In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

The results of the American air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities serves as a harsh reminder to those who believe multipolarity is the future of the world order. American military power is still unmatched.

Operation Midnight Hammer demonstrated the remarkable military power of the United States and President Donald Trump’s willingness to use it when an adversary crosses American red lines. The surgical strikes of American stealth aircraft and cruise missiles expertly showcased the awesome power of the American military.

The strikes were more than a display of power. They left no doubt that President Trump is laser focused and committed to protecting American vital interests. The strikes were also a message to allies and foes alike that the United States will stand by its allies when facing an existential threat, especially when that ally demonstrates a willingness to defend itself.

Even though the Trump administration used limited strikes against the nuclear facilities, the underlying message is clear. Red lines, deadlines, and ally support are back. Through the masterful use of deception, stealth, and precision, the American strike was unseen. Tehran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes were nothing more than preplanned and face-saving missile launches to placate domestic audiences.

The follow-on ceasefire agreement stands to put an end to Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions and forces Iran and Israel to tamp down their hostilities to allow for a negotiated settlement. Interestingly, Iran’s allies effectively abandoned Tehran as the Ayatollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) looked feckless and weak compared to the combined strength of Israel and the US.

China, Russia, and Iran’s Middle East proxies were nowhere to be found. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” is in tatters as the result of Israeli and American action. Whether or not Iran takes the opportunity to deescalate and seek a peaceful resolution remains to be seen.  Regardless, Operation Midnight Hammer should be seen as a return to deterrence with Tehran and in the capitals of America’s adversaries worldwide.

Bolstering Alliances

 On the heels of successful air strikes, President Trump received another geostrategic win as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) member states agreed to spend 5 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending. NATO members, with the goading of President Trump, realized that Russian aggression necessitated greater commitment to defense.

Trump’s goal for increased defense spending is not to weaken NATO but to strengthen it. By requiring all members to carry a proportional share of collective defense, American leadership will only strengthen a once great alliance. Russia must reconsider its desire to once again expand its sphere of influence and control by force.

Alliances are based on shared values and commitments. President Trump made it clear that free riding is no longer an option. A strong NATO, with the needed capabilities and political will, can confront aggression and serve as a stabilizing force.

The Dealmaker

 Finally, President Trump made it clear that he desires to be a peacemaker rather than a war maker. Thus, he is seeking to negotiate the end to conflicts around the globe.

First, the administration brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda to end decades of fighting. The administration states that the peace deal will include mechanisms that address the underlying causes of the conflict and pathways for reconciliation.

Second, Trump continues to work toward the resolution of conflict between Ukraine and Russia. While negotiating peace is proving more difficult than expected, the president continues to work toward an acceptable option.

In another significant turn of events, Trump’s dealmakers made overtures to Israel in pursuit of an end to the conflict in Gaza—hoping to end the conflict in the next few weeks. As part of ending the conflict, several Arab neighbors agreed to allow Gazans to immigrate to their countries.

Additionally, the Trump administration also plans to expand the Abraham Accords so that more Arab nations commit to resolving decades of conflict. Trump’s dealmaking goals are aspirational considering that much work remains to fulfill these goals. After decades of animosity, a two-state solution for the Arabs in Israel would be a welcome step toward a lasting peace.

Russia and China failed to provide any resolution to conflict in the Middle East and Africa. Russia has no ability to negotiate a peace deal considering its continued war on Ukraine.  China’s domestic troubles coupled with its questionable usage of the Belt and Road Initiative are backfiring. Russia and China were unwilling to support their friends in need, whereas Washington sought to end conflict. So much for multipolarity.

The past few weeks show a marked contrast to years of wishful thinking and kicking the proverbial can down the road. Peace through strength, President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, seeks to deter adversaries and assure allies while avoiding new conflicts. Ending protracted conflicts through negotiated settlements may also prove a critical element of the Trump Doctrine. The combination of peace and military power may prove a winning combination.

Russia and China cannot achieve these goals. They lack the standing to do so. It should come as no surprise that all eyes are returning to Washington as the world’s leading power broker. Mark Twain once said in response to news stories he was dead, “The rumors of my demise are greatly exaggerated.” Much the same is true of America’s unipolar moment.

Todd Clawson is a retired naval officer with 28 years of service and combat tours in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and South Asia. He holds a doctorate in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of the United States Primacy was originally published on Global Security Review.

Now, Moscow is coming to understand what life is like outside the tent. Its new military connections with Iran and North Korea, and its political-economic alliance with China, are reason for concern in the West and more than enough reason to see if there is a way to bring Russia back inside the tent.

Background

Russia as a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, unlike China, worked to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Where China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan, the Russians were careful in their transfers of items that could be used to proliferate. Thus, when it sold nuclear reactors to India the agreement was that the spent fuel would be reprocessed in Russia (then the Soviet Union), removing any concerns about the spent fuel being diverted for building nuclear weapons.

The Indians have also received two Russian submarines on lease, but both vessels were returned to Russia before the leases ended. When the Russians signed an agreement to build the supersonic Brahmos missile, they insisted that the missile’s range be within the limits imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Similarly, despite the long-standing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, there were no serious transfers of nuclear capabilities to the Hermit Kingdom—although there are questions about how the technology in the SS-18 missile made it to Pyongyang. The missile was manufactured in a cash-strapped factory in Ukraine and William Broad and David Sanger argue that this possibly led to a sale by rogue actors within Ukraine; the government of Peter Poroshenko denied any knowledge of the transfer. In contrast, the Chinese provided nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, particularly the bomb design from their second nuclear test.

