Detractors raise three challenges to the Admiral’s concerns. First, the Chinese buildup is not extensive. Second, the Chinse cannot technically build such a big force in the projected timeframe. Third, there is nothing the Chinese threaten that justifies the level of concern. Let’s examine each concern in order.

The Chinese Buildup

According to a new Department of Defense (DoD) report on the military power of China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nuclear arsenal grew from 200 to over 500 in just the past four years and will hit 1,000 and by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. The 150 percent growth since 2020 is thus in the books and unprecedented.

As for the future, the key driving factor is the 300–360 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos that were built over the past few years. The silos are able to hold either the DF-31 or the DF-41 ICBM—capable of carrying three to ten warheads, respectively.

The additional major factor is the four new strategic nuclear-armed submarines (SSBN) projected to be fully operational by 2030, each with 20 missiles and three to six warheads per missile. The US Pacific Command says the submarines already in the Chinese fleet are currently being fitted with multiple warheads.

When combined, a reasonable estimate could project a Chinese nuclear arsenal significantly larger than the 1,500 projected for 2035. This is well above the US day-to-day operationally deployed strategic nuclear deterrent, especially given the shaky assumption that new Chinese ICBM silos will largely be filled with single warhead DF-31 missiles.

Do the Chinese have the technical capacity to build sufficiently to soon exceed the US nuclear force balance? Chinese state-run media claims that the DF-41 can carry up to ten warheads and, as James Howe explains, the PRC published a schematic of a DF-41 with ten warheads launched from a railcar.

The DF-41 has a payload of 2,500 kilograms. If one assumes this weight is split between ten warheads at 175-225 kilograms per warhead, which is feasible for a light re-entry vehicle, and reflects the Chinese trend to deploy smaller and more accurate warheads, then such an option is certainly possible.

The DoD, in the 2019 Chinese Military Power Report (CMPR), estimated that the DF-41 can carry six to ten warheads, while the 2023 CMPR now estimates the DF-41 can carry upwards of six warheads. China launched a DF-5 ICBM with ten re-entry vehicles in 2017, proving a technological capability to deploy ten warheads per ICBM.

What would the Chinese do with such a force if they built it? The United States is clearly the intended target. Critically important, as Admiral Richard told Congress, “The breathtaking growth and strategic nuclear capability enables China to change their posture and their strategy and execute any plausible nuclear employment strategy—the last brick in the wall of a military capable of coercion.”

The newly released report on the Strategic Posture of the United States concurs, noting that China and Russia repeatedly threaten the US with coercive nuclear strikes, while becoming closer allies with nuclear-armed North Korea and nuclear-aspiring Iran.

Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping designated 2027 as the year when China should have the military capability to resolve the “Taiwan” question. That could very well mean, as Admiral Richard warned, that China is seeking to coerce or blackmail the US to stand down over any conflict involving Taiwan, believing that a significant nuclear capability gives them the leverage to do so.

America’s Response

As the Strategic Posture Commission recommended, it is not that the US must match warhead for warhead the combined force of Russia and China. But as many of the Commission members emphasized, the US needs a greater nuclear deterrent capability because the program of record is not sufficient.

A quick increase in warheads carried by the Minuteman III ICBM and Trident D-5 sea-launched ballistic missile was recommended. They also suggested acquiring more Columbia-class submarines and some mobile Sentinel ICBMs. A sea-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile capability was highly recommended as well.

A robust missile defense of the US homeland, protecting against limited nuclear coercion, is also an excellent remedy. The new strategic environment is highly dangerous because of the significant and historically unprecedented growth in Chinese nuclear forces. To sustain deterrence, the US must add credible military capability to its nuclear forces in a series of planned, serial additions while finally deploying integrated air and missile defenses protecting the US homeland.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Strategic Posture Commission and the China Breakout was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, Chinese state-run media, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defense Project, CNN, and the Federation of American Scientists all claim that the DF-41 may carry up to 10 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). A MIRVed system aims to increase the missile’s counterforce capability and/or ensure penetration of American missile defense networks. Reportedly, the DF-41 has a payload of 2,500 kilograms—assuming 30 percent for the post boost vehicle and 70 percent for the warhead reentry vehicle (RV). This would provide 1,750 kilograms (kg) for warheads, or each of the 10 warheads could weigh up to 175 kg, which is feasible for a light RV.

