Russia’s nuclear strategy occupies a central place in global security debates. With the world’s largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal and a leadership that frequently employs nuclear rhetoric, Russia’s approach to deterrence is both consequential and deeply rooted in its historical experience. Scholars often analyze Russian nuclear doctrine through the lens of post–Cold War geopolitics or contemporary military reforms, but such approaches overlook the deeper historical foundations of Russian strategic culture. 

For better or worse, the origins of Russian nuclear deterrence lie in the Stalinist heritage, a political and strategic worldview forged in the crucible of revolution, civil war, industrialization, and global conflict. Stalin’s rule created the institutional, psychological, and ideological foundations that shaped the Soviet nuclear program and continue to influence Russian nuclear policy today. 

Stalin’s Strategic Mindset 

Joseph Stalin’s approach to security was shaped by a profound sense of vulnerability. He believed the Soviet Union was encircled by hostile capitalist powers and that survival required absolute centralization, militarization, and coercive statecraft. This worldview justified: rapid industrialization to support military power; expansion of the security apparatus; preemptive and punitive measures against perceived enemies; and readiness to accept extreme risks. Stalin’s strategic thinking fused Marxist-Leninist ideology, personal paranoia, and geopolitical realism. 

Stalin believed that only an overwhelming force could guarantee the survival of the Soviet state. This belief drove the massive industrialization campaigns of the 1930s, which prioritized heavy industry, armaments, and military infrastructure. This logic later translated into the nuclear age: nuclear weapons became symbols of national greatness and instruments of political leverage. Stalin’s domestic use of terror—purges, show trials, mass repression—was mirrored in his foreign policy. He believed that intimidation could shape adversaries’ behavior. 

The Soviet Atomic Project: Stalinist Governance in Science 

The Soviet atomic project began during World War II, but it accelerated dramatically after the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Stalin immediately recognized the political significance of nuclear weapons. For Stalin, nuclear weapons were not simply military tools; they were instruments of political prestige and strategic leverage. The atomic project was organized into secret research centers, such as Arzamas-16, where scientists lived under surveillance and strict information controls. This system mirrored the broader Stalinist model of compartmentalization, elite isolation, centralized oversight, and security-service dominance. 

Despite postwar devastation, Stalin prioritized the nuclear program above all other sectors. Archival evidence shows that the atomic project received unlimited access to manpower, materials and funding, even during famine conditions. 

This reflected Stalin’s belief that nuclear weapons were essential to state survival, international prestige, and strategic parity with the United States. Soviet espionage in the Manhattan Project was central to the rapid development of the Soviet bomb. Agents such as Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall provided critical information that accelerated Soviet progress. Stalin’s reliance on intelligence reflected his broader belief that security depended on outmaneuvering adversaries through covert means. 

When the USSR successfully tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, Stalin’s response was characteristically understated but strategically significant. He viewed the bomb not only as a weapon of war but also as a political instrument that elevated the USSR to superpower status. This symbolic dimension remains central to Russian nuclear identity. Nuclear weapons are not merely tools of deterrence; they are markers of national greatness and geopolitical relevance. 

The Evolution of Soviet and Russian Nuclear Doctrine 

Stalin’s belief in overwhelming force evolved into the Soviet commitment to massive nuclear arsenals, redundant delivery systems, and the capability for assured retaliation. By the 1970s, the USSR possessed thousands of warheads, an approach rooted in Stalinist thinking about security through quantitative superiority. Stalin’s insistence on political supremacy over the military carried into the nuclear age. The Soviet command-and-control system was designed to ensure that only the top political leadership could authorize nuclear use. Modern Russia’s “nuclear briefcase” (cheget) is a direct institutional descendant of this model. 

For Stalin, industrial and military achievements were markers of national greatness. Nuclear weapons became the ultimate symbol of superpower status. This symbolic dimension remains central to Russian identity and foreign policy, as seen in Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on “invincible” new nuclear systems. Russian leaders continue to view the world as a hostile environment in which Western powers seek to weaken or encircle Russia. This worldview, rooted in Stalin’s belief in external hostility, justifies reliance on nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty. Russia’s willingness to threaten limited nuclear use to compel adversaries to back down reflects a Stalinist belief in the coercive power of fear. Putin’s nuclear signaling by alerting forces, showcasing new systems, and issuing veiled threats echoes Stalin’s use of intimidation as a diplomatic tool. As Leon Aron has noted: 

Russia’s resorting to a nuclear strike to terminate a conventional conflict that was not going its way became known as an “escalate to de-escalate” theory. Intended to scare the enemy and coerce armistice rather than inflict massive damage and precipitate an open-ended strategic nuclear exchange, a “de-escalation” is likely to involve low-yield tactical weapons detonated away from densely populated areas.” 

Such an approach involves deterrence as ustrashenie (a sense of intimidation or scaring) rather than deterrence as sderzhivanie (a sense of holding back or restraining). Thus, one enduring Stalinist inheritance is psychological rather than doctrinal. This aspect includes security through strength, instead of trust; fear as a legitimate instrument of statecraft; occasional acceptance of extreme risk; and ambiguity as strategy. These attitudes shape how Russian leaders interpret international crises and how they wield nuclear threats. 

Conclusion 

Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is not merely a product of modern geopolitics or technological capability. It is also at least partly the continuation of a Stalinist worldview that equates security with dominance, deterrence with fear, and state survival with centralized, militarized power. Understanding this heritage is essential for interpreting Russia’s behavior today—from its latent and manifest use of coercive nuclear strategy to its insistence on maintaining a vast and diverse nuclear arsenal. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

Russian Nuclear Deterrence and the Ghost of Stalin was originally published on Global Security Review.

Amid U.S. involvement in a war against Iran, President Donald J. Trump has decided to double down on previous public expressions of disregard and distrust toward NATO. President Trump has threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO several times since his reelection. His repeated jibes at the alliance have raised concern among European defense experts and government officials. Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently noted that “It’s hard to see how any European country will now be able and willing to trust the United States to come to its defense.” And French President Macron indicated on April 2nd that, in his view, U.S. President Trump was undermining NATO through his repeated threats to withdraw from the alliance. Raising new fears of American abandonment on the part of European leaders, Trump, in various interviews and social media posts within a few days, said that the United States “will remember” France’s refusal to assist in the war against Iran; that NATO was a “paper tiger”; and that “Putin knows that, too, by the way.”