While Russia stuck with the international community’s goals to prevent nuclear proliferation, the war in Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions changed Russia’s strategic calculus and potentially its hesitation to supply technologies to other states.

Faced with sanctions, the Russians cut deals with both Iran and North Korea for the supply of weaponry—ranging from artillery shells and drones to ballistic missiles. It is not clear what will be given in return.  Most observers believe that North Korea may receive “direct military assistance from Russia to include fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and ballistic missile production equipment or materials, as well as other advanced technology.”

It is the advanced technology part of the agreement that is worrying since the North Koreans may well seek technologies that increase the lethality of their strategic weaponry. This could include nuclear submarines and the technological capability to launch submarine-launched cruise missiles. It could also lead the Russians to transfer technology needed to increase the accuracy of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and warheads. Such transfers can take place by giving the actual technology or providing the scientific manpower to make Pyongyang’s weapons more lethal.

In the case of Iran, Tehran filled an immediate need of Moscow by providing drones in large numbers to help the Russians better deal with the changed nature of warfare in the Ukraine conflict. Like Western nations, Russia allowed its munitions stockpiles to run low. Russia is now building up to 6,000 drones annually in a new factory near the Urals. Tehran also supplied close-range ballistic missiles to further beef up Moscow’s arsenal and, in return, Moscow is reportedly upping its supply of weapons to Iran.

Russia is considering the sale of the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 anti-missile system, but the biggest contribution by Moscow could be to help improve domestically manufactured Iranian weaponry. Again, giving advanced technology to the Iranians would increase the lethality of its missile force.

The Strategic Realm

It is in the nuclear realm that the removal of restraints by Moscow would be the most damaging. Russia has abided by the provisions of the NPT and the MTCR, but if the war continues, with increasing Western provision of weaponry to Ukraine and growing sanctions on Moscow, the Russians may decide to abandon the international treaties they helped create and enforce and, instead, start to become major proliferators.

This would create a global flow of weaponry and technology that will not only build up the capabilities of hostile nations but also severely complicate regional security settings and make American intervention more costly. The worst-case scenario would be the Russians basing nuclear weapons in one of these countries—creating a new level of global insecurity. This is not as far fetched as it seems since this was done by the former Soviet Union in Cuba. That move was seen as an existential threat by the US. It is not clear what the reaction would be to a Russian nuclear fait accompli in Iran or North Korea.

Options

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West was confident that its technological superiority, economic strength, and unified resolve would lead the Russians to back down. Instead, the Russian economy is growing, the West spent close to $300 billion in arming Ukraine, and Kyiv now faces an economic and demographic disaster. It is wishful thinking to suggest that this war may end with a favorable outcome for Ukraine. Bringing the Russians back into the tent may prove difficult.

In four months, the United States will have a new administration, giving the next president some leeway for pursuing a different policy towards Moscow. Carrots, rather than just sticks, may be the best approach. Included, however, in whatever cease-fire plan is created should be a commitment from the Russians that they will continue to abide with the provisions of the NPT and MTCR and ensure that Moscow will try to prevent the flow of Russian scientific labor to North Korea and Iran, specifically.

This will require a rethink in Washington and Brussels on how to end the war and what constitutes an equitable outcome rather than a maximalist view, as suggested by some in the West. Not doing so could lead to a new set of security problems in other parts of the world that are just as crucial for the United States.

Amit Gupta, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

You Think the Ukraine War Was Bad? Imagine a Rogue Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

The latest ICBM EAR Report provides updates from USAF Global Strike command ’s on the ICBM Bomber Nuclear Programs, senior officials quotes, Hill developments and international strategic developments. A must read for all National Security professionals.

Summary: The US Congress and Administration are now grappling with how to improve US deterrence in the face of military conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, and the growing possibility of an additional military conflict in the Western Pacific. The common thread is the coordination of such military aggression by North Korea, Iran, Russia and China. The current defense budget is constrained by a 1% cap on any increase for FY2025, significantly below what most recognize as what is required for the US to spend, even with a coordinated effort by the US and its allies to all increase defense investments. Some House members have called for a change in defense but to do so after the November election. The Senate SASC did approve a $25 billion increase in defense spending to $768 billion (not including NNSA) which was originally proposed by Senator Wicker, the ranking member of the Committee.

Key Events of the Week

Lt Gen Michael Lutton (Deputy Commander of USAF Global Strike Command) and Maj Gen Stacy Jo Huser (Commander of 20^th USAF) spoke on Friday June 28^th at 10am and 2pm, respectively, on the ICBM and bomber nuclear programs as part of the ongoing nuclear seminar series by NIDS/Huessy. Links are available from alex.litlefieeld@thinkdeterrence.com A full report on their remarks will be available in next weeks report.

Triad Conference June 20^th at LSUS

https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3819202/strategic-systems-programs-promotes-workforce-modernization-at-nuclear-triad-sy/

Quotes of the Week:

Ms. Kelly Lee, SSP’s Director of Plan and Programs: “Strategic deterrence is a team sport, and all three legs are needed to win.” (At the LSUS, NIDS and BFR Triad Symposium, June 20^th.

Mr. Cole (R-OK)“They’ve [the Senate Democrats] got to learn to prioritize a little bit. It’s a lot more dangerous world than one would like right now, so I think defense ought to be the priority.”

