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	Comments on: Two Years After the ASAT Test Ban: A Realistic Assessment	</title>
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		<title>
		By: Michael Listner		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/two-years-after-the-asat-test-ban-a-realistic-assessment/#comment-1291</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Listner]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jan 2025 16:38:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27784#comment-1291</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In reply to &lt;a href=&quot;https://globalsecurityreview.com/two-years-after-the-asat-test-ban-a-realistic-assessment/#comment-1046&quot;&gt;Douglas Loverro&lt;/a&gt;.

With respect to Mr. Loverro and his point of view I did not forget any of these talking points he brings up; word limits prevented addressing the narrative promulgated by the Biden Administration and NGOs, and I opted to use the opportunity to elucidate on my perspective. That said, I will briefly rebut Mr. Loverro&#039;s points: First, the point is not whether the U.S. needs to destructively test ASAT capabilities. The reality is we made a unilateral arms control concession without extracting similar concessions from peer and near-pear geopolitical actors. Moreover, as noted in the article, the need for destructive testing is gone. The technology and techniques for doing so have been available to any state that possesses anti-ballistic technology, and thus as noted in the article an incident involving destructive actions are demonstrations of a capability not a test. Second, while the West dismisses the role of lawfare and hybrid warfare, the Russians, the PRC and certain NGOs are aware of its use. This means despite Mr. Loverro’s assurance testing of ballistic missile defense is protected, the role of lawfare and its use by the entities mentioned cannot be dismissed, especially since destructive testing involves technology ancillary to missile defense. Further, Mr. Loverro’s assertion the PRC, the Russian Federation and India implicitly agree with the ban is nonsensical for two reasons. 1) There is no evidence standing down further “testing” by these actors means they agree with the moratorium and 2) there is no reason for these actors to “test” a capability that they have demonstrated. Finally, the argument this unilateral concession puts the U.S. in a position of leadership is inaccurate. Indeed, the U.S. efforts at the Conference of Disarmament in 2018 calling out the Russian Federation and the PRC for their counterspace activities effectively burned down the soft-power efforts of those two actors in regard to outer space security and put the U.S. in a position of prestige. The unilateral concession made by the U.S. and its support of the Open-Ended Working Group, which was a diplomatic catastrophe, were a phoenix from the ashes moment for the PRC and the Russian Federation and their soft-power agenda. All-in-all, the ban is a political win and positive optics for those who support the ban but is also a soft-power win for the Russian Federation and the PRC.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In reply to <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/two-years-after-the-asat-test-ban-a-realistic-assessment/#comment-1046">Douglas Loverro</a>.</p>
<p>With respect to Mr. Loverro and his point of view I did not forget any of these talking points he brings up; word limits prevented addressing the narrative promulgated by the Biden Administration and NGOs, and I opted to use the opportunity to elucidate on my perspective. That said, I will briefly rebut Mr. Loverro&#8217;s points: First, the point is not whether the U.S. needs to destructively test ASAT capabilities. The reality is we made a unilateral arms control concession without extracting similar concessions from peer and near-pear geopolitical actors. Moreover, as noted in the article, the need for destructive testing is gone. The technology and techniques for doing so have been available to any state that possesses anti-ballistic technology, and thus as noted in the article an incident involving destructive actions are demonstrations of a capability not a test. Second, while the West dismisses the role of lawfare and hybrid warfare, the Russians, the PRC and certain NGOs are aware of its use. This means despite Mr. Loverro’s assurance testing of ballistic missile defense is protected, the role of lawfare and its use by the entities mentioned cannot be dismissed, especially since destructive testing involves technology ancillary to missile defense. Further, Mr. Loverro’s assertion the PRC, the Russian Federation and India implicitly agree with the ban is nonsensical for two reasons. 1) There is no evidence standing down further “testing” by these actors means they agree with the moratorium and 2) there is no reason for these actors to “test” a capability that they have demonstrated. Finally, the argument this unilateral concession puts the U.S. in a position of leadership is inaccurate. Indeed, the U.S. efforts at the Conference of Disarmament in 2018 calling out the Russian Federation and the PRC for their counterspace activities effectively burned down the soft-power efforts of those two actors in regard to outer space security and put the U.S. in a position of prestige. The unilateral concession made by the U.S. and its support of the Open-Ended Working Group, which was a diplomatic catastrophe, were a phoenix from the ashes moment for the PRC and the Russian Federation and their soft-power agenda. All-in-all, the ban is a political win and positive optics for those who support the ban but is also a soft-power win for the Russian Federation and the PRC.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Douglas Loverro		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/two-years-after-the-asat-test-ban-a-realistic-assessment/#comment-1046</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Douglas Loverro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Nov 2024 19:04:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27784#comment-1046</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Unfortunately, while Mr Listner&#039;s comments appear to be well founded, he&#039;s forgotten several things.  First, the US has already demonstrated our ability to target satellites with a destructive test against a failed US satellite in 2008 -- we do not need to do so again.  Second, while the moratorium forgoes tests against orbital objects that create long lived debris, it still allows tests against non-orbital objects, as well as tests against orbital objects, as long as they do not create debris -- both those approaches allow the thorough testing of sensors, engagement scenarios, dynamics, and other qualities that allow the US to develop a weapon and demonstrate capability without polluting the space environment.  Third, the reality is that both China and India actually agree with the moratorium as demonstrated by the fact threat neither have conducted a debris causing test for over 17 years for China and 5 years for India.  And with the UN vote of support by 155 nations, what the voluntary moratorium actually does is to further demonstrate Russia&#039;s increasing pariah status with regard to space security.