The most recent Presidential broadsides against NATO reflected Trump’s frustration with European allies who chose not to involve themselves in the war against Iran and/or denied their political and military support for the actions taken under Operation EPIC FURY—an effort that Secretary of War, Hegseth describes as “laser-focused [to] destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure – and they will never have nuclear weapons.” But this hesitancy among European allies should not have surprised U.S. leadership. Neither NATO as an alliance nor individual European governments were consulted before the decision to go to war, nor were they fully informed until the operation was already in progress. Further to the issue of NATO support, Trump’s address to the nation on April 1st simply assumed that the United States would wind up its military operations within several weeks and would turn the problem of unblocking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz over to European countries and others. In addition, Western European governments have strong public support for putting distance between themselves and the war in Iran. Popular majorities in every country oppose the U.S. and Israeli campaign, and European opposition to the war is enhanced by Trump’s personal unpopularity on that side of the Atlantic.

An additional element in the split between Trump and NATO was the Russian interpretation of its implications for the war in Ukraine, and more broadly, for Russia’s national security strategy writ large. Prolonged U.S. commitment to war in the Middle East could deplete the availability of military assets that would otherwise be available to sustain Ukrainian forces in their fight against Russia. The global spike in gas and oil prices was an obvious boon to the Russian economy and, from the standpoint of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, an unwelcome distraction for European leaders from the priority of supporting Ukraine. Russia also took advantage of Epic Fury to reinforce its support for Iran by providing targeting information for Iranian missile attacks against Israel and other regional states. Russia and Iran had already been sharing technology and knowledge with respect to drone warfare even prior to the launch of military operations against Tehran.

To some extent, the volatility in the Trump administration’s approach to NATO reflected the President’s frustration at his inability to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s war as existential and refused to acknowledge that there was any distinction between Ukrainian and Russian civilizations, let alone sovereignties. The Ukrainians responded in kind, resisting Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukrainian territory with creative use of drone technology and edgy defensive strategizing that put at risk a variety of targets in Russian territory, including bomber bases and critical infrastructure. Worse for Putin, his invasion in 2022, preceded by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, refocused NATO on its primary mission of deterrence and defense in Europe as opposed to “out of the area” operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the formerly Cold War neutral states, Sweden and Finland, were added to NATO’s membership because of Russia’s attempted coup de main against Kiev that turned into the longest and most destructive war in Europe since World War II. Caught in a trap of his own making, Putin continued to pour troops and material into the battlefields of Donbas and elsewhere in eastern Ukraine to support a more favorable negotiating position, should productive negotiations ever materialize.

Given Trump’s propensity for rearranging the deck chairs on foreign policy via Truth Social memoranda, it is conceivable that he will tone down the anti–NATO rhetoric once he has decided on a strategy for winding down the U.S. military campaign in Iran. The process of deconflicting the Strait of Hormuz will likely involve participation from European nations and other countries. Almost nobody benefits from continued bottlenecks in global shipping of oil and other vital commodities. Regardless of the outcome in Iran, the United States needs NATO, and NATO needs the United States. Without the U.S. as the indispensable leading partner, NATO Europe has insufficient nuclear or conventional deterrence against further Russian aggression. This assertion implies no disregard for the steps that the U.S. European allies have already taken since 2022 to improve the quality of their armed forces and military–industrial complexes. It is instead a recognition that the unique American nuclear deterrent and conventional war-fighting capabilities, supported by European determination to resist further Russian aggression, create a global as well as a regional deterrent for Russia and its partners (The CRINKs – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) that benefits not only NATO but also world peace. On the other hand, a divided and internally fractious NATO invites further aggression within and beyond Europe.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trumping NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

Little doubt exists that Iran was in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to American airstrikes. Although Iran is a signatory to the treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has long complained of Iranian efforts to hinder IAEA inspections. Iran started its nuclear energy program in the 1950s when President Dwight Eisenhower and the Shah had a good relationship and the Atoms for Peace program was a noble effort.

The relationship between Iran and the United States collapsed with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. When the Iranian government was overthrown by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the US took on the moniker of “the Great Satan” and the Islamic Republic never stopped condemning the United States, all while spending the past four decades supporting terror groups that attack American targets. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Islamic Republic began looking into the development of nuclear weapons but did not take major strides in that effort until after the American response to the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Given the long animosity between the United States and Iran, neither Israel nor the United States would have opposed regime change had the “Twelve Day War” led to such a result. A new, pro-American, regime would certainly desire a nuclear weapon less than the current regime. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the current ruler, was not toppled and is now cracking down on Iranian society as dissidents are rounded up and often executed.

Although China and Russia did not intervene on Iran’s behalf during the war, within 24 hours of the American attack messages of support for the regime were issued by authoritarians, like Russian president, Vladimir Putin. Set aside former Russian president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev’s claim that “some countries” might give Iran nuclear weapons because of the American strike. Such a remark was unserious. But Russia very well may help Iran reconstitute its nuclear program.

What does matter is that the post-war behavior of Ayatollah Khamenei shows a pattern of continued aggression in the face of defeat, which is supported by Russia for its own interests. It is unlikely Russia or China will play a constructive role in helping the United States find a lasting resolution to the Iran problem.

Israel’s recent air campaign and covert operations in Iran should shock the Iranian regime into reconsidering its fundamental approach, but Iran’s raison d’etre (reason for being) is to both fight the Americans and the Jews. It offers little else. Thus, making peace with the Gret Satan and “the Jews” challenges five decades of anti-American and anti-Jewish propaganda. For the Ayatollah and his regime, such a change in direction is destabilizing at best.

The Israeli assassination of key Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals and Iran’s leading nuclear scientists was both a practical solution to a difficult problem and a warning to Israel’s enemies. Whether or not these assassinations have a long-term effect is uncertain.

There is certainly a pipeline of scientists training in China and Russia that will step in where their predecessors left off. Given their own interest in creating a distraction for the United States, China and Russia will likely continue to support Iran’s aspirations. So, too, will North Korea. This may allow Iran to learn from its recent experience and rebuild more effectively.

There is also the battle damage assessment, which, absent on-the-ground intelligence, can only make informed assessments about the destruction of facilities like Fordow. Undoubtedly, the American mission was impressive and executed flawlessly, but Iran always knew its facilities were an enticing target for American stealth bombers. Hopefully, American intelligence estimates are correct and the GBU-57s destroyed their intended targets, setting back the Iranian nuclear program for years. Better yet, enriched uranium is buried under hundreds of feet of debris.