Mr. Diaz-Balart (R-FL) “A 1% increase with inflation is basically a 5% reduction. Obviously, logic would tell you that’s not good enough.”

Republican Study Committee Chair Kevin Hern (R-OK): “The cap should stay where it’s at overall and something else has to give–we would agree to increase defense spending in exchange for cuts to nondefense funding.”

Hill Developments

The Congress is currently in the midst of a Congressional tug of war to pass a new defense bill but which also responds to the need for a greater nuclear and conventional deterrent capability as outlined by the Posture Commission of the United States.

The House HASC has kept within the 1% budget growth required by the previous budget deal agreed to by the Administration. The HASC nearly fully funded most of the nuclear deterrent.

The SASC added a number of new nuclear provisions (outlined in my remarks below to the LSUS/NIDS/BFR Triad Symposium in Shreveport, Louisiana on June 20^th, 2024.) while increasing overall defense spending by $25 billion as proposed by Senator Wicker of Mississippi the ranking member of the Committee.

However, the HAC defense subcommittee cut $324 million from the Sentinel program and according to CQ added ICBM language to the Committee report, while also sticking to the 1% budget growth as required by the law:

HAC Report June 2024 Minuteman Modernization / Ground Based Strategic Deterrent

The United States currently deploys more than 400 Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles, and under the current nuclear modernization program the Air Force plans to replace the Minuteman with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system (named the “Sentinel”). The measure appropriates $3.4 billion for continued research and development of the GBSD, $324 million less than requested.

Section II. Major Weapons Systems Fact Sheet No. 118-29

In January 2024, the Air Force notified Congress that Sentinel is two years behind schedule and that overall costs have increased from $96 billion to more than $130 billion. The schedule delays triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach, which occurs when a major acquisition program experiences delays beyond a threshold used to manage the costs of major programs.

In its report, writes CQ, the HAC said it was surprised to learn about the program acquisition unit cost breach of at least 37% and is concerned that the issues driving the critical overruns were not identified sooner. The measure therefore directs GAO to assess the impact of program turnover within 180 days of passage of this act.

Some in the House GOP reject Senate bid to renegotiate budget deal for defense spending boost, seek boost after November’s election.

By Lindsey McPherson – The Washington Times – Wednesday, June 26, 2024

Senate defense hawks want to renegotiate a budget cap deal signed into law last year to spend an extra $25 billion on national security, but most House Republicans do not want to revisit the contentious spending level debate.

The House has managed to address pressing defense needs from deterring conflict with China to ensuring troops get a pay raise while sticking to budget caps, Republicans argue.

“They love to spend, those senators,” Rep. Nick LaLota, New York Republican, told The Washington Times. “Opening up the deal is opening up a can of worms and is probably not what we should do.”

Mr. LaLota, who serves on the House Armed Services Committee that oversees defense policy, said the 1% increase in defense spending the House has proposed, in alignment with the budget cap, “meets the moment.”

Republicans on the House Appropriations Committee, which oversees spending, had differing views about the Senate’s proposed defense increase. Some prefer to stick to the budget cap and others are sympathetic to spending more on defense to keep up with inflation and rising foreign conflicts.

But GOP appropriators seem to agree that renegotiating the spending limits would run contrary to their goal of cutting nondefense spending. Senate Democrats are demanding any boost to defense be paired with an equal percentage increase to domestic funding.

“It does make it problematic,” Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, Florida Republican, told The Times. “So, we’ll see what they try to come up with.”

Mr. Diaz-Balart is, however, supportive of increasing defense spending beyond the 1% allowed under the statutory limit.

“A 1% increase with inflation is basically a 5% reduction,” he said. “Obviously, logic would tell you that’s not good enough.”

More conservative members of the Appropriations Committee said they want to stick with the spending limits enacted last year as part of the debt limit law, the Fiscal Responsibility Act.

“It’s the law of the land. There’s no need to negotiate it,” said Rep. Andy Harris, Maryland Republican.

House Appropriations Chair Tom Cole, Oklahoma Republican, said the House will continue passing spending bills that adhere to the budget caps, including the defense appropriations bill that is on the floor this week.

As for his willingness to renegotiate spending levels with the Senate, Mr. Cole said, “Not between now and the election.”

“I’m all for additional money for defense, and we’ll sit down and bargain afterward,” he told The Times.

Mr. Cole also had a warning for Senate Democrats pushing for equal increases to nondefense spending: “They’ve got to learn to prioritize a little bit. It’s a lot more dangerous world than one would like right now, so I think defense ought to be the priority.”

While Mr. Cole would be involved in any negotiation over spending levels, he said any decision on whether to revisit the spending caps is up to House Speaker Mike Johnson, Louisiana Republican.

Mr. Johnson’s office did not respond to a request for comment. However, the speaker tends to consult his members on such decisions, and the prevailing view in his conference is to stick to the spending limit.

“The cap should stay where it’s at overall and something else has to give,” Republican Study Committee Chair Kevin Hern of Oklahoma said, noting GOP members would agree to increase defense spending in exchange for cuts to nondefense funding.

Senate Democrats would not go for that. They are already complaining House Republicans have not fully adhered to last year’s deal. In addition to the spending caps enacted into law, the deal included unenforceable side agreements involving budget maneuvers appropriators could use to spend more on defense and nondefense programs without technically breaching the law’s limits.

Since the side deal was brokered under former Speaker Kevin McCarthy, House Republicans, now under new leadership, have disregarded it.

