In 1987, acclaimed feminist researcher Carol Cohn released a scathing gendered critique of Cold War nuclear deterrence. Cohn argued that the ‘technostrategic,’ masculinized language used to discuss deterrence strategy was not accidental. It obscured moral responsibility, normalized violence, and made nuclear war more plausible. As one of the most influential pieces within its subfield, Cohn’s conclusions are still cited more than three decades later in the growing cadre of women arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons is anti-feminist.

Cohn is part of a distinct group of political theorists referred to as international relations (IR) feminists. Rather than offering a causal explanation of war, IR feminists focus on exposing the gender hierarchies embedded in international politics. They specifically argue that the dominant classical IR theories, such as realism and liberalism, privilege masculinity and normalize violence through abstract language. War, in their view, is linked to masculinized norms of autonomy, aggression, and control. Nuclear weapons, as the ultimate instrument of war, are then the ultimate instruments of male violence.

So, what does it mean to be a woman working within the nuclear weapons complex today? Do all women who find themselves in such a position suddenly become anti-feminist? Given that the argument that nuclear deterrence is responsible for the sharp decline in major power conflict is quite persuasive, the answer is most certainly not.

At its core, feminism argues that women are affected differently than men for many things, yet still fundamentally deserve equal rights to life, liberty, and property. War, in particular, is a strong example of this. Unquestionably, sexual violence is a tactic used in genocides and ethnic cleansings; a type of violence that is predominantly perpetrated against women. Therefore, the prevention of war is also a feminist issue. Nuclear weapons are simply the key to deterring the very global wars that would result in mass atrocities like the Rape of Nanjing. These specific war crimes were enabled by a powerful, unchecked conventional army in an era without nuclear weapons.

Cohn’s critique of nuclear discourse is compelling on its surface, but it does not offer an alternative theory of deterrence. Nuclear war has not occurred since 1945, not because states abandoned violent thinking after World War Two, but because deterrence altered strategic calculations. Feminist IR theory does not explain this outcome.

The deeper issue is that feminist IR theory prioritizes deconstruction over explanation. Its intellectual roots in critical theory lead it to distrust policy-oriented thinking, viewing it as complicit in domination. As a result, IR feminist scholars often resist offering recommendations to leaders or engaging with strategic trade-offs. However, international relations theory exists to explain and manage conflict, not merely to critique it.

This gap becomes clear when IR feminists are asked the same question classical theories confront directly. Why do wars begin between states at particular moments? IR feminists often answer by pointing to patriarchy, masculinized institutions, or hierarchical gender norms. These may be part of the broader social environment, but they do not explain timing, escalation, or variation. Patriarchy exists in both peaceful and belligerent states.

States pursue deterrence because they cannot directly control their enemies’ actions and want to avoid war without capitulation. Deterrence is successful when a state’s credibility and capability are maintained. As Herman Kahn once bluntly put it, deterrence works because “the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.”

Cohn critiques the language used to discuss this logic: “Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relation of one set of weapons to another. As such, it is utterly bankrupt of possibilities for thinking about peace or meaningful security.” Cohn gets the argument of deterrence wrong, however. Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relationship between one state’s risk threshold and another’s. So far, thankfully, no nation has determined that the military benefit of using nuclear weapons in a conflict is worth the risk that nuclear weapons will subsequently be used against it. This has fundamentally maintained global peace; the fear of nuclear escalation has prevented small wars from intensifying into world wars.

Another element of Cohn’s argument, and those of IR feminists at large, is that there is no such thing as objective, impartial knowledge. Contending with this premise is intentionally made difficult by IR feminists as they further argue requests for evidence are themselves masculine-coded; these are arguments of bad faith. Their arguments against nuclear weapons have the same fallacies. Deterrence is measurably less aggressive than the alternatives of armed conflict.

Whether morally troubling others or not, deterrence operates within a realist framework in which adversaries’ perceptions determine outcomes. Feminist IR theory offers no alternative explanation for how nuclear war is avoided in a world where states cannot control their enemies’ choices. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that while a world without nuclear weapons might appear desirable, “you cannot base a sure defense on dreams.”

Unfortunately, IR feminists have co-opted the broader interaction of feminism with international relations theory. It has since made it difficult for other aspects of feminist thought to combine with IR theories to produce more nuanced explanations of war that do not rely on critical theory. As explanations of war ultimately seek to offer paths of war prevention, feminist IR theory as it stands remains an incomplete theory.

To want war to be avoided is a core feminist issue. Acknowledging that nuclear weapons are the key to this is not anti-feminist. Deconstructing the language of deterrence strategy does not explain why nuclear war has been avoided for nearly eight decades, nor does it offer a credible alternative for preventing it. Preventing global war protects the very populations feminists seek to defend. Women can therefore work in the nuclear enterprise without being morally bankrupt, and feminists can support nuclear deterrence because the prevention of catastrophic war is itself a profoundly feminist objective.