However, should American and Israeli efforts fail, and Iran somehow reconstitutes its nuclear program and is able to field a working nuclear weapon, both Israel and the United States still have the ability to deter Iran from using such a weapon. Iranians are an ancient people who can trace their civilization back 3,000 years. When Darius the Great established the world’s greatest empire (522–486 BC), he set Iran on the path to becoming one of the planet’s great civilizations. Ayatollah Khamenei, for all his bluster, is not willing to see that history destroyed along with the Iranian people.

Unquestionably, the situation is complex and will continue to evolve. Let us hope that President Trump, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, can reach an agreement that ensures the security of all three countries. But if Iran refuses to negotiate in good faith, let us hope Israeli intelligence remains effective and Iranian air defenses are still unable to see American stealth bombers.

Sam Stanton is a Professor of International Relations at Grove City College and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Results in Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

Given these doubts, European political leaders have expressed a determination to increase their defense budgets and upgrade their armed forces and defense industrial bases. For example, European Community leaders met in early March to discuss the urgency of rearmament and the possible shift in American commitment to the defense of Ukraine and/or Europe altogether. The president of the European Commission noted that Europe faces a “clear and present danger” from the possibility of an asymmetrical peace agreement favorable to Russia followed by a more ambiguous American commitment to the defense of Europe.

European concerns are understandable, but the possibility that free Europe can establish a self-sufficient deterrent against further Russian political coercion or military aggression, apart from US security guarantees, is remote. An effort to bisect American national security from that of Europe would be politically unwise, weaken deterrence, and open the door to piecemeal disintegration of the transatlantic partnership that served leaders during the Cold War and thereafter. Four aspects of this issue merit specific consideration.

First, NATO is the strategic and military embodiment of shared security commitment and risk among member-states. NATO’s totality of conventional and nuclear military strength, supported by its political unity, is the linchpin for credible deterrence against Russian revanchism. Collectively, NATO members have the resources, including conventional forces for modern combined arms battle and the defense industrial base for protracted conflict, to deter any repetition of Russia’s invasion against Ukraine or any Russian attack on the alliance. American commitment to European defense ensures that its strategic nuclear forces support deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict, including possible Russian nuclear political coercion or first use.

Second, President Trump, on his best and worst days, tends to see international relations as entirely transactional. This may work when dealing with trade or tariff matters but not matters of war and peace. American entanglement with the security of Europe is not only transactional; it is also existential. European and American defense and deterrence requirements are joined at the hip, notwithstanding occasional spats and acrimony over the details of military planning and defense economic priorities. American politicians complain that the United States should try to avoid getting stuck in another “forever war” in Ukraine but Ukraine is not Iraq or Afghanistan.

A victory for Putin in Ukraine opens the door to European vulnerability that Russia will later exploit at a higher cost in blood and treasure for the United States and its European partners.

Therefore, it follows that the US decision in early March to suddenly suspend American military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine was ill advised and poorly timed. Although holding back equipment deliveries might take some months to impact events at the front, failure to share timely intelligence could impact immediately on Ukraine’s ability to strike key Russian targets, including logistics hubs, command centers, and troop concentrations. Thus, the suspension sent the wrong message to Ukraine and to Russia about allied steadfastness as preliminary ceasefire and peace negotiations were taking place in Saudi Arabia.

Third, messaging of American commitment to peace and security in Europe also involves the decisions about modernization of the American nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure. This has a number of components. First, the US is replacing all three legs of its strategic nuclear triad. The Trump administration also wants to deploy the sea-launched cruise missile, to replace some existing nuclear warheads with upgrades, and to provide additional limited nuclear options for contingencies short of general nuclear war.

Fourth, American defense planning for each potential theater of war will continue to emphasize a spectrum of options including both conventional and nuclear weapons. The US must maintain credible deterrence against the combined forces of China and Russi, not only with respect to the possible outbreak of conventional war in Asia or Europe, but also with regard to the threat of nuclear first use or first strike against American allies or the American homeland.

In this respect, another challenge to deterrence lies in the increasing capability of conventional weapons for use against targets previously assigned to nuclear weapons, and, conversely, the attractiveness for some parties of low-yield nuclear weapons for use against targets previously assigned only to conventional weapons.

The challenges in meeting the preceding standards for deterrence in Europe and beyond are enormous. First, they include the evolving international security environment in which an emerging multipolar realignment places a coalition of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia at cross-purposes with US and allied visions for world order in Europe and Asia. Second, the challenges involve the significance of emerging technologies for long-range precision strike, missile and air defenses, cyber deterrence and war, space conflict, and continuing developments in autonomous warfare. Third, the costs for maintaining deterrence in Asia and Europe are enormous and Europe cannot expect the United States to foot the bill.

Some American allies in Asia and Europe expressed a willingness to increase their defense budgets and their degrees of readiness for local or regional conflict. More demanding times are ahead. In short, there is no “Eurodeterrent” without the United States and vice versa.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a distinguished professor at Penn State-Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Euro-deterrence and the Quest for Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

In fact, months ago, the president asked North Atlantic Treaty Council Organization (NATO) countries for a proposal by each state for putting peacekeeping troops in Ukraine. The Europeans dithered and then expressed consternation that Trump was keeping them out of the negotiations with Putin.

More pertinently, the president suggested that NATO countries increase their defense expenditure to five percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This is a far more realistic assessment of the decline in European capabilities than that which calls for a growth of defense expenditure to three percent of GDP.

The British, French, and Germans all expressed varying degrees of outrage at Trump’s actions including the suggestion by some that he is creating a “Munich”-like outcome in his negotiations with Putin by conceding too much even before the discussions began. The fact is that Trump is playing his cards knowing full well that the Europeans have no plan.

Why Five Percent Is Impossible

When one looks at NATO’s defense expenditure, countries like Canada, Italy, and Spain are below the two percent threshold while France, Germany, and the Netherlands barely cross it.  Yes, countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are above the two percent threshold, but they are small nations with populations less than that of Chicago. Estonia has a mere 1.6 million people.

To get to three percent, let alone five, would require NATO countries to add tens of billions to their defense budgets and require cutting the social services that their citizens expect and value. As Politico pointed out, for France, which is one of the voluble proponents of European rearmament, to go from two to three percent of GDP would require Paris to add about 30 billion euros to its defense budget.