House Republicans’ appropriations bills “ignore the deal that they negotiated in favor of devastating cuts to nondefense,” Senate Appropriations Chair Patty Murray said in a floor speech last week.

The Washington Democrat called on the Senate to “chart a different path” and “provide additional resources beyond the caps to address major shortfalls and new challenges.”

Administration Statement of Administration Policy threatens to veto House defense spending bill

InsideDefense.com, June 24 (1550) | Tony Bertuca

President Biden would veto the GOP-led House’s version of the fiscal year 2025 defense appropriations bill if it were to pass in its current form, according to a new statement of administration policy from the White House Office of Management and Budget. The administration opposes all the House GOP’s appropriations bills on the grounds that they make steep cuts in non-defense spending and eliminate various initiatives related to climate change mitigation, abortion services and diversity, according to OMB.

ICBM Critics push the Pentagon for ‘unbiased’ review of costly Sentinel nuclear missile program

The Hill Online, June 24 (1001) | Brad Dress

A group of Democrats led by the congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group sent a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Monday calling for a “comprehensive, thorough, and unbiased assessment” of the controversial Sentinel nuclear missile program, which has soared in costs over the years. In the letter, provided first to The Hill, the lawmakers expressed concerns that the Pentagon’s review of the Sentinel program, which is mandatory after a significant cost overrun in January, was “being prepared with an end-state in mind.”

In the letter, the lawmakers expressed concerns that the Pentagon’s review of the Sentinel program, which is mandatory after a significant cost overrun in January, was “being prepared with an end-state in mind.”

“Given the imperative of advancing nuclear policies that promote stability and prevent escalation, we demand a thorough review of all alternatives,” they wrote. “At this critical juncture, we must not allow momentum and preconceived notions to cloud our judgment in reviewing whether this program provides for our national security or is wasting U.S. taxpayer dollars.

“The American people have a right to know how their money is being spent and to what end, particularly for our nation’s nuclear policy,” the lawmakers added.

The congressional working group, which is holding a July hearing on Sentinel, is co-chaired by Democratic Sens. Ed Markey (Mass.) and Jeff Merkley (Ore.) and Reps. John Garamendi (Calif.) and Don Beyer (Va.).

The letter was also signed by several other Democrats, including Sens. Elizabeth Warren (Mass.), Chris Van Hollen (Md.), and Ron Wyden (Ore.) and Reps. Sara Jacobs (Calif.), Mark Pocan (Wis.), Barbara Lee (Calif.), Jim McGovern (Mass.) and Jerry Nadler (N.Y.). -20-

The Monday letter signals that concerns are growing about the embattled Sentinel nuclear missile program, with more Democrats pressing for an honest review of the initiative and of the alternatives.

Sentinel aims to replace the more than 50-year-old Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) scattered across the rural western U.S. in underground silos. The 400 ICBMs are one part of the nuclear triad, along with bomber planes and submarines.

But the program, which awarded its first contract in 2020 to defense giant Northrop Grumman, the contractor likely to keep developing the program, overran its costs by 37 percent in January, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy breach that requires a Pentagon review.

Sentinel is expected to now cost around $130 billion, far more than the original roughly $60 billion about a decade ago. Much of the increase is tied to a vast real estate project as the Air Force looks to modernize related infrastructure for the new missiles.

In the letter, the lawmakers said the Air Force “has relied on a budget projection that underestimated costs, made poor assumptions, and relied on incomplete data to gain Congressional approval for the program’s authorization.”

“It’s unacceptable that such flawed assumptions were the basis for a project of this magnitude and that these types of errors persist to this day,” they wrote.

Supporters of Sentinel argue that it is critical for the U.S. to maintain its nuclear triad and modernize each leg as competition increases with China and Russia. Skeptics have questioned whether ICBMs provide a necessary deterrence, considering they lack the abilities of fast bomber planes or clandestine submarines.

Modernization, however, remains a key national security strategy under the Biden administration, and Air Force officials have said that Sentinel must be funded.

The Democratic lawmakers on Monday said Sentinel, after the Nunn-McCurdy breach, can only be continued if there are no alternatives, the program’s cost is reasonable and can be constrained further, and if the program is essential to national security and a higher priority than other programs that may be cut.

In the letter, however, they pointed to past comments by the Air Force and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante, vowing that Sentinel will be funded as “concerning signs that past preferences prejudiced the outcome of this new review.”

“There must be an honest evaluation of the necessity of proceeding with this program now and at what cost we are willing to continue,” lawmakers said. “Inevitably, this means making hard decisions about how and where to spend taxpayer dollars. Billions of dollars and at least a decade have been spent justifying the $130 billion Sentinel program. This requires reevaluation.”

International & Strategic Developments

U.S. to Hezbollah: Don’t count on us to stop an Israeli attack

Politico Online, June 24 (1926) | Nahal Toosi, Erin Banco and Lara Seligman

U.S. officials trying to prevent a bigger Middle East war are issuing an unusual warning to Hezbollah: Don’t assume that Washington can stop Israel from attacking you. The blunt message comes as many U.S. officials appear resigned to the possibility that Israel will make a major move against Hezbollah inside Lebanon in the coming weeks. Two U.S. officials told POLITICO that the militia needs to also understand that Washington will help Israel defend itself if Hezbollah retaliates. They stressed that the militant group should not count on America to act as a brake on Israeli decision-making.

