<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	
	>
<channel>
	<title>
	Comments on: Why America Needs ICBMs	</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 11 Feb 2024 00:24:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>
	<item>
		<title>
		By: Robert Servant		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/#comment-63</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Servant]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 11 Feb 2024 00:24:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27006#comment-63</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I like your article, Adam.  Of course, no article is perfect as one can deduct from some of the comments. You can&#039;t address everything in an article that is referring to cost overrun and the Nunn-McCurdy breach.  The bottom-line is the Sentinel program must continue!  Bob]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I like your article, Adam.  Of course, no article is perfect as one can deduct from some of the comments. You can&#8217;t address everything in an article that is referring to cost overrun and the Nunn-McCurdy breach.  The bottom-line is the Sentinel program must continue!  Bob</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: James Drouin		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/#comment-58</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[James Drouin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 08 Feb 2024 03:38:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27006#comment-58</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Expecting logic from the illogical, no matter how clearly the situation is explained, is simply not a great sign of intelligence.  Yes, the Minuteman is more than fifty years old and needs to be replaced ... and it&#039;s going to cost a ton of money.

However, for those unalterably opposed to nuclear weapons, they don&#039;t care.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Expecting logic from the illogical, no matter how clearly the situation is explained, is simply not a great sign of intelligence.  Yes, the Minuteman is more than fifty years old and needs to be replaced &#8230; and it&#8217;s going to cost a ton of money.</p>
<p>However, for those unalterably opposed to nuclear weapons, they don&#8217;t care.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Skeptic		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/#comment-57</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Skeptic]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Feb 2024 23:15:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27006#comment-57</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Why are they do out dated in the first place.  This more important than climate change.  We wasted  a lot of money in twenty years in Afghanistan.  We should have just pulverized areas of Taliban strength.  This program should be on continuous upgrade.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Why are they do out dated in the first place.  This more important than climate change.  We wasted  a lot of money in twenty years in Afghanistan.  We should have just pulverized areas of Taliban strength.  This program should be on continuous upgrade.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: fenderowner		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/#comment-56</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[fenderowner]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 07 Feb 2024 18:19:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27006#comment-56</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I agree with your assertion that the US needs ICBMs, and Minuteman III is long overdue for an upgrade. One aspect of our ICBM force you failed to mention is its time-urgent, hard-target kill capability; i.e., because of its readiness to launch and its accuracy, our ICBM force can immediately (30 minutes or less)  threaten Russian and Chinese &quot;hardened&quot; (buried) missile silos. This capability does NOT reside in the bomber or SLBM forces (note that while SLBMs may have the accuracy for a high probability of kill [PK] on Russian/Chinese missile silos, there are certain submarine patrol area issues that are counter to providing a time urgent, counter-silo threat at all times, depending on where an SLBM sub may be at a given time in that patrol area). Without this time urgent hard target kill capability, we end up with a dangerous asymmetry of strategic nuclear capabilities: Russian ICBMs can threaten to kill our silos but we can&#039;t hold theirs at risk around the clock. We faced this asymmetry in the eighties until we deployed Peacekeeper ICBMs in Minuteman silos, thereby correcting the hard target kill asymmetry between US Minuteman III ICBMs and Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. I am sure that Putin would be ecstatic if the US were to forgo this time urgent capability in the future by not upgrading its ICBM force. Moreover, the TRIAD is a time-proven strategic deterrent, as each leg provides unique and backup capabilities in the event of an attempted simultaneous Russian or Chinese attack on US strategic forces. 