Given the country’s budgetary problems that is unlikely to happen. Five percent is a bridge too far. Britain, which is also facing economic headwinds, cannot afford such an increase. In Germany, despite the 100 billion euros committed to modernization, which largely went to refurbish existing equipment that was mothballed, Berlin made it clear it is a long way from substantially increasing its defense budget. Countries like Italy and Spain, given their own economic compulsions, will also find five percent impossible.

The Europeans raise the issue that even if they went to five percent their defense industries are not able to crank up production to meet the demand for new weaponry. That is not the primary problem for these countries. Instead, it is an issue of manpower. Europe is aging and lacks the population for expanded militaries. Worse, as part of the peace dividend, conscription was removed in most countries in the 1990s. This left Gen X, the millennials, and now Gen Z, without any memory of military service.

Reinstating conscription, as seen from the figures below, would be the way to give teeth to European militaries. Compulsory military service, however, is hugely unpopular among the younger generation and a push to draft people would lead to an electoral backlash that few politicians in Europe want to face.

As Table I shows, the major European militaries drastically downsized after the Cold War:

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, 2023, 2024 editions.

The above figures clearly show that remilitarization would require a major intake of manpower that the European countries would be unable to achieve because of the factors discussed above. Yet, this does not stop them from making bold pronouncements about future militarization efforts. Reality is something else.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy states the German case of weakness quite bluntly:

The decline in German numbers over the past 20 years is particularly striking: in 2004 Germany had thousands of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and even almost one thousand howitzers. By 2021, these numbers had come down to the hundreds, as Germany only had 339 tanks and 121 howitzers. The German numbers for 1992 must be interpreted carefully, as they include weapons and equipment from the newly incorporated East German army. Still, when considering the available Leopard tanks, i.e., the West German tanks, Germany had around 4200. The German decline in military stock is thus massive.

Despite all the optimistic talk emanating from Berlin, German rearmament is a myth.  The country’s industrial capability, which is in the doldrums, will not allow it to rapidly militarize. And young people will not join the military in droves as Olaf Scholz and Ursula van der Lyon fondly believe. There is a reason Ukraine has not dipped into its pool of 18–21-year-olds for the current war. It would probably lead to mass flight from the country by younger Ukrainians.

If Europe cannot remilitarize easily and lacks the manpower to build Cold War–level forces, what can it do? The answer is simple. Write checks.

Ukraine requires reconstruction. The World Bank estimated that it would cost around $486 billion, while Zelensky put the number closer to $700 billion. It is a year since the World Bank made its estimate so one can safely assume that in the intense conflict of 2024 the damage to infrastructure may have added another $50 billion to $100 billion to the bill. The Europeans can make a $25 billion a year commitment to Ukraine for the next twenty years to aid reconstruction. This would lead to the rapid build-up of Ukraine’s economy and stop the population from fleeing the war-torn nation.

As things stand, Ukraine’s population is set to decline to around 30 million by 2050 and it will largely be a country of old people thanks to a decline in fertility. If Kyiv stands a chance, it needs a sustained dose of financial aid with no strings attached. A side benefit would be that China would not be the major post-war economic player in Ukraine.

From the European perspective, Brussels can go to Trump and say that yes, we engaged in burden sharing and it would be a lot less expensive than five percent of GDP and far less socially divisive than the imposition of conscription.

Xi Jin Ping suggested Chinese and Indian peacekeepers be inserted in Ukraine. This would change the future security architecture of the region. Russia will be far more comfortable with such a peacekeeping force rather than a crypto-NATO force posing as peacekeepers. It will be interesting to watch how this plays out.

Perhaps most interesting is the fact that Trump called Europe’s bluff. If London, Paris, and Berlin want to be relevant, it is time to write a big check. At least for now, Americans are no longer willing to subsidize Europe’s welfare states.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal.

The European Dilemma: Five Percent and Manpower was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the UK, under Prime Minister Keir Starmer, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has stalled. PM Starmer committed to spending at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense. However, funding has not materialized. A clear plan for future UK defense may not emerge until the Summer of 2025.

In Germany, left-of-center Chancellor Scholz dissolved his coalition, and the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz is expected to take over with a right-of-center coalition after snap elections in the first quarter of 2025. However, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, whose leader recently chatted with Elon Musk, remains a wild card. Germany has yet to define and fund its defense budget at the 2 percent of GDP threshold.

Chancellor Scholz, who paid a last visit to Ukraine in early December 2024, committed to deliver Patriot systems in 2025. Merz wants to up the ante with the delivery of Taurus medium-range missiles to Kyiv. While the Ukraine dossier is being used as a political football, a root cause of the problem is that NATO’s defense math just does not add up.

In France, the downfall of the Barnier government stems from rejection of his budget. The new centrist prime minister François Bayrou now faces the same budgetary dead-end and parliamentary gridlock. Barnier was punished for trying to reduce the French deficit to 5 percent of GDP in 2025. The European Union (EU) rule is 3 percent as the maximum.

France’s current deficit is over 6 percent of GDP and might end up closer to 7 percent. France is in third place for debt-to-GDP ratio at 111 percent. Only Greece and Italy have a worse situation.

The EU average is 82 percent, with Germany maintaining a healthy 62 percent. There is a looming debt crisis, and it will not be possible to kick the can down the road forever. France already passed its 2024–2030 Military Programming Act (Loi de Programmation Militaire).

President Macron is committed to seeing it through until the 2027 presidential election. Yet the funding needs to be in place for France to remain the top European spender in civilian and military space.

At the other end of the spectrum is Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. These Nordic and Baltic states clearly lead the way, as they are all becoming increasingly significant players in European security. In particular, Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO plays a central role in securing the High North and deterring Russia, as these two countries continue to supercharge NATO’s deterrence.

Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin placed his economy on a war footing. His defense budget steadily increased over the past two years. Of course, this strains society’s resources and patience after nearly three years of war. The vast majority of Russian society is wired to bite the bullet and take the pain for as long as necessary until an endgame pans out. And for good measure, Putin will maintain his nuclear swagger at the highest level.

For the West, it is time to think deeply about deterring the use of low-yield theater nuclear weapons. This is a capability that not only Russia but China has deployed in great numbers and is in the process of augmenting.

The latest uncertainty comes from NATO member Romania. The courts unexpectedly nullified the results of the first round of presidential elections—deeming them unlawful because of alleged Russian interference.

The establishment candidate, who favors EU and NATO, is likely to win. But blaming the surge on an alleged TikTok-driven Russian conspiracy misses the deeper picture: across Europe, from France to Germany to Austria to Hungary to Romania, there is a rising wave of discontent with the current European order. Thus, “extremist” parties are supported in disrupting mainstream left-of-center politics.

