Russia. It highlights the United States’ unpreparedness in nuclear deterrence against these peer adversaries. The report recommends strengthening the nuclear triad, deploying air and missile defense systems, and increasing cooperation with allies. It emphasizes the urgency of these recommendations and the need for phased modernization of US nuclear capabilities, considering the evolving strategic environment and the growing threats from China and Russia.

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Global Security Review 2023 Article Compendium was originally published on Global Security Review.

It calls for a coordinated response using all available tools and those of member states. This includes dual-use space systems and services. However, the policy remains confined to an emphasis on resilience of space assets and confidence-building measures to clarify intentions behind various space activities. While this is not a bad thing, it does not express the European Union’s readiness to prevent and respond to space attack by deterring adversaries from hostile actions.

 Space Threat Analysis

The EU proposes an annual classified analysis of space threats called the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), a system of systems where both civilian and military contributions are used for all-sources intelligence assessments. This integrates all space threat analyses within the broader EU threat analysis process. However, its key asset, the EU Satellite Center, requires timely geospatial and orbital intelligence capabilities. It needs to see that long-acknowledged technological shortcomings in early warning and conflict analysis  are effectively addressed.

Space Threat Response Architecture

When responding to space threats, the strategy calls for a comprehensive toolbox of joint EU state responses but goes no further in stating what these responses might look like. It does emphasize information-sharing and regular exercises. While the EU considers preventive and restrictive measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it has yet to determine whether to treat attacks in the space domain as armed aggressions under Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty.

The EU rightly acknowledges the need to enhance the use of space for security and defense and intends to do so by integrating the space dimension into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Strengths include additional communication services through IRIS² and relying on assured independent access to space. IRIS² is the new EU secure satellite constellation which stands for Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity, and Security by Satellite. However, while IRIS² is a credible prospect, European independent access to space remains hindered by bureaucratic processes.

Indigenous Launch Capabilities

The EU made the strategic mistake of not developing any heavy lift reusable launch vehicles and the maiden flight of its expendable heavy lift launcher program, Ariane 6, is delayed until 2024. Even if successful, it will remain expensive and subsidized to survive. This led to contracting SpaceX for launch services for such EU mainstays as the Galileo navigation satellites.

Space Norms of Behavior

On norms for responsible behaviors in space, the EU reaffirms its commitment to norms and joined the US in condemning destructive anti-satellite missile (ASAT) tests. The strategy underscores the priority of dialogue with spacefaring nations and international organizations to ensure norm implementation. While the establishment of a structured dialogue on space norms between the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN) is a step in the right direction, the strategy falls short in acknowledging that normative cooperation alone will not deter adversary behavior. This is due in part to Russia and China’s opposition for such norms and their rapid buildup in ASAT weapons and other offensive space forces. In short, the EU is posturing for resilience, not deterrence.

Resilience-based Posture

Back to the very core of the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, which is to “enhance resilience and protection of space systems,” the document emphasizes the need for a common resilience framework, proposing the creation of an EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC). In the realm of defense space systems, EU member states tend to develop indigenous capabilities. The United Kingdom leads with the sixth-generation Skynet for military telecoms, followed by France’s Syracuse, and Italy’s Sicral. Despite attempts at common definitions, a shared system remains elusive. An exception is the joint high-speed communication satellite Athena-Fidus by France and Italy. The EU Commission aims for the GOVSATCOM system, providing secure government communications. Observation satellites for reconnaissance see France pioneering with Helios, while European collaboration efforts falter due to national-centric approaches and protective industrial interests.

Strengthen EU Space Industry

Overall, the intention to reduce European strategic dependencies on foreign-produced critical technologies, while keeping the industrial base for its civilian and defense value chains sovereign and competitive, is a good goal. This will be easier said than done, considering the entanglement of Europe with technologically advanced economies such as the US and Japan. Moreover, challenges stem primarily from economic dependency on China. The solution has been defined as “de-risking” rather than “decoupling.” It is not entirely clear how that might work.

