What Is the Third Nuclear Age?

The world can be divided into three eras of nuclear weapons history, each defined by distinct weapons dynamics and geopolitical relationships, and distinguished by major proliferation or treaty events of its time.

The first nuclear era was characterized by a bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, from 1945 to the late 1980s. At its peak, the number of warheads held by both countries is estimated to have reached around 60,000 in 1986. This era was marked by limited arms control agreements and significant arms racing.

The second nuclear era, spanning from 1991 to 2013, saw significant disarmament through bilateral U.S.–Russia treaties such as START I and New START, which reduced global warhead numbers by a considerable amount. However, this period was also marked by nuclear proliferation efforts by regional actors, including the nuclearization of South Asia, particularly India, followed by Pakistan, and then North Korea’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

Beginning in 2014, the third nuclear era emerged, typified by the current, chaotic, multipolar environment. Russia has unilaterally suspended participation in New START monitoring and verification, a treaty that expired on February 5^th, 2026. Both the United Kingdom and France have commenced modernization and expansion of their nuclear forces. China is rapidly nearing an estimated 600 warheads, North Korea continues to test intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and Russia has modernized its weapons systems and deployed short-range nuclear weapons in Belarus. Iran continues to signal that it is nearing the nuclear threshold, opacity persists regarding Israel’s nuclear capabilities, and the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan has created multiple additional flashpoints, all of which underscore the need for new international multilateral guardrails.

Current Global Nuclear Trends

The United States has initiated a $1.7 trillion nuclear triad modernization plan, which includes submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles. Russia has been testing nuclear-powered cruise missiles such as Burevestnik, while China is expanding its nuclear weapons capability at a rapid pace amid rising tensions over Taiwan.

In addition, strategic non-nuclear weapons, including hypersonic systems, AI-driven command structures, and missile defense, are contributing to an escalatory environment in which the nuclear ladder has become increasingly slippery to climb and equally difficult to descend. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has set its “Doomsday Clock” at 89 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been since 1947, reflecting its assessment that the erosion of arms control, the expansion of nuclear capabilities, and the persistence of conflict have significantly increased the risk of nuclear catastrophe.

Escalating Global Nuclear Challenges

The U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations have ceased over Ukraine, and President Putin has reduced stated nuclear use thresholds. At the same time, U.S. military strikes against Iran have alarmed some observers who argue that such actions undermine norms governing sovereignty. NATO countries are increasingly exploring their own European deterrence capabilities.

A defining feature of the third nuclear age is the growing complexity of the strategic environment and the inability to manage global risks through simple bilateral frameworks.

Technological advancements that accelerate escalation risks include hypersonic weapons that challenge missile defense systems, artificial intelligence that may misinterpret launch indicators, and cyber operations that could inadvertently contribute to nuclear escalation—echoing historical false-alarm incidents in 1983. Meanwhile, China’s evolving relationship with Russia further complicates U.S. efforts to deter aggression across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

The Way Forward

With New START having expired, significant future limits on the number of nuclear weapons possessed by major powers appear unlikely, accelerating competition and instability. By the mid-2030s, the convergence of nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities may become normalized as tools of coercion rather than deterrence, while additional states may seek nuclear weapons should nonproliferation barriers erode. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has identified the emergence of the “third nuclear age” as the top global risk in 2026.

Accordingly, new mechanisms for arms control and nuclear disarmament consistent with commitments made by major nuclear-weapon states under the NPT framework are urgently required. These include enhanced verification technologies, AI-assisted monitoring, restraints on the development of destabilizing new weapons, and sustained strategic-stability dialogue aimed at separating and disentangling nuclear and conventional escalation pathways. Additional measures to promote norms of responsible nuclear behavior are also necessary, although opposition from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council remains a significant barrier to progress. Ensuring the global security of radioactive materials must remain a priority.

The third nuclear age has placed humanity in unprecedented danger. Existing disarmament mechanisms have proven ineffective as new rivalries emerge, and technological changes accelerate. History demonstrates that diplomacy can work: New START reduced nuclear arsenals to their lowest levels since the early years of the first nuclear era. Today’s leaders must again prioritize cooperation and restraint, or risk allowing miscalculation to turn expanding arsenals into catastrophe. The alternative is too terrible to ignore.