The grapes of wrath stem from stalled economies, unwanted immigration from Africa and the Middle East, growing crime and social disruption, and a welfare state that cannot afford both native born citizens and the influx of immigrants. Europe’s wealth level gap with the United States is 30 percent and growing.

By culture, Europe disdains billionaires and even taxes or tries to interdict their free speech, as exemplified in a recent exchange on X (Twitter) between former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and Elon Musk. Not wired for animal instinct, creative destruction, freedom of innovation, entrepreneurship, and disruptive capitalism, European socialism loathes wealth creation as a positive value.

Even though history shows that socialism only leads to failure, or, in the words of Lady Thatcher, “running out of other people’s money,” Europeans tend to shrug and call that state of things “Venezuela without the sun.”

As long as this does not change, the best and the brightest will keep flocking to the US, be it from India, Latin America, or South Africa. To say that it is time for Europe to get its act together would be an understatement. Europe needs to understand that it can never develop into an autonomous power without the free creation of wealth, which is required to fund the defenses Europe requires.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

More Political Uncertainties Affecting Europe’s Defense Build-up was originally published on Global Security Review.

The incoming administration may prefer a blend of hard power and transactional diplomacy. An exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia is for both to come across as winners through conflict resolution.

A Russian maximalist position would require Ukraine to lose on all fronts. This means no return of territory; no European Union (EU) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. In theory, Russia needs to be incentivized to either give back the territories, and/or allow Ukraine to join NATO and the EU. The latter, however, is the least likely since it was Western encroachment on Russian borders and Ukrainian efforts to join Western organizations that served as Russian justification for their aggression.

In reality, Russia will never return Crimea to Ukraine. Crimean history, for Russia, is a bloody struggle against the Ottomans, making Crimea important to Russian pride.

The normal EU or NATO accession process takes years or decades. Expediting Ukraine’s accession to either will only reinforce Russian fears that the West is attempting to encircle Russia.

Ukraine’s reconstruction represents a serious economic challenge for the West. The United Nations currently estimates the cost of reconstruction at $486 billion. Who will pay for that reconstruction may play a large role in any negotiations.

Previous public statements by Western officials calling for the expedited membership of Ukraine in NATO only provokes Russian recalcitrance, which will be a challenge for Donald Trump to overcome. With Finland and Sweden now part of NATO, the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake that is closed to Russian naval assets. Ukraine in NATO will threaten Russia’s warm-water ports.

Ukraine in NATO is a non-starter for Russia. Keeping Crimea is an important part of ensuring Russian security. An acceptable compromise will require both sides to walk away unhappy while claiming victory. Ukraine may have to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbass. It may also require an agreement to forgo joining NATO and, likely, the EU. Russian troops will end their aggression against Ukraine and leave. Western states will likely have the unenviable task of rebuilding Ukraine.

The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to strike Russia with American weapons is not sustainable in the long run, making it difficult for Ukraine to coerce Russia into a “good deal” in any peace talk. Public opinion in Ukraine supports ending the war short of victory. Ukrainians just want the war to end.

The endgame for Ukraine does not stop at Ukraine’s border. The Trump administration is expected to also play a role in protecting NATO member-states near Russia from further aggression. Appearing too weak empowers Russian aggression, while imposing unrealistic conditions will not end the war.

The exact conditions of any deal are certain to include elements that are not strictly related to the conflict’s settlement. For example, European states may agree to purchase American natural gas instead of Russian natural gas. European NATO member-states may also be required to pay for reconstruction.

A return to the purchase of Russian natural gas, Russia’s biggest export to Europe, may serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations, it is easily conceivable that a Trump administration will want payback for previous American support. This may include a much larger position on Europe’s energy and other markets.

Germany, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, will care deeply about such negotiations. Lifting sanctions will be important for Russia and Europe.

The brave new world that is the future of Europe may stand somewhere between a new NATO versus Russia bipolarity and balkanization. Some countries may attempt to play all sides involved. Deterrence may still hold, but European NATO must certainly rearm.

Across NATO, there is an effort already underway to learn the lessons of the Ukraine war. Any endgame must ensure the West is far more effective at making sense of those lessons than are China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Developments in cyber, space, drone, and missile warfare are all critical elements of post-war learning.

For the sake of the Ukrainian people, it is time to end this conflict. But it must be done in a way that protects the future of Ukraine while understanding Russian fears. Rightly, Russian President Vladimir Putin deserves the disdain of the free world. Absent the ability to impose a clear victory on Russia, which is a challenge given Russian nuclear arms, a negotiated settlement is the only viable option.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

An Endgame in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

The EAR Report is a must read for National security professionals to stay informed about rapidly evolving global threats and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy.

This report addresses critical developments in nuclear deterrence, missile defense, and geopolitical trends, and equips professionals with actionable insights to navigate the complexities of modern security challenges effectively.

Commentary and Quotes of the Week

• Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin: Reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance and the strengthening of extended deterrence through the Nuclear Consultative Group.
  Peter Huessy: Detailed the financial and strategic implications of eliminating the ICBM leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, emphasizing the costs of alternative measures for maintaining current deterrence levels.
  Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Adviser: Highlighted Pakistan’s emerging threat with the development of long-range ballistic missile capabilities.
  Bill Gertz: Revealed China’s rapid nuclear buildup and the expansion of its missile capabilities.
  Russian Leaders: Asserted advancements in missile systems and dismissed arms control as a relic of the past.
  Rep. Chuck Fleischmann: Stressed the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, citing contributions from Tennessee’s Oak Ridge Lab.

Strategic Developments of the Week

• China’s Military Build-Up: The Pentagon report highlighted Beijing’s dramatic advancements in hypersonic missile technology, nuclear warheads, and ‘intelligentized warfare.’
  Russia’s Strategic Actions: Russia’s legislative shift regarding the Taliban and progress in missile systems underlined its geopolitical maneuvers.
  U.S. Missile Defense Challenges: Reports emphasized the lag in U.S. hypersonic missile capabilities compared to China, pressing the need for enhanced missile defense systems.
  Space and Drone Developments: New legislation and technological advances highlight the increasing role of space and drones in modern warfare.