In conclusion, the new EU strategy addresses challenges and outlines goals for strengthening capabilities and cooperation in the space domain. Unfortunately, it fails to address gaps in deterrence measures and consider the evolving geopolitical landscape to ensure the security of EU space systems. While Russia showed some restraint in orbital warfare by relying on non-kinetic and reversible capabilities against Ukrainian and Western space assets, there is no guarantee China would similarly restrain itself. Are the EU and its allies ready for prime time in a major space conflict? The answer to that question might come earlier than we think.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

The concept of a successful deterrence strategy in any domain boils down to three key requirements: a credible threat (capability to support such a threat), the will to carry out the threat, and effective communications. Part of the problem for Japan is that it failed to develop a credible capability. Furthermore, the three non-nuclear principles (not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons on the Japanese territory) leave Japan fully dependent on the American nuclear umbrella.

For Japan’s effective deterrence in all domains, mere rhetoric about threats is insufficient. As an island nation entirely dependent on maritime access, Japan needs a military capability and clear communication of its determination to achieve domain superiority and escalation dominance over adversaries.

Credibility is based on a nation’s past behavior and its demonstrated willingness to respond to aggression. Clearly, Japan has baggage in its history of aggression and colonization in the Indo-Pacific. Both North Korea and China consistently frame a pacified post-war Japan as the aggressor every time Japan makes a move to survive and claim its right to defend itself in a hostile neighborhood. Japan, however, is now rearming itself.

Space, as a domain, is no exception to deterrence principles. The 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test by China triggered Japan’s review of its passive approach to space infrastructure defense. Japanese spacecraft are at risk of attack through such means as jamming, close approaches by anti-satellite vehicles, and kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that are designed to disrupt or destroy satellites. China has further demonstrated its ability to capture uncooperative spacecraft in geosynchronous Earth orbit, posing a significant concern to Japanese assets in space—and to any critical space infrastructure.

Japan’s transition to a militarily sovereign posture is a protracted process. Japan began by cutting the Gordian knot of post–World War II pacifism in 2014 when it “reinterpreted” Article 9 of its constitution, rather than revising or adjusting it. That sea change operationalized Article 14 of Japan’s 2008 Basic Space Law, Ensuring International Peace and Security as well as the National Security Strategy of Japan, which stipulates, “The State shall take necessary measures to promote space development and use to ensure international peace and security as well as to contribute to the national security of Japan.”

Over the next decade, Japan’s posture evolved from a non-military use of outer space to a deterrence-oriented military capability in space. In 2018, Japan’s defense policy introduced the concept of multi-domain operations, emphasizing national security space capabilities as a central aspect of Japanese strategy. And in 2022, Japan expanded its Space Operations Squadron into a Space Operations Group, responsible for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) space domain awareness operations.

For too long Japan’s space sector development was constrained to civilian aims only. Faced with existential threats, Japanese policymakers realized how vital it was to foster civilian and military cooperation in space for economic gain and furthering national security. Japan’s strategy is to develop an Earth-orbital-cislunar ecosystem.

In the same vein as Japan relies on free sea lanes for communications across the Indo-Pacific, at sea and in space, Japanese-American security cooperation is paramount. The threat of attacks on commercial satellite constellations and spacecraft in orbit and cislunar space is all too certain a reality, in view of already occurring daily threats and attacks on space and cyber assets.

As space continues to be a domain of strategic importance and increasing economic value for Japan, its Space Operations Group must strengthen its space situational awareness capabilities to track and identify hostile objects in space. However, while space situational awareness is essential, Japan must ultimately develop a war-winning space force to effectively deter attacks and win conflicts in space.

The JASDF should be given the policy direction and resources to develop agile, responsive, and lethal capabilities to ensure the protection of Japanese and allied commercial and military assets in space. For that matter, so should the US Space Force.

Challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and globally resemble a gathering storm. Yet, Europe, in part due to its quasi-irreversible techno-economic entanglement with China, remains unclear on what it will do in case of a Taiwan or Japan contingency. An informal yet functional partnership between NATO and the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) is already established. Yet, France, furthering its relationship with China, recently opposed the opening of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo.

On November 11, 1983, Ronald Reagan addressed the Diet in Tokyo, “I have come to Japan because we have an historic opportunity, indeed, an historic responsibility. We can become a powerful partnership for good, not just in our own countries, not just in the Pacific region but throughout the world. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my question is: Do we have the determination to meet the challenge of partnership and make it happen? My answer is without hesitation: Yes we do, and yes we will.” Forty years later, the Gipper’s words have not aged a bit.