Ms. Harsa Kakar is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), Quetta. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Understanding the Third Nuclear Age: Why 2026 Matters was originally published on Global Security Review.

The term ‘diplomacy’ originates from the ancient Greek word diplōma, meaning “an object folded in two,” referring to a document granting travel or special privileges to diplomats. Statecraft is defined as the art of governing state affairs, encompassing diplomacy, economic statecraft, military strategy, and intelligence. Economic statecraft is defined as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,” including foreign aid, trade, sanctions, tariffs, and investment to achieve foreign policy goals. While diplomacy relies on negotiation and alliances to further foreign policy, economic statecraft, on the other hand, relies on economic power to achieve foreign policy objectives.

In early human history, relations between groups were often conflictual, with armed confrontation serving as the primary means for achieving strategic advantage. Yet, even in antiquity, diplomacy emerged as a vital tool for negotiation and conflict resolution. The rivalry between the United States and China, unlike ancient rivalries, did not evolve solely due to military power; rather, it is a hybrid of trade, investment, alliances, and military strength.

China has rooted its diplomacy in trade and economics, stretching its relationships from Asia to Africa and reviving the old Silk Road that was once a symbol of China’s economic dominance. By using economic diplomacy as its foreign policy tool, China can open new markets and build alliances. Elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, China is becoming the most important trade partner, with the likes of Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia now shifting towards China despite being traditional allies of the United States.

The United States’ current diplomacy is evolving in the use of economic statecraft as well, through sanctions, tariffs, and foreign investment based on coercion and compliance. If that can be successful in achieving the U.S. foreign policy objective and the interest of the U.S. national security, it is apparent that the strategy is limited, as it does not have global reach. While states may comply with the U.S. policy based on fear of retaliation, success from this method can be limited; as in international relations, states can balance or bandwagon. By analyzing the global politics of small states in the south, the U.S. economic statecraft and boat diplomacy may push them towards balancing towards China.

Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, argue that “force can be used to take or to bargain. If you can take what you want, you do not need your adversary’s cooperation and do not have to bargain with him. A country may use force to seize disputed territory just as a robber may kill you to get your wallet. Most of the things people and nations want, however, cannot be taken in this way. A nation may want others to stop menacing it; it may even want others to adopt its values. Brute force alone cannot achieve these goals.”

Coercion has been a tool of U.S. economic statecraft in foreign policy for a long time. However, history shows that it has clear limitations, especially in great power rivalry. In the U.S.-Japan rivalry leading to World War II, Japan achieved early military successes, but its overextension and limited industrial base prevented long-term strategic victory. Rather than deterring Japan, U.S. sanctions intensified its aggression, illustrating again that economic pressure can provoke escalation rather than prevent it. Coercive tools such as economic sanctions and tariffs, while a game-changer, cannot alone secure a strategic victory.

For deterrent purposes, economic sanctions historically have not prevented rogue states from changing their behavior. It did not prevent North Korea from developing long-range ballistic missiles, just as it was not successful in changing Iran’s human rights behavior and nuclear ambitions. Rather than punitive deterrence, what ultimately works in Iran is deterrence by denial, as initial punitive measures did not suffice highlighting the limitations of economic statecraft in power competition. Punitive deterrence will not prevent a new power from rising, as described by Alison in Thucydides’ Trap, nor will it prevent weaker states from balancing against strong ones. It did not prevent the rise of China, and it will not prevent the rise of other future powers. What has and will make deterrence effective is the innovation of the U.S. nuclear triad, extended deterrence, and international cooperation through diplomacy.

Contemporary politics reflects the same pattern. Russia’s military power has not secured a decisive victory in Ukraine, and economic sanctions, either targeted or sectoral, have not changed Russia’s posture. As noted by the Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.” While sanctions in other sectors, such defense and energy, have been seriously targeted, the war is still ongoing. In the same vein, the U.S.–China competition and tariffs imposed on Beijing have failed to change China’s behavior as described by Global Trade Magazine, “China’s annual trade surplus passed $1 trillion, a record high, with a GDP growth remained steady at around 5%.”

It is paramount that the United States develop a hybrid strategy, combining diplomacy and other tools of statecraft to keep its leadership on the global stage, as opposed to relying on power.