The estimate of 1,500 warheads assumes that China will not add more DF-31AG, JL-3 SLBM, rail- or road-mobile DF-41 missiles, or additional silo-based DF-41 missiles beyond what is currently in the inventory. However, it is possible that the number could be much larger. If DF-41 ICBMs are deployed with an average of 5 warheads per missile—in the 360 new silos recently built—and there is a projected 25 percent increase in the assumed baseline of 400 other missiles, China could field an estimated 2,300 long-range strategic nuclear warheads.

This would be a significantly larger force than that of the United States. There is a concern that Chinese President Xi Jinping will use such a nuclear force to coerce or blackmail the US into capitulation during an attack on Taiwan. Given that 2035 is still over a decade away, the time is now to rectify this challenge.

Is America Underestimating the DF-41 Risk? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The report, which is an annual requirement mandated by Section 1202 of the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, provides an authoritative assessment of military and security developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 2023 report’s findings speak to the consistent failure of Western idealism and a failure to acknowledge the oncoming threat of China.

The report is replete with alarming “takeaways” and disquieting gaps in known information about the PRC’s capabilities and current plans. The word “probably” was used 102 times within the report, indicating a nascent level of awareness so low that analysts could do little more than venture guesses or futile estimates for Congress.

Additionally, missing from this report is an acknowledgment that the PRC is likely seeking to “acquire a first-strike capability.” While garnering a first-strike capability does not always mean an intent to “go first,” for a country with a stated “no first use” policy, this nuclear arsenal expansion is distressing. By not acknowledging this perceived PRC goal, the report mutes the clarion call this report should evoke.

While this annual report has plenty to cheer and jeer, below are ten points from the report that should alarm Congress, the Biden administration, and the American people.

First, as of May 2023, the DoD estimates that the PRC has at least 500 operational nuclear warheads (p. 104). This is a significant increase from the DoD’s 2020 estimate, which placed China’s stockpile in the low 200s—with an expectation of doubling by 2030 (p. 111). This is juxtaposed by a 2012 estimate in which retired Russian generals asserted that China had enough fissile material for 3,600 nuclear warheads, with 1,600–1,800 nuclear weapons in the stockpile.

Second, the report suggests, “The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in 2022, which consists of at least 300 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos and has loaded at least some ICBMs into these silos.” This may be the first public announcement that “some” of the completed ICBM silos are now loaded with potentially both DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs (p. 107).

Former USSTRATCOM commander Admiral (Ret.) Charles Richard and his predecessor General (Ret.) John Hyten have both noted that the DF-41 carries up to ten warheads. When combined with the scores of road-mobile ICBMs in China’s nuclear arsenal, the number of land-based ICBM launchers exceeds the number of American land-based nuclear missiles.

During the summer of 2021, open-source researchers using commercial imagery discovered, documented, and tracked the construction of new ICBM missile silos at Yumen, Hami, and Yulin. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies first identified the construction of an estimated 119 silos at the Yumen site. US Strategic Command tweeted a link to a New York Times story about the Hami discovery, a poor substitute for the requisite and timely official statement a revelation of this magnitude demanded.

Third, the PRC has approximately 350 ICBMs that can all reach the United States (p. 106). In addition to the DF-31 and DF-41, the PRC is also deploying the new DF-5C, a silo-based ICBM with a multi-megaton-class nuclear warhead (p. 107). A January 31, 2017, Bill Gertz article reported that a flight test of the DF-5C missile carrying ten warheads was conducted, which indicated the PRC “is increasing the number of warheads in its arsenal.”

Generally, megaton warheads are designed as a counter-value capability for destroying American cities. The PRC likely considers DF-5Cs as an asymmetrical advantage designed to hold American cities hostage and ransom their safety in exchange for abandoning Taiwan during forced unification.

Fourth, the newly constructed network of silo-based ICBMs is likely to operate under China’s emerging “Early Warning Counterstrike” posture. This launch-on-warning (LoW) operating concept enables a rapid counter-nuclear strike before an adversary’s first strike destroys the Chinese arsenal. The LoW concept of operations has long been vilified by American strategists as destabilizing and fraught with risk of accidental launch.

Fifth, the PRC officially established its own nuclear triad. The vintage H-6N bomber features a modified fuselage to allow an external nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) (p. 63). According to the report, the nuclear-capable ALBM “appears to be armed with a maneuvering reentry vehicle,” thus indicating the ALBM is likely capable of conducting nuclear precision strikes (p. 108). This capability and the report’s assessment indicates China is developing a nuclear warfighting approach, not just maintaining deterrence.

Sixth, the PRC may be developing a conventionally armed ICBM. If fielded, such capability would allow the PRC to threaten conventional ballistic missile strikes against the continental United States (p. 66). The report notes that conventionally armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability, which is one reason why the United States Air Force abandoned the concept.