Alexis Schlotterback is the screening editor for Global Security Review and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Her experience includes a Masters Degree from Missouri State’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and participation in the National Nuclear Security Administration Graduate Fellowship. The views of the authors are her own.

Yes, You Can Be a Feminist and Still Support Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

The availability of arms exacerbates the length and severity of identity-based strife. The United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs pointed out that the illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons undermine peace and security at the national, regional, and global levels.

Conflict often revolves around identity politics, where one group views another group with hatred, resulting in conflict. Violence often stems from perceptions of who is inside or outside the group, especially when survival is at stake. When a group of people attaches meaning to political and economic forces and considers compromise and disagreement unbearable, it erupts into violence, making conflict resolution a formidable challenge.

In this volatile situation, the presence of light arms and small weapons only worsens the situation. One of the main reasons for having guns is that they bring safety. The existing relationship between safety, survival, and weapons, especially in developing states, makes the differences deadly. According to “The Psychology of Guns,” the availability of weapons can drive aggressive behavior, leading to violence. In this regard, the proliferation of small arms and light weaponry needs to be checked.

Armed conflicts are ubiquitous, and those based on ethnic and tribal lines are often the most brutal. One estimate suggests that around 3.8 million people died in such conflicts between 1989 and 2023.

For instance, in South Sudan, two groups, Dinka and Nuer, felt threatened by each other and launched into a violent war. It is important to understand the identity-borne roots of this dispute. Land and cattle hold significant prestige in South Sudanese society. With limited resources, achieving political power becomes a top priority.

In a bid to maintain political power and control over resources for one ethnic group, a political conflict between two leaders turned into an ethnic war, which resulted in the killing of nearly 400,000 people. It is important to note the destructive impacts of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons on the civil war in South Sudan.

Likewise, the ethnic unrest of the Kurds in the Middle East illustrates how the combination of small arms proliferation and ethnic grievances can burst into conflict. The struggle for autonomy, a free Kurdistan, is driving a war against Türkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

The region has witnessed chaos, with over 40,000 deaths in an insurgency against Türkiye. The presence of smuggling routes across the Iran-Iraq and Türkiye -Iraq borders aids in weapon proliferation. The recent decision to lay down arms by the Kurdish insurgents in Türkiye is a welcome step towards conflict resolution. The warring parties realised the economic and human cost of the conflict.

Hiruni Alwishewa notes that the international regime to control the proliferation of small arms exhibits serious dichotomies. For example, the Firearms Protocol and the European Union’s Programme of Action lack regulatory distinction between legal arms exports and illegal transfer of arms, so even legal transfers end up as illicit ones.

Likewise, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of the West African States failed to address the proliferation of small arms. It is because both agreements do not scrutinise military aid, which flows undetected, causing arms proliferation. Similarly, the Arms Trade Treaty and United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) lack definitional clarity between small arms and firearms, thus hampering any substantial effort to curb the proliferation of small arms.

In resolving identity-based conflicts, a needs-based approach is an important tool because it works to build trust. It focuses on accepting needs, based on ethnic, religious, and resource-related issues that parties in conflict believe essential to their survival. Repression and tyranny only worsen a conflict.

Unlike other disputes, conflicts sparked by ethnic and religious differences cannot be settled by contractual arrangements. They rest on bringing structural reforms that involve either power redistribution or changing the political and economic systems to benefit all parties. Such efforts ensure that understanding and accepting diverse cultures run in tandem with each other.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, regionalism received significant attention in the form of trade agreements, economic integration, and increasing interdependence. Regional initiatives such as coordinating between border states to curb illicit arms transfer, strengthening national laws, and promoting transparency were useful in controlling the proliferation of small and light weapons.

Understandably, effectively controlling small arms is a challenging task. In this regard, significant attention must be given to improving the international structure of arms control. Theoretically, arms control agreements cover all weapons, but, practically, nuclear weapons are the primary focus. In this regard, these agreements must be revisited to fill the existing gaps. This includes removing definitional gaps and bringing military aid under scrutiny.

Similarly, artificial intelligence (AI) can be utilized to effectively trace and detect light weapons. AI’s utility in data analysis, detection, and surveillance makes it useful in controlling arms proliferation.

For example, AI-based weapon detection software combines video analysis, learning, and object recognition. This software can be used to identify and track weapons, which will be useful in controlling the proliferation of small arms.

In the end, the goal is to reduce needless casualties in needless conflicts. It is possible to undertake intelligent measures that deter arms traffickers from providing the weapons sowing so much death in the world today.

Kumail Mehdi is a researcher at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

Proliferation of Small Arms: Impact on Conflict Resolution was originally published on Global Security Review.