Pentagon Confident It Can Still Defend Against Houthi Attacks Without a Carrier in the Region

Military.com, June 24 (1708) | Konstantin Toropin

The Pentagon said Monday it remains confident that it will be able to respond to ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea after a Navy aircraft carrier strike group departed the region and it was unclear when another carrier group might arrive. “We still have capability in the region,” Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder told reporters. The Navy will “continue to work very closely with our international allies and partners toward that end when it comes to safeguarding the flow of commerce and safety of mariners in the Red Sea.”

Air Force fires official overseeing Sentinel missile program

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4741560-air-force-fires-sentinel-missile-program-overseeing-official-charles-clegg/

BY: BRAD DRESS for THE HILL // 06/26/24 3:22 PM ET

The Air Force has fired the top official overseeing the costly Sentinel nuclear missile program, which is currently under a Pentagon review for ballooning costs.

The commander of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Maj. Gen. John Newberry, fired Col. Charles Clegg, The Hill confirmed Wednesday. Clegg had assumed the position in August 2022, serving less than two years in the job that oversees the Sentinel program that began around a decade ago. An Air Force spokesperson said Clegg was removed from his job because of a loss of confidence and that it was not related to the Nunn-McCurdy breach in January, when Sentinel overshot its budget costs by 37 percent.

That triggered the Defense Department to review whether the program is still necessary and vital to national security. “He was removed because he did not follow organizational procedures. This removal action is not directly related to the Nunn-McCurdy review,” the Air Force spokesperson said in an email. The spokesperson also said the removal does not impact the operation of the 400 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that Sentinel is supposed to replace.

Minuteman “remains our nation’s safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, just as it has been without interruption for the past six decades,” the spokesperson added. The Sentinel program aims to create brand-new missiles to replace the aging, more than 50-year-old Minuteman ICBMs. But the project’s cost has grown from around $60 billion in 2015 to around $130 billion now and has attracted more intense congressional scrutiny after the Nunn-McCurdy breach.

Several Democrats sent a letter to the Pentagon this week calling for a fair and honest review of whether Sentinel is vital to national security at the updated cost of the program. A congressional nuclear arms working group is also holding a July 24 hearing on the program. The sentinel is supposed to finish around 2030 but is now expected to be delayed. The main contractor on the project, Northrop Grumman, earlier this year announced it would not be conducting a critical flight test until 2026.

The project’s costs are inflating in part because it also involves renovating or constructing new real estate, including infrastructure that will house the new missiles. The Minuteman ICBMs are spread out across several states in the rural Western part of the country. The Air Force has fired the head of its program to build the next intercontinental ballistic missile, whose projected costs have ballooned to $131 billion.

Sentinel Systems Director Col. Charles Clegg was removed because he “did not follow organizational procedures” and the service lost confidence in his ability to lead the program, Air Force spokesperson Ann Stefanek confirmed in a statement. The removal, first reported by Bloomberg, comes after the troubled program breached Nunn-McCurdy limits, which triggered the Pentagon to review the program and recertify it to stop it from being canceled.

However, Stefanek said Clegg’s removal “is not directly related to the Nunn-McCurdy review.” The results of the Nunn-McCurdy process are due to Congress on July 9, but some lawmakers are already concerned that the Pentagon’s process of evaluating the program hasn’t been fair. The Air Force started the Nunn-McCurdy review with “biased and preconceived notions,” a group of Democratic lawmakers wrote in a June 24 letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Those lawmakers want  a “thorough review of all alternatives” before the Pentagon moves ahead with Sentinel

Important Essays To Review

Make All B52s Nuclear Capable

The SASC proposed making the entire B52 force nuclear capable. Here is what it might cost: https://www.twz.com/air/making-the-entire-b-52-fleet-nuclear-capable-what-it-would-take

HSCI Chairman Mike Turner speaks About Nuclear Weapons and US Foreign Policy

https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-weapons-and-foreign-policy-conversation-hpsci-chairman-mike-turner

Should  the United States cut Nuclear weapons spending as part of a fiscal discipline strategy?

https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/we-cant-afford-cut-americas-nuclear-modernization-program

Three Essays on ICBMs and nuclear deterrence by Peter Huessy

Is US Nuclear Deterrence In Jeopardy? Lost? – Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization

Nuclear Weapons Essay: Rust to Obsolescence or Modernize to Credibility? – Warrior Maven: Center for Military Modernization

Closing Remarks by Peter Huessy at the LSUS, BFR and NIDS Triad Symposium, June 20^th, 2024, on the Campus of Louisiana State University in Shreveport, Louisiana in support of the USAF Global Strike Command

A leading progressive newspaper recently noted that the world has a “lot of arms but not much control.” And surprisingly, the editorial went on to explain—correctly—while the US has exercised restraint in its nuclear modernization—staying within the New START limits—not so Russia and China, with the result that a two-nation arms race is underway in which the United States is not participating.

As retired Admiral Charles Richard noted in 2022 China is adding to its nuclear arsenal at a breathtaking speed. Russia may have  already engaged in a significant upload of its New START accountable warheads, as it has such a capability in the multiple thousands of warheads. And especially dangerous given there have been no New START inspections for many years, on top of thousands of Russian deployed theater nuclear forces under no arms limits.

North Korea and Iran, one an expanding nuclear armed rogue state and the other on the nuclear doorstep, are allied with Russia and China, adding to nuclear dangers. Acting with its proxy terror groups such as the Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran shut down western allied freight traffic in the Red Sea and Suez, attacked US forces some 170 time in the region since October 2023, and launched thousands of rockets and missiles at Israel and other US allies. On top of which, Putin continues to make serial nuclear threats to Ukraine, while China says if Japan comes to the defense of Taiwan, it will suffer the same fate as the country did in WWII.