Important Reports of the Week

1. “President Trump Must Put the Nuclear Enterprise on a Wartime Footing” by Robert Peters:
   • Advocates for accelerating nuclear arsenal modernization to restore deterrence credibility.
     Calls for a stronger commitment to stockpile stewardship and missile defense.
2. “Importance of Building Homeland Missile Defense” by Robert Joseph:
   • Reiterates the vision of a comprehensive missile defense system to counter emerging threats.
     Proposes leveraging space-based systems for more robust and efficient protection.
3. “What Happens if the United States Eliminates the ICBM Leg of the Triad?”:
   • Examines the repercussions of removing the ICBM leg, including massive financial costs for alternative deterrence methods and strategic vulnerabilities.

Download the Full Report

ICBM EAR Report for December 20th was originally published on Global Security Review.

This single-missile attack was launched from the Sary Shagan missile test complex near Astrakhan, almost 700 kilometers from the target. In remarks later that day, Vladimir Putin identified the delivery vehicle as an intermediate-range ballistic missile known as Oreshnik. The missile has been linked, variously, by the Pentagon to a terminated project, likely an intermediate-range multiple-warhead missile project known as Rubezh, and by the Ukrainian intelligence service to a future replacement for the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM known as Kedr (translated as Cedar) that is just entering engineering development.

Further, at least one component identified in the debris from the missile had markings associated with the Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). These missiles (Rubezh, Kedr, and Bulava) are designed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, as is likely the case with Oreshnik. Rubezh and a version of the SS-27 Mod 2 were tested with a new warhead deployment concept in which each warhead is called an “independent dispersal unit” (Russian acronym BIR) with its own deployment motor rather than being deployed from a single warhead bus in a more traditional multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) configuration. This feature, along with flight in a more fuel-consuming depressed trajectory, may make the warheads more difficult to intercept.

To date, no official damage assessments for the Pivdenmash facility are published. Putin compared the effect of a conventional Oreshnik strike to that of a nuclear weapon. However, reporting in the UK Daily Mail five days after the attack indicated that the damage was not as extensive as advertised. Ukrainian press reporting was similarly dismissive. The Kyiv Post reported that satellite imagery did not show the expected damage and recounted Russian war blogger expressions of disappointment or disbelief of the Russian official claims. American and NATO experts are said to be investigating the site, but no statements have been released yet.

Putin indicated that Oreshnik was not a weapon of mass destruction, in that it was not nuclear-armed. Examination of debris at the site indicated that the submunitions did not appear to carry high explosives; their effect was purely kinetic. At the reported impact velocity of Mach 11 (3,740 meters/second at sea level), the kinetic energy of an incoming projectile is about 7 mega-joules per kilogram (MJ/kg), which is almost 70 percent higher than the chemical energy content of TNT at 4.2 MJ/kg.

The choice of using 36 relatively large mass submunitions dispersed from the independent warheads may not have been the optimal choice for such an attack. A more effective approach may be more like systems researched and tested by the US that have been described as a “big shotgun shell.” Through the controlled use of conventional explosives to scatter fragments, one can place a desired fragment pattern on a target by selecting a height of burst appropriate to the incoming speed of the warhead and the expected fragment sizes.

Two examples are instructive. First, consider metal fragments of 50 grams each, roughly equivalent to a .50 caliber bullet; at Mach 11, each fragment has roughly ten times greater kinetic energy. The number of such fragments expected from an 800-kilogram payload (not counting structure and controls) would be 16,000.

First, if the height of burst is set to disperse 1 fragment per square meter, then the radius of the “shotgun” pattern is about 70 meters. Consequently, a fully fragmented warhead could theoretically cover about 4 acres in one shot, which would probably have produced far more devasting surface effects on the Pivdenmash complex, which is assumed to be a relatively soft target.

Second, for an increased fragment mass of 100 grams, the mass of a 25-millimeter (mm) cannon armor-piercing round, then the kinetic energy for an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) -delivered, Mach 11 100-gram fragment is about 7 times higher than a cannon-fired round. Such energies raise the likely prospect of even penetrating ceilings and floors to vulnerable basement spaces. The parameters can be varied to maximize effectiveness, but at 1 fragment per square meter, the affected area will be reduced to about 1 acre.

Because of the hypersonic velocities of ballistic missile–delivered fragmenting munitions, fragment energies delivered by an IRBM will, in virtually every case, deposit significantly more energy than similarly sized munitions fired from rifles and cannons.

Conventionally armed Oreshnik allows Putin the option of shifting away from a strategy of repeated nuclear threats and reducing the need to violate the so-called nuclear taboo, for which the consequences are unknown following the first breach. It provides Russia an additional high-speed delivery option on the conventional side of the conventional-nuclear integration space. Nevertheless, given that a Russian IRBM can also be designed to carry a nuclear payload, and deliver it at transcontinental range, it also provides an additional high-speed nuclear option.

Col. (Ret.) David Rehbein is a former US Army FA52 and consultant for the National Strategic Research Institute. John Swegle, PhD, spent his career at Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Lab, and Savannah River National Lab. He is also a consultant for the National Strategic Research Institute and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are their own.

Russian Use of IRBMs in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the international community struggles to manage the escalating crisis, the prospect of a peace process remains distant. Russia maintains that peace is only achievable when its objectives are met. These objectives, central to Moscow’s stance from the beginning of the war, include the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, as well as changes that align with Russia’s security interests. These include control over Crimea and influence in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, dismissed peace talks with Russia, insisting that any resolution must involve the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

He emphasized that Russia, as the sole aggressor, must be compelled to comply with international law and respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite ongoing military engagements and international diplomatic efforts, both sides remain entrenched in their positions, with Russia demanding territorial concessions and Ukraine insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

A potential resolution could involve establishing a neutral zone in contested areas, facilitating a phased withdrawal of both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s commitment to its territorial integrity should be upheld, while Russia could receive assurances regarding its security concerns, particularly concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) commitment to Ukraine’s future membership. Such a balanced approach could open avenues for dialogue, encourage a more stable regional environment, and ultimately benefit both nations while contributing to broader international stability.

Russia’s Domestic Situation

Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined Russia’s conditions for ending the war in Ukraine, which focus on Ukraine’s full withdrawal from the entire territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—regions Moscow claims as Russian land. He also demands that Ukraine abandon its bid to join NATO—addressing Russian concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion. Furthermore, Putin called for Ukraine’s demilitarization and insisted on the lifting of Western sanctions that, while not crippling, impact Russia’s economy.