While coercion and deterrence are important in great power rivalries, the current global landscape does not favor such a posture. There is a need to consider economic diplomacy as the main tool of U.S. foreign policy and economic statecraft as a second, as a future war will not be determined by military strength but by the mixture of both economic and military might.

Hafiz Ibrahim is a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech’s School of Public and International Affairs, specializing in political economy, global security, and African-U.S. affairs. His professional experience includes serving as a Defense Trade Analyst government contractor at the U.S. Department of State, as well as working previously at Deloitte Consulting as a Sanctions Analyst. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Diplomacy in Great Power Competition and the Limits of Economic Statecraft was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bad actors, for example, would likely cheat on such a ban. Russia, for example, has a long track record of cheating on international agreements. As with all law, it is only the honest who follow the rules. The dishonest are incentivized to cheat in order to employ nuclear coercion, or even nuclear attack, in a time of crisis.

Scenario analysis of possible results from denuclearization suggest there is significant risk to such a move. Removing the constraints on conventional war, which mutual nuclear deterrence has provided since 1945, could serve as the catalyst for expanded conventional conflict. Disarmament would not eliminate nuclear arms design knowledge. Instead, the world would rely on a shaky monitoring regime to ensure no misuse of such knowledge.

Without the impediment of a nuclear-armed adversary, great-power war would return with gusto. Some simple actuarial calculations are revealing. First, about 80 million soldiers and civilians were killed in World War II. An equivalent war today, accounting for population growth, gives an approximate death toll of 325 million. This estimate could be too low, given modern military capabilities.

There is a myth that modern war produces less collateral damage and fewer civilian casualties due to precision-guided munitions, prevailing humanitarian restraint, and improved medicine. Actual conditions in Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine illustrate that this is a myth. Modern conventional warfare tends to equal the destructive capacity of that in the twentieth century.

Similarly, the idea that ethnic cleansing (genocide) is a thing of the past is also false. The Balkans, Ukraine, and Xinjiang are all examples.

Other likely side effects of conventional great-power war deserve consideration. War creates refugees, expanding troop requirements, violence, stress, deprivation, and overtaxed medical systems.

If Americans thought the loss of life during the COVID-19 pandemic was terrible, and the global death toll was about seven million, how many more will the next world war kill? Lest we forget, the American medical system was overtaxed by a flu virus that left only a small percentage of the population needing medical care. If the next world war brings the fight to the United States and the American people, the medical crisis will prove far greater.

Furthermore, during the next world war, the current focus on manufacturing consumer goods will shift to a focus on producing war materials as nations exhaust their financial resources to wage war. Environmental regulations, child labor laws, and the other luxuries of peace will certainly be cast aside as victory becomes the primary concern.

Nuclear disarmament also has another consequence that should enter the equation. The nation(s) losing the war or those fearful of being pulled into war may very well turn to the covert development of nuclear weapons to either win or prevent attack. In short, the genie will likely escape the bottle once again, but without the benefit of providing pre-war deterrence. The scientific knowledge and engineering know-how to build nuclear weapons will never go away. Neither will ample supplies of special nuclear material.

A race among combatants to be the first to build new nuclear weapons would likely result. With trust at zero, an incentive to go nuclear is certain. As a conventional World War III wore on, anger, panic, grief, and revenge would likely feed the collapse of restraint. A rebirth of the most powerful nuclear weapons possible is likely. International law would prove meaningless as the fear of defeat loomed. Events far more terrible than Hiroshima and Nagasaki may follow.

Advocates of nuclear abolition argue that without global denuclearization, the accidental launch of a nuclear weapon or use by miscalculation is very likely, even if deterrence never fails. The disarmament community wants it both ways, while ignoring basic human nature.

Focusing on solid risk-mitigation decisions is a better option than the risky course of nuclear abolition. Assertions that general nuclear war is inevitable and will kill millions before bringing about nuclear winter is bad science and worse strategy. It attributes high probabilities where none exist.

