President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less attention. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, Europe’s indigenous nuclear forces may have the potential to serve as a sufficient deterrent against Russian nuclear first use.

French “Forwardism”

In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows: First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (force de dissuasion) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to deter aggression beyond France’s borders. Second, France would permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. However, France will not delegate nuclear employment authority to other countries. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce France’s commitment to its European partners. Third, France would work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on the management of escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration will include visits to strategic sites and/or joint exercises with Germany, the UK, and other NATO countries.

Trump’s Frustrations

The decision taken by Macron reflects a perceived need for upgrading the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and “free riding” on the backs of the U.S. military. Trump has announced that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany and has suggested that the U.S. should leave the alliance despite being prohibited by Congress from unilaterally doing so.

There are several prompts for this continuing cold shoulder from Washington to Brussels. First, Trump is frustrated by Putin and Zelensky and their inability to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Second, the U.S. President launched a pre-emptive combat operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies before the fact. Understandably, in this regard, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support, and some have refused to grant access to American bases or airspace for Operation Epic Fury, further frustrating President Trump. Third, the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide.

European and U.S. Support for Ukraine

Despite distractions, NATO members remain committed to supporting Ukraine as long as needed. An agreement allows U.S. allies in Europe to buy weapons from the U.S. and pass them to Ukraine. The U.S. continues to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad, with a $71.4 billion FY27 plan for next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers with new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, and improved nuclear command and control.

It is doubtful that France’s nuclear force, which includes several hundred warheads with delivery systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, can replace the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent – nor was it meant to. Instead, France’s independent nuclear deterrence, designed to defend its own interests and sovereignty, along with the United Kingdom’s small ballistic missile submarine force, offers a minimal deterrent against nuclear threats from Russia at a level below strategic nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and airborne platforms and could number as many as 2,000 in Russia’s available inventory. In comparison, the U.S. deploys some 200 available NSNWs at several NATO bases.

U.S. Nuclear War Planning and NATO

This disparity in the number of NSNWs is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of U.S. nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current U.S. operational plans include the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within one comprehensive plan. U.S. nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response. Toward that end, U.S. bomber deployments and military exercises provide additional support to U.S. European Command, bolstering NATO deterrence. In addition to the increased bomber presence, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to U.S. European and Asian allies.

France recognizes that deterrence is not only about the size of military forces, including nuclear arms, despite Macron’s plan to increase the number of French nuclear weapons. It also depends on perceived resolve among allies and potential adversaries. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO excludes the possibility of deploying French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help send that message.

Conclusion

A more forward-leaning French military doctrine does not mean abandoning France’s commitment to European security. Nor does it replace the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Macron recognizes that, in defense matters, truth counts more than words: the United States cannot completely detach itself from NATO, nor can NATO sever its ties with America. NATO without the U.S. invites nuclear coercion upon Western Europe, while the U.S. without NATO risks political and military isolation instead of credible deterrence. The American and European pillars of NATO, as the French might say, are “condemned to succeed” together.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way was originally published on Global Security Review.

The world is now reminded of the normality of war in human existence by the aggression of revisionist Russia and China. The United States, leader of the free world, must once again deter the aggression of authoritarian regimes. This time, however, the United States is no longer in the same dominant position it once held.

American nuclear deterrence plays a critical role in managing the modern international system—the latest iteration of which is tripolar. Whilst many analysts in the arms control and disarmament community accuse those in the deterrence community of “Cold War thinking,” they make grossly inaccurate assertions that poorly reflect reality. The Cold War, which placed much of the world on the precipice of a nuclear exchange, generated unprecedented strategic thinking about how to manage great-power relationships and deter war between them.

The concepts underpinning deterrence: second strike, damage limitation, escalation control, delegation authority, and many others, are concepts that remain relevant today and require a careful re-thinking as the tripolar era moves forward. The implications of new technologies like effective missile defenses, hypersonic glide vehicles, and drones may change perceptions in unexpected ways.

Members of the academic and think tank communities were warning governments over a decade ago about the impending return of great-power competition in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific. There is a benefit to studying history. It is the ability to see trends without assuming they are certain to repeat themselves. The constancy of human nature, however, makes Thucydides’ admonitions equally useful today as they were 2,500 years ago.

It is time to re-think how to apply the classic strategic theories and concepts that aided in navigating the first nuclear age. They can aid the West in successfully navigating this era of tripolar superpower competition.

The bipolar Cold War construct was a unique development in history. This construct of two nuclear-armed superpowers competing for global influence was the new dynamic of what international great-power competition looked like historically. What appeared to be a global competition, was, in practice, a regional one focused on Western Europe and NATO, with second- and third-order effects for the rest of the world. The Asia-Pacific primarily received the leftovers in terms of the consequences and interests in the Cold War.

Thinking about concepts such as strategic stability, deterrence, extended deterrence, and arms control (developed during the Cold War) as the West contemplates confrontation across both Europe and the Asia-Pacific is a challenge. This is especially important as China ramps up its aggressive activity in the South China Sea, expands its nuclear arsenal, and builds a military specifically designed to defeat the United States.

The prospect of war between the great powers raises the question of how America’s post-war alliances, formed at the dawn of the nuclear age, might endure and function in such a world. Strategic concepts and connotations of the first nuclear age will have to be re-conceptualized to formulate strategies that reassure allies and deter adversaries. Ultimately, the credibility of American extended deterrence may not endure as the world enters a period akin to what William Walker termed nuclear disorder.

Walker suggests that the establishment, in the late 1960s, of nuclear order was based on managed systems of deterrence and abstinence. The former was a system whereby a recognized set of states would continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule bound. There was a degree of familiarity in the dyadic deterrence relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear abstinence consisted of a system whereby other states give up sovereign rights to develop, hold, and use such weapons in return for economic, security, and other benefits. This took place concomitantly with the provision of a nuclear umbrella and a stable Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is a system whereby not only the possession but also the use of nuclear weapons is controlled. According to Walker, the stability and robustness of these two systems provided the rationale for many states in the international system to abstain from acquiring weapons and for several key states to rely on American extended deterrence for their national survival.

There are several elements that characterise the nuclear order underpinning the structural foundations for the credibility of that extended deterrence. First, the number of nuclear weapons states is relatively small. Second, nuclear weapons are no longer considered bigger and better conventional weapons—as they once were. Third, there are strong norms against possession and use of nuclear weapons. Fourth, there are no existential threats to American allies. Fifth, war between major powers is relatively unlikely—even with Russian threats.

In the mid-2000s nuclear order began unravelling. That process increased in speed with the invasion of Ukraine and China’s nuclear breakout. With this came a need to re-think the strategic theory and concepts that helped navigate the first nuclear age. After all, the future lasts a long time.

There are still many known unknowns and potentially even more unknown unknowns. What is known is that no other weapon has the gravitational force of nuclear weapons. Thus, it is important to adapt strategic theory and concepts to deal with a dangerous era of international politics that is not well understood. Despite idealist claims that war and nuclear weapons can or will cease to exist, conflict is a fundamental element of humanity, and the technology to do so continues to proliferate. Getting smarter at deterring it should be the goal. Nuclear weapons and strategic theory help achieve that objective.

Christine Leah, PhD is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are her own.

Nuclear Weapons and Trilateral Superpower Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.