It is right to characterize the 2010 US nuclear program of record as consistent with the New START treaty. But absent a new agreement by China and Russia to restrict arms, the US is indeed projected in the 2025-35 timeframe to face two nuclear armed peer adversaries for the first time, each probably with unrestrained nuclear arsenals. In such an environment, the US nuclear deterrent strategy needs to be augmented as it was adopted in a more benign environment.

What then should the United States do?

There are two general approaches currently being discussed.

As the Posture Commission noted, the program of record is necessary, even critical, but not sufficient. The Senate Armed Service Committee is listening it appears, and in the NDAA or national defense legislation, calls for at least four new initiatives: (1) make all 76 B52s nuclear capable; (2) deploy the Sentinel ICBM in all 450 silos; (3) establish a SLCM-N program office; and (4) create a high-level DoD official to oversee all nuclear programs. One could also reasonably add three additional Columbia submarines [post 2042] as well as add warheads to the SLBM and ICBM legs of the Triad.

Now some critics note that the US should just improve our conventional capability. But as senior US military officials have told Congress, if adversary nuclear weapons are introduced into a conventional conflict, “nothing holds,” thus requiring for the USA to have both a conventional and nuclear deterrent second to none.

This is where Putin and Xi are making the world dangerous—as they are threatening the use of nuclear force as an adjunct to their conventional capability, using nuclear weapons not to deter conflict but to make it serve their purposes—getting the US and its allies to stand down in a conflict, what the Posture Commission described as nukes for bullying and coercion. It is this “gap” in US capability at the theater level particularly that needs to be remedied.

Especially as Professor Chris Yeaw told this conference, Russia and China combined may have within the decade some 10,000 deployed nuclear weapons both strategic and theater.

Now what are some alternative strategies than adding to the capability of the US nuclear deterrent?

Annie Jacobson new book calls US deterrent strategy as crazy—“mad” is her description. She says the US needs more negotiations and diplomacy—but not more weapons. But she does not say what we are negotiating for and where diplomacy will take us.

Some members of Congress call for unilateral measures—to make the US nuclear arsenal smaller—such as killing ICBMs. This would reduce the US strategic nuclear force by 70% fewer SNDVs or Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles and 25% fewer warheads, while also eliminating any hedge to build beyond the current New Start warhead level.

This idea of killing our ICBM needs some examination. Some six arguments are common.

First, critics of ICBMs propose we just remove the silo targets, and then Russians wouldn’t be tempted to attack them. If ICBM silos are first, logically would New York city be next? Would moving the people of New York throughout rural America stop Russia from attacking us with nuclear weapons? Are the targets at fault?

Second, ICBM’s are apparently on a hair trigger although no President has ever called for their launch in the past 3.2 million minutes since the MMIII went on alert in Montana in October 1962. That is some excellent “launch control” but certainly not characteristic of any supposed hair trigger weapon.

ird, for some reason ICBM critics think the Russians are suicidal and will launch nearly all their New START accountable ICBM warheads—over 900—to take out 400 Minuteman ICBM silos and associated warheads and 45 launch control centers spread over 32,000 square miles over 5 states.

But Russia would be ignoring 350-400 sub warheads that could be deployed from Kings Bay and Bangor based submarines and 60 bombers from 3 bomber bases with anywhere between 600-1000 cruise missiles and gravity bombs available for retaliation. To say nothing, of the estimated 800 warheads at sea also available for retaliation.

Fourth, another implicit charge is if the Russians launch their submarine missiles at the ICBM silos, they secure a shorter flight time making it even more difficult for a President to launch our ICBMs back at Russia. But Moscow has around 500 submarine-based warheads in their entire fleet, not all of which are necessarily on alert. The force simply cannot hold at risk the entire US ICBM force.

Fifth, given the Russian missiles would have to either be launched at different times or would reach US soil at different times—either scenario would allow the US to launch after being attacked which would place Russia in nuclear jeopardy.

Sixth, critics often say the nuclear modernization effort is simply too expensive. But if you examine the defense budget, all strategic nuclear modernization efforts within DOD—subs, sub missiles, ICBMs, bombers, cruise missiles and NC3—come to $18.6 billion annually, which is 2% of the defense budget, and one third of all DOD-NNSA nuclear expenditures, including all nuclear sustainment and all nuclear modernization.

Another way to measure the cost is that over the 50 years of the ICBM force being deployed, it comes to an annual investment of $2.6 billion annually, compared to $128 billion annually for food stamps and the $76 billion annual Federal cost of caring for illegal aliens.

As General Mattis has said, “the US can afford survival.”

To restore deterrence and prevent the world from spinning out of control, continuing the program of record and the newly recommended additional capabilities is the only choice we have unless again as Admiral Charles Richard explained, we wish to disarm and get out of the nuclear deterrent business. We can rust to obsolescence or modernize to deter. Those are our only two choices.

Now will the US succeed in this unprecedented modernization effort? I think the presence of so many attendees  here —in record numbers—and your growing support for this Symposium will help America make the right choice. [Applause]

Thank you.

Political News of the Week

In the six battleground states, 44% say Mr. Trump will do a better job handling threats to democracy in the U.S., compared to 33% who said Mr. Biden would do a better job, according to a poll by The Washington Post and the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.