Seventh, the PRC is likely developing advanced nuclear delivery capabilities like the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). A FOBS-HGV was tested on July 27, 2021—orbiting the earth before reentering the atmosphere to strike a target (pp. 67, 111). Chinese FOBS weaponizes outer space because it potentially places nuclear warheads into low-earth orbit prior to de-orbiting them onto their targets with the goal of evading missile defenses.

The risk to America from a realized Chinese FOBS-HGV is conspicuous. The system’s extreme range allows it to circumnavigate the planet placing any target on the face of the earth at risk, potentially from any direction. This greatly complicates an early warning system’s ability to detect, track, and target it for intercept. Moreover, once separated from the FOBS, HGVs would be very maneuverable and travel at least five times the speed of sound, “effectively reducing the defender’s warning and response time as well as understanding of the ultimate destination of the attack.” From a Western perspective, there is little deterrent value from a FOBS-HGV system other than to coerce adversary compliance amid a crisis or function as a first-strike pre-emptive attack.

Eighth, despite the PRC’s “No First Use” policy, China’s nuclear strategy likely includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack. As one senior People’s Liberation Army Colonel told this author on a trip to China, threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or command and control systems will likely elicit a nuclear response.

A recent assessment of China’s Proposal of the People’s Republic of China on the Reform and Development of Global Governance noted the omission of any “No First Use” policy while expressing other detailed positions on nuclear weapons could indicate a departure from China’s almost 60-year commitment. In 2021, the PRC sanctioned a video threat in which the narrator said,  “We will use nuclear bombs first. We will use nuclear bombs continuously. We will do this until Japan declares unconditional surrender for the second time.” It appears the PRC’s “No First Use” policy remains in name only and exists only to deceive Western policymakers and nuclear disarmament advocates.

Ninth, China deploys two land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), which can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads that can “hot swap”  between launching the nuclear and conventional warhead variants. The purported flexibility, precision, and range of these IRBMs suggest that they are well suited to limited nuclear use against American military targets in the Pacific.

And tenth, the PRC’s continued research on toxins and pharmaceutical-based agents has both military and civilian applications, which raises concerns about its compliance with the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. The United States is unable to confirm if the PRC has fulfilled its obligations under either Convention (p. 114). The probability of chemical or biological weapon employment against American forces remains a real threat.

Since the United States does not possess an in-kind chemical or biological capability with which to respond to such escalatory attacks and thus must either deter or respond with conventional or nuclear weapons, China may view its capabilities as an asymmetric advantage. Adversaries who are signatories to such treaties but are unwilling to adhere to their protocols cannot be trusted to adhere to nuclear weapons treaties or risk reduction measures.

Conclusion

The DoD’s inability to provide a confident and consistent description of China’s increasing nuclear threat for public consumption raises questions of intentional underestimation. For the Department of Defense to construct and implement a coherent strategy to counter the Chinese nuclear threat, it must first understand the adversary’s capabilities and capacities. Next, it must accurately communicate the magnitude of the threat to the American people and their congressional representatives to ensure proper support and resourcing. Then it must be prepared to “hold at risk” the newly added PRC nuclear targets without uncovering other strategic targets in other parts of the world. This may well demand additional American capability, something the Biden administration has already repudiated without sufficient explanation.

The PRC views the development of its “asymmetric countermeasures,” primarily nuclear weapons, as a “trump card” for safeguarding the PRC’s core interest of achieving unification with Taiwan (p. 181). With breathtaking speed, the Chinese are fervently and consistently building the capability and capacity needed to ensure their “freedom of movement.”

If deterring a nuclear attack by the United States was its goal, the PRC would not have spent such time and treasure expanding a nuclear force that was already successfully deterring the United States. Rather, its nuclear force is expanding rapidly to prevent America and its allies from intervening in any aggression toward Taiwan or in the South China Sea. Simply said, China seeks to restore a hierarchical international order where the Chinese Communist Party sits atop the rest of the world and American influence is severely reduced or even eliminated.

The time has come to be honest with the American people about the true nuclear threat from China. We must replace “probability” with certainty and then act realistically to defend American interests with a more aggressive deterrence posture.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Adam Lowther, PhD is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Together, they have more than five decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service in the nuclear enterprise. Both authors co-host the popular weekly podcast “The Nuclear View” found at https://thinkdeterrence.com/podcast-shows/.

The views expressed by the authors are their own.

The Pentagon’s China Military Report: Why Americans Should Be Alarmed was originally published on Global Security Review.