The moratorium has now put the US back in the leadership position in space diplomacy, a position we had ceded for the last 40 years.  It cost us nothing, further ostracized Russia, gained explicit or implicit agreement from almost every nation of the world, and made it that much harder for anyone else to engage in a debris-causing test.  Pretty nice payoff for the price of a signature.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Unfortunately, while Mr Listner&#8217;s comments appear to be well founded, he&#8217;s forgotten several things.  First, the US has already demonstrated our ability to target satellites with a destructive test against a failed US satellite in 2008 &#8212; we do not need to do so again.  Second, while the moratorium forgoes tests against orbital objects that create long lived debris, it still allows tests against non-orbital objects, as well as tests against orbital objects, as long as they do not create debris &#8212; both those approaches allow the thorough testing of sensors, engagement scenarios, dynamics, and other qualities that allow the US to develop a weapon and demonstrate capability without polluting the space environment.  Third, the reality is that both China and India actually agree with the moratorium as demonstrated by the fact threat neither have conducted a debris causing test for over 17 years for China and 5 years for India.  And with the UN vote of support by 155 nations, what the voluntary moratorium actually does is to further demonstrate Russia&#8217;s increasing pariah status with regard to space security.</p>
<p>The moratorium has now put the US back in the leadership position in space diplomacy, a position we had ceded for the last 40 years.  It cost us nothing, further ostracized Russia, gained explicit or implicit agreement from almost every nation of the world, and made it that much harder for anyone else to engage in a debris-causing test.  Pretty nice payoff for the price of a signature.</p>
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		<title>
		By: Joseph Buff		</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/two-years-after-the-asat-test-ban-a-realistic-assessment/#comment-228</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joseph Buff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2024 13:42:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27784#comment-228</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Michael Listner makes many good points in this article. The US already suffered serious erosion of our security and prestige from the misguided attempt at a &quot;pseudo-norm&quot; of unilateral restraint and neglect re our nuclear deterrence modernization and necessary arsenal rightsizing. We are doing the same thing in space defense &#038; deterrence, too. The world has enough of silly pyrrhic empty disarmament gestures such as the UN&#039;s total ban on nuclear weapons. America needs to wake up to 21st century &quot;nuclear realpolitik&quot; just like we need to wake up to &quot;space realpolitik.&quot; Our adversaries run rings around us in lawfare shenanigans and in armaments expansion. Now with Putin&#039;s &quot;Sputnuke&quot; and XI&#039;s FOBS they are running rings around us in the intersection of nuclear capabilities and space capabilities!]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Michael Listner makes many good points in this article. The US already suffered serious erosion of our security and prestige from the misguided attempt at a &#8220;pseudo-norm&#8221; of unilateral restraint and neglect re our nuclear deterrence modernization and necessary arsenal rightsizing. We are doing the same thing in space defense &amp; deterrence, too. The world has enough of silly pyrrhic empty disarmament gestures such as the UN&#8217;s total ban on nuclear weapons. America needs to wake up to 21st century &#8220;nuclear realpolitik&#8221; just like we need to wake up to &#8220;space realpolitik.&#8221; Our adversaries run rings around us in lawfare shenanigans and in armaments expansion. Now with Putin&#8217;s &#8220;Sputnuke&#8221; and XI&#8217;s FOBS they are running rings around us in the intersection of nuclear capabilities and space capabilities!</p>
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