Domestically, Putin frames the war as essential to Russia’s security and national identity, maintaining significant support despite economic hardships caused by sanctions. The extended nature of the war, however, is seeing inflation, falling living standards, and localized protests over conscription. Despite these pressures, Putin shows little interest in peace, viewing the war as vital to Russia’s strategic objectives. Without significant internal shifts or international pressure, it is unlikely that Russia will pursue peace soon. Putin’s current stance suggests that the conflict will persist, with little sign of de-escalation unless broader geopolitical changes occur.

Ukraine’s Domestic Conditions

In Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelensky maintains strong public support despite the immense challenges the country faces. The Ukrainian population remains united in their resistance against Russian aggression, bolstered by a deep sense of national pride and resilience. However, the ongoing conflict has taken a severe toll on the country’s infrastructure, economy, and civilian population.

Ukraine’s desire for peace is clear, but not at the cost of sovereignty or territorial concessions. Zelensky’s government has repeatedly stated that any peace deal must include the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.

President Zelensky dismissed the idea of peace talks with Russia, urging for decisive global action to compel Moscow into peace. Speaking at a United Nations Security Council meeting, he emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion violated numerous international laws and will not cease through negotiations. Zelensky’s government consistently maintains that any peace deal must include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. He argued that as the sole aggressor, Russia must be forced into peace, underscoring the need to uphold the UN Charter’s principle of respecting every nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Collapse of Peace Proposals for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Multiple international peace efforts failed to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. China’s 12-point peace proposal for the Russia-Ukraine conflict advocated for an immediate cease-fire and respect for national sovereignty. It called for the lifting of non-UN sanctioned sanctions, protection of civilians, and the promotion of dialogue while emphasizing humanitarian issues and global energy security. The plan also included a cease-fire that would freeze Russian troops in place on Ukrainian territory and urged cooperation among nations to achieve lasting peace.

However, it was dismissed by the West for favoring Russia and not addressing Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. The Geneva talks regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict sought to establish a framework for dialogue aimed at addressing security concerns and finding pathways to a peaceful resolution. Key topics included NATO expansion, security guarantees for Ukraine, and managing the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. These discussions, however, have faced obstacles due to differing views among the parties involved, leading to limited progress and a continuing stalemate in negotiations.

Hungary’s attempts to mediate in the Russia-Ukraine conflict faced significant challenges, culminating in the European Union’s (EU) decision to strip Budapest of its right to host foreign and defense ministers’ meetings due to Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s meeting with Vladimir Putin. EU leaders viewed it as undermining a united European response to the war. As a result, Hungary’s role as a mediator has been called into question, with criticism from various EU member states highlighting the lack of consensus around its diplomatic initiatives.

Is Peace Possible?

The prospect for peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict remains vague at best. A potential resolution could involve creating a neutral zone, phased troop withdrawal, and maintaining Ukraine’s territorial integrity while addressing Russia’s NATO-related concerns. However, entrenched geopolitical dynamics may prolong the conflict for years, worsening devastation, and complicating diplomatic efforts.

Seher Intikhab is a university student majoring in international relations. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Ukraine’s Incursion into Russia: What’s Next for the Peace Process? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent decision by Hungary’s Prime Minister, Victor Orban, to open its borders to Russian and Belarusian immigrants is an example of a NATO member-state failing to see the large security implications of an act that is not directly tied to security. The mistake could, however, have broader implications for Europe.

Hungary’s recent decision to implement a liberal immigration policy, allowing Russian and Belarusian citizens to enter as guest workers without vetting or security checks, poses a significant threat because it will allow Russian agents, and there are certainly Russian agents mixed within the larger mass of migrants, to freely move within European Union (EU) member-states. With the policy also allowing guest workers to bring their family with them, without vetting for ties to the Russian military or security services, makes the concern that Russian agents will infiltrate Europe even more likely. Russian efforts to undermine European democracies through disinformation and misinformation is already well known. There is certainly no need to make the problem worse.

This policy flies in the face of an EU ban on Russian airlines to the Schengen Area (the borderless area inside the EU that does not require a passports for travel) and individual bans of hundreds of people connected to the Kremlin and the War in Ukraine. This is also contrary to the actions of many other EU countries. For example, Finland closed its border with Russia, preventing all immigration, noting serious security concerns.

Hungary did not consult with the EU or NATO. Strangely, this act took place while Orban is serving as the rotational head of the EU. The body is now considering legislation designed to halt Hungary’s immigration policy.

Orban is the only head of an EU or NATO member-state that maintains ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Orban is sometimes called a pawn of Putin and one of his “useful idiots”—a term used by Soviet leaders to describe unsuspecting collaborators in the West.

However, it is unclear whether or not Orban is aligning himself with Putin because of ideological similarity, economic necessity, or both. During his time in office, Hungary voted to sanction Russia in the European Parliament and even condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. More recently, however, Orban tried to rally Central Europe behind Russia.

The question regarding Orban’s motivations is vital because the EU needs to reverse this new policy as quickly and painlessly as possible or Russia will gain a significant strategic advantage. This is particularly important as NATO ramps up efforts to counter Russian aggression elsewhere across Europe.

The infiltration of Russian spies across Europe is no trivial matter. In Western democracies, personal freedoms make it harder to determine who is working for an adversary government. Once into the Schengen Area, movement is unchecked to 29 participating states. Given the recent attacks on the French high-speed rail line before the 2024 Olympics in Paris, there is clear reason to worry.

The attack that shut down France’s high-speed rail for almost a week was low-cost and required very little training on the part of the saboteurs. Simple arson and explosive attacks on the rail lines wreaked havoc on travel. The attack is suspected to have emanated from far-left French extremists, but that does not preclude Russia from encouraging, training, and equipping domestic groups from undertaking such attacks. The Russians also use their special forces for covert attacks against civil targets.

Hungary’s liberalization of immigration policy, favoring easy access for Russian and Belarusian citizens, is detrimental to the security of the European Union and NATO. At this early stage, Western leaders must ascertain whether it is possible to persuade Victor Orban away from openly supporting Russia in word and deed. This latest development gives Russia a strategic weapon that is useful in conducting warfare below the threshold of conventional war.

The Russians cannot be given greater operational freedom. It may become necessary to punish or alienate Hungary if it will not act in solidarity with other Western nations.

Dan Cox, PhD is a professor of political science at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Impact of Hungary’s New Liberal Immigration Standards was originally published on Global Security Review.

This year, outbreaks of antisemitism across American college campuses, including at the most elite private colleges and universities, remind commentators of the turbulent year 1968. That year was marked by the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert F. Kennedy, together with antiwar demonstrations at many colleges and riots at the Democrat National Convention in Chicago.