In space, as on Earth, the mutual commitment of Japan and the US, as staunch allies, should ensure the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open, all the way to orbit, cislunar space, and beyond.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yet, due to several factors including the American moratorium on testing destructive ASAT weapons, concerns of environmental sustainability, and increased use of grey-zone tactics by adversaries, inferential and non-kinetic ASATs may be the primary means with which conflict in outer space is waged in the immediate future. Thus, emphasizing potential negative impacts upon strategic deterrence for both nuclear and space arenas is essential.

Contrasted with kinetic physical ASATs, which are highly attributable, cause permanent damage, and simultaneously signal both capability and the political will of the aggressor, inferential ASATs are a broad categorization comprised of capabilities that do not create debris fields and are significantly less visible to third-party observers. This grouping, which encompasses directed energy, electromagnetic, radiofrequency, and cyber capabilities, does not strictly align with the traditional categorizations of kinetic physical and non-kinetic physical ASATs, and can include non-kinetic physical attacks.

For example, military-use electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons are categorized as non-kinetic physical attacks but may be categorized as “inferential” because they are rapid, invisible, and can affect damage with indirect contact with a satellite. Considering this proposed categorization, changing technological environment, and increased used of grey-zone tactics in the space domain, it is time to take a hard look at the underlying theories guiding national security strategies such as strategic-level deterrence; specifically, its tenants of credibility and signaling, which could be negatively impacted by the inferential attributes of new weapons systems.

Successful deterrence theory and practice is contingent upon (1) credible psychological impact upon the adversary; (2) communication of an attributable weapon capability, wherein the ability to visibly detect or identify the negative consequences of attack are clearly signaled; and (3) the political will to carry out such an attack if attacked by an aggressor. The proliferation of inferential ASAT capabilities significantly alters this cost-benefit calculus due to the difficulty of attributing their use in attacks.

Moreover, since conventional weapons capabilities evolved to include virtually undetectable forms of attack with little progress towards attribution, it is reasonable to conclude that the successful operationalization of deterrence against inferential ASATs will be difficult to achieve in outer space.

Credibility and Signaling

Generally, credibility is characterized as the effective communication (signal) to an adversary through deterrence posture, so as to compel the adversary to believe the utility of the planned attack, thereby, psychologically registering the attack as a sufficient threat. Since the value of signaling lies in the opponent’s perception, and because inferential capabilities engender difficulties in attribution, adversaries remain undeterred so long as the attack does not register as a threat.

Degradation of credibility occurs when signals are misinterpreted or misperceived, as well as if there are differing belief systems and intentional interference by the adversary. If present, these factors are likely to result in a weakened deterrence posture; this remains especially true when such signals are below the escalatory threshold of retaliatory response, as is the case with grey-zone tactics that employ inferential capabilities.

Proposed Solutions

A potential solution to the credibility and signaling problem in the space domain would be to bolster deterrence strategies with an integrative triad that combines special operations, cyber, and space force capabilities. While still largely in development, the triad could leverage space-based competencies such as space domain awareness, space forensics, dual-use spacecraft, proximity operations, or on-orbit servicing to fill the gap left open by weakened attribution capacity and to deter actions below the threshold of conflict without having to resort to kinetic-type ASAT.

The question here is whether such space-based capabilities, especially dual-use spacecraft, serve to deter or escalate conflict. In 2022, China’s Shijan-21 docked with a defunct Chinese satellite and towed it into a graveyard orbit. This not only demonstrated China’s technological advancement, but also its ability to conduct counter-space operations under the pretense of debris-removal operations. Such developments point to the trend of increased reliance on inferential capabilities by adversaries and negative implications of strategic-level deterrence in outer space.

In an explosive, technological growth environment, the non-demonstrable nature attributed to inferential ASATs are allowing an increasing number of non-state actors adverse to the United States to take self-motivated action in ways that hinder the successful application of deterrence strategies. While a deterrence triad can bolster credibility and signaling, inferential ASATs remain below the threshold for escalation, degrading the integrity and security of outer space systems over time. Thus, the salience for deterrence within this context in this discussion is not only meaningful for its theoretical applications, but also because its successful implementation implies that deterrence as a theory is highly adaptable, resilient, and will continue to remain relevant in formulation of the United States’ national space strategies going forward.