The same poll found that 16% of swing state voters think neither candidate is equipped to handle threats to democracy, and 7% said both candidates are equally prepared to deal with threats.

Mr. Trump leads among so-called “deciders,”

voters who fit into one or more categories such as voting in only one of the past two presidential elections, between 18 and 25, registered to vote since 2022, not sure if they will vote for Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden this year, or switched this support between 2016 and 2020.

Nearly 40% of “deciders” say they trust Mr. Trump more to handle threats to democracy while 29% say they have more trust in Mr. Biden. More than 20% of deciders say they don’t trust either to handle threats to democracy while 10% say they are both equally prepared to deal with threats.

The poll surveyed 3,513 registered voters in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin in April and May. Of those surveyed, 2,255 were classified as “deciders.”

Toons of the Week

As concern grows over the growing conflict in the Middle East, Michael Ramirez, the Pulitzer Prize winning editorial cartoonist, incapsulates in these toons the ongoing Iranian directed turmoil and the feckless response by the United Nations.

A recent news story about Iran’s latent nuclear program goes right to the heart of the Iranian capability: Iran’s strategy of warning that it will build a bomb has become more prominent, public, and explicit in the wake of October 7 and the ensuing war in Gaza.

Throughout the conflict, Iran has mounted a steady drumbeat of attacks on Israel, U.S. forces, and international shipping via its surrogate groups across the region. Iran’s nuclear program has played a role in Iran’s management of the crisis, too, as Tehran has relied on a combination of technical signaling and rhetoric to bolster the credibility of its threshold deterrent and manage escalation risks.

That Iran’s leaders have not kept the nuclear program out of the spotlight is a sign that they view their threshold capability as more of an asset than a liability. For example, last December Iran reverted the configuration of its advanced centrifuges to a setup that in early 2023 had produced small amounts of 84 percent enriched material—a hair’s breadth away from the 90 percent needed for nuclear weapons.

Tehran knew inspectors would see and report the December change, which strongly suggests its leaders wanted to communicate that the possibility of producing weapons-grade uranium was back on the table. Iranian officials have also ramped up their commentary about the country’s ability to build nuclear weapons and the conditions under which they might do so. In January, the head of Iran’s nuclear program, Mohammed Eslami, repeated the long-standing Iranian position that weapons of mass destruction have “never been part of [its] security and defense doctrine” but added that Iran’s nuclear latency—its inherent capacity to build nuclear weapons—provided a deterrent.

“It is not about the lack of capability,” he declared in a televised interview. “I think we have achieved such deterrence . . . . We should not underrate our current achievements, thinking that we are not there yet.” The Iranian government then circulated Eslami’s statement on social media. The next month, his predecessor and one of the key negotiators of the 2015 nuclear deal, Ali Akbar Salehi, elaborated on Eslami’s point.

When asked whether Iran can build a nuclear bomb, Salehi replied that Iran has crossed “all the scientific and technical nuclear thresholds.” Using the example of manufacturing a car, he continued: “What does it take to make a car? You need a chassis, an engine, a wheel, a gearbox . . . . If you are asking me if we [have] built the gearbox and the engine, my answer is yes.”

The Archives

Lots of arms, too little control

Washington Post, June 18 (0115), Pg. A16 | Editorial

Russia and China are pushing the world toward a new nuclear arms race. And it could be even more dangerous, and more difficult to brake, than the Cold War competition that ended three decades ago. That was the unsettling message Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation at the National Security Council, delivered in a largely overlooked but important speech June 7 to the Arms Control Association.

In the near term, Mr. Vaddi declared, “the prospects for strategic arms control are dim.” Russia has rejected talks, and the last remaining U.S.-Russia treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons, New START, which caps each side’s warheads on missiles, submarines and heavy bombers, expires in 2026 – possibly, Mr. Vaddi said, “without replacement.” China, for its part, has never had any nuclear arms agreements with the United States and has shown no interest in nuclear arms control. On the contrary, Mr. Vaddi noted that China, which has historically maintained a small stockpile of nukes, is “expanding and diversifying” its nuclear arsenals “at a breakneck pace,” as are Russia and North Korea. In refusing to discuss limits, these three geopolitically aligned adversaries “are forcing the United States and our close allies and partners to prepare for a world where nuclear competition occurs without numerical constraints,” he said.

To understand why this new arms race is dangerous, look back at the last one: The United States and the Soviet Union together amassed more than 60,000 nuclear warheads in a standoff that threatened mutual, possibly global, annihilation. The danger of an accidental launch grows when great powers keep their nuclear weapons on launch-ready alert, as the United States and Russia still do today. Fortunately, arms control treaties and the end of the Cold War reduced both the tensions between the two countries and their respective arsenals. Thus, it was especially significant that Mr. Vaddi said that the shrinkage of those stockpiles over the past 25 years might now be reversed. “Absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from the current deployed numbers is required,” he said.

China has more than 500 nuclear warheads and is aiming to accumulate more than 1,000 by 2030, compared with the 1,550 warheads the United States and Russia each currently deploy. A three-way arms race poses complex strategic questions – more complex than those presented by the two-way U.S.-Soviet conflict. Should the United States seek to match the combined strength of Russia and China, or just one of them? How would Moscow and Beijing respond? Mr. Vaddi said the United States would pursue “better” and not necessarily “more” nuclear weaponry. This country does “not need to increase our nuclear forces to match or outnumber the combined total of our competitors to successfully deter them,” he said.