Effective nuclear deterrence can sustain peace as it has for seven decades. Efforts to abolish nuclear weapons are based on emotion rather than a well-founded understanding of human nature. It is time we fully consider the consequences of a world without nuclear weapons. They are certainly not attractive. We know what that world looks like because we have seen it before.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

The Consequences of Nuclear Disarmament was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, North Korea unexpectedly launches a limited preemptive strike against the American homeland. The United States responds with a decapitating strike against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Through unlikely errors, Russia believes that the United States is attacking them instead of North Korea. In response, Russia launches a large-scale strike. This leads the United States to launch everything. Bing, bang, boom, and we have Armageddon followed by nuclear winter and the death of billions. In interviews with Vanity Fair and Mother Jones, Jacobsen argues that the US has a plan to conduct nuclear warfighting, based on a series of previously adopted requirements that leave the president little leeway to modify his response. This problem is only made worse by the fact that the president has sole authority to employ nuclear weapons. To this point, Jacobsen argues that military “war mongers” have a very “aggressive culture” that has a predilection to “jam” the president toward “quickly launching a massive retaliatory strike.”

Jacobsen asserts that American intercontinental ballistic missiles are on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” Why? She interviewed William Perry who used the term. Bam, nuclear weapons are on hair trigger alert and missileers have itchy trigger fingers.

While admitting that nuclear deterrence has worked for seven decades, Jacobsen warns that deterrence will fail and when it does, any use of a nuclear weapon will result in large-scale nuclear war. Why? Jacobson interviewed Paul Bracken, who participated in government sponsored wargames—four decades ago—that ended in general nuclear war. Ipso-facto, the use of one nuclear weapon leads to Armageddon.

In Jacobsen’s scenario, American missile defenses are a complete failure. Why? She interviewed Ted Postol who said they do not work—case closed. Her conclusion is that missile defense is a farce and a waste of money. And the United States is lying to itself if it thinks they will ever stop an inbound nuclear weapon.

Elsewhere in the scenario, the president is forced to launch a large-scale nuclear response against the Russians within six minutes. Why? Jacobsen was also told by Perry that the president “will not wait” and thus assumed that Ronald Reagan’s memoir, in which he made an off-hand remark about having six minutes to decide on nuclear weapons use, reflects policy. Abracadabra, the president must decide to use nuclear weapons within six minutes.

Jacobsen’s predilection for incorrectly contextualizing the statements of those she interviewed is both stunning and worrying. The conclusions she draws about the present from the statements of former, often Reagan era or earlier, officials boggles the mind. Jacobsen does not seem to grasp the fact that she or her interviewees may be wrong about the relevance of their past experience to the present. Three examples are indicative.

Problems

First, Jacobsen is wrong about the alert status of the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. They are not on “HAIR TRIGGER ALERT.” The United States does not have a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack policy/doctrine. Nothing of the sort exists. Adam Lowther and Derek Williams dismantle this argument and explain that the United States maintains a launch-under-attack option, which allows the president to employ intercontinental ballistic missiles pre-, mid-, or post-strike. The option requires nothing of the president.

A number of variables will influence this decision. What is important to remember is that there is tremendous work that goes into thinking through scenarios well before they ever arise. Thus, the idea that these weapons are on hair trigger alert is ridiculous. Years of planning and analysis take place left of launch.

Second, Jacobsen is clearly unfamiliar with the design and purpose of wargames. They are specifically designed to understand the implications of a concept or capability. This means a scenario is artificially designed to ensure participants achieve the game’s objectives. Thus, when Jacobsen assumes that because a wargame or series of wargames end in general nuclear war, that a real conflict must necessarily end in general nuclear war, she is fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose and arbitrary nature of wargames. Within the wargaming community, it is well understood that they are not predictive of the future but are instructive of potential options.

Third, missile defenses are not worthless, as Jacobsen claims. They are making steady improvements in their ability to destroy targets. Ted Postol, her primary source of information about missile defenses, was wrong about the effectiveness of Israel’s Iron Dome system. Hard data is proving that missile defenses, in this case Iron Dome, are far more effective than Postel believed.

Although there are additional areas where Jacobsen incorporates inaccurate information into her scenario, the point is clear. Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario would be far more accurately titled, Nuclear War: A Novel or Nuclear War: Disarmament Propaganda. The biggest challenge with the book is that Americans with little understanding of nuclear operations will believe the bias with which Jacobsen writes. This makes it imperative that those within the nuclear community speak out and correct the record. Nuclear deterrence is too important to turn over to a journalist with an agenda.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Annie Jacobsen Gets It Wrong about Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.