Finally, I am not overly enthusiastic about your third rationale for Sentinel: i.e., its ability to be used for a niche mission (satellite launch, etc.). I have a hard time believing it would be cost effective to configure an ICBM for another mission AND launch it from an operational silo (launch our of Vandenberg or Cape Canaveral would make more sense, and in the time it would take to reconfigure an operational missile, it could be done just as effectively from one of the silos at Vandenberg, or pad-launched from Canaveral). Moreover, launching an ICBM - even on a non-nuclear mission - would create some &quot;high pucker factor&quot; on Russian and/or Chinese missile warning systems - a risk I doubt would be worth any perceived payoff from taking out a target with a conventionally armed ICBM.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with your assertion that the US needs ICBMs, and Minuteman III is long overdue for an upgrade. One aspect of our ICBM force you failed to mention is its time-urgent, hard-target kill capability; i.e., because of its readiness to launch and its accuracy, our ICBM force can immediately (30 minutes or less)  threaten Russian and Chinese &#8220;hardened&#8221; (buried) missile silos. This capability does NOT reside in the bomber or SLBM forces (note that while SLBMs may have the accuracy for a high probability of kill [PK] on Russian/Chinese missile silos, there are certain submarine patrol area issues that are counter to providing a time urgent, counter-silo threat at all times, depending on where an SLBM sub may be at a given time in that patrol area). Without this time urgent hard target kill capability, we end up with a dangerous asymmetry of strategic nuclear capabilities: Russian ICBMs can threaten to kill our silos but we can&#8217;t hold theirs at risk around the clock. We faced this asymmetry in the eighties until we deployed Peacekeeper ICBMs in Minuteman silos, thereby correcting the hard target kill asymmetry between US Minuteman III ICBMs and Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. I am sure that Putin would be ecstatic if the US were to forgo this time urgent capability in the future by not upgrading its ICBM force. Moreover, the TRIAD is a time-proven strategic deterrent, as each leg provides unique and backup capabilities in the event of an attempted simultaneous Russian or Chinese attack on US strategic forces. </p>
<p>Finally, I am not overly enthusiastic about your third rationale for Sentinel: i.e., its ability to be used for a niche mission (satellite launch, etc.). I have a hard time believing it would be cost effective to configure an ICBM for another mission AND launch it from an operational silo (launch our of Vandenberg or Cape Canaveral would make more sense, and in the time it would take to reconfigure an operational missile, it could be done just as effectively from one of the silos at Vandenberg, or pad-launched from Canaveral). Moreover, launching an ICBM &#8211; even on a non-nuclear mission &#8211; would create some &#8220;high pucker factor&#8221; on Russian and/or Chinese missile warning systems &#8211; a risk I doubt would be worth any perceived payoff from taking out a target with a conventionally armed ICBM.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Bill Cummings		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/#comment-54</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bill Cummings]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2024 16:11:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27006#comment-54</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Everything you say is valid, but I would have liked to hear you address the issue of the &quot;nuclear sponge.&quot;]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Everything you say is valid, but I would have liked to hear you address the issue of the &#8220;nuclear sponge.&#8221;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: 1KoolKat		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-america-needs-icbms/#comment-53</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[1KoolKat]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2024 13:23:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27006#comment-53</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Another article that fails to describe the fundamental problem facing the US, not enough time to modernize its nuclear forces. Back  in 2016 when President Obama first initiated Nuclear Modernization (NM) it was behind schedule from the start, because the nation delayed, procrastinated and kick the can down the road until they ran out of road. All the generals and admirals involved in NM agree that NM must be completed with no margin for error or delay. I take that to mean all the existing legacy nuclear forces have an expiration date. So, those that say we need less nuclear forces or those that say we need more all miss point of the current reality, there&#039;s not enough time to complete NM.  Which means the number of exsiting  US nuclear forces will probably shrink  before the replacements come online. Which means deterrence will become questionable and uncertain we are in deep trouble]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another article that fails to describe the fundamental problem facing the US, not enough time to modernize its nuclear forces. Back  in 2016 when President Obama first initiated Nuclear Modernization (NM) it was behind schedule from the start, because the nation delayed, procrastinated and kick the can down the road until they ran out of road. All the generals and admirals involved in NM agree that NM must be completed with no margin for error or delay. I take that to mean all the existing legacy nuclear forces have an expiration date. So, those that say we need less nuclear forces or those that say we need more all miss point of the current reality, there&#8217;s not enough time to complete NM.  Which means the number of exsiting  US nuclear forces will probably shrink  before the replacements come online. Which means deterrence will become questionable and uncertain we are in deep trouble</p>
]]></content:encoded>
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
