By: Corey R Harvey

Corey R Harvey — Fri, 19 Apr 2024 03:34:50 +0000

Ray, when I was a 19 year old airman in 1992, I was called in on a Saturday to download the nuclear alert force. At the time I believed we won the Cold War and would never have to worry about nuclear war again. Unfortunately, the State Dept neglected this moment and we quietly ignored the change in Russian leadership that rejected glasnost and yearned for the “good old days” of Russian dominance in total numbers of warheads and willingness to use them. They were followed closely by China. Now we face a world where the use of nuclear weapons are a greater threat than they were in the 1950s. Meanwhile the US population seems oblivious to this fact. I think it would help if we made clear our stance that any use of nuclear weapons by an adversary would result in a full scale response from the US. I’ve never understood the idea that we would potentially go one for one in a nuclear exchange. To me, that suggests we’d be ok with losing San Francisco or New York. That is unacceptable! We must make it clear that any attack on the US or our allies would result in an overwhelming response. That is the only way to ensure deterrence. I am not a warmonger but when you are attacked you must respond with absolute force or risk total annihilation.

By: Joseph Buff

Joseph Buff — Mon, 08 Apr 2024 13:05:13 +0000

Ray Vann Jr. has written an excellent article. While limited nuclear war as something fightable, winnable, and above all survivable goes back to the early Cold War, thank God the concept and its debate remain theoretical — a thought experiment. Even so, a few profoundly true things can be said: Effective, credible nuclear deterrence by USA & NATO requires the ability to fight a limited nuclear war; without this being true AND proven to adversaries, nuclear deterrence won’t succeed. Strategic ambiguity, to terribly complicate an adversary’s risk calculus so they ALWAYS say “Not today, Comrades,” absolutely demands a “clear and present will for us to retaliate.” America’s near abandonment of our low yield arsenal and tactical nuclear doctrine and training after Cold War I ended was a dreadful miscalculation; in fact it was Bill Clinton’s “Great Friend” Boris Yeltsin who ordered Russia to develop the putatively Putin-invented Escalate to Win gambit. Nuclear war is a VERY fungible thing, as even the late great Herman Khan wrote of some three-dozen steps on his escalation ladder. In modern terms, adversary nuclear first-use could be anything from an open-air test, or simulated “strike” on a desolate area of their own territory (a MIRVed Sarmat?), to a demonstration in international waters (open ocean, or maybe targeting one of their own decommissioned cruisers?) or (using FOBS or Poseidon?) on Antarctica, or even in empty space safely past EMP-causing distance from Earth (using Sputnuke?). Friendly military targets for “Red” to hit with a low-yield detonation might be an island base, a container ship or warship at sea, a thinly populated area in one of our smaller non-NATO allies (Ukraine?), or even a desolate area in one of our non-nuke-owning NATO allies (northernmost Canada?). The list goes on. AND the more likely a delusional reckless warmongering adversary is to believe that America will not retaliate with a proportionate and discriminate nuclear counter-strike, the more likely our tactical nuclear deterrence, such as it is, is likely to catastrophically fail. Thank you Ray for a great analysis to help us all start our work week!

Comments on: The US Military’s Unwinnable War

By: Corey R Harvey

By: Joseph Buff