That’s good, but no one knows whether that notion would hold up in a future arms race, nor whether Russia and China could or would make similar calculations.

Mr. Vaddi also warned of a “new and dangerous era” because of the efforts of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran to proliferate advanced weapons technologies, including missiles, drones, and chemical and biological weapons. “Unlike our adversaries,” he said, “we will not develop radiation-spewing, nuclear-powered cruise missiles – or nuclear weapons designed to be placed in orbit – which would be a clear violation of the Outer Space Treaty.” He was referring to Russia, which is reportedly developing both.

Ideally, more aggressive U.S. diplomacy might bring China to the table for tripartite arms talks with Russia and the United States. The prospects for that are dim, however, as the United States found when it made a proposal to China on managing strategic risks last year – and Beijing brushed it off. The Cold War arms race began to end when President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev found the political will to reduce the arsenals. Gorbachev was desperate to ease the burden of the arms race on his tottering communist system, and Reagan had long harbored an ambition to abolish nuclear weapons altogether. President’s Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, however, show no such flexibility or pragmatism. If anything, their pursuit of a new arms race reflects a desire for heightened geopolitical struggle.

Mr. Vaddi’s warning is deeply worrisome. It would be far more preferable to reach verifiable, binding treaties to limit nuclear weapons. But diplomacy takes two to tango, or, in this case, three.

ICBM EAR Week of June 25, 2024, Prepared by Peter Huessy, Senior Fellow at NIDS and President of Geostrategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland

ICBM EAR Report for June, 25 was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the military supplement package is undoubtedly beneficial, it falls short of grappling with the deeper strategic complexities of the conflict. The war in Ukraine is not merely a matter of tactical engagements. It is a multifaceted struggle that demands a comprehensive approach.

The cyclical nature of military aid inadvertently creates vulnerabilities. As obstacles arise—whether due to domestic political debates, bureaucracy, or logistic challenges—a new gap in Ukraine’s defense could emerge. With each step forward, Russian forces entrench themselves deeper into Ukrainian territory, making subsequent efforts to reclaim lost ground more resource-intensive and costly in terms of human lives. Russia has already switched to an exhaustion strategy that is too costly for Ukraine.

While the current rate of military aid may bolster Ukraine’s defense, it is unlikely to afford Ukrainian forces the opportunity for a counteroffensive or strategic initiative that can secure victory. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Washington looms, the prevailing stance in the US and Europe is to persist in providing life support for Ukraine, yet refrain from confronting Russia, the root cause of Ukraine’s tragedy. This approach affords the Kremlin increased confidence and time to adapt its war economy.

By choosing political passivity and refraining from adopting a counter-offensive stance against Russia, Western democracies are gradually ceding their global influence. The strategic choice—or, more accurately, the strategic indecisiveness—to remain in a passive-defensive mode against Russia extends beyond the relationship between Western democracies and Russia. The war in Ukraine is but a single theater in a much larger conflict—a third world war, to be blunt—where the free world is pitted against authoritarian regimes. China, Iran, and North Korea already emerged as major supporting actors on Russia’s side, fully cognizant that their fight is not against Ukraine, but an indirect war with Western democracies.

For China, the war in Ukraine holds paramount importance. By supplying military components and dual-use technologies to Russia, and purchasing Russian oil and gas, China can gauge not only the effectiveness of economic sanctions on a large authoritarian state, but also the seriousness of the US and European countries in implementing full-scale isolation of the aggressor. This could be a pivotal factor in the future, particularly when assessing the impact of potential economic isolation from Western democracies towards China, for instance, in a scenario involving an assault on or blockade of Taiwan.

As one report indicates, China is already the largest single exporter of key military goods to Russia. This clearly reveals Beijing’s strategic posture on the war. Chinese communist leaders aim to defeat Western powers in Ukraine by exposing democracies as unable to compete with the authoritarian axis in terms of political will, efficient strategic decisions, and even by depleting the military reserves of NATO countries and the readiness of democratic societies to fight for democratic values.

Despite these challenges, the Biden administration persists in seeking dialogue with China, even with the knowledge that China attempts to “influence and arguably interfere” with the upcoming election in the United States. However, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to China demonstrated that Beijing does not seem inclined towards meaningful conversations with Washington. It appears that Chinese leaders already assessed the Ukraine-Russia war in terms of Western resolve to fight back. These conclusions bolster Beijing’s confidence that the US and NATO allies are too timid, too slow, and too preoccupied with domestic political issues to assert themselves against Russia.

The war in Ukraine is likely the initial phase of a much longer and more complex war between the US and China, as leaders of diametrically opposed blocs in the current global landscape. This initial phase could culminate in a victory for China if Western democracies fail to adopt a robust stance and enter a counter-offensive mode against Russia.

NATO must dissuade Russia that it fears the dubious escalation risk, a narrative heavily promoted by the Kremlin’s propaganda, to prevent genuine NATO membership accession talks with Ukraine. This would send an unequivocal signal that Russia is incapable of conquering Ukraine, regardless of the duration of their attempts. And Ukrainians, armed with military supplies from NATO, will do everything in their power to liberate the occupied territories from Russian control. This is the path forward for Western democracies to re-assert their global role and uphold democratic values.

Tomas Janeliūnas is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, and a professor of international relations at Vilnius University, Lithuania. At X: @TomasJaneliunas The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Strategic Contest in Ukraine: A Pivotal War Foreshadowing a Major US-China Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.