Some saw, in the upsurge of pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations a possible prelude to a similar upheaval at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 2024. The Biden administration was under attack from its progressive wing and for its support of Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza.

Democrat doubters about the administration’s foreign policy were already worried about the polls showing Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump competitive against Vice President Kamala Harris in the seven key swing states of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. And irony of ironies, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., was running as a third-party candidate who might conceivably take away votes from either Biden or Trump—eventually withdrawing and throwing his support to Trump.

In 1968, Democrat dissidents and message malaise opened the door for Richard Nixon to come back from the graveyard of politics and win the White House. Would the Democrat Party recreate that debacle in 2024 and usher Donald Trump into the presidency for a second term?

Unfortunately for political prognosticators, 2024 is only superficially reminiscent of 1968. Pro-Hamas demonstrations on college campuses are not catching fire with the public as did antiwar protests in 1968. To the contrary, college presidents are under siege from various quarters for not doing enough to resist outbreaks of antisemitism and pro-Hamas demonstrations.

Jewish students feel unsafe on many college campuses, and parents of college students began to file lawsuits against schools that refuse to enact policies that protect Jewish students against harassment. In addition, a majority of American voters support Biden’s policy of favoring Israel’s right to defend itself against attack, while sharing some reservations about Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s approach to the war in Gaza. Not every criticism of Israel’s policy is antisemitism. As Israel moves toward the final stages of its campaign against Hamas, controversy will almost certainly surround its choice of military tactics and the costs of war for civilian noncombatants.

Given current events, the foreign policy center of gravity for the 2024 presidential campaign is not only the war in the Middle East, but also the war in Ukraine. The most recent tranche of American military assistance to Ukraine was held up in Congress by endless delays based on a variety of complaints from conservatives in the House. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, ended this deadlock by agreeing with a majority of Democrats to pass legislation providing aid to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine in separate bills.

For his anti-isolationist temerity, Johnson was threatened by his House Republican colleagues with a vote to vacate the speakership as soon as practicable. Some House Republicans gave as their reason for opposing Johnson the absence of a companion bill providing additional funding for controlling the southern border. However, the problem at the border is not a lack of funding, but a fundamental policy disagreement between the Biden administration and its critics about whether to enforce existing immigration law and or allow the near-free flow of illegal aliens to enter the country.

The war in Ukraine, on the other hand, is a fundamental test of American resolve to defend the international order based on rules and expectations that preserved security and freedom in Europe from the end of World War II until well into the twenty-first century. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is an overt attempt to overthrow a legitimate government in Europe, based on reading history through a glass darkly and on ambition to restore Russian greatness as seen by its clique of siloviki, oligarchs, and propagandists.

Apologists for Russia attribute its belligerence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post–Cold War expansion, the United States’ drive for unipolar dominance, and Ukraine’s illegitimacy as a unique culture and civilization. None of this may be true or original on the part of Russia. It is Aleksandr Dugin marinated in twenty-first century Moscow-centric geopolitics.

The tragedy is that Russia is a great civilization, with a history and culture that provided some of the world’s great literature, music, art, higher education, and excellence in professional military studies. Russia’s history is the story of an advanced civilization ruined by a succession of retro autocratic governments.

NATO has admirably rallied in the face of Russian military aggression by providing Ukraine with necessary military assistance, including weapons, intelligence, and training. But NATO has dragged this out to an extent that jeopardizes Ukraine’s ability to fight successfully even on the defensive, let alone on offense, for anything more ambitious than a military stalemate. Russia still hopes that an offensive before winter might turn the tide decisively against Ukraine—to the extent that the latter would have an insubstantial position for any post-conflict peace agreement.

Disparities between Russian and Ukrainian personnel- and military-related resources favor Russia as the war becomes more extended in time and space. Ukraine can only be saved by American and NATO firmness in the face of repeated threats of horizontal (extending military operations into NATO territory) or vertical (nuclear weapons) escalation. NATO’s combined gross domestic product is about thirty times that of Russia, but Russia has a far larger nuclear arsenal. Such problems all await the next president.

Therefore, the proper analogy is not between 2024 and 1968, but 2024 and 1938. Before the end of 1938, Germany had already crossed several red lines that anticipated an unlimited appetite for political coercion supported by the threat of military conquest. Then, as now, isolationists in the US and apologists for Hitler in Europe called for conciliation of Germany and appeasement of its demands. History never repeats itself exactly, as the saying goes, but it does rhyme.

The question for the United States and democratic Europe, now, as then, is not whether to resist aggression, but how and when. History suggests that tyrants’ appetite grows with the eating. The United States needs neither a return to its “unipolar moment” nor a willy-nilly reboot into forever wars among non-Western cultures. It does need to lead NATO’s resistance to Russia’s mistaken revanchism in Europe with smart strategy and politics until the climate improves for a viable peace settlement.

With regard to wars in the Middle East, the United States and its allies must also confront the foreboding reality of Iran’s wars against Israel, the United States, and the international order.

Iran’s instigation of Hamas’ attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, together with its support for proxy attacks on Israel and American troops elsewhere (Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iranian-supported terrorists in Iraq and Syria) has thus far met with less than intimidating responses. In addition to these failures in US and allied conventional deterrence, Iran is now a threshold nuclear weapons state potentially capable of threatening its immediate neighbors and targets outside the region.

An Iranian bomb could also stimulate Saudi Arabia and other Middle East powers to follow suit and destabilize the region. In addition, a nuclear Iran might pass nuclear materials and know-how to proxies for the construction of so-called dirty bombs or suitcase nukes. A nuclear Iran can destabilize the Middle East without firing a nuclear weapon.

Tehran can use the bomb for coercive diplomacy against Israel and other enemies, including threats of nuclear first use in response to any losses in a conventional war. In this respect, as well, 2024 may resemble 1938. Imagine Hitler with the bomb in 1938. A strategy of appeasement would have been far more appealing to political leaders in Britain and France, and a posture of isolationism to Americans—compared to what actually happened. Iran must be stopped by political negotiation or other means before it crosses this Rubicon.

Whether the world’s worst fears are recognized in the years ahead, as they were in and after 1938, or whether conflict is avoided will likely result, in large part, from the actions of the next president. This is a daunting future for either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD is a distinguished professor at Pennsylvania State University—Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the authors own.  

It’s 1938, not 1968 was originally published on Global Security Review.