Kaili Ayers is a JD candidate at the University of Oregon School of Law and Law Clerk at the Space Court Foundation. The thoughts, opinions, and analysis presented here are her own and do not reflect the position of the University of Oregon or the Space Court Foundation.

Anti-Satellite Capabilities and American Options for Strategic Deterrence in Outer Space was originally published on Global Security Review.

While no single agency oversees Russian cyberattacks, the amount of personnel involved in these operations continues to increase. There is a heavy reliance on criminal and civilian involvement to conduct offensive measures. Combining Russian interest in cyber and outer space has led to the “proliferation of handheld Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers, deployment of road-mobile jammers, and even development and testing of space-based jammers,” as reported on by Sarah Mineiro. She also warns that Russia can hack American ground control systems for the GPS constellation.

 Types of Satellite Cyberattacks

Though electronic means of interfering with satellite signals, such as jamming or spoofing, occur at a more frequent rate, attacks using cyber may prove to be more impactful and frequent in the next decade. Cyberattacks “target the data itself and the systems that use, transmit, and control the flow of data,” potentially causing irreparable harm for military commanders and civilians reliant on communications and navigation systems for decision-making.

Like other cyberattacks, those on satellites and their networks require four main components: “access, vulnerability, a malicious payload, and a command-and-control system.” Multiple methods and modes of attack can take out a satellite system or render it inoperable without using kinetic force. Adversaries can target the networks that satellites use, individual satellites, and the supply chains that produce satellite hardware and software. The Center for Strategic and International Studies describes three main types of cyberattacks: data intercept/monitoring, data corruption, and seizure of control.

First, there is data interception or monitoring, which is often seen as espionage. Adversaries may find spying to be a strategically sound decision to anticipate the next moves of the United States and leverage this knowledge in diplomatic or military channels. Secure World Foundation reports that many attempts of back door installations into American satellite networks were found in “Chinese electronics and Russian software packages.”

Additionally, the communications from the ground to a satellite and a satellite to the ground often use “open (unencrypted) telecom network security protocols,” Luke Shadbolt warns—making these systems vulnerable.

Second, data corruption, like a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, is accomplished through corrupting satellite data or even ransomware attempts to hold data hostage unless payment is received by the attackers. Secure World Foundation describes how a group of university students developed a DoS technique that causes GPS receivers to crash when they try to decode malicious signals. Reports in 1999 surfaced that an unknown actor hacked the United Kingdom’s Skynet satellite, requiring payment to become operational again. Though the British Minister of Defense described the claim as “impossible”  at the time, more of these instances may occur as computer systems advance and space networks fail to evolve with greater security.

Third, while American policymakers may focus mainly on protecting networks, defending against the seizure of a satellite remains equally important. Such seizures could result in the deliberate destruction of the spacecraft, creating considerable debris that threatens other systems on orbit.

Equally likely, a hacker could transfer ownership of a system, so the original user is completely locked out and the capability of a satellite is given to the adversary. In 1998, a German-American satellite was hacked and destroyed. Attackers fried the optics by turning the satellite towards the sun. Unfortunately, examples of hacked satellites continue into the twenty-first century. Bill Malik reports that “there are six known examples of hackers successfully interfering with or even commanding unauthorized maneuvers of NASA satellites before 2011.”

 Looking Forward: Addressing Cyber Threats

The US currently invests in multiple avenues to combat the possibility of satellite hacking, a challenge made more difficult by the same factors that affect other industries and targets. For general satellite protection, the Air Force Research Laboratory is beginning its fourth year of sponsoring a satellite hacking challenge to involve researchers across the country. The Hack-A-Sat competition opened for registration in February with this year’s format involving the use of an on-orbit satellite for the first time.

“Space cybersecurity is a global issue, which is why it is so important that Hack-A-Sat is open to the global security research community,” said Col. Kenny Decker. Across the Atlantic, the European Space Agency sponsors similar competitions with HackCYSAT.

Recently, the geospatial intelligence company, Orbital Insight, won a Department of Defense contract to identify intentional global navigation system disruptions. Orbital’s platform aims to use artificial intelligence to detect spoofing operations. According to the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Aaron Ferguson, it is a goal of NSA is to develop, “a way to characterize telemetry data so that as we deploy new satellites, we can make adjustments.” Finally, HDI Global Specialty argues that “the backbone of a cyber-resilient spacecraft should be a robust Intrusion Detection System (IDS).” Encryption and authentication must become priorities for the US government to implement in satellites and satellite systems.

Conclusion

Russia poses a large security threat to the United States even outside the future possibility of satellite hacking. Russian aggression in Ukraine demonstrated blatant disregard for Western ideals of a rules-based international order. It is no longer possible for policymakers to secure stability and prevent conflict by relying on post–Cold War paradigms.

Previous engagement through international communication channels is unlikely to reduce threats to critical infrastructure. As state-sponsored groups and proxy actors continue to target American assets, it is necessary to prepare for multiple modes of attack, especially in the space and cyber domains. A whole-of-government approach to defend against this new generation of conflict can increase reactivity in the event of an attack and aims to provide a deterrent against the targeting of satellites. As the twenty-first century evolves, implementing these solutions is one of the most important challenges the nation faces.

Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyberattacks was originally published on Global Security Review.

As is the case with most congressional reports labeled “strategy,” it is a mixed bag of some good things that should be commended, with gaping holes that will have negative impacts on the strategic interests of the United States in space unless addressed. If left untouched, the United States could find itself a nation in danger of failing in the near future.

There are some good points in the document. It rightly explains the importance of the Space Force’s role as a service provider to the terrestrial (air, land, sea) services and combatant commands. Regional combatant commanders understand the “competitive advantage” that space systems like satellite communications, missile warning and tracking, and surveillance and reconnaissance provides. As such, combatant commanders worldwide have “requirements in space expertise, activities, and space capabilities.”

These are correctly explained in the document as something needing funding, support, and the right service posture to meet these requirements across the terrestrial services and agencies. However, while this is all true, it is not good to communicate the role of the Space Force as only an enabler of the Joint Force or “enhancing readiness of U.S. [terrestrial] forces” as if it is not a part of American forces or the Joint Force. It was created for much more than this.

Second, there are concerns about some aspects of the document, which are unhelpful to the service and the nation’s readiness for great power war in space. This is because the Space Force was not created to be primarily an enabler and supporter of the Joint Force, but to be the service responsible for organizing, training, and equipping space combat forces to address the threat posed by the growing space combat forces of China and Russia.

Rather than creating a superior war-winning force to deter attacks upon critical space infrastructure, the objectives of the current strategy is resilience and the ability of American warfighting support capabilities to “degrade gracefully under attack” while being “reconstituted in a reasonable time.” This approach is insufficient as China’s and Russia’s space forces do not exist to merely “deny the United States its access to the space domain.”

They instead mean to “kill” that access and the critical space capabilities leveraged by all instruments of American national power and influence. As such, the Space Force is not postured appropriately to deter, counter, and win against enemy warfighting capabilities that can currently degrade and destroy our critical space infrastructure.

In addition, the Space Force’s role in this document is focused more on protecting the terrestrial force structure from “space enabled attack” that, frankly, is not a new phenomenon and was accomplished when space was only a functional support area and not a warfighting domain—and area of responsibility (AOR) in its own right.

The document does correctly state that the United States “must be prepared to deny a potential adversary’s use of space systems to monitor, track, and enable attack of US, Allied, and partners’ military forces,” but space forces are just as much a part of military forces as air, land, and sea. The nation cannot achieve this objective if it does not treat warfighting support forces as part of the team, as well as create space combat forces capable of deterring attack by having the ability to wage a successful campaign in, to, and from space.

This means the nation must have “combat-credible forces” with the ability to fire and maneuver just like air, land, and sea forces can. The strategy mentions the types of forces that should demonstrate “the ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations against an adversary,” but this offensive and defensive objective is not the primary mission of the service, which it should be.

The primary mission of the air, land, and sea forces are not to “support the Joint Force,” but rather to project military power against any adversary region on earth to achieve military objectives and protect and advance strategic interests of the United States. As such, the Space Force’s reason for being is not supporting terrestrial actions, but to deter attack upon critical space infrastructure vital to society and commercial interests in space, and through that primary mission, achieve victory against enemy space and terrestrial forces from space.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, D.C. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the positions of the Department of Defense or his employer.

The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad was originally published on Global Security Review.

Deterrence Is Domain Agnostic  

Thomas Schelling, in Arms and Influence, writes, “Deterrence involves a threat to keep an adversary ‘from starting something,’ or ‘to prevent [an adversary] from action by fear of consequences.’” That threat must include not only a capability but the political will to use that capability if an adversary decides to “start something” despite the capability being threatened.

If an adversary decides the political will does not exist to use the capability, there is no deterrence. Conflating deterrence with academic concepts such as hard deterrence, soft-deterrence, or integrated deterrence does not create deterrence. Rather, these concepts deny the fundamental truth of what deterrence is and what it takes to achieve it; a nation must possess the capability and will to use force.

In the space domain, this means the United States must have the capability and will to apply force in outer space. It is also important to remember that adversaries like Russia and China may view deterrence differently.

The United States is consistently guilty of mirror imaging when it comes to its views on deterrence—assuming the Russians and Chinese think in similar terms about costs and rewards. This creates the false belief among Americans that a capability designed to deter will do so, when, in fact, the adversary thinks very differently. For the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for example, preemption or compellance is a deterrence doctrine. What does this mean for deterrence in outer space? Consider the following scenario.

The PLA launches a limited kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) attack on American space assets or those of an ally. The attack destroys key space assets vital to mount military operations prior to an invasion of Taiwan. Simultaneously, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) utilizes ASAT capabilities in geosynchronous orbit to interfere and disable commercial space assets, which affect the general population of the United States.

Following these attacks, the PRC employs hybrid warfare to encourage the US to avoid interfering with its annexation of Taiwan or risk the loss of further space assets. The loss of these space assets, while not debilitating, coupled with the PRC’s messaging, creates a psychological response that compels the president to sit out the conflict. In short, the lack of American offensive and defensive space capabilities forces the United States to capitulate when it cannot deter Chinese aggression.

A second scenario involves the PRC employing fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) utilizing nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles. The PRC employs multiple FOBS as a first strike against the United States’ nuclear arsenal. With no space-based capabilities to deter or defend against such systems, the US loses critical second-strike assets.

After the attack, the PRC takes advantage of the psychological impact of a first strike to fracture the confidence of the American people and compel the president to restrain from using the nation’s ballistic missile submarines, which are still needed to deter Russia and additional strikes from China. In short, the lack of effective space-based deterrence capabilities once again play a critical role in American decision-making.

In both cases, deterrence failed because of assumptions about the PRC rooted in mirror imaging. The lack of acknowledgment of the PRC’s stance on deterrence, which is compellance, results in the political failure to deploy a capability to deter attack and, if deterrence fails, respond with overwhelming force.

Resilience Is Not Deterrence

Over the past decade, many space professionals turned to resilience as the best method for deterrence in space. The theory of resilience relies on the redundancy of American space assets as the means for deterring adversary attack. This view also mirror images adversary thinking and makes assumptions about adversary behavior that is rooted in idealism and not realism.

Resilience is not deterrence. It is a quiet acknowledgement of inadequate defensive/offensive capabilities and a façade for a lack of space-based deterrence capabilities and the will to use them. At present, the United States lacks the capability needed to hold adversary space assets at risk and, by default, deter those adversaries from harming American interests in space.

Conclusion

Deterrence is not complicated. The formula is simple. Effective deterrence = capability x will x communication. Norms, resilience, and other alternatives to this simple formula never set the conditions for effective deterrence. At best, they give the allusion of deterrence and allow politicians to temporarily escape hard decisions.

However, that time is quickly coming to an end. President Biden and future presidents will undoubtedly face increasing risk in space and must make the tough decisions. The United States cannot afford to lose the next war because it is left blind and deaf because of attacks on its space assets. Now is the time to take a hard look at Russian and Chinese views on space warfare and stop assuming they have the same aspirations as Americans.

Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert in outer space law, outer space policy, and lawfare strategy and the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis.

Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated was originally published on Global Security Review.